Section — Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

On Affiliation to Religious Institutes

¶1.

To n. 303 bis.

Affiliation to a Religious Institute can be twofold. The first affiliation, strictly such, can be had with respect to one Institute by another Institute. And this consists in this: that a Religious Institute depends on another Institute as regards its government and administration, or at least as regards spiritual direction. This affiliation, which is permitted as regards ancient Institutes, as can be seen in the ancient Second Orders and Third Orders, is now altogether prohibited to recent Religious Institutes.

In the Norms of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, June 28, 1901, art. 17, it is said: "Institutes of Sisters dependent on similar Institutes of men of simple vows are not approved in the future, nor Institutes of men having such Institutes of Sisters aggregated to themselves and directed by themselves." And again, art. 52, it is said: "No Institute of religious of simple vows can aggregate to itself a similar Institute of Sisters which depends on it or is directed by it."

The other affiliation, broadly such, is that which is contained in participation of the good works of some Institute. There can indeed be no doubt concerning this participation of good works. The Supreme Pontiff Leo X, Constitution Illius qui caritas est, February 28, 1520, § 5, Bullarium Romanum, vol. 5, p. 741, granted it to the Confraternity of Charity of the City, namely that "whoever belong to the said Confraternity and whoever also are its officials... become participants in the fasts and divine offices and any other spiritual goods whatsoever, wherever in the whole world they are made for the time."

¶2.

And that Regular Prelates also can grant this participation of good works is established by the fact itself. For they often grant it to benefactors, and special letters of affiliation of this kind are had. And a concession is had made by Urban V to the Order of Friars Minor of St. Francis. But Anacletus Reiffenstuel, Theologia Moralis, tract XII, dist. III, question XI, n. 144, says: "Authors note that this concession contains nothing which has not been granted by common law; for by common law every Prelate can already communicate and apply the goods and merits of his subjects to a benefactor."

But can the same thing be done by Superiors of religious men, even lay Institutes, and by Superioresses also of sisters of more recent Institutes of simple vows? There are not lacking those who deny it, or doubt it: because no special or general concession has been made to these by the Holy See, because they do not have spiritual jurisdiction over their subjects by force of their own Religious Institute.

Nevertheless it seems that it must be affirmed. And several Modern Institutes grant this affiliation to their benefactors without any doubt and without any difficulty. Let us undertake an analysis of this affiliation. And first, this is the question clearly enough set forth:

¶3.

Whether benefactors of the aforesaid more recent Institutes can be affiliated to the same, namely so that they may become participants in the good works which are done in the aforesaid Institutes.

As is evident, in this affiliation it is a question of the fruit of the good works of the members, men or sisters, of the Institute. Now this fruit is manifold; and it must soon be spoken of individually, in order to set forth the Response to the proposed Doubt.

First there is the fruit of Indulgences. And the matter is evident, that affiliation to Religious Institutes cannot be extended to Indulgences without a special Apostolic Indult. Nor indeed has the affiliation which in reality is accustomed to be granted to benefactors by these Religious Congregations ever been understood thus, as can be seen in their Diplomas which are given to affiliated benefactors. Cf. also the Norms, art. 16.

There is besides the fruit of merit de condigno, and this fruit also is excluded from that affiliation. For one of the conditions of merit de condigno is that someone merit for himself. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 6.

Besides merit de condigno there is merit de congruo. As is the common opinion, someone can merit de congruo for another. For as the Angelic Doctor says, I-II, q. 114, a. 6: "It is fitting according to the proportion of friendship that God fulfill the will of man in the salvation of another, although sometimes there can be an impediment on the part of him whose justification someone desires." From these last words of the Holy Doctor it is evident that merit of this kind for others is not infallible.

¶4.

Thus on account of ten just men, if they had been found there, the Lord would have spared Sodom and Gomorrah and the neighboring cities. Genesis 18.

Moreover there is another fruit of our good works, namely satisfactory for temporal punishments and impetratory of actual graces. The satisfactory fruit can profit the one working and other living persons by way of payment, and therefore more probably infallibly, by force of the communion of Saints. Likewise the impetratory fruit can without any doubt profit both the one working and other living persons. "For whatever things are undertaken piously and holily by one pertain to all, and charity, which seeks not the things that are its own, effects that they profit them..." Thus the Roman Catechism explains the Communion of Saints, part 1, on the ninth article of the Creed, n. 25.

Prayer remains, concerning which no doubt can be raised. For it is Catholic doctrine that we can pray for ourselves and for others; and therefore render others participants in the impetratory fruit which is proper to prayer. And thus in the last chapter of James we are admonished to pray for one another, that we may be saved. To the same pertains that text of 1 John 5:16: "He who knows his brother to sin a sin not unto death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him who sins not unto death..."

¶5.

But the promise of Christ is altogether universal: Everyone who asks receives... Whatever you shall ask in My name, this I will do. Hence Suarez says: "On account of this the opinion which asserts the promise to be universal seems sufficiently pious and probable, whether one prays for himself or for others.... This infallible impetration is not from justice, but chiefly from mercy and also from simple fidelity."

Therefore, in order that there be participation of the good works of the Religious of some Institute, there is no need of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the one who grants it, nor is there need of some special faculty first obtained from the Holy See; but there is need only of charity, which seeks not the things that are its own, and consequently that someone wish to render others participants in the fruits of his own good works.

Therefore there is no difficulty if the Religious of some Institute consent to that participation, as in reality all consent; nor can any serious difficulty truly be raised concerning that pious will and practice of Religious.

But it is not necessary that each individual Religious in particular manifest his will to the Benefactor. Rather it suffices altogether that the Chapter or the Superior do this, who by force of his economic authority represents the whole Community, nevertheless with this Community knowing and consenting.

¶6.

And thus, if it is a question of the vows of Communities, these are emitted by the Superior of the Community, with the Community consenting. If it is a question of alms to be given for gaining Jubilee, the father of a family can give alms for himself, for his wife, for his children, for his servants; the Superior of a Convent or Monastery can give alms for the whole Convent or Monastery, etc. Therefore, since a Religious Institute is a certain Moral Body, its General Chapter or General Superior, who is its Head, will well be able to grant and communicate to benefactors that participation of the good works of the whole Institute, in the name of the same Institute, knowing and consenting, with the whole Institute, as was said, well willing and approving this; concerning which there can be no question.

Finally, how useful this participation of spiritual goods is, is openly established from the Sacred Scriptures themselves. On account of ten just men, if they had been found there, God would have spared Sodom and Gomorrah and the neighboring cities. Genesis 18. Likewise Matthew 9:2: "Jesus seeing their faith," that is, the faith of those who were offering the paralytic to Him, "said to the paralytic, thy sins are forgiven thee." According to St. Augustine, Sermon 4 on the Saints, St. Stephen impetrated, and in some way merited, the conversion of Saul. Likewise it is known that St. Monica impetrated the conversion of St. Augustine. The assiduous prayer of a just man indeed avails much, as St. James himself asserts in the last chapter of his Catholic Epistle, and St. James speaks explicitly of prayer for others.

¶7.

But impetratory force is properly in prayer, yet it is also in any good work done with the grace of God. For according to the opinion of all the Doctors, good works have meritorious, satisfactory, and impetratory force; and under this impetration is contained also propitiatory force, namely by the impetration of salutary graces.

From these things it is evident that, for making to another a participation in one's own good works, whether it is a question of a physical person or of a moral person or moral body, no special concession to be made by the Holy See, or any spiritual jurisdiction, is truly required. A special concession of the Holy See is certainly required if it is a question, as in the concession made by Leo X, of participation in the good works of all Christ's faithful in the whole world.

This alone can truly make difficulty in the aforesaid affiliation or communication of good works: that in those working there is required the intention of directing their own works to the aforesaid end, since this intention of the end depends only on those working. But for this reason it was said above that the aforesaid affiliation can well be made by the Superior or by the Chapter, with the Community knowing and consenting or approving, namely so that the aforesaid affiliated persons may be able to perceive every fruit from that affiliation; for even if the Community has not in some way been forewarned, some fruit will always come to the affiliated persons, and not a slight one, as will appear more broadly from the things soon to be said.

¶8.

"It is certain by faith that there is given some communication of good works among the faithful, by which they can help one another and give suffrage to one another as regards the impetratory fruit. It is evident from that article of the Apostles' Creed: I believe in the Communion of Saints...

"Moreover, the just faithful can help one another through suffrages for satisfaction for temporal punishment. Thus the certain and common doctrine of Catholics, against the heretics.

"In order that a suffrage have its fruit, three conditions are required on the part of the one offering: I. the state of grace... II. that the one offering have the intention of offering his work for another and of applying the suffrage to him... III. that a work of this kind be of itself satisfactory, that is, have value and price for paying the debt of the one for whom it is offered. And works of this kind generally are three, namely prayer, fasting, and almsgiving, under which all other penal operations are comprehended.

"In order that a suffrage, as regards satisfactory force, have its effect also on the part of him for whom it is offered, three conditions are required: I. that he need suffrage; II. that he be in the state of grace; III. that the sins for which satisfaction is offered have already been remitted as regards fault...

¶9.

"As regards satisfactory force is added, for as regards impetratory force a suffrage can profit even those existing in mortal sin, by meriting and impetrating for them de congruo special helps of grace, by which, inwardly enlightened, they may be converted more quickly to penance and may be preserved from various dangers both of soul and of body..." Thus Anacletus Reiffenstuel, Theologia Moralis, tract XII, dist. III, question XI, n. 133 ff.

And Suarez, in III, tom. 4, disp. 55, sect. 5, says: "Prelates of Religions, whether local, provincial, or general... have the power of granting to some a remission of punishments, by applying to them the good merits and satisfactions of their congregations and making them participants in them, by admitting them to a certain special union with their religions.... For any private person can offer suffrage for another from his own works...

"It must be noted that among suffrages some are offered by way of impetration or of merit de congruo, but others by way of satisfaction or payment... to satisfy for sins already committed... can be done by any private person by his own authority, either for himself, and then it keeps the proper name of satisfaction, or for another living person or departed person on account of the union of charity, and it is called satisfactory suffrage...

¶10.

"When some Religion or its Prelate admits some persons to the fellowship or participation of the works of such a Religion... he admits them to the application of its merits and works, especially by way of impetration. For because, on account of the pious works of the whole Religion, God specially does good to its members, therefore also to all persons specially joined with such a Religion He confers special benefits on account of the same works.

"They can also admit some persons to participation of satisfactory suffrage, if they wish to apply their satisfactions when they make them. In this, nevertheless, it must be noted that an application of this kind always requires the particular will and intention of the individual persons working. Therefore it is not enough that the Prelate of one house, for example, by his intention and will apply for benefactors, or for a benefactor, so much satisfaction, or such a satisfactory work, which is performed by some subject of his; but it is necessary that the subject himself also offer it by his will, either expressly and directly, or by referring his intention to the intention of the Superior.

"The reason is that the will of the superior does not suffice for morally directing another's work, because it is not directly and immediately under his dominion, although he has some right to it; but the proximate one working has his own dominion of that work as regards its use, and therefore the relation to this or that end depends on him. And by the same reason it depends on his intention that the work be satisfactory for this one or for that one.... Wherefore Prelates of Religious act neither rightly nor validly if, in their subjects, they apply their works to others as regards satisfactions; because, morally speaking, the subjects who are ignorant of the Prelate's intention will have another and diverse intention, and that intention will be efficacious as regards the fact...

¶11.

"But someone will say: What fruit, therefore, comes to the faithful... from the fact that they are admitted by Prelates of Religions to the fellowship and participation of the good works of the religion? For if the particular intention and application of individual religious is always necessary, that alone would suffice without such admission or union, and this without the said intention does not suffice; therefore it brings no fruit...

"The answer is... that in three ways suffrage can profit another: by way of satisfaction, by way of direct impetration, and indirectly by way of a certain merit de congruo. Therefore I say that that admission or union first of all profits toward this last manner of fruit, which does not depend on the particular intention of individual persons working; but from this very fact, that someone is in a particular way a member or associate of this religion, the merits of the same religion avail before God, so that by reason of them He confers certain goods by a particular help on persons joined to it, even if those merits are not referred to this end.

"And especially they will have this efficacy if such a person asks something of God on account of the merits of such a religion.... For the prayer will receive greater efficacy from this, that such a person has been more joined to those on account of whose merits he asks; for the reason of friendship demands that on account of friends we do good to others joined to them, even if the friends themselves directly ask nothing...

¶12.

"But it must also be added that it profits toward that fruit which can be obtained directly by proper impetration. For although for this fruit the proper intention of the person praying is necessary, nevertheless the prayer of a just person made for a person joined to him is more efficacious than for a stranger...

"And besides, it profits so that persons so joined become participants in all prayers which are accustomed to be made generally for the religion itself and its members; for they participate in them not only in the former way, or indirectly, but also as regards direct impetration.

"And it is likely that, when these prayers are made by the whole community and as it were in the name of the whole Religion, their effect, even as regards direct impetration, does not depend on the particular intention of the individual members, but that the intention of the Prelates suffices, although if the intentions of the individual members also are added, they would contribute much, other things being equal, to efficacious impetration."

Hence it has already happened that new Religious Institutes also of simple vows have admitted benefactors to the aforesaid participation of their own good works, no previous faculty having been obtained, and no ecclesiastical jurisdiction favoring them, which they altogether lack, as, for example, Institutes of Sisters. Moreover, in the very praised Norms of the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars, which the Sacred Congregation on Religious also now follows, an argument is had for the aforesaid admission. For in art. 51 it is said:

¶13.

"It is not permitted to Congregations of simple vows to aggregate to themselves some third group having the appearance of a third order. NOTHING NEVERTHELESS PREVENTS Congregations of men from attaching to themselves, for the external business of the house, pious men, and Congregations of sisters, pious women, to whom they prescribe a certain form of living and grant participation in the merits of their own Institute."

Therefore, just as nothing prevents admitting to the participation of the good works of an Institute mandataries of this kind, secular persons, outsiders, benefactors; so by parity nothing prevents admitting to the same participation of the good works of the Institute other secular persons, outsiders, benefactors, whether by a gift of money or by services rendered in another way in favor of the Institute. What, for example, can stand in the way of an Institute, by gratitude of soul, admitting to such participation of good works the Cardinal Protector of the Institute, the Cardinal Prefect of the Sacred Congregation on Religious, from whom it obtained various Decrees of Approbation? And let the same be said of others.