ARTICLE II: ON THE NUMERICAL DISTINCTION OF SINS

216. Preliminary Note. - The dissertation now to be undertaken on the numerical distinction of sins claims for itself no less attention than the inquiry of the preceding article on their specific distinction; since, from the Council of Trent,¹ all and each mortal sins committed after Baptism, of which memory is had after diligent examination of conscience, must be declared in Sacramental Confession, not only according to species, but also according to number. - But sins are said to be distinct according to number, or numerically distinct, if they are several in number, for example two homicides, three thefts, etc.; and hence the whole argument of the present article can be reduced to this one general question: When must sins be judged to be several in number? or, what comes to the same thing: whence must their numerical distinction be sought? Yet observe that in this question the discussion concerns only sins diverse in number alone, that is, sins of the same species which are several in number; for if the discussion concerns sins distinct in species, it is of itself clear that they are also distinct in number; for things which differ in species by that very fact are not one, but several, and therefore numerically diverse.

This being noted beforehand, concerning the numerical distinction of sins of the same species let there be three sections.

§ I. Whence The Numerical Distinction Of Sins Of The Same Species Is To Be Sought.

217. • According to the mind of St. Alphonsus,² this distinction is to be taken from a twofold root, namely 1° from the multiplicity of acts of the same species which do not coalesce into one act of sin, and 2° from the multiplicity of objects of the same species which do not coalesce into one object; and therefore, with the same Saint as guide, these two general principles can rightly be established.

Principles. - I. Several acts of the same species, which do not coalesce into one act of sin, constitute as many sins as there are acts.

II. One act, having several objects of the same species which do not coalesce into one object, contains as many sins as there are objects.

That these principles may be better understood and made accommodated to practical use, in the two following sections we shall investigate: 1° with respect to the first principle, when several acts must be judged not to coalesce into one act of sin; 2° with respect to the second principle, when several objects must be judged not to coalesce into one object.

§ II. Which Acts Do Not Coalesce Into One Act.

218. • The following are judged not to coalesce: a) acts which are disparate among themselves, and b) acts between which there intervenes a moral interruption.

Those acts are called disparate which do not concur as means, beginnings, or complements toward the same work to be consummated in its own species. Wherefore:

1° Among themselves all acts complete in themselves, that is, consummated in their own species, are disparate.

2° Likewise preliminary acts, that is, not consummated, which are posited without the intention of arriving at the consummated act, are judged to be disparate from the consummated act, if the latter afterwards follows, with the will changed and increased.

3° Similarly acts not consummated, which indeed are posited with the intention of arriving at the consummated act, but by accident do not attain to it, are again rightly held as disparate from this act, intended to be consummated but by accident not consummated.

4° On the contrary, as often as such acts not consummated are posited with the intention of arriving at the same consummated work, and actually attain to this also, so often they are not disparate from the consummated work, but coalesce with it into one act of sin, provided nevertheless that between them there does not intervene a moral interruption, concerning which below in the second Point.

219. Resolves from 1°. - Therefore two fornications, two homicides, etc., are disparate acts, and therefore numerically two sins, because individual fornications, individual homicides, are complete acts. Hence acts of this sort, complete or consummated in their own species, must always be set forth in Sacramental Confession according to their number, even if perhaps they proceed from the same intention or from the same impulse of the will; for instance, if someone from the same impulse of the will successively kills several persons, or from the same heat of lust fornicates several times, etc. Likewise if a priest in the state of mortal sin celebrates three Masses successively on the day of the Nativity of the Lord; for individual Celebrations, in moral estimation, are acts complete in themselves, and therefore disparate among themselves. Likewise, from the truer opinion of St. Alphonsus and one whose opposite must wholly be denied,¹ if a priest, in mortal sin, successively absolves several persons; because individual absolutions are individual Sacraments, and therefore actions disparate among themselves. Yet the same Saint thinks otherwise² concerning a priest who, in the state of mortal sin, in one successive course distributes Holy Communion to several persons. Indeed such a priest, in distributing the Most Holy Eucharist, according to the opinion which Alphonsus defends against Lugo, sins mortally by the sin of sacrilege, but does not commit numerically several sins, because such a distribution, made to several in one course, is judged in moral estimation to be one action, one banquet, although it consists of many guests, and therefore the individual distributions, in the case, will not be actions disparate among themselves.

220. Resolves from 2°. - Therefore obscene words, touches, kisses, etc., had with another person, without the intention of arriving at the consummated act of lust, for instance at fornication, are acts disparate from the fornication itself, if this afterwards follows because lust has been increased; and therefore kisses of this sort, etc., separately from the fornication afterwards following, must be declared in Confession. Likewise grave woundings inflicted on someone, without the will of killing him, are disparate from the killing itself, if afterwards it happens because anger has become more inflamed; and as such they must be explained in Confession. Cf. St. Alphonsus.³

Note. - If you ask here whether those very acts not consummated, as kisses, etc., in the first case, and woundings in the second case, are also disparate among themselves mutually, so that in Confession it is necessary to say how many times they took place? I answer affirmatively; because these acts, as is supposed, are by no means ordered from the intention of the sinner to the consummated act, but are done solely on account of their own delectation; and hence it is the common opinion of the Doctors that in Confession it must be declared how many times. - Nevertheless one exception must be admitted, namely: if these acts proceed from the same impulse, even with a certain brief interval; for then they can morally be estimated as one continued act, and therefore then it will suffice that in confession there be simply set forth what was done, for example: I acted dishonestly with another person by touches and kisses; I injured my neighbor by gravely wounding him. - The same you will rightly judge concerning locutions which, while remaining in the same matter and person, are uttered several times in one course from the same vehemence of affection, and thus morally become as it were one continued locution; for instance, if someone in the same matter, from the same impulse, several times curses the same person, several times blasphemes or perjures himself, etc.

221. Resolves from 3°. - Therefore depraved conversations, touches, kisses, etc., had with another person from the intention of arriving at the consummated act of fornication, are disparate from this very intended fornication, if by accident it is not consummated, and consequently must be opened separately from it in Confession. - Wherefore St. Alphonsus rightly notes altogether¹ that, separately from the intended sin, as sins numerically distinct from it, there must be explained the acts not consummated which were posited as means toward consummating the sin, if afterwards the sin is not consummated, as Viva teaches, asserting that the common opinion so holds. And this not only if the aforesaid acts are evil of themselves, as touches and dishonest conversations are; but also, according to a very probable opinion, if they are indifferent of themselves, as to take the road, prepare arms for homicide, etc.: "because then the sin does not remain merely internal, but is externalized in those actions, which all become evil, since they are informed by the malice of the depraved end."

Note. - If here again you ask whether these acts not consummated, in the supposed case, are also disparate among themselves mutually, and as such must be declared in Confession according to the number of each? I answer negatively; because from the intention of the sinner they are ordered to the same work to be consummated in its own species; and hence for confession it will suffice that, separately from the intended sin, you say: I posited several acts for the purpose of committing this or that sin, which I nevertheless did not consummate. So St. Alphonsus.²

222. Resolves from 4°. - Depraved conversations, touches, kisses, etc., had with another person from the intention of fornicating, and actually also attaining to fornication, are not disparate from the fornication itself, and therefore do not constitute new sins, but morally coalesce into one complete work, one numerically consummated sin; because according to the common course such acts are as a certain introduction, a proximate disposition, a remote inchoation, or complement of the consummated work itself. Wherefore there is no obligation of explaining them separately in Confession; but it will suffice if it is said: I committed fornication with such and such a person; since actions preceding this are understood from common occurrence. So St. Alphonsus³ with the common opinion. - Moreover let it be well noted that actions of this sort preceding, as also complacency concerning fornication consummated, when they are had immediately after the fornication and are by no means intended toward a new fornication, probably are not new sins to be explained in Confession; because then they seem to be employed as a complement of the obtained fornication.

223. • Acts in the same species of evil, and conversant about the same object, are called morally interrupted when between them there intervenes a breaking off of the evil will, so that the subsequent acts proceed from a new decree of the will. - But that it may be determined more accurately in which acts moral interruption actually has place, with attention to the distinction between internal and external acts:

Quaer. 1° When are INTERNAL ACTS morally interrupted?

Resp. They are morally interrupted:

1° If the first will is expressly revoked by a contrary will; for this prevents the posterior act from being able to be called a continuation of the prior, since in reality it proceeds from a new decree of the will. Hence, if you take complacency in an evil delectation, and then elicit an act of displeasure; or if you will to kill your enemy, and then retract that will by putting away the hatred, or also by an act of charity toward the enemy; if afterwards you return to the evil will, you commit a new sin, numerically distinct from the prior one.

2° If the first will is virtually or tacitly revoked, namely by voluntary advertence to matters with which the evil will is incompatible; or even by taking up a state incompatible with the first evil will. Thus St. Alphonsus,¹ after the common opinion, teaches. Hence he who turns his soul to pious thought, for example by attending to a sermon, by reciting prayers, etc., tacitly revokes the preceding evil will, and therefore, if afterwards he resumes that evil will, he sins anew. Likewise he who resolves to steal something, and in the meantime, before the execution of the theft, becomes gravely ill, so that during the time of the infirmity he is incapable of carrying out the theft; if afterwards, after recovering health, he returns to the same purpose, he commits a new sin, because through such impotence the first purpose was morally interrupted.

3° If the first will ceases naturally, that is, through a cessation not freely chosen, but caused by natural distraction, inadvertence, or oblivion, lasting for a more or less notable time according to the nature of the diverse acts. But, concerning this third mode of moral interruption, Theologians greatly disagree. Some think that internal acts are not morally interrupted at all by natural cessation alone, at least ordinary cessation, for instance by common distractions, by sleep, etc. Others on the contrary opine that any internal acts whatever are morally interrupted by any natural cessation whatever, even ordinary. But among these St. Alphonsus held a middle way; his opinion, safe in practice, seems capable of being explained briefly thus:

224. Opinion of St. Alphonsus. - In this controversy concerning the moral interruption of internal acts through natural cessation, first, according to the holy Doctor, a distinction must be made between merely internal sins, that is, those which either are wholly consummated internally in their own species, as hatred, heresy, envy (sins of the heart strictly so called), or at least are committed internally only, without effectively tending to an external sin, as morose delectation and inefficacious desire; - and sins not merely internal, that is, those which effectively tend to an external sin of mouth or deed, as an efficacious desire or purpose of blaspheming or stealing. But after this distinction has been premised, according to the mind of the same holy Doctor one may establish thus:

A. Merely internal sins are morally interrupted by natural cessation, even ordinary cessation, for instance by common distractions, by sleep, etc., so that they are numerically distinct as often as they are repeated after such cessation. - Yet here attention must be given to the vehemence of the affection by which the will is borne into the object; for the given resolution is understood with this limitation: unless several acts of this sort proceed from the same vehemence of affection, or from the same impulse of passion; for then they constitute only one sin, even if a certain brief distraction intervenes between the acts. - From these things it is inferred, for Confession, that he who recalls that he took delight many times in the same object, and especially if this happened on the same day, must say how many times he yielded to this evil will, if he can remember this, at least confusedly; that is, if he is able to estimate how often the evil will, either not interrupted or interrupted and then reassumed, lasted through a notable time. But if he cannot - as ordinarily happens, when the depraved disposition was long-lasting - let him say through how much time he persevered in that disposition and whether the interruptions were notably rare or frequent.¹ Cf. nevertheless n. 1424, Principle III, 1°, c), § Some Doctors.

B. Sins not merely internal, namely efficacious desires or firm evil purposes concerning an external sin of mouth or deed, more probably are not morally interrupted by ordinary natural cessation alone, whether by common distractions or sleep; but only by the intervention of a long time, which long time, ordinarily speaking, is judged by the holy Doctor to be present as often as more than two or at most three days intervene between the purposes, since such force does not seem to be present in one single act of the will that it can efficaciously endure beyond that time. Therefore, if the penitent has persevered beyond two or three days in an evil purpose, in Confession he must explain the time, saying for example: for the whole month or week I remained in the purpose of stealing, which I renewed about so many times before the consummation of the theft; so that thus the number of internal sins concerning external sins may be understood by the confessor.² Yet it must carefully be observed here whether perhaps by force of the evil purpose some external effect has already been produced, conducing to the consummated external sin; for then the first purpose is judged not to be morally interrupted, but to persevere, so long as that external effect lasts; and hence the aforesaid resolution - that an evil purpose is morally interrupted by the intervention of a long time - must be received with this limitation: unless nevertheless the efficacy of the first purpose virtually perseveres in some external effect; for then the evil purposes, through whatever time they last, constitute one sin only. Hence, if someone proposes to kill a man, and therefore prepares arms, takes the road, and finally kills him, he commits one sin in number, although he sought him for many days, and meanwhile also thought about other things, renewed the purpose a hundred times, etc. Similarly, if someone proposes not to restore another's property, and remains in this purpose - even for a year - he commits one sin only; because in the very retention of the other's property the efficacy of the first purpose virtually perseveres. Yet where the thief becomes incapable of restoring, and afterwards again becomes capable and does not restore, he commits a new sin; because during the time of that incapacity there is nothing in which the efficacy of the first purpose virtually persevered.

225. • Quaer. 2° When are EXTERNAL SINS morally interrupted?

Resp. There is no need here for discourse about external sins which are disparate, which of themselves are morally disjoined and therefore numerically distinct, as was explained more broadly in Point I, n. 218 sqq. Hence the question proposed in this sense is to be understood of external sins which, according to themselves, are not disparate, for example kisses or touches which of themselves and from the intention of the agent tend and attain to fornication. But external sins of this sort are morally interrupted in three cases, namely:

1° When between them there intervenes an express or tacit revocation of the evil purpose; concerning which case see the things handed down before at n. 223.

2° When between them there intervenes a simple cessation of the evil purpose beyond two or three days, without some external effect having been produced in which the purpose is judged morally to persevere; concerning which case see the notes above at n. 224, B.

3° They are still morally interrupted, or, to speak more accurately, in a certain broader sense they become disparate and numerically several, when between them, even while the same purpose remains physically, there intervenes such an interval of time that the external acts themselves can no longer be called concatenated, that is, so that the preceding act is no longer the proximate disposition or as it were an inchoation of the subsequent act, although it remotely tends to it. But when such concatenation, because of an interval of time, is actually absent must be judged from the nature and circumstances of the acts themselves, especially with regard to common sense and the natural estimation of men. - Generally I would think it can be said: that it is rather easily lacking in sins of the mouth, especially if they are done from levity or custom, for instance in curses, blasphemies, perjuries, not uttered from the same impulse; - and then that it is lacking in sins of deed when the intervening delay of time is in no way customarily apprehended as brief. But if commonly it is apprehended as brief, sins of deed, notwithstanding such interval of time, still seem to be concatenated and morally united. - Hence I resolve: a) He who, from the intention of stealing a heap of wheat, which he cannot carry off wholly at one time, repeatedly on the same night steals part, commits one sin only; but he who from the same intention on alternate nights does this, seems to commit as many sins as there are acts. L. II. 44 at the beginning. b) Youths sin by several sins who, from the intention of fornicating, at times notably distant according to common sense, approach another person, with libidinous acts, and thus finally arrive at fornication; because those external acts, in the case, are no longer concatenated, since they are not the proximate disposition or a certain quasi-inchoation of the subsequent fornicary intercourse. On the contrary, they would sin by one sin only if, in the same morally continuous approach, some delay intervened between the libidinous acts, for example because of conversation with a third person. c) Similarly, if someone, laboring servilely on Sunday, wishes to rest a little and therefore is occupied by sleep; but then, awakened, begins again to work, he commits one sin only. - Likewise he sins by one sin who interrupts the eating of meat on a fast day for a little while, for example to receive a guest, etc.

§ III. Which Objects Of The Same Species Do Not Coalesce Into One Object.

226. • Several objects in the same species of evil, about which one and the same act is conversant, are judged not to coalesce when one object is not part of another, or, in other words, when those several objects do not constitute, as parts, one total object. Such especially are: the lives of several men, whether of body or of soul; - and the honors, reputations, or temporal goods of several men, unless perhaps they are possessed by common dominion.

Resolves with St. Alphonsus.¹ Therefore he commits sins several in number: 1° Who by one act kills several men; or gives scandal to several; or affects several with contumely. 2° Who in one discourse detracts from several, even of the same family or community; except perhaps, according to Dens, in the case where the reputation were proper to some community precisely as such; as if someone should unjustly say of some monastery that regular discipline is not observed in it. 3° Who by one act imprecates some evil on several; or also steals from several, unless nevertheless the goods carried off by theft are possessed by those several with common dominion, for instance by reason of undivided inheritance, by reason of community, etc. 4° Who by one act desires to commit several fornications, whether with diverse persons or with the same one. - From these things the resolution for other similar cases will easily be clear.

227. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Does he who detracts from someone before several commit as many sins as there are persons among whom the other is defamed?

Resp. Probably he does not commit several sins of detraction; because he does not seem to injure several objects or rights, since the right to reputation, which chiefly consists in the opinion of the multitude, is one and not multiple, both among all and among individuals. Hence by reason of such detraction it will suffice that in confession it be said: I detracted from someone before several.² Nevertheless the same detractor, in the case, commits several sins of scandal; and by reason of this, the number of persons must be set forth.³

Quaer. 2° Does he who in one discourse detracts from another in distinct matters, saying for example that he is unjust, lustful, and a man without religion, commit as many sins as the matters are diverse?

Resp. More probably affirmatively, at least of itself; because such a detractor violates a multiple right to diverse reputations which do not coalesce into one reputation; for he who has been defamed in one crime is not for that reason defamed in another. Yet by accident detraction of this sort not rarely constitutes one sin only, namely: when the circumstances in which those diverse insults are uttered are such that the hearers easily understand them to be uttered from anger, and therefore do not attribute faith to them. Hence women of the lower class and common people who, quarreling together, from the same impulse load one another with diverse contumelies, commit one sin only. Indeed those quarreling in this way, for the most part, are excused from mortal sin, unless perhaps they reproach the adversary with some particular fact.¹

Quaer. 3° What must be said concerning him who by one continuous act wishes diverse evils to another, as infamy, poverty, etc.?

Resp. According to a sufficiently probable opinion, he commits one sin in species and number, as often as, as more frequently happens, those evils are apprehended under the reason of evil in general. But otherwise, if the will is borne advertently to wishing those diverse evils to him, as they are distinct; and otherwise also a fortiori, if he desires actually to inflict those diverse evils on another.²

Quaer. 4° Of how many sins is he guilty who by one act denies several articles of faith?

Resp. Of one only; because the formal object of faith is not multiple, but one, namely: the veracity of God revealing; and hence he who denies several articles of faith is no more an unbeliever than he who denies one.³