Chapter II: On Humility

I. Notion of the virtue. Humility is a special virtue annexed to Temperance or Modesty, by which man, considering that he has received all things and his very being from God, moderates the appetite of his own excellence according to divine ordination.

By this definition we indicate the logical place of humility, its root or foundation, its object, and its proper honorableness. A few things concerning each.

1. Logical place. It is annexed to Temperance, not because it has its principal seat in the sensible appetite, or because its proper object is concupiscence of the lower appetite, but because it has the mode of temperance, i. e. the repression of some appetite easily becoming insolent. It is annexed to Modesty, because modesty is placed under temperance as generally moderating those things which are less difficultly restrained; but the appetite which humility regards has lesser parts in sense, and needs not only a bridle but also a spur.

2. Root or foundation. In every rational inclination a certain truth shines before the mind, which is the principle of the practical judgment that gives to the obedient will its present inclination. Now the humble man uses, as foundation and guide, this truth, that he has received nothing from himself, but all good things from God gratuitously giving. All good things, I say, even existence itself. "But what do you have that you have not received?" St. Paul asked, 1 Cor. 4:7. "Why ... do you glory as though you had not received?" He who has received all things is, in himself, nothing.

Wherefore St. Bernard (On the Degrees of Humility, c. 1) used to say that humility is the virtue "by which someone, by a most true knowledge of himself, becomes vile to himself." Yet we prefer to place the formal root of humility, rather than in one's own nothingness itself, in the origin of every good from God. For consideration of nothingness, as such, can lead to various pursuits but to no definite one per se. For from this you can be moved to sadness or despair; from this also to unbridled ambition of obtaining what you do not have; from this also to impatience, anger, and cursing. Besides, since all men, by the same consideration, are equally reduced to nothingness, there is no reason for relative humility by which one shows himself inferior to another. Therefore as long as you do not think back upon all things as freely given by God, you have no foundation of humility. Formerly indeed, he who professed himself to be and to be worth nothing tacitly testified to divine benignity in him. (Cf. what is said by Lessius, Virt. card., L. IV, c. 4, n. 53). But because today not a few profess lowliness with an entirely different spirit and persuasion, it seemed more opportune to indicate expressly the formal reason of the consideration.

3. Object. We say the object is the appetite of one's own excellence. Appetite signifies the impulse of a natural inclination. One's own excellence is almost the same as "superiority," i. e. the quality, merit, perfection of the subject, considered less in itself than insofar as it gives some relative preeminence. Moreover humility moderates or checks that appetite. But excellence is an arduous good; and, for the greatest part, the appetite of excellence is spiritual. Wherefore the seat of humility is the irascible appetite and the will (cf. 2, 2, q. 162 art. 3, ad 3). Thus the same virtue, considered according to its mode, which is the repression of some impulse, is ascribed to the concupiscible appetite; but, with attention to its object, it pertains to the irascible appetite and the will.

4. Proper honorableness or norm of moderation. We say that moderation is done according to divine ordination. Certainly, in some way, the divine will is the rule of every just moderation. But when there is question, for example, of temperance, the need of the subject manifests this divine will to us. Here, however, since the circumstances on account of which excellence varies among men are for the greatest part hidden from us, and it is not in our power to acquire this or that excellence, we are ruled more immediately, in desiring excellence, by the divine will alone. Our will is less actively regulating under the divine will. After it has excluded illicit arts, it ought to await excellence from God almost as a poor man awaits food from a rich man. That is, through endowments, faculties, circumstances, and fates, God leads us as if by the hand and permits access to this or that excellence to us. But humility, by consideration of our dependence on God and gratitude, willingly embraces that divine ordination and thus moderates the appetite itself. Wherefore, in tractate 25 on John, n. 16 (P. L. 35, 1604), St. Augustine says: "Pride does its own will, humility does the will of God." Hence, On the City of God, L. 14, c. 28 (P. L. 41, 436), suggests to us this definition of humility: "it is love of God even unto contempt of self." But St. Bernard, sermon 26 de diversis (P. L. 183, 610), says: "The sum of all humility seems to consist in this, if our will is subject to the divine will as is fitting." This also is inculcated more than once by St. Thomas (2, 2, q. 161, art. 3, c. Cf. art. 1 ad 5; 2, ad 3; 4, sed contra; q. 162 art. 5; art. 6, c.).

II. Excellence of the virtue. From this it is understood in what way, according to St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 161 art. 5, the virtue of humility can claim for itself the first place after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues, and after justice, especially legal justice. But effectively, while it removes every rebellion against grace radically, it closes the way to every sin, and opens it to every virtue (cf. 2, 2, q. 161 art. 6 ad 2). Because it fosters the affection which befits a creature, it is a certain practical adoration by which the divine Majesty is adored by most diverse acts. Wherefore St. Augustine could write: "Humility is almost the one Christian discipline." (Sermon 351, III, 4; P. L. 39, 1538. 1539. Cf. also On Virginity, c. 31: "Against pride, the mother of envy, the whole Christian discipline chiefly fights." P. L. 40, 413).

Humility thus fully understood can also be called a certain justice toward God, rendering more perfectly to God what is His. Under this respect it can be annexed to the virtue of justice.

You will ask how humility also subjects us to other men?

Resp. It effects this, because, according to divine ordination, our excellence has this mode, that many surpass us simply, while all possess some divine gift which we ought to put before our own defect. (Cf. 2, 2, q. 161 art. 3, c.).

Christian perfection of the virtue. Christian humility is perfected by contempt of earthly sublimity, which is done according to divine ordination. For this is perpetual, that positive mortification is most apt for tempering an appetite which easily becomes excessive. But earthly sublimity is that which by its external splendor most greatly allures the senses and excites the impulse of passion. Therefore contempt of it has the strongest force for firming humility. Besides, through that contempt there is almost removed the difficulty which man experiences in assenting to the divine will when it excludes or prohibits him from a higher place. Yet only earthly sublimity can be contemned; for exaltation is promised to the humble themselves; and because Christ humbled Himself unto death, therefore God exalted Him (Phil. 2:9). And contempt itself of earthly sublimity must be done according to divine ordination, since the supreme rule of humility is the divine good pleasure, and because for the common good it is necessary that there be various orders, and that some preside and others be subject. God could not approve absolute contempt of human excellence.

But this perfection is Christian, both because it is inculcated in the sacred letters of the New Testament; and because outside Christianity it is unknown; and because through the grace of Christ alone can man carry off that victory over himself.

Moreover this perfection is cultivated both by religious obedience and by voluntary poverty.

By the name of religious obedience there is commonly understood, materially, a certain rather universal abdication of one's own choice and an enslavement into the hands of another by whom the religious is governed. But formally it is done for worshipping God; i. e. in the way of pursuing perfection and exercising charity, the religious seeks a more perfect adaptation to the divine will, while, free from the deception of self-love, he hands himself over to be governed by a legitimate Superior, who at the same time, prudently chosen, tacitly promises him that he will be a master of perfection and head of the work of charity.

But by voluntary poverty, one strips away the foods of vain glory which is contrary to humility.

Opposite vices. They are: pride, or the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence; also empty glory, which too greatly desires the manifestation of excellence, seeking a certain ostentation of endowments whence glory may result among men. Concerning these vices something has been said in volume I, nn. 467. 469.

In this way one sins against humility by excess. But by defect the vicious propensities opposed to humility are both timidity, by which someone, through fear of danger or difficulty, or by fear and sloth, and pusillanimity, by which someone, by flight from labor and narrowness of mind, does not dare those things which, according to divine ordination, are in his power.

I. Humility is a special virtue, annexed to Temperance or Modesty, by which man, considering that he has received all things and his very being from God, moderates the appetite of his own excellence according to divine ordination.

It is a special virtue, because it presides over a special inclination to be restrained, toward following great and glorious things.

It is annexed to Temperance, not because it has its principal seat in the sensible appetite, or because its proper object is concupiscence of the lower appetite, but because it has the mode of temperance, i. e. the repression of some appetite.

Since, however, excellence is an arduous good, its appetite postulates not only inhibition but also the virtue which impels man, according to right reason, toward pursuing truly great things.

It is annexed to Modesty, because Modesty is placed under Temperance as generally moderating those things which are less difficultly restrained, and humility regards an appetite which has lesser parts in sense and which needs not only a bridle but also a spur.

But insofar as humility subjects man to God, it is referred to religion and becomes a potential part of justice.

Since the mean of this virtue cannot be taken from a definite measure known to us, but requires attention to many circumstances, especially varied and uncertain to us, we are ruled more immediately by the divine will in desiring excellence, so that for this reason that appetite is said to be moderated according to divine ordination.

But we are most greatly adapted to that norm by consideration of our dependence on God in every positive good and in the benefit itself of existence.

II. The seat of humility is at the same time the will and the irascible appetite.

III. According to St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 161 art. 5, the virtue of humility can deservedly claim for itself the first place after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues, and after justice, especially legal justice; and as contrary to pride, it removes all things which obstruct perfection.

IV. But humility acquires Christian perfection in contempt of earthly sublimity, if that contempt itself is done according to divine ordination.

That perfection is cultivated eminently both by religious obedience and by religious poverty: religious obedience, insofar as the religious pursues perfect adaptation to the divine will through obedience; religious poverty, insofar as through it the religious removes from himself the foods of vain glory.

V. One sins against humility by excess through pride and presumption, through vain glory and ambition; but by defect through timidity and pusillanimity, i. e. through vices which are opposed to fortitude and magnificence, so that someone refuses to tend toward that which is proportioned to his power and truly desirable (2, 2, q. 133 art. 1).