Entrance into Religion

Our Lord Jesus Christ proposed the counsels of perfection to all his followers in general: ‘‘ He who can take, let him take it’; “ If thou wilt be perfect.” When, however, we consider particular cases, we see that many are debarred as a matter of fact from embracing the religious state. Many find themselves in a fixed position in life with duties to be performed towards parents, relations, and others, which will not allow of their abandoning the world. Many more are unsuitable by character and temperament for the religious life. None of these can properly be said to have a divine call to the religious state, for when God gives a call he provides the necessary means for following it. There are others whom God calls in wonderful and different ways, making known his will to them sometimes in an extraordinary manner, more often by slowly developed inclinations and desires to forsake all and give themselves to him. The question arises whether such a divine vocation is a necessary condition for lawfully entering into religion, and whether one who felt himself called would sin if he neglected to follow the call.

Anyone who is free and who wishes to enter religion to be able to do more good, or to save his soul with greater security, is in fact called by God, for such desires are special graces given by God, and so they are signs of a divine vocation. So that all who have the aptitude, are free, and are led to religion by supernatural motives of some sort, are divinely called by God. One who entered religion from merely natural motives would probably soon find that he had made a mistake, and would return to the world. However, if such a one chose to rectify his intention and remained in religion to do good and to save his soul, he would not commit sin. He embraces a more perfect state of life, and if he does what in him lies, God will give him abundant grace to live a good religious life. Of course, sin is committed by one who enters religion from merely natural motives, and does not intend to fulfil the obligations of the state into which he has intruded himself. One who is called to religion and prefers to remain in the world acts very foolishly, throws away a great grace, and may expose his salvation to great danger. If such a one is persuaded that he cannot save his soul in the world, he commits grave sin by not taking the necessary means to secure his eternal salvation. If, however, he hopes with God’s grace (which will not be wanting to him) to lead a good life in the world, he will not commit sin by not following the divine call; for this is a counsel, not a command, and counsels do not bind under sin. Some divines disagree with the foregoing doctrine, but it is supported by the authority of St Thomas and many approved authors (cf. Can. 538).

As, therefore, the observance of the counsels is not only lawful but a more perfect state of life, anyone may enter into religion who is not prevented by some obstacle. Those who have not possession of their faculties, and children who have not arrived at the age of puberty, and are still subject to their parents, cannot enter into religion. In former times parents used occasionally to present their children to be brought up in monasteries with the intention of their becoming religious when they reached the proper age. This custom, however, has long been abandoned.

Besides safeguarding what the constitutions of each institute prescribe on the point, the Code declares that the following cannot be validly admitted to the novitiate: Those who have formally belonged to a non-Catholic sect.

Those who have not the age required for the novitiate.

Those who enter religion induced thereto by violence, grave fear, or deceit, or whom the superior receives from the same motives. A spouse while the marriage lasts.

Those who are bound or who have been bound by the bond of religious profession.

Those over whom hangs a penalty on account of committing some grave crime of which they have been or can be accused.

A Bishop, whether residential or titular, although only designated by the Roman Pontiff.

Clerics who, by an arrangement of the Holy See, are bound by an oath to work for the benefit of their diocese or mission, for the time during which the obligation of the oath lasts.

The following are admitted unlawfully but validly: Clerics in sacred orders without the local Ordinary being consulted, or against his will, because their departure would be to the great loss of souls, and this loss cannot otherwise be avoided.

Those in debt who are not solvent.

Those who are liable to render accounts or who are implicated in other secular business from which religion may have to fear lawsuits and troubles.

Children who ought to assist parents—that is, father, mother, grandfather, or grandmother—placed in grave necessity, and parents whose care is necessary for the support and education of children.

Those destined for the priesthood in religion, but who are debarred from it by irregularity or other canonical impediment (Can. 542).

Girls may not be admitted to the novitiate or be professed before they have completed their fifteenth year, and before doing so they must be examined by the bishop or by someone deputed by him as to whether they know the grave character of the step they are about to take, and whether they are acting of their own free and unfettered will (Can. 552).

Boys cannot be lawfully admitted into any order or congregation before the superiors thereof have received from the Ordinaries of their place of birth and of any place where they have lived for more than a year after attaining their fifteenth year testimonial letters bearing witness to their having the qualifications necessary for entering religion.¹ By the common law a full uninterrupted year of probation must be spent by the candidate for religion in the house of the novitiate. Although the novice has not yet taken the vows of religion, he is subject to the authority of the superiors of the order and is bound to obey them.

¹ S.C. super Stat. Reg., January 25, 1848; can. 544.

We shall speak beforehand about vocation to religion, then about admission itself into religion.

Vocation to the Clerical State.—(a) Internal Vocation.—No one should enter the religious or clerical state unless called thereto by God (John, xv. 16; Acts, xiii. 2; Heb., v. 4, 5; I Cor., xii. 4 sqq.). The foundation of the entire religious, priestly and apostolic life, namely divine vocation, consists of two essential elements, the one divine, the other ecclesiastical. As to the first element, God’s call to embrace the priestly or religious life must be considered so necessary that in its absence the foundation upon which the whole structure is to rest is absent (Pius XII, Sedes Sapientiae). The signs of a divine call do not necessarily or even ordinarily include a feeling of inspiration or invitation from the Holy Spirit, but it suffices that one may have a liking, a right intention, and fitness (physical, mental, moral) for the life; for, where God gives a call, He gives the means to fulfill the duties. Thus, those who will not be able to say Mass, or who cannot master Latin or theology, or who cannot observe celibacy, or who are vicious (e.g., mischief-makers, drunkards) or unspiritual (e.g., the lazy, those who dislike exercises of piety), do not show the signs of a priestly vocation.

(b) External Vocation.—No one should be admitted to the religious life or to Orders unless he has given sufficient signs of a call from God. Thus, a Bishop would sin most gravely and be a sharer in the sins of others if he conferred Major Orders on anyone about whose unworthiness he was morally certain on positive grounds (Canon 973); nor may a Religious Superior receive to profession any novice about whom he is doubtful (Canon 571). Scarcity of vocations is no excuse for laxity, since it is better to have a few creditable clerics than a multitude of unworthy ones (Benedict XIV). What St. Paul said of deacons (“Let these first be proved, and so let them minister, having no crime,” I Tim., iii. 10), is therefore to be applied to all candidates for the clerical life. A vocation is tested by the years of probation which the church law provides for seminarians, novices and other aspirants to the ecclesiastical state. No cleric has a right to ordination before he receives the free call from a bishop, but on the other hand it is criminal to prevent a suitable candidate from embracing the clerical state (Canon 971). “By a divine vocation to the religious and clerical state a person undertakes publicly to lead a life of holiness in the Church, a visible and hierarchical society, and to exercise this hierarchical ministry. Such a person, therefore, ought to be authoritatively tested, approved and directed by the hierarchical rulers to whom God has entrusted the administration of the Church” (Pius XII, Sedes Sapientiae).

Sinfulness of Disregarding Vocation.—(a) He who enters the clerical state, not knowing that he has a vocation, is guilty of sin, as is clear from the previous paragraph. According to some, anyone who receives Major Orders, even with serious doubt about his vocation, commits a mortal sin, since he inflicts a serious injury on the rights of God, the Church, himself and his neighbor. According to others, the sin is only venial when one enters the clerical state conscious of the absence of vocation, but determined with the help of God to live up to all the duties; for, though the act is rash, there is good will and good intention, and grace will not be wanting.

(b) He who refuses to enter the clerical state, though knowing for certain that he has a vocation, is also guilty of sin, for only negligence or improper motives such as laziness, sensuality, or too great love of liberty can produce such reluctance. The sin is grave or light according to the circumstances. There is grave sin, if the resistance to the call constitutes serious disobedience, pride or uncharitableness (e.g., if there were a great scarcity of priests and the bishop commanded a worthy layman to take Orders); there is venial sin in other cases when the rejection is only dissent to an invitation and exposes neither self nor other to grave peril of losing salvation. Finally, if the signs of vocation do not produce certainty, there may be no sin at all, but rather virtue, in refusal to ascend to the clerical state, for no one is bound to take up grave obligations when uncertain of his duties, and many holy persons from humility or fear of unworthiness have decided, against the advice or invitation of others, not to become clerics.

To n. 303 bis.

Affiliation to a Religious Institute can be twofold. The first affiliation, strictly such, can be had with respect to one Institute by another Institute. And this consists in this: that a Religious Institute depends on another Institute as regards its government and administration, or at least as regards spiritual direction. This affiliation, which is permitted as regards ancient Institutes, as can be seen in the ancient Second Orders and Third Orders, is now altogether prohibited to recent Religious Institutes.

In the Norms of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, June 28, 1901, art. 17, it is said: "Institutes of Sisters dependent on similar Institutes of men of simple vows are not approved in the future, nor Institutes of men having such Institutes of Sisters aggregated to themselves and directed by themselves." And again, art. 52, it is said: "No Institute of religious of simple vows can aggregate to itself a similar Institute of Sisters which depends on it or is directed by it."

The other affiliation, broadly such, is that which is contained in participation of the good works of some Institute. There can indeed be no doubt concerning this participation of good works. The Supreme Pontiff Leo X, Constitution Illius qui caritas est, February 28, 1520, § 5, Bullarium Romanum, vol. 5, p. 741, granted it to the Confraternity of Charity of the City, namely that "whoever belong to the said Confraternity and whoever also are its officials... become participants in the fasts and divine offices and any other spiritual goods whatsoever, wherever in the whole world they are made for the time."

And that Regular Prelates also can grant this participation of good works is established by the fact itself. For they often grant it to benefactors, and special letters of affiliation of this kind are had. And a concession is had made by Urban V to the Order of Friars Minor of St. Francis. But Anacletus Reiffenstuel, Theologia Moralis, tract XII, dist. III, question XI, n. 144, says: "Authors note that this concession contains nothing which has not been granted by common law; for by common law every Prelate can already communicate and apply the goods and merits of his subjects to a benefactor."

But can the same thing be done by Superiors of religious men, even lay Institutes, and by Superioresses also of sisters of more recent Institutes of simple vows? There are not lacking those who deny it, or doubt it: because no special or general concession has been made to these by the Holy See, because they do not have spiritual jurisdiction over their subjects by force of their own Religious Institute.

Nevertheless it seems that it must be affirmed. And several Modern Institutes grant this affiliation to their benefactors without any doubt and without any difficulty. Let us undertake an analysis of this affiliation. And first, this is the question clearly enough set forth:

Whether benefactors of the aforesaid more recent Institutes can be affiliated to the same, namely so that they may become participants in the good works which are done in the aforesaid Institutes.

As is evident, in this affiliation it is a question of the fruit of the good works of the members, men or sisters, of the Institute. Now this fruit is manifold; and it must soon be spoken of individually, in order to set forth the Response to the proposed Doubt.

First there is the fruit of Indulgences. And the matter is evident, that affiliation to Religious Institutes cannot be extended to Indulgences without a special Apostolic Indult. Nor indeed has the affiliation which in reality is accustomed to be granted to benefactors by these Religious Congregations ever been understood thus, as can be seen in their Diplomas which are given to affiliated benefactors. Cf. also the Norms, art. 16.

There is besides the fruit of merit de condigno, and this fruit also is excluded from that affiliation. For one of the conditions of merit de condigno is that someone merit for himself. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 6.

Besides merit de condigno there is merit de congruo. As is the common opinion, someone can merit de congruo for another. For as the Angelic Doctor says, I-II, q. 114, a. 6: "It is fitting according to the proportion of friendship that God fulfill the will of man in the salvation of another, although sometimes there can be an impediment on the part of him whose justification someone desires." From these last words of the Holy Doctor it is evident that merit of this kind for others is not infallible.

Thus on account of ten just men, if they had been found there, the Lord would have spared Sodom and Gomorrah and the neighboring cities. Genesis 18.

Moreover there is another fruit of our good works, namely satisfactory for temporal punishments and impetratory of actual graces. The satisfactory fruit can profit the one working and other living persons by way of payment, and therefore more probably infallibly, by force of the communion of Saints. Likewise the impetratory fruit can without any doubt profit both the one working and other living persons. "For whatever things are undertaken piously and holily by one pertain to all, and charity, which seeks not the things that are its own, effects that they profit them..." Thus the Roman Catechism explains the Communion of Saints, part 1, on the ninth article of the Creed, n. 25.

Prayer remains, concerning which no doubt can be raised. For it is Catholic doctrine that we can pray for ourselves and for others; and therefore render others participants in the impetratory fruit which is proper to prayer. And thus in the last chapter of James we are admonished to pray for one another, that we may be saved. To the same pertains that text of 1 John 5:16: "He who knows his brother to sin a sin not unto death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him who sins not unto death..."

But the promise of Christ is altogether universal: Everyone who asks receives... Whatever you shall ask in My name, this I will do. Hence Suarez says: "On account of this the opinion which asserts the promise to be universal seems sufficiently pious and probable, whether one prays for himself or for others.... This infallible impetration is not from justice, but chiefly from mercy and also from simple fidelity."

Therefore, in order that there be participation of the good works of the Religious of some Institute, there is no need of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the one who grants it, nor is there need of some special faculty first obtained from the Holy See; but there is need only of charity, which seeks not the things that are its own, and consequently that someone wish to render others participants in the fruits of his own good works.

Therefore there is no difficulty if the Religious of some Institute consent to that participation, as in reality all consent; nor can any serious difficulty truly be raised concerning that pious will and practice of Religious.

But it is not necessary that each individual Religious in particular manifest his will to the Benefactor. Rather it suffices altogether that the Chapter or the Superior do this, who by force of his economic authority represents the whole Community, nevertheless with this Community knowing and consenting.

And thus, if it is a question of the vows of Communities, these are emitted by the Superior of the Community, with the Community consenting. If it is a question of alms to be given for gaining Jubilee, the father of a family can give alms for himself, for his wife, for his children, for his servants; the Superior of a Convent or Monastery can give alms for the whole Convent or Monastery, etc. Therefore, since a Religious Institute is a certain Moral Body, its General Chapter or General Superior, who is its Head, will well be able to grant and communicate to benefactors that participation of the good works of the whole Institute, in the name of the same Institute, knowing and consenting, with the whole Institute, as was said, well willing and approving this; concerning which there can be no question.

Finally, how useful this participation of spiritual goods is, is openly established from the Sacred Scriptures themselves. On account of ten just men, if they had been found there, God would have spared Sodom and Gomorrah and the neighboring cities. Genesis 18. Likewise Matthew 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," that is, the faith of those who were offering the paralytic to Him, "said to the paralytic, thy sins are forgiven thee." According to St. Augustine, Sermon 4 on the Saints, St. Stephen impetrated, and in some way merited, the conversion of Saul. Likewise it is known that St. Monica impetrated the conversion of St. Augustine. The assiduous prayer of a just man indeed avails much, as St. James himself asserts in the last chapter of his Catholic Epistle, and St. James speaks explicitly of prayer for others.

But impetratory force is properly in prayer, yet it is also in any good work done with the grace of God. For according to the opinion of all the Doctors, good works have meritorious, satisfactory, and impetratory force; and under this impetration is contained also propitiatory force, namely by the impetration of salutary graces.

From these things it is evident that, for making to another a participation in one's own good works, whether it is a question of a physical person or of a moral person or moral body, no special concession to be made by the Holy See, or any spiritual jurisdiction, is truly required. A special concession of the Holy See is certainly required if it is a question, as in the concession made by Leo X, of participation in the good works of all Christ's faithful in the whole world.

This alone can truly make difficulty in the aforesaid affiliation or communication of good works: that in those working there is required the intention of directing their own works to the aforesaid end, since this intention of the end depends only on those working. But for this reason it was said above that the aforesaid affiliation can well be made by the Superior or by the Chapter, with the Community knowing and consenting or approving, namely so that the aforesaid affiliated persons may be able to perceive every fruit from that affiliation; for even if the Community has not in some way been forewarned, some fruit will always come to the affiliated persons, and not a slight one, as will appear more broadly from the things soon to be said.

"It is certain by faith that there is given some communication of good works among the faithful, by which they can help one another and give suffrage to one another as regards the impetratory fruit. It is evident from that article of the Apostles' Creed: I believe in the Communion of Saints...

"Moreover, the just faithful can help one another through suffrages for satisfaction for temporal punishment. Thus the certain and common doctrine of Catholics, against the heretics.

"In order that a suffrage have its fruit, three conditions are required on the part of the one offering: I. the state of grace... II. that the one offering have the intention of offering his work for another and of applying the suffrage to him... III. that a work of this kind be of itself satisfactory, that is, have value and price for paying the debt of the one for whom it is offered. And works of this kind generally are three, namely prayer, fasting, and almsgiving, under which all other penal operations are comprehended.

"In order that a suffrage, as regards satisfactory force, have its effect also on the part of him for whom it is offered, three conditions are required: I. that he need suffrage; II. that he be in the state of grace; III. that the sins for which satisfaction is offered have already been remitted as regards fault...

"As regards satisfactory force is added, for as regards impetratory force a suffrage can profit even those existing in mortal sin, by meriting and impetrating for them de congruo special helps of grace, by which, inwardly enlightened, they may be converted more quickly to penance and may be preserved from various dangers both of soul and of body..." Thus Anacletus Reiffenstuel, Theologia Moralis, tract XII, dist. III, question XI, n. 133 ff.

And Suarez, in III, tom. 4, disp. 55, sect. 5, says: "Prelates of Religions, whether local, provincial, or general... have the power of granting to some a remission of punishments, by applying to them the good merits and satisfactions of their congregations and making them participants in them, by admitting them to a certain special union with their religions.... For any private person can offer suffrage for another from his own works...

"It must be noted that among suffrages some are offered by way of impetration or of merit de congruo, but others by way of satisfaction or payment... to satisfy for sins already committed... can be done by any private person by his own authority, either for himself, and then it keeps the proper name of satisfaction, or for another living person or departed person on account of the union of charity, and it is called satisfactory suffrage...

"When some Religion or its Prelate admits some persons to the fellowship or participation of the works of such a Religion... he admits them to the application of its merits and works, especially by way of impetration. For because, on account of the pious works of the whole Religion, God specially does good to its members, therefore also to all persons specially joined with such a Religion He confers special benefits on account of the same works.

"They can also admit some persons to participation of satisfactory suffrage, if they wish to apply their satisfactions when they make them. In this, nevertheless, it must be noted that an application of this kind always requires the particular will and intention of the individual persons working. Therefore it is not enough that the Prelate of one house, for example, by his intention and will apply for benefactors, or for a benefactor, so much satisfaction, or such a satisfactory work, which is performed by some subject of his; but it is necessary that the subject himself also offer it by his will, either expressly and directly, or by referring his intention to the intention of the Superior.

"The reason is that the will of the superior does not suffice for morally directing another's work, because it is not directly and immediately under his dominion, although he has some right to it; but the proximate one working has his own dominion of that work as regards its use, and therefore the relation to this or that end depends on him. And by the same reason it depends on his intention that the work be satisfactory for this one or for that one.... Wherefore Prelates of Religious act neither rightly nor validly if, in their subjects, they apply their works to others as regards satisfactions; because, morally speaking, the subjects who are ignorant of the Prelate's intention will have another and diverse intention, and that intention will be efficacious as regards the fact...

"But someone will say: What fruit, therefore, comes to the faithful... from the fact that they are admitted by Prelates of Religions to the fellowship and participation of the good works of the religion? For if the particular intention and application of individual religious is always necessary, that alone would suffice without such admission or union, and this without the said intention does not suffice; therefore it brings no fruit...

"The answer is... that in three ways suffrage can profit another: by way of satisfaction, by way of direct impetration, and indirectly by way of a certain merit de congruo. Therefore I say that that admission or union first of all profits toward this last manner of fruit, which does not depend on the particular intention of individual persons working; but from this very fact, that someone is in a particular way a member or associate of this religion, the merits of the same religion avail before God, so that by reason of them He confers certain goods by a particular help on persons joined to it, even if those merits are not referred to this end.

"And especially they will have this efficacy if such a person asks something of God on account of the merits of such a religion.... For the prayer will receive greater efficacy from this, that such a person has been more joined to those on account of whose merits he asks; for the reason of friendship demands that on account of friends we do good to others joined to them, even if the friends themselves directly ask nothing...

"But it must also be added that it profits toward that fruit which can be obtained directly by proper impetration. For although for this fruit the proper intention of the person praying is necessary, nevertheless the prayer of a just person made for a person joined to him is more efficacious than for a stranger...

"And besides, it profits so that persons so joined become participants in all prayers which are accustomed to be made generally for the religion itself and its members; for they participate in them not only in the former way, or indirectly, but also as regards direct impetration.

"And it is likely that, when these prayers are made by the whole community and as it were in the name of the whole Religion, their effect, even as regards direct impetration, does not depend on the particular intention of the individual members, but that the intention of the Prelates suffices, although if the intentions of the individual members also are added, they would contribute much, other things being equal, to efficacious impetration."

Hence it has already happened that new Religious Institutes also of simple vows have admitted benefactors to the aforesaid participation of their own good works, no previous faculty having been obtained, and no ecclesiastical jurisdiction favoring them, which they altogether lack, as, for example, Institutes of Sisters. Moreover, in the very praised Norms of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, which the Sacred Congregation on Religious also now follows, an argument is had for the aforesaid admission. For in art. 51 it is said:

"It is not permitted to Congregations of simple vows to aggregate to themselves some third group having the appearance of a third order. NOTHING NEVERTHELESS PREVENTS Congregations of men from attaching to themselves, for the external business of the house, pious men, and Congregations of sisters, pious women, to whom they prescribe a certain form of living and grant participation in the merits of their own Institute."

Therefore, just as nothing prevents admitting to the participation of the good works of an Institute mandataries of this kind, secular persons, outsiders, benefactors; so by parity nothing prevents admitting to the same participation of the good works of the Institute other secular persons, outsiders, benefactors, whether by a gift of money or by services rendered in another way in favor of the Institute. What, for example, can stand in the way of an Institute, by gratitude of soul, admitting to such participation of good works the Cardinal Protector of the Institute, the Cardinal Prefect of the Sacred Congregation on Religious, from whom it obtained various Decrees of Approbation? And let the same be said of others.

1. Caius, a novice, having obtained dismissal, put off the habit and the intention of remaining in religion. But at night, while still sleeping in the monastery, led by repentance, he asked again to be admitted into religion, which he immediately obtained.

Question. Was the novitiate interrupted in the case?

R. Many deny this because of the brevity of the time and the smallness of the matter; others more probably affirm it, because the continuity of the annual time according to the Council of Trent is no longer had. La Croix, bk. 4, n. 18. “But if Caius was not dismissed, although, having put off the habit and the intention of remaining, he hid in the monastery while awaiting an opportunity of going out, Suarez and Castropalaus rightly say against Diana that no interruption was made; as also not then, if the superior had wished first to dismiss him clothed in secular dress. For in these cases he is judged still to have remained in the order, since he was not dismissed by the will of the superiors; and at least by this there is not judged to be a full interruption, unless it was at the same time completed by actual departure.” Thus La Croix, loc. cit., n. 20.

And Ferraris, v. Annus probationis, n. 10 ff.: “The year of probation or novitiate ought to be continuous, so that a novice interrupting the year of probation with the intention of deserting the religion, and going out, although for only two hours, is bound to begin the year of novitiate anew from the Decree of S. C. C. ... If, however, says Fagnanus, the novice had not gone out from the monastery, but with the intention of fleeing had hidden for a little while within the cloister, the year of probation would not on that account be judged interrupted. ... Indeed the year of novitiate is not interrupted even if the novice, retaining the habit, goes out secretly for the sake of hiding himself, provided that he has the intention of returning. And concerning one who remained for the space of twenty hours outside the monastery without the habit, S. C. EE. et RR., 11 August 1626, declared that it could be tolerated concerning departure with the habit and with the intention of returning.” — I. M. 268, 269.

2. A certain novice, after nine months of novitiate, from the error of a physician thinking that he was laboring under a grave infirmity which rendered him unfit for the ministries and discipline of religion, was dismissed by the superiors. Nevertheless, a more accurate examination being applied, the error of the former physician appeared, and the young man was free from suspicion of such a disease; and therefore after six days he was again admitted to the novitiate.

Question. Was the novitiate interrupted in the case?

R. In the affirmative. For there is no doubt that interruption of the novitiate for six days interrupts the required continuation of the novitiate. It is added that, in the case, although from a false cause, that is, from the physician’s error, the novice was truly dismissed by the superiors, and the dismissal was accepted by the novice, and therefore the novice went out from the religion. Wherefore, the dismissal given and accepted in the case, and the departure of the novice standing, the novitiate was altogether interrupted. Hence the aforesaid novice, having again entered religion, will not be able to be admitted to profession after three months; but it is necessary that he again begin the novitiate and complete an entire year of novitiate. Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 4, d. 3; I. M. 269.

3. Benedictus, after six months of novitiate, is compelled to depart from religion because of military service. Three years having been spent in the military in a very praiseworthy manner, the master of novices judges that Benedictus can be admitted to vows after another six months have elapsed, since, he says, with that necessity standing of a wholly involuntary departure, the year of novitiate has not been morally interrupted.

Question. What is to be said in the case?

R. It does not seem that the master of novices judges rightly. For although the departure of Benedictus was altogether necessary and compelled, and Benedictus conducted himself well and laudably during the whole three years of military service, nevertheless the year of novitiate is truly interrupted, and the novitiate is at present to be continued for an entire year. The reason is first, because that new condition of Benedictus in military service renders him altogether secular, and therefore the novitiate is altogether interrupted. For as surely in that new condition of a soldier the novitiate does not endure, nor is it continued, so neither consequently, with this new condition and notable change of state standing, can the novitiate afterwards be continued; rather it must be begun anew. Moreover, the space of three years is altogether notable, and morally speaking it truly cannot be said that the former six months of novitiate are continued with the later six months, that notable intervening space of time having elapsed. And each reason holds even if the military service had lasted for only one year. Likewise each reason remains wholly intact, although the departure in the case was not voluntary, and although Benedictus conducted himself very praiseworthily.

Indeed, from the common opinion, even a much shorter time in the present matter is held to be notable and sufficient for interruption of the novitiate. And thus Cardinal Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 3, d. 2, n. 3, says: “although some judge that a brief interruption does no harm, nevertheless Suarez and Sanchez reject this, and in our case the matter is beyond controversy, since the interruption was for seven days, which is judged a small interruption by no one.” And the same Cardinal Lugo, loc. cit., bk. 4, d. 2, n. 1, speaking of an interruption of six days, says, “there seems no doubt that in every opinion it interrupts the required continuation.” The resolution of the case set forth can be confirmed from the resolution to the fifth doubt of the following case proposed by the praised Cardinal Lugo, loc. cit., bk. 3, d. 2.

4. “A certain novice, after 21 days from his entrance, having left the habit, departed with the intention of not returning; but when seven days had elapsed he returned, and, having again obtained the habit, pursued the novitiate. And when eleven months and ten days had elapsed, which with those 21 days made a whole year, in good faith he emitted profession, and afterwards remained in the order for fifteen other years. ... It was asked: 1. Whether the profession was valid? — 2. Whether at least afterwards tacit profession intervened? — 3. Since he doubts that the convent will not now easily give new consent, whether, without new consent being required, he can now ratify the first profession at least before the prelate and witnesses? — 4. What finally shall he do, so that he may profess validly? — 5. Whether for this it is necessary to put forward again an entire year of probation, or whether without a new year of novitiate the prior profession can be ratified immediately?

To the first. The response was that that profession without doubt was invalid ... since the interruption of the novitiate was for seven days, which is judged a small interruption by no one.

To the second. It also seems certain that that profession was not yet healed and made valid, because for the value of profession the positive consent of the one professing is required; for this it is necessary either that the one professing know the defect of the profession and will to bind himself anew, or at least that he have a conditioned will, by which he says: if perhaps I am not truly professed, from now I will to bind myself anew. However, mere perseverance in religion, and the exercise of acts which professed do, does not suffice; for one who thinks that he is professed, by persevering in religion, does not will to profess, but to fulfill the profession which he thinks he has emitted.

To the third. Although Suarez says that in this case new consent is required on the part of the religion, knowing that the prior acceptance was invalid, which also Sanchez followed and confesses to be more probable, nevertheless the same Sanchez says that it is safe and probable that new knowledge and consent are not required on the part of the prelate or convent, as long as its prior consent was not revoked. ... And it seems to be gathered from the Council of Trent, sess. 25, c. 19, de Reg., where after five years a protest against profession is not admitted, because at that time it is supposed to have been ratified, and therefore by the consent of the one professing alone, even without any new acceptance standing on the part of the religion. Therefore the religious in our case could embrace this opinion; this indeed would proceed well insofar as only the revalidation of profession is considered. Yet it can with difficulty be sustained in order to the novitiate, or to supplying a part of it, as will be clear from what is to be said.

To the fourth. It is clear from what has been said that this religious, by embracing this last opinion, can ratify the profession either alone or before the prelate or some witness; which ratification, as Suarez notes, ought to be made by some external sign, explicitly, or at least implicitly, signifying the will to bind himself, such as remaining in the habit and obedience with the intention of binding himself, which permanence endures for the time required for inducing tacit profession. ... Or, if according to the other opinion he wishes to have new consent of the prelate and convent, he may secretly disclose the whole matter to the prelate, and the prelate, the name of the petitioner being kept silent, may propose it to the convent; or he may seek a dispensation from the Pontiff for ratifying the profession. ... These things, however, proceed insofar as the discussion is about the revalidation of profession. But in our case there is a peculiar difficulty concerning the time of probation, as will be able to be clear from the response to the fifth point.

To the fifth. Therefore concerning repeating the novitiate it must be known that some think that the entire year of novitiate ought to be repeated, because the prior novitiate was morally interrupted by the invalid profession. Once it had been made, that religious already thought himself professed, and therefore he was not in probation; for probation requires the liberty of remaining or departing, which liberty he did not have while thinking himself professed. And although afterwards, when the defect of profession has become known, he begins now to have liberty and is constituted again in the state of novice, nevertheless this time is not continued with the prior novitiate, which was interrupted by the profession thought valid. Since therefore the year of probation ought to be continuous, the consequence is that an entire continuous year of probation ought to be made anew. Thus Suarez. He thinks it probable, however, that the preceding time can be counted, the days which are lacking to the year being afterwards added, because a moral interruption does not seem to occur, since the state and religious habit were always continued. ... He warns, however, that it is necessary that the defect of the past profession be known to the prelate himself and to others to whom it pertains to admit to profession, and this before the time of novitiate begins to be continued. ... For the same knowledge is required on the part of each, so that the novice may prove the religion, and so that the religion itself may be able to prove the novice.

Yet it does not easily appear how consistently this was said by Father Suarez, who, as a reason of doubting against the obligation of manifesting it to the religion, objects the Tridentine Decree (sess. 25, c. 19, de Reg., in which it is established that those are not to be heard who after five years allege the nullity of their profession because of force or fear, or because of defect of age, or something similar), in which, without a preceding manifestation of this kind, the profession is supposed to have been validly ratified in the subsequent five years. Yet to this objection he confesses that in that Decree the discussion is about alleged nullity of profession made through force and fear, or before due age, or something similar, that is, such causes that afterwards the profession could be tacitly ratified by the will of the religious himself, without new consent of the religion. And therefore our case is not comprehended, in which knowledge and will on the part of the religion itself were necessary, except only with a certain accommodation, so that even in these cases the religious is not heard after five years, except when the presumption of ratified profession ceases on the part of the religious and also on the part of the religion; or certainly he is not heard unless he wishes to prove that the profession could not have been ratified during that time, from whatever source this impossibility proceeded. And thus it seems to me that one must consistently speak.” Lugo, loc. cit.

It must be noted here: 1. that Suarez, tom. 3, de Relig., bk. 7, c. 1, n. 20, requires on the part of the monastery new knowledge and consent for accepting the ratification of invalid profession, precisely because he is speaking of profession invalid from a defect holding on the part of the religious professing and of the religion itself, namely when the year of probation was lacking. But when the defect holds only on the part of the one professing, and especially when the defect was because of fear, he expressly admits, nn. 6 ff., that new consent is not required on the part of the religion, because the prior consent always remains as long as it is not revoked. Cf. Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 3, d. 16, n. 21.

2. Although some essential thing is lacking for the validity of profession, nevertheless if during the whole immediately following five years the professed, knowingly and willingly, did not protest, from Trent, sess. 25, c. 19, de Reg., he is presumed to have had the profession ratified. He is presumed, namely by a presumption of law and concerning law, Benedict XIV, Constitution Si datam. But in the internal forum the truth is to be inspected. Suarez, de Relig., tom. 3, bk. 7, c. 4, n. 6. For the Church cannot supply consent. Fagnanus on c. Si quis, n. 32, de Regul.

3. At present, for validly emitting solemn vows after simple vows, express profession is required; and therefore tacit profession has been altogether abrogated.

4. As regards the consent of the monastery at present, from the Decree of Pius IX, Regulari disciplinae, 25 January 1848, the conventual Chapter of the Convent or House must be convoked, “so that the capitulars may declare by secret votes whether the novice can be admitted to profession.” Then an examination must be made by the Provincial and by at least three Provincial examiners, that “they may define whether the novice is furnished with the necessary qualities so that he can safely be admitted to profession.” And the Superior General “can never permit the profession of a novice who has been rejected by the Provincial examiners.” Moreover, from the Decree of the same Pius IX, 7 February 1862, where there is question of admission to solemn profession, in the aforesaid Chapter those professed of simple vows do not have a voice. And “for admission to solemn vows after the completion of the three years of simple vows, the conventual Chapter indeed must be heard for the instruction of the mind of the superiors; but the Superior General, or his subdelegate, by no means will have to stand by the resolution of that Chapter.” I. M. 268, 269, 277, 278.

5. Norbertus committed an occult homicide. Sincerely converted to God, he enters religion, remaining silent about the homicide committed. Hence, after simple vows have been completed, he then solemnly professes.

Question. Did Norbertus emit profession licitly and validly?

R. Norbertus indeed emitted simple and solemn vows illicitly and invalidly, if he entered a religion in which a homicide previously committed is a substantial impediment according to the Constitutions approved by the Apostolic See, as in fact it is in the Society of Jesus. Exam., c. 2, § 2, 6; Const., pt. 6, c. 3, § 4, and C.

But if he entered another religion in which an impediment of this kind is not had, he professed validly. For Sixtus V, by the Bulls of the year 1587 and of the following year, rendered homicides and others guilty of certain crimes incapable of religious profession. But Clement VIII in the year 1602 moderated the aforesaid Constitutions of Sixtus and restored the value of profession. Wherefore there is no doubt that the profession of Norbertus was valid.

But did Norbertus act illicitly by saying nothing about the occult homicide? He indeed acted illicitly, generally speaking, if some grave detriment could come to the religion from it. He also acted illicitly if, when interrogated by the prelates about impediments of this kind, he said nothing. For then fraud and deceit intervened in a grave matter. For it cannot be denied that homicide according to itself, even if it was not brought into judgment, even if it is altogether occult, is a matter of such moment that the religion could prudently be wholly unwilling to accept one who labors under such a defect. If finally Norbertus was incautiously not interrogated about this matter, perhaps he can be excused, because the aforesaid homicide is not of itself an invalidating impediment impeding entrance into religion and profession in it; and since it is altogether occult, Norbertus is not bound to defame himself, nor does grave damage seem thence to threaten the religion. Nevertheless it must not be denied that, although the homicide is occult, there always remains the danger that sometime it may be manifested with grave disgrace to the religion itself. Wherefore Norbertus will be able to be excused only when the circumstances are such that a danger of this kind is wholly improbable. — Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 1, d. 1.

6. Euphemia, from grave fear of her father, well known to her relatives, entered religion and emitted solemn profession. But after some years Euphemia’s father died. Then her relatives, in order that they might obtain the inheritance through her, protested against the validity of the profession. The Ordinary of the place, in order to take cognizance of the litigation that had been moved, sent to Euphemia his Vicar General with two witnesses, so that they might examine her. But Euphemia, lest she stir up scandals, told the Vicar General to abstain from any examination whatever, because she herself of her own accord yielded to any litigation, and “if before,” she said, “I was not a nun, today I wish to be a nun.”

Question. Is the aforesaid ratification of Euphemia’s profession valid?

R. The ratification of Euphemia’s profession could seem invalid, because profession, in order to be made validly, ought to be made into the hands of the abbess or of a prelate able to accept profession. But that ratification of Euphemia was not made into the hand of anyone able to accept it, but before a certain delegated judge, to whom it did not pertain to grant or accept profession. But in the case the ratification of profession did not need for its value some new acceptance, but only the consent of the same nun, wishing validly to profess. The reason is that for the value of the preceding profession, invalid because of fear, only the free consent of the nun herself professing was lacking; when that accedes at any time whatever, the profession becomes valid, even if the ratification is not made with a new solemnity into the hands of the abbess or prelate. Nor does this seem able to be denied, given the doctrine of the Council of Trent, sess. 25, c. 19, de Reg., where, after five years have elapsed from the day of the profession made, a regular alleging the nullity of his profession because of fear is denied a hearing, because, namely, tacit ratification is presumed, and one sufficient for the value of profession, even without new solemnity or acceptance of the prelate or Chapter, whose acceptance had already preceded and was not revoked. How much more, therefore, in the case, will express ratification before a delegated judge and witnesses suffice?

But again the ratification in the case could seem invalid from those words of the nun: “if before I was not a nun, today I wish to be a nun.” For those words do not seem to signify present profession, but the will and intention of ratifying the profession afterwards. But first, those words, in those circumstances in which there was question of examining the nullity of the profession, and in which they were uttered to impede this examination, cannot be understood in another sense except of profession to be revalidated in the present. Besides, those words, “today I wish to be a nun,” signify the intention of ratifying the religious profession in the present. For the word “I wish,” with another verb of the infinitive tense, e.g., “I wish to sell,” “I wish to buy,” can indeed signify only an intention disposed toward doing, but it can also signify the intention of doing in the present; and thus by the aforesaid words, “I wish to sell,” “I wish to buy,” the contract of sale and purchase can well be perfected in the present. Indeed, if to the verb “I wish” there is joined a verb signifying the very exercise and execution of the thing, then it signifies the intention of doing in the present, as, e.g., “I wish to have you as wife,” because for having as wife marriage is necessarily presupposed. But that nun did not say, “I wish to make profession,” but “I wish to be a nun,” for which profession is necessarily presupposed. Nor could it be understood of a novice nun, since the doubt to be examined was not this, but whether she was a professed nun. Accordingly those words, “if before I was not a nun, today I wish to be a nun,” signified nothing else than, “if up to now I have not been professed, now from this moment I wish to be professed.” And that word “today” must also be weighed, opposed to the past time, “if before,” by which the present ratification of the profession is openly manifested, as if she were saying: if up to this day I was not a nun, from this same day henceforth I wish to be a nun; by which locution a present will and consent is certainly signified. — Lugo, Resp. Mor., bk. 3, d. 16; I. M. 277, 278.

7. Brother N., a cleric religious, petitioned for dispensation from the simple vows emitted on 6 March 1887, asserting that, because of weak health, he could not remain in the order. On 4 September 1888, the Sacred Congregation on Regular Discipline benignly granted the Father Minister General for the effect concerning which in the prayers; and he, on 8 September 1888, by these words, “We dispense, and from every bond and obligation of the said vows we restore him free to secular life,” committed the Rescript to execution. Meanwhile, however, on 4 September, Brother N. had written to the Minister General that, deceived by the devil, he had set forth a false cause in the petition, and that therefore he wished to die in the order, and he begged that the dispensation from simple vows not be intimated to him. The Provincial Minister heard his prayers, informed the Minister General of his repentance, and on 6 April 1890, the three years having elapsed, admitted him to solemn vows.

Question. Whether Brother N., notwithstanding his petition of 4 September, really was dispensed from simple vows by the Rescript of 4 September, or by its execution on 8 September 1888, and whether his solemn profession must be judged invalid?

R. In the negative as to each part. S. C. EE. et RR., 15 March 1892; M. E., vol. 7, pt. 2, p. 75.

8. Benedictus, his religious profession having been pronounced invalid, asks doubtfully whether at least now he is still bound by the vow of chastity. For the confessor told him so, namely that the solemn vow of chastity passed into a simple vow of chastity. But Benedictus, not greatly trusting that confessor, goes to another and sets forth his doubt to him, asking its solution.

R. When religious profession has been pronounced invalid, regulars return to their former state, as if profession had never been issued. Wherefore the solemn vow of chastity does not remain, nor does it pass into a simple vow of chastity. How indeed can a vow pass into a simple vow when it never existed? And, if there is question of profession of simple vows, not solemn vows, the vow of chastity simply is not, because it was not, whence that which never began cannot continue. The reason is that the acts of agents do not operate beyond their intention. But a restrictive clause is not accustomed to be added, nor can it be, when religious profession is declared null, e.g., from defect of consent or from defect of prior novitiate; for then no vow was truly present. That clause is accustomed to be added only as regards the vow of chastity, the vow of chastity remaining, when those vows are dispensed; for then the vow was present and consequently can remain. That confessor perhaps made a confusion between dispensation and declaration of invalid profession. I. M. 262.

9. A religious Provincial granted dispensation from simple vows emitted by a certain nun in a community under the rule which that religious himself professed. Hence the Bishop asked whether the said Provincial could validly dispense from the simple vows of the nuns of whom there is question.

R. The preceding case was proposed to the Sacred Congregation, and, a report on it having been made to the Supreme Pontiff, “His Holiness ordered that it be rescribed that the Father Provincial could not dispense from the aforesaid vows, although simple, emitted in the said monastery, according to the things handed down by Benedict XIV in the Bull Convocatis, 27 November 1749, § 32.” Bizzarri, Collectan., ed. 1885, p. 133.

Now Benedict XIV, loc. cit., has these things: “As regards vows, let them know that they [the Penitentiaries] must abstain from their commutation in those cases in which there is question of prejudice to a third party. Wherefore in that which pertains to vows, although simple, whether of perseverance, or others customarily emitted in some Congregation or Community and into vows obligatory accepted by a third party, let them not involve themselves.”

Hence it appears that simple vows which are emitted in some Institute or Congregation or House approved by the Holy See are reserved to the same Holy See, because those vows are received by the Institute or by the Congregation or by the House, and they assume the nature of a contract and reciprocal obligation. Whence dispensation of those vows introduces prejudice to a third party, and therefore is to be granted only by the Supreme Pontiff.

“1. In any Order, Congregation, Society, Institute, Monastery, or House whatsoever, whether solemn or simple vows are emitted in them, and even if Orders, Congregations, Societies, Institutes, Monasteries, and Houses are in question which, by a particular privilege contained even in the body of the law, or by any other title, are not comprehended in general decrees unless special, individual, and express mention is made of them, no one shall be admitted to the habit without testimonial letters both from the Ordinary of origin and also from the Ordinary of the place in which the Postulant, after completing the fifteenth year of his age, has remained for more than one year.

“2. In the aforesaid testimonial letters, after they have diligently inquired, even through secret information, into the qualities of the Postulant, the Ordinaries must report concerning his birth, age, morals, life, reputation, condition, education, and knowledge; whether he is under investigation, bound by some censure, irregularity, or other canonical impediment, burdened by debt, or liable to render an account of some administration. And let the Ordinaries know that their conscience remains burdened concerning the truth of the things set forth; nor is it ever free for them to deny testimonial letters of this kind; in the same letters, nevertheless, concerning each of the foregoing articles they must attest only those things which they shall judge in conscience that they can affirm in the Lord.

“3. The observance of this decree is strictly enjoined, even in virtue of holy obedience, upon all and each Regular Superior and other Religious whom it concerns, of whatever rank they may be and even of an exempt and privileged Institute and one requiring express mention; and whoever, contrary to the tenor of this decree, shall receive anyone into the religious habit shall by that very fact incur the penalty of deprivation of all offices and of active voice, and of perpetual incapacity for obtaining others thereafter, from which he can be dispensed only by the Apostolic See.

“4. By force of any privilege, faculty, indult, dispensation, or approval of rules and constitutions even in specific form which any Order, Institute, Superior, or Religious may obtain from the Apostolic See, it shall never be considered that derogation has been made from this decree unless derogation from it is made expressly and by name, even if general derogatory clauses, however broad, are appended in the concession. But if it should happen that a dispensation from the same decree is at any time granted expressly and by name to some Institute, it cannot be extended to others by force of any privilege or communication of privileges.

“5. On the first day of January in every year, this decree shall be read in the public refectory under penalty of deprivation of office and of active and passive voice, to be incurred by the Superiors by the very fact.

“But lest the observance of this decree be impeded by any reason, title, or pretext, His Holiness derogates wholly from any constitutions operating to the contrary...and any other things whatever to the contrary, and declares that derogation has been made from them.” Decree Romani Pontifices of the Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 25 January 1848.

The qualities required in those to be admitted are those which are prescribed “in the Constitution of Sixtus V Cum de omnibus, with the moderation of Gregory XIV, and in the Decree of Clement VIII Cum ad regularem disciplinam, as well as in the rules and Constitutions of the respective Order.” Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 1 May 1851. In the aforesaid Decree of Clement VIII one has Instructions concerning the reception and education of novices in monasteries and convents designated or to be designated. Bizzarri, Collect., pp. 843 ff., 867 ff.

“Conversi shall not be received before the twentieth year of their age, and unless they know at least the chief heads of Christian doctrine.” Instruction concerning the reception and education of novices, issued by command of Clement VIII, 19 March 1693; Sacred Congregation on the State of Regulars, 1 May 1851, to the seventh; Encyclical Letter Neminem latet, 19 March 1857.

“The mind of the Sacred Congregation is that henceforth the year of probation or novitiate and solemn profession be made in monasteries designated for the novitiate according to the form of the Constitution of Clement VIII Regularis disciplinae restitutioni…in such a way that, according to the prescription of the Council of Trent, Session 25, ch. 16, De Regularibus, when the time of the novitiate has been completed, Superiors shall admit to profession the novices whom they have found suitable, or shall eject them from the monastery.” Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, 12 July 1793. On 19 September 1686, moreover, the Sacred Congregation had declared null any vestition and profession made in a convent not designated for the novitiate, adding that “the year of probation is to be computed from the day of arrival at the lawful place of novitiate.” Bizzarri, Collect., pp. 279 ff.

148. • It is certain that there is given a divine vocation, that is, that God by most benign providence calls some before others to a more excellent and more perfect state, and at the same time lavishes the gifts and graces for rightly executing and preserving it, especially as to the ecclesiastical and religious state. For since all things in the natural order are governed by God in the mode proper to each, therefore a fortiori in the supernatural order. On another ground, special gifts and graces are required for embracing and pursuing a more perfect state, which can be conceded by God alone, the supreme dispenser. It is established moreover from various places of Sacred Scripture. Thus concerning the Priesthood in particular the Apostle says, Heb. 5:4: "Nor does anyone take honor to himself, but he who is called by God, as Aaron...." Moreover the same thing must be said about religious life, which is a more perfect and much more difficult state.

149. Questions. - QUESTION 1º. Whether or how does one sin who, feeling himself called to Religion, does not comply with the divine vocation?

Resp. 1º Per se, strictly speaking, he sins in no way; because divine counsels per se impose no obligation, since in this precisely they differ from precepts.

Resp. 2º Yet he can scarcely be excused from some fault because of the danger of eternal salvation to which he commits himself. Indeed he would not be excused from grave sin who was persuaded that this one means of obtaining eternal salvation remained for him, namely that he flee from the dangers of the world.

But indeed, are those persons in a bad state who, morally certain about a divine vocation to Religion, strive to persuade themselves that they can obtain their salvation equally easily by remaining in the world, or by returning to it? It does not seem to be doubted that these persons expose themselves to a great risk of salvation; because by remaining in the world against the vocation of God, they deprive themselves of those special helps which God's providence had prepared for them in religion, and therefore they will with difficulty resist the temptations of the world. Nevertheless St. Ligorius does not dare to render a certain judgment about this.

150. • QUESTION 2º. How does one sin who, not called, nevertheless undertakes the more perfect state of Religion or of the Clericate?

Resp. He sins gravely, if he has clearly known the defect of vocation, both on account of the reverence due to sacred Orders and Religion, both on account of the injury brought upon God, and especially on account of the danger of salvation which he incurs, while he undertakes obligations which he will not be able morally to satisfy, as one lacking the special helps which are conceded by God only to those called. Nevertheless he will be excused from that fault if he has a firm will of fulfilling the obligations of the state undertaken.

151. • QUESTION 3º. Do parents or Superiors sin gravely who turn children or subjects away from the religious state?

Resp. 1º Affirmative, if they turn them away unjustly by threats, force, fraud, or importunate prayers; because they impede them from the attainment of a great good, to which they have a right ¹.

¹ ** They not only impede from the attainment of an immense good, but expose their children to the risk of eternal salvation.

Resp. 2º Affirmative, for the most part, even if they turn them away only by prayers and promises; because this cannot be without grave harm to them. - Thus commonly with St. Ligorius, who says that this opinion is altogether to be held against some. - Yet parents do not sin who oppose for a time the pious desires of younger children in order to test their constancy, or because of another just cause ². Nevertheless in this matter, in order to avoid hallucinations, they ought to stand by the counsels of the Confessor or of an upright and learned man.

² ** That cause can be judged just on account of which not even the Superiors of the Order would easily admit the candidate. For the rest, even in testing the constancy of the younger ones, no small discretion is needed, lest namely the candidate's frailty turn him away from a vocation otherwise true.

QUESTION 4º. Do children sin by entering Religion when their parents are unwilling or unaware?

Resp. No, speaking per se, although in practice this ordinarily is not expedient, unless they deservedly fear unjust vexation or impediment. The reason is that unless parents oppose from a just cause, children are altogether free concerning the choice of a state of life. - Recall the things said concerning the fourth precept, tom. 1, n. 369.

152. • QUESTION 5º. What are the signs of a religious vocation?

Resp. Speaking generally, or according to ordinary providence, two things are required and suffice for proving a divine vocation, namely due aptitude and propensity of the will.

1º Aptitude is understood as suitability for the religious state in general, and in particular for the observance proper to such an Order. But it consists especially in right judgment, in a good disposition, in a soul submitted to the yoke of obedience, in relatively sufficient knowledge, and in lack of defects of body and soul which are repugnant to the reason of this life. 2º A natural ³ and constant inclination, which therefore is not subject to frequent changes, notwithstanding otherwise some past tergiversation arising from temptations of the devil or from some repugnance of nature. Yet it is not required that the inclination proceed from spontaneity or propensity more than from intimate persuasion of soul. Moreover that inclination ought to be right, namely to proceed from a pure intention, from the mere desire of attaining salvation more easily, of procuring the greater glory of God or even the salvation of souls, etc.

³ ** Understand natural here as a spontaneous propensity of soul, which arises almost from this, that the religious state is presented to the mind as congruous to one's proper disposition, and suitable for bringing about internal peace and happiness.

I said speaking generally or in ordinary providence; because there are more evident signs of vocation, namely 1º divine revelation, as St. Paul, St. Aloysius Gonzaga, St. Stanislaus Kostka, etc., were called; 2º singular inspiration, which consists in an internal motion by which someone is vehemently impelled to a more perfect life and, as it were, drawn.

— Passage to another religion or to another monastery sui iuris cannot be made without an indult of the Holy See. One passing to another religion must perform a novitiate, though not likewise a postulancy; during this he observes the vows and must obey the Master of novices also by reason of the vow of obedience. The particular rights and obligations which he had remain suspended. If he does not persevere in the new proposal, he is bound to return to the former religion, unless the time of vows has expired. One passing to another monastery of the same Order repeats neither novitiate nor profession. If he had already been professed of perpetual vows, one passing makes no temporal vows precede perpetual profession, but is not admitted to it without a deliberative vote of the Council or Chapter, and the Superior has the right of proving him longer, yet not beyond a year from the completed novitiate. One passing to another monastery of the same religion, from the day of passage; one passing to another religion, from the new profession made, loses all rights and obligations of the prior monastery or religion, and takes up the rights and offices of the other. If in the prior religion he had been solemnly professed, the very solemnity of the vows of itself is extinguished. Cf. cc. 632-636.

— Passage to another religion or to another monastery sui iuris requires an indult of the Holy See. One passing to another religion must perform a novitiate, during which he observes the vows; but he has special obligations suspended; if he had been professed of perpetual vows, he must make no temporal vows precede perpetual ones. But one passing to another monastery of the same Order repeats neither novitiate nor profession.

In this chapter we shall treat: 1. of those who can enter; 2. of those who are bound to enter; 3. of the Novitiate; 4. of Profession.

2137. • Principles. I. "All and only those can enter Religion who are of their own right and not bound to others; but those who are bound to others CANNOT do so without their consent."¹ Each is clear of itself.

Hence: 1. Entrance is not licit for IMPUBERES, because they are subject to parents or guardians as regards the disposition of life. To them are to be numbered servants properly so called, if their masters refuse; and in many places, on account of civil laws, minors, unless with the consent of parents, which, for preventing future troubles, is prudently required to be set down in letters.

2. Entrance is not licit, regularly, for CHILDREN, even those bound by a vow of Religion, who would have to leave parents constituted either in extreme necessity or merely grave necessity. - But otherwise, if their necessity were common, or if they would suffer only a moderate diminution of state, or if the son, although he should remain in the world, nevertheless could in no way aid their necessity; otherwise also, if he himself could not remain in the world without grave and proximate danger of sin; because his spiritual salvation must be preferred to the temporal life of the parents.²

You will ask: Is a son already professed bound TO LEAVE Religion ON ACCOUNT OF THE NECESSITY OF PARENTS? - Resp. 1. If the necessity is only grave, he is not bound, nor can he; because just as a wife already taken, so also Religion already assumed must be preferred to parents. - 2. But if the necessity is extreme, he is bound, in the case in which he cannot aid them from the cloister. In doubt concerning the gravity of the necessity, judgment belongs to the Superior.³

"Outside the case of necessity," Luther used to say, "children sin by entering Religion without the consent of parents. - But the opposite has been taught by all the Holy Fathers and all Catholics, while it is certain, as the Angelic Doctor says,⁴ that children are free concerning the election of State. And although it is fitting, as the Doctors say, that children not depart unless they have first received the father's blessing; nevertheless this is understood when there is no danger that the father will turn them aside from a holy purpose; but because this danger is almost always present, therefore St. Thomas absolutely exhorts children not to use the counsel of blood-relations when the matter is about a religious vocation. But from this counsel, says the Saint,⁵ first indeed relatives of the flesh must be removed. But relatives of the flesh in this proposal are not friends, but rather enemies."⁶

3. Entrance is not licit for PARENTS who have children constituted in grave necessity or destitute of sufficient education, "unless it has been provided how they can be educated," as St. Thomas speaks.⁷ But this is not understood of emancipated children, unless they are in grave necessity.⁸

4. Entrance is not licit for THOSE who would have to leave brothers or sisters in extreme necessity. If their necessity is only grave, in this case, a brother who has vowed Religion needs dispensation so that he may defer entrance for a long time. - Otherwise, if he has not vowed; because "by reason of charity someone could defer and even omit the state of Religion in order to aid brothers gravely in need."⁹

5. Entrance is not licit for SPOUSES, when matrimony has already been consummated, unless with the consent of the other party, or unless because of his or her notorious adultery; for the matrimonial bond belongs to the order of justice, against which the virtue of religion does not prevail. That a ratified marriage is dissolved by solemn profession, and that two months are conceded to spouses for deliberating concerning entrance into Religion, or into an Order strictly regular, we have already said in the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 1981.¹⁰

6. Finally, entrance into Religion is not licit for BISHOPS. - For they cannot, without a just cause, leave their Churches, both on account of the vow which they emitted in accepting them, of serving them perpetually, and on account of the spiritual marriage with their own Church, which, as Innocent III says, "is dissolved not by human, but rather by divine power." But if a just cause intervenes, the Supreme Pontiff certainly can permit them entrance into Religion.¹¹

2138. • II. All clerics, parish priests, or beneficiaries CAN licitly enter Religion, even if the Bishop contradicts, unless they are held by another bond. This is clear both from the canon Duae sunt leges,¹² in which Pope Urban II established: "If any of these clerics holds people in his church under a Bishop and lives secularly, if, inspired by the Holy Spirit, he should wish to save himself in some monastery ..., even with his Bishop contradicting, let him go free by our authority"; and from the unanimous opinion of the Canonists, which Benedict XIV reports in the Bull Ex quo dilectus.¹³

Nor does the obedience promised to the Bishop stand in the way; because this is promised according to the liberty given by Christ the Lord and according to the laws of the Church. Nevertheless a parish priest, because he is about to resign his office, is bound, from natural law, to make the Bishop more certain concerning the counsel he has taken up, lest the flock be abandoned without a keeper. Clerics and other Beneficiaries are held to the same from decency and office, unless they are excused on account of reverential fear.¹⁴ Yet the benefice is not vacant except after profession. Indeed, if the benefice is not residential, it can be retained, but without use and administration, by those who emit simple vows.¹⁵

We have said: unless he is held by another bond, e.g. of justice, by which that cleric would be held who had been educated gratuitously under the condition that afterward he would exercise ministry in the diocese for a determined time; or by the bond of charity, for example if the Church would suffer grave damage from his departure; indeed, in such a case, the Bishop could recall a priest of this kind from Religion.¹⁶ Thus likewise those are prohibited from deserting missions who were ordained by title of mission with an oath (cf. n. 1923).

2139. • IT IS ASKED. Can those burdened by DEBT enter Religion?

Resp. 1. Considering natural law, the opinion which seems more probable to St. Alphonsus teaches that such persons cannot licitly enter if there is probable hope that in a short time, e.g. within two years, they will be able to satisfy creditors. - But if this hope is absent, or if from that brief stay in the world there threatens a probable danger of falling into grave sins or of losing vocation, they can enter immediately, a cession of their goods having been made to the creditors. "The reason is that the natural precept does not oblige when the debtor cannot satisfy except with so great a detriment to his liberty, and with the burden of undergoing danger to eternal salvation." But if the debts are uncertain, so that they can be restored to the poor or to pious places, he is not bound to wait even the least little while, since nothing is so pious as to dedicate oneself and all one's own things to God in Religion.

Resp. 2. From canonical law, the profession of those who, through the squandering of their goods, have fallen into enormous debt is indeed valid, but illicit; and also that of those who must render accounts, e.g. guardians, procurators, executors of a testament, if the accounts to be rendered are very litigious, intricate, fraudulent, and about to furnish occasion for lawsuits.

2140. • Principles. I. In the first place, he is BOUND to enter Religion who has promised this by a LEGITIMATE vow.¹ It is clear from what was said concerning the obligation of a vow in general (n. 627). Hence it follows:

1. He who has vowed Religion in general, i.e. not determining Order, or place, or discipline more lax or more severe, is bound to seek by ordinary means some Order or some approved religious Congregation in which discipline is flourishing, at least as regards the more principal observances; and if he is repelled from that Order, he is bound, more probably, to enter some other Religion; because by a general vow he is bound to entrance into some Religion.

2. He who has vowed Religion in species is bound to enter some house of that Order, and after being repelled from one he must use ordinary means so that he may be admitted into another. - But after the third or fourth repulse, he is now free from fault if he remains in the world; because fulfillment of the vow has become impossible.

3. He who has vowed Religion individually, so determining the place that he intended no other, is free from his vow if he is not admitted into that house; because he bound himself under this condition only.

4. He who has vowed Religion and has entered it is bound to PERSEVERE in it; "because the vow of Religion obliges not only to taking up the religious habit, but also to serving God for the whole time of life."² - Whence he sins gravely if he withdraws without a just cause; "unless he had understood only that he would make trial of it. Moreover, there would be a just cause of going out if he should find there such a manner of living to which his powers were not equal; or if there he should experience grave and long sadness. - But if he had also vowed to profess, he is bound to execute this even with grave inconvenience to himself, provided the religious State does not turn out wholly intolerable to him."³

2141. II. Everyone who is morally CERTAIN OF HIS VOCATION to the religious life is bound to enter Religion, nor can he, with conscience safe, remain in the world. Certainly, not to obey a divine vocation, speaking of itself, is not a sin; for counsels do not of themselves bind to fault. - Nevertheless, unhappy is he who neglects such a vocation! For "if anyone gravely sins who draws another away from vocation on account of the harm which he inflicts on him: how will he be immune from fault who knows that he is certainly called by God to Religion, and wishes to remain in the world with danger to his eternal salvation? To expose oneself to such danger, the Holy Doctor adds, I will never be able to persuade myself is free from fault. But whether this fault is grave or light, I leave to the judgment of the wise."⁴

2142. For the fuller explanation of the matter, it will not be beside the point to add here some general questions ON DIVINE VOCATION to some state of life.

Questions. QUESTION 1. What is VOCATION to some state?

Resp. Vocation can be defined: An act of supernatural providence, by which God elects each human being to some kind of life, and adorns him with suitable gifts and helps for worthily and laudably fulfilling the offices which are proper to that kind of life. Certainly, many states, e.g. of advocate, of judge, etc., if they are considered in themselves, do not transcend the merely natural order; but if they are considered insofar as they are states of men destined to a supernatural end, there is none which is not subject to the supernatural order. Whence St. Paul says: "Each one has his proper gift from God" (1 Cor. 7:7).⁵ And St. Cyprian: "By His order, not by our judgment, the virtue of the Holy Spirit is administered."

QUESTION 2. What are the SIGNS of a divine vocation to some state?

Resp. THREE especially are enumerated, namely: 1. A certain constant and deliberate PROPENSION to that condition of life about which one is deliberating: a propension, I say, constant; for him whom God destines to some kind of life, He sweetly and strongly draws in a permanent manner to it, although at the same time there can be present a certain natural repugnance; then a propension deliberate, so that in the intellect of the one called there is an illumination of divine grace, in which he looks upon the state to be entered as going to be suitable for him for attaining his eternal salvation. - 2. SUITABILITY, or APTITUDE for fittingly fulfilling the offices of that state. This aptitude for the religious state consists chiefly in right judgment, in a good disposition, in a soul submitted to the yoke of obedience, in relatively sufficient knowledge, and in the absence of defects of body and soul which are opposed to the religious life or to the end of the Institute. - 3. ABSENCE OF IMPEDIMENTS, such as would be want of parents, bad health of body, etc. This last sign, although negative, is nevertheless of the greatest moment, since God is accustomed to manifest His will also through the circumstances of things and external events.⁶ Recall what was said n. 1849, 3.

QUESTION 3. How does one sin who, not called, embraces the state of Clericate or Religion?

Resp. 1. If he embraces the sacerdotal state, especially while intending to dwell in the world, without vocation, i.e. without aptitude or without right intention, he sins most gravely, because he casts himself and others into great danger of salvation.

Resp. 2. If he embraces only the religious state, he is certainly to be accused of great temerity, because he takes up obligations which he will be able to satisfy with difficulty, on account of the defect of special helps which are granted by God to those alone who are called. Whence Christ the Lord said (Matt. 19:11): "Not all take this word." Nevertheless, if one not called has a firm will of satisfying his obligations, he does not seem to sin gravely; because the religious state, by its own nature, will supply him with such helps by which he will be able to execute this will of his.⁷ Except if he knows that he lacks those conditions of soul or body without which he certainly will not be able to observe the vows and rules, or in fact will not observe them.⁸

QUESTION 4. What is to be done by him who has certainly ERRED in the election of state?

Resp. If it is still licit, let him choose for himself another suitable state by the counsel of his confessor. - But if Religion prohibits this, let him consider that word of St. Augustine said to him: "If you are not called, make yourself be called," i.e. live in such a way as if you had been called to the present state of life. Namely, necessity is to be converted into virtue, and special helps must be obtained from God through prayer; for God will never be lacking to one doing what is in him.⁹

QUESTION 5. Whether and how does one sin who DRAWS ANOTHER BACK from the religious State?

Resp. 1. If he draws him back by unjust means, namely by force, fraud, or grave fear, he offends gravely by a sin of injustice, both against that private person, whom he unjustly deprives of a great good, and against Religion, which has the right that it not be impeded by force or deceit from attaining its good. - Hence, he is held to reparation, both of the scandal which he gave and of the damage which he inflicted, according to what was said n. 514 and 921.

Resp. 2. If he draws him back by prayers or counsels, he indeed does not sin against justice, but he sins of himself gravely against charity, unless a just cause is present. Parents, however, can be excused from mortal sin, at least for some brief time, "by reason of ignorance or inadvertence, which can easily be in them on account of vehement carnal affection toward children."¹⁰

2143. • The NOVITIATE is the probation of religious life, or the mutual experiment, by which Religion examines the qualities and disposition of the Novice, and the Novice examines the austerity or observance of the Order. - Hence there are diverse obligations, looking on the one side to the Superiors of the Order who admit novices, but on the other side to the novices themselves who ask to be admitted. Concerning these obligations only a few things are to be said. For it suffices here briefly to explain the common principles of the Law of Regulars, which can be modified by particular Statutes or Indults.¹¹

I. The RIGHT OF ADMITTING novices belongs to the ORDER which one desires to enter, in such a way namely that it is to be exercised not by the Prelate alone, but by the Convent, or capitularly. Now then,

1. As regards MEN, it is of common law that Religions approved by the Holy See, even those not exempt, do not depend on the Bishop in admitting novices; for the faculty of admitting them is contained in the approbation itself.¹²

But in the decree of the Sacred Congregation SUPER STATU REGULARIUM (25 Jan. 1848, Romani Pontifices)¹³ Pius IX established, and indeed under penalty of privation of offices, though not under penalty of nullity of profession, that: "In any Order, Congregation ... whether solemn vows or simple vows are emitted in them, no one be admitted to the habit without testimonial letters both of the Ordinary of origin and also of the Ordinary of the place in which the postulant, after the completion of the fifteenth year of his age, has stayed beyond a year; after they have diligently inquired concerning the qualities of the postulant, the Ordinaries must report concerning his birth, age, morals, life, reputation, condition, education, knowledge." And it is added: "Let the Ordinaries know that their conscience remains burdened concerning the truth of the things set forth, nor is it free to them to deny letters of this kind."

If the Ordinary refuses to testify concerning the qualities of the postulant, either because he does not know him, or because he is impeded by the civil authority, etc., it must be supplied by another accurate information, and the postulants, before they are admitted to the habit, are to remain at least for three months in the Convent, and there they are to be diligently proved. Thus the Sacred Congregation super Statu Relig., on 1 May 1851.¹⁴

But in another Decree of the same day (Regulari disciplinae), the same Supreme Pontiff enacted a twofold law concerning things to be observed: 1. in proving those who ask to be admitted to the Religious habit; 2. in admitting Novices to Profession. - The reason for the decree is that "it seemed necessary that in the admission of Novices to the habit and profession the parts to be conceded should belong not only to inferior Prelates and Superiors general, but also to certain other Religious men ... outstanding in counsel and gravity, so that they might accurately examine the disposition, talent, morals, and other necessary gifts of those who are about to give their name to the religious family," etc.

This second decree was issued only "for Italy and the adjacent islands"; but it furnishes an excellent norm also for other regions.

2. As regards NUNS, the Tridentine law (Sess. 25, de Regul.) continues to have force. - Therefore the Bishop, either by himself or through another, is bound, both before the reception of the habit and before profession, even in exempt monasteries, to examine the will of the virgin: "whether she has been forced, whether she has been seduced, whether she knows what she is doing, whether she is suitable for the monastery, whether this monastery is suitable for her."¹⁵ - This EXAMINATION is indeed commanded under grave obligation, at least before profession. Nevertheless, profession, if the examination has been omitted, is valid.

And here it must be NOTED that the aforesaid examination binds only nuns of solemn vows; but it is expedient that it also be instituted with nuns who pronounce only simple vows, although, at least from positive law, it is not commanded under grave obligation.

Furthermore it must be noted that nuns, although not exempt and professing only simple vows, can never be compelled by the Ordinary to admit some novice; nor can they be compelled to manifest the cause why they have not admitted someone.¹⁶ But they themselves sin, and indeed gravely, if they admit someone evidently not suitable; or if they exclude someone who "has had the conditions required according to the rule of the monastery and Order."

Note. From Trent, loc. cit., novices could be admitted to the habit when the twelfth year had been completed. - But today, from the decree of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars issued on 23 May 1659, it is required that the fifteenth year be completed. Then indeed a name of a saint, not of a gentile woman, must be imposed on a nun ...; likewise, she is to be called by the title of sister, and not lady.¹⁷

2144. • II. NOVICES, before they are admitted to profession, must stand in probation for at least ONE YEAR, and this whole and continuous, and indeed in the religious habit and in houses destined for this, under penalty of nullity of profession. - Thus from Trent.¹⁸

A novice must observe the rule of Religion during the time of probation, at least from decency; he enjoys the privileges of Religion; nor can he be dismissed without a just cause, although he himself always enjoys full liberty of abandoning the proposal begun and returning to the world.¹⁹

Indeed, to provide for his liberty, the Council of Trent, under penalty of anathema, PROHIBITS that he himself, and his parents and relatives, give anything to the monastery, except food and clothing; and at the same time it commands that, to him when he departs, all things which were his be restored. - It further forbids, under penalty of nullity, that after vestition he make any irrevocable renunciation or contract an obligation, even in favor of whatever pious cause and even if an oath has been added, unless with the license of the Bishop, within the two months immediately before profession, and provided that profession follows. - And these things were most wisely established, lest on account of the said renunciations and obligations he be despoiled of his goods, and so be compelled against his will to dwell in the monastery, when, despoiled, only begging would remain for him in the world.²⁰ See more among the Canonists.

2145. • IT IS ASKED. When is the year of probation judged to be INTERRUPTED?

Resp. 1. It is judged to be interrupted chiefly when the novice goes out from the monastery without license, with the intention of not returning, even if he immediately returns, as is clear from a decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council;²¹ when he is dismissed absolutely by the Superiors and afterward is again admitted; when he departs by private authority so that he may enter another house, or another province, although of the same Order.

Resp. 2. But it is not judged to be interrupted if the novice is sick in the monastery, even for a notable time, although he can by no means take part in the exercises of novices; - if he departs from the monastery compelled by violence; - if, license having been received, he goes aside to parents or others for a brief time for the sake of recovering health or conducting business; - if he is dismissed on account of a false accusation, and afterward, the truth having been known, is again admitted; - if he makes a journey ordered by his Superiors, because then he remains under their dependence.²²

2146. • DEFINITION. Religious profession, in the canonical sense, is customarily defined: "A promise freely made and legitimately accepted, by which someone constituted in due age, the time of probation having been completed, binds himself perpetually to a certain Religion approved by the Church, with solemn emission of vows." In a broader and improper sense, even the emission of simple vows is called Profession.

DIVISION. Profession is either express, which is enunciated by words; or tacit, which is expressed by deeds, e.g. when a novice, the time of probation having elapsed, knowingly wears the habit of profession and exercises acts proper to the professed. Today this is almost unusual; indeed, it has been expressly abrogated, if there is question of the emission of solemn vows to be made by male Regulars.¹

2147. I. For the VALIDITY of the profession either of Religious or of Nuns, THREE things are required, namely the aptitude of the one vowing, free consent, and the acceptance of the Superior.²

There is required 1. the aptitude of the one vowing, namely: that he not be of another's right, that he have completed the sixteenth year to the moment of the hour, that he have stood in probation for a whole year (in a leap-year the lapse of 366 days must altogether be awaited); that he have no impediment which, by Statutes confirmed by the Roman Pontiff, is judged substantial in that Order.³

There is required 2. free consent, i.e. that there be present in the one vowing the intention of making profession, free from every deceit, fraud, or error concerning substantial things; and that force or grave fear be absent, both on the part of the one professing and on the part of the monastery accepting (cf. n. 1044 sqq.). - And here there comes to be noted the Tridentine decree, by force of which they incur excommunication reserved to no one "whoever shall have forced some virgin, or widow, or any other woman, except in the cases expressed in law, to enter a monastery, or to receive the habit of any Religion whatever, or to emit profession"⁴ (cf. n. 1359, where concerning cases expressed in law, or excepted).

There is required 3. Acceptance of the Superior of the Order, with the consent or at least with the counsel of the Chapter, according to the Statutes of each Religion; for religious profession consists in a certain bilateral contract, for which true and legitimate consent is necessary on each side.⁵

In ITALY, the Decrees of the Holy See, concerning which n. 2143, must moreover be observed.

Further, a Religious unjustly denying a vote to a novice not only sins, but besides is held to restitution, as they most commonly say, unless there is present a grave cause for reproving, namely a cause of infirmity, bad disposition, defect of talents, and the like, so that the novice is thought going to be grave, i.e. burdensome, to Religion. Thus St. Alphonsus.⁶

2148. II. For the validity of the profession of MEN with SOLEMN vows, there is further required, according to the present discipline, that they first have emitted SIMPLE VOWS. - Namely, from the decrees of Pius IX (19 March 1857 and 7 Feb. 1862):⁷ all Religious of those Orders in which solemn vows are emitted, in the future, the tyrocinium having been completed, emit only simple vows, at least for three years; then, after at least the nineteenth year of their age has been completed, they are admitted to solemn vows, if they are found worthy by their Superiors. But for just causes solemn profession can also be deferred longer, although not beyond the age of twenty-five completed years. The decree does not regard nuns.

But from the declarations of the Sacred Congregation SUPER STATU REGULARIUM given on 12 June 1858, and regarding the aforesaid decree of 19 March 1857, the simple vows of which there is question are perpetual on the part of the one vowing, and dispensation from them is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff. - On the part of the Order, however, they can be dissolved by dismissal of the Professed, so that, dismissal having been given, by that very fact the professed become free from every bond of the said vows. But no one can be dismissed because of infirmity arising after profession of simple vows. - Moreover, the professed of these vows become participants of all the graces and privileges by which the solemnly professed in the same Order enjoy.⁸

2149. III. Concerning the profession of NUNS, the following things especially must be noted:

1. A novice CANNOT LICITLY be admitted to profession: 1) If the Bishop, by himself or by a delegate, even in an exempt monastery, has not examined her beforehand; wherefore the Superiorissa is bound, under penalty of suspension from office, to warn him at least one month before profession; but the Ordinary is bound, within fifteen days from the day of notification, to institute the examination according to the Tridentine rules (cf. n. 2143, 2).⁹ - 2) If, the year of probation having been completed, the Ordinary has deferred profession from a just cause. - 3) If the dowry of a choir nun, assessed by the Bishop and which is to be paid in money, has not been furnished (cf. n. 589, 5). But the dowry cannot be alienated, nor, if the nun is transferred into another monastery, be transferred to the same, unless this monastery is compelled to admit the nun. But it is to be restored to one departing from the monastery if only simple vows are emitted in it. - Nevertheless it is equitable that expenses incurred be deducted (cf. n. 2144).¹⁰

2. Profession is INVALID if a novice, having departed from the monastery because of infirmity, and, after she has recovered, having returned, has not begun the novitiate anew. - If a novice of sixteen years and constituted in danger of death wishes to emit profession, she can certainly emit it; but if she recovers, once the year of her profession has been completed, she must profess anew.¹¹

3. The profession of nuns must be made principally into the hand of the Ordinary or his delegate, not into the hand of the Superiorissa. - Nevertheless it is valid if it is made into the hand of the Superiorissa, with the consent of the greater part of the Chapter. Except if custom or approved Statutes of the Order require something else.¹²

2150. Questions. QUESTION 1. Can one RECLAMATE who has emitted an INVALID profession?

Resp. He can, from the Council of Trent,¹³ provided he does this within a five-year period; once this has elapsed, he is no longer heard, unless he is restored in full by the Apostolic See. - But the process must be made both by the local Prelate and by the Ordinary of the diocese, with the assistance of a defender of profession. Further, the professed, although he has the first sentence in his favor, cannot therefore withdraw from Religion, but must await the second, if an appeal is pending. But if he has already taken flight, he is repelled from judgment until he has resumed the habit of Religion. Thus Benedict XIV, Bull Si datam hominibus.¹⁴ See more among the Canonists.

QUESTION 2. What are the EFFECTS of valid profession?

Resp. The principal effects are the following:¹⁵

1. Remission of sins as regards penalty, if the professed is in grace and immune from every depraved affection, even lightly sinful; for profession is a holocaust offered to God, and exceeds every kind of satisfaction.¹⁶ 2. Extinction of vows previously emitted, as though through a certain commutation into something better.¹⁷ 3. Liberation from paternal power, notwithstanding civil law; whence it happens that parents who, relying on secular law, draw a son or daughter from the convent after profession has been emitted, stain themselves with grave sin. - 4. Dissolution of betrothals, according to what was said n. 1957. 5. Dissolution of a ratified marriage already contracted, and inability for contracting matrimony, if the profession is solemn (cf. n. 1981). 6. Cessation of irregularity from defect of birth; but only to the effect of receiving Orders, not however as regards obtaining Prelatures or Dignities (cf. n. 1935). - 7. Vacancy of Benefices, according to what was said n. 2138. 8. Participation in all privileges of Regulars, especially exemption, if the monastery has the required conditions (cf. n. 2183). 9. The obligation of tending to perfection and of observing vows, concerning which now at greater length.

1156. • Novitiate is a mutual experiment, by which Religion, on the one side, tries the morals and qualities of the novice, so that it may see whether it is expedient to admit or reject him; and the novice, on the other side, tries the austerities and Statutes of Religion, and his own disposition, so that he may see whether it is expedient for him to profess it. - Thus Billuart.²

1157. Questions. - Query 1° Who are not to be admitted into the Novitiate?

Resp. 1° On account of defect of mind, those who are not masters of themselves, as is clear of itself.

2° On account of defect of liberty.

a) Slaves, on account of the injury which would be done to masters.

b) Those joined in Matrimony, concerning whom it will be treated in the Treatise on Matrimony.

c) Bishops, even only confirmed, unless with the permission of the Supreme Pontiff, on account of the bond by which they are bound to their Church in perpetuity.³

d) Those professed in some Religion, unless either they are previously dispensed from the vows emitted in it, or they pass to a stricter Religion, that is, such that its actual observance, not merely its primary institution, is stricter. Yet this transition must not be made rashly or from levity, or with grave damage to the Religion to be left. Besides, the permission of the Superior or of the Pope is to be sought, and, in the case of a privilege granted to the Order which is being left for this, it must also be obtained. But transition to a laxer Religion cannot be made except with permission of the Supreme Pontiff; but to an equal one by the same permission, or also, but with just cause, by permission of the Superior.⁴

3° Those whose parents are in grave or extreme necessity would be admitted illicitly, though not invalidly, if they can assist that necessity without being exposed in the world to proximate and grave danger of falling into mortal sin. Only grave necessity of brothers or sisters does not impede admission; indeed dispensation from the vow of entering is also necessary for someone to be able to defer entrance for a long time on account of it. But parents would illicitly enter Religion if they had unemancipated children constituted in grave necessity or destitute of sufficient education.¹

4° By natural law (concerning the dispositions of positive law, see n. 801. q. 4°), those burdened with debts would be admitted illicitly, if they were able to pay them in a notable part at least, and in a short time (say within two years), and without great difficulty or probable danger of sin or of losing vocation. - Thus St. Alphonsus² as more probable, although the opinion which denies absolutely and the opinion which affirms absolutely are also probable to him.

5° Those also would be admitted illicitly and most imprudently whom public acts show to have been accused or investigated before the secular court concerning some graver crime, unless they have been dismissed by the judge as innocent.³

6° Those are not to be admitted whose infirmity is such that they are not equal to bearing the burdens of common life and fulfilling the obligations of the Order.

7° Those would be admitted illicitly to the habit who had not sought and waited for a suitable time (three months) for testimonial letters both from the Ordinary of origin and from the Ordinary of the place in which, after the completion of the fifteenth year of their age, they stayed beyond a year, unless nevertheless the Institute which admits them has been dispensed by a special and non-communicable privilege from the Decree of Jan. 25, 1848,⁴ in which this disposition is contained.

8° The prepubescent (n. 911), against the will of parents or guardians.

1158. • Query 2° Whether clerics, especially those having care of souls, can be admitted to Religion without the permission of their own Ordinary?

Resp. Affirmatively, as is clear both from the unanimous opinion of the Doctors, and especially from the authority of Benedict XIV, Brief Ex quo, Jan. 14, 1747. Yet a priest exercising care of souls must make the Bishop more certain concerning his plan, lest the flock be left without guardianship. Besides, in the case in which the Church which the priest serves would suffer grave damage from his transition to Religion, the Bishop could recall him, even after profession, as is clear from the Brief just cited. - Which of our clerics are not absolutely able to enter Religion, see n. 374. 8°.

V. Especially A. concerning the religious state: 1) as to aptitude, there are necessary: good health, relatively sufficient intelligence with right judgment, whence the notably melancholic or scrupulous are not suitable; a good character which can bear the burdens of common life; piety; 2) as to the end, let it be supernatural, e.g., holiness, zeal, reparation, or preservation; not natural or worldly, such as convenience of life, complacence of parents, or ambition for honors; 3) as to conservation of vocation, the confessor must enjoin the caution of secrecy, assiduous prayer and frequenting of the sacraments, separation from the world, namely, as far as can be done, from every dissipation, worldly association, worldly amusements.

Question 1. Who can be admitted into religion?

Resp. Any Catholic can be admitted into religion who is detained by no legitimate impediment, is moved by a right intention, and is suitable for bearing the burdens of religion (Can. 538).

Therefore immunity from obstacles, right intention, and suitability for carrying burdens are required for admission. The necessity of these three is established from the very nature of the matter of which there is question.

Question 2. What is the law concerning postulancy according to the new Code?

Resp. §1. In religions of perpetual vows all women and, if there is question of a religion of men, lay brothers, before they are admitted to the novitiate, must complete a postulancy for at least six full months; but in religions of temporary vows, as regards the necessity and time of postulancy, one must stand by the constitutions.

§2. The major Superior can extend the prescribed time of postulancy, yet not beyond another six months (Can. 539).

§1. The postulancy must be completed either in the house of novitiate or in another house of the religion in which discipline is accurately observed according to the constitutions, under the special care of an approved religious.

§2. Let postulants wear modest clothing and clothing different from the clothing of novices.

§3. In monasteries of nuns, aspirants, while they are completing the postulancy, are held by the law of enclosure (Can. 540).

Before they begin the novitiate, postulants should attend to spiritual exercises for at least eight full days; and, according to the prudent judgment of the confessor, they should make beforehand a general confession of their past life (Can. 541).

Thus a distinction is made between religions of perpetual vows and religions of temporary vows: in these latter one must stand by the constitutions, both as regards the necessity and as regards the duration of postulancy; in the former, women and lay brothers are held to make a postulancy of six months. The major Superior can extend this time, but not beyond another six months.

The postulancy must be made either in the novitiate or in another house where discipline flourishes under the care of an approved religious. The garments are to be modest, different from the clothing of the novitiate. In monasteries of nuns, aspirants are held by the law of enclosure. Before the novitiate, postulants should complete spiritual exercises through eight solid days and, at the judgment of the confessor, make a general confession.

Question 3. Who are admitted to the novitiate invalidly, and who illicitly?

Resp. With the prescription of can. 539-541 remaining firm, and other prescriptions in the proper constitutions of each religion:

1st. They are admitted to the novitiate invalidly:

Those who have adhered to a non-Catholic sect;

Those who do not have the age required for novitiate;

Those who enter religion induced by force, grave fear, or fraud, or whom the Superior, induced in the same way, receives;

A spouse, while the marriage lasts;

Those who are bound, or have been bound, by the bond of religious profession;

Those upon whom a penalty is impending because of a grave delict committed, concerning which they have been accused or can be accused;

A Bishop, whether residential or titular, even if he has only been designated by the Roman Pontiff;

Clerics who, from an institute of the Holy See, are bound by oath to devote their work to the good of their diocese or of the missions, for that time for which the obligation of the oath endures.

2nd. They are admitted illicitly, but validly:

Clerics constituted in sacred orders, without consulting the local Ordinary, or with the same Ordinary contradicting because their departure would turn to grave detriment of souls, which cannot be avoided otherwise;

Those burdened with debt who are not able to pay;

Those liable to render an account, or entangled in other secular business, from which the religion could fear lawsuits and troubles;

Children who must assist parents, that is, father or mother, grandfather or grandmother, placed in grave necessity, and parents whose work is necessary for feeding or educating children;

Those destined for the priesthood in religion, but from which they are removed by irregularity or another canonical impediment;

Orientals in Latin religions without permission given in writing by the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church (Can. 542).

Invalidity arises first from the fact that someone previously adhered to some non-Catholic sect. In the new Code, non-Catholics are called either baptized or not baptized: baptized outside the Catholic Church and adhering to some sect; baptized in the Catholic Church and afterwards defecting from it and adhering to some sect; baptized nowhere but adhering to some sect, for example of Quakers, Unitarians.

The words of canon 542, those who have adhered to a non-Catholic sect, are not to be understood concerning those who, moved by the grace of God, have come to the Church from heresy or schism in which they were born, but concerning those who have defected from the faith and adhered to a non-Catholic sect. Thus C. A. C. C. A. I., 16 Oct. 1919.

Question 4. With whom is the right of admitting to the novitiate and to profession?

Resp. The right of admitting to the novitiate and to subsequent religious profession, both temporary and perpetual, belongs to the major Superiors with the vote of the Council or Chapter, according to the peculiar constitutions of each religion (Can. 543).

Question 5. What testimony must aspirants present?

Resp. §1. In any religion, all aspirants, before they are admitted, must present testimony of received baptism and confirmation.

§2. Male aspirants must moreover present testimonial letters from the Ordinary of origin and of each place in which, after completing the fourteenth year of age, they have stayed beyond a morally continuous year, any contrary privilege being removed.

§3. If there is question of admitting those who have been in a Seminary, college, or the postulancy or novitiate of another religion, testimonial letters are moreover required, given for the different cases by the rector of the Seminary or college, after the local Ordinary has been heard, or by the major Superior of the religion.

§4. For clerics to be admitted, besides the testimony of ordination, testimonial letters of the Ordinaries in whose dioceses after ordination they have dwelt beyond a morally continuous year suffice, with the prescription of §3 being safe.

§5. For a professed religious transferring to another religion by apostolic indult, the testimony of the major Superior of the prior religion is sufficient.

§6. Besides these testimonies required by law, Superiors to whom the right belongs of enrolling aspirants into religion can also require other things which seem necessary or suitable to them for this end.

§7. Finally, let women not be received unless accurate investigations concerning their character and morals have been made beforehand, with the prescription of §3 remaining firm (Can. 544).

§1. Those who must give testimonial letters from the prescription of law should give them not to the aspirants themselves, but to the religious Superiors gratuitously within the space of three months from their requisition, closed with a seal and, if there is question of those who have been in a Seminary, college, or the postulancy or novitiate of another religion, confirmed by the oath of the Superior.

§2. If for grave reasons they have judged that they cannot answer these, let them explain the causes to the Apostolic See within the same time.

§3. If they have replied that the aspirant is not sufficiently known to them, the religious Superior should supply by another accurate investigation and a trustworthy report; but if they have replied nothing, the requesting Superior should inform the Holy See of the response not received.

§4. In their testimonial letters, after they have instituted diligent investigation, even through secret information, they must report, their conscience being gravely burdened concerning the truth of the things set forth, concerning the aspirant's birth, morals, talent, life, reputation, condition, knowledge; whether he has been investigated, whether he is entangled by some censure, irregularity, or other canonical impediment, whether his own family needs his help, and finally, if there is question of those who have been in a Seminary, college, or the postulancy or novitiate of another religion, for what cause they were dismissed or departed of their own accord (Can. 545).

Question 6. When does the novitiate begin, and what is required for its validity?

Resp. The novitiate begins with the reception of the habit, or in another manner prescribed in the constitutions (Can. 553).

§1. Besides the other things enumerated in can. 542 for the validity of the novitiate, in order to be valid the novitiate must be completed:

1st. After completion of at least the fifteenth year of age;

2nd. Through an entire and continuous year;¹

3rd. In the house of novitiate.

§2. If a longer time is prescribed for the novitiate in the constitutions, it is not required for the validity of profession, unless something else is expressly said in the same constitutions (Can. 555).

The novitiate begins in the manner prescribed in the religion; for validity it must be completed after the fifteenth year is completed, in the house of novitiate, through an entire and continuous year. Without these three, or without any one of them, the novitiate is not validly completed; the minimum age is the completed fifteenth year; the house of residence is the house of novitiate; the minimum and necessary time is one complete and continuous year.

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1111, n. 53.

Question 7. What is to be said concerning interruption of the novitiate?

Resp. §1. The novitiate is interrupted, so that it must be begun anew and completed, if the novice, dismissed by the Superior, has left the house, or has deserted the house without his permission, not intending to return, or has remained outside the house, even intending to return, beyond thirty days, whether continuous or not continuous, for any cause whatsoever, even with the permission of Superiors.

§2. If the novice has remained beyond fifteen, but not beyond thirty, days, even not continuous, outside the enclosure of the house under obedience to the Superior, with the permission of Superiors or compelled by force, for the validity of the novitiate it is necessary and sufficient to make up the days spent in this way; if not beyond fifteen days, the supplement can be prescribed by Superiors, but is not necessary for validity.

§3. Let Superiors not impart permission to remain outside the enclosure of the novitiate except from a just and grave cause.

§4. If a novice is transferred by Superiors into another house of novitiate of the same religion, the novitiate is not interrupted (Can. 556).¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1088, n. 8.

Question 8. What is required for the validity of profession?

Resp. §1. For the validity of any religious profession it is required that:

1st. The one about to emit it have the legitimate age according to the norm of can. 573;

2nd. A legitimate Superior admit him to profession according to the constitutions;

3rd. A valid novitiate according to the norm of can. 555 have preceded;

4th. The profession be emitted without force or grave fear or fraud;

5th. It be expressed;

6th. It be received by a legitimate Superior according to the constitutions, by himself or through another.

§2. But for the validity of perpetual profession, whether solemn or simple, it is moreover required that temporary simple profession according to the norm of can. 574 have preceded (Can. 572).

Question 9. What age is required for profession?

Resp. Anyone about to emit religious profession must have completed the sixteenth year of age, if there is question of temporary profession; the twenty-first, if of perpetual, whether solemn or simple (Can. 573).

When the sixteenth year of age has not been completed, no profession is valid for which that completed year is required, if namely there is question of temporary profession; but if of perpetual, whether simple or solemn, the twenty-first year, and indeed completed, is required.

Question 10. When the novitiate has been completed, must the novice immediately be admitted to profession?

Resp. §2. When the novitiate has been completed, if he is judged suitable, the novice is to be admitted to profession; otherwise he is to be dismissed. If doubt remains whether he is suitable, the time of probation can be prolonged by the major Superiors, yet not beyond six months (Can. 571).

Question 11. Must temporary simple profession always be placed before solemn and perpetual profession?

Resp. §1. In any Order both of men and of women, and in any Congregation which has perpetual vows, after the novitiate has been completed, the novice, in the house of novitiate itself, must place before perpetual vows, whether solemn or simple, with the prescription of can. 634 being safe, a profession of simple vows to last for three years, or for a longer time if the age required for perpetual profession is farther distant, unless the constitutions require annual professions.

§2. The legitimate Superior can prolong this time, after temporary profession has been renewed by the religious, yet not beyond another three years (Can. 574).

Question 12. When the time of temporary profession has been completed, what must be done?

Resp. §1. When the time of temporary profession has been completed, the religious, according to the norm of can. 637, either emits perpetual profession, solemn or simple according to the constitutions, or returns to the world; but also, during the time of temporary profession, if he is not held worthy to pronounce perpetual vows, he can be dismissed by the legitimate Superior according to the norm of can. 647 (Can. 575).

The highest care of the Church is in saving the liberty of the subject vowing, lest they unwillingly lead the religious life.

Question 13. When the time for which the vows were pronounced has elapsed, must renewal be made immediately?

Resp. No delay is to be interposed to the renewal of vows, when the time for which they were pronounced has elapsed. Indeed, Superiors have the faculty of permitting that the renewal be anticipated for some time, yet not beyond a month. Cf. Can. 577.

Question 14. Do those professed by temporary simple vows enjoy the privileges, etc., and are they held to the obligations of others professed by perpetual and solemn vows?

Resp. Those professed by temporary vows, of whom in can. 574:

1st. Enjoy the same indulgences, privileges, and spiritual graces by which those professed by solemn vows or those professed by perpetual simple vows rejoice; and if they are overtaken by death, they have a right to the same suffrages;

2nd. They are held by the same obligation of observing the rules and constitutions; but where the obligation of choir flourishes, they are not bound by the law of reciting the divine office privately, unless they are constituted in sacred orders or the constitutions expressly prescribe something else;

3rd. They lack active and passive voice, unless something else is expressly provided in the constitutions; but the time prescribed for enjoying active and passive voice, the constitutions being silent, is computed from first profession (Can. 578).

Question 15. To what is the Bishop held with regard to girls about to enter religion?

Resp. The Superioress must inform the local Ordinary, at least two months before, concerning the approaching admission to the novitiate and to profession, both temporary and perpetual, whether solemn or simple. The local Ordinary, or if he is absent or impeded, a deputed priest, at least thirty days before the novitiate and before profession as above, should examine the will of the aspirant, whether she has been coerced or seduced, whether she knows what she is doing; if it is established concerning her pious and free will, then the aspirant can be admitted to the novitiate or the novice to profession. Cf. Can. 552; S. C. de Religiosis, 19 Jan., 1909. The Church wills that it be authentically established that the aspirant was not coerced, and that she understands what she is doing; only then is it lawful to admit her to the novitiate or to profession, when both the liberty and the knowledge of the aspirant are plainly evident.

Question 16. How does profession affect acts contrary to the vows?

Resp. Simple profession, whether temporary or perpetual, renders acts contrary to the vows illicit, but not invalid, unless something else has been expressly provided; but solemn profession, if they are irritative, renders them also invalid (Can. 579).

We have an example of the former in relation to those who, for example, in some religious congregation with simple vows only, although perpetual, enter marriage without dispensation: the marriage is valid, although surely a most grave sin; but if a Scholastic of the Society of Jesus with his simple perpetual vows did the same thing, the marriage would be invalid. Cf. Const. Ascendente Domino, Greg. XIII.

Question 17. By what means and under what obligation is a Religious held to tend toward perfection?

Resp. He is held to tend primarily through the essential means of the religious state, namely through the observance of the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. And since the obligation of tending to perfection is grave by force of the state in which he is found, he will sin gravely if in a grave matter he infringes those vows. But secondarily he is held to tend toward perfection also through accidental means, namely through the proper rules of the Order; and he will sin gravely if he infringes them from formal contempt, namely by spurning their authority as such and their known wisdom. It is otherwise, however, if he violates them, led by concupiscence, or because he thinks they are not necessary for him unto salvation, or if he thinks that they are not commanded under grave obligation. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 10.

Question 18. Does a Religious sin gravely who intends to observe only commands obliging under grave obligation, and to care nothing for the rest?

Resp. Negatively, more probably; and the reason is that by this very fact, that the Religious wills to fulfill those several things which oblige under grave obligation, he already tends toward perfection, since he wills to fulfill several things which, with respect to others, do not oblige but are merely of counsel. St. Alphonsus calls this opinion the more common and more probable; nevertheless he warns that a Religious disposed in this way can be in grave danger of sinning mortally from other heads, for example, by reason of the danger of transgressing the vows or of bringing grave damage upon the Religion as regards discipline, etc. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 10 and seq. - Bouix, de Regul., vol. 2, pp. 550 and 551.

Question 19. Whether, or how far, does a rule oblige under sin, taken distributively, or considering individual rules in particular?

Resp. In very many Orders the rule, generally speaking and of itself, does not oblige under sin, not even venial sin. This is established from the constitutions themselves of various Orders and from the common interpretation of theologians. Those Orders are to be excepted in which the constitutions expressly establish the opposite. I said 1st, generally speaking, because whatever things fall under vows or express precepts of Superiors are not without fault, and indeed grave fault according to the gravity of the matter, as we shall say below concerning vows. - I said 2nd, of itself, because theologians teach that transgression of the rule very rarely is free from all fault because of extrinsic reasons, since almost always there will be some fault by reason of negligence, concupiscence, scandal, laziness, or any other disordered movement. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, ibid.

Question 20. To what is a novice held in relation to the cession of administration of goods and to a testament?

Resp. §1. Before profession of simple vows, whether temporary or perpetual, the novice must, for the whole time for which he will be bound by simple vows, cede the administration of his goods to whom he prefers and, unless the constitutions provide otherwise, freely dispose concerning their use and usufruct.

§2. That cession and disposition, if it was omitted because of lack of goods and these afterwards came, or if it was made and afterwards other goods by any title came, is to be made or repeated according to the norms established in §1, notwithstanding simple profession emitted.

§3. A novice in a religious Congregation, before profession of temporary vows, should freely make a testament concerning goods present or perhaps to come (Can. 569).

The whole novitiate is to be completed in the habit which the constitutions prescribe for novices, unless special circumstances of places require something else (Can. 557).

I. St. Thomas treats of the vow of assuming the religious state (II-II, q. 189, art. 2 — not art. 88, as Leander writes, correcting Prado, since he wrote art. 89), where he shows that a vow of professing the religious state is a laudable work, and full of merit — since, whatever a vow concerns pertains to God, and the profession of the religious state pertains to God in the highest degree; for by this profession a man offers himself as a holocaust in the service and honor of God.

II. It follows from this that one who made a vow to enter religious life ought to apply every diligence, as the Angelic Doctor teaches (loc. cit., art. 3, ad 1). Nor, however, is it required for the observance of the vow that the one vowing actually enter religious life, and actually carry out the entrance — since many things can prevent such an entrance from being carried out, and it does not depend on the one vowing that these be removed; but it is only necessary that the one vowing omit nothing, on his own part, of those things which can pave the way toward entering the Order. If, however, the one vowing had any impediments, he ought to reveal them to the Superiors of that religious order which he vowed to enter. For such a revelation, even if it should impede the entrance, is necessary for the validity of the contract between the religious order and the one vowing. For a religious order has the right not to receive those who are bound by a grave impediment, and can, by right, insist that hidden impediments be revealed. So authors commonly teach. The diligence, however, which we have said must be applied by the one vowing, need not be extraordinary — such as having recourse to intercessors, and the patronage of great men, to secure entrance — but it suffices that he use those means which prudent men are accustomed to employ in matters of graver import. We consider less probable what the theologians of Salamanca write (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 1, n. 2) — namely, that the one vowing is not bound, when he seeks to be received into the habit, to reveal his vow to the Prelate, even though he might hope, by this manifestation, to be admitted to religious life more easily — since, they say, this manifestation is not necessary for the execution of the vow: for the one vowing is bound only to apply the necessary means. They praise, for this opinion, Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 3, near the solution to the second objection). But this is falsely alleged, as often happens with them. For Cajetan has not a word in the place cited to exempt the one vowing from the manifestation of such a vow. They also praise Bonacina, and others, whose examination, since the matter is of lesser moment, I pass over. I say this manifestation is necessary for the execution of the vow: for the one vowing is bound, by virtue of the vow, to apply those means which he prudently judges to conduce to obtaining the end of the vow. Given, then, that such a means is fitting for obtaining the end of the vow, and can be employed without grave inconvenience to himself, I do not see why he should not be bound to use it in such a means. What, indeed, is easier than this manifestation of the vow? Once it is known, entrance into religious life is more easily obtained; nor, indeed, does it not sometimes happen that this is the case. Although we grant that this manifestation is not, by its own nature, necessary for the execution of the vow, nonetheless, in this circumstance, it is necessary that the one vowing act in good faith, and apply those means which present no difficulty, and are efficacious for the attainment of the end. For in what business of any importance similar to this would such an easy diligence be omitted? Nor does it follow from this that the one vowing is bound to implore the aid and favor of patrons — since such means carry with them a grave inconvenience, and it is prudently presumed that the one vowing did not bind himself to them. So that this matter, somewhat entangled, may be more clearly explained, we shall devote the following paragraphs to it.

I. Question I. What is to be said of this vow: "I promise to enter religious life, unless God should decide otherwise concerning me"? Response: This vow can have a twofold sense, as Sánchez, following Córdoba, notes (Bk. IV, on the Decalogue, ch. 16, n. 2). The first is: "I vow religious life, unless God should render me unfit for entrance by some illness, or other obstacle" — this impediment removed, the vow will still oblige. The second is: "I vow religious life, unless God should decree something more expedient for my salvation." In this case, they say, the vow ceases. And in doubt as to whether some other state than religious life is more expedient for the salvation of the one vowing, they add that upright men should be consulted, and, the doubt remaining, a dispensation from the vow should be sought. For the rest, to state what I think: this attached condition seems to me inept, and superfluous — since, whenever an impediment occurs, or a state of greater perfection presents itself, it would be understood even if the condition had not been attached. I likewise consider this other condition superfluous: "I vow to enter religious life, if I shall be able" — since no one is bound to enter religious life unless he is able. And although all have physical power, not all have moral power. Nonetheless, in any vow whatsoever moral power too is included, so that grave impediments render the one vowing unfit. But if someone wishes to defend the aforesaid condition as reasonable, I do not consider it a matter of such importance that I should contend sharply about it — especially since, in similar vows, the intention of the one vowing must always be looked to first of all.

II. Question II. How is this vow to be explained: "I vow to enter this religious order, if I shall have entered any"? Response: St. Antoninus proposes this vow (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §1, note 15), in these words: "If someone should swear, or vow, to enter this religious order — if he enters any, it is valid; because by this, no other order is principally excluded, but this one is principally included. And if not purely, yet under a condition — namely, if he wishes to enter any. But if he were to promise that he would enter no other, and would not promise to enter this one, he would not be bound to enter it, either purely or conditionally; nor would he sin by not entering it." When, then, the one vowing designates some particular religious order, even though he casts aside the condition, the vow is valid; if, however, he excludes every religious order, the vow is null, and impious. To make the nature of this vow clearer, however, the intention of the one vowing must be examined. For if, led by a particular affection toward this religious order, he vowed entrance into it as something set before him principally, the vow is valid, even though conditional — since the entrance into religious life, even though bound by a condition, is good and fit matter for a vow. On the contrary, if he had principally vowed that he would enter no religious order at all, then the whole matter of the vow would be a pure negation, unsuited to a vow; and consequently the vow itself would be null. So authors commonly teach.

III. Question III. Is this vow valid: "I vow that no person shall be an obstacle to me, from entering religious life, or from doing something else"? Response: Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 3), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 17, n. 4), Leander (tract. 1, q. 5) pronounce this invalid. It seems valid to me, however; for it yields this sense, unless the express intention of the one vowing indicates otherwise: "I vow that I will enter religious life, unless someone's prayers or objections are an obstacle to me" — that is, "I vow that I will overcome, as much as I can, the impediments of all persons, so that I may enter religious life." What of the fact that the cited authors affirm that a vow conceived in this manner is valid: "I vow that nothing shall be an impediment to my entering religious life"? And yet there is no difference at all, save in the words, if it is compared with the other.

IV. Question IV. Is one who made a vow of wishing to enter religious life bound to enter it? Response: Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 8) answers negatively, and Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, on vows), to whom Leander, Pellizzari, Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 20), Bassaeus, and others subscribe. If this vow is considered absolutely, disjoined from any circumstance, it is certain that it does not induce an obligation to enter religious life, for the reason the cited authors assign — namely, that a vow to wish is one thing, a vow to do is another. One who vows only to wish does not vow to do. But this one vowing does not vow to enter, but vows to wish to enter. For this, it suffices that he sometimes have a firm and good will to enter — which will not at all obstruct his entering marriage. But these are, in a certain metaphysical consideration, all true. For the rest, if someone had really made such a vow, there would scarcely be any foundation for presuming that such a one vowing did not have the intention of vowing entrance into religious life. What prudent man would vow that he would have the will to enter religious life, while at the same time having a purpose of contracting marriage? The will to enter religious life is good, since it looks to a good. But, while a contrary deliberate will to marry is present, there are two acts that collide with one another. Wherefore, if this case occurred to me, I would seriously investigate the intention of the one vowing — since in practice either the vow is ill-considered, and null for want of due knowledge, or the one vowing is certainly bound to entrance into religious life. The same must be said of one who vowed that he did not wish to live in the world — namely, the intention of the one vowing must be investigated. The cited authors say that, for the observance of such a vow, it will suffice that the one vowing behave negatively, and elicit no contrary act — "I wish to live in the world" — and therefore he can enter marriage. Such vows seem ridiculous to me; and those who would make them, too imprudent, and ill-considered. Wherefore, if I were to find that prudent men had made such vows, and expressed them thus, I would seriously investigate their intention: since commonly one who vows... wishes to enter religious life is presumed to intend that entrance in earnest. Nor is it so much from the words as from the intention of the one vowing that the obligation and nature of the vow are to be drawn. If the matter of the vow were a mere negation, and included nothing positive, the contrary opinion would be true. And therefore the cited authors say that such a one vowing must behave negatively, by virtue of such a vow. But I, all things weighed, would judge either that the vow is null, or would oblige the one vowing to entrance into religious life.

V. Question V. Is a vow of dying in religious life a vow of religious life? Response: All commonly affirm this. For no one can meet death in religious life unless he first enters it. Indeed, by virtue of such a vow, he is bound to persevere in it. Authors dispute only about the time by which the one vowing is bound, by virtue of such a vow, to make his entrance. Some maintain that such a vow does not induce an obligation to enter so quickly, as with an absolute vow of entering religious life; and this must be investigated, as regards this vow and other similar disputed points, with the intention of the one vowing and the circumstances considered. If the force of the words is attended to, it seems probable enough that such a vow does not press an entrance as swift as an absolute vow to enter religious life would. That, on the contrary, it does not admit a long delay, likewise appears likely enough. Wherefore this should be left to the judgment of a prudent man, so that, the circumstances inspected, he could either anticipate, or moderately defer, the time of execution.

VI. Question VI. Does a vow of eremitic and solitary life induce an obligation? Response: Authors agree that this is not a true vow of religious life. They differ concerning its obligation. Lest we linger longer than is just on questions of lesser moment, it does not seem to be doubted that this vow is valid. If those vowing do not fully hold the eremitic and solitary state and perfection of life (which is not to be undertaken without a special vocation, and celestial illumination), they will be able to obtain a dispensation. This too is common ground among authors.

I. Question I. Does one who vowed religious life absolutely fulfill the vow, if he assumes the habit of the Knights of St. James, of Calatrava, of Alcántara? Response: Some affirm this; but the common opinion denies it — both because it is highly controverted whether these are true Religious, since they do not vow chastity absolutely, but only conjugal chastity; nor do they pledge to God either absolute poverty, or obedience; and also because, granting them to be truly in the religious state, those who vow "entrance into religious life" do not intend such orders, but those which profess the cenobitic life.

II. Question II. Is a vow of religious life at least fulfilled if the habit of the Knights of St. John is assumed? Response: Several not undistinguished writers say that these Knights make three absolute vows — poverty, chastity, and obedience — and are true Religious; and, as far as the religious state is concerned, some of these same Knights insist to me that, by the assumption of the habit, they turn to an apostolic life approved by the Church. But the common opinion denies that the absolute vow of religious life of the aforesaid Knights of St. John is fulfilled — since, according to the common estimation of those who vow entrance into religious life, the ordinary meaning intended is one of the orders in which, wholly separated from the tumult of the world, a common life is led.

III. Question III. Would such a vow at least be fulfilled by entrance into an order of military Clerics of chastity, such as the Knights of Malta living there, and observing common life? Response: All commonly affirm this — since these do lead a truly regular life in convents, in the manner of other Regulars; and it is beyond controversy that, as long as they live under a rule approved by the Holy See, they are true Religious, since the Knights of Malta dwelling there lead a common life, just as other Religious do.

IV. Question IV. Does the one vowing religious life satisfy the vow, if he enters a relaxed religious order? Response: All authors commonly deny this. But it must be explained what is meant by "relaxed" religious order. For relaxation admits of greater or lesser latitude. Some religious order (would that it were only some!) has diminished from its ancient rigor in food, and in its garments, observing neither the abstinence, nor the austerity, which it observed from its beginnings; it takes care, however, that the laws and constitutions, though now milder, are observed by all. Moreover, the observance of the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience flourishes exactly in it, having remitted nothing of the ancient rigor, not only in its chief points but in every particular. This religious order, however, though somewhat diminished in its common estimation, and in fact, is not relaxed; but can only be called milder.

V. That religious order is commonly called "relaxed" which is deficient, as they say, in substantial matters. Now the substantial laws, or the first and chief constitutions and precepts, which must be observed, are the three necessary vows, and those things which are proximate to these vows, and without which — or scarcely without which — the observance of these vows can stand at all. Thus the vow of poverty cannot possibly be reconciled with private property; the vow of chastity with free egress from the cloisters; the vow of obedience with the free faculty of advancing one's own private interests. Hence those religious orders whose Religious have their own private property, now richer, now poorer, according to what fortune brings, and inhabit dwellings not infrequently more spacious and comfortable than secular men, feast on delicacies, and, if they wish, eat meat at their own pleasure and appetite, and where the leaders and Superiors, with tacit connivance, impune violate the other constitutions, in which, finally, the subjects conspire against the transgression of the laws; leave the monastery, indulge in games, break silences, fasts, and — although with their mouths they boast of observing their vows — most manifest experience nonetheless suggests the opposite.

VI. It must also be noted that scarcely any religious order is found which has collapsed in all its convents; rather, nearly every order has some monasteries, or Congregations, or Provinces, in which firm regular observance persists.

VII. We say, then, that one who vows entrance into religion not only does not fulfil his vow if he enters a religious order relaxed in the way we have described; but we add that even a vow of entering such religious orders is null, because it is not of a better good. Religious orders approved by God make the way of salvation easier; the relaxed Orders which I have described make the attainment of the blessed life more difficult, indeed most difficult. Therefore a vow of entering them is not of a better good, and so is null. The minor premise, about which alone there can be doubt, has been plainly shown in our Apostolic-Monastic Discipline, where we asserted, with all the theologians and casuists, however benign, that one who enters such religious orders casts himself into the gravest dangers of his eternal perdition. We will now recount only some of them: St. Antoninus (Part III, tit. 16, ch. 2); Thomas Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 9, and Vol. I of the Opuscula, the last tract, resp. 7); Seraphinus Porrecta in the same place; Martín Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 12, nn. 45 and 46); Paul Nazarius (on the state of religion, concl. 14); Nyder (on the reform of religious orders, ch. 9, part 1); López (in the Instructions, ch. 43); Lezana (on the obligations of religious, ch. 7, n. 16); Lessius (on justice and right, Bk. II, ch. 41, dub. 5); Cassiano a S. Elia (decis. 1, n. 2); Sánchez (Bk. IV on the Decalogue, ch. 16, n. 14); Passerini (q. 189, art. 2, n. 6); Leander (tract. 1 on oaths, qq. 14 and 15); the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 1, n. 3); Rotarius (Vol. I, Bk. I, ch. 7, punct. 2, n. 2); Martínez de Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 7, n. 2); Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §6, n. 3); Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 5, ch. 6, n. 5). The reason is obvious enough, and occurs to everyone at once. For whoever vows entrance into religion intends chiefly and solely that state in which, far removed from the dangers of the world, he may serve God and work out his eternal salvation more safely. But when he enters a collapsed religious order, he casts himself into more and graver hazards, and into a kind of necessity, as it were, of violating the new obligations he has taken on, above all the vow of poverty, which he will pronounce to God with solemn rite. Consult what we have said in the aforesaid Apostolic-Monastic Discipline, dissert. 5, ch. 13.

VIII. Question V. Does one who vowed to enter a stricter religious order satisfy his obligation if he enters a laxer one? Response: By no means, and this is certain among all — since a solemn vow renders it impossible to commute a lesser thing for a greater. What if he makes profession in a laxer institute? Will the profession be valid? I do not deny it. But does he satisfy the vow? No one, however, promised a greater vow. This is certain and holds among all. Is the profession valid? It will certainly be valid, though it does not satisfy — since one solemn vow, such as monastic profession is, dissolves another simple vow, such as that of entering a stricter Order. This holds among all.

IX. Question VI. Can one who vowed a stricter religious order, but professed in a laxer one, lawfully persevere in it? Response: Authors speak too obscurely, and confusedly, about this matter. For they commonly assert that, in one sense, it is true, according to what St. Thomas holds (II-II, q. 189, art. 8, ad 3), where he says: "A solemn vow by which someone is bound to a lesser religious order is stronger than a simple vow by which someone is bound to a greater religious order. For if someone, after a simple vow, should contract marriage, it would not be dissolved, as a solemn vow would be. And therefore one who has already professed in a lesser religious order is not bound to fulfill the simple vow which he made of entering a greater religious order." From this doctrine the theologians of Salamanca gather (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 1, n. 4) that someone can, on his own authority, commute a vow of entering a stricter religious order into that of persevering in a laxer one — since to persevere in the laxer is more perfect than to dissolve the vow only of entering the stricter. This they teach, and several authors praise it, who really do gather this doctrine. This, however, unless it is explained, is a cause of error, and matters must be resolved apart from doubts. It is certain that a solemn vow extinguishes a simple vow; and consequently one who made a vow to enter a stricter religious order, if he made profession in a laxer one, is no longer bound, by virtue of his simple vow, to embrace the stricter — since that simple vow is dissolved, and utterly extinguished, by the solemn vow of profession. And, as to this point, the cited authors, along with St. Thomas, speak excellently. But if the religious order is relaxed in substantial matters, although he is not bound, by virtue of the past and extinguished vow, to enter the stricter order; he is nonetheless bound by reason of the divine law, which obliges all to avoid the dangers of eternal damnation. It has already been shown that a vow of entering a relaxed religious order is null, and that the one vowing gravely sins, unless ignorance excuses him, when he fulfills it by entering such a religious order — as we have said, and as the theologians of Salamanca themselves teach, in agreement with all other theologians. Such a one vowing, then, cannot lawfully persevere in a religious order relaxed in substantial matters. St. Thomas, however, in the place cited, speaks of a religious order which is truly "lesser," in relation to a greater religious order which is stricter — each of which, however, observes its own proper laws, as I have shown at length in the aforesaid Discipline. But one who vowed a laxer order, without doubt, elicited a valid vow of such a lesser order.

One who vows the assumption of one religious order cannot, by his own authority, commute the vow into another, even equally strict, by entering it: for no one, without dispensation, can, as we more probably consider, commute a vow into an equally good, but only into an evidently better, one.

X. Question VII. Does one satisfy the vow of entering a stricter religious order, if he enters a laxer one which has a pontifical privilege of receiving all who have vowed the stricter one? Response: The Doctors commonly affirm this, and report that the Benedictines, Augustinians, and others really do have such a privilege. Whatever the truth about these privileges, the distinction given above must always be kept before one's eyes — namely, understanding by "laxer religious order" one that is milder, gentler, and less severe, which nonetheless truly observes its own milder laws; the privilege having been granted, this is the true, common opinion. If, however, by "laxer religious order" is meant one collapsed in substantial matters, the aforesaid opinion would be false. For we deny that any legitimate privilege is found which grants collapsed Orders the faculty of receiving those who have vowed a stricter religious order. Indeed, we assert that pontifical decrees deprive religious orders of this kind of the faculty of receiving anyone at all for profession.

XI. Question VIII. What is one bound to who vowed religious life indefinitely? Response: St. Thomas (II-II, q. 189, art. 3, ad 2) says this: "That man is bound to go to a specific religious order, who intended simply to bind himself. Therefore, if he is not received into one religious order, he is bound to seek entrance into another; and, if he is indeed received into some religious order, he ought to do what he intended by such a vow. And if he vows himself specially to one religious order, he is bound only according to that mode of obligation which he vowed. But if he determinately vowed one religious order alone, he ought to apply the diligence that he would apply in any other matter of graver moment, so that he may be received in it." Thus, as the Doctors commonly say, if he has been refused by one monastery, he ought to seek out four or five others; just as, if he vowed religious life indefinitely, he is bound to explore four or five orders, and five or six convents of each order, so that, if rejected by all, he may be free of the vow. So teach Sánchez, Castropalao, Trullench, Leander, and others. They also dispute whether he is bound to go outside his own nation and homeland, and to approach convents of another language and region. But this is commonly denied — it seeming preferable to leave the matter to the judgment of a prudent man. This alone should always be noted: that the entrance into a collapsed religious order is neither to be attempted, nor carried out. If the one vowing is free of impediments, entrance into one or another religious order will be easy for him; if he is entangled with impediments, he will find none. One who is unfit for one may be fit for another. All these matters depend on many circumstances. For this reason no fixed rule can be assigned, but the matter must be left to the judgment of a prudent man.

From this it is gathered that the opinion of Sánchez, Castropalao, Leander, and the theologians of Salamanca, who assert that one who vowed religious life indefinitely is not to be compelled to enter the strictest Order — such as the Capuchins, Carthusians, Camaldolese, and Minims — is not absolutely true. Since it can occur, and indeed not infrequently, that one vowing possesses all those qualities that render him fit, and apt, for one of the aforesaid Orders. If, however, he is unfit for others, and this one vowing is healthy and robust, if he experiences no aversion to such an Order, if he is instructed with the best character, if he burns with the ardor of virtue — why should he not be advised toward the entrance into such an Order? Rather, this matter, as we have said, ought to be left entirely to the judgment of a prudent and learned man, and, alongside him, a pious man, when it comes to the assumption of the religious state. Absolutely, then, the rule of these Doctors seems false. And this must equally be affirmed of women as of men. As for the diversity of homeland and province, however, women are commonly not to be compelled to seek a convent outside their own city, or at least too far removed from their parents. Men who have vowed religious life indefinitely, if they have been commonly refused by all religious orders, are by no means bound to enter the military Order of the Knights of St. John, of Calatrava, or of Alcántara — since such military Orders are not comprehended under the term "religious order" in general, as has been explained above.

XII. Question IX. One who vows to enter this or that convent, if he suffers a refusal, is he bound to approach other monasteries? Response: The resolution must be gathered from the intention of the one vowing. If, moved by some peculiar reason, he first and principally set before himself such a monastery, and suffered a refusal, he remains free from the vow. Cautiously, however, and seriously, the intention of the one vowing must be investigated. For if a peculiar affection alone toward such a monastery moved him only to elicit the vow, and no solid reason for such a specific choice shines forth, then he is not free from the debt of seeking acceptance in other monasteries of the same Order — since in these circumstances it is clear that this one vowing intended, first and per se, entrance into religious life, and then, secondarily, into this particular monastery. In similar cases, the whole judgment depends on the one vowing's own account of the matter.

XIII. Question X. One who has once been legitimately rejected by a monastery, or religious order, is he bound, if invited afterward to embrace it, or the monastery, to do so? Response: If someone is repelled on account of a temporary impediment, once the impediment is removed, he is bound, by virtue of the vow, to seek re-entry. This is agreed upon by all. This must be said first, which is certain among all: namely, that if the one vowing was rejected on account of some apparent impediment, which in fact and in truth was not one — as, if one to be received were reckoned to be burdened with debt, or illegitimately born, or afflicted with some hidden disease, which was in fact not true — then, certain, I say, it is that he would be bound, if that same Order should later admit him.

XIV. What is brought into dispute, however, is whether one legitimately, and perpetually, rejected remains free of the vow, if he is invited later, or is not bound to entrance. Authors commonly declare that such a person is free of the bond of the vow; and this opinion seems to me more probable, and absolutely so — since, otherwise, if he were invited anew by a religious order, and did not enter, he would be forced to remain anxious and suspended for his whole lifetime; nor is it in any way to be presumed that the one vowing intended to bind himself to so uncertain a fate when he made the vow of religious life; nor can such a grave burden be prudently gathered from the nature of a vow. Less probable to us, however, seems what the theologians of Salamanca teach (n. 11), along with Castropalao, Aragón, Pellizzari, Diana, and others, in the place cited — namely, that the one vowing, having made his petition for admission to the religious habit, is not bound, by virtue of the vow, to await the consent of the religious order; since, they say, this vow is presumed to have been made under this condition: "If, due diligence having been applied, the religious order should wish to admit me" — for this time is required for deliberating, or if it defers the deliberation as long as it wishes. This opinion, I say, seems to us both less probable, and false — since scarcely any religious order is so cautious and prudent in receiving candidates that it does not defer acceptance for some period of time, so that it may ascertain whether it is expedient to admit, and make trial of whether the postulant's will is constant and firm. So far, then, is it from being true that, in the vow of acceptance, a tacit condition of a sudden acceptance is included, that rather a fitting delay is always presumed. It must be said, then, that if such a delay is such as to provide a solid foundation for despairing of obtaining entrance, then the one vowing is to be declared free from the vow; otherwise, if the delay is moderate, and leaves hope of obtaining acceptance at a suitable time.

XV. Question XI. Can a regular Superior lawfully reject, with the same facility, one bound by a vow of religious life, as one bound by no vow? Response: The common opinion affirms this, and rightly — since the obligation of the one vowing in no way affects the Prelates, or the religious order accepting him. For the vow was made under this condition — namely, if the Prelate should wish to accept.

XVI. Question XII. One who vowed religious life, so that he might be a Cleric in it, is he free from the vow, if the religious order refuses to admit him except as a lay Brother? Response: He is altogether free — since a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing; but the one vowing expressly intended, when he made the vow, to profess as a Cleric. Therefore, this condition failing, the vow remains dissolved. But if, when he made the vow, he thought nothing about the clerical or lay state, and is fit for either state — namely, both clerical and lay — he is bound to accept whichever grade the religious order shall prescribe. One who expressly vowed to assume the priestly state can commute the vow, and become a lay Brother, and vice versa, if, however, the religious order consents — since this is an accidental change within the same religious order. All this is common ground among all. From the condition of the one vowing, however, it will generally be easy to discern which state he intended for himself, whether expressly, or at least tacitly. But if this can in no way be discerned, the one vowing must abide by the judgment of the religious order, as we have said.

XVII. Question XIII. An illegitimate son, aware of the constitution of Sixtus V, by which illegitimate sons are excluded from ranks and dignities, vows religious life; knowing the constitution, is he bound to fulfill the vow? Response: The Doctors commonly deny this — since, since an illegitimate son is unfit to attain such dignities and ranks, he suffers grave ignominy on account of such a penal deprivation; and they assert the same of one vowing a religious order which has a similar law, if he was ignorant of it at the time he made the vow. So teach Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 55), Pellizzari (Vol. I, tract. 4, ch. 1, sect. 1, q. 9, n. 55), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 43), Castropalao (tract. 16, disp. 1, punct. 3).

This opinion causes me no small difficulty, since not every inconvenience, or difficulty, is sufficient to dissolve a vow. One who despises the world, and all that the world can give — whether riches or dignities — in order to profess evangelical perfection, so as to exercise himself in the virtue of humility, which seems, by its own nature, to include a renunciation of all worldly ranks and dignities — is most prudently presumed, when he made the vow of religious life, to have renounced all such things. Add to this that the aforesaid deprivation of ranks brings ignominy to worldly men, not to Religious; since the more devout, and the more approved, Religious are, the more this renunciation of the vow will bring them praise, the more they will excel among other Religious, however great the worldly dignity from which an illegitimate son is barred. Wherefore this opinion just cited seems to me to accede more to human affections than to the evangelical counsels, to whose observance one who vows religious life pledges to conform his whole life. I myself, indeed, on account of this difficulty alone, unless peculiar circumstances occurred, would not exempt from entrance into religious life one who had made such a vow while ignorant of the aforesaid law.

XVIII. Question XIV. One who vowed religious life in the priestly state — is he bound to learn grammar, when, on account of his ignorance of it, he is not admitted? Response: The common opinion affirms this: Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 61), Suárez (Vol. III, on Religion, Bk. IV, ch. 15, n. 11), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 3, n. 14), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 44), Aragón, Ledesma, Rodríguez, Azor, and others. For whoever wills the end must will the means that conduce to attaining it. If, however, when he made the vow, he thought he could learn it within the religious order, he is not bound to learn it outside it — since his express intention is established, beyond which a vow does not oblige. If he does not wish to learn grammar, he can become a lay Brother, with the consent of the religious order — since then he is judged to fulfill his vow more perfectly, on account of the peculiar humility and labor of such a state. What if, at the time he made the vow of embracing religious life in the priestly state, he was ignorant that a knowledge of grammar was necessary? Is he bound to learn it? The cited authors deny this, on the grounds that this supervening difficulty is grave enough to be sufficient for the dissolution of the vow. This, however, must be gathered from the circumstances. For if the one vowing was so affected toward the religious order that, had he known of this difficulty, he would nonetheless have made the vow, he would surely be bound to learn grammar. If, on the contrary, it is prudently presumed that he would not have made the vow, had he had a clear view of such an impediment, he remains free of the vow, nor is he bound to embrace the lay state in the aforesaid religious order — just as one who vows religious life, knowing that this state requires learning grammar, is not bound to become a lay Brother, if, the risk having been made, he is afterward found altogether incapable of learning it — since moral incapacity dissolves the debt of a vow. On the other hand, the lay state, besides being the state of the one vowing, was, when he made the vow, doubted, whether or not it required grammar, then he is bound to learn it — since, when he was in doubt, he ought to have made himself more certain. Indeed, if he had doubted whether a knowledge of the liberal arts was required for acquiring Philosophy or Theology, he would be compelled to learn those arts, for the reason given — since, when he made the vow in such doubt, he is presumed to have bound himself to carry out all those things which are necessary for obtaining the end. When, however, it is doubted whether the one vowing knew or did not know, at the time of the vow, that grammar was required for the clerical state, it must be presumed that he did know — since there is no religious order which does not require this knowledge; and consequently this is commonly known to all. One who vowed the lay state is not bound to learn a mechanical trade, so that he may be received, if the religious order would exclude him on account of this defect, when, in making the vow, he thought nothing at all about such a trade. On the contrary, if he knew that some trade was necessary for entrance into religious life, then he ought to learn some trade. Sotus notes, however (Bk. VIII, on justice, q. 2, art. 1), that the one vowing is bound to learn the trade which the religious order requires, even if he thought nothing of it, provided, however, that the trade is of such a nature that it can easily be learned; and otherwise the one vowing would scarcely be useful to the religious order without such a trade. For whoever vows is bound to carry out easy means, so that he may become possessed of his vow. This opinion is true.

XIX. Question XV. One who, after having made a vow of religious life, contracts marriage; or, having contracted and consummated marriage, vows religious life — what must he do? Response: If the vow of religious life preceded the marriage, the one contracting marriage sins mortally. For the entire first two months, he can neither lawfully request the debt, nor render it — since, within these two months, he can still fulfill his vow, by assuming the religious state; wherefore he would sin mortally, both by rendering and by requesting. Once the two months have passed, he is bound to render it, but by no means can he request it. If, however, the marriage is consummated, whether with or without fault, he is then held, by Lessius, Palao, Bonacina, Sánchez, and the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit.), to be able both to render and to request the debt. If, however, after the marriage is consummated, the spouses, by mutual consent, make a vow, they can both render and request it — since the use of marriage does not impede the vow of taking up religious life; the vow of religious life is understood to be contracted under this condition: unless a better state is chosen. And if someone, after a marriage ratified but not consummated, has the right to enter religious life, he enjoys an even stronger right after the betrothal has been contracted; for betrothals are held to be contracted under this condition. A vow of religious life made after betrothal is valid — since betrothal does not impede a vow of undertaking religious life. But more on all this at greater length when we come to discuss marriage.

XX. Question XVI. Does one who accepts the Episcopate thereby fulfill a vow of religious life? Response: The common opinion denies this. This is gathered from the chapter "Per tuas," on vows, where Innocent III answers this case: "We are confused as to why, if you desire to heal your conscience, you should resign the governance of the Church, rather than accede to it, unless compelled; and render your vows to the Most High." The reason too is clear: for no one is bound to a more perfect state, unless led by peculiar inspiration; and although the episcopal state is absolutely more perfect than the vow of a religious man, nonetheless, excluding the case of necessity, it is better — as far as it concerns embracing and promoting perfection — to have embraced the religious state, and, as it were, called from above, and constrained by superiors, to accept the Episcopate, to which he is called by vocation, rather than to seek it out. This is the common opinion.

I. One who vows religious life is bound, by virtue of the vow, not only to enter it, but also to persevere in it, unless he otherwise indicates, so that he is bound to one, not to the other. He, however, who vows absolutely to enter religious life, is bound to try it, in the year of probation, as they call it, with a sincere mind of professing it, if he recognizes it as expedient for his eternal salvation. Wherefore, if he is expelled without his own fault, he remains free of the vow, nor is he bound to seek entrance into another religious order. Nor is it to be presumed, when this is not openly established, that one who vowed religious life also vowed perseverance in it — since this is a distinct burden, which is not to be added to the one vowing beyond his intention. St. Thomas treats of this (II-II, q. 189, art. 4).

II. Question I. Does one who enters religious life with the intention of leaving satisfy the vow? Response: St. Thomas, in the place cited, ad 3, answers that one who enters, so as to leave immediately, does not seem to satisfy his vow — since in vowing this he did not intend it; and he is therefore bound to change his purpose, so that at least he wills to make trial of whether it would be expedient for him to remain in religious life; he is not, however, bound to remain there in perpetuity. The reason is clear. For one who vowed religious life... did not vow only the reception of the habit, but the religious state, in which he might be able to serve God; wherefore, unless he tries this state, he cannot lawfully abandon it, if he finds this state less suited to him. So all teach commonly.

III. Question II. One who entered religious life with the intention of leaving, together with the resolve to pray to God that he might change his heart — would he satisfy the vow? Response: Leander affirms this (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 47), where he cites Angles, Richard, Sylvester, Sánchez, and Bassaeus. Sylvester (s.v. Religio, q. 19) actually reports the opinion of one holding this view; and Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 74), with several others, defends this same opinion, on the grounds that he would, in good faith, apply all that is necessary, on his own part, to obtain the effect of his vow. But when the one vowing enters with the intention of leaving, the purpose alleged — of trying to get God to change his heart — is presumed false and mendacious. Wherefore he ought, first of all, to lay aside his intention of leaving; and then pray to God to soften his heart. For how can he, in good faith and sincerely, pray to God to change his heart, if he enters with the deliberate intention of leaving? Wherefore it seems to me more probable, and more consonant with sincerity, that the one vowing ought first to lay aside his depraved intention of leaving, and then apply himself to obtain that God might break the hardness of his heart. If, however, having entered with the aforesaid intention of leaving, and with the purpose of persevering (which two things fight against each other simultaneously), he really did leave the religious order — I would urge him anew that, his intention of leaving having been laid aside, he make trial of the matter in the customary way; and then, if, the experiment made in good faith, he should leave the religious order, because he found that state less suited to him, I would declare him free of the vow. Hence it is to be said, by a stronger right, and authors commonly teach, that one who enters with the intention of not persevering does not satisfy the vow of religious life, even if he leaves for a just cause — since he does not enter in good faith; and therefore he is bound to carry out the business with a sincere mind, so that, having made trial, he may satisfy his vow.

IV. Question III. One who made a vow of entering, and of immediately leaving, or of entering with the express intention of leaving, or of enjoying the liberty granted to Novices by law — to what is he bound? Response: The vow is null, and inept, when both the entrance and the departure equally constitute the matter of the vow. If, however, the vow were, in itself, a valid vow that regarded the entrance, and the departure were an attached circumstance, then the one vowing would be bound to the entrance, and the circumstance, as unjustly attached, need not be observed. One who vows with this express intention of enjoying the liberty which Novices making trial enjoy, can, without doubt, once the trial is made, leave religious life without any bond of vow, and has satisfied his vow. So St. Thomas expressly says (II-II, q. 189, art. 4, in the body): "If, however, he intends to bind himself to entrance into religious life for the sake of making trial, with liberty of remaining, or not remaining, it is manifest that he is not bound to remain. If, however, he leaves without any just cause, he would sin against his vow — provided he held the divine mercy, whose kindness he thus scorns and contemns, as of no account. But if, in vowing, he simply thought of entrance into religious life, without thinking of liberty of departure, or of the perpetuity of remaining, he seems to be bound to entrance according to the common form of law — namely, that a year of probation be given to those entering — whence he is not bound to remain perpetually in religious life. And so, if, the trial having been made beforehand, he leaves for a just cause, he has satisfied his vow."

V. Question IV. One who vowed religious life absolutely, thinking nothing either of perseverance or of departure — does he satisfy the vow if he enters religious life, and, the trial having been made, without any cause, but merely with the liberty granted to other candidates freed of the vow, he leaves? Response: Not a few affirm this. Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 3, q. 9; Quodlibet 14, q. 15), Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, on vows, consil. 25 or 3), Angles (s.v. Votum, n. 18), and others whom Sánchez cites (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 89). The reason for this opinion is that a vow, just like an oath, takes on all the limitations and exceptions which the law grants — final chapter, on undue condition. Therefore the vow of religious life is understood to be only for the sake of trial, according to the rules of law.

VI. The contrary opinion, which is more probable, and which authors commonly teach, we embrace. The reason is evident. For one who vows religious life vows that he will lead his life in such a state, granted that this state, the trial having been made, is agreeable to himself, and no sufficient reason occurs why he should withdraw from it. If, indeed, he vowed a religious life to be abandoned at mere whim, with no cause pressing at all; this entrance would be vain and futile, and the matter of the vow inept. Indeed, all who enter religious life set before themselves that they will persevere in it. Therefore, if they act prudently, as we ought to presume, they intend, and this the law grants to the candidates for the sake of making trial within the year of probation — so that, if the state, once tried, is found agreeable, no sufficient reason for departure occurring, they will remain in it fully free of departing. Since, then, all who prudently make the vow of religious life intend, so that they fulfill their vow, to persevere in the religious order, unless some cause of departure arises, the one vowing is bound to persevere in religious life. Nor does the reasoning of the contrary opinion stand in the way — namely, that the law grants full liberty of withdrawing within the year of probation in the external forum, so that, that is, no action lies against departing Novices. For it by no means follows from this that a Novice, though freed of the vow, can, without any cause at all, and by mere caprice, withdraw from religious life which he had once seriously embraced, without at least venially sinning against the gratitude owed to divine goodness. Moreover, if this holds for those free of the vow, whenever they depart without any cause, they would not sin against the vow, but would sin the sin of levity, rashness, and ingratitude against divine kindness — the same, with even stronger reason, must be said of those who would be bound by a vow, and are by no means free from it: for although those freed of the vow would sin, if, having taken up religious life, they departed, they would sin only venially; but these would sin, and gravely, by departing, and would themselves be bound, in good faith, to seek entrance and trial again. So teach Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 4, dub. 3), Armilla (s.v. Novit., n. 10), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 3), Toledo (Bk. IV, Summa, ch. 17, n. 12), Valentia (disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 4), Manuel Rodríguez (Vol. II, Summa, ch. 95, n. 1), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 57), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 90), and several others.

VII. Question V. What are the just causes for leaving religious life, whether one freed of the vow, or bound by the vow? Response: As is clear from what has been said, according to the common opinion, if, without any legitimate cause, but by mere whim, he abandons the religious order which he had entered, he sins. There is, however, this difference: that one free of the vow would sin venially, one bound by the vow would sin mortally. Sufficient causes must now be assigned, by which both one who vowed, and one who did not, can lawfully withdraw. And, first, it is certain that a greater cause is required in one who made a vow of religious life than in one who assumed religious life without a vow. For a Novice free of the vow can lawfully leave religious life for any reasonable cause whatsoever — say, that the religious order does not suit him, that he foresees that he will not lead a happy life in it, etc. It suffices that he can probably fear such evils. For the rest, one who entered religious life by a vow can withdraw from the religious order which he vowed only for grave, and morally certain, causes. Such are: grave danger of some notable harm, whether temporal or spiritual; the gravest temptations, which such a state would bring upon him; incapacity for sustaining the burdens of religious life; a grave necessity of one's parents, and the like — all of which are to be submitted to the judgment of a prudent man, so that, the circumstances inspected, he may decide what he judges expedient for the one vowing. One who vowed not only religious life, but also perseverance in it, cannot withdraw even for otherwise just causes. Only incapacity, and being expelled from the religious order without his own fault, can exempt him from the vow. If, however, he were rejected through his own fault, he would by no means be free of the vow.

VIII. Question VI. One who, beyond the vow of religious life, also vowed perseverance in it — is he bound to persevere in such a way that, if he happens to leave for just causes, he must enter it again? Response: One who vowed two things — namely, entrance and perseverance — does not satisfy the vow by entrance alone, unless he also adds perseverance: therefore, if he withdraws, even for an otherwise just cause, he is bound to attempt entrance again. For only, as has just been said, evident incapacity for profession, or expulsion from the religious order without the one vowing's own fault, can free him from the bond of the vow. If, however, some most grave difficulty were to supervene, unknown at the time of the vow, such that, had he known of this difficulty, he could have withdrawn — this opinion seems to me more probable: that, the difficulty ceasing, he would be bound to embrace religious life again — and although many authors defend the contrary, several nonetheless... uphold this opinion — St. Thomas (II-II, q. 189, art. 4), Cajetan there, Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 91, citing Navarrus, Covarrubias, Azor, Valentia, Rodríguez, who defends it too), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 5, ch. 6, n. 42), Pellizzari (Vol. I, tract. 11, ch. 6, n. 11), Candido (s.v. Votum, art. 2, punct. 5, §6, n. 13), Portel (s.v. Votum, n. 21), Toledo (Bk. IV, ch. 17, n. 12), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 1, n. 28), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 51), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, n. 1), Bassaeus (Vol. II, s.v. Votum), Suárez (Vol. III, on Religion, Bk. IV, ch. 4, n. 1), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 20, n. 2), López (Part I, Instructions, ch. 4), and several others.

IX. Question VII. Is one bound by a vow of persevering in religious life, who has been expelled, obliged to preserve chastity while remaining in the world? Response: First of all, if he was expelled without his own fault, it seems certain that he is not bound to preserve chastity — since chastity is not included in the vow of entrance, but only in solemn monastic profession; therefore, since this profession was not made, the vow of chastity does not oblige. This reasoning also establishes that he is not bound to chastity even if he was expelled through his own fault. This opinion is taught by Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 3, ad 2), Armilla (s.v. Votum, n. 21), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 63 and 45), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 22, q. 3), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 111), John of St. Thomas (disp. 29, art. 11), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 20), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 45). If, however, someone had vowed religious life and chastity simultaneously and principally, he would be bound to chastity, even if he remained in the world — since it did not perish as an accessory, its principal having failed. If, however, one had vowed chastity dependently upon religious life, then, the vow of religious life ceasing, the vow of chastity would likewise cease. When doubt arises as to whether chastity was vowed dependently upon religious life, the intention of the one vowing must be investigated from the words in which the vow was conceived; for from these the doubt arises. If, however, the intention of the one vowing is itself doubted, and cannot be resolved from the circumstances, then the rule must be observed, which asserts that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen.

I. One who vowed religious life absolutely, with no time prefixed, is bound to fulfill his vow as soon as he can conveniently, as is declared (Deut. 23): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin." This too is impressed upon us (Ecclesiastes 5): "If thou hast vowed anything to the Lord, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him." When it is said "as soon as he conveniently can," the sense is by no means that any difficulty whatsoever is sufficient to defer the entrance into religious life; but it indicates that only some grave obstacle can lawfully excuse the delay. For if any difficulty whatsoever sufficed to justify delays, scarcely any time would ever be opportune and fitting for fulfilling the vow. That time, then, is reckoned opportune for the execution of the vow in which the one vowing can, morally speaking — that is, without an urgent and grave impediment — leave the world, and embrace religious life. Just as, then, other indefinite promises made to men oblige to execution at the first opportunity offered, so too it must be said of a promise made to God. For one who has prescribed no time for himself has no reason why he should await a future time; otherwise, once it were granted that he could defer his promise into future time, no time at all could be defined for its execution. This, however, I would not have you take too strictly, so as to reduce the one vowing to straits. But the law "What we say" on solutions must be kept before one's eyes: "'Immediately' is to be understood with the tempering of some allowance of time." Likewise, "at once," "immediately," "continuously," in the law "Since so," on the meanings of words, on obligations. Such adverbs, then, admit some interval of time, which is neither the smallest nor the greatest, but a fitting one. What span, however, is to be called fitting, cannot be absolutely defined, but must be left to the judgment of a prudent man. Now a shorter, now a longer span may be granted, according to the diversity of the circumstances observed. If the matter is conducted in good faith, anyone can most easily define such an interval of time.

II. Question I. Does one bound by a vow of religious life sin mortally if he defers his entrance for an entire year? Response: Some authors, such as Ledesma (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 3, dub. ult.), Rodríguez (Vol. II, ch. 95, n. 9), consider that a delay of two or three years is required in a vow of religious life, for it to be called a notable delay, and for the one vowing to sin mortally; but in other vows, such as of fasting, alms, pilgrimage, etc., which do not look to perpetual divine service, they hold that a greater delay of execution is admissible; and that only then does the one vowing sin mortally, when he exposes himself to the danger of not fulfilling the vow. This opinion is too lax.

Although a longer span of time is required in other vows besides religious life, its execution can nonetheless not be deferred, without grave fault, for so long a span without risk to the promise. Authors commonly hold, then, that one bound by a vow of religious life sins mortally, if, opportunity given, he procrastinates the execution of his vow beyond half a year. They permit more time for the execution of other vows, since, in these, less is subtracted from the divine service by delay. If someone protracted their execution beyond a year or two, he would sin mortally, unless grave impediments excused him.

III. Question II. If someone has defined a time for the execution of his vow, is he bound to fulfill his vow within the interval of the prefixed time? Response: All affirm this. The only difficulty that arises is whether, if he foresees an impediment which would render the observance of the vow impossible at the designated time, he is bound to anticipate that time. Authors commonly deny this, and rightly — since a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing; but the one vowing did not wish to bind himself before the defined time: therefore he is by no means bound — just as one is not bound to anticipate hearing Mass before a feast day, nor to fast at the time of carnival, even if he foresees impediments by which he would be prevented, both on the feast day, and in Lent, from hearing Mass, and from keeping the fast. Suárez (Vol. II, on Religion, Bk. V, on life, ch. 7, n. 3), Bonacina (Vol. II, disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §1), Castropalao (tract. 15, punct. 14), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 3, n. 33), and others.

I suppose that the individual Orders have some particular statutes on this matter. Since however there are four principal Rules, namely of Basil, Augustine, Benedict, and Francis, yet the individual Orders differ in their statutes, much more those alien to them, as the Carthusians and the Jesuits.

I shall say in this matter what is more or less common, and meets each case.

First, Bishops, bound by oath to the most holy Pope, cannot be received without his leave. Thus D. Thom. question 189. article 7. from the chapter Nisi cum pridem de renunc.

Secondly, nor spouses with marriage consummated chapter Quidam, and the chapter Placet de convers. coniugat. Yet by mutual consent chapter Cum sis, chapter Uxoratus, chapter Ad Apost. de convers. coniugat. they can enter; but the woman, if she is young, or such that incontinence on her part might be feared if she remain in the world, is bound to enter a monastery, the husband entering too. Otherwise it is enough if she vow continence into the hands of the Bishop.

The judgment must be made from the person's state, health, and past life, as Poncius says de matrim. lib. IX. cap. 12. Whether there is danger, the Bishop will judge chapter si vir, et uxor, 27. quaest. 2. chapter Quia Agatho, chapter scripsisti nobis, 27. quaest. 2. as S. Bonaventure observes on chapter 2. of the Rule, where S. Father Francis provided for this.

S. Doctor notes that the age due for this, so that the wife may remain in the world without suspicion, with the husband entering Religion, is to be measured more by stability of virtue than by the course of years; for it is said Sap. 4. The senses of a man are grey hairs, and a spotless life is the age of old age. Poncius consents in the place cited, as does Bassaeus V. Religio 2. num. 2. Therefore he does not determine that she be fifty years old, as Sanchez would have it de matrim. lib. VII. disp. 32. num. 15. Gutierrez de matrim. cap. 95. Bonacina quaest. 3. puncto 3. num. 12. Filliucius tract. 10. part. 2. num. 133. Nor does he decree that she be sixty, with Faustus in theol. relig. lib. V. quaest 55. Azor tract. 1. lib. XII. cap. 1. quaestio 6.

Yet in a ratified marriage, one can enter religion against the spouse's will, chapter verum, chapter ex publico, de convers. coniug. Or if the man has consummated within a two-month period, Diana de sacr. resol. 242. part. 3. Or if one commits adultery chapter Agathosa 27. quaest. 2. chapter Portio de divort. but not if he has forgiven it. Or if the spouse falls into heresy dist. 32. quaest. 1. cap. 1.

Thirdly, one who has deflowered a virgin under promise of marriage. See Diana part. 3. de sacrament. Resol. 203.

Fourthly, a slave against his master's will chapter si quis 17. quaest. 2.

Fifthly, one who is a debtor; thus D. Thom. 2. 2. q. ult. art. 6. I say a debtor by contract or by wrong, as I said de Rest. Yet the profession will be valid, though illicit from the Clementine S. In suprema, where the Bull of Sixtus V is moderated.

Sixthly, those bound to render accounts from Sixtus V. Cum de omnibus.

Seventhly, sons whose parents lie in grave poverty: or conversely.

Eighthly, minors without the leave of parents or guardians, D. Thom. 1. 2. quaest. 88. art. 9. et q. 101. art. 4. et quaest. ult. art. 5.

Ninthly, an illegitimate one whose father, still living, has professed in that religion. But by their own statutes some orders exclude homicides, the infamous, and those born of Jews, Saracens, or heretics.

Eleventhly, those disfigured in body; for these are barred from the altar, c. De corp. vitiato, and chapter 2. de cler. aegrot.

Twelfthly, the infamous. Add from the Constitution of Sixtus V. criminals. These are they who have perpetrated shameful deeds, and these are notorious. Likewise exclude those gravely suspected.

Twelfthly, Bigami cannot be Clerics.

The Prelate is indeed bound to be informed; and if through his fault a criminal, or one bound by accounts, etc., is received, he incurs the penalties of deprivation of voice, of incapacity for all offices, honors, etc. See Tamburinus tract. 3. de iure Abbat. disp. 6. quaest. 4. Portel. dub. Reg. v. Novitii informat. Rodriquez tract. 3. gg. regul. quaest. 10. Miranda tract. 1. quaest. 17. 18. 19. Peyrinus tract. 2. de Praelat. quaest. 3. cap. 1. §. 1. Vecch. in prax. disp. 6. dub. 7. Bassaeus V. Religio 2. who warns, that the one received is bound to disclose his grave impediment.

Therefore those are to be received who are fit to serve Religion. Wherefore those who receive the unfit or the worthless are guilty of deadly fault.

D. Bonaventure appends a third mirror, in which his Novices fashion their conduct exactly to it, and the Fathers destined to admit candidates to profession anatomically examine the life of the novices. A work indeed heavenly.

He appends another similar work. On the Institution of Novices; a work truly golden. But he gathers all things more fully discussed in the Rule of Novices.

Again, he appends another little work for nuns, on the perfection of life.

The holy Council of Trent decrees session 25. chapter 15. that the profession is not valid if the novice has not completed 16 years, and has not completed a full year of probation; and this our Rule observes, as S. Bonav. on chapter 2.

The year must be completed in the civil manner, so that if it be a bissextile year, two days count as one.

If a dying novice is admitted to profession by privilege, the parents succeed ab intestato, whatever Diana says with others part. 3. de dub. reg. resol. 17. and part. 5. tract. 5. resol. 139. The reason is, because it is granted only for spiritual solace, therefore it cannot in the external forum prejudice the legitimate heirs, and devolve the inheritance upon the monastery, where there is no right; and equally no debt.

The year must be whole and continuous, not interrupted; Rodriquez tomo 2. cap. 8. et tomo 3. qq. quaest. 15. art. 8. Sa V. Religio n. 9. Azor tract. 1. lib. XII. cap. 2. quaestio 8. Bonacina de claus. quaest. 2. puncto 10. diff. 2. Nauar. de reg. consil. 32. et 33. Henriquez lib. XIII. de excomm. cap. 40. Syluester V. religio 5. q. 4. D. Anton. 3. part. tit. 16. cap. 3. §. 2. Faust. in th. f. lib. V. quaest. 163. et 164. Sanchez lib. 5. cap. 4. Bassaeus V. Religio 3. num. 5.

If a novice runs away for two hours with the habit, and returns, the year is interrupted, according to the decision of the Cardinals in Barbosa de iur. can. lib. 1. c. 42. n. 139. Vecch. disp. 11. dub. 3. num. 6. et 15.

The year must be completed with the habit of Religion, as Sylvester teaches V. Religio 5. quaest. 5. Angel. V. novitius, Vecchius disp. 11. dub. 7. and others in Bassaeus num. 7.

If the novitiate was null, it must be repeated, because there is no cause, and there is no potency toward the past. Thus Nauar. and Rodriquez in Bassaeus num. 9.

Those receiving candidates to profession among the Mendicants, before the year is complete, are excommunicated, and suspended ipso facto from the faculty of admitting to profession chapter Non solum de reg. in 6. the same censure binds those who throughout that whole year impede the novice from freely passing to another order, unless he has made profession being over 16 years of age. In other Orders, however, they sin gravely against the precept of the Council of Trent session 25. de regul. cap. 15.

Superiors can for a cause prolong the profession, by the old law, from which the Tridentine Synod in this does not derogate. It is conceded indeed by Pius V, in Rodriquez in the place cited, and Bassaeus num. 10. provided that within six months he may be hoped to become fit.

NOVICES are not bound by the statutes of Religion, since they are not yet members. See Bassaeus n. 11. and 13.

They enjoy the privilege of Canon and Forum, Sanchez lib. IV. cap. 39. num. 17. et lib. VI. cap. 10. Layman lib. IV. tract. 5. cap. 4. Diana de dub. regular. Resol. 73.

ONE RETURNING to the world does not fall back into the censures or irregularities from which he was absolved in Religion by force of the privileges which Vecch. disp. 9. dub. 25. brings forward. See Suarez tract. 5. in 3. part. disp. 7. sect. 5. num. 35. Diana cit. resol. 44. Bonacina de leg. disp. IV. quaest. 2. puncto 7. §. 4. num. 28. This is the more probable opinion, says Bassaeus num. 16.

I. Before young men profess a Religion with solemn rite, they ought for an entire year to wear the habit of Religion openly. But this reception of the religious garment must needs be free and not forced. Those who compel girls to this reception sin mortally, and contract excommunication, as Trent, session 25, chapter 18, established. But those who compel male youths by threats sin mortally, but do not incur excommunication. Youths who having been compelled had performed their noviceship, if they freely emitted profession, the noviceship would have been valid. The year of this noviceship ought to be entire, as Trent, session 25, chapter 15, prescribes, continuous and not interrupted. He who for a day should lay aside the habit, or go out of the cloister with the mind of not returning, although after a day he returned, would be said to have interrupted the noviceship; otherwise if for some hours he laid it aside without going out of the monastery.

II. Unfit for this noviceship by the right of nature are the decrepit, the demented, those habitually infirm with a grave disease, slaves truly such with their master resisting, spouses after matrimony consummated without mutual consent, and the professed of another Order without the licence of superiors. By positive right there cannot be received bishops and archbishops, who without the express faculty of the Supreme Pontiff cannot profess a regular Religion. But the rest of ecclesiastics are altogether free, even those assigned to the care of souls, to profess the regular life.

III. The Supreme Pontiffs have published several constitutions in which they determine the conditions of those to be received into the regular Orders. Sixtus V by his constitution Cum de omnibus forbade that men who had passed the sixteenth year be received unless a severe inquisition were sent before concerning their birth, past life, and the quality of their parents. And if it were found that they had perpetrated robberies or other like crimes, or that they were suspected of the same, or condemned, or that it be prudently feared that they will be condemned; if they be burdened with debt above their strength, or bound to render accounts, whence suits and troubles are foreseen — he forbids that they be received, and declares null the profession emitted by them. But Prelates who shall have knowingly received such men he deprives of active and passive voice, of grades and prefectures, and constitutes them unfit for future dignities and grades. This constitution he tempered by another constitution whose beginning is Ad Romanum Pontificem, not as regards the penalties, but as regards the crimes. Gregory XIV by another constitution called Circumspecta partly took away, partly increased the moderations of the Sixtine constitution. And at last Clement VIII reduced profession to the terms of common law: so that unless some impediment of common law stand in the way, the profession is valid. But he left the penalties against transgressors in their force. Now nevertheless by force of the constitution of the same Clement VIII Regulars can receive youths even beyond the nineteenth year, an oath being exacted that they are neither criminal, nor obnoxious to the rendering of accounts, nor guilty of theft or homicide, nor bound by the other impediments recounted in the Sixtine constitution. Prelates who neglect scrutiny of this kind gravely offend and are subject to the penalties of the Sixtine Bull. The profession nevertheless will be valid, provided nothing repugn against common law.

IV. Novices are partakers of all the privileges of Regulars, since they are under the power of the Religion and sustain its burdens. Wherefore they are immune from the jurisdiction of the bishop and enjoy the privilege of the forum. The superiors of the Religion can dispense with them upon the precepts of the Church and upon their vows, which nevertheless they ought to fulfil if they lay aside the habit of Religion. On the contrary if they be absolved from censures, irregularity, or reservation, if they go out of the Religion which they had in good faith embraced, they remain absolved.

V. If in the year of noviceship a novice die, the heir ab intestato succeeds to his goods. Free donations between the living, lucrative contracts, and renunciations of temporal goods, offices, and dignities are void and null, unless they be made with the licence of the bishop or of his Vicar within two months before profession, as Trent determined. Goods which a novice hopes will come to him he can renounce to the Religion which he is about to profess, even while his father lives; otherwise to another determinate person. To the goods which come to a novice by right of blood, unless he himself dispose according to the prescript of Trent before profession, the Order which he has professed succeeds, if it be capable of immovable goods.

Caius, a young man of excellent ability and good morals, educated in a certain Catholic College, as the time for leaving the College approached, went to his confessor and asked what he ought to do. For he fears that he may be called to the religious state, since for almost an entire year the thought of entering religion has very frequently come into his mind, and he is persuaded that he would easily attain salvation in that state, whereas this would be rather difficult in the world because of his lively disposition and inclination to pleasures; nevertheless, his spirit shrinks from the austerity of religious life. He therefore wishes to know whether he is bound to enter religion. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a divine vocation, and how is it known whether someone has a vocation?

2. Does one who is called sin if he does not follow the vocation, or one who is not called if he thrusts himself into the religious state?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered above, p. 23.

2. Does one who is called to religion sin if he does not follow his vocation, and does he sin who enters religion without a vocation?

The answer given above with regard to vocation to the priesthood may be applied to this question. With regard to religious life which does not involve the priesthood, many divines hold with St. Thomas that a general vocation is given by God to all who are free and suited to the religious state. So that any such persons who choose to enter religion for some supernatural motive are in fact called thereto by God. As a vocation to a religious life is a call to perfection and to the practising of the counsels of the Gospel, which do not bind under sin, no sin is committed per se by one who does not follow such a vocation. If, however, he is conscious that by remaining in the world he would expose his salvation to serious danger he would of course commit sin by neglecting the necessary means to save his soul. 1

3. The case. Caius, a young man of excellent disposition and good morals, is afraid that he has a vocation to the religious life. The thought of it has often been in his mind during the past year; he is persuaded that he could easily save his soul in that state of life, while he is afraid that on account of his lively disposition and inclination for pleasure he would find it difficult to do so in the world. What deters him is the austerity of religion. Caius manifests some of the ordinary signs of a religious vocation. His fear of the austerity of the life does not militate against his having a genuine vocation, and should not be reckoned when trying to come to a decision. The confessor therefore should tell Caius that a religious vocation is a great grace which God gives to those whom He specially loves, 1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 642.

as He did to the young man in the Gospel. He might tell him that he has many of the signs of a religious vocation, but he should not attempt to settle the question himself; he should let Caius do that, recommending him to make a retreat for the purpose.

Caia, a nun who recently professed simple vows, discloses to Titius, her confessor, that before entering Religion she had contracted with Paul a debt of twenty pounds that was not yet paid, of which she had made no mention to the superiors. Furthermore, she says that she brought fifty pounds with her into religion and gave it to the Order to compensate for the board and clothing furnished to her during the novitiate. Titius indeed knows that debt is an impediment to religion and that justice must be observed; nevertheless, he does not know what is to be done in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. Who may enter religion?

2. How do substantial and secondary impediments to entrance into religion differ?

3. Is a religious Order bound to pay the personal debts of its members?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. Who may enter Religion?

All those who have the aptitude for the duties of religious life and who ar£ not prevented by any special obstacle may enter religion. The chief obstacles are: the necessity of supporting parents, consummated marriage, and debts. Bishops can not become Religious without the leave of the Holy See. The different Religious Orders have special impediments in addition to these.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 643.

2. How do substantial impediments differ from secondary?

The former make religious profession invalid if they are not removed beforehand, the latter only render it unlawful. Debts constitute a secondary impediment.

3. Is a Religious Order bound to pay the personal debts of its members?

Certainly not. Personal obligations of this sort only affect him who contracted them.

4. The case. Caia did wrong to enter Religion without paying her debts. She has given all the money she had to pay for her own support during the novitiate to her superiors, who know nothing about the debt. She has no money left to pay the debt now. If she obtains any afterwards by inheritance or otherwise she will be obliged to pay the debt with the customary interest. In the meantime it will be sufficient if she repents of her fault, and resolves to fulfil her obligations when she can do so.

Patrick, a secular priest and a missionary in England but born in Scotland, seeks the counsel of Caius, a regular, in these circumstances. A few years ago Patrick entered a certain diocesan seminary in England and, after taking the oath of the Mission, was at length ordained under the title of the Mission. Afterwards, serving a certain Mission for two years, he brought forth much fruit in the vineyard of the Lord. Nevertheless, having experienced the dangers of such a life and having been captivated by love of religious perfection [a conjectural restoration of one corrupt printed word], he asks the Bishop for permission to return to his native country with the intention of entering a certain monastery there. The Bishop refuses; indeed, he asserts that Patrick is already in a state of perfection and that there is no reason for desiring religious life. So that he may forget it more easily, the Bishop orders him to go to another, very poor Mission, where neither labor nor poverty will be lacking. Patrick therefore asks Caius:

1. What obligations to serve the Mission rest upon him?

2. Is it true that the state of a secular priest is a state of perfection?

3. Can he enter religion, and under what conditions?

4. Is he bound to obey the Bishop with regard to the other Mission?

1. Under what obligations does Patrick lie of serving the Mission?

Patrick is bound to serve the diocese for which he was ordained by the very fact of his ordination and by his promise of canonical obedience to the Bishop. He is also bound by the terms of the missionary oath which he has taken.¹

1 Trent, xxiii, c. 16 De Ref.; Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 634.

2. Is it true that the state of a secular priest is a state of perfection?

A certain stability of life is necessary to constitute a state of life in the strict sense, and that it may be a state of acquiring perfection it should impose the obligation and offer special means to attain perfection. The secular priesthood is not a state of acquiring perfection, as there is not the requisite stability, nor does it offer special means of acquiring perfection. On account of the want of stability it can not strictly be called a state in which perfection is exercised like the state of bishops, but in the opinion of Suarez it may be called an imperfect and inchoate state of exercising perfection on account of the priest's duty of working for the sanctification of others.²

2 Suarez, De Relig., tract, vii, lib. i, cc. 14, 15, 17.

3. Can Patrick enter Religion and under what conditions?

If Patrick can get the leave of the Holy See he may enter Religion, but that leave is required by the terms of the missionary oath. He should therefore be advised to make up his mind whether as far as can be known he has a true vocation, and then if he wishes to follow it he must ask leave from the Holy See, which will doubtless first consult the Bishop and then grant leave or not as it judges to be for the best.

4. Is he bound to obey the Bishop and accept the poor Mission assigned to him?

It may reasonably be doubted whether Patrick is so obliged if he does not wish to leave his present post. To transfer him to a poorer and harder Mission has the appearance not of promotion but of degradation, and Patrick has done nothing to deserve that. When the First Council of Baltimore laid it down that priests were obliged to obey the bishop when he bade them accept any mission within the diocese, the S. Cong, de Prop. Fide substituted for it this clause: “ We admonish priests that mindful of the promise made at their ordination they should not refuse to accept any mission assigned to them by the bishop ” (Collectio Lacensis recent. Concil., Ill, p. 22). Which is much less peremptory.

Miss X. applies to the superior of a convent for admission. The superior answers that she may come, but only on condition that she is a pure virgin. X. goes to her confessor, and tells him that she was once so unhappy as to be seduced, but the sinful act had no results, and she repented of it and confessed it long ago. She asks anxiously whether she can describe herself as a pure virgin.

It can scarcely be doubted that the constitutions, to which the superior referred, meant, by the words " a pure virgin," to designate one who is pure in the ordinary acceptation of the word, and in the eyes of her fellow creatures—only those who had " fallen " were to be excluded from admission. It is possible, and is said to have actually happened, that a superior, misunderstanding the text of the rules, has meant really vera virginitas coram Deo, and in this way has made the mistake of making admission depend upon a condition not based upon the rules. In this case X. can with a clear conscience call herself a pure virgin, for she is such, according to the constitutions to which the superior has referred. The mistake is on the part of the superior, whose wrongly imposed condition must be regarded as non adjecta (cf. Gury, 795 nota). How would matters stand, however, if the rule really required virginity in the eyes of God, and absolute innocence of at least any outwardly dishonorable action?

We can safely assume that the rule of no religious order of women would receive the approval of a Bishop, and still less of a Pope, if this interpretation were to be placed upon it, as such a point would inevitably give rise to many embarrassments and scruples. We can hardly be wrong in believing that the ecclesiastical authorities would not be justified in attaching such a condition to the admission of postulants, for it would be injurious to the community life, and a morally impossible condition.

In an analogous case, St. Alphonsus writes: The authors say that a bride corrupted by another man, even if she is asked by her bridegroom whether she has been known by another, may dissemble and deny it by a restriction that is not purely mental, replying that she is not corrupted, understanding this in the common estimation (1. vi. 865). X's confessor may set her mind completely at rest.—Georg Freund, C.SS.R.

Case.—Mrs. M. was entrusted with the care of two nieces who had as an inheritance the sum of ten thousand dollars. She was very fond of the younger niece, who was attractive and much sought by suitors. She had no affection for the older, who was not attractive, though good and gentle, and unsought in marriage. Mrs. M. finally concluded that the best place for her elder niece Alice was a convent. This scheme did not meet with Alice’s favor and thereafter the homely relative was subjected to petty annoyances, which in time became persecution and made her life unbearable in the home of her aunt. After a few years of patient suffering, no longer able to bear such ill-treatment, she decided to enter the convent, hoping to have there a happier life than she had so far enjoyed. In this she was disappointed. Hence in the course of a few years she returned to the world. Meanwhile her sister had married and received what remained of the money of Alice, which the married sister now refuses to return, leaving Alice penniless and without a home.

Question.—What should be done?

Solution.—The aunt in question has certainly proved herself an unjust steward. She has a very grave account to settle with the Just Judge. She undertook to be a mother to the orphans and failed miserably. She sinned gravely by her schemes to force her gentle, though homely, niece to enter the religious life against the inclinations and wishes of the girl. She no doubt consoled herself with the conclusion that she was doing great good to the luckless girl, unsought in the world, by compelling her to accept the religious life—forcing her to accept the “better part.” In reality she was doing her ward a positive injury in driving her to act against her will, to take up the burdens of a life for which she had no fitness. The lack of the qualities needed for the successful and peaceful life in the convent could have but one result. Alice found herself even more unhappy in her new life than in the old one. She could not but feel that she was not doing God’s Will and was in consequence running the risk of endangering her soul’s eternal welfare. Therefore she gave up the convent life. For this she is to be praised.

Secondly, the worldly-minded aunt, for this is what she was, sinned against justice by the constant harassing to which she subjected a young girl, who was unable to protect or defend herself in her circumstances. She made the life of her niece unbearable, and although the vexations were in themselves petty, yet by reason of the relations between the two and the utter friendlessness and dependence of the girl, they became relatively grave. A girl’s life for the most part is spent at home and she has a strict claim to proper treatment. A violation of this right may be a grave injustice and in the present case does constitute a serious fracture of the virtue of justice, since it forced the girl in question to leave what should have been her home, and compelled her to seek refuge in a convent where she was absolutely out of place. The liberty of Alice was interfered with in the choice of a vocation. This, indeed, is a serious matter. The Church demands positive freedom for all on this important point and to secure it she has placed heavy penalties on all who break so weighty a law. If the convent in question were one where solemn vows were taken, then this faithless aunt would incur the sentence of excommunication as inflicted by the Council of Trent. Now as to the conduct of the sister of Alice, we must say it is indefensible. She has no right to the money —never had any right to it; she sins in keeping it, and, of course, is bound to restitution. She sins again in not helping her sister who is penniless and homeless. She cannot be absolved until she does her duty by the maltreated and defrauded Alice.