Chapter IX — On the vow of assuming the religious state

I. St. Thomas treats of the vow of assuming the religious state (II-II, q. 189, art. 2 — not art. 88, as Leander writes, correcting Prado, since he wrote art. 89), where he shows that a vow of professing the religious state is a laudable work, and full of merit — since, whatever a vow concerns pertains to God, and the profession of the religious state pertains to God in the highest degree; for by this profession a man offers himself as a holocaust in the service and honor of God.

II. It follows from this that one who made a vow to enter religious life ought to apply every diligence, as the Angelic Doctor teaches (loc. cit., art. 3, ad 1). Nor, however, is it required for the observance of the vow that the one vowing actually enter religious life, and actually carry out the entrance — since many things can prevent such an entrance from being carried out, and it does not depend on the one vowing that these be removed; but it is only necessary that the one vowing omit nothing, on his own part, of those things which can pave the way toward entering the Order. If, however, the one vowing had any impediments, he ought to reveal them to the Superiors of that religious order which he vowed to enter. For such a revelation, even if it should impede the entrance, is necessary for the validity of the contract between the religious order and the one vowing. For a religious order has the right not to receive those who are bound by a grave impediment, and can, by right, insist that hidden impediments be revealed. So authors commonly teach. The diligence, however, which we have said must be applied by the one vowing, need not be extraordinary — such as having recourse to intercessors, and the patronage of great men, to secure entrance — but it suffices that he use those means which prudent men are accustomed to employ in matters of graver import. We consider less probable what the theologians of Salamanca write (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 1, n. 2) — namely, that the one vowing is not bound, when he seeks to be received into the habit, to reveal his vow to the Prelate, even though he might hope, by this manifestation, to be admitted to religious life more easily — since, they say, this manifestation is not necessary for the execution of the vow: for the one vowing is bound only to apply the necessary means. They praise, for this opinion, Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 3, near the solution to the second objection). But this is falsely alleged, as often happens with them. For Cajetan has not a word in the place cited to exempt the one vowing from the manifestation of such a vow. They also praise Bonacina, and others, whose examination, since the matter is of lesser moment, I pass over. I say this manifestation is necessary for the execution of the vow: for the one vowing is bound, by virtue of the vow, to apply those means which he prudently judges to conduce to obtaining the end of the vow. Given, then, that such a means is fitting for obtaining the end of the vow, and can be employed without grave inconvenience to himself, I do not see why he should not be bound to use it in such a means. What, indeed, is easier than this manifestation of the vow? Once it is known, entrance into religious life is more easily obtained; nor, indeed, does it not sometimes happen that this is the case. Although we grant that this manifestation is not, by its own nature, necessary for the execution of the vow, nonetheless, in this circumstance, it is necessary that the one vowing act in good faith, and apply those means which present no difficulty, and are efficacious for the attainment of the end. For in what business of any importance similar to this would such an easy diligence be omitted? Nor does it follow from this that the one vowing is bound to implore the aid and favor of patrons — since such means carry with them a grave inconvenience, and it is prudently presumed that the one vowing did not bind himself to them. So that this matter, somewhat entangled, may be more clearly explained, we shall devote the following paragraphs to it.

I. Question I. What is to be said of this vow: "I promise to enter religious life, unless God should decide otherwise concerning me"? Response: This vow can have a twofold sense, as Sánchez, following Córdoba, notes (Bk. IV, on the Decalogue, ch. 16, n. 2). The first is: "I vow religious life, unless God should render me unfit for entrance by some illness, or other obstacle" — this impediment removed, the vow will still oblige. The second is: "I vow religious life, unless God should decree something more expedient for my salvation." In this case, they say, the vow ceases. And in doubt as to whether some other state than religious life is more expedient for the salvation of the one vowing, they add that upright men should be consulted, and, the doubt remaining, a dispensation from the vow should be sought. For the rest, to state what I think: this attached condition seems to me inept, and superfluous — since, whenever an impediment occurs, or a state of greater perfection presents itself, it would be understood even if the condition had not been attached. I likewise consider this other condition superfluous: "I vow to enter religious life, if I shall be able" — since no one is bound to enter religious life unless he is able. And although all have physical power, not all have moral power. Nonetheless, in any vow whatsoever moral power too is included, so that grave impediments render the one vowing unfit. But if someone wishes to defend the aforesaid condition as reasonable, I do not consider it a matter of such importance that I should contend sharply about it — especially since, in similar vows, the intention of the one vowing must always be looked to first of all.

II. Question II. How is this vow to be explained: "I vow to enter this religious order, if I shall have entered any"? Response: St. Antoninus proposes this vow (Part II, tit. 11, ch. 2, §1, note 15), in these words: "If someone should swear, or vow, to enter this religious order — if he enters any, it is valid; because by this, no other order is principally excluded, but this one is principally included. And if not purely, yet under a condition — namely, if he wishes to enter any. But if he were to promise that he would enter no other, and would not promise to enter this one, he would not be bound to enter it, either purely or conditionally; nor would he sin by not entering it." When, then, the one vowing designates some particular religious order, even though he casts aside the condition, the vow is valid; if, however, he excludes every religious order, the vow is null, and impious. To make the nature of this vow clearer, however, the intention of the one vowing must be examined. For if, led by a particular affection toward this religious order, he vowed entrance into it as something set before him principally, the vow is valid, even though conditional — since the entrance into religious life, even though bound by a condition, is good and fit matter for a vow. On the contrary, if he had principally vowed that he would enter no religious order at all, then the whole matter of the vow would be a pure negation, unsuited to a vow; and consequently the vow itself would be null. So authors commonly teach.

III. Question III. Is this vow valid: "I vow that no person shall be an obstacle to me, from entering religious life, or from doing something else"? Response: Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 3), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 17, n. 4), Leander (tract. 1, q. 5) pronounce this invalid. It seems valid to me, however; for it yields this sense, unless the express intention of the one vowing indicates otherwise: "I vow that I will enter religious life, unless someone's prayers or objections are an obstacle to me" — that is, "I vow that I will overcome, as much as I can, the impediments of all persons, so that I may enter religious life." What of the fact that the cited authors affirm that a vow conceived in this manner is valid: "I vow that nothing shall be an impediment to my entering religious life"? And yet there is no difference at all, save in the words, if it is compared with the other.

IV. Question IV. Is one who made a vow of wishing to enter religious life bound to enter it? Response: Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 8) answers negatively, and Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, on vows), to whom Leander, Pellizzari, Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 20), Bassaeus, and others subscribe. If this vow is considered absolutely, disjoined from any circumstance, it is certain that it does not induce an obligation to enter religious life, for the reason the cited authors assign — namely, that a vow to wish is one thing, a vow to do is another. One who vows only to wish does not vow to do. But this one vowing does not vow to enter, but vows to wish to enter. For this, it suffices that he sometimes have a firm and good will to enter — which will not at all obstruct his entering marriage. But these are, in a certain metaphysical consideration, all true. For the rest, if someone had really made such a vow, there would scarcely be any foundation for presuming that such a one vowing did not have the intention of vowing entrance into religious life. What prudent man would vow that he would have the will to enter religious life, while at the same time having a purpose of contracting marriage? The will to enter religious life is good, since it looks to a good. But, while a contrary deliberate will to marry is present, there are two acts that collide with one another. Wherefore, if this case occurred to me, I would seriously investigate the intention of the one vowing — since in practice either the vow is ill-considered, and null for want of due knowledge, or the one vowing is certainly bound to entrance into religious life. The same must be said of one who vowed that he did not wish to live in the world — namely, the intention of the one vowing must be investigated. The cited authors say that, for the observance of such a vow, it will suffice that the one vowing behave negatively, and elicit no contrary act — "I wish to live in the world" — and therefore he can enter marriage. Such vows seem ridiculous to me; and those who would make them, too imprudent, and ill-considered. Wherefore, if I were to find that prudent men had made such vows, and expressed them thus, I would seriously investigate their intention: since commonly one who vows... wishes to enter religious life is presumed to intend that entrance in earnest. Nor is it so much from the words as from the intention of the one vowing that the obligation and nature of the vow are to be drawn. If the matter of the vow were a mere negation, and included nothing positive, the contrary opinion would be true. And therefore the cited authors say that such a one vowing must behave negatively, by virtue of such a vow. But I, all things weighed, would judge either that the vow is null, or would oblige the one vowing to entrance into religious life.

V. Question V. Is a vow of dying in religious life a vow of religious life? Response: All commonly affirm this. For no one can meet death in religious life unless he first enters it. Indeed, by virtue of such a vow, he is bound to persevere in it. Authors dispute only about the time by which the one vowing is bound, by virtue of such a vow, to make his entrance. Some maintain that such a vow does not induce an obligation to enter so quickly, as with an absolute vow of entering religious life; and this must be investigated, as regards this vow and other similar disputed points, with the intention of the one vowing and the circumstances considered. If the force of the words is attended to, it seems probable enough that such a vow does not press an entrance as swift as an absolute vow to enter religious life would. That, on the contrary, it does not admit a long delay, likewise appears likely enough. Wherefore this should be left to the judgment of a prudent man, so that, the circumstances inspected, he could either anticipate, or moderately defer, the time of execution.

VI. Question VI. Does a vow of eremitic and solitary life induce an obligation? Response: Authors agree that this is not a true vow of religious life. They differ concerning its obligation. Lest we linger longer than is just on questions of lesser moment, it does not seem to be doubted that this vow is valid. If those vowing do not fully hold the eremitic and solitary state and perfection of life (which is not to be undertaken without a special vocation, and celestial illumination), they will be able to obtain a dispensation. This too is common ground among authors.

I. Question I. Does one who vowed religious life absolutely fulfill the vow, if he assumes the habit of the Knights of St. James, of Calatrava, of Alcántara? Response: Some affirm this; but the common opinion denies it — both because it is highly controverted whether these are true Religious, since they do not vow chastity absolutely, but only conjugal chastity; nor do they pledge to God either absolute poverty, or obedience; and also because, granting them to be truly in the religious state, those who vow "entrance into religious life" do not intend such orders, but those which profess the cenobitic life.

II. Question II. Is a vow of religious life at least fulfilled if the habit of the Knights of St. John is assumed? Response: Several not undistinguished writers say that these Knights make three absolute vows — poverty, chastity, and obedience — and are true Religious; and, as far as the religious state is concerned, some of these same Knights insist to me that, by the assumption of the habit, they turn to an apostolic life approved by the Church. But the common opinion denies that the absolute vow of religious life of the aforesaid Knights of St. John is fulfilled — since, according to the common estimation of those who vow entrance into religious life, the ordinary meaning intended is one of the orders in which, wholly separated from the tumult of the world, a common life is led.

III. Question III. Would such a vow at least be fulfilled by entrance into an order of military Clerics of chastity, such as the Knights of Malta living there, and observing common life? Response: All commonly affirm this — since these do lead a truly regular life in convents, in the manner of other Regulars; and it is beyond controversy that, as long as they live under a rule approved by the Holy See, they are true Religious, since the Knights of Malta dwelling there lead a common life, just as other Religious do.

IV. Question IV. Does the one vowing religious life satisfy the vow, if he enters a relaxed religious order? Response: All authors commonly deny this. But it must be explained what is meant by "relaxed" religious order. For relaxation admits of greater or lesser latitude. Some religious order (would that it were only some!) has diminished from its ancient rigor in food, and in its garments, observing neither the abstinence, nor the austerity, which it observed from its beginnings; it takes care, however, that the laws and constitutions, though now milder, are observed by all. Moreover, the observance of the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience flourishes exactly in it, having remitted nothing of the ancient rigor, not only in its chief points but in every particular. This religious order, however, though somewhat diminished in its common estimation, and in fact, is not relaxed; but can only be called milder.

V. That religious order is commonly called "relaxed" which is deficient, as they say, in substantial matters. Now the substantial laws, or the first and chief constitutions and precepts, which must be observed, are the three necessary vows, and those things which are proximate to these vows, and without which — or scarcely without which — the observance of these vows can stand at all. Thus the vow of poverty cannot possibly be reconciled with private property; the vow of chastity with free egress from the cloisters; the vow of obedience with the free faculty of advancing one's own private interests. Hence those religious orders whose Religious have their own private property, now richer, now poorer, according to what fortune brings, and inhabit dwellings not infrequently more spacious and comfortable than secular men, feast on delicacies, and, if they wish, eat meat at their own pleasure and appetite, and where the leaders and Superiors, with tacit connivance, impune violate the other constitutions, in which, finally, the subjects conspire against the transgression of the laws; leave the monastery, indulge in games, break silences, fasts, and — although with their mouths they boast of observing their vows — most manifest experience nonetheless suggests the opposite.

VI. It must also be noted that scarcely any religious order is found which has collapsed in all its convents; rather, nearly every order has some monasteries, or Congregations, or Provinces, in which firm regular observance persists.

VII. We say, then, that one who vows entrance into religion not only does not fulfil his vow if he enters a religious order relaxed in the way we have described; but we add that even a vow of entering such religious orders is null, because it is not of a better good. Religious orders approved by God make the way of salvation easier; the relaxed Orders which I have described make the attainment of the blessed life more difficult, indeed most difficult. Therefore a vow of entering them is not of a better good, and so is null. The minor premise, about which alone there can be doubt, has been plainly shown in our Apostolic-Monastic Discipline, where we asserted, with all the theologians and casuists, however benign, that one who enters such religious orders casts himself into the gravest dangers of his eternal perdition. We will now recount only some of them: St. Antoninus (Part III, tit. 16, ch. 2); Thomas Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 9, and Vol. I of the Opuscula, the last tract, resp. 7); Seraphinus Porrecta in the same place; Martín Navarrus (in the Manual, ch. 12, nn. 45 and 46); Paul Nazarius (on the state of religion, concl. 14); Nyder (on the reform of religious orders, ch. 9, part 1); López (in the Instructions, ch. 43); Lezana (on the obligations of religious, ch. 7, n. 16); Lessius (on justice and right, Bk. II, ch. 41, dub. 5); Cassiano a S. Elia (decis. 1, n. 2); Sánchez (Bk. IV on the Decalogue, ch. 16, n. 14); Passerini (q. 189, art. 2, n. 6); Leander (tract. 1 on oaths, qq. 14 and 15); the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 1, n. 3); Rotarius (Vol. I, Bk. I, ch. 7, punct. 2, n. 2); Martínez de Prado (Vol. II, ch. 31, q. 7, n. 2); Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §6, n. 3); Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 5, ch. 6, n. 5). The reason is obvious enough, and occurs to everyone at once. For whoever vows entrance into religion intends chiefly and solely that state in which, far removed from the dangers of the world, he may serve God and work out his eternal salvation more safely. But when he enters a collapsed religious order, he casts himself into more and graver hazards, and into a kind of necessity, as it were, of violating the new obligations he has taken on, above all the vow of poverty, which he will pronounce to God with solemn rite. Consult what we have said in the aforesaid Apostolic-Monastic Discipline, dissert. 5, ch. 13.

VIII. Question V. Does one who vowed to enter a stricter religious order satisfy his obligation if he enters a laxer one? Response: By no means, and this is certain among all — since a solemn vow renders it impossible to commute a lesser thing for a greater. What if he makes profession in a laxer institute? Will the profession be valid? I do not deny it. But does he satisfy the vow? No one, however, promised a greater vow. This is certain and holds among all. Is the profession valid? It will certainly be valid, though it does not satisfy — since one solemn vow, such as monastic profession is, dissolves another simple vow, such as that of entering a stricter Order. This holds among all.

IX. Question VI. Can one who vowed a stricter religious order, but professed in a laxer one, lawfully persevere in it? Response: Authors speak too obscurely, and confusedly, about this matter. For they commonly assert that, in one sense, it is true, according to what St. Thomas holds (II-II, q. 189, art. 8, ad 3), where he says: "A solemn vow by which someone is bound to a lesser religious order is stronger than a simple vow by which someone is bound to a greater religious order. For if someone, after a simple vow, should contract marriage, it would not be dissolved, as a solemn vow would be. And therefore one who has already professed in a lesser religious order is not bound to fulfill the simple vow which he made of entering a greater religious order." From this doctrine the theologians of Salamanca gather (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 1, n. 4) that someone can, on his own authority, commute a vow of entering a stricter religious order into that of persevering in a laxer one — since to persevere in the laxer is more perfect than to dissolve the vow only of entering the stricter. This they teach, and several authors praise it, who really do gather this doctrine. This, however, unless it is explained, is a cause of error, and matters must be resolved apart from doubts. It is certain that a solemn vow extinguishes a simple vow; and consequently one who made a vow to enter a stricter religious order, if he made profession in a laxer one, is no longer bound, by virtue of his simple vow, to embrace the stricter — since that simple vow is dissolved, and utterly extinguished, by the solemn vow of profession. And, as to this point, the cited authors, along with St. Thomas, speak excellently. But if the religious order is relaxed in substantial matters, although he is not bound, by virtue of the past and extinguished vow, to enter the stricter order; he is nonetheless bound by reason of the divine law, which obliges all to avoid the dangers of eternal damnation. It has already been shown that a vow of entering a relaxed religious order is null, and that the one vowing gravely sins, unless ignorance excuses him, when he fulfills it by entering such a religious order — as we have said, and as the theologians of Salamanca themselves teach, in agreement with all other theologians. Such a one vowing, then, cannot lawfully persevere in a religious order relaxed in substantial matters. St. Thomas, however, in the place cited, speaks of a religious order which is truly "lesser," in relation to a greater religious order which is stricter — each of which, however, observes its own proper laws, as I have shown at length in the aforesaid Discipline. But one who vowed a laxer order, without doubt, elicited a valid vow of such a lesser order.

One who vows the assumption of one religious order cannot, by his own authority, commute the vow into another, even equally strict, by entering it: for no one, without dispensation, can, as we more probably consider, commute a vow into an equally good, but only into an evidently better, one.

X. Question VII. Does one satisfy the vow of entering a stricter religious order, if he enters a laxer one which has a pontifical privilege of receiving all who have vowed the stricter one? Response: The Doctors commonly affirm this, and report that the Benedictines, Augustinians, and others really do have such a privilege. Whatever the truth about these privileges, the distinction given above must always be kept before one's eyes — namely, understanding by "laxer religious order" one that is milder, gentler, and less severe, which nonetheless truly observes its own milder laws; the privilege having been granted, this is the true, common opinion. If, however, by "laxer religious order" is meant one collapsed in substantial matters, the aforesaid opinion would be false. For we deny that any legitimate privilege is found which grants collapsed Orders the faculty of receiving those who have vowed a stricter religious order. Indeed, we assert that pontifical decrees deprive religious orders of this kind of the faculty of receiving anyone at all for profession.

XI. Question VIII. What is one bound to who vowed religious life indefinitely? Response: St. Thomas (II-II, q. 189, art. 3, ad 2) says this: "That man is bound to go to a specific religious order, who intended simply to bind himself. Therefore, if he is not received into one religious order, he is bound to seek entrance into another; and, if he is indeed received into some religious order, he ought to do what he intended by such a vow. And if he vows himself specially to one religious order, he is bound only according to that mode of obligation which he vowed. But if he determinately vowed one religious order alone, he ought to apply the diligence that he would apply in any other matter of graver moment, so that he may be received in it." Thus, as the Doctors commonly say, if he has been refused by one monastery, he ought to seek out four or five others; just as, if he vowed religious life indefinitely, he is bound to explore four or five orders, and five or six convents of each order, so that, if rejected by all, he may be free of the vow. So teach Sánchez, Castropalao, Trullench, Leander, and others. They also dispute whether he is bound to go outside his own nation and homeland, and to approach convents of another language and region. But this is commonly denied — it seeming preferable to leave the matter to the judgment of a prudent man. This alone should always be noted: that the entrance into a collapsed religious order is neither to be attempted, nor carried out. If the one vowing is free of impediments, entrance into one or another religious order will be easy for him; if he is entangled with impediments, he will find none. One who is unfit for one may be fit for another. All these matters depend on many circumstances. For this reason no fixed rule can be assigned, but the matter must be left to the judgment of a prudent man.

From this it is gathered that the opinion of Sánchez, Castropalao, Leander, and the theologians of Salamanca, who assert that one who vowed religious life indefinitely is not to be compelled to enter the strictest Order — such as the Capuchins, Carthusians, Camaldolese, and Minims — is not absolutely true. Since it can occur, and indeed not infrequently, that one vowing possesses all those qualities that render him fit, and apt, for one of the aforesaid Orders. If, however, he is unfit for others, and this one vowing is healthy and robust, if he experiences no aversion to such an Order, if he is instructed with the best character, if he burns with the ardor of virtue — why should he not be advised toward the entrance into such an Order? Rather, this matter, as we have said, ought to be left entirely to the judgment of a prudent and learned man, and, alongside him, a pious man, when it comes to the assumption of the religious state. Absolutely, then, the rule of these Doctors seems false. And this must equally be affirmed of women as of men. As for the diversity of homeland and province, however, women are commonly not to be compelled to seek a convent outside their own city, or at least too far removed from their parents. Men who have vowed religious life indefinitely, if they have been commonly refused by all religious orders, are by no means bound to enter the military Order of the Knights of St. John, of Calatrava, or of Alcántara — since such military Orders are not comprehended under the term "religious order" in general, as has been explained above.

XII. Question IX. One who vows to enter this or that convent, if he suffers a refusal, is he bound to approach other monasteries? Response: The resolution must be gathered from the intention of the one vowing. If, moved by some peculiar reason, he first and principally set before himself such a monastery, and suffered a refusal, he remains free from the vow. Cautiously, however, and seriously, the intention of the one vowing must be investigated. For if a peculiar affection alone toward such a monastery moved him only to elicit the vow, and no solid reason for such a specific choice shines forth, then he is not free from the debt of seeking acceptance in other monasteries of the same Order — since in these circumstances it is clear that this one vowing intended, first and per se, entrance into religious life, and then, secondarily, into this particular monastery. In similar cases, the whole judgment depends on the one vowing's own account of the matter.

XIII. Question X. One who has once been legitimately rejected by a monastery, or religious order, is he bound, if invited afterward to embrace it, or the monastery, to do so? Response: If someone is repelled on account of a temporary impediment, once the impediment is removed, he is bound, by virtue of the vow, to seek re-entry. This is agreed upon by all. This must be said first, which is certain among all: namely, that if the one vowing was rejected on account of some apparent impediment, which in fact and in truth was not one — as, if one to be received were reckoned to be burdened with debt, or illegitimately born, or afflicted with some hidden disease, which was in fact not true — then, certain, I say, it is that he would be bound, if that same Order should later admit him.

XIV. What is brought into dispute, however, is whether one legitimately, and perpetually, rejected remains free of the vow, if he is invited later, or is not bound to entrance. Authors commonly declare that such a person is free of the bond of the vow; and this opinion seems to me more probable, and absolutely so — since, otherwise, if he were invited anew by a religious order, and did not enter, he would be forced to remain anxious and suspended for his whole lifetime; nor is it in any way to be presumed that the one vowing intended to bind himself to so uncertain a fate when he made the vow of religious life; nor can such a grave burden be prudently gathered from the nature of a vow. Less probable to us, however, seems what the theologians of Salamanca teach (n. 11), along with Castropalao, Aragón, Pellizzari, Diana, and others, in the place cited — namely, that the one vowing, having made his petition for admission to the religious habit, is not bound, by virtue of the vow, to await the consent of the religious order; since, they say, this vow is presumed to have been made under this condition: "If, due diligence having been applied, the religious order should wish to admit me" — for this time is required for deliberating, or if it defers the deliberation as long as it wishes. This opinion, I say, seems to us both less probable, and false — since scarcely any religious order is so cautious and prudent in receiving candidates that it does not defer acceptance for some period of time, so that it may ascertain whether it is expedient to admit, and make trial of whether the postulant's will is constant and firm. So far, then, is it from being true that, in the vow of acceptance, a tacit condition of a sudden acceptance is included, that rather a fitting delay is always presumed. It must be said, then, that if such a delay is such as to provide a solid foundation for despairing of obtaining entrance, then the one vowing is to be declared free from the vow; otherwise, if the delay is moderate, and leaves hope of obtaining acceptance at a suitable time.

XV. Question XI. Can a regular Superior lawfully reject, with the same facility, one bound by a vow of religious life, as one bound by no vow? Response: The common opinion affirms this, and rightly — since the obligation of the one vowing in no way affects the Prelates, or the religious order accepting him. For the vow was made under this condition — namely, if the Prelate should wish to accept.

XVI. Question XII. One who vowed religious life, so that he might be a Cleric in it, is he free from the vow, if the religious order refuses to admit him except as a lay Brother? Response: He is altogether free — since a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing; but the one vowing expressly intended, when he made the vow, to profess as a Cleric. Therefore, this condition failing, the vow remains dissolved. But if, when he made the vow, he thought nothing about the clerical or lay state, and is fit for either state — namely, both clerical and lay — he is bound to accept whichever grade the religious order shall prescribe. One who expressly vowed to assume the priestly state can commute the vow, and become a lay Brother, and vice versa, if, however, the religious order consents — since this is an accidental change within the same religious order. All this is common ground among all. From the condition of the one vowing, however, it will generally be easy to discern which state he intended for himself, whether expressly, or at least tacitly. But if this can in no way be discerned, the one vowing must abide by the judgment of the religious order, as we have said.

XVII. Question XIII. An illegitimate son, aware of the constitution of Sixtus V, by which illegitimate sons are excluded from ranks and dignities, vows religious life; knowing the constitution, is he bound to fulfill the vow? Response: The Doctors commonly deny this — since, since an illegitimate son is unfit to attain such dignities and ranks, he suffers grave ignominy on account of such a penal deprivation; and they assert the same of one vowing a religious order which has a similar law, if he was ignorant of it at the time he made the vow. So teach Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 55), Pellizzari (Vol. I, tract. 4, ch. 1, sect. 1, q. 9, n. 55), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 43), Castropalao (tract. 16, disp. 1, punct. 3).

This opinion causes me no small difficulty, since not every inconvenience, or difficulty, is sufficient to dissolve a vow. One who despises the world, and all that the world can give — whether riches or dignities — in order to profess evangelical perfection, so as to exercise himself in the virtue of humility, which seems, by its own nature, to include a renunciation of all worldly ranks and dignities — is most prudently presumed, when he made the vow of religious life, to have renounced all such things. Add to this that the aforesaid deprivation of ranks brings ignominy to worldly men, not to Religious; since the more devout, and the more approved, Religious are, the more this renunciation of the vow will bring them praise, the more they will excel among other Religious, however great the worldly dignity from which an illegitimate son is barred. Wherefore this opinion just cited seems to me to accede more to human affections than to the evangelical counsels, to whose observance one who vows religious life pledges to conform his whole life. I myself, indeed, on account of this difficulty alone, unless peculiar circumstances occurred, would not exempt from entrance into religious life one who had made such a vow while ignorant of the aforesaid law.

XVIII. Question XIV. One who vowed religious life in the priestly state — is he bound to learn grammar, when, on account of his ignorance of it, he is not admitted? Response: The common opinion affirms this: Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 61), Suárez (Vol. III, on Religion, Bk. IV, ch. 15, n. 11), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 3, n. 14), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 44), Aragón, Ledesma, Rodríguez, Azor, and others. For whoever wills the end must will the means that conduce to attaining it. If, however, when he made the vow, he thought he could learn it within the religious order, he is not bound to learn it outside it — since his express intention is established, beyond which a vow does not oblige. If he does not wish to learn grammar, he can become a lay Brother, with the consent of the religious order — since then he is judged to fulfill his vow more perfectly, on account of the peculiar humility and labor of such a state. What if, at the time he made the vow of embracing religious life in the priestly state, he was ignorant that a knowledge of grammar was necessary? Is he bound to learn it? The cited authors deny this, on the grounds that this supervening difficulty is grave enough to be sufficient for the dissolution of the vow. This, however, must be gathered from the circumstances. For if the one vowing was so affected toward the religious order that, had he known of this difficulty, he would nonetheless have made the vow, he would surely be bound to learn grammar. If, on the contrary, it is prudently presumed that he would not have made the vow, had he had a clear view of such an impediment, he remains free of the vow, nor is he bound to embrace the lay state in the aforesaid religious order — just as one who vows religious life, knowing that this state requires learning grammar, is not bound to become a lay Brother, if, the risk having been made, he is afterward found altogether incapable of learning it — since moral incapacity dissolves the debt of a vow. On the other hand, the lay state, besides being the state of the one vowing, was, when he made the vow, doubted, whether or not it required grammar, then he is bound to learn it — since, when he was in doubt, he ought to have made himself more certain. Indeed, if he had doubted whether a knowledge of the liberal arts was required for acquiring Philosophy or Theology, he would be compelled to learn those arts, for the reason given — since, when he made the vow in such doubt, he is presumed to have bound himself to carry out all those things which are necessary for obtaining the end. When, however, it is doubted whether the one vowing knew or did not know, at the time of the vow, that grammar was required for the clerical state, it must be presumed that he did know — since there is no religious order which does not require this knowledge; and consequently this is commonly known to all. One who vowed the lay state is not bound to learn a mechanical trade, so that he may be received, if the religious order would exclude him on account of this defect, when, in making the vow, he thought nothing at all about such a trade. On the contrary, if he knew that some trade was necessary for entrance into religious life, then he ought to learn some trade. Sotus notes, however (Bk. VIII, on justice, q. 2, art. 1), that the one vowing is bound to learn the trade which the religious order requires, even if he thought nothing of it, provided, however, that the trade is of such a nature that it can easily be learned; and otherwise the one vowing would scarcely be useful to the religious order without such a trade. For whoever vows is bound to carry out easy means, so that he may become possessed of his vow. This opinion is true.

XIX. Question XV. One who, after having made a vow of religious life, contracts marriage; or, having contracted and consummated marriage, vows religious life — what must he do? Response: If the vow of religious life preceded the marriage, the one contracting marriage sins mortally. For the entire first two months, he can neither lawfully request the debt, nor render it — since, within these two months, he can still fulfill his vow, by assuming the religious state; wherefore he would sin mortally, both by rendering and by requesting. Once the two months have passed, he is bound to render it, but by no means can he request it. If, however, the marriage is consummated, whether with or without fault, he is then held, by Lessius, Palao, Bonacina, Sánchez, and the theologians of Salamanca (loc. cit.), to be able both to render and to request the debt. If, however, after the marriage is consummated, the spouses, by mutual consent, make a vow, they can both render and request it — since the use of marriage does not impede the vow of taking up religious life; the vow of religious life is understood to be contracted under this condition: unless a better state is chosen. And if someone, after a marriage ratified but not consummated, has the right to enter religious life, he enjoys an even stronger right after the betrothal has been contracted; for betrothals are held to be contracted under this condition. A vow of religious life made after betrothal is valid — since betrothal does not impede a vow of undertaking religious life. But more on all this at greater length when we come to discuss marriage.

XX. Question XVI. Does one who accepts the Episcopate thereby fulfill a vow of religious life? Response: The common opinion denies this. This is gathered from the chapter "Per tuas," on vows, where Innocent III answers this case: "We are confused as to why, if you desire to heal your conscience, you should resign the governance of the Church, rather than accede to it, unless compelled; and render your vows to the Most High." The reason too is clear: for no one is bound to a more perfect state, unless led by peculiar inspiration; and although the episcopal state is absolutely more perfect than the vow of a religious man, nonetheless, excluding the case of necessity, it is better — as far as it concerns embracing and promoting perfection — to have embraced the religious state, and, as it were, called from above, and constrained by superiors, to accept the Episcopate, to which he is called by vocation, rather than to seek it out. This is the common opinion.

I. One who vows religious life is bound, by virtue of the vow, not only to enter it, but also to persevere in it, unless he otherwise indicates, so that he is bound to one, not to the other. He, however, who vows absolutely to enter religious life, is bound to try it, in the year of probation, as they call it, with a sincere mind of professing it, if he recognizes it as expedient for his eternal salvation. Wherefore, if he is expelled without his own fault, he remains free of the vow, nor is he bound to seek entrance into another religious order. Nor is it to be presumed, when this is not openly established, that one who vowed religious life also vowed perseverance in it — since this is a distinct burden, which is not to be added to the one vowing beyond his intention. St. Thomas treats of this (II-II, q. 189, art. 4).

II. Question I. Does one who enters religious life with the intention of leaving satisfy the vow? Response: St. Thomas, in the place cited, ad 3, answers that one who enters, so as to leave immediately, does not seem to satisfy his vow — since in vowing this he did not intend it; and he is therefore bound to change his purpose, so that at least he wills to make trial of whether it would be expedient for him to remain in religious life; he is not, however, bound to remain there in perpetuity. The reason is clear. For one who vowed religious life... did not vow only the reception of the habit, but the religious state, in which he might be able to serve God; wherefore, unless he tries this state, he cannot lawfully abandon it, if he finds this state less suited to him. So all teach commonly.

III. Question II. One who entered religious life with the intention of leaving, together with the resolve to pray to God that he might change his heart — would he satisfy the vow? Response: Leander affirms this (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 47), where he cites Angles, Richard, Sylvester, Sánchez, and Bassaeus. Sylvester (s.v. Religio, q. 19) actually reports the opinion of one holding this view; and Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 74), with several others, defends this same opinion, on the grounds that he would, in good faith, apply all that is necessary, on his own part, to obtain the effect of his vow. But when the one vowing enters with the intention of leaving, the purpose alleged — of trying to get God to change his heart — is presumed false and mendacious. Wherefore he ought, first of all, to lay aside his intention of leaving; and then pray to God to soften his heart. For how can he, in good faith and sincerely, pray to God to change his heart, if he enters with the deliberate intention of leaving? Wherefore it seems to me more probable, and more consonant with sincerity, that the one vowing ought first to lay aside his depraved intention of leaving, and then apply himself to obtain that God might break the hardness of his heart. If, however, having entered with the aforesaid intention of leaving, and with the purpose of persevering (which two things fight against each other simultaneously), he really did leave the religious order — I would urge him anew that, his intention of leaving having been laid aside, he make trial of the matter in the customary way; and then, if, the experiment made in good faith, he should leave the religious order, because he found that state less suited to him, I would declare him free of the vow. Hence it is to be said, by a stronger right, and authors commonly teach, that one who enters with the intention of not persevering does not satisfy the vow of religious life, even if he leaves for a just cause — since he does not enter in good faith; and therefore he is bound to carry out the business with a sincere mind, so that, having made trial, he may satisfy his vow.

IV. Question III. One who made a vow of entering, and of immediately leaving, or of entering with the express intention of leaving, or of enjoying the liberty granted to Novices by law — to what is he bound? Response: The vow is null, and inept, when both the entrance and the departure equally constitute the matter of the vow. If, however, the vow were, in itself, a valid vow that regarded the entrance, and the departure were an attached circumstance, then the one vowing would be bound to the entrance, and the circumstance, as unjustly attached, need not be observed. One who vows with this express intention of enjoying the liberty which Novices making trial enjoy, can, without doubt, once the trial is made, leave religious life without any bond of vow, and has satisfied his vow. So St. Thomas expressly says (II-II, q. 189, art. 4, in the body): "If, however, he intends to bind himself to entrance into religious life for the sake of making trial, with liberty of remaining, or not remaining, it is manifest that he is not bound to remain. If, however, he leaves without any just cause, he would sin against his vow — provided he held the divine mercy, whose kindness he thus scorns and contemns, as of no account. But if, in vowing, he simply thought of entrance into religious life, without thinking of liberty of departure, or of the perpetuity of remaining, he seems to be bound to entrance according to the common form of law — namely, that a year of probation be given to those entering — whence he is not bound to remain perpetually in religious life. And so, if, the trial having been made beforehand, he leaves for a just cause, he has satisfied his vow."

V. Question IV. One who vowed religious life absolutely, thinking nothing either of perseverance or of departure — does he satisfy the vow if he enters religious life, and, the trial having been made, without any cause, but merely with the liberty granted to other candidates freed of the vow, he leaves? Response: Not a few affirm this. Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet 3, q. 9; Quodlibet 14, q. 15), Navarrus (Bk. III, Consilia, on vows, consil. 25 or 3), Angles (s.v. Votum, n. 18), and others whom Sánchez cites (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 89). The reason for this opinion is that a vow, just like an oath, takes on all the limitations and exceptions which the law grants — final chapter, on undue condition. Therefore the vow of religious life is understood to be only for the sake of trial, according to the rules of law.

VI. The contrary opinion, which is more probable, and which authors commonly teach, we embrace. The reason is evident. For one who vows religious life vows that he will lead his life in such a state, granted that this state, the trial having been made, is agreeable to himself, and no sufficient reason occurs why he should withdraw from it. If, indeed, he vowed a religious life to be abandoned at mere whim, with no cause pressing at all; this entrance would be vain and futile, and the matter of the vow inept. Indeed, all who enter religious life set before themselves that they will persevere in it. Therefore, if they act prudently, as we ought to presume, they intend, and this the law grants to the candidates for the sake of making trial within the year of probation — so that, if the state, once tried, is found agreeable, no sufficient reason for departure occurring, they will remain in it fully free of departing. Since, then, all who prudently make the vow of religious life intend, so that they fulfill their vow, to persevere in the religious order, unless some cause of departure arises, the one vowing is bound to persevere in religious life. Nor does the reasoning of the contrary opinion stand in the way — namely, that the law grants full liberty of withdrawing within the year of probation in the external forum, so that, that is, no action lies against departing Novices. For it by no means follows from this that a Novice, though freed of the vow, can, without any cause at all, and by mere caprice, withdraw from religious life which he had once seriously embraced, without at least venially sinning against the gratitude owed to divine goodness. Moreover, if this holds for those free of the vow, whenever they depart without any cause, they would not sin against the vow, but would sin the sin of levity, rashness, and ingratitude against divine kindness — the same, with even stronger reason, must be said of those who would be bound by a vow, and are by no means free from it: for although those freed of the vow would sin, if, having taken up religious life, they departed, they would sin only venially; but these would sin, and gravely, by departing, and would themselves be bound, in good faith, to seek entrance and trial again. So teach Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 4, dub. 3), Armilla (s.v. Novit., n. 10), Sotus (Bk. VII, q. 2, art. 1, ad 3), Aragón (II-II, q. 88, art. 3), Toledo (Bk. IV, Summa, ch. 17, n. 12), Valentia (disp. 6, q. 6, punct. 4), Manuel Rodríguez (Vol. II, Summa, ch. 95, n. 1), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 57), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 90), and several others.

VII. Question V. What are the just causes for leaving religious life, whether one freed of the vow, or bound by the vow? Response: As is clear from what has been said, according to the common opinion, if, without any legitimate cause, but by mere whim, he abandons the religious order which he had entered, he sins. There is, however, this difference: that one free of the vow would sin venially, one bound by the vow would sin mortally. Sufficient causes must now be assigned, by which both one who vowed, and one who did not, can lawfully withdraw. And, first, it is certain that a greater cause is required in one who made a vow of religious life than in one who assumed religious life without a vow. For a Novice free of the vow can lawfully leave religious life for any reasonable cause whatsoever — say, that the religious order does not suit him, that he foresees that he will not lead a happy life in it, etc. It suffices that he can probably fear such evils. For the rest, one who entered religious life by a vow can withdraw from the religious order which he vowed only for grave, and morally certain, causes. Such are: grave danger of some notable harm, whether temporal or spiritual; the gravest temptations, which such a state would bring upon him; incapacity for sustaining the burdens of religious life; a grave necessity of one's parents, and the like — all of which are to be submitted to the judgment of a prudent man, so that, the circumstances inspected, he may decide what he judges expedient for the one vowing. One who vowed not only religious life, but also perseverance in it, cannot withdraw even for otherwise just causes. Only incapacity, and being expelled from the religious order without his own fault, can exempt him from the vow. If, however, he were rejected through his own fault, he would by no means be free of the vow.

VIII. Question VI. One who, beyond the vow of religious life, also vowed perseverance in it — is he bound to persevere in such a way that, if he happens to leave for just causes, he must enter it again? Response: One who vowed two things — namely, entrance and perseverance — does not satisfy the vow by entrance alone, unless he also adds perseverance: therefore, if he withdraws, even for an otherwise just cause, he is bound to attempt entrance again. For only, as has just been said, evident incapacity for profession, or expulsion from the religious order without the one vowing's own fault, can free him from the bond of the vow. If, however, some most grave difficulty were to supervene, unknown at the time of the vow, such that, had he known of this difficulty, he could have withdrawn — this opinion seems to me more probable: that, the difficulty ceasing, he would be bound to embrace religious life again — and although many authors defend the contrary, several nonetheless... uphold this opinion — St. Thomas (II-II, q. 189, art. 4), Cajetan there, Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 91, citing Navarrus, Covarrubias, Azor, Valentia, Rodríguez, who defends it too), Layman (Bk. IV, tract. 5, ch. 6, n. 42), Pellizzari (Vol. I, tract. 11, ch. 6, n. 11), Candido (s.v. Votum, art. 2, punct. 5, §6, n. 13), Portel (s.v. Votum, n. 21), Toledo (Bk. IV, ch. 17, n. 12), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 1, n. 28), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 51), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, n. 1), Bassaeus (Vol. II, s.v. Votum), Suárez (Vol. III, on Religion, Bk. IV, ch. 4, n. 1), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 20, n. 2), López (Part I, Instructions, ch. 4), and several others.

IX. Question VII. Is one bound by a vow of persevering in religious life, who has been expelled, obliged to preserve chastity while remaining in the world? Response: First of all, if he was expelled without his own fault, it seems certain that he is not bound to preserve chastity — since chastity is not included in the vow of entrance, but only in solemn monastic profession; therefore, since this profession was not made, the vow of chastity does not oblige. This reasoning also establishes that he is not bound to chastity even if he was expelled through his own fault. This opinion is taught by Cajetan (II-II, q. 189, art. 3, ad 2), Armilla (s.v. Votum, n. 21), Navarrus (ch. 12, n. 63 and 45), Azor (Bk. XI, ch. 22, q. 3), Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 16, n. 111), John of St. Thomas (disp. 29, art. 11), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 20), Leander (tract. 1, disp. 21, q. 45). If, however, someone had vowed religious life and chastity simultaneously and principally, he would be bound to chastity, even if he remained in the world — since it did not perish as an accessory, its principal having failed. If, however, one had vowed chastity dependently upon religious life, then, the vow of religious life ceasing, the vow of chastity would likewise cease. When doubt arises as to whether chastity was vowed dependently upon religious life, the intention of the one vowing must be investigated from the words in which the vow was conceived; for from these the doubt arises. If, however, the intention of the one vowing is itself doubted, and cannot be resolved from the circumstances, then the rule must be observed, which asserts that in doubtful matters the safer part is to be chosen.

I. One who vowed religious life absolutely, with no time prefixed, is bound to fulfill his vow as soon as he can conveniently, as is declared (Deut. 23): "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it. And if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin." This too is impressed upon us (Ecclesiastes 5): "If thou hast vowed anything to the Lord, defer not to pay it: for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him." When it is said "as soon as he conveniently can," the sense is by no means that any difficulty whatsoever is sufficient to defer the entrance into religious life; but it indicates that only some grave obstacle can lawfully excuse the delay. For if any difficulty whatsoever sufficed to justify delays, scarcely any time would ever be opportune and fitting for fulfilling the vow. That time, then, is reckoned opportune for the execution of the vow in which the one vowing can, morally speaking — that is, without an urgent and grave impediment — leave the world, and embrace religious life. Just as, then, other indefinite promises made to men oblige to execution at the first opportunity offered, so too it must be said of a promise made to God. For one who has prescribed no time for himself has no reason why he should await a future time; otherwise, once it were granted that he could defer his promise into future time, no time at all could be defined for its execution. This, however, I would not have you take too strictly, so as to reduce the one vowing to straits. But the law "What we say" on solutions must be kept before one's eyes: "'Immediately' is to be understood with the tempering of some allowance of time." Likewise, "at once," "immediately," "continuously," in the law "Since so," on the meanings of words, on obligations. Such adverbs, then, admit some interval of time, which is neither the smallest nor the greatest, but a fitting one. What span, however, is to be called fitting, cannot be absolutely defined, but must be left to the judgment of a prudent man. Now a shorter, now a longer span may be granted, according to the diversity of the circumstances observed. If the matter is conducted in good faith, anyone can most easily define such an interval of time.

II. Question I. Does one bound by a vow of religious life sin mortally if he defers his entrance for an entire year? Response: Some authors, such as Ledesma (Vol. II, tract. 10, ch. 3, dub. ult.), Rodríguez (Vol. II, ch. 95, n. 9), consider that a delay of two or three years is required in a vow of religious life, for it to be called a notable delay, and for the one vowing to sin mortally; but in other vows, such as of fasting, alms, pilgrimage, etc., which do not look to perpetual divine service, they hold that a greater delay of execution is admissible; and that only then does the one vowing sin mortally, when he exposes himself to the danger of not fulfilling the vow. This opinion is too lax.

Although a longer span of time is required in other vows besides religious life, its execution can nonetheless not be deferred, without grave fault, for so long a span without risk to the promise. Authors commonly hold, then, that one bound by a vow of religious life sins mortally, if, opportunity given, he procrastinates the execution of his vow beyond half a year. They permit more time for the execution of other vows, since, in these, less is subtracted from the divine service by delay. If someone protracted their execution beyond a year or two, he would sin mortally, unless grave impediments excused him.

III. Question II. If someone has defined a time for the execution of his vow, is he bound to fulfill his vow within the interval of the prefixed time? Response: All affirm this. The only difficulty that arises is whether, if he foresees an impediment which would render the observance of the vow impossible at the designated time, he is bound to anticipate that time. Authors commonly deny this, and rightly — since a vow does not oblige beyond the intention of the one vowing; but the one vowing did not wish to bind himself before the defined time: therefore he is by no means bound — just as one is not bound to anticipate hearing Mass before a feast day, nor to fast at the time of carnival, even if he foresees impediments by which he would be prevented, both on the feast day, and in Lent, from hearing Mass, and from keeping the fast. Suárez (Vol. II, on Religion, Bk. V, on life, ch. 7, n. 3), Bonacina (Vol. II, disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §1), Castropalao (tract. 15, punct. 14), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 3, n. 33), and others.

IV. Question III. How ought the one vowing to conduct himself in the execution of the vow, if the defined time admits latitude? Response: If someone promised to enter religious life within a year, six months, etc., he is not bound except in the last interval of the designated time. If, however, he should foresee that, in that last space of time, some impediment will befall him, then he ought to anticipate the execution — since the whole designated time is subject to the execution of the vow. Therefore, since he foresees that he cannot fulfill it in this particular determined span of time, he is bound to do so in another. For this very reason the one vowing set for himself a divisible, and extended, span of time, so that, if obstacles should occur in one interval, he might, free from impediments, be able to fulfill his vow in another interval — just as, if someone foresees that he cannot hear Mass around midday on a feast day, he is bound to hear it in the morning: since that whole time is bound to the obligation. So St. Thomas (Bk. IV, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 1, ad 7), Suárez (Vol. III, on Religion, Bk. V, ch. 12, n. 7), Sánchez (ch. 14, n. 18), Bonacina (disp. 4, q. 2, punct. 5, §1, n. 13), the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 3, n. 34), and others commonly.

V. Question IV. One who did not fulfill his vow at the designated time, is he bound to fulfill it once that time has elapsed? Response: The common opinion affirms this — since the definition of the time was established not to extinguish, but to hasten, the obligation. For one who vows the entrance into religious life at a determined time imposes upon himself a twofold burden: the entrance into religious life, and its execution within the bounds of the defined time. This second obligation having been violated, the first still stands. It must be judged otherwise, if you had vowed a fast on the vigil of some solemnity — since it is clear that this fast per se looks to the honor and homage to be offered to God in honor of such a Saint: once that day has passed, then, the end of the vow too will be given up. For the rest, vows which look immediately to the good of the one vowing, once the prefixed time has elapsed, must still be fulfilled. Would you, if you promised your creditor the payment of a debt within a month, be free from paying the debt, because you did not pay within the month? No one would say this. This opinion is common.

VI. Question V. One who vowed religious life for some particular end, or defined it under some condition — is he freed of the obligation of the vow, if the end, or the condition, of the vow ceases? Response: When the condition, or the end, is the whole and sole cause of making the vow, then, the end or condition ceasing, the vow ceases, as all admit. Thus, if you vowed religious life for this reason alone, to avoid the company of such a woman; if this woman should die, you are free from the vow. If you vow religious life, provided you should recover from the illness with which you are constantly afflicted; provided your father should consent, etc. — these conditions failing, you are, with no one dissenting, free of the vow.

VII. Question VI. One bound by a conditional vow, who spontaneously places impediments so that the condition may not occur, does he escape free of the vow? Response: Before I give my answer, conditional vows must be described... since they can be of different kinds. If someone made this vow: "I vow religious life, if I should fall into such a crime" — it is certain that the one vowing escapes free of the vow, if he avoided the crime, although he did not abstain from it with the intention of not fulfilling the vow; since he imposed that vow upon himself by way of a penalty, and what he rationally intended, first of all, was the avoidance of sin. Wherefore, until he falls into sin, he is not bound by the vow. In no way, however, does he sin against the vow, even if he strives to avoid the vow by avoiding sin — since he reserved this right for himself, namely, of using the consideration of the vow, and the burden to be undergone, as a bridle, so that he might the more easily turn aside from sin. In this all agree. The difficulty, rather, concerns vows of this kind: "I vow religious life, if I shall not have committed such-and-such a sin"; and the one vowing afterward, with deliberate mind, falls into the sin, so as to escape free of the vow; "I vow religious life, if I enter such a place, if I recover from illness, if my father consents," etc.; and the one vowing, so that the condition may not occur, removes himself from consent by fraud and deceit — the difficulty, I say, is whether this one vowing, who behaves thus, is freed from the bond of the vow.

VIII. The theologians of Salamanca affirm this (tract. 15, ch. 2, punct. 4, n. 4), and for this opinion they praise Suárez, Bonacina, Layman, Filliucci, and Diana. For, they say, the one vowing intends to bind himself in no other way than with the condition fulfilled: therefore, whatever the manner in which the occurrence of the condition is impeded, the bond of the vow is dissolved — just as, if someone were to travel on foot on a fasting day, so that, exhausted, he might be freed from the law of fasting, or were to deliberately contract an illness, so that in Lent he might escape free of the obligation of fasting, or were to withdraw from a city in which there is an obligation of fasting, with the intention of not fasting, and go to another place where there is no obligation of fasting — he would certainly be free from the observance of the fast. To begin with the refutation of these examples, we say that these examples are altogether inept. One who contracts an illness deliberately is free from the fast, because the effect really renders him incapable of fasting. But one who undertakes a journey on foot, if such exhaustion would not otherwise excuse from fasting, would be bound to fast. Nor is the example of one who declines the obligation of the fast by leaving that place any more to the point. For, even granting this opinion, it would still make him free from the abstinence attached to that place, which does not exist, so as to render him incapable of observing the Lenten fast. The same must be said of one who travels to a place free of that law, so that this example — although we should grant this absolute claim — the example still remains far too removed from the mark, because that law is local; but the vows of which we are now speaking are personal, which affect not a place, but a person. The reasoning, moreover, which they adduce, once the examples are rejected, is by no means solid. Since, although it is true that the one vowing does not otherwise subject himself to the obligation of the vow than with the attached condition fulfilled, this holds true only when the one vowing, in good faith, attaches the condition — that is, when he does nothing so that the condition may not be fulfilled. But if, by fraud and deceit, he strives to impede the condition, he remains nonetheless bound by the vow. To lay the matter out more clearly: in two ways it can be understood that the one vowing does not wish to bind himself by the vow, except with the condition posited: either he intends this while he elicits the vow, or after the vow has been made. Not the first. For who is there who attaches a vow to a condition, and at the same time has the intention of frustrating that condition? "I vow religious life, if I am afflicted with gout" — and at the same time I intend to do all things so as to avoid my health being impeded. "I vow religious life, if my father consents" — yet I do not spare frauds and deceits, so as to remove my father from consent. Would he not be reckoned a fool who made such a vow? It is not to be presumed that any man endowed with reason would make such vows. Is not everyone free either to make, or not to make, a vow? Is not everyone free to have the intention of not attaching a condition, and to abstain from the condition, or to attach the condition? For one who supposes the vow, but does not wish the condition, does not wish the vow — for one who does not wish the vow does not make the vow. No prudent man, then, when he elicits a vow, intends to render the very condition of the vow futile by his own hands. Nor does there seem to be any room for doubt about this. Furthermore, if he attaches the condition to the vow with a sincere mind, and intends to carry out the vow, once the condition is fulfilled, it must already be said that he does not reserve for himself the faculty of impeding the outcome of the condition; otherwise this condition, which he attaches, would be null, as is plain. If, however, after the vow has been made, he reserves for himself the faculty of impeding, or of not carrying out, the condition — this faculty is nowhere apparent, as is clear. From every side, then, the opposite opinion collapses.

IX. We say, then, that the aforesaid one vowing is bound to the execution of his vow, whenever, through his own fault, he has taken care either that the condition should not occur, or that it should occur, against the intention which he had when he made the vow. And we have this expressed in the law "In execution," §ult., "Finally," on the meanings of words, on obligations: "Whoever, bound under a condition, has taken care that the condition not occur, is nonetheless bound." The reasoning, too, from the refutation of the contrary opinion, is manifest. Moreover, no one ought to reap advantage from his own iniquity and fraud; nor is it right that deceit should favor anyone. One who elicits a conditional vow has the tacit will of not impeding the condition to which he attaches the vow. This will once posited, no faculty remains by which that same condition can be frustrated. The supporters of this opinion, alongside those already cited, are Sánchez (Bk. IV, ch. 10, n. 17), Trullench (Bk. II, ch. 2, dub. 19, n. 9), Angles (s.v. Votum), and others. Very much else that would need to be said about this vow we refer to the treatise on the religious state.