The end or motive of the agent

Human acts are by theologians divided into various classes:

(a) Internal acts are performed by the internal powers of the soul; external, by the bodily organs.

(b) Elicited acts are such as proceed immediately from the will and are performed by it alone. They are usually said to be six in number; three having reference to the end, and three others to the means for the attaining of the end. A wish is a simple inclination of the will or an ineffectual desire of an object; an intention is a firm resolve to attain an object by the use of the appropriate means; fruition is a peaceful delight in the possession, real or imagined, of a loved object. The act of selection between various means to an end is called choice; if no alternative is offered by the intellect, acceptance of the means by the will is called consent, though this term is more commonly used of every act of acceptance by the will of an object proposed to it; use or execution is said of the act of the will which applies the means chosen to the obtaining of the end proposed.

Commanded acts are executed by other faculties than the will by which they are commanded.

(c) Natural acts are performed by man’s faculties unaided by divine grace; supernatural, by the help of God’s grace.

(d) Good actions are conformed to the rules of morality; bad actions are contrary to them; those that are indifferent may be good or bad according to circumstances.

(e) Valid acts are such as have all the conditions requisite, and so produce their effect; invalid acts are destitute of some condition necessary to produce their effect.

By the end is here understood the reason or motive which induces the agent to act.

The end of all human life is called the last end; other motives for action are intermediate ends. An end is primary if it holds the first place among several, and would be sufficient by itself to induce action; otherwise it is secondary.

It is obvious that the end or motive which induces the agent to act holds a very prominent place among the sources of the morality of an action.

For it is the object to which the will tends, the prospect of gaining which moves the agent to act; but, as we saw in the last point, the motion of the will takes its moral quality from the object; a will, then, which tends to a good end will so far be good; a will which tends to a bad end will be bad. But the morality of an action resides chiefly in the will, so that a good or bad will, derived from the motive of an action, must necessarily contribute to the goodness or badness of that action. It is the end or motive which sets the will in motion and gives its own moral quality to the action which follows. One, then, who steals money in order to be able to commit adultery commits a sin against justice, induced thereto by a desire to sin against chastity, and as St Thomas, following Aristotle, says, he is more of an adulterer than a thief.¹

¹ St Thomas, 1-2, q. 18, a. 6.

The end which the agent has in view may coincide with the natural scope of the action, as when a man eats to support life. The extrinsic end is then said to correspond with the intrinsic end of the object. Or it may be different, as when a man eats merely for the sake of pleasure; and a man may be moved to action by a variety of subordinate ends, as when he eats to keep up his strength, to be able to work, to obtain the money wherewith to be able to support his family, and so fulfil his duty.

A good motive gives its own moral quality to an indifferent action and makes it good. And so I do an act of charity by depriving a man of a knife with which he was threatening to commit suicide, while the same action done with a view to making the knife my own would be theft.

There is a controversy among theologians as to whether the purpose or intention with which an action is performed can make an action unjust, which, apart from that intention, is not so.

Would a man, for example, be guilty of an act of injustice towards his enemy, and bound to make restitution to him, if he committed a crime, foreseeing and intending that it should be imputed to his enemy, who would be punished for it? Of course he is guilty of a grave sin by giving way to such an act of hatred, and if by any means he procures the false accusation of his enemy he is also guilty of injustice by causing his undeserved punishment. But supposing the false accusation, though foreseen, was in no way procured by him, but was brought about by other causes, would his intention make him guilty of injustice towards his enemy and bound to make restitution to him ? Many theologians affirm that it would,¹ but seeing that the false accusation is indeed occasioned by the crime, but not caused by it, it would seem that the bad intention of the man who committed the crime was incapable of supplying the . causal connection between the crime and the false accusation. The intention alone cannot change the nature of the external action. But if this be so, he is not the effective cause of the injury done to his enemy, and he is not bound to make restitution to him, A good intention certainly cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to tell a lie even to save another’s life, according to the teaching of Innocent III. Evil must not be done that good may come of it. This is the teaching of Holy Scripture and of the Catholic Church, nor have Jesuits any other doctrine different from that of the Church. Father Dasbach promised to give anyone two thousand florins who would prove in open court that the Jesuits had ever taught that the end justifies the means, Count Paul von Hoensbroech undertook to do so, but he failed in his suit when it was tried at Cologne in the spring of 1905.² Here we must touch upon a question which has raised a good deal of controversy among divines, and which still divides them. Some, following the great St Augustine, hold that it is a venial sin to eat and to perform other operations of our animal nature for the sake of the pleasure which they give us. Others, on the contrary, hold that the sensible pleasure which accompanies the satisfaction of our animal appetites is good, inasmuch as it is natural and intended by the Author of nature, and so to perform actions which are not wrong in themselves from the motive of pleasure cannot be sinful. If it were not for the sake of the pleasure afforded by eating and by other animal functions many men would abstain from them altogether through disgust. The imperious Stimulus of our fleshly appetites and their satisfaction is required for the preservation and increase of the human race. These satisfactions of our animal nature must indeed be ruled and moderated by right reason, the norm of human conduct. If they are thus moderated, they are conformable to man’s nature, they are in right order and morally good. This seems to be the teaching of St Thomas;³ it is the commoner opinion among modern theologians, nor is it involved in the condemnation of the eighth and ninth propositions condemned by Innocent XI on March 2, 1679.⁴

¹ Lugo, De Justitia, disp. 8, n. 75.

² Civilta Cattolica, Oct. 7, 1905, p. 3.

³ Cont. Gent. 3, c. 9, n. 1; Summa, 2-2, q. 141, a. I, ad I.

⁴ V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 505.

It follows from what has been said in the preceding section, that an action will be morally good if the object, end, and circumstances are good, The object, end, and circumstances will be good if they are conformable to man’s rational nature and to the eternal law of God. An opinion was held by some theologians that besides these conditions it is necessary to refer, actually or at least virtually, all our actions to God; otherwise they will at least be venially sinful. These theologians rested their opinion on certain texts of Holy Scripture and on passages from some of the Fathers, especially St Augustine. The principal Scripture text is from St Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians, x 31: “‘ Therefore whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do; do all to the glory of God.” There are various interpretations of the passage, but the meaning seems plain from the context. St Paul is teaching the Corinthians the duty of avoiding scandal to Jews, Gentiles, and to the Church of God. They must so order their actions, even those that are indifferent in themselves, such as eating certain kinds of food, as not to be a cause of offence to others. Then will their actions all tend to the honour and glory of God, then will they do all things in charity (1 Cor. xv 14). There is obviously no word here which can be legitimately construed into a command to direct all our actions to God by an actual or virtual intention of the will. Such a merely internal act would not tend to edify others, and in the text quoted this is what St Paul is urging the Corinthians to do. Other passages which are quoted in support of the opinion are similarly capable of being explained in a sense which affords the opinion no support. It is indeed a truth, which is insisted on by other theologians, that if an action be honest and good and performed because it is conformable to right order, it is thereby implicitly directed to God, who wills the observance of right order, and who is himself the end to which rightly ordered action tends. In this sense it is true that every good action must be referred to God; but every good action is thus referred to him by the very fact that the object, the end, and the circumstances are good.¹

¹ V. Frins, De Act. Hum. 2, n. 290.

In order that such an obligation may be imposed, certain conditions must be fulfilled which it will be well to state more explicitly.

(a) The damage must be inflicted voluntarily, with knowledge and the will to do the wrong. For a man is only responsible in the forum of conscience for his free and voluntary actions. There must be theological fault, as theologians express it, otherwise there will be no obligation in conscience to make good any damage, at any rate before lawful sentence of a judge competent to impose such an obligation. For the law sometimes imposes the obligation of making good damage which has been done, even though it was not foreseen or intended. This is especially the case when there has been legal negligence or the omission of that diligence which the law requires in the circumstances. There are three degrees in this negligence: “ Ordinary neglect has been defined to be the omission of that care which every man of common prudence, and capable of governing a family, takes of his own concerns; gross neglect is defined to be the want of that care which every man of common sense, however inattentive soever, takes of his own property; and slight neglect to be the omission of that diligence which very circumspect and thoughtful persons use in securing their own goods and chattels.”¹ In some cases the law punishes even slight neglect, in others ordinary, in others only gross neglect. The omission of that care which the law requires in the case is called juridical fault, and after sentence there will be an obligation in conscience to make good damage caused through juridical fault, for the laws prescribing this are just, inasmuch as they make men more careful and conduce to the public good.

If something has been done without foreseeing that it would cause damage to another, but this danger was noticed before the damage actually took place, there will be an obligation in justice for him who performed the action to prevent the damage as far as he can; if he does not do this, he will be bound to restitution. For as long as he can prevent the evil consequences of his action, this is under his control, and may, from the point of view of morals, be considered as continuing, and thus, unless he prevents the evil when he can do so, the agent is the voluntary cause of it. If, however, he cannot prevent the damage without relatively serious inconvenience to himself, there is just cause for excusing him. And so, if I inadvertently throw a lighted match on the ground, and then notice that it may probably cause a conflagration with loss to others, I am bound in justice to extinguish the light, otherwise I must repair the damage done.

If slight negligence caused slight damage to another, there will be an obligation of repairing it under pain of venial sin. If slight negligence caused serious loss to another, there is a difficulty as to whether before any judicial sentence there be an obligation to make restitution. Many theologians deny that there is, for no grave obligation can arise from a slight fault, and a light obligation has no proportion to serious matter; there cannot be a light obligation to avoid homicide, for example.²

(b) In order that there may be an obligation to make restitution for causing damage to another, the damage must be really and objectively unjust. If damage to another follows from the lawful exercise of my rights, I am not bound to make it good. If I dig a well in my property and thereby deprive my neighbour of his supply of water, I am not bound to make restitution for the damage. Similarly, I may sell a new machine or invention, though it may indirectly cause loss to many who had on sale machines of older pattern for which now there will be no market.

I may lawfully use persuasion to induce a rich relative to leave his money to me, though others who would have had it thereby suffer loss, If, however, I make use of unjust means such as threats, violence, or calumny, and so prevent another from getting what he otherwise would have got, I commit a sin against justice and am bound to make restitution to the injured party. This is true even though he had no strict right to what he would have got, for at least he had a right not to be balked of his expectations by unjust means, And so in a competitive examination or concursus where something of value is the prize at stake, one who secures the prize by unjust means must make restitution to him who would otherwise have secured it. If there were no certainty of his securing it, restitution as far as possible must be made according to the degree of probability of his success.

(c) The unjust action must be the cause, not merely the occasion, of damage being done to another, in order that there may be an obligation of making restitution. For we are only responsible in justice for damage which we have caused. And so if I commit theft and others are induced to do the same by my bad example, I am indeed bound to make restitution for what I have stolen, and I commit a sin against charity by giving bad example to others; but probably at least, according to many theologians, I am not bound to make restitution for what others stole through my bad example. Similarly, I am not bound to make restitution for damage which was caused accidentally by my action, when there was antecedently no probable connection between my action and the damage caused. As, for example, if I lit a fire in my property, and there was no probable danger of its causing damage to my neighbour, I am not in conscience before judicial sentence bound to make good damage which it caused him on account of an unforeseen change in the direction of the wind. Some theologians would bind the man who lit the fire to restitution in this case if he hoped for the change of wind and intended the damage. They say that the wrongful intention supplies the want of physical causation and puts him under the obligation of making restitution. This opinion is probable, but the opposite also is probable, for although the evil intention makes the man guilty of affective injustice, he is not guilty of effective injustice, for his evil intention makes no difference in the physical sequence of cause and effect, and if he was not the cause of the damage prescinding from his evil intention, that evil intention could not make him the cause.

In the same way, if the theft of one servant is wrongly imputed to another, and this one is dismissed in consequence, the thief is not bound to make restitution to the injured man unless in some way he caused the false imputation.

One who is not sure whether any harm was caused by his action is not bound to make restitution, for a certain obligation cannot arise from an uncertain source. Whether there is any obligation of making restitution for damage which was certainly caused, but it is uncertain whether the author was A or B, is a disputed point among theologians. Many teach that there is an obligation on all the probable authors in common to make good the damage, and each will be bound to make good the whole in default of the rest. This is certainly true in case of conspiracy; but if each acted independently, and it is not certain which one caused the damage, it is hard if the burden of restitution is imposed on someone who perhaps did not cause the harm.³

If an incendiary intended to set fire to the house of A, and by mistake he destroyed the house of B, it would seem that he is bound to make restitution, for all the requisite conditions are present. His action was voluntary, really, and effectively unjust. Some theologians, however, deny that the obligation of making restitution can be imposed in such cases. For the injury should be formal, and they deny that it is formal in this case. He did not intend to injure B; it was purely by mistake that his house was burnt down. Some weight must be allowed to this opinion on account of the authority of those who maintain it, but it would seem to be over-subtle and against the common sense of mankind. The injury was formal, inasmuch as it was voluntary and knowingly unjust. This is sufficient to induce the obligation of making restitution; it is not necessary that the wrongdoer should intend to injure a definite person.

¹ Chitty, The Law of Contracts, p. 412.

² St Alphonsus, 3, n. 552.

³ Bucceroni, 1, n. 1369.

The obligation of saying the breviary is imposed by ecclesiastical precept, and the question arises what internal dispositions are necessary while reciting the office in order to satisfy the positive precept of the Church. Does one who is voluntarily distracted while saying the office satisfy his obligation, or must he repeat what he said with voluntary distractions ? It is not a question of what is required that prayer may be pleasing to God—voluntary distractions while praying are certainly venial sins—but the question is, what sort of attention is required by the law of the Church under pain of not fulfilling the obligation imposed by the law ?

Attention, which is an act of the mind adverting to what is being done, must be distinguished from intention, which is the will to do something. At least, a virtual intention to say the office is required that the act may be voluntary, such as the law prescribes. Theologians distinguish between internal and external attention. The former consists in directing the mind to God, or in thinking of the sense of the words uttered, or in being careful to pronounce them correctly, and it is certain that any of these forms of internal attention is sufficient to satisfy the precept. External attention means the abstaining while engaged in prayer from any external occupation which is incompatible with internal attention. Thus one who curiously examines a painting while praying, or intently listens to what someone is saying, has not external attention.

It is a disputed point among theologians whether this external attention is sufficient in order to satisfy the precept of saying the office, or whether there must be in addition internal attention. In other words, they dispute whether one who is voluntarily distracted but apparently devout while saying the breviary satisfies the law, or whether he must repeat what he has said with wilful distractions.

Although, of course, all should strive after internal attention, and sin is committed if voluntary distractions are admitted while praying, yet it is probable that external attention is sufficient to satisfy the positive law of the Church. For the Church does indeed prescribe prayer, but there is prayer in a real sense when one says the breviary with the intention of fulfilling his obligation, and with decorum and a devout demeanour, even though he is thinking of something else the while. If voluntary distractions destroy the essence of prayer, involuntary distractions will do so likewise, and yet it is impossible to avoid involuntary distractions altogether. This milder opinion is especially of use in order to calm scrupulous and anxious souls.¹ 9. As the obligation of saying the divine office arises from positive law, it does not bind when it would entail serious inconvenience. On this ground one who is sick, or who cannot say his office without causing a serious headache, is excused. Moreover, other occupations, undertaken for the good of our neighbour and such as cannot be neglected without his loss, will be a sufficient excuse for omitting the office, when both duties cannot be fulfilled. And so missionaries, who are all day long occupied in hearing confessions and preaching, are excused from the office which would interfere with their work, Even when there is not a sufficient cause to excuse of itself from the law, a dispensation may be lawfully obtained from the competent authority, if there be good cause for it. The Pope can grant a dispensation to any cleric, a bishop can dispense in particular cases with those of his diocese, and a regular prelate has similar powers for his own subjects. Wider powers are also granted as a special privilege by the Holy See. The faculty of saying fifteen decades of the rosary instead of the office is frequently granted to missioners who are lawfully prevented from saying the office. The meaning of which is that there must be some difficulty in getting in the office, but it need not be so great as would of itself excuse altogether from the obligation. Inasmuch as the office is composed of several portions which are usually said separately, there will be an obligation to say any such portion if it can be done without serious inconvenience, even though it be impossible to say the whole,

¹ Lugo, De Eucharist. 22, n. 25.

While administering a sacrament the minister should attend to what he is doing and remember that he is engaged in a religious function. If he voluntarily allows his mind to wander on other and profane matters, he is guilty of irreverence toward God for whose worship the sacraments were instituted and should be administered. This irreverence, however, is not grave in itself, probably not even if a priest is voluntarily distracted during the consecration in Mass, so that voluntary distractions while administering the sacraments are only venial sins. Attention, then, or advertence of the mind to what is being done, is not necessary for the validity of a sacrament; only three things are necessary for its validity, as we saw above —the matter, the form, and the intention of the minister to do what the Church does.

On the other hand, God does not sanctify adults who have the use of reason without some co-operation on their side; justification, says the Council of Trent,¹ is the sanctification and renewal of the interior man by the voluntary reception of grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Some wish, desire, or intention to receive a sacrament is, then, necessary on the part of adults for its validity. A positive refusal to receive a sacrament, or a neutral state of mind neither willing nor refusing it, would make the reception of a sacrament null and void. The kind of intention which is necessary and sufficient for the validity of a sacrament varies according to its nature. In Penance and Matrimony a virtual intention is required in the subject, as it is required in the minister. For in Penance the acts of the penitent enter into the substance of the sacrament, and so they must be directed by him to its confection. Matrimony is constituted by the mutual consent of the parties, and for this at least a virtual intention is necessary. An habitual intention is required in order to be baptized validly; in other words, the person baptized must have at some time intended to receive the sacrament and not revoked his intention afterward. It is a disputed point among divines whether an habitual and express intention is necessary or whether an implicit intention contained in a desire to do all that God has ordained, or in an act of perfect charity or contrition, is sufficient. The latter opinion is probable, and it may be used in case of necessity when one is in danger of death, and then only. For the sacraments, which confer benefits without imposing any great burden, a general or implicit intention, such as is contained in a desire to die like a Catholic with all the rites of the Church, is sufficient for their validity. For Orders at least an habitual intention is required.

Those, therefore, who are asleep, or are unconscious, can receive the sacraments validly, for they may have all the dispositions which are necessary. The only difficulty is about Penance, but, as we shall see, it is at least a probable opinion that absolution is valid when given to one who is unconscious, but otherwise disposed for the sacrament. However, it is not lawful to administer the sacraments to those who are asleep, unconscious, or out of their mind, except when in danger of death. For the subject should be in a fit state to dispose himself for the reception of the sacraments so that he may receive them with due reverence and fruit.

¹ Sess. vi, c. 7.

The Mass is a representation and a reproduction in an unbloody manner of the sacrifice of our Lord on the Cross.

The principal minister, Jesus Christ, is the same; the victim is the same; the only difference is the manner of offering, as the Council of Trent teaches. A rightly ordained priest is the secondary minister, who in the name of Christ and of the Church offers the sacrifice to God. In so far as it is the action of Christ, the Mass produces its effect like the sacraments ex opere operato, and does not depend for its efficacy on the holiness or other dispositions of the priest. But it is also the action of the priest, and of the faithful in whose name he acts; and under this respect it produces its effect ex opere operantis.

All the faithful, by virtue of the Communion of saints, but especially those who assist at Mass, partake of its fruits and benefits. Those fruits are, as we have seen, latreutic, eucharistic, impetratory, propitiatory, and satisfactory; so that in the Mass we have a most excellent means of fulfilling all the ends of religion. By it and through it we offer to God the highest act of worship which it is in our power to offer; we give him thanks for his continual benefits to us, we ask in the most efficacious manner for what we and others stand in need of, we propitiate his just anger, and make satisfaction for our sins.

The priest who celebrates performs an action in the highest degree pleasing to Almighty God and meritorious for himself. Moreover, just as prayer may be offered for a special intention, and as the sacrifices of the Old Law were offered for the needs of those who presented the victim, so the Mass also may be celebrated by the priest for some definite intention. The special or ministerial fruit of the Mass is thus applied by the priest according to the intention with which he offers it.

No one can gain an indulgence unless he is a member of the Catholic Church, and, moreover, he must have the requisite intention, he must be in the state of grace, and he must fulfil all the conditions prescribed for gaining the indulgence.

It is not necessary that the intention be actual; it is sufficient if it be virtual, so that there was the wish to gain the indulgence, and it continues to influence the actions whose performance is required for the purpose of gaining the indulgence. It will be sufficient to form an intention in the morning of gaining all the indulgences which may be annexed to any of the good works done during the following day. Some authorities hold that such a virtual intention is not necessary, but that an habitual, or even an interpretative intention, will suffice. An habitual intention is one which was formed and which has not been retracted, but which does not influence the performance of one’s actions any longer. An interpretative intention does not exist in reality, but it would be elicited if the agent thought of the matter. Inasmuch as an indulgence is a grant made by the Church to all who fulfil certain conditions, these authors maintain that all pious Catholics who value indulgences gain such as are annexed to their prayers and other good deeds without any special intention, ‘This opinion, however, though probable, is not certain, and so it is safer in practice to follow the other, which requires at least a virtual intention, especially as it is doubtful whether probabilism can be used in this matter. Canon 925, sec, 2, says that a general intention is requisite, which many interpret as signifying an habitual intention.

I. Notion. Intention is here understood as the deliberate will of confecting a sacrament.

II. Division. Intention is distinguished:

1. By reason of itself into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. Actual intention is had when the minister, at the time at which he confects the sacrament, actually wills to confect it. It is reflex, or rather in actu signato, if there is had an express and formal volition of confecting the sacrament; it is in actu exercito if someone actually wills indeed, but nevertheless less expressly and formally, to confect the sacrament, as if someone, recognizing a rite as a sacrament, administers it under this recognition. Virtual intention is had when someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament, and that will, though not actually, nevertheless perseveres virtually, so that he operates by force of the will once had, as if someone, from the intention of celebrating Mass, puts on the vestments and performs the other things, even if perhaps at the time of the ministry he is wholly distracted. Habitual intention exists if someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament and that will has not indeed been retracted, but nevertheless does not persevere virtually. Interpretative intention is had when someone neither actually and explicitly wills nor actually and explicitly has willed to confect a sacrament, but is presumed to be going to will it if thought about it should occur.¹ (St. Alphonsus, VI, 15.)

2. By reason of the object into merely external and internal. Merely external intention is had when someone wills and outwardly seriously performs only the external rite, but lacks the mind of confecting a sacrament, or even intends the contrary. It is called merely external because, although in itself it is internal, nevertheless its whole object is external, namely only the placing of the external rite. Internal intention is had when someone wills the external rite insofar as it is sacred, or at least insofar as it is held as such by the Church.

By reason of the object, intention is further distinguished into determinate and indeterminate, according as the thing intended is certain and defined; or is uncertain, as if someone intends to consecrate only ten hosts out of a multitude of hosts.

3. By reason of mode into explicit and implicit, according as someone expressly wills such a sacrament known and thought of, or by a more general will wills such a sacrament, whether not known, or known but not thought of.

By reason of mode it is also distinguished into absolute and conditioned, according as someone intends to confect a sacrament independently of, or dependently upon, some circumstance or event; as if someone absolves another under the condition: if you are attrite; or: if you make restitution.

¹ Some call interpretative the intention which others call implicit habitual intention.

III. The intention required. It is of faith that intention is required, and indeed intention "at least of doing what the Church does."¹ In order that these things may be unfolded and completed, observe the following:

1. In itself, actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices; habitual intention does not suffice, much less interpretative intention; fear, however, does not hinder intention. I said:

a) Actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices. For it must be judged that the intention suffices which truly flows into the act or sacramental rite, and therefore can be called its cause. Such is not only actual intention, but also virtual intention. There is added the fact that actual intention is not always within man's power, and its necessity would give occasion for anxieties about the validity of the sacraments (St. Thomas, III, q. 64, a. 8, ad 3;² St. Alphonsus, VI, 17, 18).

Corollary. A priest validly acts who, in the customary way, betakes himself to the baptistery, confessional, or altar and there baptizes, absolves, or consecrates; for there is had at least virtual intention; indeed practically everywhere actual intention is present, even if remiss. Likewise, a priest validly consecrates who has placed on the corporal the hosts to be consecrated, even if at the time of consecration he does not think of them. Indeed, in general it must be said that one imprudently doubts the value of the act who has placed the required rite, unless he has expressly excluded the due intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 18).

b) Habitual intention does not suffice; since it cannot be admitted that an intention suffices which in no way flows into the action of the minister; such is habitual intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16). Much less, as is clear, does interpretative intention suffice (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16).

c) Fear does not hinder, because, as we posit, it does not take away the voluntary (St. Alphonsus, VI, 19). Except, however, Matrimony, as will be said in its place.

2. As regards the object, there is required the intention or will of confecting a sacrament. This is established against those who judge that external intention suffices; in other words, that it suffices for someone outwardly and seriously to place the external rite, even if inwardly he does not will to confect the sacrament. This doctrine, first defended by Roland Bandinelli, and afterwards revived by Ambrosius Catharinus (1553), is today almost commonly abandoned and rightly seems to be rejected. For: 1. as we have said, it is of faith that intention is required in the minister, "at least of doing what the Church does." But these words seem to have to be understood according to the sense which they had in the schools, in other words, of the intention of doing what the Church intends to effect through the rite. 2. Proposition 28 was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes every external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, even though inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: I do not intend what the Church does."³ Here it seems entirely that there is discussion of one who outwardly and seriously places the external rite. Therefore this does not suffice. 3. The Roman Missal has these words: "If someone has before him eleven hosts and intends to consecrate only ten, not determining which ten he intends, ... he does not consecrate, because intention is required,"⁴ namely, as the Missal, according to the obvious sense, supposes, the intention of consecrating, and that a determinate one (St. Alphonsus, VI, 23).

It suffices, however, that the minister implicitly will to confect the sacrament, for example, that he will the rite as sacred, that he will to do what Christ instituted, what the Church does, what is asked by a Christian, etc.

Corollary I. A sacrament is not valid: 1. if someone places the external rite without any intention; this, for example, will have place if someone does not place a human act, as if he baptizes someone in sleep or drunkenness; 2. if someone performs the external rite for the sake of jest, mockery, or mere exercise.

Corollary II. A sacrament can be valid, even if someone does not regard the rite placed by himself as sacramental, provided he truly wills, for example, what Christ instituted, what he who admits the sacrament asks, etc. Hence heresy or infidelity of itself is not a reason for doubting the required intention;⁵ otherwise if there is added hatred of the Christian name, which, for example, we can easily suspect in a Jew.

3. As regards the term, intention must be borne toward a determinate person or matter; yet it suffices that the intention be directed to the person or to the whole matter present, without being directed to the parts individually. But he consecrates invalidly who would will to consecrate ten hosts out of eleven and would not determine those ten.

4. As regards the mode, especially as regards a sacrament to be confected under a condition, several things must be noted:

a) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the present or the past generally is valid or not valid at once, according as the condition is verified or not verified. I said "generally," because it is disputed whether a sacrament conferred under a condition naturally unknowable is valid; as if someone were to absolve another if he were predestined. Further, it seems this must be denied, because "since God has committed the administration of the sacraments to the knowledge and will of men, a condition cannot be placed which cannot fall under human knowledge" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 26).

b) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the future, for example: I absolve you, if you will make restitution, that is, as soon as you shall have made restitution, generally is not valid, neither before nor after the condition has been fulfilled. Not before the condition is fulfilled, because there is not had the intention of confecting the sacrament before the fulfilled condition; not after the condition is fulfilled, because then the matter and form no longer exist (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). I said generally, because Matrimony is excepted, which follows the nature of a contract. But a contract entered into under a condition is perfected when the condition has been fulfilled.

¹ Council of Trent, Session 7, On the Sacraments, canon 11.

² St. Thomas in the cited place indeed says: "Although he who is thinking of something else does not have actual intention, nevertheless he has ... habitual intention, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament." But St. Alphonsus responds: "By habitual intention here the holy Doctor without doubt understands virtual intention; for immediately after he adds thus: Suppose that when a priest approaches to baptize, he intends to do with respect to the one to be baptized what the Church does; hence if afterwards in the very exercise of the act his thought is carried off to other things, the sacrament is perfected from the force, note well, of the first intention" (VI, 18).

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1318.

⁴ De Defectibus, title 7, n. 1.

⁵ Holy Office, 18 December 1872 (Collectanea, n. 1392).

For validly receiving a sacrament neither faith nor uprightness is required, as is clear from the sense and practice of the Church, which has always held as valid a sacrament received according to the rite of the Church in heresy. Penance is excepted, for which the good acts of the penitent are required, as will be explained in its own place.

Baptism, however, is required for the other sacraments. This is established, namely, from tradition, that the other sacraments were instituted only for those who through Baptism have been made members of the Church (St. Alphonsus, VI, 79).

Finally, for the valid reception of all the sacraments there is required, at least in adults, intention, that is, the will of receiving the sacrament; concerning which intention we must speak more fully (St. Alphonsus, VI, 80, 139).

I. Requisites for daily Communion. "Frequent and daily Communion, as being most desired by Christ the Lord and by the Catholic Church, should be open to all Christ's faithful of whatever order or condition; so that no one who is in the state of grace and approaches the sacred table with a right and pious mind can be prohibited from it" (cited Decree, n. 1). "But a right mind consists in this, that one who approaches the sacred table does not indulge custom, vanity, or human reasons, but wills to satisfy God's good pleasure, to be united to Him more closely by charity, and by that divine medicine to meet his infirmities and defects" (n. 2). Now:

1. An intention which is predominantly supernatural suffices to this extent, that one who approaches with such an intention cannot be kept away from Communion.

2. It suffices that the good ends assigned be intended implicitly.

3. Custom, whether one's own or that of others, will in practice rather often be more the occasion than the principal reason. Vanity will be the principal reason if someone becomes conceited because of frequency of Communion and willingly speaks about it to others in the manner of little devotees.¹

¹ Instruction to the Bishops of Prussia, 8 December 1906.

XI. Right intention; concerning this it suffices to have observed these things:

1. A merely natural intention, that is, one resting on a natural motive alone, does not suffice, so that someone can be excluded for that cause.

2. An intention at least predominantly or equally supernatural suffices to this extent, that one approaching with an intention of this kind cannot be kept away.

There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will. Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it has been gained: this is the last act of the will.

What is will? - Will, or simple volition, is the first act of the will, which is as it were the first inclination of the will toward the proposed object, as toward something lovable of itself, without any order to another. From this it is clear that this act is concerned with the end; for only the end is lovable of itself. But it does not include a tendency into the end, standing only in love and complacency for that good, and therefore it is simple volition, or love and complacency, still inefficacious. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 6, s. 1; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1, 2.

What is intention? - Intention is a free or perfectly voluntary tendency into a good, so that we may attain it. Therefore intention is a tendency of the will into some end to be obtained through due means. It is a purpose and desire toward the thing loved, and of itself is an efficacious desire. For purpose is had when someone determines with himself to do something. But desire, in its general signification, signifies any appetition whatever of obtaining a good which someone lacks; and it extends not only to the appetition of an efficacious will, but also to imperfect volitions, or velleities, even of impossible things. Intention, either virtually or expressly, is also an appetition of the means in common. The reason is that intention is the efficacious will of obtaining the end. But to will the end, absolutely as something to be attained as such, is virtually to will to execute all the means necessary to the end. Moreover someone can explicitly elicit this act: I will to employ all the means necessary for the end; this act is intention, because it precedes every consultation about the means and every election, and is the principle of counsel and election. In common, not in particular; for by this reason it is distinguished from election. Suarez, tr. 2, s. 2; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 2; q. 12.

Can someone intend several things at the same time; and if several incompatible things are intended, which intention prevails? - R. To the first: Affirmatively. For either those things are ordered to one another, or they are not. "If indeed they have been ordered to one another, it is manifest that man can intend many things at the same time. For there is intention not only of the ultimate end, but also of an intermediate end: but someone simultaneously intends both the proximate and the ultimate end, as the making of medicine and health. But if two things not ordered to one another are taken, thus also man can intend several things at the same time, which is clear from the fact that man chooses one thing before another, because it is better than the other. But among the other conditions by which something is better than another, one is that it is useful for several things. Hence something can be chosen before another from the fact that it is useful for several things, and thus manifestly man intends several things at the same time." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 12. a. 3.

R. To the second: If those wills are simultaneous, the predominant one prevails, namely the one which would be chosen if the impossibility were known. If neither is more powerful, neither prevails, and accordingly neither is valid. If among contrary wills one succeeds another, the later prevails over the former; for it is predominant in the order of time and actuality. Except if the former is more powerful, or has revoked, at least virtually, every subsequent will; for then the former will, provided it is not expressly revoked, is certainly predominant. Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 121, 123; L. 1. 6. n. 24.

You will resolve: If one person asked you for a Mass in thanksgiving, another for someone gravely sick, it must be held to have been applied for the latter, whether he asked for it first or later.

If you have established with yourself: Whatever vow I may emit hereafter without the permission of my confessor, I do not wish it to be valid; and afterward you have vowed something without consulting your confessor, it is not valid, provided that will is not retracted expressly or virtually, namely if, mindful of the first vow, you were to emit the second, for example in shipwreck, in fire, etc.

If someone contracted marriage, intending it to be soluble, with such a mind that if he knew it to be indissoluble he would not contract, the marriage is null; for indissolubility is an essential property of Christian marriage. But he would contract validly if merely through error he thought marriage to be soluble, because private error does not take away from him the intention of contracting in the way in which he ought. L. 1. 3. n. 179, 210, 700; l. 6. n. 24; Elbel 130.

Can the intention of an extrinsic end intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? - R. Negatively. The reason is: 1. Because the intrinsic nature of things cannot be changed. 2. Because the intention of the one acting adds nothing to the work; indeed it does not even touch it, since it is wholly extrinsic to it. - Therefore our good intention cannot render an evil work good, nor can our evil intention render evil what is good, nor intrinsically transfer what is evil into another species of malice.

But this does not prevent, as is clear, that where the question concerns an object indifferent of itself, the extrinsic end of the one acting can confer moral goodness or malice. For this is not to change the intrinsic nature of the exterior work itself, but to determine its intrinsic indifference, insofar as it is a human work; and in morals this determination is only from intention. And thus, although the depraved intention of a judge to harm the accused cannot intrinsically change the nature of a just sentence and constitute it an unjust damaging, nevertheless the intention of taking another's property determines the very taking, according as someone takes another's property in order to preserve it for its owner, or in order to take it for himself and steal. - L. 1. 3. n. 584. 636.

What concerning general inquisition? - A judge, without any special occasion having been given, from his office alone can institute a general inquisition, in which nevertheless his power does not extend to eliciting hidden delicts, concerning which there is no report, or which turn to the damage of no one. The reason for the former is that this is necessary for the republic, and no injury is done to anyone. And although the crimes of some persons may be uncovered, this occurs accidentally, beyond intention, and the common good prevails over that inconvenience. The reason for the latter is that otherwise the reputation of the neighbor would be injured directly and in itself; and this right, speaking in itself, neither the judge nor society itself has. Then the greatest inconveniences of scandals, quarrels, etc., would follow, and public peace would be disturbed. Wherefore, for the common good of society itself, always speaking in itself, it is more profitable that delicts remain hidden than that they be made public, so that scandal may be removed, lest others be stirred up by the example of others to perpetrating similar crimes. Nevertheless always except cases of imminent danger of common or private damage, in which the judge can and must inquire even concerning secret delicts. C. Perniciosa 1. de Off. iud. ord.; L. 198.

199; Lugo d. 38, s. 6; Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 2, c. 29, dub. 13; S. Th. Quodl. 11, a. 13; 2. 2. q. 33. a. 7.

What concerning special inquisition? - "For a judge to make a special inquisition, there must, at least regularly, precede infamy, or something equivalent, which gives a just cause. The reason is both because otherwise he would defame without cause, and because a judge must proceed from public knowledge, which he does not have except through accusation, or the confession of the defendant, or evidence of the fact, or through infamy; for which two witnesses are not sufficient, who swear that they have seen the crime committed, because it is still hidden, but it is required that rumor be spread through the greater part of the community, that is, of the city, neighborhood, or monastery, and that it not have arisen from slanderers, although in this matter it is safe to follow the common practice of good men and republics." L. 801.

Regularly; for again there are excepted cases, namely if there is imminent danger of common damage, or of grave damage to another person, or if it concerns graver crimes, homicides, thefts, and other things disturbing the republic, and if there is some suspicion arising from indications not slight, lest delicts left unpunished provide occasion for wicked men to disturb the republic by their crimes and to injure the innocent. Wherefore the judge must then use great prudence, and have regard to persons, and until he sees whether the matter can be proved, he must take information in such a way that reputation is injured as little as possible. Hence, if he sees that it cannot be proved, he must desist. Lessius, l. 2, c. 29, dub. 15.

But lest meanwhile the defendant be able to corrupt witnesses or himself flee, the judge can command that he be enclosed in prison. But this cannot be done without grave delict and grave indications. Lev. 24, 12. Indeed by common Law it is provided that an innocent citizen not be enclosed in prison; and likewise to defendants the faculty is given, pledges having been furnished, of enjoying liberty until they have undergone judgment, unless they are accused of greater crimes with a great presumption of delict. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 14. a. 3; Quodl. 11, a. 13; Lugo, l. c.; CC. Accedens 23, Qualiter et quando 24, Cum oporteat 19, Inquisitioni 21 sections 1-2 de Accusationibus; Trent, sess. 25, c. 6 de R.; C. I. penal procedure, l. 1, title 1, c. 2, title 2, c. 1-4.

Is intention required in the administration of the sacraments? - Intention is an act of the will tending toward some end, or an act of the will by which someone intends to do or omit something. - For the validity of a sacrament, there is required in the minister some true and serious will at least of doing that which the Church, namely the Catholic Church, does. For those things which are done in the sacraments can be done in diverse ways, and are determined to sacramental action only through the intention of the minister. St. Thomas 3 p., q. 64, a. 8; Trent s. 7, c. 11.

Hence St. Thomas 3 p., q. 83, a. 4 ad 7, says: "The efficacy of sacramental words can be impeded by the intention of the priest." - Yet actual intention is not required, but virtual suffices. The reason is that actual intention, although best and desirable, is sometimes morally impossible; but virtual intention sufficiently flows into the action of the minister, so that this can be called truly human and deliberate. - Habitual intention does not suffice, nor interpretative. The reason is that for a human act some will is required, by force of which the act is placed.

Now neither habitual nor interpretative intention is of this kind: not the first, because it is neither actually elicited by the will, nor, although once elicited, does it persist in some effect or in a series of actions; not the second, because it is neither actually elicited nor ever was actually elicited, but would only be elicited if the mind were thinking about the thing to be done. Suarez d. 16, s. 2; Lugo d. 8, n. 28, 35. "A coerced intention of the minister, or one extorted by fear, also suffices, except in matrimony. Likewise error of the minister about the person of the recipient does not invalidate the sacrament, excepting matrimony." L. 19; E. M.

If the minister has two contrary intentions, which one ought to prevail? - If those wills are simultaneous, the predominant one prevails, namely the one which would be chosen if the impossibility were known. - If among contrary wills one succeeds another, the later one is valid, unless the prior one has revoked, at least virtually, every subsequent will; for then the prior will, provided it is not expressly revoked, certainly prevails. But in these matters, if doubt still remains, the validity of the sacrament will be doubtful. - And this also holds for the application of Masses. L. 24, 784; l. 3, n. 700; Lugo d. 8, n. 121, 123. Cf. V. 1, n. 18.

What things are required for the valid reception of the sacraments? - For receiving the sacraments validly, no probity is required in adults, nor properly faith in the subject, if you except the sacrament of penance. This is clear from the practice of the Church, which has never permitted heretics and wicked men, duly baptized and ordained, to be baptized or ordained again. - In infants or those perpetually insane, no disposition is required, nor intention, so that they may validly receive the sacraments of which they are capable, namely baptism, confirmation, order, and the Eucharist, which formerly was ministered to them. This is clear from the practice of the Church and the common opinion. L. 80, 782; St.

Thomas Suppl. q. 39, a. 2. - In adults, for the valid reception of the sacraments some intention is required, because it is not fitting that an adult be sanctified unless he wills it. Council of Trent sess. 6, c. 5, 6, 7. But for most sacraments a habitual intention suffices, even sometimes only a confused, or implicit, intention, the nature of each sacrament being considered; because the conferral of the sacraments is a certain giving and benefit, for accepting which habitual intention suffices. St. Thomas 3 p., q. 68, a. 7. Cf. Lugo de Euch. d. 13, n. 23, 26; de Poenit. d. 14, n. 46, 48. If the will of receiving the sacrament is lacking, the sacrament will be invalid, whether someone does not wish to receive it, or does not not wish, having a neutral will. Benedict XIV, Const. Postremo mense § 47, 48, 51; L. 81. - For validly receiving the other sacraments, reception of baptism is presupposed; therefore an unbaptized man is in no way capable of the other sacraments. The reason is that the other sacraments were instituted for the Church alone; moreover through baptism alone men become members of the Church. Therefore. Florence, Decree for the Armenians. - E. M.

15. Moreover the end which intention regards is not necessarily the ultimate end, as in fruition, as will be said in its own place. “Intention,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, a. 2, “regards the end according as it is the term of the motion of the will. But in motion the term can be taken in two ways. In one way, the ultimate term itself, in which one rests, which is the term of the whole motion. In another way, some means which is the principle of one part of the motion, and the end or term of another. As in a motion by which one goes from A into C through B, C is the ultimate term, but B is a term, though not the ultimate. And there can be intention of each. Whence, although it is always of an end, nevertheless it is not necessary that it always be of the ultimate end.... Fruition indeed imports rest, which is in the end, which pertains only to the ultimate end; but intention imports motion into the end, not into rest.”

1. By end here is properly understood that which the agent further intends through such and such an act, as the reason on account of which he operates. This is that end which is called the end of the one operating. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 2 Dist. 36. q. un. a. 5 ad 5, “that some act has a twofold end, namely the proximate end, which is its object, and the remote end, which the agent intends.” But if the agent does not intend another end diverse from the very intrinsic end of the action which he does, then the end of the one operating coincides with the end of the work, as appears in him who wishes to steal so that he may steal, i.e. so that he may become rich from another’s property. The end of the work cannot in any way be excluded by the one operating, if he himself knows the nature of the work; for that end is intrinsic to the work. Now the end of the one operating can be considered in two ways: 1.º with respect to the intention of the will, that is, with respect to the act of the will intending it; 2.º with respect to the act itself which is commanded, as a means to that end. Under the first consideration, the end is properly the object of the will, indeed its principal object, since the end is what moves the will to the means. Under the second consideration, the end is a mere circumstance of the commanded act, and thus is usually numbered among the circumstances. He who steals, for example, so that he may commit adultery, principally wills adultery; he intends this and efficaciously procures it. And from this adultery comes the principal malice of the will. But the act commanded for this reason by the will of adultery, namely theft, for example, has its own substantial malice from its proper object, that is, from the taking of another’s thing against the will of the owner; but that it is referred extrinsically by the one operating to such and such an end is altogether accidental to it, not from its own nature, but from the judgment of the one operating. Therefore the end which is a circumstance of the act is not the end itself of the work, which gives species to the act, but some adjoined end: just as the fact that a brave man acts bravely on account of the good of fortitude is not a circumstance; but it is a circumstance if he acts bravely for the liberation of the city, or for Christ, or something of this sort. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3 ad 3; q. 18. a. 6 ad 2.

2. The end of the one operating can be one thing as primary, another as secondary. The primary end is that which someone first proposes to himself, and is the cause simply of the action. The secondary end is that which is added to the primary, and is not the cause simply of the action, but only, with the primary end, impels that it be done better, that is, more eagerly, more easily, more pleasantly, etc.

28. • An end in general is that for the sake of which something is done.

It is twofold, namely the end of the work, that is, the end intrinsic to the work itself and toward which the work tends per se; and the end of the worker, that is, extrinsic to the work, and toward which the agent directs his intention at will, or which the agent has set before himself ¹. We must speak only about this latter end, since it alone is properly called the end.

¹ These two ends sometimes fall into the same thing, sometimes one is added to the other, sometimes, with the intrinsic end of the work set aside, one alone directs the act extrinsically.

Now that end is 1. intermediate or ultimate, according as it is referred to another end, or the will rests in it; - 2. positively ultimate, or negatively ultimate, according as it is intended or not intended with the exclusion of another end; - 3. primary or secondary, according as it is the totally motive cause of the act, or only partially impulsive. Again the ultimate end can be explicitly or implicitly intended, according as the agent is moved expressly or only virtually by an end of this kind.

I say 1. A human act takes true morality from the end. The reason is that the end can express an order of conformity and deformity to right reason. Thus it is conformable to right reason not only to give alms, but also to give it unto the remission of sins; just as likewise it is repugnant to right reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to make oneself drunk.

I say 2. He sins who acts for the sake of delight alone ². The reason is that he acts inordinately, perverting the order of things instituted by the author of nature. For according to the order instituted by the author of nature, delight is on account of operation, and not vice versa: namely, delight is like salt and a certain condiment, which serves to entice to actions of life necessary or useful. Therefore delight is only a means for carrying out actions more easily, better, and more constantly, but not the ultimate end of the action. For thus St. Thomas: The divine intellect, which is the institutor of nature, appended delights for the sake of operations. I-II, q. 4, art. 2.

² It is one thing to act for the sake of delight, another to act for the sake of delight alone. This latter positively excludes a further end of the work; but this exclusion of an end is inordinate, and indeed not only in desiring delight, but also in an act of any virtue whatever; because even an act of virtue, if it is exercised in such a way, or so stopped in itself, that the higher or ultimate end is positively excluded, by that very fact will already become vicious.

But that first thing involves no inordination of this kind. For first, delight, as St. Thomas says (Against the Gentiles, book 3, ch. 26, no. 6), is good and to be desired if it follows a good operation; and it is proper to the virtue of temperance to moderate the use of delightful things, and indeed to draw back from those things which are against reason, but not from those which are convenient according to reason (see St. Thomas, II-II, q. 141, art. 1, ad 1). But then the further end is not excluded, except perhaps negatively only. But a negative exclusion of the end does not vitiate the act; for it is not necessary for the honesty of an action to think about the further end, or even about the intrinsic end of the work. Therefore, that someone may honestly take delight from play, or food, or rest, it is in no way necessary that he think about the end, whether intrinsic or further, of play, or food, or rest; but it is sufficient that he apprehend the action as consonant with right reason, or also that he find nothing in it contrary to the order of reason; since, as St. Thomas has it (Supplement, q. 49, art. 4), from the same thing some act has that it is not evil in the genus of morals, and that it is good, because no act is indifferent.

From this the reason plainly comes forth why propositions VIII and IX concerning the work of marriage or the act of eating on account of pleasure alone were deservedly proscribed by Innocent XI. For they labor under an intrinsic vice on account of the predicate alone, which positively excludes any other ends, unto which actions of this kind are ordered. For otherwise, that someone is enticed and moved to the work by an appetite for delight, just as also to labor by hope of reward or wages, is consonant with the order of nature, as St. Thomas has it in the cited place. Compare the Salmanticenses (On Marriage, ch. 3, no. 33), Viva (On Proposition VIII of Innocent XI, no. 6), Duarte (Exposition of Condemned Propositions, no. 162), Roncaglia (On Marriage, q. II, ch. 1, q. 2, resp. 2), Pontius (On Marriage, book X, ch. 8, no. 6), Azor (part I, book 2, ch. 5, q. 4), etc.

It is confirmed from proposition 8 condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: To eat and drink unto satiety on account of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts. - Nevertheless this disorder is not grave per se, and therefore does not exceed venial sin; because ordinarily the ultimate end ³ is not excluded, not even implicitly, unless there is question of those of whom the Apostle says, Phil. 3. 19: Whose God is their belly.

³ The Author understands the ultimate end of human life, not the intrinsic end of those works about which the discussion is held. Moreover, that ultimate end is excluded through any grave sin, which the Author deservedly supposes in those whose God, as the Apostle says, is the belly.

148. 1. Principle: A human act receives some principal morality from the end, or intention on account of which it is done. For from this intention it can happen that an action is conformable or difform to right reason: for by force of the intention, an act indifferent of itself can become good or evil, a good act can become better or evil, an evil act can become worse. Thus a walk, indifferent of itself, is good if it is done so that afterward one may be more free for work or prayer, but evil if it is done in order to seek occasions of sinning; alms, good in itself, is rendered better if it is done from love of Christ, but evil if it is done in order to turn the poor man away from the true faith; theft, evil in itself, becomes worse if it is committed for the sake of drunkenness or lust.

But St. Thomas¹ declares thus that this morality, derived from the end, although not primary or fundamental nor essential, is principal: "To the second it must be said that the end, although it is not of the substance of the act, is nevertheless the most principal cause of the act, insofar as it moves the agent to acting; whence also a moral act most especially has species from the end."

¹ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 7, a. 4, ad 2.

149. 2. Corollaries. (A) An act good from the object, and referred to a good end, besides the objective goodness which it retains or can retain, acquires a new goodness, and sometimes a manifold one, from the intention or end.

Thus alms given to a poor man, for relieving him, on account of the love of God, and at the same time in satisfaction for sins, has a threefold goodness: that of mercy from the object, that of charity from the intention of loving God, and also that of penance, on account of the motive of making satisfaction for sins; for the agent truly seeks this threefold goodness, and his action is virtually and morally threefold.

We said: an act can retain its objective goodness. Indeed it in fact retains it if this is at least implicitly intended; but if it is in no way intended, and only the final goodness is sought, the act derives its morality solely from the end; thus if someone abstains from wine, not on account of the moral goodness of abstinence, about which he cares nothing, but in order more easily to preserve the health of the body.

From this it follows that those who wish to progress in the spiritual life and to acquire greater merits ought especially to take care concerning the purity and perfection of their intention, and to embrace several good ends; for the purer, more perfect, and more manifold the intention is (provided excessive anxiety about this matter is avoided), the more perfect is the manner of acting.

150. (B) An act good from the object, but referred to an evil end, (a) becomes totally evil if the depraved intention is the total and adequate cause for positing it; for example if someone bestows alms solely in order to turn the poor away from the true religion. For then the agent wills the good, not as it is good, but as a means to an evil end, and therefore as something evil.

(b) But if an act good of itself is posited partly on account of a good end and partly on account of an end lightly culpable, it is more probable that the whole is not vitiated, but that it is partly good and partly evil; for example if someone gives alms both in order to relieve the poor man and in order to catch praise. For then the will is truly borne toward the good object, and that tendency is not destroyed by the intention lightly culpable, which by no means turns us away from God.¹

¹ Thus Billuart, diss. IV, art. 4, § 2; Collet, De act. hum., cap. IV, art. 2, sect. 1, conclus. 1; Gury, n. 30; Ball. P., I, n. 98; Noldin, n. 65. - But Suarez, op. cit., disp. 8, sect. I; Vasquez, in Ia IIae, disp. 70, cap. 2; Walsh, n. 546-561, defend the contrary opinion.

But if the evil intention, although not the adequate cause of the act, is nevertheless gravely culpable - as is alms given partly in order to relieve the poor, but partly and especially in order to turn them away from the faith - the act is totally evil, at least much more probably; for that intention turns us away from God, and consequently prevents the act itself from pleasing God.

151. (C) An act evil from the object, and known as such, even referred to a good end, remains evil, though less so than if it were elicited on account of an evil end.

(a) It remains evil; for if the object is evil and is known as such, the good end does not prevent the will from seeking evil; for example, if someone steals in order to relieve a friend who is by no means placed in extreme necessity, by that very fact he wills the malice of theft, although the relief of the poor man is good. In this sense the Apostle says:¹ "And not (as we are slandered, and as some claim that we say) let us do evil that good may come." - Therefore it is not lawful to apply a means evil of itself in order to attain a good end.²

¹ Rom. III, 8.

² Therefore they slander Catholics who ascribe to them this saying: The end justifies the means. For theologians reprove it; while certain non-Catholics approve the same, among whom Matthew Prior, who wrote that from a good end even evil means become legitimate, and that only he sins who has a depraved intention:

"The end must justify the means, He only sins who ill intends."

Cf. The works of the english poets, London, 1810, t. X, p. 155; Etudes des PP. Jésuites, 5 August 1904, p. 357.

(b) Nevertheless a good end diminishes the malice of the act, because it shows that the affection toward evil is lesser, since the evil is not sought except from love of some good, or as a means for attaining an honorable end; thus, in the case brought forward, the malice of theft committed for doing good is less than that committed for harming one's neighbor. - Conversely, however, an evil end adds new malice to an act objectively evil, because it is difform from the rule of morals in a twofold way, as if someone steals in order to become drunk.

152. (D) An act indifferent from the object, but referred to a good end, receives from the end a certain goodness; but if it is ordered to an evil end, it receives moral malice from it. Thus to sing in order to praise God is an act of religion, while to sing in order to excite lust is a sin of scandal: for in the former case the will truly intends something good, in the latter something evil.

From this it is given to understand of how great importance it is to set before oneself an honorable end in all actions, even indifferent ones, so that all may become morally good.

17. b) Principal or primary end, and secondary or less principal end. This division is rather a subdivision of the end of the one operating (although it can also have place in the end of the work), and is of great importance in discerning the morality of acts. The principal end is that which is intended chiefly and principally, and which before the others impels the agent to acting. The secondary end is that which is joined with some principal end and for this reason is not intended by reason of itself alone, nor by itself alone moves the agent to acting. For example, the principal end of a priest saying Mass ought to be to worship God; his secondary end can be: to receive a stipend or alms for the application of the Mass. Or another example: the principal end (at least implicit) of a Christian ought to be, in any action, the glory of God; but the secondary end can be any honorable good.

156. Practical rules follow from this:

1. An act good from the object, referred to a good end, has a double goodness if both are intended, as if someone wills to relieve a poor man and does this for penance; if the goodness of the object is not intended, it has only the goodness of the end, because then the object is considered as only a means to the end, for example, if someone abstains from wine, not on account of the good of abstinence, about which he does not care at all, but solely in order to preserve continence more easily.

1. Hence care must be taken concerning intention, so that moral perfection may be increased.

2. An act evil from the object, referred to an evil end, has a double malice of object and end, for example, theft for fornication.

3. An act otherwise good according to itself and from the object, referred to an evil end which is the total and adequate reason why it is chosen, is good from no part but wholly evil, for example, if someone gives alms solely for fornication or in order to turn a poor man away from religion.

It is proved: a) from the Scriptures, Mt. VI, 2, 5, 22-23; Prov. XXI, 27; b) from the general principle: Goodness is not contracted unless it is intended and the agent is moved by it (n. 146). But in the present case the object is intended not as good in itself but as a means to an evil end: for it is not apprehended except as something evil, and consequently insofar as it is the object of this act it is not good but evil. Namely, the object communicates no goodness to the act, but only the intended end passes over into the notion of object. - In other words: to will good under the notion of evil is not good but evil; but he who acts solely on account of an evil end does not will goodness except under the notion of evil; therefore the act is totally evil.

4. An act good of itself or from the object, which is referred to an evil but partial end, so that this is not the only reason for acting, is evil from the end but good from the object, even if the end is mortally evil, for example, if someone intended to give alms for mercy and also to honor an idol; in practice, however, it almost never happens that a mortally evil act has a good end sufficiently disparate.

It is proved: an act is good from the object if goodness is intended in itself and on account of itself, and that intention is not vitiated. But in the case the goodness of the object is intended in itself and on account of itself, for the act is not done solely on account of the evil end; and on the other side that intention is not vitiated, because the good end is not sought on account of the evil end, to which it is not subordinated, nor is the evil intended on account of the good end. Therefore the act is good from the object. In other words: two independent and equally principal ends are intended, the intrinsic end of the object and the extrinsic end of the one acting, and therefore one physically single act is a twofold moral act.

5. An act evil from the object or circumstance, referred to a good end, remains evil, because an evil means is not proportioned to a good end, and the goodness of the end does not prevent there being a defect in the object and the means being evil, and the will appetizing evil; hence St. Paul, concerning those who slanderously charge us with the contrary, says: "And not (as we are slandered, and as some affirm that we say), let us do evil that there may come good: whose damnation is just" (Rom. III, 8; cf. Eccli. XXXIV, 23-24).

Nevertheless: a) It is less evil, 1) than an evil act ordered to an evil end, and indeed so much less as the good end is better, because the affection toward malice is so much less; also 2) than a good act exercised solely on account of an evil end, because then the goodness of the act is corrupted; but to corrupt good is worse than to order evil to good.

b) The very intention of the good end is good, if this is intended absolutely and on account of itself, to be obtained indeterminately by some means; and therefore at times it was rewarded by God (Exod. I, 20, 21). But it is evil if the end is intended not absolutely but precisely as moving to an evil means, or as to be obtained by an evil and no other means, because then the end is intended not as good in itself but as a cause moving to evil.

6. An act indifferent from the object and circumstances becomes good or evil from the end, which then passes over into the notion of object, which gives the first morality: thus to sing for the praise of God or for lust.

157. Observation.

A partial end can be related to an action in three ways:

a) it can merely precede it, so that it does not influence the action afterward to be placed, but rather is its occasion, as if someone from human respect approaches the sacred rite, which afterward he attends with due intention: this occasional end does not vitiate the action;

b) it can accompany it, so that together with another good end it is the cause of the action, as if someone plays the organ to praise God and for vainglory: this vitiates the action in part;

c) it can follow, if, after the action has already been begun from a good end, an evil end enters in, as if someone begins to sing for the praise of God and afterward something of ostentation also creeps in: this end likewise vitiates the action in part, supposing that it truly becomes the end of the action which is then continued on account of the good and evil end together; otherwise, during the good action, another evil act is placed, for example, of ostentation or vainglory, because this is not a circumstance of the prior action but merely accompanies it (n. 154; q. 19, a. 7, ad 2).

An end in general is that for the sake of which something is done; but it is distinguished as twofold, namely the end of the work, that is, the end intrinsic to the work itself and to which the work tends through itself; and the end of the one working, that is, the end to which the agent directs his intention at will, or which the agent has set before himself, whether it is the same as the end of the work, or is diverse from it and extrinsic to the work. Concerning this latter end only must we speak, since it alone is properly called the end.

But that end is: 1st, intermediate or ultimate, according as it is referred to another end, or the will rests in it; 2nd, positively or negatively ultimate, or, what is the same thing, simply and as to all things, or in a certain respect and in only some series ultimate, according as it is or is not intended with the exclusion of any other ultimate end whatsoever; 3rd, primary or secondary, according as it is intended first and through itself, or only consequently and with subordination to the primary. Again, the ultimate end can be intended explicitly or implicitly, according as the agent is moved by an end of this sort expressly or only virtually.

I say, 1st. A human act takes true morality from the end. The reason is that the freely intended end ultimately orders the act to this, that it be or not be conformable to right reason. But this ordering is diverse from that which the object and the other circumstances besides the end bestow upon the act. Thus it is conformable to right reason not only to give alms, but also to give them unto the remission of sins; just as likewise it is repugnant to right reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to make oneself drunk.

I say, 2nd. He sins who acts on account of delight alone, which he does not refer even implicitly or virtually to a further end. The reason is that delight is only a means for carrying out actions more easily, better, and more constantly, but not the ultimate end of an action. Therefore he who acts on account of delight alone perverts the order of things instituted by the author of nature. The same is clear from proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI, which sounds thus: "To eat and drink even to satiety on account of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can licitly enjoy its acts." Moreover this proposition, as Father Viva observes, was condemned both on account of the clause even to satiety, and on account of the word alone. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 4, art. 2. - Viva, on the cited proposition, nn. 5 and 6.

Yet it must be noted, 1st, that this disordering through itself is not grave, and therefore does not exceed venial sin; for he who behaves thus seeks, on the one hand, not a bad thing, but rather a good thing in an undue order, since, as St. Thomas says, Contra Gentiles, lib. 3, cap. 26, n. 6, "delight is good, and to be sought, if it follows a good operation"; and on the other hand he does not ordinarily place the ultimate end of his life in this undue mode of seeking, unless he is of the number of those concerning whom the Apostle says, Philipp. iii, 19: "whose God is the belly." Cf. St. Alphonsus, tract. on sins, n. 73; and tract. on matrimony, n. 912.

It must be noted, 2nd, that this disordering then only has place when someone so acts on account of delight alone that he positively excludes a further honest end. For he does not sin, not even venially, who expressly seeks the delight of food, for example, or of games, even if he does not actually think about a further end, provided only that in some way he virtually intends this further end; for instance, because he wills generally in all these things to behave honestly, and to admit nothing against the prescription of right reason, or because he is accustomed to assume them on account of some utility of soul or body, etc. For such a one must perhaps be said to act on account of delight, but not on account of delight alone. Cf. Viva, on prop. 8, condemned by Innocent XI, n. 6. - Salmantic., de matr., cap. 3, n. 33. - Baller., note (a), p. 26.

The end, on which the morality of an action also depends, is the motive of the action, the reason why it is done. It is obvious from what has been said above that the moral quality of an act depends on its motive or on the intention with which it is done; it is bad to steal, it is worse to steal in order to be able to commit adultery, according to the well-worn illustration.