I. On the Nature of the Human Act

What are human acts? - An act in created things is the determination of some potency or faculty. Hence human acts are acts of human faculties. But human acts are considered in moral theology in the genus of morals, or insofar as they are moral acts. Hence here "moral acts and human acts are the same." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3. But "the genus of morals begins where dominion of the will is first found." S. Th. 2. D. 24. q. 3. a. 2. Therefore human acts are, in general, acts of man by which man himself orders himself to an end suitable to him. Therefore human acts can be considered either in relation to the man who is ordered to the end by them, or in relation to the end to which he is ordered by their help. We shall speak step by step of human acts considered in both respects. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; E. M. n. 4.

What is the division of the treatment of human acts in relation to man? - Human acts, considered in relation to man, can be inspected in two ways: 1. Insofar as they proceed from human faculties, which is to consider them in their intrinsic nature. For an act in general, in created things, as was just said, is nothing other than the determination of some faculty from being able to be to being. And therefore they are called acts, not actions. For an act is so called by reason of its intrinsic principle; an action, when it comes forth outwardly, from which also the effect differs if it follows, for the action is the object of the act. 2. Insofar as they fall short of this proper nature of theirs because of impediments, which do not allow the human faculties to act rightly.

We shall speak first of the intrinsic nature of the human act; then of its impediments. E. M.

What is the intrinsic nature of the human act? - Usage has obtained that a distinction be made between an act of man and a human act. An act of man is called one which proceeds from man without advertence and deliberation, or without deliberation only. But human acts are called those which proceed, not in any way whatever, but with advertence and deliberation. Nor indeed was that distinction made without reason. For "of the actions which are done by man, those alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man" (namely adequately, both as to the substance of the work and as to the mode of operating). "But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts.... But man is master of his acts through reason and will; hence free choice is said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions befit man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human actions, since they are not of man insofar as he is man." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1.

Moreover, a human act can be elicited or commanded, according as it is performed by the will alone, or also by another potency; merely internal or external, or mixed, according as it is performed by a power of the soul alone, or also by another faculty of the body; natural or supernatural, according as it is brought about by the powers of nature alone, or also by the powers of grace; good, bad, indifferent, and meritorious or demeritorious from its relation and order to the rule of morality, to reward or punishment; valid or invalid, according as it has all the things required for its effect, or not.

Now, since a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, and therefore voluntary and free, so that we may know its nature more deeply, it is necessary briefly to explain 1. the nature of the voluntary, 2. the nature of the free, 3. finally, in how many ways any act can proceed from a deliberate will. And this is done in the following questions. E. M. n. 6, 69, 71, 72, 74, 89.

What is the voluntary; how many acceptions of the voluntary are there? - R. To the first: The voluntary, so called from the will, is that which proceeds from or is caused by the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore the voluntary is nothing except either an act of the will or the effect of that act. Therefore the voluntary differs from the willed, which designates only the object of the act of the will. Since the voluntary proceeds from the will, which is a principle intrinsic to the agent, it agrees with any natural motion, but differs from the violent; for the former proceeds from an intrinsic principle, the latter from an extrinsic principle.

R. To the second: The voluntary can be taken in three ways: 1. more broadly, for the spontaneous; 2. more strictly, for the voluntary precisely as such, namely insofar as it differs from the spontaneous and from the free, or at least abstracts from the free; 3. most strictly, for the free. The spontaneous is that which proceeds from the sensitive appetite from a prior sensitive cognition of the object toward which the appetite tends. "The reason is that, just as the appetite of nature follows from the natural form, so the elicited appetite follows from the apprehended form, the act representing the object." Suarez, on 1. 2, tr. 2, d. 6, s. 4. Therefore the spontaneous belongs both to men and to brute animals.

The voluntary properly is that which proceeds from the spiritual appetite, or will, with prior rational cognition of the object or end. Finally, the free is that which proceeds from the will determining itself to an act, with the power of eliciting that very act, or not eliciting it, or of eliciting another. Therefore the free essentially includes the notion of the voluntary; and the voluntary also essentially includes the notion of the free, if indeed the voluntary is taken according to the proper meaning of the word, but adequately, both as to the substance of the act and as to the mode of operation proper to the will. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1, 2; q. 8. a. 1; q. 26. a. 1; 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 1; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 1, 3, 6; L. 1. 5. n. 6.

You will resolve: The voluntary cannot be had without prior cognition. Nothing is willed unless first known. Nevertheless a clear and distinct knowledge of the thing is not always necessary; for obscure and confused knowledge is sufficient. And thus an adult is validly baptized, even though he does not yet have all Christian obligations fully examined. Moreover, the voluntary cannot exist except concerning a determinate thing. For the will is moved only to the good; but the good has the notion of an end. "Since the good is what all things seek, and this has the notion of an end, it is manifest that the good imports the notion of an end." S. Th. 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. But an end is nothing except something certain and determinate. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. And therefore he who wills to contract betrothal with either one of two women does not contract; and the priest who wills to consecrate any one host out of several hosts does not consecrate. Sanchez, l. 1, d. 26, s. 1; Rubr. Miss. de Defect., title 7, n. 1; L. 1. 3. n. 203, 224.

Finally, the voluntary cannot exist concerning an impossible thing. For "the will is a certain rational appetite; but every appetite is only of the good. The reason for this is that appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination into something. But nothing is inclined except into something similar and suitable." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. Yet it is by no means required that the voluntary be only concerning a true and real good. "For the will to tend into something, it is not required that it be good in the truth of the thing, but that it be apprehended under the notion of good; and on account of this the Philosopher says: the end is a good, or an apparent good." S. Th. 1. c.

Can the voluntary at least exist concerning a thing impossible, not in fact, but in law? - Concerning a thing impossible as to the fact itself, the voluntary cannot exist, as is clear from what was said in n. 9, if one uses reason rightly. Hence no one can seriously will to touch with his hand the empty space outside the world.

Concerning a thing impossible only as to law, there is a question: for example, contracting marriage with one who has a diriment impediment, consecrating water, baptizing with wine, etc. But it seems that this must be affirmed; since the will is borne into the fact itself, and it is not necessarily borne at the same time into the law, or into the fact only dependently upon the law. And thus one who contracts marriage with a diriment impediment unknown to him, and one who even attempts marriage before a civil magistrate, truly wills, as far as he is concerned, to contract marriage. Hence it is that the Church afterward sometimes dispenses in the root, namely without a renewed consent, and validates the marriage. And indeed C. Ex sponsalibus, sole chapter, de Spons. et Matr. in the Sixth, says: "From pure and certain betrothals, even if they are null by reason of consanguinity, affinity, frigidity, religion, or any other reason whatever, provided they are not null from defect of consent, there arises ... the impediment of public honesty of justice." Therefore true consent with a diriment impediment is openly supposed. Cf. vol. 2, n. 1033; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 2, d. 33.

What is the free, and how many kinds are there? - The free adds to the voluntary only a relation to the potency eliciting the voluntary act and having the power to suspend it, or to elicit another act, different only in species, or even opposed. In the first case it is called liberty of exercise or of contradiction. In the second case, liberty of specification. In the third case, liberty of contrariety.

Therefore the free certainly requires in the potency or faculty an intrinsic dominion of the act, and accordingly immunity not only from extrinsic coercion, but also from intrinsic necessity; but it by no means requires immunity also from weakness, namely from concupiscence and the other miseries of human life, which, as extrinsic, and neither coercing nor necessitating, cannot change the intrinsic manner of acting of the human will. "The free is that which is the cause of itself." S. Th. C. G. l. 2, c. 48. And this liberty is altogether necessary for meriting or demeriting.

This liberty of which we are speaking is physical liberty. But moral liberty involves in its concept the absence not only of physical necessity of acting, but also of moral obligation by force of a law commanding or prohibiting. S. Th. 1. p. q. 83; 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; E. M. n. 10, 11.

There is indeed no doubt that various interior dispositions of the soul and body of man, and also exterior conditions of man, can influence human acts. Hence moral statistics collects the moral facts of men, in various conditions of persons, in order to investigate their causes, whether internal or external. And it especially dwells upon enumerating criminal facts. But criminal anthropology insists upon investigating the causes of crimes, some of which are internal, various diseases, neurasthenia, epilepsy, etc., others external, education, the company of associates, the reading of books and newspapers, etc. Psychopathology or Psychiatry considers the influence of various diseases upon various crimes. But from all these exterior and interior causes, although the voluntary and the free can be diminished, as will later be seen in the impediments of human acts, nevertheless liberty is by no means taken away, unless madness entirely perverts the use of reason. For from these there can indeed be inadvertence, inconsideration, ignorance, the excitation of concupiscence and of the passions, a contracted habit, and imaginations clinging to the mind, and certain fixed judgments; by all of these an inclination to acting can indeed be had, greater or lesser, but in no way an intrinsic necessity of acting. If the intellective faculty is not injured, through whatever bodily disturbance, the liberty of the will always remains.

In human acts is the free truly found not only from coercion, but also from necessity? - R. Affirmatively. It is a truth of faith, which is most openly clear from Scripture and Tradition; notably from Trent, sess. 6, c. 4-6. The reason is that "if some good is proposed to the will which has the complete notion of good, as the ultimate end, on account of which all things are sought, it cannot not will to be happy, or will to be miserable. But in those things which are ordered to the ultimate end, nothing is found so evil that it does not have some good mixed in, nor anything so good that it suffices in all respects; hence, however much the good or the evil is shown, it can always adhere and flee into the contrary by reason of the other thing which is in it; from which it is taken, if it is evil simply, as an apparent good; and if it is good simply, as an apparent evil; and hence it is that in all things which fall under election the will remains free, having determination in this alone, that it naturally seeks happiness, and not determinately in this or in that." S. Th. 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 2.

Hence, as is clear, that power toward opposites, by which the act of the will is placed by the will itself, presupposes in its exercise the objective indifference of the judgment of the intellect, which consists in this: that the intellect proposes to the will in the object various notions of suitability or unsuitability, of good or evil. Therefore liberty is concerned with particular goods to be sought. But as regards the seeking of happiness in general, the human will is not free as to the specification of the act, because it cannot will the opposite; but it is free as to the exercise of the act, because someone can not wish then to think about beatitude. S. Th. de Malo, q. 6, sole article.

From the liberty by which human acts are performed, they are said to be imputable to the agent, namely the honesty or baseness of the act redounds to the agent himself, as to its author. Eccl. 15:11 ff.; Trent, sess. 6, c. 4-6; St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 105; S. Th. 1. 2, Prologue, q. 10. a. 2; q. 13. a. 6; 2. D. 25. q. 1. a. 1; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 2; Wurzburg, de Act. hum., c. 2; E. M. n. 10, 11.

"It follows that, when a grave temptation has arisen, and after the sensitive appetite, concupiscible, venereal, or irascible, is vehemently excited by phantasy or from elsewhere, then, I say, acts of a threefold kind can be given in the will. 1. Those which precede the use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant or time in which the intellect does not yet propose to the will motives deterring it, but only motives enticing it toward that object into which the appetite is borne. And these acts of the will are called first-first motions. 2. Those which follow upon some use of reason, and are elicited by the one tempted in that instant in which the intellect proposes the deterring motives only obscurely, but the enticing motives toward illicit love or toward hatred so vividly that the will is moved only weakly and imperfectly by the deterring motives.

And these acts of the will are called second-first motions. 3. Finally, those which follow upon the perfect use of reason, and are elicited by the will in that instant in which the intellect has proposed to the will, sufficiently clearly and intensely, deterring motives or the unsuitability and moral malice, by which the will could freely be deterred if it seriously wished. And these acts of the will are called deliberate acts. "Acts of the first kind are not free, and consequently they are not formally sinful. But acts of the second kind are imperfectly free, and only venially sinful. But acts of the third kind are perfectly free, and consequently, if there is gravity of matter, they are mortally sinful." Struggl, Theol. Mor., tr. 1, q. 1, a. 1, v. 10; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3.

In how many ways does the voluntary proceed from the will? Since the voluntary presupposes the apprehension of the intellect, includes an act of the will and the exercise of liberty, and extends itself also to some extrinsic act, or extrinsic action, hence the voluntary is from the will in many ways, and from this arise various divisions of the voluntary, which we shall now explain.

What is the voluntary elicitedly and commandingly? - The first is had when the whole act is performed by the will and in the will, without the aid of another faculty, whether interior and spiritual, or exterior and bodily; such are volitions and nolitions.

The second is had when the act indeed depends upon the very command of the will, but nevertheless is performed by another faculty of the agent; whether interior, as are the intellect, phantasy, memory; or exterior, as are the members of the body and the organs of the senses, as to walk or to speak. But an act can be at the same time elicited and commanded; for the will can command itself in its own acts. And in this way one virtue, for example charity, commands the acts of other virtues, when the will from the motive of one virtue elicits the act of another virtue, for example, from love of God it has mercy on the poor. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1 ad 2; q. 17. a. 5; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 10, s. 1, 2.

What is the division of acts elicited by the will? - The division is twofold, according as these acts consist in the pursuit of good, or in flight from evil; and according as they are concerned with the end or with the means.

What are the acts of the will which consist in the pursuit of good and in flight from evil? - These acts of the will can be distinguished according as the passions of the sensitive appetite, to which they correspond, are distinguished. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 22. Now the passions are: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; finally anger, which has no opposite.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. The first three are passions of the concupiscible; the four latter are passions of the irascible. Love is the simple complacency of good, which proceeds from the connaturality and coaptation of the one appetizing with regard to the thing suitable to him. Dilection adds to love a preceding election; charity adds to love a certain perfection, insofar as that which is loved is esteemed of great price. One love is of friendship, another of concupiscence. For to love is to will good to someone. Toward that good which someone wills to someone there is love of concupiscence. Toward that to which someone wills good there is love of friendship. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 26.

Hatred is the simple displeasure and detestation of evil, which arises from a certain dissonance of the appetite toward that which is apprehended as repugnant and harmful. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 29. One hatred is of abomination, another of enmity. The former is the detestation of some evil of a person; the latter is also the detestation of the person himself, to whom one wills evil. Concupiscence or desire is the movement of the appetite into an absent good. Flight or abomination is the detestation of an absent evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30.

Delight is a certain repose of the appetite from the presence of a delighting good. Sadness is a certain pain from the presence of evil. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 31, 35. Hope is the movement of the appetite into a future good, arduous, possible to obtain, and according to this possibility or impossibility hope differs from despair. Hence it is that hope imports a certain approach to an arduous good; despair, on the contrary, imports withdrawal from it. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 40. a. 1, 4. "Fear flees future harm because of its victory over the one fearing; but daring attacks imminent danger because of its victory over the danger itself." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1. For fear "does not regard evil absolutely, but with a certain difficulty or arduousness, so that it can scarcely be resisted." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 41. a. 2 ad 3. "According to the opposition of good and evil, fear is contrary to hope; according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, daring is contrary to fear, but despair to hope." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 45. a. 1 ad 3.

Anger is the appetite of vengeance, as possible to itself. It seeks evil itself under the notion of vindictive justice. Hence it regards one object according to the notion of good, namely the vengeance which it seeks, and another according to the notion of evil, namely the harmful man, against whom it wills to be avenged through the infliction of punishment. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 46. a. 2, 6. It has no contrary either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the opposition of good and evil. For it is a movement toward attacking the injurious evil already lying upon one. Hence neither can there be a movement toward fleeing evil; nor can there be a movement toward good: for when this has been obtained, there is repose and joy of the appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 23. a. 3.

What are the acts of the will which are concerned with the end and with the means? "Every action of the will is concerned either with the end, or with the means, which can happen in two ways, either by appetizing or by executing. From this arises a twofold order of acts of the will and of the practical intellect, which governs the will in morals. The first contains all those acts which are necessary up to the final election of the means, which are will, intention, counsel, consent, election. The first two are concerned with the end; the latter with the means, in the order in which they have been numbered. But once the election has been established, the will proceeds to free execution, and thus there is the second order, in which only two acts are numbered: command and use. To these acts fruition is added, which is not an operation ordered to seeking or attaining the end; but, rather, once the end has been obtained, it follows upon it." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 6, at the beginning.

What is will? - Will, or simple volition, is the first act of the will, which is as it were the first inclination of the will toward the proposed object, as toward something lovable of itself, without any order to another. From this it is clear that this act is concerned with the end; for only the end is lovable of itself. But it does not include a tendency into the end, standing only in love and complacency for that good, and therefore it is simple volition, or love and complacency, still inefficacious. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 6, s. 1; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1, 2.

What is intention? - Intention is a free or perfectly voluntary tendency into a good, so that we may attain it. Therefore intention is a tendency of the will into some end to be obtained through due means. It is a purpose and desire toward the thing loved, and of itself is an efficacious desire. For purpose is had when someone determines with himself to do something. But desire, in its general signification, signifies any appetition whatever of obtaining a good which someone lacks; and it extends not only to the appetition of an efficacious will, but also to imperfect volitions, or velleities, even of impossible things. Intention, either virtually or expressly, is also an appetition of the means in common. The reason is that intention is the efficacious will of obtaining the end. But to will the end, absolutely as something to be attained as such, is virtually to will to execute all the means necessary to the end. Moreover someone can explicitly elicit this act: I will to employ all the means necessary for the end; this act is intention, because it precedes every consultation about the means and every election, and is the principle of counsel and election. In common, not in particular; for by this reason it is distinguished from election. Suarez, tr. 2, s. 2; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 8. a. 2; q. 12.

Can someone intend several things at the same time; and if several incompatible things are intended, which intention prevails? - R. To the first: Affirmatively. For either those things are ordered to one another, or they are not. "If indeed they have been ordered to one another, it is manifest that man can intend many things at the same time. For there is intention not only of the ultimate end, but also of an intermediate end: but someone simultaneously intends both the proximate and the ultimate end, as the making of medicine and health. But if two things not ordered to one another are taken, thus also man can intend several things at the same time, which is clear from the fact that man chooses one thing before another, because it is better than the other. But among the other conditions by which something is better than another, one is that it is useful for several things. Hence something can be chosen before another from the fact that it is useful for several things, and thus manifestly man intends several things at the same time." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 12. a. 3.

R. To the second: If those wills are simultaneous, the predominant one prevails, namely the one which would be chosen if the impossibility were known. If neither is more powerful, neither prevails, and accordingly neither is valid. If among contrary wills one succeeds another, the later prevails over the former; for it is predominant in the order of time and actuality. Except if the former is more powerful, or has revoked, at least virtually, every subsequent will; for then the former will, provided it is not expressly revoked, is certainly predominant. Lugo, de Sacr., d. 8, n. 121, 123; L. 1. 6. n. 24.

You will resolve: If one person asked you for a Mass in thanksgiving, another for someone gravely sick, it must be held to have been applied for the latter, whether he asked for it first or later.

If you have established with yourself: Whatever vow I may emit hereafter without the permission of my confessor, I do not wish it to be valid; and afterward you have vowed something without consulting your confessor, it is not valid, provided that will is not retracted expressly or virtually, namely if, mindful of the first vow, you were to emit the second, for example in shipwreck, in fire, etc.

If someone contracted marriage, intending it to be soluble, with such a mind that if he knew it to be indissoluble he would not contract, the marriage is null; for indissolubility is an essential property of Christian marriage. But he would contract validly if merely through error he thought marriage to be soluble, because private error does not take away from him the intention of contracting in the way in which he ought. L. 1. 3. n. 179, 210, 700; l. 6. n. 24; Elbel 130.

What is election? - Election is an act of the will by which the will is borne into a particular means as a means, or as a useful good; namely, it is the efficacious volition of some particular thing which is loved on account of another.

Therefore election proceeds from the efficacious intention of the end, and its object is the useful good as such and possible for us; and it contains at least virtually the volition of the end itself.

Likewise election retains its intrinsic nature, although it does not happen to take place among several things, when that means is only one. For an act is specified by its proper object, and the same object of election remains, namely the means to the end, whether it is the only means or whether it is compared with others. Election is after the manner of desire, because it is concerning the means as to be executed, and precedes execution; and therefore it is concerning an absent thing.

Moreover election is the purpose of the will; since purpose is an act of the will by which someone determines that he will do something. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 13; Suarez, d. 8, s. 1, 2.

What is consent? - Consent can be attributed to any free act of the will conforming itself, or consenting, to the judgment of the intellect, that is, accepting the good proposed by the intellect; in this way sin is said to be perfected by consent, and thus it is not a special act, and is concerned not only with the means, but also with the end. But insofar as it is a special act, it is concerned with the means, and is not an act specifically distinct from election, but only by reason, from diverse respects. "For insofar as the will wills what the intellect judges to be useful, it is called consent; but insofar as it prefers that either to other useful means, or certainly to other useless things not conducing to the end, it is called election." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 8, s. 2. But also in reality consent can be distinguished from election, namely when consent is inefficacious. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 15.

What is counsel? - Counsel properly is an act of the intellect including two things: the inquiry and discovery of the means, and the discerning judgment concerning the means more apt for attaining the end. Therefore counsel involves not one act of the intellect, but several. For that inquiry does not take place without discourse and consideration of several things. But counsel sometimes signifies only inquiry, sometimes only judgment, even though it does not proceed from discourse, and sometimes it embraces both. Counsel in this last sense indeed frequently precedes election, but not always. For when election takes place among many things, which happens more often, all those things must be found, proposed, discussed, and judged by the intellect. But where there is question of very small matters, or of things determined of themselves, or known of themselves, then there is no formal counsel. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 14; q. 9. a. 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 8, s. 5.

What is use? - Use is one thing active, another passive. The first is an act elicited by the will, by which the will moves the other powers to operating. The second is the act of the executing power proceeding from active use.

Use properly concerns the means, for use signifies a certain movement of the will toward really obtaining the thing willed, or the end. Use is really distinguished from election, since counsel and election concerning the means according to itself first take place before there is treatment of execution. But it is by no means really distinguished from election when the intellect suddenly determines the means and all the circumstances, and the will in the same instant in which it chooses the means also chooses the circumstance of actual execution; for from the force of such election there follows the action of the executing power. Therefore use is the will executing the chosen means for attaining the end. Use and election are not acts specifically distinct from one another, because they tend into the object under the same notion of good, namely as it is useful for attaining the end. But election of itself is concerned with the means in the order of intention, as future and as an effect of the end. Active use is concerned with the same means in the order of execution, as present and as the efficient cause of the end had in reality. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 16; Suarez, d. 9, s. 1, 2.

What is command? - The command which is treated here is the command by which someone commands himself, not that by which he commands others, and it is the absolute will intimated to oneself for doing or omitting something. Man can command himself in two ways: 1. as it were in the exercised act, while he moves himself to doing something; 2. in the signified act, by expressly eliciting the act of command: do this. Command of this kind is partly an act of the will, and partly an act of the intellect; because to command is to move to acting, but "the first mover among the powers of the soul to the exercise of an act is the will." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. But to command is not to move in any way whatever, but to move as if by imposing a law; and it is the intellect that imposes law on the will, since it judges concerning things to be done. Now here it is asked, what is this act of intellect and will which adequately constitutes command?

As regards the act of the intellect, note: 1. Before will and intention there precedes a practical judgment of the intellect, by which someone judges not only that the thing is good in itself, but also that it is suitable for him, and that it is expedient to love it. This judgment contains some notion of command. "For one commanding orders him whom he commands to doing something, by intimating or announcing." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1.

2. Before election and consent there likewise precedes a practical judgment, whether it is by way of formal counsel or not, proposing the means apt for the end as something electable; and a judgment of this kind contains the notion of command more, since it moves more by announcing and intimating.

3. After that election which in time precedes active use, another judgment precedes, more practical, distinct in this from the judgment which precedes election, that it more immediately touches the work and all the determinate circumstances necessary for the execution of the work. The reason is that before every act of the will there must precede a judgment of the intellect consonant with it, by which it is directed and illuminated; but active use is an act of the will, which adds something to the election already made. Therefore. This judgment still more participates in the notion of command; for it moves the will more vehemently by announcing and intimating, not so much by its own power as by the power of the election already made. For it is altogether ordered to the execution of the work and inclines more to overcoming the difficulty of the work, which at the time of execution always appears greater than in consultation and abstract election.

4. Besides these practical judgments, there is found in us another judgment, which we experience when it speaks thus internally with us: do this; and it explicitly expresses the efficacious act of the will to be elicited for executing the work. This judgment is that which explicitly constitutes command. This judgment is not of itself necessary for the work; nevertheless it is a useful act, so that the will itself and the whole man may be moved more, or so that he may more quickly undertake the execution, or so that he may persevere more constantly in it; because while man thus commands himself, he as it were reflects above himself and becomes superior to himself; and because, as external speech with regard to others has the power of moving and inciting the mind, so internal speech has this power with regard to oneself.

As regards the act of the will, it must be noted: 1. that this command, if it is efficacious and true, supposes an absolute will; for if it takes place without any will, it is fictitious and not true; but if the will which precedes is inefficacious, the command itself also will be inefficacious. And the reason is that the whole efficacy of moving is from the will. Therefore a will of this kind completes the notion of that command.

2. The act of the will preceding the act of reason, which is command, is election, by virtue of which reason moves. Therefore command is the practical judgment itself, whether direct or reflex, which, from election already made, by announcing and intimating what is to be done, moves to execution; and then the will begins to use by executing the command of reason. Hence it is manifest that command is prior to use.

3. Nevertheless active use itself of the will has some notion of command, and is often called command. For the will commands the other potencies, even the intellect. Indeed, the will commands even itself. For the will commands all voluntary acts, and one act of the will is commanded by another act of the same will. And the reason is that to command belongs to one having dominion; but it is the will which, as it were, has dominion over all human actions.

S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17; q. 71. a. 6 ad 2; 2. 2. q. 4. a. 2 ad 2; Quodl. 9. a. 12; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 9, s. 3.

What is fruition? - Fruition, as regards the name, is to take fruit from a thing. As regards the thing itself, it is a certain repose of the will, sweetness, joy, delight, once the presence of the desired object and its possession have been posited.

Joy is said more of a rational good, delight of a sensitive good, fruition of both; and it is rather restricted to one's own good, while joy is also said of another's good, as of a friend. Moral theologians commonly distinguish joy from delight by time, teaching that joy is of a past thing, delight of a present thing. Therefore the object of fruition properly is the good under the notion of a delightable good. But both the end and the means can be an object of joy, although the reason for rejoicing, or the formal object, is always the end. The first reason is that joy arises from the attainment of a delightable good. But the means itself is a certain delightable good. And thus we experience that we are delighted when we obtain suitable means. The second reason is that every loved good is an end or by reason of the end. Therefore every good which delights is an end or by reason of the end. Moreover a twofold joy or fruition is distinguished, perfect and imperfect. "For since it concerns an attained end, if the end has been perfectly obtained, fruition is perfect; if it has been obtained in a certain hope, from this some fruition can arise, but imperfect, because that is already some kind of attainment; and this seems to be that fruition of which Paul speaks: rejoicing in hope." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 7, s. 2. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 11, 31; 2. 2. q. 28.

What is the perfect and imperfect voluntary; the absolute voluntary and velleity; the voluntary simply and according to a certain respect? - These various divisions can be taken and explained in various senses, according as there is considered in the voluntary either precisely the notion of the voluntary, or the notion of the free, or the various object to which it is referred, according to its various state. We shall briefly explain them in the following paragraphs, according to the various acceptions which they have.

By reason of the voluntary, or of the inclination of the will, one voluntary is such simply, or perfect; another is such according to a certain respect, or imperfect. The first is that which proceeds from the will with the full inclination of the same will, without any repugnance. In this way the most perfect voluntary is the love of God toward Himself and the love of the Blessed toward God, which proceed from the most perfect cognition of the object.

The second is that which proceeds indeed from the consenting will, but not without some repugnance of the same rational will, so that there is indeed volition actually, but mixed with a conditioned nolition of the object. Thus a sailor, when the danger of shipwreck presses, actually wills and deliberately wills to throw away the merchandise, which nevertheless he would also, by deliberate will, wish to preserve if shipwreck were not imminent; hence, not without the deliberate repugnance of the will, but an inefficacious repugnance, he absolutely consents to throw them away. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6 ad 3; a. 7 ad 2; Suppl. q. 47. a. 1; L. 1. 5. n. 21.

By reason of the free, according to the varying degree of deliberation, one voluntary is perfect, and it is that which proceeds from the will with perfect cognition and full deliberation; another is imperfect, and that is what proceeds from the will with imperfect cognition and half-full deliberation. Such are the actions of a man half-drunk, half-asleep. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 3, 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. The voluntary that is perfect in this way can well be imperfect in the preceding way, as is clear from the example given of throwing merchandise into the sea in shipwreck.

By reason of deliberation, simply, one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is according to a certain respect, which is also called velleity. And thus, when the temptation of sin stands in the will, yet someone deliberately resists the sin, the will as nature, or according to a certain respect, wills the sin; but nevertheless the same will, as the will of reason, absolutely and simply detests the sin. Aptly S. Th. 3. p. q. 21. a. 4, where he also gives the reason for this division: "The will simply of man is the will of reason. For we will absolutely what we will according to deliberate reason. But that which we will according to the movement of sensuality, or even according to the movement of simple will, which is considered as nature, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, namely if nothing else stands in the way, which is found by the deliberation of reason. Hence such a will should rather be called velleity than absolute will; because, namely, man would will this if something else did not stand in the way."

By reason of the object, likewise one voluntary is absolute and simply; another is velleity and according to a certain respect, according as the object to which the will tends is considered absolutely, as it really is, according to all its circumstances, or only as it is in itself, with abstraction made from the circumstances.

To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. p. q. 19. a. 6 ad 1: "Each thing, according as it is good, is thus willed by God. But something can be, in the first consideration of itself, according as it is considered absolutely, good or evil, which nevertheless, as it is considered with something added, which is the consequent consideration of it, has itself contrariwise. Thus for a man to live is good and for a man to be killed is evil, according to absolute consideration; but if there is added concerning some man that he is a murderer, or living to the danger of the multitude, then it is good for him to be killed, and evil for him to live. Hence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills every man to live, but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. Similarly God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills certain ones to be damned, according to the demand of His justice. And nevertheless that which we will antecedently, we do not will simply, but according to a certain respect, because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, and in themselves they are in particular. Hence we will something simply according as we will it with all particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Hence it can be said that a just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but according to a certain respect he would will him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Hence it can rather be called velleity than absolute will. And thus it is clear that whatever God wills simply, happens; although that which He wills antecedently does not happen."

And thus also that throwing away of merchandise of which above in n. 30, under various respects, is voluntary according to a certain respect, and at the same time voluntary simply. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 142. a. 3; 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6.

By reason of its perfection, finally, one voluntary is absolute, efficacious, perfect, or complete; another is the voluntary which again is called velleity, of simple complacency, or imperfect and incomplete. The first is that which extends itself all the way to the attainment of the thing, by efficaciously willing the thing and the means to it. The other is that which does not proceed all the way to the attainment of the thing, but stops in simple complacency for it. When there is a twofold contrary will concerning the same object, that one is absolute and efficacious which explicitly or implicitly contains the revocation of the other, because one is absolute, the other as if conditioned; for example, someone truly wills to contract marriage, but nevertheless would not wish to receive the sacrament; he truly contracts marriage and receives the sacrament. De Lugo, de Sacr. in genere, d. 8, s. 8, n. 120 ff.

Thus the Angelic Doctor assigns the reason for this division, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1: "It must be said that the will is intermediate between the intellect and exterior operation. For the intellect proposes its object to the will, and the will itself causes exterior operation. Thus therefore the principle of the movement of the will is considered on the part of the intellect, which apprehends something as good in universal. But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to order to operation, through which someone tends to the attainment of the thing: for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing; and therefore the perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to this, that something is good for someone to do. But this is possible. And therefore the will is not complete except concerning the possible, which is good for the one willing. But incomplete will is concerning the impossible, which according to some is called velleity: because, namely, someone would will it if it were possible."

A sick man hoping for health wills health with a complete will; for he has an absolute and efficacious will of health, at the same time willing the means inducing health. A sick man despairing of health, whence he neglects to employ the means necessary for recovering it, wills health with an incomplete will; for he has only simple complacency, or velleity, of health, since he does not at the same time will the means inducing health. Complete and incomplete will, therefore, is not to be taken as if incomplete will were an undeliberated willing, or not capable of merit and demerit, or as if incomplete will were a half-deliberated willing. For someone can deliberately and with full deliberation will to expel God from His kingdom, if he could, and similar things, where it is clear that sin and grave sin are found. But the completion and incompletion of the will is to be taken according to the order of the will to operation, namely according to the movement of the will toward the thing. Hence from the fact that the movement of the will is toward the thing to be attained, disposed, etc., by means of exterior operation, it is not perfect, with the perfection apt by nature to be found in the genus of movement of the will, unless it is terminated at a good that can be done, although it is perfect as regards consent, deliberation, and other things of this kind. And thus a sinner, even a great sinner, who wills to be converted to God, and therefore wills to do penance, has a complete will.

The Angelic Doctor, q. 20. 2. a. 4, says: "If we speak of the goodness of the exterior act which it has according to the matter and due circumstances, then it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or movement is perfected in this, that it attains the end or reaches the term. Hence the will is not perfect unless it is such that, when opportunity is given, it acts. But if possibility is lacking, while the will exists perfected so that it would act if it could, the defect of perfection which is from the exterior act is simply involuntary."

Therefore the will can be called and can be complete in two ways. In one way, according to that relation by which the willed thing is in the will. In another way, according to that by which the will tends into the real attainment of the thing willed. According to the first way, the perfection of the will is signified by this, that it wills perfectly; but according to the second, by this, that it has perfectly, or attains and possesses the thing willed. Hence the will prepared to act if it could is a perfect will, because it wills perfectly, and this pertains to the perfection of the first relation; and it is imperfect simply, because it does not arrive at this, that it really has, attains, and possesses that which it wills, and which it is apt by nature to have. For every movement falling short of the term is imperfect by privation, which consists in the attainment of the term. And since the first perfection is of another account from the second, and the whole latitude of the first is compared to the second as the imperfect to the perfect, it follows that however much the interior act of the will may grow, and however intense it may be, alone it will never arrive at this, that it be perfect simply, without exterior attainment. On account of this the Savior said, John 15:13: Greater love no one has than that someone lay down his life for his friends; He said lay down, not wish to lay down. Cajetan, on 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5; q. 20, a. 4.

What is the direct and indirect voluntary; voluntary in itself and in the cause; positive and negative? - The voluntary, by reason of the act of the will by which it proceeds from the will, is one thing direct, another indirect. The direct is from the will acting. The indirect is from the will not acting, not prohibiting, namely which ought and can prohibit. For "not always is that which follows upon a defect of action reduced, as into a cause, into the agent from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman could not direct the ship, or the governance of the ship had not been entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him. Therefore, since the will, by willing and acting, can impede this which is not to will and not to act, and sometimes ought to, this which is not to will and not to act is imputed to it as existing from it." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; 2. 2. q. 69. a. 7; 3. p. q. 47. a. 1. Namely, it must be what one ought and can prohibit, so that one is in fault. And thus no one would say that every good which you do not do is voluntary to you, even indirectly, and consequently imputable, although absolutely you can do it, but are not bound to do it; and much less every evil which you are not bound in any way to impede.

If nevertheless someone knowingly posits an act incompatible with another act, which is omitted, for performing which there is no obligation, since that omission is free, it is indirectly voluntary, although not imputable to fault; for example, if you wish to study without wishing not to go to visit a church, when there is no obligation; and, on the contrary, it is imputable to merit, as if you wish to pray and therefore omit recreation, without saying, I wish to omit it. Cf. Commentary de Act. hum., Fourth, n. 9. Cf. here the following paragraph and n. 35.

The voluntary, by reason of the object which immediately terminates the act of the will, is one thing voluntary in itself, another voluntary in the cause. The first is had when someone immediately wills something in itself; the second, when someone wills the cause from which some effect is going to follow, even if he foresees this effect; for then he does not will it in itself, but in another, namely in its cause. Foresees, that is, merely foresees; for if besides this he wills it, that effect will already be directly and in itself willed and voluntary, and not merely in the cause. From this it follows that that effect will no longer be willed and voluntary as an effect; nor likewise will its cause be willed and voluntary as a cause; but then the effect, with respect to the will, will have the notion of an end, and the cause the notion of a means. For that which someone wills on account of itself has the notion of an end; what someone wills on account of another has the notion of a means. Nor indeed is it valid to object that if the effect is merely foreseen, and the will is not borne into it by its own act, then that effect is outside the intention, and in no way can it be voluntary, not even in the cause. For because the will, by not willing the cause, can impede the effect, and sometimes ought to impede it if it is evil, the effect is imputed to it; consequently, since it is not willed in itself, it will be willed in the cause. S. Th. q. 6. a. 3; q. 71. a. 5.

And thus evil works committed against one's neighbor in drunkenness are voluntary in the cause for him who was voluntarily made drunk, foreseeing those evils from previous experience, although he neither willed nor intended those same evils. If someone writing a bad book foresees many spiritual evils from it, although he does not intend them, they are imputed to him, and they are voluntary to him not in themselves, but in the cause. But if the effect is good, and someone who posits the cause foresees it, he is already judged implicitly to will it, and he does not lack his merit, since the good is the object of the will, not evil. If you give your goods to a monastery, foreseeing the spiritual goods thence to come, you certainly do not lack merit. Therefore there is a distinction between good and evil; for good, at least in some way, we ought to intend; evil, on the contrary, cannot be intended, but ought to be avoided. Suarez, d. 1, s. 4.

Several theologians altogether distinguish the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause from the direct and indirect voluntary. And thus Suarez says, "The voluntary in itself is sufficiently clear; for then something is said to be voluntary in itself when it is willed in itself, so that the will is immediately concerned with it, either by a proper act, if it is voluntary direct, or through the lack of an act, if it is indirectly voluntary." D. 1, s. 4. Likewise S. Th. q. 77. a. 7: "Two things seem to have to be considered. First, that something can be voluntary either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it, or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause and not into the effect; as is clear in him who voluntarily becomes drunk. For from this, what he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as quasi-voluntary. Secondly, it must be considered that something is called voluntary directly or indirectly. Directly indeed is that into which the will is borne; but indirect is that which the will could have prohibited, but does not prohibit."

But others call the voluntary in itself and in the cause the direct and indirect voluntary, and express this by another division, namely of the positive and negative voluntary. Gury, Ballerini, n. 5. Now, with a comparison established between both divisions, the voluntary in itself and in the cause, and the direct and indirect voluntary, and insisting upon the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it must be said that the direct voluntary includes under itself both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause. For the direct voluntary is said by the Angelic Doctor to be "that which proceeds from the will as from an agent," q. 6. a. 3 ad 1. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause proceed from the will insofar as it is acting and willing.

But the indirect voluntary can be reduced both to the voluntary in itself and to the voluntary in the cause. The indirect voluntary is said by the same Holy Doctor to be "that which is from the will as from a non-agent," l. c. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause include the acting and willing will. Therefore the indirectly voluntary is neither properly voluntary in itself, nor likewise properly voluntary in the cause. Nevertheless it can be reduced to both; for the indirectly voluntary is said either only of the interior act of the will, or also of the exterior act. If the first, since not willing is immediately from the will, it can be called voluntary in itself. If the second, since externally not acting is as it were the external object completing that not willing, just as the former is in some way voluntary in itself, so also is the latter, since one complete non-act is as it were constituted from both the lack of an interior and exterior act; for example, not willing to hear Mass, and not hearing Mass in fact, just as one complete act is constituted from the internal and external act of willing to hear Mass and of hearing Mass.

Now, as from the positing of an act, as from a cause, some effect can follow, so from the omission of an act another act can follow, which, although it is not properly the effect of that omission, just as that omission is not properly the cause of the following act, since not acting cannot properly be a cause, nevertheless it can be considered as an effect. And thus it can be called voluntary in the cause; for example, the death of those sailing, indirectly voluntary, is, in the sense stated, voluntary in the cause for the pilot of the ship who desists from steering.

What is required so that an evil effect which follows, voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, be imputable to the will as fault? - The following conditions are required: 1. That he who posits or omits the cause advert, at least confusedly, that such an effect will follow from that cause; because nothing is willed unless in some way it is known beforehand.

2. That the agent be able to impede such a cause; because there is no obligation to impossibilities.

3. That the agent be bound, by reason of that effect, to remove or omit that cause; because the effect following outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his own right. For then the agent in reality does not will the effect, but wills the permission of the effect. L. 1. 5. n. 15; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3; q. 21. a. 2; C. I. 1151 f.; C. G. 1182 f.; C. H. 1092 ff.

When is someone bound to remove the cause, by reason of an evil effect that will follow? - 1. He is bound when it of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect. For then the cause is evil in itself. It is said, of itself, directly and primarily, produces nothing except an evil effect, because one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause if the evil effect followed merely accidentally; for then the cause would not therefore be evil in itself. Nor would he be bound if the cause of itself, directly and primarily, produces a good effect, and only through this as a medium an evil effect follows; for a cause according to moral estimation is judged from its effect of itself, directly, and primarily, and accordingly it is then simply honorable in itself. Therefore then one would not will the evil, but would will the good, and would only permit the evil. Likewise one would not therefore be bound to remove the cause because it equally, directly and primarily, as if in a parallel manner, influences a good and an evil effect. For then the cause in itself, according to moral estimation, is indifferent, and honorable, insofar as it is subject to the honorable intention of the agent; for the evil effect is not intended, but permitted. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 20. a. 5; q. 73. a. 8; 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

2. Someone is likewise bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless someone is bound to impede the effect from justice, or from charity, or from a precept that presses to be fulfilled; for example, if someone wished to play for the sake of recreation while the last Mass on Sunday will soon be celebrated, so that consequently he omits it from distraction. "For he who is bound to the law must necessarily be bound to procure the ordinary means, and the means proximately necessary from the very nature of the thing, for observing the law..... Ordinary, I say; for human laws do not compel to extraordinary and excessively difficult things." Ithur., case 32, n. 4. Hence "the reason can be given, that by reason of the precept that cause and the effects following from it, although physically they are connected only accidentally, and one is not the cause of the other, nevertheless morally are judged to have the notion of one unsuitable object, or one to be avoided by the will, and therefore the will of one is judged the virtual will of the other." Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 9.

3. Finally, someone is bound to remove the cause by reason of an evil effect that will follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless there is no proportionate necessity, utility, or fittingness on the part of the agent. For then an honorable end of the one operating is lacking; for evil is to be avoided, and it can be permitted when there is a rational and just cause. Besides, to will such a cause then often shows an evil affection directly toward that evil effect that will follow; or at least there is often a proximate danger of such evil affection. But a greater or lesser reason is required for positing the cause according as it is a cause of itself, or from its own nature influencing such an effect, or an accidental cause, namely one which does not influence such an effect from its intrinsic nature, but from some extrinsic condition of things. Likewise the greater reason is required for acting in such a case, the more proximately the cause touches the evil effect, the more probable the evil effect is, the less right one has to the action considered in itself, and the graver the effect itself is, if one is bound by office to impede the evil. For if a proportionately grave reason is not had, natural honesty itself obliges us to omit that cause. L. 1. 1. n. 152; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

Is the effect which follows, gravely evil, voluntary only indirectly or in the cause, always imputable as grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if he illicitly posits the cause without any sufficient reason? - R. 1. Affirmatively, if that cause of itself, or from its intrinsic nature, gravely influences the effect. The reason is that if the cause of itself gravely influences the effect, the grave malice from the effect redounds into the cause. Therefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect itself by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, one who wills the cause, of itself gravely influencing an effect gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in reality directly wills the grave malice of that effect, and does not merely permit it; since the cause and effect are inseparably connected with one another, so far as concerns the very nature of the thing, and no other honorable reason is present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed.

R. 2. Negatively, if that cause of itself influences that effect only lightly. The reason is that, since the cause of itself has only a light influence upon that gravely evil effect, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and accordingly, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with one another. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. Accordingly he does not contract the grave malice proper to the effect. But since the malice of the effect redounds into the cause by reason of the influence which the latter has upon the effect, where the influence is light there is only light malice; and consequently, with the direct intention of the gravely evil effect always excluded, someone willing a cause that influences such an effect only lightly, although he will not sin gravely, nevertheless will sin lightly. And this is the proper reason why, although there is no smallness of matter in venereal matters, nevertheless there is such in those acts of mere sensuality, as are looks, from a cause of mere curiosity, at less honorable things, with the intention of the venereal thing itself again excluded, as the very common opinion of theologians holds.

R. 3. Again negatively, if the cause in no way of itself influences that evil effect, but the effect follows merely accidentally, or from extrinsic circumstances. The reason is that since the effect follows only accidentally, there is no connection, so far as concerns the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. Therefore it is not the case that because someone wills the cause, he also wills the effect, but he wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause of itself, but merely accidentally, someone willing the cause, with every intention of the evil effect excluded, contracts none of its malice, neither grave nor light, although perhaps otherwise he also sins gravely. And thus, if someone foresees pollution from some excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly, or perhaps even gravely, by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of lust. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing only accidentally into some evil effect, by reason only of that evil effect itself. For in actions only this one thing must be attended to: whether they are the cause of this effect, or not. For if they do not have the force of a cause, it is ridiculous that they must be avoided on account of an effect of this kind. And in no way is someone bound to abstain from positing such a cause, if a reasonable motive is present for positing a cause of this kind.

Cf. 40. 1, 4; Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, 5; Sanchez, l. 9, d. 45, n. 14 ff.; L. 1. 3. n. 484; Salm., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5; 3. p. q. 30. a. 7; d'Annibale, 4th ed., p. 1, n. 157, note 15.

When is an effect willed in the cause imputed? - It is imputed, speaking of itself, first when someone has posited the cause, or from the time when he could and ought to have impeded it, if he noticed it after the cause had been posited. "The reason is that the free volition, or non-impeding, of an evil effect is formally evil, but not the physical existence of the effect; and accordingly formal sin is committed when there is such a perverse volition or nolition.... Thus therefore, he who, for example, has offered poison to another ... does not sin when the death of the other follows ... but when he freely posited the cause of this effect." Struggl, q. 1, a. 3, n. 32. Speaking of itself; for if someone can impede an effect of this kind right up to its execution, and does not impede it, or is pleased in its futurition or existence, he continues in his mind the sin whose cause he previously posited freely and culpably. Consequently someone must then confess the effect as if it were the external act and object, the complement of the sin. But it would be otherwise if, after the cause had been posited, before the effect follows, he retracts the will, or confesses the sin committed. L. 1. 5. n. 10; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. a. 3 ad 3.

Note: Since the cause, as such, participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a different malice, it suffices in confession to accuse only the malice of the effect; or if the cause has in itself another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if because of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if because of theft you likewise omitted Mass, you can then accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. L. 1. 5. n. 9; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 15, n. 479.

You will resolve: 1. "If the cause of pollution is one gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed as sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was at least confusedly foreseen. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which of themselves are grave faults in the genus of lust, namely touches or sights of the shameful parts of another's or one's own body with base and deliberate delight; the sight of human intercourse; and morose thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions arising from these causes are certainly mortal. Thus S. Th. a. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act which is the cause of pollution has a special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, de Matr., l. 9, c. 45, n. 23, and all agree." L. 1. 3. n. 482. A special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in delight excited from a base object. Gravely influencing; therefore, if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow, since then it follows outside the intention and accidentally. Of themselves are grave faults: "the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause of itself mortal in the genus of lust.... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil." L. 1. 3. n. 484. In the genus of lust, whence "it is inferred that the pollution which happens outside the intention from causes illicit even mortally in another genus than lust is not mortal, as from drunkenness, or from eating too immoderately or on a forbidden day." L. 1. 3. n. 484, 477; Salm., Theol. Schol., tr. 13, d. 10, n. 274; Theol. Mor., tr. 26, c. 7, n. 41.

2. "If someone, about to do some necessary or lawful and honorable thing, foresees that pollution will naturally follow, and this applies much more to distillation, which nevertheless he in no way wills or intends, then, provided the danger of consent to the delight is absent, he is not bound to abstain from such an action; because the effect following accidentally and outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his right. Hence, notwithstanding pollution, it is lawful to hear the confessions of women, to study cases of conscience, to touch oneself from necessity, cautiously and from necessity to kiss women, to embrace according to the custom of the country, if otherwise one would have to be regarded as uncivil." L. 1. 3. n. 481. "It is lawful for someone who suffers a great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows." L. 1. 3. n. 483. The reason is that these acts either of themselves influence only lightly, or although they of themselves gravely influence, nevertheless, since they are not done from a base cause of concupiscence and delight, but from an honorable, necessary, useful, suitable cause, they no longer have the same force and influence upon the effect, which is gravely increased by that evil propensity of the will, and on the contrary is greatly diminished by the will turned elsewhere and resisting as far as it can. Hence the evil effect, if it follows, is attributed rather to natural constitution, or to weakness of nature, than to the aforesaid acts as cause. Besides, with the aforesaid honorable end standing, someone is not bound to abstain from the cause in order to impede the evil effect. For when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be posited from the intention of the good effect alone, by behaving permissively toward the evil. Therefore that evil effect, in the case, truly follows accidentally and outside the intention. L. 1. 3. n. 483; l. 5. n. 14; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.

3. "It is inferred that the pollution which arises from a not prolonged conversation with a girl, or from a slight glance, or from curious reading venially base, is only venial; because, as has been said, since those causes influence lightly, the subsequent pollution proceeds rather from a natural cause than from them." L. 1. 3. n. 484. But if someone has a just cause, he sins in nothing. L. 1. 5. n. 29. A just cause is "any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness." L. 1. 3. n. 484; l. 5. n. 29.

4. A fortiori grave fault is absent in those actions which influence remotely and accidentally, since they are outside the genus of lust. Therefore, although pollution or an evil commotion is foreseen as going to follow, it is lawful to ride horseback, not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also for recreation; to recline in some position in order to rest more comfortably; moderately to take hot foods or drink; to lead honorable dances, etc. L. 1. 3. n. 483. Grave fault is absent; for whether light fault is present in the positing of such causes without a just reason, on account of the effect going to follow, is disputed. Holzmann and others deny it, "because, as they say, the pollution arises rather from the weakness of nature than from that cause, which concurs to pollution only accidentally and remotely. But Sanchez, Lessius, and others more probably affirm it..., because without a rational cause to permit pollution always seems something unbecoming and disordered." L. 1. 3. n. 484; Sanchez, de Matr., l. 9, d. 45; Sporer, de Matr., n. 644 ff.; Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, d. 14, n. 97-103.

What is the actual, virtual, habitual, interpretative voluntary? - The voluntary, by reason of the very act of the will and its efficacy, is one thing actual or formal, another virtual, another habitual, another interpretative. Actual voluntary is given when someone actually wills something, with actual attention on the part of the intellect, whether he wills explicitly, that is, clearly and in particular, or implicitly, that is, confusedly, by a universal or quasi-universal will, which extends also to this object.

The virtual voluntary is threefold. First, the virtual voluntary is that which perseveres in some power of itself, and it is given when the explicit and clear will itself, or intention of the end, no longer exists, but only volitions of the means explicitly and clearly exist, which volitions of the end itself, in a more remiss degree, with more remiss attention, accompany. Thus when a priest wills to celebrate Mass and then puts on the sacred vestments, approaches the altar, and performs the other customary things, without any longer having that clear actual will to consecrate, the consecration will be virtually voluntary if, while he performs all things voluntarily, there is always present to him, confusedly and weakly, some attention and will to consecrate. Or at least then acts of the cogitative or estimative power remain, which are first generated when the mind proposes its object to the will, and which acts then go on to influence all subsequent acts. When the mind apprehends that object, its apprehension is at the same time generated in the cogitative or estimative power, which pertains to sensitive cognition, and moves the sensitive appetite and the exterior members to motion.

The virtual voluntary, secondly, is that which perseveres in the exterior work itself, commanded by a prior act of the will, or in the voluntary execution of the means, which someone voluntarily employs by the force or virtue and impulse of the prior intention of the end, even though as regards the end not even remiss attention and volition any longer exists. Thus the pilgrimage undertaken by a traveler to the sanctuary of the Blessed Virgin will be virtually voluntary, even though on the journey he no longer attends to it, indeed thinks of entirely different things.

The virtual voluntary, thirdly, is that which perseveres in some moral effect of its own; thus, for example, a contract entered into by a procurator will be virtually voluntary to the principal agent, who gave him the faculty of acting in his name. In a moral effect, so that a merely physical effect may be excluded, into which perhaps that prior act of the will influenced as it is a physical act; for example, if, having had the will to consecrate, afterward while sleeping you consecrate in a dream, the consecration is null. For that prior act of the will does not influence this effect as it is a human or moral act, but merely as it is a certain physical action. S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8 ad 3; Lugo, de Sacr. in gen., d. 8, s. 5, n. 87; de Fid., d. 1, n. 98; de Poenit., d. 24, s. 4; Laymann, l. 1, c. 2, c. 3, n. 4.

The habitual voluntary is that which was, but is neither in itself, not even weakly, with no attention to it persevering on the part of the intellect, nor in an exterior commanded work, or in the execution of the means, nor in any positive moral effect, but is, morally speaking, in a merely negative effect, insofar as the prior will has not been retracted. Hence a will of this kind suffices for certain moral effects. Thus, if an adult invalidly baptized were rebaptized while he sleeps, the baptism is valid. Thus also "for contracting," says St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 769, "an interpretative or conditional will does not suffice, cf. below n. 773, but an actual or virtual will is required, or at least one had and not retracted, according to what is to be said, l. 6, n. 324." Habitual voluntary is sometimes called virtual voluntary, which in truth is a certain habitual voluntary, insofar as it is distinguished from actual. S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8 ad 3; Laymann, l. c.

Interpretative voluntary is an act of the will which neither is, nor was, because cognition of the object is not present and was not present, but would be if cognition of this kind were had. Just as actual and virtual voluntary is a true cause of the act which is posited by the force of an actual or past volition, so habitual and interpretative voluntary is not a cause of the act. Habitual makes it that the act is positively according to the will, for example, the reception of a sacrament by a dying person deprived of his senses, who while healthy had resolved to receive the sacrament in danger of death. Interpretative makes it that the act at least is not judged to be against the will. Its foundation is the disposition and inclination of the soul, on account of the suitability of the thing. And these concern the voluntary considered in itself. Suarez, tr. 2, d. 1, s. 4, n. 4.

What is expressed, tacit, presumed, interpretative voluntary? - If the voluntary is considered insofar as it is outwardly shown by some sign, then expressed, tacit, presumed, and interpretative will are distinguished.

Expressed will is that which is expressed by words, letters, nods, or some exterior deed. This is one thing explicitly expressed, namely when someone by an exterior sign clearly and explicitly, or in particular, manifests some act of the will; another is implicitly expressed, when someone by an exterior sign manifests that he wills something with which another thing is connected.

Tacit will is that which is manifested by silence itself. He who is silent seems to consent, if namely he can and ought to speak, or if there is question of a matter simply favorable, unless nevertheless from the nature of the thing or from law expressed consent is required. Hence tacit voluntary does not lack its effect. And tacit license is valid, as expressed license is valid. Rule 43 in the Sixth.

Presumed will is that which, although it is not known to us a posteriori by some exterior sign, or by silence itself, nevertheless is gathered a priori to be present. For there is some sufficient cause for judging thus.

Interpretative will is that which, although in reality it neither was present nor is present, and is not gathered to be or to have been present either by some exterior sign a posteriori or by some sufficient cause a priori, nevertheless there is some sufficient reason for gathering that it would be present if cognition of the object were had. Therefore no one sins by merely interpretative will. And therefore the confessor rightly imparts absolution to one retaining another's thing in good faith, if the same confessor does not admonish him for this reason, namely because the penitent, knowing the thing to be another's, would still retain it and would not restore it. Struggl, t. 1, q. 1, a. 2.

Presumed voluntary is sometimes had by the law itself, namely when in certain determinate cases the law presumes a priori that consent of the will was present. Thus formerly, by Canon Law, a silent son was presumed to consent to betrothals contracted for him by his parents. But this presumption of law, in the internal forum, always yields to the truth; and it yields to it also in the external forum, if it can be proved. C. un. de Despons. impub. in the Sixth.

What is the distinction between presumed and interpretative will? - Presumed will is often confused with interpretative will. It is also often distinguished from it by distinguishing presumed will concerning the present, which is properly called by us presumed, and presumed will concerning the future, which is properly called by us interpretative. So that the distinction between the two may be better known, the matter can be explained by this practical example.

A religious on a journey, while the superior is absent, wishes to buy a thing of some importance and of great utility for the whole community. He writes about the matter to the superior. While the superior, after receiving the letter, is writing back, the occasion for buying the thing presses, and he buys it, the response not yet having been received because of lack of time, presuming an affirmative response from the otherwise well-known will of the superior. Here you have will simply presumed, or presumed concerning the present. But whether the will of the superior is really present, or is falsely presumed to be present, the truth itself must be inspected, which the response of the superior afterward received will declare.

But if the same occasion presses for buying a thing very useful to the community, for example a great abundance of excellent books at a very small price, and no time is present for consulting the absent superior, nevertheless from the same otherwise well-known will of the superior that religious presumes that he would agree if he were asked, and he buys the books with the money received for the journey, preferring the utility of the monastery to a more comfortable journey, you have will presumed concerning the future or interpretative. L. 1. 3. n. 288, 700; l. 4. n. 18; Laymann, l. c. n. 3; Struggl, l. c. n. 20; La-Croix, l. 4. n. 1324 ff.