Article I: On Humility in Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 161.

1041. Humility is said from humus, and humble as if inclined to the ground or near it; hence physically it is the state of that which clings to the ground and scarcely rises above it (nederigheid); metaphorically it is a low and needy condition. Morally it is taken for every lowering to things low, whether it is done from without, namely by another against the will of him who is lowered, and then it is a punishment (vernedering); or from within, and then it can be either contrary to reason (laagheid) or according to right reason, when someone voluntarily lowers himself from consideration of his defects, in which case it is a virtue (ootmoedigheid). Hence it is defined: "the virtue by which someone, considering his defect, holds himself in low things according to his mode" (a. 1, ad 1), or a virtue moderating the appetite lest it tend immoderately into high things, that is, into those things which are above itself. Somewhat more fully: the virtue which restrains the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence lest it tend immoderately to high things, and inclines man to acknowledging his own baseness (or nothingness) according to truth.

It differs from magnanimity a) by reason of the act: magnanimity primarily tends to high things, secondarily restrains the soul lest it tend to them contrary to right reason; humility does not impel the soul to high things but on the contrary restrains it; but virtues are distinguished according to their primary act; b) by reason of the formal motive: the magnanimous man restrains the soul from high things by considering that they exceed his condition or powers, even according to the gifts which he possesses from God; the humble man does so according to consideration of his own defect, which is from himself (q. 129, a. 3, ad 4). And so humility presupposes that which belongs to magnanimity but adds something beyond, because it does not hope even for things commensurate except as exceeding his dignity, and as to be acquired and preserved only through that which is of God. "And therefore concerning the appetite of arduous good a twofold virtue is necessary. One indeed which tempers and restrains the soul lest it tend immoderately into high things, and this pertains to the virtue of humility. But another which strengthens the soul against despair and impels it to the pursuit of great things according to right reason, and this is magnanimity" (a. 1).

1042. Humility is a virtue, because it moderates the appetite tending to the great and arduous according to right reason. Hence it is in the irascible appetite, because it is concerned with arduous good, and principally in the will when it concerns a spiritual excellent good; it presupposes cognition of one's own defect, as the rule directing the appetite, and thus is in the cognitive power and in reason as in the rule directing the appetite (a. 2). Its foundation, namely, is knowledge of oneself, which is especially acquired by the comparison of our littleness with the infinite perfection of God; hence Bernard says: it is the virtue by which someone, by a most true knowledge of himself, becomes vile to himself. And so "humility consists essentially in the appetite, according as someone restrains the impulse of his soul, lest it tend inordinately to great things; but it has its rule in cognition, namely that someone not judge himself to be above that which he is; and the principle and root of each is the reverence which someone has toward God" (a. 6).

It is a special virtue which "principally regards the subjection of man to God, on account of whom he also subjects himself to others by humbling himself" (a. 1, ad 5). For it moderates hope tending to one's own arduous good; now "in repressing the presumption of hope, the chief reason is taken from divine reverence, from which it happens that man does not attribute more to himself than belongs to him according to the grade which has fallen to him from God. Hence humility seems principally to import the subjection of man to God" (a. 2, ad 3).

It is a virtue annexed to temperance, because it represses the motion of hope tending to great things, in the same way as meekness moderates anger (a. 4).

1043. Perfection of humility. - Humility is not the greatest of the virtues: for the theological virtues are more perfect, being about God himself as the end; the intellectual virtues and prudence, which are essentially in reason itself; and justice, especially legal justice, which universally participates in the ordering of reason; but it is more perfect than the other moral virtues, namely those which are about passions, because it renders man well subject to the ordering of reason in a universal way as to all things, whereas each other virtue does so as to some special matter (a. 5).

Yet it is called the foundation of the spiritual building, because it is "first in the acquisition of virtues, ...by way of removing an obstacle, insofar as namely it uproots pride, which God resists, and makes man subject... for receiving the influx of divine grace" (Jas. 4:6). Yet it is not the foundation in the virtues directly and positively, or that through which one first approaches God, but this belongs to faith, and therefore faith is a foundation nobler than humility (ad 2).

1044. Practical rules for exercising humility. - In man two things can be considered: that which is of God and that which is of man. Of man is whatever pertains to defect; of God is whatever pertains to salvation and perfection, for man, as a creature, of himself is nothing (a. 3). Hence it is honorable from humility to embrace low things, that we may profess that we have nothing good from ourselves, can do nothing, are nothing, and consequently that every good of ours is from God, that all things are to be referred to him as author, and that every praise and honor which is given to us is to be referred to him. Hence:

1. If man considers God's gifts in himself, humility does not prevent someone from seeking great things, provided from God's gift he has sufficient proportion, nor does he seek those things as if worthy of them from himself. The magnanimous are humble when it is a question of God's honor, because there is nothing which, with God's aid, they hesitate to undertake (a. 2, ad 2).

2. If man considers himself according to that which is his own, the humble man, referring himself to God and to that which is of God, judges himself to be nothing except defect, fault, and offense of God, and judges that he is to be subjected to all things which are of God, and that he is unworthy and useless for these things.

3. Humility properly regards the reverence by which we are subjected to God. And therefore every man, according to that which is his own, ought to subject himself to neighbor as to that which is of God in him, because since humility properly regards the reverence by which we are subjected to God, we ought to reverence not only God in himself but also that which is of God in any persons whatever (a. 3).

4. But humility does not require a) that someone subject that which is of God in himself to that which appears to be of God in another, b) nor that someone subject that which is his own in himself to that which is of man in his neighbor (a. 3).

5. Yet someone can reckon that there is some good in his neighbor which he himself does not have, or some evil in himself which is not in another, from which he can subject himself to him through humility (a. 3). "Indeed," says Billuart, "he can think that if others had been endowed with so many graces and benefits as he himself has received, they would be better than he and more pleasing to God."

From these considerations man can without falsity reckon and pronounce himself lower than all, unworthy of God's gifts and unfit for all things: "if we prefer that which is of God in our neighbor to that which is proper to us, we cannot incur falsity" (a. 3, ad 2). And thus "someone without falsity can believe and pronounce himself lower than all according to hidden defects which he recognizes in himself; and the gifts of God which lie hidden in others... Similarly also without falsity someone can confess and believe himself useless for all things, and unworthy through his own powers, so that he may refer his whole sufficiency to God" (a. 6, ad 1).

1045. Grades of humility. - According to St. Benedict, twelve grades of humility are fittingly distinguished, from the root of humility, namely reverence toward God, ascending by degrees from greater things to lesser; concerning this read article 6. These grades are not all species and acts of humility, but certain ones are antecedent dispositions or consequent signs.

According to St. Bernard, three grades are distinguished: sufficient, namely to be subject to a superior and not to prefer oneself to an equal; abundant, namely to be subject to an equal and not to prefer oneself to an inferior; superabundant, that is, to be subject to an inferior.

Billuart recounts eight acts or functions: 1. contempt of self; 2. to reckon oneself unworthy of God's gifts; 3. not to desire to be esteemed greatly or honored; 4. to desire to be held vile and contemned; 5. to grieve when one is magnified or honored; 6. to esteem oneself lower than others; 7. to subject oneself to God and to men on account of God; 8. in external things or functions to embrace what is more abject.

1046. Remark. - Billuart asks: "whether all these acts of humility belong to superiors toward subjects? Resp. The interior acts belong to them according to that saying of Augustine in the rule: 'before God let the prelate be prostrate at your feet.' But as to exterior acts, discretion is needed, lest, as the same St. Augustine says in the same place, 'among those whom it is necessary to be subject, while humility is observed too much, the authority of ruling be broken.' Hence St. Thomas, a. 3, ad 3: From humility 'man can according to the interior act of the soul subject himself to another... But in exterior acts of humility, as also in the acts of the other virtues, due moderation is to be applied, lest they be able to turn to the detriment of another,'" who from this would become proud or would contemn.

1047. Humility is a mean between pride and excessive self-abasement. - This inclines to imprudent self-abasement when it redounds to injury of the state or office which someone bears, or of the talent with which he is endowed, or to the disadvantage of those whom he ought to benefit. Humility, for a reasonable cause, pursues care for one's own excellence.

Inordinate abasement is opposed to humility secondarily and by excess; but by defect and primarily, pride is opposed.