Humility

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

I. Notion of Humility. Humility, which seems to be derived from humus, according to the mind of St. Thomas can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man, as one considering his own defect, to moderate the appetite for his own excellence, according to the prescription of reason illumined by faith (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 6, corpus and ad 1).¹ It is said: as one considering his own defect; by these words is understood the consideration by which someone recognizes that he has nothing from himself which is excellent and worthy of honor, but that whatever perfection he possesses is in him from God. Humility imports this consideration presuppositively; formally, however, it is in the appetite, which it restrains lest it tend immoderately toward lofty things (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 6), inclining man to this: that, led by the aforesaid consideration, he embrace the abjection befitting him; indeed, that he subject himself not only in all things to God, but also, according to that which is his own, to every neighbor, with respect to that which is of God in him.

¹ Cf. St. Bernard, De gradibus humilitatis, c. 1, n. 2, beginning (M.P.L. 182, col. 942); Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 133 (t. 6, p. 490); Billuart, diss. 7, a. 4, § 1.

II. Object of Humility. 1. The remote material object is constituted by man himself, insofar as he is worthy of abjection and humiliations are to be imposed upon him; the proximate object is the inclinations of the appetite for one's own excellence.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt proceeding from consideration of one's own defect, for moderating the appetite for one's own excellence; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in this moderation.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed pride, which is an inordinate appetite for one's own excellence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, aa. 1 and 2),¹ by which someone either estimates that he has good from himself; or, although he believes that he has received good from God, ascribes it to his own merits; or boasts that he has a good which he lacks; or desires to seem singularly to have what he has (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 4).² Moreover, it must be observed that "pride is not the same as vain glory, but its cause; for pride inordinately seeks excellence, but vain glory seeks the manifestation of excellence" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 8, ad 4).³ By defect there is opposed excessive self-abjection, by which someone desires vile things not befitting his state and condition.⁴

¹ Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 145 (p. 496).

² Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 146 (p. 496).

³ On pride one should read St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, entire; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, book 5, n. 65 sqq.

⁴ Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 145 (p. 496).

Comparison between Greatness of Soul and Humility.—Greatness of soul and humility are different, but not contrary.

(a) Thus, greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as worthy of great things, when one is indeed worthy of them on account of gifts bestowed by God (Luke, i. 46). Hence, the great of soul put the good above the profitable, they do not busy themselves unduly about lesser things, they are slow to ask and quick to grant favors, they are not outdone in generosity, they are not subservient before the mighty, and they are familiar only with friends. But if they are truly great of soul, they are also humble, knowing that the good is from God, and that of themselves they are weak and sinful.

(b) Greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as superior to lower things, for it makes one loathe anything that would be unbecoming the gifts one has received from God. Hence, as St. Thomas says, the noble character does not flaunt his ideals, nor obtrude himself into places or offices of honor; he does not complain or remember injuries; he is not haughty with inferiors but gentle and considerate with all; in manner he is quiet and unhurried, speaks sincerely, and is not much given either to praise or to blame others. But though the noble person despises all that is petty, he is not proud; and hence he can see the good that is in others, and he reveres those who are superior to himself.

(Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 141-170.)

Definition of Temperance.—Temperance is a moral virtue which regulates according to reason the gratification of the lower pleasures and desires of sense.

(a) It moderates pleasure and desire, and in consequence also the sadness caused by the absence of pleasure. Just as a special virtue (fortitude) is needed to check the strongest of the repelled emotions (fear of death), so likewise a special virtue (temperance) is necessary to bridle the most vehement of the attracted emotions (pleasure and desire).

(b) It moderates sensible pleasure, that is, satisfactions derived from the use of the external senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. Spiritual pleasures, which are derived from the loftier powers of intellect, will and imagination (e.g., from the study of theology, the reading of classical literature, the meeting of mother and child or of friend and friend), have no opposition to reason, except accidentally when a still higher activity which should be exercised is impeded by them. Some of these (such as the pleasures of the intellect) may be called purely spiritual, since they make little or no impression on the sensible appetite; others, on the contrary (such as the pleasures of the will), may be called mixed pleasures, since at times they vehemently excite the sensitive appetite and powerfully affect the body (e.g., mothers have been known to die of joy at the return of a child who was thought to be dead).

(c) Temperance moderates the lower sensible pleasures, that is, the satisfactions caused primarily by touch and taste, and secondarily by other senses, in the activities necessary for preservation of the individual (eating and drinking) and of the race (sexual intercourse). These passions are called the lower, animal, or carnal pleasures, since they are common to man and beast, and are strongly rebellious against reason. The special virtue of temperance is necessary, then, to make man follow reason, not Bacchus or Venus. The higher sensible pleasures, on the other hand, are produced by a sensible object, not on account of any relation to venereal or gustatory delight, but on account of a perfection in the object that makes it suitable to the sense (e.g., the enjoyment derived from beautiful scenery, classical music, fragrant roses, or downy or velvety cloth). The esthete or the connoisseur obtains from these agreeable sensations a pleasure unknown to the animals, and one that is not from its nature refractory to reason nor seductive to carnal excess. Hence, these higher sensual pleasures are not gross, but refined; they should be moderated by prudence, but they are not so dangerous as to demand a special virtue, like temperance, for their regulation. Neither should we class with carnal pleasures the joys of physical well-being, such as the refreshment of sleep, the exhilaration of a sea bath or of a massage, the comfort of a balmy breeze, the ease of strength, or the relaxation of exercise.

The Rule of Moderation.—The rule of moderation which temperance imposes on the carnal appetites is this: “Indulge only as necessity requires and duty allows.” For pleasure is a means whose end is some reasonable need of life, and it is therefore a perversion to make pleasure an end by indulging it apart from need and duty (see 85). But necessity is to be understood broadly, so as to include not only the essentials, but also the conveniences of life (e.g., seasonings and desserts with food).

(a) As to venereal pleasures, then, the rule means that they should not be used outside matrimony, nor in matrimony except for the procreation of children and the other lawful ends of marriage.

(b) As to the pleasures of the table, they should not be indulged except for the benefit of mind and body, and in such manner, quantity, quality, etc., as this purpose requires. But one may regulate one’s food or drink by the higher purpose of mortification, and partake of less than the body demands here and now.

The Excellence of Temperance.—(a) Temperance is among the four principal or cardinal virtues. It keeps in order one of the passions that is most natural and most necessary for the present life, and among the virtues it excels in the quality of moderation, since it chastens the inclination that is hardest to hold within bounds, and guards the senses, the gateways of the soul (see 2441). “Wisdom teaches temperance, prudence, justice and fortitude, than which there is nothing more useful in life” (Wis., viii. 7).

(b) In its nature temperance is not the chief but the least of the moral virtues. For justice and bravery are of greater service to the common welfare, and the good of the multitude, as Aristotle remarks, is more divine than the good of the individual. But in accidental respects temperance has a superiority; for it is more tender and graceful than fortitude, more arduous than justice, and there is perhaps no other virtue whose exercise is so constantly called for.

The Parts of Temperance.—(a) The subjective parts or species of temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue. These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink; the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act (copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts (kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy) and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement). Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues. They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four: humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

Humility.—Humility is the virtue that makes one modest in the desire of greatness.

(a) It is a virtue, that is, a moral excellence and a voluntary disposition. Hence, it is not the same as physical humility (e.g., the humble or lowly circumstances in which a person was born) or as involuntary humility (e.g., the humiliation which comes upon those who exalt themselves).

(b) It is concerned with greatness, that is, with the higher things that pertain to greatness of soul (see 2448 sqq.). There is no opposition between these two virtues, for greatness of soul makes one set such a value upon the gifts one has received from God as to aspire to the betterment for which they prepare one, while humility makes one realize one’s own shortcomings so sincerely that it keeps one from the desire of those excellences for which one is unsuited.

(c) It is modest; that is, it regulates according to the standard of reason the passion for greatness, so that one may avoid the extremes of pride and of abjectness or littleness of soul (see 2465 c).

The Three Acts of Humility.—(a) Its regulatory act is in the intellect, and consists in the knowledge and acknowledgment of one’s infirmity and inferiority, not only in comparison with God, but also in comparison with men.

(b) Its essential act is in the appetite and consists in a regulation of the hope for greatness so that, recognizing one’s limitations, one does not strive for that for which one is unfitted. Higher degrees of humility are those which do not desire honor, or which are pained by it, or which desire dishonor.

(c) Its expressive act is in the external conduct. St. Benedict says that the humble person avoids singularity in deed, is sparing in his words and not given to loudness, and bears himself modestly, not staring about or laughing immoderately. But there is also a false humility, which is only in externals, and this is really proud hypocrisy (Ecclus., xix. 23).

Two Requirements of Humility.—Humility is chiefly an abasement of self before God (Gen., xviii. 27), and it is not opposed to truth or to good order. Hence, the two following rules on the lowering of self before fellow-creatures:

(a) in the internal act, humility requires that each one acknowledge his neighbor as his better, if comparison is made between what the former has from himself and what the latter has from God (Phil., ii. 3; Osee, xiii. 9). But it is not against humility to believe that one has more of divine grace or less of human imperfection than another, if there are good reasons for the belief (Eph., iii. 5; Gal., ii. 15);

(b) in the external act, humility requires that one show proper signs of respect to one’s betters. But of persons who are in authority St. Augustine says that, while before God they should prostrate themselves at the feet of all, before man they should not so demean themselves to inferiors as to detract from their dignity or authority. Like the other virtues, humility must be guided in its manifestations by prudence as to place, time, and other circumstances.

The Excellence of Humility.—(a) Humility is inferior to the theological virtues, which tend immediately to the end itself, and also to the intellectual virtues and legal justice, which rightly dispose mind and will about the means to that end. Humility and the remaining virtues incline one to follow the direction of mind and will, but with this difference that, while humility makes one ready for submission in all that is right, temperance, fortitude and the rest prepare one for submission only in some one or other particular matter. To these latter virtues, then, humility is superior.

(b) Humility is the groundwork of the spiritual edifice negatively or indirectly; for, since God resists the proud and gives grace to the humble (James, iv. 6), the obstacles to the other virtues are removed by humility. But it is faith which positively and directly places the cornerstone of the spiritual life, for faith is the first approach towards God: “He who would come to God must believe” (Heb., xi. 6).

What is pride? "Pride is named from this, that someone by will tends above that which he is." Whence it is clear that it is a sin. Insofar as it is an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence, it is a special sin. But insofar as all vices can arise from it, because to one's own excellence "there can be ordered everything which someone inordinately desires"; and because "man through pride contemns the divine law, by which he is prohibited from sinning," it has a certain generality, or is a general sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 162, aa. 1, 2, 7, 8. - Hence the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 4; q. 162, a. 8, posits pride not as a capital vice, but as the queen of all vices; and he posits vainglory as the capital vice, which arises immediately from it.

Commonly, however, pride is constituted as a capital vice. Pride by its genus is a mortal sin. For "pride is opposed to humility. But humility properly regards the subjection of man to God. Hence, on the contrary, pride properly regards the defect of this subjection, according namely as someone exalts himself above what is fixed for him according to the divine rule or measure.... But it is manifest that this very thing, namely not to be subject to God, has the account of mortal sin; for this is to be turned away from God." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 162, a. 5.

"And therefore to be turned away from God and his precepts, which is as a consequence in other sins, per se pertains to pride, whose act is contempt of God." S. Th. l. c., a. 6. Moreover, when the aforesaid aversion and contempt cease, and there is had only a certain inordinate movement toward one's own excellence, by willing to excel above equals, pride is had only improperly so called, and it is venial, unless it is done with notable contempt of others, by taking pleasure in their abasement before oneself. But there would be no disorder if someone wished from an honorable motive to excel above inferiors. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77, aa. 4, 5; q. 84, a. 2; L. 65.

If someone has received a depraved book lent by another to be read, can he restore it to the owner? - R. Negatively, unless prudent fear of some grave inconvenience persuades otherwise. This flows of its own accord from the obligation of impeding the sins of others by reason of charity, when this can be done without grave inconvenience. But it is to be judged a grave inconvenience if you fear grave quarrels, blasphemies, hatreds, and other things of this sort from the owner.

1079. (A) The genuine concept. Humility is a virtue which checks the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence, and inclines a man to acknowledge his own lowliness according to truth.

³ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, p. III, ch. 4-7; Olier, Introduction, ch. 5; the pious author of the work Formation a l'humilite, Paris, 1902.

(a) I say according to truth; for there are some who think humility consists in fictitiously exaggerating our defects, or diminishing our endowments, and in fleeing every honor and glory. This indeed is false; for true virtue cannot be an enemy of truth. It does indeed repress the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence, according to what was said above, n. 514; but it by no means forbids us gladly to acknowledge the natural and supernatural goods which God has bestowed on us: to be unwilling to acknowledge them is not humility, but ingratitude. - Nor likewise is it forbidden to seek some honor or glory, provided it be sought with God, according to His good pleasure and according to our merits. Thus Christ said of Himself:⁸ "I have glorified Thee on the earth... And now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which I had, before the world was, with Thee." Nor otherwise did the Blessed Virgin say:⁹ "For behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed, because He that is mighty hath done great things to me." Paul indeed says: "Let no man therefore glory in men";¹⁰ but before this he had said: "He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord";¹¹ and he himself expected the crown of justice "which the Lord the just judge will render to me in that day."¹²

⁸ John 17:4-5.

⁹ Luke 1:48-49.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. 3:22.

¹¹ 1 Cor. 1:31.

¹² 2 Tim. 4:8.

1080. (b) But in order that we may estimate ourselves and our endowments according to truth, to God first of all must be attributed whatever proceeds from Him. Now the Apostle testifies that all natural and supernatural endowments which are in us are from God:¹³ "What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received?" - We do indeed have good works and merits; but these must be attributed primarily to God, although they are truly ours, since we have existence, faculties, the power of meriting, and the divine help necessary for merit only from the Lord; therefore concerning these we can glory only in the Lord, and the chief part of the glory must be rendered back to God. - Moreover we have sinned, and under this title we deserve ignominy and confusion before God and men.

¹³ 1 Cor. 4:7.

1081. (c) If we compare ourselves with our neighbor, we ought first to admire and esteem the gifts, both natural and supernatural, granted to him by God: if greater gifts are seen in him than in us, we ought gladly to acknowledge his superiority. Furthermore, if he has committed lesser sins than we have, he is worthy of lesser ignominy, and under this title it is necessary to confess that we ourselves are inferior. But because we are prone to magnify our own endowments and to diminish the qualities of others, equity demands that we guard ourselves in our judgments against this unjust propensity. Nor must this be passed over: often there are hidden defects in us and hidden qualities in others, so that it is not lawful, on account of manifest things alone, to prefer oneself to others; therefore the neighbor is wisely presumed to be better than he appears: "In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves."¹⁴

¹⁴ Phil. 2:3.

To the point Augustine says:¹⁵ "This also must be considered, that there is no man who cannot have some good which thou dost not yet have, even if it lies hidden, in which without doubt he can be superior to thee. This thought avails for crushing and taming pride, lest thou think that, because certain goods of thine stand out and appear, therefore another has none hidden, and perhaps goods of greater weight by which, while thou dost not know it, he surpasses thee."

¹⁵ St. Augustine, Quaestiones 83, q. 71, n. 5, P. L., XL, 82.

1082. (B) Concerning the chief acts of humility. (a) The humble man acknowledges himself to be nothing before God: for just as a little drop of water is said to be nothing when compared with the ocean, so our being, compared with the divine, can be held as nothing: "All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to Him as nothing, and vanity."¹⁶ Moreover he confesses that whatever good is in him ultimately proceeds from God, in the sense explained above, n. 1080.

¹⁶ Isa. 40:17.

(b) He further confesses himself to be a sinner, and under this title to be worthy of contempt, especially if he has sinned lethally (above, n. 463).

(c) He judges himself unworthy of all the gifts of God, and of himself unfit for every good work, especially supernatural work. For since by sin he has offended God, he has incurred His wrath and indignation, and therefore is unworthy of His benefits. On the other hand, by his own powers, without divine concurrence, he can do nothing good, especially in the supernatural order, according to that saying:¹⁷ "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God."

¹⁷ 2 Cor. 3:5; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 6, ad 1.

1083. (d) He is not puffed up in prosperity, nor cast down in adversities; for he knows that prosperous events, and also adverse ones, are wisely ordered by God according to His good pleasure, and do not ultimately depend on us. Wherefore with all his powers he indeed strives to act well, so as to please God: if things turn out prosperously, he returns praises to God; if unfortunately, he patiently bears the humiliation taken from this: "I know both how to be humbled, I know also how to abound..."¹⁸ "In all things we suffer tribulation, but are not distressed; we are straitened, but are not destitute; we suffer persecution, but are not forsaken; we are cast down, but we perish not."¹⁹ Indeed he receives humiliations gladly, as means for obtaining grace and glory from God: "And do ye all insinuate humility one to another; because God resisteth the proud, but to the humble He giveth grace. Be you humbled therefore under the mighty hand of God, that He may exalt you in the time of visitation; casting all your solicitude upon Him, for He hath care of you."²⁰

¹⁸ Phil. 4:12.

¹⁹ 2 Cor. 4:8-9.

²⁰ 1 Pet. 5:5-7.

1084. (e) Wherefore, impelled by love of truth, he does not desire to be made great or to be praised by others, judging that this belongs not to himself but to God, from whom all good things proceed: for a picture or statue does not deserve praise, but the artist. Therefore if he sees himself honored by others, he does not keep the honor for himself, but refers it to God, to whom alone are honor and glory: "Not to us, O Lord, not to us; but to Thy name give glory."¹ - Where the will of God and an undertaken duty do not demand the contrary, he flees honors and chooses the lowest place. For Christ taught this by word and example:² "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they that have power over them are called beneficent. But you not so: but he that is the greater among you, let him become as the younger; and he that is the leader, as he that serveth. For which is greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? Is not he that sitteth at table? But I am in the midst of you as he that serveth." When, by force of office and duty, he must receive honors, he is not puffed up by them, but receives them as one bearing the place of God.

¹ Ps. 113:1.

² Luke 22:25-27; cf. John 13:15-16; Matt. 23:12.

(f) Indeed, since he is conscious of his own lowliness and of the sins which he has committed, he sincerely desires, as far as lies in him, to be despised by others; for he desires to be esteemed by others as he knows himself to be according to truth. Yet prudence often demands that we not disclose our defects to others, lest perhaps we lose that good esteem which we need for rightly fulfilling our duties.

1085. (g) The saints, comparing themselves with others, generally judge themselves more vile and worse than all; for this is the character of humility, to look in ourselves upon the defects which proceed from us, and in others upon the endowments which are from God. Wherefore they leave the better things to others, but seek the baser things for themselves. - Yet the truly humble man generally does not vilify himself by words, nor deliberately seek to be vilified by others; but he is silent concerning himself, loving to be unknown and to be counted as nothing. Besides, as St. Thomas says,³ "in the exterior acts of humility, as also in the acts of the other virtues, due moderation must be employed, lest they be able to turn to the detriment of another."

³ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 3, ad 3.

1086. (C) Concerning the excellence of humility. (a) Some so extol humility that they seem to prefer it to the other virtues. This, however, is not agreeable to truth. For certainly the theological virtues, by which we tend directly to God, are more excellent; more excellent is the virtue of religion, by which we profess the excellence of God and render Him due worship. It is also commonly taught that prudence is more excellent than humility, because it is more universal and necessary. But it seems more excellent than the other moral virtues. For humility subjects man to the order of reason and to the divine law with respect to all things, while other virtues do so only with respect to some special matter;⁴ for he who is humble by that very fact gladly acknowledges the supreme dominion of God, and is prepared to obey Him in all things. Moreover it is of no little profit for the practice of the theological virtues, because it removes pride, which most harms these virtues.

⁴ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 5.

(b) In truth humility is deservedly held as the foundation of many virtues, their mother and nurse, insofar as it is necessary for acquiring and retaining them.

To the point Augustine says:⁵ "Dost thou wish to be great? Begin from the least. Dost thou think to construct a great building of height? First think of the foundation of humility. And how great a mass of building each one wills and disposes to place above, the greater the building will be, the deeper he digs the foundation... But because the summit is great, think of the foundation. What foundation, thou askest? Learn from Him, because He is meek and humble of heart. Dig this foundation of humility in thyself, and thou shalt come to the summit of charity." - For he who cultivates humility renounces inordinate love of self, which is the greatest impediment of Christian perfection; he easily subjects his mind to God through faith, charity, and obedience; and, since he judges himself inferior to others, he cultivates love toward the neighbor without difficulty; the same can be said of many other virtues.

⁵ St. Augustine, Sermo 69, n. 2, P. L., XXXVIII, 441 sq.

Therefore it is of the greatest importance to cultivate humility assiduously, either by taming pride through the means explained above, n. 519, or by eliciting the acts described above, n. 1082.

I. Notion of the virtue. Humility is a special virtue annexed to Temperance or Modesty, by which man, considering that he has received all things and his very being from God, moderates the appetite of his own excellence according to divine ordination.

By this definition we indicate the logical place of humility, its root or foundation, its object, and its proper honorableness. A few things concerning each.

1. Logical place. It is annexed to Temperance, not because it has its principal seat in the sensible appetite, or because its proper object is concupiscence of the lower appetite, but because it has the mode of temperance, i. e. the repression of some appetite easily becoming insolent. It is annexed to Modesty, because modesty is placed under temperance as generally moderating those things which are less difficultly restrained; but the appetite which humility regards has lesser parts in sense, and needs not only a bridle but also a spur.

2. Root or foundation. In every rational inclination a certain truth shines before the mind, which is the principle of the practical judgment that gives to the obedient will its present inclination. Now the humble man uses, as foundation and guide, this truth, that he has received nothing from himself, but all good things from God gratuitously giving. All good things, I say, even existence itself. "But what do you have that you have not received?" St. Paul asked, 1 Cor. 4:7. "Why ... do you glory as though you had not received?" He who has received all things is, in himself, nothing.

Wherefore St. Bernard (On the Degrees of Humility, c. 1) used to say that humility is the virtue "by which someone, by a most true knowledge of himself, becomes vile to himself." Yet we prefer to place the formal root of humility, rather than in one's own nothingness itself, in the origin of every good from God. For consideration of nothingness, as such, can lead to various pursuits but to no definite one per se. For from this you can be moved to sadness or despair; from this also to unbridled ambition of obtaining what you do not have; from this also to impatience, anger, and cursing. Besides, since all men, by the same consideration, are equally reduced to nothingness, there is no reason for relative humility by which one shows himself inferior to another. Therefore as long as you do not think back upon all things as freely given by God, you have no foundation of humility. Formerly indeed, he who professed himself to be and to be worth nothing tacitly testified to divine benignity in him. (Cf. what is said by Lessius, Virt. card., L. IV, c. 4, n. 53). But because today not a few profess lowliness with an entirely different spirit and persuasion, it seemed more opportune to indicate expressly the formal reason of the consideration.

3. Object. We say the object is the appetite of one's own excellence. Appetite signifies the impulse of a natural inclination. One's own excellence is almost the same as "superiority," i. e. the quality, merit, perfection of the subject, considered less in itself than insofar as it gives some relative preeminence. Moreover humility moderates or checks that appetite. But excellence is an arduous good; and, for the greatest part, the appetite of excellence is spiritual. Wherefore the seat of humility is the irascible appetite and the will (cf. 2, 2, q. 162 art. 3, ad 3). Thus the same virtue, considered according to its mode, which is the repression of some impulse, is ascribed to the concupiscible appetite; but, with attention to its object, it pertains to the irascible appetite and the will.

4. Proper honorableness or norm of moderation. We say that moderation is done according to divine ordination. Certainly, in some way, the divine will is the rule of every just moderation. But when there is question, for example, of temperance, the need of the subject manifests this divine will to us. Here, however, since the circumstances on account of which excellence varies among men are for the greatest part hidden from us, and it is not in our power to acquire this or that excellence, we are ruled more immediately, in desiring excellence, by the divine will alone. Our will is less actively regulating under the divine will. After it has excluded illicit arts, it ought to await excellence from God almost as a poor man awaits food from a rich man. That is, through endowments, faculties, circumstances, and fates, God leads us as if by the hand and permits access to this or that excellence to us. But humility, by consideration of our dependence on God and gratitude, willingly embraces that divine ordination and thus moderates the appetite itself. Wherefore, in tractate 25 on John, n. 16 (P. L. 35, 1604), St. Augustine says: "Pride does its own will, humility does the will of God." Hence, On the City of God, L. 14, c. 28 (P. L. 41, 436), suggests to us this definition of humility: "it is love of God even unto contempt of self." But St. Bernard, sermon 26 de diversis (P. L. 183, 610), says: "The sum of all humility seems to consist in this, if our will is subject to the divine will as is fitting." This also is inculcated more than once by St. Thomas (2, 2, q. 161, art. 3, c. Cf. art. 1 ad 5; 2, ad 3; 4, sed contra; q. 162 art. 5; art. 6, c.).

II. Excellence of the virtue. From this it is understood in what way, according to St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 161 art. 5, the virtue of humility can claim for itself the first place after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues, and after justice, especially legal justice. But effectively, while it removes every rebellion against grace radically, it closes the way to every sin, and opens it to every virtue (cf. 2, 2, q. 161 art. 6 ad 2). Because it fosters the affection which befits a creature, it is a certain practical adoration by which the divine Majesty is adored by most diverse acts. Wherefore St. Augustine could write: "Humility is almost the one Christian discipline." (Sermon 351, III, 4; P. L. 39, 1538. 1539. Cf. also On Virginity, c. 31: "Against pride, the mother of envy, the whole Christian discipline chiefly fights." P. L. 40, 413).

Humility thus fully understood can also be called a certain justice toward God, rendering more perfectly to God what is His. Under this respect it can be annexed to the virtue of justice.

You will ask how humility also subjects us to other men?

Resp. It effects this, because, according to divine ordination, our excellence has this mode, that many surpass us simply, while all possess some divine gift which we ought to put before our own defect. (Cf. 2, 2, q. 161 art. 3, c.).

Christian perfection of the virtue. Christian humility is perfected by contempt of earthly sublimity, which is done according to divine ordination. For this is perpetual, that positive mortification is most apt for tempering an appetite which easily becomes excessive. But earthly sublimity is that which by its external splendor most greatly allures the senses and excites the impulse of passion. Therefore contempt of it has the strongest force for firming humility. Besides, through that contempt there is almost removed the difficulty which man experiences in assenting to the divine will when it excludes or prohibits him from a higher place. Yet only earthly sublimity can be contemned; for exaltation is promised to the humble themselves; and because Christ humbled Himself unto death, therefore God exalted Him (Phil. 2:9). And contempt itself of earthly sublimity must be done according to divine ordination, since the supreme rule of humility is the divine good pleasure, and because for the common good it is necessary that there be various orders, and that some preside and others be subject. God could not approve absolute contempt of human excellence.

But this perfection is Christian, both because it is inculcated in the sacred letters of the New Testament; and because outside Christianity it is unknown; and because through the grace of Christ alone can man carry off that victory over himself.

Moreover this perfection is cultivated both by religious obedience and by voluntary poverty.

By the name of religious obedience there is commonly understood, materially, a certain rather universal abdication of one's own choice and an enslavement into the hands of another by whom the religious is governed. But formally it is done for worshipping God; i. e. in the way of pursuing perfection and exercising charity, the religious seeks a more perfect adaptation to the divine will, while, free from the deception of self-love, he hands himself over to be governed by a legitimate Superior, who at the same time, prudently chosen, tacitly promises him that he will be a master of perfection and head of the work of charity.

But by voluntary poverty, one strips away the foods of vain glory which is contrary to humility.

Opposite vices. They are: pride, or the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence; also empty glory, which too greatly desires the manifestation of excellence, seeking a certain ostentation of endowments whence glory may result among men. Concerning these vices something has been said in volume I, nn. 467. 469.

In this way one sins against humility by excess. But by defect the vicious propensities opposed to humility are both timidity, by which someone, through fear of danger or difficulty, or by fear and sloth, and pusillanimity, by which someone, by flight from labor and narrowness of mind, does not dare those things which, according to divine ordination, are in his power.

I. Humility is a special virtue, annexed to Temperance or Modesty, by which man, considering that he has received all things and his very being from God, moderates the appetite of his own excellence according to divine ordination.

It is a special virtue, because it presides over a special inclination to be restrained, toward following great and glorious things.

It is annexed to Temperance, not because it has its principal seat in the sensible appetite, or because its proper object is concupiscence of the lower appetite, but because it has the mode of temperance, i. e. the repression of some appetite.

Since, however, excellence is an arduous good, its appetite postulates not only inhibition but also the virtue which impels man, according to right reason, toward pursuing truly great things.

It is annexed to Modesty, because Modesty is placed under Temperance as generally moderating those things which are less difficultly restrained, and humility regards an appetite which has lesser parts in sense and which needs not only a bridle but also a spur.

But insofar as humility subjects man to God, it is referred to religion and becomes a potential part of justice.

Since the mean of this virtue cannot be taken from a definite measure known to us, but requires attention to many circumstances, especially varied and uncertain to us, we are ruled more immediately by the divine will in desiring excellence, so that for this reason that appetite is said to be moderated according to divine ordination.

But we are most greatly adapted to that norm by consideration of our dependence on God in every positive good and in the benefit itself of existence.

II. The seat of humility is at the same time the will and the irascible appetite.

III. According to St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 161 art. 5, the virtue of humility can deservedly claim for itself the first place after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues, and after justice, especially legal justice; and as contrary to pride, it removes all things which obstruct perfection.

IV. But humility acquires Christian perfection in contempt of earthly sublimity, if that contempt itself is done according to divine ordination.

That perfection is cultivated eminently both by religious obedience and by religious poverty: religious obedience, insofar as the religious pursues perfect adaptation to the divine will through obedience; religious poverty, insofar as through it the religious removes from himself the foods of vain glory.

V. One sins against humility by excess through pride and presumption, through vain glory and ambition; but by defect through timidity and pusillanimity, i. e. through vices which are opposed to fortitude and magnificence, so that someone refuses to tend toward that which is proportioned to his power and truly desirable (2, 2, q. 133 art. 1).

712. Humility, insofar as it is a moral virtue, can be defined: the virtue which restrains the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence and inclines a man rightly to acknowledge his own mean condition on account of his subjection toward God; or more briefly: "the virtue by which someone, considering his own defect, holds himself among the lowliest according to his own mode."¹³⁹⁸

Duties. Humility principally has two duties: 1. to repress the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence. It by no means prevents us from gladly acknowledging, notwithstanding humility, the goods, whether natural or supernatural, which God has bestowed upon us. Nor does humility prohibit every appetite for glory; whence the Blessed Virgin, who certainly was most humble, exclaimed: "For behold from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed, because he that is mighty hath done great things to me."¹³⁹⁹ 2. To subject oneself to God by acknowledging that all goods proceed from God. Whence St. Thomas teaches:¹⁴⁰⁰ "Humility, according as it is a special virtue, principally regards the subjection of man to God, for whose sake he also subjects himself to others by humbling himself." Humility presupposes a vivid knowledge of one's own defects; and this knowledge is called by St. Bernard humility of cognition.¹⁴⁰¹ For man of himself is nothing and is laden with sins of every kind; but all goods whatsoever proceed from God. Therefore St. Paul says: "For if any man think himself to be something, whereas he is nothing, he deceiveth himself."¹⁴⁰² Essentially, however, humility consists in the appetite, which it moderates lest it be borne inordinately toward high things.

St. Thomas comprehends the whole doctrine concerning the essence of humility in the following few words: "Humility consists essentially in the appetite, insofar as someone restrains the impulse of his soul lest it tend inordinately toward great things; but it has its rule in cognition, namely, that someone not esteem himself to be above that which he is; and the principle and root of each is the reverence which someone has toward God."¹⁴⁰³

Certain saints, from humility, thought themselves worse than all other men. But in order that this may be immune from falsity, two things must be considered in every man, namely, that which is God's and that which is man's. Whatever is defective and sinful is man's; but every perfection is God's. Therefore a man, comparing in himself those things which are his own with the goods which others have from God, ought to judge himself worse than they. Likewise he can and ought to think that another man would have cooperated better with the graces received than he himself has. Finally, he can suppose that in another man there are many unknown goods. On account of these considerations a man can subject himself inwardly to any other person; but outwardly prelates and persons constituted in dignity ought not to subject themselves to inferiors.¹⁴⁰⁴

¹³⁹⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 161, a. 1, ad 1.

¹³⁹⁹ Luke 1:48 ff.

¹⁴⁰⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 161, a. 1, ad 5.

¹⁴⁰¹ De adventu Domini, sermon 4, n. 4: "Humility is twofold: one of cognition, the other of affection" (Migne, Patr. lat. 183, 48).

¹⁴⁰² Gal. 6:3.

¹⁴⁰³ S. theol., l.c., a. 6.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., a. 3.

713. Necessity. Humility is a very necessary virtue; indeed, it is the foundation of the moral life, not indeed in the sense that it excels all the other virtues - for this is false, since the theological virtues are more excellent and more necessary - but insofar as it removes pestiferous pride, which impedes the efficacy of divine grace. Whence St. Augustine beautifully writes:¹⁴⁰⁵ "Provide for thyself no other way for attaining and obtaining truth than that which was provided by him who, as God, saw the infirmity of our steps. That way is, first, humility; second, humility; third, humility; and as often as thou shouldst ask, I would say this, not because there are no other precepts which may be named, but because, unless humility precede, accompany, and follow all things whatsoever that we do well, and be set before us, that we may look upon it, and set beside us, that we may cleave to it, and set over us, that we may be restrained by it, pride, when we now rejoice over some good deed, wrests the whole from our hand. For the other vices are to be feared in sins, but pride is to be feared even in things rightly done, lest those things which were laudably done be lost through the desire of praise itself."

The Angelic Doctor clearly explains how humility and faith are the foundation of the spiritual life:¹⁴⁰⁶ "The first [foundation] in the acquisition of virtues can be taken in two ways: in one way, by way of removing that which prohibits; and thus humility holds the first place, insofar, namely, as it expels pride, which God resists, and renders man subject and open to receiving the influx of divine grace. Whence it is said that 'God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble.'¹⁴⁰⁷ And according to this humility is called the foundation of the spiritual edifice. In another way, something is first in the virtues directly, through which, namely, approach to God is now made. But the first approach to God is through faith, according to this: 'For he that cometh to God must believe.'¹⁴⁰⁸ And according to this, faith is posited as the foundation in a nobler manner than humility."

¹⁴⁰⁵ Epistle 118 (otherwise 56) to Dioscorus, n. 22 (Migne, Patr. lat. 33, 442).

¹⁴⁰⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 161, a. 5, ad 2.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Jas. 4:6.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Heb. 11:6.

714. Degrees. There are three degrees of humility, which St. Bernard elegantly expresses thus: "One humility is sufficient, another abundant, another superabundant. Sufficient: to be subject to a greater and not to prefer oneself to an equal. Abundant: to be subject to an equal and not to prefer oneself to a lesser. Superabundant: to be subject to a lesser."¹⁴⁰⁹

The following acts of humility are enumerated: contempt of oneself; to account oneself unworthy of the gifts of God; not to desire to be esteemed great; to desire to be held as lowly; to subject oneself to God and to men on account of God; in external things and functions to embrace that which is more abject, unless the contrary is necessary.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Sententiae S. Bernardi, n. 37 (Migne, Patr. lat. 183, 755).

715. Opposed vices. Opposed to humility by excess is inordinate self-abjection, which is the inordinate renunciation of one's own honor and reputation and is therefore done with neglect of one's duty;¹⁴¹⁰ but by defect, pride, which is the inordinate appetite for one's own excellence. Pride is called an appetite because, although it presupposes an act of the intellect, namely, an excessive estimation of one's own merits, nevertheless it formally consists in the appetite for one's own personal excellence. For pride seeks the exaltation of one's own person, and by this it is distinguished from ambition, presumption, and vainglory. For ambition concerns honors and dignities; presumption seeks excellence in works; and vainglory, finally, seeks excellence in reputation and external glory. St. Gregory¹⁴¹¹ enumerates four species of pride, namely: 1. when someone thinks that he has goods from himself; 2. when someone thinks that he has goods indeed from God, but from his own merits; 3. when someone arrogates to himself goods which he does not possess; 4. when someone, despising others, wills to be preferred to them more than is fitting.

How pride manifests itself outwardly is beautifully explained by St. Thomas.¹⁴¹² Just as the essence of humility consists in due subjection to God, so the essence of pride is situated in the refusal of that subjection. Hence also the malice of pride is manifest, which is the graver, the greater that rebellion against God is. From these things there also shines forth the gravity of the first sin of our first parents and of the devil. Pride, as just explained, is called by St. Thomas and St. Gregory the Great the queen of all vices, because it truly commands all the vices and can induce to all vices. Wherefore it is also easily understood that God must resist the proud and withdraw his grace from them.¹⁴¹³ We treated pride more broadly above in the tract on the capital vices, I, n. 409.

¹⁴¹⁰ Selbstwegwerfung [self-abjection].

¹⁴¹¹ Moral. l. 23, c. 7.

¹⁴¹² S. theol., l.c., q. 162, a. 4, ad 4.

¹⁴¹³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 162, a. 6, ad 3.

S. Th. II-II, q. 161.

1041. Humility is said from humus, and humble as if inclined to the ground or near it; hence physically it is the state of that which clings to the ground and scarcely rises above it (nederigheid); metaphorically it is a low and needy condition. Morally it is taken for every lowering to things low, whether it is done from without, namely by another against the will of him who is lowered, and then it is a punishment (vernedering); or from within, and then it can be either contrary to reason (laagheid) or according to right reason, when someone voluntarily lowers himself from consideration of his defects, in which case it is a virtue (ootmoedigheid). Hence it is defined: "the virtue by which someone, considering his defect, holds himself in low things according to his mode" (a. 1, ad 1), or a virtue moderating the appetite lest it tend immoderately into high things, that is, into those things which are above itself. Somewhat more fully: the virtue which restrains the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence lest it tend immoderately to high things, and inclines man to acknowledging his own baseness (or nothingness) according to truth.

It differs from magnanimity a) by reason of the act: magnanimity primarily tends to high things, secondarily restrains the soul lest it tend to them contrary to right reason; humility does not impel the soul to high things but on the contrary restrains it; but virtues are distinguished according to their primary act; b) by reason of the formal motive: the magnanimous man restrains the soul from high things by considering that they exceed his condition or powers, even according to the gifts which he possesses from God; the humble man does so according to consideration of his own defect, which is from himself (q. 129, a. 3, ad 4). And so humility presupposes that which belongs to magnanimity but adds something beyond, because it does not hope even for things commensurate except as exceeding his dignity, and as to be acquired and preserved only through that which is of God. "And therefore concerning the appetite of arduous good a twofold virtue is necessary. One indeed which tempers and restrains the soul lest it tend immoderately into high things, and this pertains to the virtue of humility. But another which strengthens the soul against despair and impels it to the pursuit of great things according to right reason, and this is magnanimity" (a. 1).

1042. Humility is a virtue, because it moderates the appetite tending to the great and arduous according to right reason. Hence it is in the irascible appetite, because it is concerned with arduous good, and principally in the will when it concerns a spiritual excellent good; it presupposes cognition of one's own defect, as the rule directing the appetite, and thus is in the cognitive power and in reason as in the rule directing the appetite (a. 2). Its foundation, namely, is knowledge of oneself, which is especially acquired by the comparison of our littleness with the infinite perfection of God; hence Bernard says: it is the virtue by which someone, by a most true knowledge of himself, becomes vile to himself. And so "humility consists essentially in the appetite, according as someone restrains the impulse of his soul, lest it tend inordinately to great things; but it has its rule in cognition, namely that someone not judge himself to be above that which he is; and the principle and root of each is the reverence which someone has toward God" (a. 6).

It is a special virtue which "principally regards the subjection of man to God, on account of whom he also subjects himself to others by humbling himself" (a. 1, ad 5). For it moderates hope tending to one's own arduous good; now "in repressing the presumption of hope, the chief reason is taken from divine reverence, from which it happens that man does not attribute more to himself than belongs to him according to the grade which has fallen to him from God. Hence humility seems principally to import the subjection of man to God" (a. 2, ad 3).

It is a virtue annexed to temperance, because it represses the motion of hope tending to great things, in the same way as meekness moderates anger (a. 4).

1043. Perfection of humility. - Humility is not the greatest of the virtues: for the theological virtues are more perfect, being about God himself as the end; the intellectual virtues and prudence, which are essentially in reason itself; and justice, especially legal justice, which universally participates in the ordering of reason; but it is more perfect than the other moral virtues, namely those which are about passions, because it renders man well subject to the ordering of reason in a universal way as to all things, whereas each other virtue does so as to some special matter (a. 5).

Yet it is called the foundation of the spiritual building, because it is "first in the acquisition of virtues, ...by way of removing an obstacle, insofar as namely it uproots pride, which God resists, and makes man subject... for receiving the influx of divine grace" (Jas. 4:6). Yet it is not the foundation in the virtues directly and positively, or that through which one first approaches God, but this belongs to faith, and therefore faith is a foundation nobler than humility (ad 2).

1044. Practical rules for exercising humility. - In man two things can be considered: that which is of God and that which is of man. Of man is whatever pertains to defect; of God is whatever pertains to salvation and perfection, for man, as a creature, of himself is nothing (a. 3). Hence it is honorable from humility to embrace low things, that we may profess that we have nothing good from ourselves, can do nothing, are nothing, and consequently that every good of ours is from God, that all things are to be referred to him as author, and that every praise and honor which is given to us is to be referred to him. Hence:

1. If man considers God's gifts in himself, humility does not prevent someone from seeking great things, provided from God's gift he has sufficient proportion, nor does he seek those things as if worthy of them from himself. The magnanimous are humble when it is a question of God's honor, because there is nothing which, with God's aid, they hesitate to undertake (a. 2, ad 2).

2. If man considers himself according to that which is his own, the humble man, referring himself to God and to that which is of God, judges himself to be nothing except defect, fault, and offense of God, and judges that he is to be subjected to all things which are of God, and that he is unworthy and useless for these things.

3. Humility properly regards the reverence by which we are subjected to God. And therefore every man, according to that which is his own, ought to subject himself to neighbor as to that which is of God in him, because since humility properly regards the reverence by which we are subjected to God, we ought to reverence not only God in himself but also that which is of God in any persons whatever (a. 3).

4. But humility does not require a) that someone subject that which is of God in himself to that which appears to be of God in another, b) nor that someone subject that which is his own in himself to that which is of man in his neighbor (a. 3).

5. Yet someone can reckon that there is some good in his neighbor which he himself does not have, or some evil in himself which is not in another, from which he can subject himself to him through humility (a. 3). "Indeed," says Billuart, "he can think that if others had been endowed with so many graces and benefits as he himself has received, they would be better than he and more pleasing to God."

From these considerations man can without falsity reckon and pronounce himself lower than all, unworthy of God's gifts and unfit for all things: "if we prefer that which is of God in our neighbor to that which is proper to us, we cannot incur falsity" (a. 3, ad 2). And thus "someone without falsity can believe and pronounce himself lower than all according to hidden defects which he recognizes in himself; and the gifts of God which lie hidden in others... Similarly also without falsity someone can confess and believe himself useless for all things, and unworthy through his own powers, so that he may refer his whole sufficiency to God" (a. 6, ad 1).

1045. Grades of humility. - According to St. Benedict, twelve grades of humility are fittingly distinguished, from the root of humility, namely reverence toward God, ascending by degrees from greater things to lesser; concerning this read article 6. These grades are not all species and acts of humility, but certain ones are antecedent dispositions or consequent signs.

According to St. Bernard, three grades are distinguished: sufficient, namely to be subject to a superior and not to prefer oneself to an equal; abundant, namely to be subject to an equal and not to prefer oneself to an inferior; superabundant, that is, to be subject to an inferior.

Billuart recounts eight acts or functions: 1. contempt of self; 2. to reckon oneself unworthy of God's gifts; 3. not to desire to be esteemed greatly or honored; 4. to desire to be held vile and contemned; 5. to grieve when one is magnified or honored; 6. to esteem oneself lower than others; 7. to subject oneself to God and to men on account of God; 8. in external things or functions to embrace what is more abject.

1046. Remark. - Billuart asks: "whether all these acts of humility belong to superiors toward subjects? Resp. The interior acts belong to them according to that saying of Augustine in the rule: 'before God let the prelate be prostrate at your feet.' But as to exterior acts, discretion is needed, lest, as the same St. Augustine says in the same place, 'among those whom it is necessary to be subject, while humility is observed too much, the authority of ruling be broken.' Hence St. Thomas, a. 3, ad 3: From humility 'man can according to the interior act of the soul subject himself to another... But in exterior acts of humility, as also in the acts of the other virtues, due moderation is to be applied, lest they be able to turn to the detriment of another,'" who from this would become proud or would contemn.

1047. Humility is a mean between pride and excessive self-abasement. - This inclines to imprudent self-abasement when it redounds to injury of the state or office which someone bears, or of the talent with which he is endowed, or to the disadvantage of those whom he ought to benefit. Humility, for a reasonable cause, pursues care for one's own excellence.

Inordinate abasement is opposed to humility secondarily and by excess; but by defect and primarily, pride is opposed.

Humility is a virtue so restraining the passion of Hope and of Boldness, that no one in that genus wishes anything to be attributed to himself beyond what befits him, with due regard for his own dignity. D. Thomas asserts this to be a certain species of modesty, and there art. 3 he teaches that it does not conflict with humility for someone to recognize the gifts he has received from God, according to 1 Cor. 2: We have not received the spirit of this world, but the spirit that is of God, that we may know what things are given to us by God. Nevertheless D. Thomas teaches that it belongs to Humility to reckon others as one's superiors, either by comparing what we have naturally with what another has by grace, or our defects with the good of another. Therefore the holy Doctor defines it in book 1 de profectu religiosorum cap. 19: It is a voluntary inclination of the mind, arising from an intuition of one's own condition or frailty. Or from D. Bernard, treatise on the twelve degrees of humility: Humility is the virtue by which a man, through most true knowledge of himself, becomes lowly in his own eyes.

The holy Doctor adduces two motives for this abasement: Consider that you are smoke, and that you are not smoke: for that we are smoke, we do not have of ourselves, nor first from our own merits; therefore reason dictates, so that we not be puffed up on this account, but rather refer all things to the Giver, lest attributing to ourselves what belongs to God we be thieves; for he says Isa. 42: My glory I will not give to another. But that we are not smoke likewise admonishes us to be humbled, because it is an empty glory to boast of what one does not have, just as if a Pygmy should proclaim himself a giant; a pauper should style himself rich, like that High Priest of Apoc. 3, or an Ethiopian should proclaim himself whiter than snow.

A threefold Humility, the holy Doctor says, is necessary to us. The first toward ourselves, that considering our own worthlessness we abase ourselves. The second in humbly comporting ourselves, as is said Ps. 34: As one mourning and sorrowful, so was I humbled. The third in exercising ourselves in humble offices. So 2 Reg. 6 David said: I will play, and be made viler than I have been, and I will be humble in my own eyes.

Secondly, we must be humble in regard to our neighbor, and indeed first by esteeming them above ourselves, as is said Philip. 2: In humility esteeming one another as superiors. Second, by preventing one another with exterior honor, reverencing, inclining, yielding the first place, not detracting from anyone, but obeying and deferring. Third, we must bear with their weak works, as is said Ps. 34: When they were troublesome to me, I clothed myself in sackcloth, I humbled myself, etc. See the holy Doctor cap. 31 of the aforesaid book.

Thirdly, we must humble ourselves before God. First by acknowledging him as our Lord, Creator, etc. Second, by subjecting ourselves to his will and scourges, acknowledging them as deserved by our demerits, as is said Mich. 7: I will bear the wrath of the Lord, because I have sinned against him. Third, so that we not be puffed up over his benefits, but say with the Psalmist: Not to us, O Lord, not to us, but to your name give glory, Psalm 113.

He assigns three degrees of humility: The first is that, considering our own worthlessness and our sins, we acknowledge ourselves needy with a humble mind, neither boast, nor seek after praise and honors.

The second degree is, when a man not only despises himself, but also patiently accepts being despised by others; indeed, because we love the truth, one even desires to be judged by others as lowly as he himself acknowledges himself to be.

The third degree is, when even in great gifts a man does not flatter himself, but refers all to the Giver above: Such was the humility of the Blessed Virgin, who, when she perceived herself raised to the dignity of God's mother, confesses herself a handmaid, Luke 1, and Christ, being in the form of God, humbled himself, Philip. 2. Hence Matth. 11 he says: Learn of me, for I am meek and humble of heart. Such is the humility of the Angels and Saints in glory, to which the meek in their ways are likened. See the holy Doctor cap. 33, and de gradibus virtutum c. 3, and P. P. Gentil. sect. 18. Rodriguez pursues this at length.

MANY other outstanding things he teaches on Humility in Diaeta, tit. 7. cap. 1, which I do not wish to transcribe, referring the reader to the ever-flowing fountain of heavenly water.

VERY MANY examples of humility from Scripture the holy Doctor gives in Bibliis pauperum, cap. 97.

VERY MANY he gathers from the holy Fathers in lib. 4. Pharetrae, cap. 12, where he also sets out the twelve degrees of humility from D. Bernard on the 12 degrees of humility, which are also found in D. Thomas.

MANY things likewise he has in serm. 2. Dom. 16. post Pentec. and serm. 2. de uno S. Confessore, and serm. 5. de uno S. Martyre, and serm. 2. in festo omnium Sanctorum.

The remaining parts of the potential Temperance were indicated above, and I shall not go on at greater length.