Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

I. On Humility

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I. Notion of Humility. Humility, which seems to be derived from humus, according to the mind of St. Thomas can be defined: a moral virtue inclining man, as one considering his own defect, to moderate the appetite for his own excellence, according to the prescription of reason illumined by faith (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 6, corpus and ad 1).1 It is said: as one considering his own defect; by these words is understood the consideration by which someone recognizes that he has nothing from himself which is excellent and worthy of honor, but that whatever perfection he possesses is in him from God. Humility imports this consideration presuppositively; formally, however, it is in the appetite, which it restrains lest it tend immoderately toward lofty things (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 161, a. 6), inclining man to this: that, led by the aforesaid consideration, he embrace the abjection befitting him; indeed, that he subject himself not only in all things to God, but also, according to that which is his own, to every neighbor, with respect to that which is of God in him.

1 Cf. St. Bernard, De gradibus humilitatis, c. 1, n. 2, beginning (M.P.L. 182, col. 942); Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 133 (t. 6, p. 490); Billuart, diss. 7, a. 4, § 1.

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II. Object of Humility. 1. The remote material object is constituted by man himself, insofar as he is worthy of abjection and humiliations are to be imposed upon him; the proximate object is the inclinations of the appetite for one's own excellence.

  1. The remote formal object is the reason of debt proceeding from consideration of one's own defect, for moderating the appetite for one's own excellence; the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in this moderation.
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III. Opposed Vices. By excess there is opposed pride, which is an inordinate appetite for one's own excellence (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, aa. 1 and 2),1 by which someone either estimates that he has good from himself; or, although he believes that he has received good from God, ascribes it to his own merits; or boasts that he has a good which he lacks; or desires to seem singularly to have what he has (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 4).2 Moreover, it must be observed that "pride is not the same as vain glory, but its cause; for pride inordinately seeks excellence, but vain glory seeks the manifestation of excellence" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 8, ad 4).3 By defect there is opposed excessive self-abjection, by which someone desires vile things not befitting his state and condition.4

1 Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 145 (p. 496).

2 Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 146 (p. 496).

3 On pride one should read St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, entire; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, book 5, n. 65 sqq.

4 Cf. Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 145 (p. 496).