Treatise I. On The Last End Of Man

Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol. I-II, q. 1-6; Contra gent. 3, 1 sqq.; Billuart, Sum. S. Thomae, treatise on the last end; L. Lehu, Phil. mor. I, De fine ultimo; V. Cathrein, Moralphil. I, Von der Bestimmung des Menschen.

Preliminary note. Already the old pagan philosophers admonished: "Whatever you do, do prudently and look to the end." The Psalmist teaches us to pray: "Make known to me, O Lord, my end,"¹ and on the contrary rebukes those who turn aside from their proper end: "They have all turned aside, they have together become unprofitable."² In the New Testament the end of human life is called the one necessary thing. "Martha, Martha, thou art anxious and troubled about many things. But one thing is necessary."³ Hence it is plain of how great importance a living knowledge of the true end of human life is. Hence also it is easily understood why men of all times have proposed to themselves the questions: Whence have I come? and whither am I going? The old pagans thought that they were going to Elysium; modern rationalists not rarely confess that they are ignorant of the end of human life. Whence Du Bois-Reymond said concerning it: Ignoramus et ignorabimus. - Before St. Thomas, in the moral part of the theological Summa, treats of human acts, that is, of the material object of Moral Theology, he first treats of the last end and of beatitude. In a similar way, also in the so-called spiritual Exercises, the beginning of the meditations is commonly taken from consideration of the last end; and in catechisms used in schools the first question is commonly put: "What is the end of human life? or for what are you on earth?" From all these things it appears most clearly that a brief dissertation on the last end is most conveniently placed at the beginning of Moral Theology. Certain notions must be set forth first.

¹ Ps. 38:5.

² Ps. 13:3.

³ Luke 10:41-42.

15. Definition of end. End "is that for the sake of which something is done,"⁴ or "that on account of which an agent operates." But it is called end because, once it has been obtained, the operation is ended or ceases, and the one operating rests; for example, the end of the physician operating is the health of the sick person to be effected; for the sake of recovering health the physician prescribes medicine, makes incisions, etc.; but when health has been recovered the action of the physician ceases. Accordingly end can be considered in two ways: 1. as the principle of willing (end in intention): in order to procure health the physician begins to labor; 2. as the term of action (end in execution): once health has been obtained the physician ceases to labor. Wherefore St. Thomas briefly says: "the end is compared to the act as principle or term."⁵

Divisions. Several divisions being passed over (which you may see in Billuart⁶), the following divisions seem to be noted for our purpose:

⁴ Aristotle, Ethic. Eudem. book 3, c. 11: "The end is that for the sake of which [something is done]."

⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3 ad 1.

⁶ Treatise on the last end, diss. 1, a. 1.

16. a) The end of the work, or intrinsic and objective end, and the end of the one operating, or extrinsic and subjective end. The end of the work is that to which the work or action directly and immediately tends from its nature, whether it is done by this agent or by another; for example, the giving of alms tends from its nature to relieving the necessity of the neighbor. Therefore the necessity of the neighbor to be relieved is the end of the work or the objective end of almsgiving.⁷ - The end of the one operating is that which the agent intends by operating, whether principally or secondarily. The end of the one operating can indeed coincide with the end of the work, as if one giving alms explicitly intends the assistance of the poor person; but it can also altogether disagree with the end of the work, for example, if one giving alms were to intend vain glory or the seduction of the poor person.⁸ The end of the one operating is materially the same as the moral motive of the action.

⁷ The end of the work is the same as the moral object of the action. This indeed must be noted especially in the indirectly voluntary. Cf. below n. 57.

⁸ Cf. S. theol. II-II, q. 141, a. 6 ad 1.

17. b) Principal or primary end, and secondary or less principal end. This division is rather a subdivision of the end of the one operating (although it can also have place in the end of the work), and is of great importance in discerning the morality of acts. The principal end is that which is intended chiefly and principally, and which before the others impels the agent to acting. The secondary end is that which is joined with some principal end and for this reason is not intended by reason of itself alone, nor by itself alone moves the agent to acting. For example, the principal end of a priest saying Mass ought to be to worship God; his secondary end can be: to receive a stipend or alms for the application of the Mass. Or another example: the principal end (at least implicit) of a Christian ought to be, in any action, the glory of God; but the secondary end can be any honorable good.

18. c) Last end and intermediate end. The simply last end (Endzweck) is that which is so desired that it is referred to no other; on the contrary, all other things are referred to it. The intermediate end (which is also sometimes called proximate) is that which is indeed desired by reason of itself, but nevertheless with relation and dependence upon the last end.⁹

Note 1. The principal end can at the same time be last, but it is not always necessary that it be so. Thus the principal end of him who, existing in sanctifying grace, knowingly commits a venial sin is some created good loved inordinately; but the last end of this sinner remains God. Let there be an example: a just man, who knowingly tells a small lie because he is placed in some difficulty, has in this act as principal end liberation from the difficulty; but nevertheless he does not wish to be turned away from God as his last end.

⁹ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3, where the Angelic very wisely teaches "that the same act in number, insofar as it once proceeds from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end, from which it has its species." - Some theologians undeservedly affirm that an intermediate end is not truly and properly an end, but only a means for obtaining the true end. Cf. Billuart, De ult. fine a. 1.

19. Note 2. End and good are the same materially, because the will cannot be moved or enticed except by good (true or apparent); or in other words: all acts which are produced by the human will are on account of some end or on account of some good to be obtained. Hence even the suicide, who intends his own annihilation, intends together with that end some good (indeed in reality a false one), namely liberation from the evils pressing upon him. Therefore no one can will evil as evil; but if he knowingly intends evil, nevertheless he wills it under the aspect of good. For this reason the scholastics said briefly indeed but most truly: "Evil is not desirable"; and the Angelic Doctor writes very well to the point:¹⁰ "It is impossible that any evil, insofar as it is such, be desired, either by natural appetite, or by animal appetite, or by intellectual appetite, which is the will." - But it was deliberately said that good is the end of acts which are produced by the will. For there are some acts produced by man, but not by his will, for example, the acts so-called "first-first," which happen suddenly and before deliberate will, as when someone, unexpectedly struck by pain, suddenly cries out. Acts of this kind are commonly called acts of man, but not human acts. Even those acts are done materially on account of good and end, but not on account of good and end known.¹¹ - Although end and good materially agree, nevertheless they differ formally, or the concept of good differs from the concept of end. For good is conceived as something suitable to appetite, but end as something to be obtained by means employed.

Proposition 1

¹⁰ S. theol. I, q. 19, a. 9.

¹¹ Cf. below n. 26 sqq.

20. God is the last end of man and of his acts, so that man is bound to tend toward God and to glorify Him.

Proof. We presuppose, both from sound philosophy and from Catholic faith, that a personal God, infinitely perfect, exists, and that He freely created the world and man. These things having been presupposed, the stated proposition can easily be proved. For man and every creature must tend toward that last end which God wished to obtain by creating; otherwise God would not be the supreme and omnipotent Lord of creation. Now the end which God proposed to Himself in creating cannot be something outside Himself, but He Himself is His own end. For every end placed outside the one operating is intended as some good not yet possessed. Therefore the one operating would intend something foreign, if he already had that thing in himself? - Therefore God, in all His operations and accordingly also in the creation of man, cannot intend something outside Himself, because He is infinitely perfect, containing all goods in Himself. "The Lord has wrought all things for Himself."¹² It follows therefore that God Himself, that is, the manifestation of His glory, is the end of the creation of man and of the whole world; and accordingly all creatures ought to intend the glory of God as the last end. Hence St. Thomas says: "The whole universe with its individual parts is ordered to God as to an end, insofar as in them, by a certain imitation, the divine goodness is represented unto the glory of God."¹³

Irrational creatures intend this end by a coerced necessity; for they are as it were vestiges of the divinity,¹⁴ and the perfections and beauties shining in them necessarily manifest the majesty of God the Creator. Whence the Psalmist¹⁵ exclaims: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of His hands." But rational creatures, such as man and angel, are bound to glorify God freely; for they are not only vestiges but also images of the divinity,¹⁶ and they are endowed with free choice. Rational creatures ought to glorify God insofar as they willingly acknowledge His majesty with subjection and praise, and venerate and love Him. Certainly this glorification offered to God by creatures does not increase His beatitude, for the Psalmist¹⁷ says: "Thou art my God, since Thou hast no need of my goods." For God is infinitely perfect and infinitely blessed. Therefore the Vatican Council¹⁸ deservedly teaches that "God, by His goodness and omnipotent power, not for increasing His beatitude, nor for acquiring it, but for manifesting His perfection through the goods which He imparts to creatures, by a most free counsel, together from the beginning of time created each creature out of nothing"; and it pronounces anathema upon him who should deny that the world was created for the glory of God. But since man is immortal, he must also glorify God in the other life; and this indeed is done by the damned through the manifestation of divine justice and omnipotence, but by the just who are blessed through the manifestation of divine mercy and goodness. Throughout all eternity the blessed will glorify God through intimate union with Him. Therefore God, just as He is the principle, so also is the last end of man; or, as it is said metaphorically, God is Α and Ω.

Man is bound to glorify God by all his acts, by serving and obeying Him and by loving and venerating Him. I say: by all his acts. Therefore if he should fail to do this even by one deliberate act, he sins. In this sense the Apostle St. Paul¹⁹ admonishes: "Therefore whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do all things unto the glory of God." - It is not required, however, that man in all his acts explicitly and expressly intend the glory of God; but it suffices that he at some time elicit an act of charity, and that his remaining acts be virtually ordered to the last end, or God. But if man elicits acts which cannot be referred to the last end, he sins; and indeed gravely, if acts of this kind are altogether opposed to the last end, or God; but venially, if in the elicited acts there is not aversion, but only some deflection from the last end on account of an inordinate affection for a temporal good.

Proposition 2

¹² Prov. 16:4.

¹³ S. theol. I, q. 65, a. 2.

¹⁴ Job 11:7; S. theol. I, q. 93, a. 2.

¹⁵ Ps. 18:2.

¹⁶ Gen. 1:26 sq.; S. theol. I, q. 93, a. 1 sqq.

¹⁷ Ps. 15:2.

¹⁸ Const. "Dei Filius" cap. 1, can. 5.

¹⁹ 1 Cor. 10:31.

21. a) In the attainment of this last end consists human beatitude; b) and the more perfect the attainment is, the greater the beatitude is; c) but in no other thing does true beatitude of man exist or can it exist.

Preliminary note. Before the proof of this assertion, there must be recalled to mind a fact confirmed by daily experience: that there is in man an innate desire for beatitude.²⁰ All, as many as there are in the world, wish to be happy, and no one wishes to be unhappy and miserable. But since this desire is innate, it is also natural and necessary, so that man cannot cast it out. Thus all teach, beginning from Aristotle and Plato down to our contemporaries. Indeed the pessimist Schopenhauer²¹ admits this. But a natural desire cannot be vain;²² and therefore something must exist which can truly satisfy this desire. Otherwise the author of nature would have acted irrationally, indeed even cruelly. - Beatitude is commonly distinguished as objective and formal; objective beatitude is the beatifying thing itself, but formal beatitude is the use or enjoyment of that beatifying thing. Thus, for example, the objective beatitude of the miser is riches, but formal beatitude is the enjoyment of riches. Yet this distinction of objective and formal beatitude does not designate two distinct beatitudes, but two formalities or two integral parts of the same beatitude. For man is not happy from the thing alone, but from the enjoyment of the thing. We treat at the same time of the objective and formal beatitude of man. These things having been noted beforehand, the first part of the proposition is proved.

Proof. a) Beatitude is conveniently defined: the stable, that is, interminable possession of the perfect good which totally quiets our desire.²³ But a possession of this kind is had in the attainment of the last end. Therefore in the attainment of the last end consists human beatitude. The major is explained: for perfect beatitude there is required stable or interminable possession of good; for if the beloved good is lost, indeed if it can be lost, beatitude is no longer present; for a lost good or fear of losing the good stands in the way of perfect beatitude. Moreover there is required possession of a good perfect in every respect, which totally quiets desire. For if the good possessed is imperfect and does not totally quiet desire, beatitude necessarily remains imperfect. The reason is that unsatisfied desire causes unhappiness. Wherefore briefly and yet adequately St. Thomas²⁴ describes beatitude: "Nothing else is understood under the name of beatitude except the perfect good of an intellectual creature, to whom it belongs to know his sufficiency in the good which he has." - The minor of the syllogism is plain from the first proposition, which asserted that God is the last end of man. That God is a good altogether perfect is plain of itself. But there is no reason why God should wish again to dissolve the union of the creature with Himself once had. Therefore this union will be interminable or eternal, and in union with God, the infinite good, human desire is satisfied in the most perfect way,²⁵ and the beatitude of man consists. Wherefore Benedict XII on 29 January 1336 declared: "By apostolic authority we define, ... that the souls of the saints ... enjoy the divine essence, and also that from such vision and enjoyment the souls of those who have already departed are truly blessed and have eternal life and rest."²⁶ - Since God is pure spirit, and since man according to his better part, that is, according to the soul, is likewise spirit, hence the union of man with God will be spiritual, and that most intimate. Spiritual union is made through knowledge and love. Therefore man will be united with God, the last end, and accordingly blessed, if he clearly knows God and perfectly loves Him. While in this life man is a pilgrim away from God, he knows God very imperfectly, enigmatically and as if through a mirror; but in heaven he will see God face to face. But although, with the light of glory assisting, the blessed in heaven clearly behold the majesty of God, nevertheless they cannot perfectly comprehend God, inasmuch as He is incomprehensible and infinite. But no finite intellective power can comprehend an infinite being. The knowledge or vision of God will be the first and essential constitutive element of (formal) beatitude in heaven; or formal beatitude is the best operation of the best human power with respect to the best object. Yet with that vision or contemplation of the divine essence there is intimately joined the perfect love of God above all things.²⁷

²⁰ St. Thomas says: "It does not pertain to free choice that we wish to be happy, but to natural instinct," S. theol. I, q. 19, a. 10.

²¹ Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik II, 196, § 14. Therefore Hilty (Das Gluck I, 179) rightly says: "Happiness is properly the key of all our thoughts.... It is the final ground of all learning, striving, and of all civil and ecclesiastical institutions. One may scold that as Eudaimonism, if one will; but it is the life-goal of men: they wish to be happy at any price."

²² S. theol. I, q. 75, a. 6.

²³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 5, a. 3 and 4. "Beatitude, since it is a perfect and sufficient good, excludes every evil and fulfills every desire."

²⁴ Ibid. I, q. 26, a. 1.

²⁵ S. theol. I-II, q. 5, a. 4.

²⁶ Denz. n. 530.

²⁷ It has been much and sharply disputed among theologians in what eternal beatitude more essentially and formally consists: whether in vision or in love, whether in some habit deifying the essence of the soul or in some transfusion of God into the soul of the blessed. (Concerning all these things see Billuart, De beatitudine a. 2.) St. Thomas (S. theol. I-II, q. 3, a. 5) writes: "The last and perfect beatitude, which is awaited in the future life, consists wholly and principally in contemplation."

22. b) The second part of the given proposition, The more perfect the attainment of the last end is, the greater the beatitude is, can easily be proved. For the last end is God, infinitely perfect and blessed. But the more perfectly this infinite good is possessed, the more perfect the beatitude of the possessor necessarily is. This becomes clear by diverse examples: the nearer someone comes to fire, the greater heat he receives from the fire. The nearer someone is to light, the greater illumination he receives. In this earth, indeed, God is possessed in a very imperfect way by the just, because the knowledge of God in this state is very imperfect, and because so many dangers of losing God are present. But in heaven beatitude is more perfect; nevertheless it is not equal for all the saints. "In My Father's house there are many mansions,"²⁸ said Christ. All the saints indeed see God face to face, or have the beatific vision, but not all see God in an equal way. The reason is that the "light of glory," by means of which the beatific vision becomes possible, is not possessed by all the saints in the same degree. For the light of glory corresponds to the sanctifying grace had in this earthly life. Now just as the same degree of sanctifying grace is not had by different men at the time of death, so after death the blessed do not have the same degree of the light of glory in heaven. Whence the saints in heaven are compared by St. Paul to the stars in the firmament. And as star differs from star, so one saint differs from another. The old scholastics are accustomed to express this truth briefly and forcefully in this way: all the saints see the same object, namely God, but not in the same degree of perfection.²⁹

²⁸ John 14:2.

²⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, l. c. I, q. 12, a. 6.

23. c) The third part of the proposition, But in no other thing does true beatitude of man exist or can it exist, is altogether denied both by ancient and by modern rationalists. Some of them think that the beatitude of man consists in pleasure or the best enjoyment of all the goods of life. Thus the ancient and modern Epicureans. Others place beatitude in virtue and in even-minded endurance of pains. Thus the Stoics. Others think that supreme beatitude consists in the destruction of the world, as being the receptacle of all evils. Thus Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and generally the pessimists. Others have devised other opinions. Already Lactantius³⁰ enumerates ten opinions concerning beatitude: "Epicurus judges that the highest good is in pleasure of the soul; Aristippus, in pleasure of the body; Callipho and Dinomachus joined honorableness with pleasure; Diodorus, with privation of pain. Hieronymus placed the highest good in not suffering pain; but the Peripatetics in goods of soul and body and fortune; the highest good of Herillus is knowledge; of Zeno, to live congruently with nature; of certain Stoics, to follow virtue; Aristotle placed the highest good in honorableness and virtue." Moderns have devised still other opinions, which there is no time to enumerate here. But that all of them together are false is demonstrated by this evident argument: all those contrary opinions place supreme beatitude in some created and finite good. But no created and finite good, whatever finally it may be, can be the perfect beatitude of man. Therefore all contrary opinions are false. The major of this syllogism is plain by running through the individual opinions of the adversaries. The minor is proved: no created good lasts perpetually, but passes away in the course of time. Now nothing which is thus transitory can perfectly satisfy the human appetite, as was already said and proved above. Moreover, even if those created goods were stable, nevertheless they could not perfectly satisfy the human appetite, because, experience testifying, the more they abound, the more they inflame desire, according to that worn adage: "The more waters are drunk, the more they are thirsted for." Moreover history offers many examples of men who, although truly heaped up with all earthly goods, nevertheless denied that they were happy. The richest Solomon is witness, most wise and satiated with all pleasures, who nevertheless exclaimed: "Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity,"³¹ and: "I have seen all things which are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity and affliction of spirit."³² But the intrinsic reason of this insufficiency is that the object of our will and desire is universal and every good.³³ Now no created thing is universal good, but a particular or determinate good, and accordingly is not the adequate object of the human will. This indeed St. Augustine,³⁴ inwardly sensing, exclaims: "Our heart is restless until it rests in Thee, O God." St. Bernard,³⁵ however, says: "The rational soul can be occupied by all other things; it cannot be filled. Whatever is less than God will not fill that which is capable of God"; and St. Thomas³⁶ affirms: "Nothing finite can quiet the desire of the intellect, which is shown from this, that the intellect, any finite thing being given, strives for something beyond."

Proposition 3

³⁰ De instit. book 3, c. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 6, 364). Indeed St. Augustine (De civ. Dei 19, 1 [Migne, l.c. 41, 621]) says that according to Marcus Varro, 288 diverse opinions of philosophers concerning the highest good of man can be established.

³¹ Eccles. 1:2.

³² Ibid., v. 14.

³³ Cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 2, a. 8.

³⁴ Confess. book 1, c. 1 (Migne, Patr. lat. 32, 661).

³⁵ Declamationes de colloquio Simonis cum Iesu (Migne, Patr. lat. 184, 455).

³⁶ Contra gent. 3, 50; cf. S. theol. I-II, q. 2, a. 8.

24. The last end of man, that is, perfect beatitude, cannot be obtained without supernatural grace, which indeed is given sufficiently to all on account of the redemption of Christ.

Proof. The first part of this proposition is easily proved. For above it was proved that perfect beatitude consists in the vision of the divine essence and in intimate conjunction with God. Now by merely natural powers, without supernatural help, man is not able to elevate himself to this intimate conjunction with God, nor can any created intellect see the essence of God.³⁷ For knowledge takes place according as the known object is in the cognitive faculty, as the scholastics rightly teach. Now the human intellect cannot by its natural power receive into itself the divine essence to be known, since that essence exceeds its mode of being. For the eye of the created intellect is with respect to the essence of God like the eye of the owl, which cannot look upon the sun. Therefore, for obtaining beatitude, there is required some supernatural help, which is grace and the light of glory. What this grace is, and what this light of glory is, belongs rather to Dogmatics to investigate.

³⁷ Cf. S. theol. I, q. 12, a. 4, and Cajetan's Commentary on this article. Moreover S. theol. I-II, q. 62, a. 1.

25. In the second part of the proposition it is affirmed that this supernatural grace is given sufficiently to all. For God has implanted in the soul an ineluctable desire of true and perfect beatitude. Therefore it would be unfitting if the same God had not given sufficient means for satisfying that desire and for obtaining perfect beatitude. - Moreover, Christ died for all and merited sufficient graces for all, so that they could be saved.

It does not belong to this place to search more intimately into the essence and existence of that sufficient grace, because this rather pertains to Dogmatics. Nevertheless two things are to be noted:

1. To baptized infants and to all those who, not having attained the use of reason, die in the state of sanctifying grace, beatitude is given as an inheritance; but to adults having the use of reason, as a reward. Accordingly adult men are bound by their good acts to merit eternal life, and indeed by cooperating well with the grace received.

2. All theologians are accustomed to distinguish between the natural order and the supernatural order. The natural order is understood as that which can be observed by proper natural powers, and in which natural reason is the supreme rule and norm of human acts. The supernatural order is that order which exceeds natural human powers, and in which human actions are regulated also according to theological faith. The purely natural order, or, as it is also commonly called, the state of pure nature, is indeed possible, but in reality it has never existed. For God from the beginning at once elevated the first parents, and in them the whole human race, to the supernatural order; indeed, according to St. Thomas,³⁸ the first man was immediately created in sanctifying grace and accordingly in the supernatural order. In other words: from creation God preappointed a supernatural end for man, so that all human acts ought at least implicitly to be directed to the supernatural end. If they are directed to it, they are good; otherwise they are evil. From these things there follow two corollaries of great importance: 1. there are not human acts indifferent in the individual, as will be proved more broadly below at n. 129; 2. there is not a purely philosophical sin, that is, a human act which would indeed be against right natural reason, but not against the supernatural end. That philosophical sin is not given is now certain, since the contrary opinion was condemned by Alexander VIII on 24 August 1690: "Philosophical or moral sin is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason; but theological and mortal [sin] is a free transgression of the divine law. The philosophical, however grave it may be, in him who either is ignorant of God or does not actually think of God, is a grave sin, but is not an offense against God, nor a mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment." This proposition was declared "scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous."³⁹ John de Lugo,⁴⁰ before the condemnation of this proposition, keenly defended philosophical sin, for example, philosophical adultery.

³⁸ S. theol. I, q. 95, a. 1.

³⁹ Denz. n. 1290.

⁴⁰ De incarn. disp. 5, sect. 5 (Paris ed. 1868, t. II, pp. 338-356, especially 352-353). Likewise Maes, Musnier, Caramuel, and others admitted philosophical sins. Cf. Hurter, Nomenclator IV, 407.