Justice and its species

THE word “ justice” is used in a variety of senses, but here it is used in its strict meaning to designate the moral virtue which inclines its possessor to give to everyone his due or his right.

The habit of giving to everyone his due from principle because it is right and proper is obviously a virtue, and it is 5 a moral, not a theological, virtue, for its immediate motive is not God, but the natural honesty and uprightness of so acting. Justice is a moral virtue which resides in and perfects the will, not the intellect, like prudence; it inclines the will to wish and to execute what is right. Justice inclines the just man to give his due to everyone irrespective of who he may be. It does not consider the relation in which that other stands to God, or to one’s self, as charity does; nor precisely what it is becoming in the just man to do, so that his actions may be worthy of himself, as does temperance, for example; it only considers what is owing to another, what is his due; and because it is the right thing that everyone should have his own, justice inclines to give it to him.

What is due to another in justice and is therefore his strict right must be distinguished from what a man has a claim to on some other ground. A poor man who cannot support himself has a claim on our help, but out of charity, not out of justice. He is our brother; he is a child of our common Father in heaven; he is destined to be a fellow-citizen with us for ever in the kingdom of heaven; the bond of mutual love which binds all such in one body, and makes them one big family, requires that all who can, should, out of their abundance, assist those who are in want. But this does not cause the abundance of one to belong to a needy neighbour in justice; it only prescribes that as much as is required to succour him in his necessity should be given him out of charity. A sufferer who is in pain has a claim on my sympathy and pity, not that it would be unjust to deny him my sympathy, but because pity and compassion require it of me. But when ten pounds are due to another in justice, those ten pounds belong to him; they are his property; he has a right exclusive of all others to all the benefit that can be derived from them, because they are his. Because they are his he can dispose of them as he pleases; he can put them in the bank, or spend them, or give them away; he would wrong no one even if he threw them into the sea, Anyone who steals them, or to whom he lends them, must, if he would be just, restore them to the owner, because justice requires that all should have their own.

We may divide the species of justice into individual or commutative and social justice.

Commutative justice regards the relations between man and man in their private and individual capacity. It supposes a perfect distinction of rights between them, and prescribes that these should be duly observed and respected. It exists between physical and moral persons alike, or between a physical and a moral person, provided that their rights are perfectly distinct from each other.

Social justice regulates the mutual relations between the individual and the society or State to which he belongs. As a member of society the individual has certain duties toward it; he must contribute his share to the common burdens; he must be ready to defend the common weal at the call of authority; he must obey just and equitable laws. This duty of rendering to the State what is its due is called legal justice. On the other hand, the State has its obligations toward its subjects; it must distribute burdens, honours, and rewards equitably without showing favour to particular classes and persons; not indeed with absolute arithmetical equality all round, but according to respective merits. The virtue which should regulate the distribution of burdens and rewards among its subjects by the State is called distributive justice. To such as have committed crime and injured the common weal the State metes out condign punishment according as vindictive justice demands.

There is a difference of opinion among Catholic writers as to whether legal, distributive, and vindictive justice, which we have grouped together under the name of social justice, are really subordinate species of the virtue, or whether commutative justice is the only species that may in strictness be so called. Whatever view be taken we must allow that in commutative justice alone is there a perfect distinction between debtor and creditor; it alone observes arithmetical equality in satisfying its obligations; it alone binds to restitution after being violated. In social justice, on the contrary, there is no perfect distinction between the State and its subjects; social justice does not prescribe the observance of arithmetical equality, nor does its violation bind to restitution, except when by the same act commutative justice has also been infringed.

Resemblance between Distributive and Commutative Justice.—The general likeness between distributive and commutative justice may be summed up as follows:

(a) they have the same remote matter, since both alike are concerned with external things, persons or works. Thus, things such as goods of fortune may be distributed by the community to its members, or may be exchanged by individuals between them; labors to be performed may be assigned by the community or may be agreed on by private persons through contract;

(b) they have the same general form, since both alike seek to impress equality on the matter with which they deal, by rendering in these things to every one his due, and by making man’s actions towards his neighbor to follow the mean of reason and of the thing (see 1711).

The Special Differences between Distributive and Commutative Justice.—(a) They differ in their proximate matter, that is, in the operations by which use is made of external things, persons or works; for while distributive justice acts through distribution (or division), appointment, or assignment among many, commutative justice acts through exchange, or transfer from one to another between two persons.

(b) They differ in their special form; for distributive justice seeks equality and the golden mean, according to proportion, while commutative justice seeks the same according to quantity (see 1712). Distributive justice does not treat parties as equals, but gives to each one according to his personal worth—to the more deserving the superior positions and high salaries, to the less deserving the inferior positions and lower salaries. Commutative justice, on the other hand, treats the parties as equal, and decrees that debts must be paid and injuries repaired, even though payment or reparation must be made by a good man to a bad man, and that the recompense must equal the difference created between the parties by the debt or the injury.

518. • Division. Justice is distinguished as fourfold, namely legal, distributive, vindicative, and commutative ⁵.

⁵ There are some who, in order to establish a certain order among these diverse justices, affirm first indeed that it is twofold: one which orders man toward the community, and this is legal or general; but another which orders him toward other particular or private persons, and this with Aristotle and St. Thomas they call particular; then they divide this latter into others in such a way that one is commutative, another distributive, and besides another vindicative. But in all these things there is found in no way a partition of some genus into species; but you have one in which the perfect notion of justice is found, and which is called justice taken precisely, or commutative justice; but the rest, since in something they fall short of the former, nevertheless participate something from it as by analogy, whence they are also accustomed to be called justice in a qualified sense. See Valentia (tom. 3, disp. 5, punct. 2), and Lugo (De Iust., disp. 1, n. 50, 68, and 70).

1. Legal justice ⁶ inclines each one to render his right to the society of which he is a part, or to the Prince, on account of the common good. Hence it orders the subject to the community as a part to the whole. It is called legal because it has for its object that which is owed to the community according to natural or positive law.

⁶ Legal justice, as Lugo has it (De Iust., disp. 1, n. 62), is a special virtue by which someone is borne toward the good of the republic or community, of which he himself is a part.

The material object of this virtue is any honorable act, or, as the Doctors are accustomed to speak, the acts of all the other virtues; whence the name general justice also has been given to it. For as St. Thomas says (2. 2, q. 58, a. 5), "the good of any virtue whatever... is referable to the common good, to which justice," namely legal justice, "orders. And according to this the acts of all virtues can pertain to justice, according as this orders man to the common good. And as to this, justice is called general justice."

But the formal object resides in this, that this virtue commands the acts of other virtues, namely any honorable acts, and orders them to the end proper to itself, namely to the common good. Hence St. Thom. (2. 2, q. 58, a. 6): "Legal justice is a certain special virtue according to its essence, according as it regards the common good as its proper object."

Moreover it is called legal justice because it belongs especially to law to order to the common good. "Because," thus St. Thomas, l. c., "it belongs to law to order to the common good, hence it is that such justice, general in the aforesaid way, is called legal justice; because evidently through it man is in concord with the law ordering the acts of all virtues to the common good."

But this justice has this singular feature, that it is not altogether and perfectly toward another. For as St. Thomas has it (2. 2, q. 58, a. 5), "All who are contained under some community are compared to the community as parts to the whole: but the part, as to what it is, belongs to the whole." And Card. De Lugo (De Iust., disp. 1, n. 68): "The community is not distinguished from its members, as is clear; and therefore it does not regard the common good in such a way that it abstracts from the good of the one acting, but rather it regards it precisely because it is considered to be the good also of the one acting, just as the good of the body is the good of the members: but justice properly regards the good of another by abstracting altogether from my utility." But according to the opinion of all, justice properly so called exists only between those things which are so mutually distinct that one is not something of the other. Therefore Lugo adds (ibid.): "Just as piety toward parents is not properly justice, because it does not regard the perfect otherness required for justice, a fortiori the same will be true in the present case," namely legal justice.

And from this it is clear that legal justice is not aptly confused with duties either of piety or of formal obedience toward the prince; for not only are the motives of these virtues plainly diverse, but moreover the distinction which intervenes between subject and prince is not present between citizen and the community of which he is a part; and the duties of the subject tend to the good of the prince alone, while those things which the citizen confers upon the community are conferred upon the good of that same citizen, as a part of the community. Indeed even the prince himself, as a member of the community, is ordered to it as a part to the whole through legal justice, although somewhat otherwise than the subject. "Legal justice," says St. Thom., 2. 2, q. 58, a. 6, "... regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the prince principally and, as it were, architectonically," because he prescribes the mode of contributing to the common good, "but in subjects secondarily and, as it were, administratively."

2. Distributive justice inclines the Superior or his ministers to an equal ⁷, or just, distribution of burdens and goods. Hence it orders the community or Superior to subjects, as the whole to parts ⁸.

⁷ The difference between the equality proper to distributive justice and that proper to commutative justice Lugo intimates thus (De Iust., disp. 1, n. 45), according to the common doctrine taken from Aristotle and St. Thomas: "Distributive justice," he says, "seeks in its object equality according to geometric proportion, not according to arithmetic, that is, it attends to equality between two proportions: for commutative justice regards equality between thing and thing, which is called arithmetic equality; but distributive justice attends to equality of proportions; so that if there are two persons, one of whom has merit as four, the other as eight, the latter exceeds the former in the distribution according to the double, so that if the former receives twenty, the latter receives forty." You may see these things set forth more fully in St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 61, art. 2).

⁸ But distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom distribution is made, insofar, namely, as they are content with a just distribution. St. Thom., 2. 2, q. 61, art. 1, ad 3.

3. Vindicative justice inclines the Prince to punish the guilty with congruent punishments for the good of society. Therefore it consists in the congruent punishment of the guilty for the public good ⁹.

⁹ More commonly the Doctors do not hold vindicative justice as a fourth species of justice; but they call it back to legal justice, insofar as either a superior, by avenging crimes, looks to the common good, or a private person with the same affection desires or requires the punishment of crimes; but to distributive justice, insofar as it inflicts punishments congruent to the gravity of crimes; finally to commutative justice, insofar as from office a judge is bound to punish offenses, not otherwise than a guard is bound to keep off a thief, and likewise to inflict on a crime no graver punishment than the matter or the law bears.

4. Commutative justice inclines the will to render his own strict right to each private person, by preserving equality of thing to thing. This regards only private persons, as distinct from one another ¹⁰. But it is called commutative because it is chiefly occupied with exchanges and contracts. Of this alone we shall treat, because it alone claims for itself the name of justice in the precise sense ¹¹.

¹⁰ This seems to be expressed too generally. For he too will plainly injure commutative justice who brings damage upon the public treasury; and likewise the prince will sin against commutative justice who distributes burdens unequally, or who inflicts punishment short of demerit.

¹¹ Distributive justice, namely, falls short of the proper and strict notion of justice in this, that it does not regard right strictly taken; and therefore, as will be said below, its violation per se does not impose the burden of restitution. But legal justice also departs from justice properly so called in this, that it is not, as we said, altogether toward another: for the community is not distinguished from its members, and therefore this justice does not regard the common good in such a way as to abstract from the good of the one acting.

I. What Is Intended in the Treatise. This treatise can occupy too small a place in this manual volume. Yet it will by no means lack its peculiar utility, if it exhibits, as it were synoptically, the principles of conclusions, with a brief demonstration added; if it teaches especially how to distinguish what is required or advised by the very law of nature, and what is left to be defined by positive statutes; if finally it supplies norms for detecting the way by which human laws influence the offices of conscience. Therefore our effort will tend here.

II. On various positive laws. We must by no means dissemble that difficulty is increased by the very multitude of laws which today, among so many various peoples, are passed almost daily. Yet it is lawful to bring into a few genera the laws to which we must chiefly attend. For besides canon law, which is by far the principal for the moral theologian, it seems sufficient, for our intention, that we consider three genera of legislations: the Latin, which borrows many things from ancient Roman law and from European customs; the Germanic, which does not stand far from the preceding, but shines by scientific elaboration; and the Anglo-American, which, in several points, is distinguished from the others by more proper marks, although it itself has by no means been withdrawn from the authority of Roman law (cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, under the word Law (Roman), art. Jos. I. Kelly).

As far as the matter allows, we shall put the documents of natural law before positive sanctions. But where separation cannot be made, we shall bring forward Italian law as an example or specimen, while not neglecting a sober sketch of other laws: which, in this international Institute, did not seem to have to be passed over.

Yet let no one think that we are deceived by that error that we hope to instruct our readers in civil laws in a few pages. This alone can we strive for, which moreover of itself suffices: that the fundamental ideas, which can be called as it were the soul of particular laws, be communicated, and that a few elements of positive law be handed down by which the theologian may be able to perceive the state of the question concerning various cases of conscience, and to recognize the frequent necessity of approaching experts in law.

For the easier understanding of the juridical exposition, certain things remain to be observed. 1. The Code of France, to which Napoleon gave his name, by brevity of speaking and method of arranging matters, far surpassed prior Bodies of Law, so that it introduced a new method of writing laws, which almost all cultivated nations, indeed recently the Church herself in her Code of Canon Law, have imitated. And since it sufficiently expressed the juridical persuasions and propensions of the declining eighteenth century, and at the same time composed Roman laws and the customs of the Franks, or of Germanic origin, not only because of the political authority of Napoleon I did it become common to several peoples ¹, but it also was author of the manner of ordering civil laws for several others, e.g. of the Brazilian republic and many States of Latin America.

Later Codes nevertheless did not omit to perfect the French accidentally. This, e.g., must be observed particularly concerning the Code of Italy. Besides, since the French Code sinned by the note of individualism, from the middle of the nineteenth century it had to be reformed or completed in France itself by several social laws.

2. While the Austrian Code is commended by solicitude concerning natural law, no other Code has been composed with more methodical preparation and long-lasting deliberation (of more than twenty years) of doctors and jurists than the Code which from the year 1900 began to rule the German Empire. Joined to that Code is the Law of Introduction, which sought accurately to define what could be retained from various particular laws. The promulgation of a Code of this kind had to exercise a certain force even in other regions; which is seen especially in Switzerland. For the Swiss Federation, from the beginning of the year 1912, is ruled by a new civil Code, which differs more than the preceding law from the Code of France; yet not so that we ought to separate proper Swiss law from the Latin. In Switzerland, moreover, besides the civil Code, there is a special Code of Obligations, to be consulted for contracts, and this, corrected in the first two sections, also obtained the force of obliging from January 1, 1912. In the Canadian dominion, the province of Quebec is ruled by its own civil Code, which approaches very closely to French law; while the other eight provinces, even in civil matters, use English law.

3. Concerning the laws of England and the federated States of North America, this must be observed: that by the name Common Law there is designated there the ancient English regime, resting not on written acts but on custom. This law, in each region, has often been derogated both by positive statutes and by jurisprudence which consulted equity.

Therefore, looking especially to the nature of the laws, by the name of Latin law we include the civil law of Latin America, Austria, Belgium, the Canadian province of Quebec, France, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, and Lusitania.

By the name of Germanic law, we designate the law introduced by the civil Code of Germany in 1900.

By the name of Anglican law, the law in force in England, in the eight provinces of the Canadian dominion, and in various parts of the British empire.

By the name of American law, the law of the U.S.A., if nevertheless you except the Philippine Islands and the State of Louisiana, which are ruled by Latin laws.

III. As to the contents of this treatise, this remains to be said. Since the last five precepts of the Decalogue, at least in their explicit formula, pertain to justice, our treatise will exhibit under one common rubric those things which writers are accustomed to place under various titles concerning the fifth, seventh, and tenth precepts. For concerning the sixth and ninth precepts we act in the brief Volume IV; to the eighth precept we reserve a special place after this treatise. But in the treatise itself we shall briefly propose those things which sometimes are inscribed concerning certain states of lay persons.

IV. Division. There will be three sections of this treatise: the first appointed to general notions; the second concerning the rights and offices of threefold justice; the third treating and discussing injustice and the connected obligation of restoring.

¹ Yet soon those nations endeavored to review the Code of France and to make a peculiar one for themselves. Thus in Holland, in the year 1833, its own civil Code was promulgated; the fundamental law of Belgium obliges the legislator to make new Codes, which work nevertheless, concerning civil law, has not yet been perfected. And just as Spain and Lusitania adapted the civil Code of France to their own character, so various colonies of each Nation, when they had grown into autonomous republics, began to prepare special civil Codes. Nor, after the laws have once been perfected, is labor ceased, so that, e.g., in the Mexican republic, the Code of December 13, 1870, was suppressed by the Code which began to be in force there from June 1, 1884, and to which a more recent law de relationibus familiaribus has partly derogated.

Utility. The few things which we hand down here explain more the notions of legal and distributive justice; and at the same time they touch the grave question concerning the force and obligation of laws, especially civil laws.

Definition. Legal justice, which is rendered to society as such, makes citizens inclined to do those acts which, either by common necessity or from the use of jurisdiction, are owed on account of the common good. - Those acts are formally honest; for indifferent acts, as such, do not conduce to the common good. They are, however, acts of various virtues. And hence legal justice is called general, because it does not have special matter to which, as chastity or charity does, it gives first honesty; but it exercises acts which are already honest from elsewhere, or even commanded, as owed on account of the common good.

The citizens, in whom the virtue exists as in its subject, are some princes, or those exercising public power, others subjects. Princes, as such, legal justice disposes to making good laws, whence it is said to exist in them architectonically, or to administering the republic well. Subjects, as such, it disposes to observing just laws well. Hence, since most acts of legal justice are commanded by law, it borrows the name of legal justice. Hence at the same time it is clear why, according to the various matter which is commanded, an act commanded by jurisdiction pertains to various virtues, so that the faithful man who observes the ecclesiastical fast cultivates temperance, and the Catholic who performs servile work on Sunday sins against religion. But to establish good laws, to administer well the republic or the Church is for rulers an office of commutative justice.

To piety or to other virtues belong the various good acts which citizens freely do with regard to the common good. This escapes not a few writers today, who confusedly ascribe those honest acts to legal justice.

You Ask Concerning the Force of Positive Law. Both canonical and civil human positive law can efficaciously dispose many things concerning the actions and things of subjects, on account of the common good. Many things also are not so terminated by divine law, natural or positive, that they can suffice for the mutual relations of men; but they must rather be further defined and accommodated to the present utilities of society: the matrimonial regime, inheritances, wills.

Positive law can, for the protection of weaker persons, make the same incapable of firm obligation; make certain agreements null with regard to the common good; impose certain solemnities to be observed in graver juridical acts, in order to forestall abuses and doubts; on account of the common good, create and extinguish rights; add new things to the conditions of agreements. By these various decrees, the human legislator can bind conscience. Now it is asked how far he has willed to bind it.

First of all the words of the law must be attended to, if they are clear; and one must answer for an obligation of conscience if they formally address conscience, or if, from a reasonable interpretation of the law, to which legislators are judged to have accommodated their mind, an obligation of conscience is gathered. This interpretation can vary with time and circumstances. Here also the force of some custom accedes.

Today, above all, a distinction must be made between ecclesiastical and civil laws. Ecclesiastical laws, as we observed in I, 253, of themselves oblige conscience, so that the presumption is for obligation. But the contrary must be said in our civil laws.

For today, in our civil laws, it seems one must answer rather for the least obligation of conscience: the common good itself suggests this, so that citizens may be in a more equal place before the law; and the profession of religious indifference on the part of many legislators demonstrates that such was the mind of the legislator. There also accedes the more vigilant and strong action today of the external forum, which brings it about that the legislator can more easily be content with external coercion.

Accordingly not a few writers, with whom we agree, establish this rule. In matter of justice, civil laws oblige conscience as much as is sufficient that public order and common peace be provided for. Wherefore they will oblige conscience: a) just laws after the definition of the judge by which a thing is adjudged to someone; b) before the sentence of the judge, laws which complete the silent natural law by their definitions. - But if the case can be solved by natural law, and there is a conflict between a natural title (say occupation) and a civil title, the thing seems able, up to the sentence of the judge, to be preserved by the natural title ¹. And this double criterion can be proposed: laws which immediately define real rights oblige conscience, at least when the definition is necessary; but after the sentence of the judge, laws which immediately prescribe certain acts to citizens. Cf. Van Gestel, De iustitia et lege, pp. 141, 203, 224, 225.

So long, however, as the matter concerns private patrimonial relations, not even the reason of the common good, or affection toward the fatherland, stirs citizens to execute those laws beyond what conscience commands.

Concerning the obligation of laws which impose taxes, we shall act below, where we treat of injustice.

¹ This formula, however, is rather our own. Often, from the principle which they have in common with us, they gather that in all laws which immediately and honestly define real rights there is of itself a force of binding conscience, while laws which impose an obligation hold conscience less immediately. But others, according to the testimony of R. P. Cornelisse himself, II, 10, 3°, restrict this force more to necessary things.

Legal justice commands various acts of virtues on account of the common good. But because those acts are already honest from elsewhere according to themselves, and pertain to all virtues (at least moral virtues), it is a general virtue, lacking special matter and commanding in the matter of all virtues. It is called legal because, except for manifest necessity of the common good, law defines its act.

Princes, as such, legal justice disposes to fulfilling their own office of commutative justice, that of making good laws, administering the republic well. Wherefore in them it is said to exist architectonically.

How far human law, which can directly oblige conscience, has willed to oblige it in matter of justice: this we can learn first of all by the common interpretation of the law. Today, however, according to approved authors, civil laws directly oblige conscience only so much as is sufficient that public order and common peace be provided for. Therefore just laws oblige conscience after the sentence of the judge by which a thing is adjudged to someone, lest there be a perpetual conflict between the external forum and the forum of conscience; and also before sentence, laws which supply the silent natural law, lest rights and goods remain in uncertainty.

Distributive justice, in an equal proportion, which varies according to the nature of the things and of Society itself, as far as the common good allows it, directly distributes common goods, and indirectly common burdens, among citizens. Through it, in this way, Society renders to its members what is owed to them as such.

1. We say that the proportion must be observed as far as the common good allows this, because the things of which there is question are destined first of all to the community, and therefore can reach private persons only with that destination preserved. Therefore distributive justice is in a certain way subordinated to legal justice, so that citizens must not rarely tolerate the very inequality which the common good has demanded.

2. Moreover, since only goods are of themselves desirable, through the distribution of goods alone does Society directly render to its members what it owes them. Yet indirectly it is advantageous not to be too much burdened; and so the equal distribution of burdens itself is commanded by distributive justice.

Indeed, since public power can deprive citizens of their goods only on account of the common good, an inequitable distribution of burdens would offend commutative justice itself.

We have said that material rules vary according to the various society. For in a society of autocratic government, it can happen that all public functions are judged to be in the possession of the monarch, who therefore can legitimately exercise them through suitable persons, but persons acceptable to himself; in an aristocratic society, the ratio of equal distribution will have to be accommodated to privileges. But in our societies, citizens are equal by right, and public offices must be placed among common goods. Therefore these will have to be distributed, not according to the political parties to which citizens belong, but according to the title which exists in them.

The title itself will vary according to the nature of the goods. Hence: a) if goods, such as public offices, even after they have been assigned to one person, retain a principal relation to the common good, they will always have to be conferred first of all with regard to the republic. Therefore all those things must be observed in candidates for offices which permit one to hope for a better procuration of the office, and, other things being equal, account will have to be taken of merits, because offices also possess some ratio of reward; b) if, concerning certain utilities deservedly hoped for from the community, all citizens are pressed by the same necessity in species, even if perhaps not in the same degree, e.g. if there is question of protecting quiet possession of rights and goods, this will have to be furnished equally to all according to the quantity of goods and rights which are exposed to danger, unless nevertheless the particular necessity of certain persons imposes greater solicitude; c) the means by which excessive misery is repelled will have to be procured more for the indigent; and the means by which the arts and science are promoted will have to be procured more for the deserving.

Distributive justice, in an equable proportion, directly distributes common goods, indirectly common burdens, among citizens.

Because it distributes common goods, which by their first destination ought to serve the community, that equality must be observed as far as the common good allows it. Among those goods today public offices also must be counted, which therefore must be conferred, not according to the parties to which citizens belong, but, with the common good preserved, according to the title which exists in the citizens.

70. The name of justice is taken in diverse ways, and indeed:

1. In the broadest sense, for the complex of all virtues, or for total and integral moral rectitude (Rechtschaffenheit). In this acceptation it is said: "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice."¹²⁸ "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven."¹²⁹

2. In a broad sense, for justification or the state of sanctifying grace (Rechtfertigung). Thus it is said: "Abraham believed God, and it was reputed to him unto justice."¹³⁰

3. In the strict and proper sense, for a special cardinal virtue. Thus accepted, it can be defined: "the constant and perpetual will of granting to each his own right"; or a little more broadly: a moral virtue inclining the will to rendering to each his own strict right; or according to St. Thomas:¹³¹ "a habit according to which someone, with a constant and perpetual will, grants to each his own right." This definition handed down in the first place is already found in Ulpian¹³² and has always been held as good.

It Is Explained. It is said, first: constant and perpetual will, by which words it is signified that justice is a habit which resides in the will as in its subject and renders it stable and apt for acting perpetually according to justice. Therefore the virtue of justice is not yet present if a man acts justly once or a second time,¹³³ - for this can happen without virtue from natural inclination alone - but if always and everywhere he renders to each one what is his own. It is said, second: of granting to each his own right. For right is the proper object of justice, which renders to each all things which are owed to him in the strict sense. But I say "owed in the strict sense"; for it does not pertain to justice itself to pay a debt in the broad sense, which is rather a certain fittingness. For this pertains to other virtues annexed to justice, as will be said below, n. 73.

The distinction between the virtue of justice and other virtues. From the definition thus explained, the distinction between the virtue of justice and other virtues appears. For justice is distinguished 1. from the other moral virtues both by reason of object and by reason of subject. The object of prudence is practical truth; the object of fortitude and temperance are passions to be moderated; but the formal object of justice is the good and just thing owed to another. The subject of prudence is the intellect; the subject of fortitude and temperance is the sensitive appetite; but the subject of justice is the will.¹³⁴ It is distinguished 2. from the theological virtues, inasmuch as these are always infused and directly have God as object. - Especially to be noted is the distinction between justice and charity toward neighbor. Each virtue, certainly, is toward another, as they say, namely toward neighbor; but in one way and another. If I exercise a work of charity, I give to my neighbor what is mine; but if I exercise a work of justice, I give to my neighbor what is his own. For charity rests altogether upon conjunction between the lover and the beloved. Whence he who rightly loves his neighbor loves him as another self. But justice, on the contrary, rests upon the distinction of one man from another. For each man has his own independence and his own inviolable rights. And so a man can indeed injure charity toward himself, but not justice (properly so called).¹³⁵ To acknowledge the rights of others and not to violate them is the office of justice. Certainly in itself and by reason of object charity far surpasses justice, but the obligation of justice is customarily stricter than the obligation of charity, which admits a certain latitude. Justice does not regard the diverse conditions of persons, but only the thing owed; and therefore it matters little, for example, whether someone is poor or rich, or noble, for he is always bound to render right to each one; and conversely anyone whose right has been injured can demand reparation of the injured right. Whence in justice there must be observed not only the mean of reason, as in all other virtues, but also the mean of the thing.

¹²⁸ Matt. 5, 6.

¹²⁹ Matt. 5, 20.

¹³⁰ Rom. 4, 3.

¹³¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 58, a. 1.

¹³² L. 10, Dig. 1, 1 (lib. primo Regularum).

¹³³ Cf. S. theol. l. c. ad 3.

¹³⁴ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 4.

¹³⁵ Cf. ib. a. 2. In a broader sense a man can also commit injury against himself, for example against his own body.

71. General or legal justice (which by some authors is also called social) and particular justice are distinguished. But particular justice is subdivided into distributive and commutative. Distributive justice is again subdivided by some into distributive strictly so called and vindicative. The individual kinds are explained. Therefore general or legal justice is distinguished from particular justice.

1. General or legal justice is the constant and perpetual will of rendering to the community (whether civil or ecclesiastical) its own right.¹³⁸ Since man is by his nature a social animal, i.e. must live in human society, offices toward society also fall upon him. Therefore that virtue which perpetually and constantly inclines the will to fulfilling those social offices is deservedly called general justice, and indeed partly from its object and end, because namely the social good is a general good; partly from its effect and proper function, because upon this virtue falls the office of directing all acts and habits of man to the social and common good. Thus from the command of general justice the brave soldier fights strenuously; any citizen pays taxes and observes laws; the prince establishes good laws and urges their observance. General justice is also called, and indeed not undeservedly, legal justice, because its chief function is to establish and observe laws, since these are always necessarily ordered to the common good.

This general justice (or legal or social justice) is most necessary for the common good; for without it peace is disturbed, and many damages are also inflicted upon fellow citizens, and this especially if the governors of the community injure it by establishing unjust laws.

There are those who think that this general justice is not a special virtue, but a certain ratio common to every virtue; but better and more rightly with the Angelic Doctor¹³⁹ general or legal justice is held to be a special virtue really distinct from other virtues. Certainly legal justice exercises a general force over all other virtues, ordering them to the common good, just as God also orders individual, even the smallest, creatures to the good of the whole world; but just as from this it is not lawful to conclude that God is something common and general (which would be Pantheism), so from the general force and influence of legal justice this cannot be called something common to all virtues. Besides, charity certainly is a special virtue, and yet it commands all virtues and directs their actions to its own end and object.¹⁴⁰

2. Particular justice is the constant and perpetual will of rendering to individual persons (whether they be physical persons or juridic persons)¹⁴¹ their own right, and it is subdivided into commutative and distributive as into two distinct species.¹⁴²

a) Commutative justice is the constant and perpetual will of a private person of rendering to another private person his strict right, with the absolute equality of the thing to be rendered to the thing received having been preserved.¹⁴³ This part of justice receives the name of commutative justice because it especially has place in exchanges, for example in purchase and sale. But St. Thomas beautifully shows that this justice has place not only in purchase and sale, but in all the last six precepts of the Decalogue.¹⁴⁴ Commutative justice is justice in the strictest sense; whence its violation involves an obligation of restitution.¹⁴⁵

b) Distributive justice is the constant and perpetual will inclining the prince of some community to distribute rewards, dignities, honors, and also common burdens (and - when the case occurs - punishments also) among individual subjects according to the proportion of merits or capacities. Therefore in distributive justice absolute equality is not observed (as happens in commutative justice), but equality of proportion. Distributive justice is indeed principally in the prince, who through it is inclined, with acceptance of persons set aside, to justly distributing common goods and burdens; but participatively it is also found in subjects, insofar as they are content with the equitable distribution made by the superior.

c) Vindicative justice is held by several theologians as a part of distributive justice; for it is the constant and perpetual will of the prince of distributing due and condign punishments upon guilty subjects. By other theologians vindicative justice is reduced to legal or general justice, because in inflicting punishments the public good must be cared for first of all. Finally, there are not lacking theologians who wish it to be a part of commutative justice, because superiors, from a quasi-contract entered into in the reception of office, are bound to punish guilty persons. - In so great a variety of opinions let each one abound in his own sense. If vindicative justice is considered insofar as it observes a just proportion between delicts and punishments to be paid, without doubt it pertains to distributive justice; but if it is considered precisely as conducing to the common good, it is commanded by legal justice; finally, if a judge through grave negligence omits the punishment of delinquents, he harms the common good, gravely fails in his office, and consequently is bound to restitution, because he has injured commutative justice.¹⁴⁶

¹³⁸ Ib. q. 58, a. 5.

¹³⁹ Ib. a. 6.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. ib.

¹⁴¹ In particular justice the term toward which justice is exercised is a private person, whether physical or juridic. But in commutative justice not only the term toward whom justice is exercised is a private person, but also he who exercises justice. Thus, for example, Peter renders to Paul the just price for a thing bought. In this act of commutative justice Peter and Paul are private persons. - Peter renders to the government the just price for a thing bought. In this act also of commutative justice each contracting party is considered as a private person. For then the government is considered as a private juridic person selling its wares, and not as a superior directing its subjects.

¹⁴² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 61, a. 1.

¹⁴³ Performance and counter-performance must be materially absolutely equal.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 61, a. 3.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. below n. 203.

¹⁴⁶ St. Thomas (S. theol. 2, 2, q. 80, a. un. ad 1) says: "Vengeance which is made by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice." The Angelic Doctor has similar things ib. q. 108, a. 2 ad 1. Yet from this it is not yet lawful to conclude that the whole of vindicative justice pertains to commutative justice. For the Angelic Doctor seems to speak of that case in which the judge punishes one subject who has injured another. Then certainly the judge is bound to inflict upon the first subject as much punishment as the evil inflicted upon the other was, so that there may be compensation and as it were commutation. But if the judge inflicts punishments to save the injured public good, then such vindication seems to pertain to legal justice. Billuart (De iust. diss. 5, a. 3) says that vindication is indeed an act elicited by commutative justice, but commanded by legal justice. Cajetan has similar things in the Commentaries on the cited places. Besides, this whole controversy is of small moment. See Lugo, De iust. et iure disp. 1, n. 69.

St. Th. II-II, q. 57, a. 1; q. 58, a. 1 and 2.

134. Justice according to the name is a habit which inclines one to doing what is just (recht-vaardigheid). Etymologically it is from just;¹ what is adequate or commensurate and adjusted to another, and it imports a certain equality: for commonly those things which are made equal are said to be adjusted;² but equality is toward another, for nothing is equal to itself but to another, and therefore justice in the proper sense, by its own nature, signifies the special virtue which renders us equal to another, or which orders man, in those things which are toward another, as he ought, and inclines him to rendering to each one what is his, up to equality.

¹ In Greek, dikaios, as if divided in two, imports equality of thing to thing, according to Aristotle, V Eth., c. 7.

² Thus they are said: just parts, a just measure, a just price, a just petition.

Nevertheless, according to a likeness, in one and the same man diverse principles of actions are considered as if they were diverse agents; and therefore metaphorically justice is said to be in one and the same man, insofar as reason commands the other faculties and these obey reason as they ought, according as to each part of man there is attributed what is suitable and due to it. Thus justice consists in the due ordering of the parts of the soul and in adequation or conformity to its rule (gerechtigheid), and thus it includes every virtue.

Hence in sacred usage justice is more often taken in a metaphorical and general sense, and signifies:

1. either holiness, or the complex of all virtues by which we are made adequate to the divine rule or law (Mt. V, 6; I, 19; "original justice"; S. Th. II-II, q. 79, a. 1);

2. or any act of virtue and all good works (Mt. VI, 1; V, 20; Prov. VIII, 20);

3. or the root of justice, namely, justification, in which grace making one pleasing and the virtues are infused (Rom. IV, 3; V, 17 and throughout); - but

4. also it is sometimes taken in the strict sense, as the special virtue of justice (Acts XVII, 31: "He will judge the world in equity," Greek dikaiosyne = in justice strictly so called).

135. Justice according to the thing, as a special virtue, is usually defined from Ulpian: The perpetual and constant will of giving to each one his right, where perpetual and constant will is not put for the power of willing, or for a passing act, but for a habit inhering in the soul by which the will perpetually and constantly wills. For stable will is required for virtue, which immovably operates the good; and this cannot exist without habit. Whence, if someone wished to put the definition in due form, he could say with St. Thomas: A habit according to which someone, with constant and perpetual will, gives his right to each one (q. 58, a. 1), or with more recent authors: a virtue inclining the will to rendering to another his right unto equality. It is said:

1. habit, i.e., a firm and permanent disposition which inclines the power to operating either well or badly, and thus is distinguished from a power and from an act, because it mediates between each;

2. by which with constant and perpetual will: for he who would wish to render right only by turns, for a time, or only in some business, and only to certain persons, could by no means be called endowed with justice.³ Whence will is required:

³ Otherwise this can be without habit, from natural inclination alone.

a) perpetual, not on the part of the act, as if it were to endure perpetually, but on the part of the object, insofar as the just man has the purpose of preserving justice at every time and in every business;

b) moreover constant (which is not the same as perpetual) on the part of the subject, namely, of the will itself, insofar as it firmly perseveres in the said purpose, and someone has a firm and constant will of preserving justice perpetually and in all things;

3. someone gives to each one his right, not only positively by procuring that which is owed, but also negatively (through omission, by which the right of another is left intact), by abstaining from every violation of right. By these words there is indicated that by which justice is distinguished from all other virtues, namely, its own proper act, and its proper object: right owed to another, which namely a) belongs not to me the agent, but to another, b) is owed to each one not from mere fittingness or the honesty of virtue or charity (a moral debt), but by strict obligation (a legal or rigorous debt), and c) is rendered integrally unto equality; otherwise the whole due right would not be given, and under this respect the act would fall short of the perfection of justice. In which case there is present justice not strict and perfect, nor metaphorical, but imperfect and according to something, which "by an enlarged name" (i.e., by extension) is called justice (I-II, q. 60, a. 3, ad 1).

136. Three conditions are required for justice strictly so called:

1. that it be toward another: for since justice is concerned with establishing equality, it has from its nature that it tend toward another for giving right to another, because nothing is equal to itself but to another;⁴

⁴ It pertains essentially to the just that it be commensurated according to equality to another to whom it ought to be equaled. Whence St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 1: the adequation of justice comprises three things: 1st, that it be ordered to another; 2nd, that it be owed to him, otherwise it would exceed; 3rd, that as much be rendered as is owed, otherwise it would fall short in less.

2. that right, and indeed right properly so called, or a true legal debt, be present to the other for that which is given to him, for example, if he has bought a thing or has merited it as the wage of labor. Thus almsgiving is not an act of justice, by defect of right in the poor person to whom it is given;

3. that it be given to another adequately, i.e., unto equality, so that as much is rendered as is owed. Thus if someone owes one hundred francs, he must render one hundred, neither more nor less: if less is rendered, justice is not preserved, because something owed remains; if more, the excess does not pertain to justice but to charity or liberality, or to vice.

By defect of the first condition, there is not justice of man toward himself;

by defect of the second condition, fidelity, gratitude, and liberality fall short of the character of strict justice, in which there is only a moral debt, though one obliging under sin;

by defect of the third condition, religion, piety, and observance do not pertain to strict justice, because we cannot render an equal thing to God, to parents, and to superiors.

Hence a) if the three conditions are present, there is justice in the proper, strict, and perfect sense;

b) if only the third is lacking, there is justice in the proper sense, but imperfect and according to something; - a fortiori, if the second is lacking, there is a greater recession from the character of justice, so that there can scarcely be speech of justice except in a very diminished sense;

c) if even the first is lacking, only metaphorical justice remains.

Therefore there is a threefold sense of the word "justice," but only the first is strictly so called.

137. Corollaries. - 1st. Justice, because it is toward another, supposes distinction of persons. For justice, because "it imports equality, by its own nature is toward another... And because it pertains to justice to rectify human acts, it is necessary that this equality which justice regards be of diverse persons capable of acting... But actions belong to persons and wholes, not, properly speaking, to parts and forms, or powers: for it is not properly said that the hand strikes, but that man strikes by the hand. Therefore justice properly so called requires diversity of persons, and therefore it exists only from one man to another" (q. 58, a. 2).

2nd. Therefore no one renders justice to himself, nor can he exercise justice or commit injustice toward himself, since he cannot be creditor to himself; and if this is sometimes said, it is a metaphorical locution. Nor does anyone, properly speaking, have rights toward himself; but rights and duties are so coordinated that to the right which inheres in someone, there corresponds a duty in another.⁵ "It pertains to justice to render his right to each one, yet presupposing diversity of one from another: for if he gives to himself what is due to himself (for example, necessary food), this is not properly called just" (q. 57, a. 4, ad 1).

⁵ Properly, there are not duties toward oneself, but toward God with respect to oneself.

3rd. Since justice supposes distinction of one from another, therefore a debt of justice strictly so called cannot intervene between son and father (servant and master, wife and husband), if they are considered as such: for thus the son is something of the father; but justice strictly so called can exist between them if they are regarded as men, as to those things which are common to all men, because thus each is something subsisting according to itself, distinct from others (q. 57, a. 4, ad 2).

4th. Justice renders right to each one, i.e., to another of whatever condition, whether he be superior, inferior, or equal.

5th. Justice differs from charity toward neighbor. Justice rests on the distinction of one man from another; charity, on the conjunction of men in God, or on the union between the lover and the beloved, whom the lover loves as another self. Namely, charity gives to the beloved other, not because it is owed, but because it is the good of the beloved. Whence man can also have charity toward himself, not justice.

6th. In God, justice properly so called cannot be given, because He is the absolute Lord of all, namely, who owes nothing to creatures, and consequently these can have no right properly so called in respect to God. Nevertheless, supposing that God wishes to act as if we had a right to our end and to the means necessary for this end, He owes it to Himself to preserve the mode of justice in His works, and in this sense a certain justice, and rather distributive than commutative, can be said to be in Him.

But strict justice toward God cannot be in us under the respect by which we are something of God (for example, servants or adoptive sons) (q. 57, a. 1, ad 3); but insofar as God leaves ourselves and those things which pertain to us under our own proper dominion, justice can exist in some way, yet not positively and according to the complete character, because we do not render to God as much as we owe, but partially and negatively, insofar as we do not violate but preserve the right of God; whence those who violate and injure it are guilty of injustice strictly so called.

138. Observation. - The definition handed down is verified both of the natural acquired virtue and of the supernatural infused virtue; but in the first case man renders to each one his right on account of the sole motive of natural honesty or conformity to right reason; in the other case he also acts from the supernatural motive of faith in order to a supernatural end.

248. Justice is divided into various parts. — In the virtues, especially the cardinal virtues, integral, subjective, and potential parts are distinguished. They are called integral by similitude to the integral parts of a body, without which the body is not perfect, and therefore they are conditions, acts, dispositions, without which the act or use of some virtue is not perfect. — Subjective parts are those into which virtue is divided as a genus into species. — Potential parts are so called by similitude to the powers of the soul, which have power from the soul but not its whole power; and therefore they are habits which agree in some respect with a cardinal virtue, but in another respect fall short of its perfect notion. They are also called annexed virtues, in which the proper notion of some virtue is present in some way, but deficiently.

Which these various parts are for the virtue of justice must now be declared.

S. Th. II-II, q. 79.

249. In every justice there are two integral parts: to decline from evil, not any evil whatever, but that which is harmful to another (whether to a particular person, or to society); and to do good, not any good whatever, but that which is due to another. These two are required for the perfect act of justice (whether general or particular), so that someone may be simply and perfectly just.

It is proved: For it pertains to justice to constitute and preserve equality in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, that is, by rendering to another what is due; and he preserves the already constituted equality of justice by declining from evil, that is, by inflicting no harm on another.

But it should be noted that to decline from evil does not import a pure negation or mere omission, namely, not to do evil (for this is not an act of virtue), but a positive movement of the will repudiating evil. And this act is the more imperfect and secondary act of justice, without which the other cannot be: to do good, which is the principal act and the completion of justice.

250. These integral parts are proper to justice itself. — Although every virtue declines from evil and does good, nevertheless these two are really distinguished only in the cardinal virtue of justice, and therefore they are integral parts of justice alone.

The name of justice seems to be derived from the just. But that is called just which is adequate and commensurate with its rule; whence justice in general is called whatever effects this adequation. - Hence sanctifying grace, and the complex of all virtues, and any good habit whatever, are accustomed and are able to be called justice; for in all these a certain adequation is had either with the ultimate end or with the total or partial rule of uprightness.

But in the stricter sense justice is defined by St. Thomas, after Ulpian: "The constant and perpetual will of rendering to each one his right." - It is called 1st. constant, because it is a habitual, deliberate, and firm purpose. - It is called 2nd. perpetual, not indeed on the part of the act, but on the part of the object, insofar as the just man wills that each one's right always be rendered to each one. - It is called 3rd. to each one, because justice is always toward another, and therefore requires diversity of persons; for no one can be called just toward himself or do injury to himself, because this is the violation of right, against another's will.

The definition of St. Thomas, a little changed by more recent authors, is presented thus: "A moral virtue inclining the will to rendering to each one his right constantly and perpetually according to equality." - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 58, art. 1. - Lugo, disp. 1, nn. 1 and seq. - Lessius, lib. 2, sect. 1, n. 1. - Crolly, vol. 1, nn. 17 and 22. - Scavini, lib. 2, tract. 6, n. 287.

Justice is distinguished fourfold, namely legal, distributive, vindicative, and commutative, not insofar as they are so many species of the same genus, but because the first three participate in some way in commutative justice, which alone is such strictly.

1st. Legal justice inclines each one to render to the society of which he is a part all the duties which are required by the common good. Hence it pertains both to the subject and to the Prince himself, insofar as it orders both to the community as a part to the whole. It is called legal, because its principal office is to promote the observance of laws by which the common good is procured. It is also called general, because there is no act of virtue which it cannot, and sometimes must, command on account of the common good. - But this virtue falls short of the nature of rigorous justice, both because it is not wholly toward another, since the part is not something altogether diverse from the whole, and because it does not regard right strictly so called, or the right of property. Hence those who do not observe the laws are called rebels or wicked, but not unjust. Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 58, art. 5. - Lugo, disp. 1, n. 68. - Crolly, vol. 1, nn. 36 and seq. - Baller., note (e), p. 473.

2nd. Distributive justice is that by which honors, offices, and common burdens are distributed among the members of society according to the due proportion of merits or faculties. It resides properly in the superior; nevertheless subjects also participate in it, not formally, but affectively, insofar as they acquiesce in the just distribution made by the superior; not otherwise than the guilty person who acquiesces in a just penalty exercises vindicative justice in his own way. - Yet observe that, if the discussion is about the distribution of honors and of other common goods, the debt is in the superior himself, as such, toward society, which alone has the right that honors be given to the more worthy, but not toward the more worthy themselves; and therefore no one has ever thought that the Prince is held to restitution toward someone, however much more worthy, because he has not conferred some common good or honor upon him. But if the discussion is about the distribution of burdens, often other justices concur: for on the part of the superior there exists the right of imposing necessary burdens, and on the part of subjects the debt of obeying the laws by which these burdens are imposed; and this is legal justice. Besides, the superior has the debt of imposing a proportionately greater burden on him who has greater faculties; and this is distributive justice, which he certainly would violate if, after a burden of ten, which otherwise is reputed just, has been imposed upon a rich citizen as one hundred, afterward he imposes the same burden upon another who is twice as rich.

Finally, commutative justice can concur, both if the superior exacts burdens not necessary from citizens, and if he oppresses some persons with unequal burdens. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 61, art. 1 and 2. - Lugo, disp. 1, n. 59. - Crolly, vol. 1, disp. 4, § 1, nn. 48 and seq.

3rd. Vindicative justice inclines the Prince to punish the guilty with congruous penalties for the good of society. Therefore it consists in the congruous punishment of the guilty for the public good, and it can easily be reduced to other justices: to legal justice, indeed, insofar as it promotes the common good; to distributive justice, insofar as it observes due proportion in inflicting penalties upon the guilty; and to commutative justice, insofar as the judge exercises it by office. For from all these things it comes about that punishment is called congruous; whence many do not hold vindicative justice as a peculiar species of justice distinct from the others. - Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 475.

4th. Commutative justice inclines the will to rendering to each private person his own strict right, by preserving equality of thing to thing, that is, of the thing rendered to the thing owed. This regards only private persons, as distinct from one another; and if sometimes it intervenes between the community and citizens, this happens where the community conducts itself or is taken not as a whole, but as a part or particular person which by contract or quasi-contract is obligated to another particular person. But it is called commutative because it is chiefly concerned with exchanges and contracts. Of this alone we shall treat, because it alone claims for itself the name of justice in the strict sense.

Justice, as such, is divided into general or legal, by which it orders citizens to the general or common good, as parts to the whole, and particular, which orders citizen to citizen³¹⁹. ³¹⁹ Ibid., a. 5, o.

I say 2°: Particular justice is adequately subdivided into commutative and distributive, as into essentially distinct species^{320 320} Hic q. 61, a. 1, c. and ad 5.

Proof. first part³²¹. Particular justice is the virtue by which one is ordered to some particular person. Now the order of one to another particular is twofold, namely either of part to part, or of whole to part. The first commutative justice directs, the second distributive. Therefore. ³²¹ Ibid., o.

Proof. second part³²². 1° Since it pertains to the reason of justice that one render what is owed to another, where there is found a special reason of debt to some person, there is a special virtue. Now in commutative and distributive justice a special reason of debt is found. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. In commutative justice there is rendered to each what is his and simply owed, namely what is proper and appropriated to him and within his dominion, although held by another. In distributive justice truly there is rendered to each what is his and owed, not simply, but secundum quid, by the right namely of condignity and of the community of which he is a part ; for the things of the whole are, in a certain way, the things of the parts. Now this reason of debt is diverse, as is plain. For in one way is owed the thing which is the creditor's own and already committed to his dominion ; in another because it belongs to the whole community of which he is a member, and for that reason, his condignity being considered, he has the right that it become his own. Therefore. ³²² Ibid., ad 5.

Nota. And this is the reason why violation of commutative justice induces the obligation of restitution, not violation of distributive justice precisely qua such.

Proof. 2°. The general form of justice is equality³²³. Now a diverse equality is found in commutative and distributive justice. Therefore. — Proof. of the minor. In commutative justice there is an absolute equality of thing to thing, which is called arithmetical proportion, as if you owe a hundred, you render a hundred ; in distributive there is an equality not absolute, but of proportion, which is called geometrical, as if, v. g., in the distribution of the common good ten coins be given to him who has six degrees of merit, five be given to him who has three degrees. Therefore. ³²³ Ibid., a. 2, c. and ad 2.

You will ask whether between father and son not emancipated, between master and slave, between husband and wife there is justice properly so called.

I answer. There is justice properly so called, yet not altogether perfect³²⁴ ; because, although the son, as son, is something of the father, as a part of him, the slave something of the master, as his instrument, the wife something of the husband, who is her head and to whom she is subject, from which aspect there is not between them perfect justice toward another : nevertheless, insofar as these men are distinct supposita, the son from the father, the slave from the master, the wife from the husband ; justice under that aspect is toward another, and thus the reason of justice properly so called is saved, though not altogether perfect. ³²⁴ Hic q. 57, a. 4, o.

III. QUESTION I. What is justice, and of how many kinds is it? ANSWER. It is the perpetual and constant will of rendering to each his right. It is threefold: commutative, distributive, and legal. Commutative justice is between two equal men buying, selling, letting, and so forth. For in these contracts they are equals, even though on other grounds the one were a prince and the other a subject. Distributive justice is of the whole toward the parts, namely of the prince toward his subjects in distributing ranks, dignities, rewards, and the like. Legal justice is of the part toward the whole, that is, of subjects toward the prince, inasmuch as all render those things which are fitting to the community by the prescript of the laws. That this legal justice is not justice in the whole rigour of the term the Salmanticenses and others contend; but the opposite opinion is to me the more probable.

IV. Distributive justice distributes the goods of the community among the parts of the same community according to the proportion of merits. This virtue of justice resides in the superior, whose office it is to distribute the common goods; it is found also in subjects, inasmuch as they acquiesce in this justice. The mean of the thing which this justice regards is not one of arithmetical equality, but of geometrical proportion: which proportion holds between the goods to be distributed and the merits of the subjects.

V. QUESTION II. Whether commutative justice is distinguished from vindicative justice? ANSWER. Commutative justice, as has been said, renders to each his own thing according to the right which he has of exacting it; for it establishes an equality between debt and credit, which arises out of buyings, sellings, loans, and the remaining contracts; likewise out of thefts, homicides, and other injuries, whose damage is to be compensated. The principal act of commutative justice is restitution.

VI. Vindicative justice can be regarded either in the judge or prince, or in the private persons injured, who demand vengeance. Under the former consideration it is an act of true commutative justice; but in the persons injured it is not true justice, but a potential part of the same, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 80, art. 1, reply 1. The reason of the first part is evident. For the judge is bound by force of commutative justice not only to provide for the common good, but also to defend his subjects from injuries and oppressions. There is present besides a mean of the thing. For the judge is bound to inflict a penalty equalling the right of the offended person that has been injured. The second part is plain of itself.

VII. QUESTION III. Is commutative justice distinguished in species from distributive justice? ANSWER. The common opinion affirms it. Since indeed the specific diversity of virtues is taken from the formal diversity of objects. But each of these virtues regards a formally diverse object. Therefore a specific diversity resides between them. For the object of the virtue of justice is a right and an equality to be constituted between the right of one and the debt of another. Commutative justice regards arithmetical equality, distributive geometrical. The right of commutative justice is a rigorous right; the right of distributive justice is imperfect, founded not in the thing or to the thing, as the former, but in fitness and personal capacity. The first justice regards the price of the thing; the other the prerogatives of the person, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 61, art. 1.

VIII. It is to be observed nevertheless that distributive justice almost always has commutative justice inseparable from it. On which matter read Vol. VII, book 2, dissertation 1, chapter 4, no. 10.

ALL Theologians, Jurists, and Philosophers hold that Ius is the object of the Virtue of Justice: but one must diligently see which Ius is established as the object of this virtue; and which Virtue Justice is understood to be by us; for each can be taken in many ways.

FOR JUSTICE is taken chiefly in three ways. First, for the habit by which we are made suited to all things equitable, both in order to ourselves, and in order to God and others: thus it is taken by all Philosophers, but more by Theologians, who understand in this sense what is delivered universally in the Scriptures, when someone is named just, namely endowed with all the virtues, which is everywhere met with, where they name Just men heroes, as Genes. 6. Noë a just man Genes. 6. Iob. 1. Eccles. 40. et seq. as the Saintly Doctor observes everywhere. The Doctor interprets it at ad 3. Luca:¹ Make straight your paths, according to 16. Isa. The path of the just is right. Prouerb. 4. I led thee by the paths of equity. So Prouerb. 8. I walk in the ways of justice. So Gregory of Nyssa, lib. de beat. oratione 4. understands it Matth. 5. Blessed who hunger and thirst after justice, in which sense it is taken also by St. Augustine at that place, cited by St. Bonaventure 3. p. Centiloquii, sect. 44. and lib. 2. Pharet. cap. 42. ¹ Editor's note: the print reads 'Ided ad 3. Luca interpretatur id'; 'Ided' is unintelligible and is rendered 'Ideo' (therefore), as a new clause begins.

IN like manner Justice is taken for the habit infused with sanctifying grace, by which one is constituted just, and holy, endowed with all the virtues. So Rom. 3. But the justice of God, by the faith of Jesus Christ, unto all who believe in him. Which is called the justice of God, not formally, but efficiently from God, or the gift of God, as St. Augustine teaches lib. de Spiritu, et litt. cap. 9. and the Holy Council of Trent often inculcates, and gravely defines, as I showed Tract. de Gratia, disp. 2.

THEREFORE we do not take justice in so general a sense, but as it is a particular virtue among the four Cardinal ones, whose proper praise and office is to constitute the due equality between men, as the Saintly Doctor notes in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. et in quaestionibus passim, et in 4. dist. 15. passim et 3. p. Cencil. sect. 44. et 5. p. Breuil. cap. 4. et lib. 2. Phar. cap. 42. et in Diata, tit. 5. cap. 8.

WISDOM takes it thus, c. 8. where it is said, to teach Soberness, and Wisdom, Justice and Virtue; where it calls Soberness Temperance; for Wisdom it understands Prudence; for Virtue, Fortitude; but it takes Justice for the Virtue of Justice, which is the second Cardinal virtue among those, as Gregory of Valencia notes disp. 5. quaest. 1. puncto 1. after St. Bonaventure in the Commentary on that place.

THIRDLY, in another mode the Saintly Doctor takes it in 3. § dist. 33. dub. 1. litt. et in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 31. for the judicial, coercing with punishments; But this is a species of the Cardinal, as I shall say; nevertheless all commonly call it this, when it is said: Justice inquired into Peter, punishes; or: Peter is afflicted in Justice.

¶ Further, Ius also can be taken in many ways.

¶ First, whatever in any mode is equitable, or good, as the Jurist Paulus says l. Ius, ff. de Iustitia, et Iure.

¶ Second, it signifies whatever is conformable to law, as the Philosopher says 5. Eth. cap. 1. In which way St. Isidore said lib. 5. Ethymol. cap. 3. that Law is a kind of species (that is, norm, or idea) of Ius, according to the doctrine of St. Thom. art. 1. ad 2.

¶ Third, it signifies the lawful faculty, or power of doing, or acquiring, or possessing, or alienating something, as the Jurists distinguish between Ius ad rem, which is owed to someone; and Ius in re, which someone also possesses.

¶ Fourth, it is taken for the Sentence of a judge, as the Jurist Paulus has it loco citato.

¶ Fifth, it signifies the same as Lex, that is, the dictamen of prudence, whether natural, or in habit, or the authority for making laws, in which way Ius is divided into the Natural of nations, and Civil, by Ulpian in l. Iuri, et often by St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 36. quaest. 1. et 3. p. Centil. cap. 44. et other places, cited in the tract. de Legibus.

¶ In none of the said modes, or the others enumerated by Valencia, is Ius taken here, but it is taken for the same as Iustum, through equality with another. Hence Scotus lib. 3. de Iustitia, et Iure, quaest. 1. art. 1. says that Ius, by APOCOPE, is said as it were iustum: Whence also in Greek Ius and Iustum are expressed by the same word δίκαιον. The ethymology of which word Ius properly sounds, to be just through the equality of thing with thing. For, as the Philosopher says 5. Eth. cap. 4. on that account it is called ius δίκαιον, because it is δίχα, that is, divided in two, as if to say bipartite; and what is divided in two is divided into equal parts according to the ratio of discrete quantity, inasmuch as it is divided into one and one. Whence, and Iudex, as Aristotle says in the same place, because he determines the just through the equality of thing with thing, is called Bipartitor. And by this reason Justice is called Equity. Thus Proverb. 8. Mine is Equity, mine is Prudence, mine is Fortitude, as the Saintly Doctor observes ad cap. 8. Sapientiae.

¶ Aristotle also used Ius in this sense cap. 4. when he said: Ius, which is in exchanges, is a certain constant equality according to Arithmetic proportion; but that ius, which is in distributions, he had said cap. 3. according to Geometric proportion.

¶ Moderns labor in this ius, which is the object of Justice, in making it clear; and as I see, Mastrius observes the matter Tom. 2. disp. 7. num. 163. saying, that it is That which constitutes dominion, which is twofold, of Jurisdiction, and of Property. This dominion however is defined by the Jurists: The faculty of using a thing at pleasure, without injury to another. In which definition, says Hurtado disp. 12. de Incarn. sect. 3. a circle is committed; for also in defining injury, they say it is the use of a thing against the right and will of the Lord. Thus Ius is defined through Injury, and this through Ius, which is to run in a circle against Aristotle 5. Metaph. cap. 15. Hence Cardinal Lugo disp. 1. de Iustitia, et disp. 3. de Incarn. sect. 2. num. 42. teaches, that this ius, which is the object of Justice, is nothing else than a certain moral prelation, by which this man is morally preferred to others in the use of this thing, by reason of a peculiar connexion, which the thing has with him. Which explanation Bellutus also embraces disp. 7. de Incarn. quaest 6. art. 1. and Mastrius num. 164. He adds, however, that this prelation must be explained, from what head it arises, namely from the disposition of laws, or the nature of the thing. Thus it is explained a priori.

¶ I indeed, weighing this new invention, find that all of these relapse into the same circle; for the Praelation in the use of a thing is an effect of ius. For each one is preferred in the use of a thing, namely a house, a garment, etc. because he has right to it before others, and so Ius is the fountain and cause of that prelation, and therefore ius is not expressed a priori. Again therefore if you seek the origin of that prelation, it must be taken a priori from ius; and so they walk in a circle.

¶ Tanner therefore disp. 4. quaest. 1. dub. 2. n. 8. says, that Ius in re, in the mode of dominion, can scarcely be explicated by any common concept, since it is an analogon of proportionality to its inferiors, such as the dominion of Jurisdiction, and of Property, of which I shall treat in the Disputationes de Furto, et Rapina.

¶ These things pre-stated, it is now established that the object of the Justice of which we treat is Ius, that is, as he says, the Iustum through a certain equality.

¶ It is proved first from the definition of Justice; which is defined through such Ius, as through its proper object. So Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. We see, that this kind of habit is wont to be called Justice; from which men are made suited to doing just things. And cap 5. Justice is that by which the just man is called the doer of the just from election. Where he takes iustum for the equal.

¶ The Jurists also with the words of Ulpian l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et Iure, define Justice thus: Justice is a constant, and perpetual will of rendering to each his ius. Which definition St. Thom. also sets forth quaest. 58. art 1. and St. Bonaventure 3. p. Centil. sect. 44. where he asserts it to be of the Masters.

¶ So also St. Ambrose lib. 1. de offic. cap. 24. says: Justice renders to each his own ius, does not claim another's, neglects his own utility, and keeps the common equity. And St. Augustine lib. 19. de civit. cap. 21. There is not (he says) ius, where there is no justice: Justice moreover is that virtue which distributes to each his own,² So also St. Bonaventure reports loco citato. ² Editor's note: the print reads 'quae sua nique distribuit'; 'nique' is corrupt (apparently for 'unicuique'); rendered 'sua unicuique distribuit' (distributes to each his own).

¶ It is proved secondly by St. Bonaventure in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 8. That is the object of Justice, which constitutes the virtue, standing in the mean, not declining to the vicious extremes through excess, and defect: Such is ius, or iustum: Therefore. The Major is Aristotle's 2. Eth. cap. 6. The Minor is proved; For then is one sinning against justice, when more or less is given than is owed. But the mean is the equitable, as Aristotle shows 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4. cited by St. Bonaventure loc. cit. He says. Thus cap. 4. he says: Whence when men contend, they flee to the judge, etc. and they seek a judge in the mean, and some call him mediator, as if, should they have attained the mean, they should also attain the ius itself. Ius therefore is a certain mean, if indeed the judge also is in the mean; But the judge reduces to equality; and as, if a line be divided into two unequal parts, that by which the greater part exceeds the half, he takes from it, and joins to the lesser.

¶ The Saintly Doctor expounds it with an elegant Astronomical example: For as he says the Polar star, near the pole, is borne with a small gyre in the diurnal motion around the Pole; yet so, that it does not recede from the middle, that is, from the pole of the world; so also created Justice gyrates closely around the immovable Justice of God: And as, not declining, it keeps the straightness of the diurnal motion; so that as the line of the Equator in the middle of its circulation describes the Highest circle, on that account it does not allow the gyrating stars to decline to the right, or to the left, that is, toward the South, nor toward the North; although it is borne through the immense space of 1017. Millions of miles; so also Justice, keeping the equatorial line of equity, does not allow the various things snatched by the first mobile to decline from East to West, either to the right of excess, or to the left of defect, giving more to one; and taking from the other.

From these the Saintly Doctor draws, in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. and 5. p. Brevil. cap. 4. with St. Thomas as cited by Cajetan art. 1. and Valencia p. 1. at the end. And Soto lib. 3. de Iustitia, quaest. 1. art. 1. the difference between justice and the other moral virtues; for Justice according to its proper reason makes right in order to another; but the others only in order to oneself. On this account St. Ambrose lib. 1. offic. cap. 28. says, that Justice is born rather for others than for itself. So also Cicero lib. 2. de Republica, and Seneca epist. 77. as the Saintly Doctor teaches in Pharetra, lib. 1. cap. 42.

It is GATHERED also, that the mean of Justice is the mean of the thing, even without comparison to the very agent; but of the other virtues, which turn about their own passions, and not about another, in no way does it consist in a mean without comparison to the very agent. But that equality is that very ius, which is called equitable between too much and too little, as Aristotle says 5. Eth. cap. 4.

This shines still more in that example of the Seraphic Doctor: For as without any thinking there is the pole, upon which the heaven moves, and the polar star; which, its small diurnal circle having been described around the pole, they keep the motion of both Hemispheres by the line of the Equator, the substance of the heaven being kept on both sides for each Hemisphere Mathematically; so also Justice, before every thought, and before all its operation, has that object alone, and only to be kept, which is not found in the other moral virtues.

HENCE also it is, that in the Disputation on Justice there is first treated of its object; then of the Virtue, because the object is presupposed before the virtue; not so in the other moral virtues. See Valencia at the end of the punctus.

IT MUST however be observed, that Ius, which is the object of Justice, includes two things; First, that it be owed: Second, that it be equal.

INASMUCH as it is owed, it can be either owed Legally by the force of some Law, or singular, arising from some pact, or convention of certain persons, such as is between buyer and seller.

SECONDLY Ius, inasmuch as it is owed, is divided into natural Ius and human Ius. The owed thing of the first kind arises from the law of nature, namely, that if you give a measure of wheat as a loan; that he render that measure to you. This however is distinguished threefold by St. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 33. quaest. 1. The first is called that which is contained in the Law, and the Gospel, and this is called natural Ius commonly. The second is proper, and is defined at the beginning of the Decretals: Natural ius is that which is common to all nations; and this ius is that which reason dictates. The third, most proper, which nature taught all animals.

The owed thing from human law is, what has been established by some human law, as that between certain things vendible, and that price which is fixed by human law, it be the only price.

From the other head, however, inasmuch as it is something just, and equal; It is divided first by Aristotle lib. 5. Eth. cap. 3. et 4. into Ius, or the equal Geometric; and Arithmetic. The Geometric equal, which is according to proportion, is observed in the distribution of common goods among those who are members of the community, so that by as much as one surpasses another in merits, by the same proportion he may receive more of the goods of the community. But Aristotle says that Ius is exercised through Arithmetic equality, both in exchanges, which are done voluntarily between men, as in buying, selling, exchange, etc. and in compensating, or making amends for the dealings of men involuntary, and those without clandestine acts, as theft, adultery, poisoning, pandering, the seduction of servants, deceitful homicide, false witness, etc. or manifestly violent, as flogging, captivity, slaughter, rapine, mutilation, reviling, contumely, etc. which examples the Philosopher brings in that cap. 2. and through this are distinguished two species of Justice properly so called, namely Distributive, and Commutative, which I exposed at length p. 1. Tract. 1. disput. 19. quaest. 1. et 2.

SECONDLY Ius, inasmuch as it is equal, is divided into Ius, or the iustum simply, and Ius secundum quid. Ius simply is, what is altogether equal, or by which those are made equal between whom it is; and because equality is between distinct ones, therefore this equal is between those, of whom one is not a part of the other, as between two citizens, and it is called Political Ius. Ius secundum quid equal, is between those, of whom one is a part of the other, as between Father, and son, who is a part of the Father, since from his seed, as Aristotle teaches 8. Eth. cap. 12. So between Lord, and servant, who is something of the Lord, namely his instrument, and a part in goods, as Aristotle teaches 1. Polit. cap. 3. Such is also that between Husband, and Wife, as Aristotle says, because whichever spouse is of the other, as is gathered from the Philosopher 6. Eth. cap. 5. and more from Matth. 19. Ephes. 5. For they are one flesh, and on that account that ius is called by St. Thomas here, art. 4. Oeconomicum, and some dominion intervenes in bodies, and some other things, as St. Bonaventure teaches in 4. dist. 41. quaest. ult. Such improper ius seems to be also between citizen, and community, of which he is a part.

THEY DISPUTE: Whether this improper ius is also on the part of the father toward the son, since the father is not a part of the son. They respond affirmatively, Cajetan art. 4. Valencia punct. 2. for whatever pertains to the whole, pertains also to the part. Hence it comes about, that what the son renders to the father, he renders also to himself.

THEY ALSO DOUBT: Whether the son, even when emancipated, ought to be included under this improper ius. It is answered, that he is included by the reason made above, because to be a part of the Father came to him from generation, which always keeps sons, that they may be as it were other Fathers, as Aristotle says 8. Eth. cap. 11.

D. Bonav. brings forward VARIOUS definitions of Justice in various places in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. litt. et 3. p. Centil. sect. 44. In Dieta tit. 5. cap. 8. et ad 3. et 20. Lucae et lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 42.

The FIRST is taken from Tully in the first book of the Rhetoric: Justice is a habit of mind, which, preserving the common utility, assigns to each his own dignity.

The SECOND is in Macrobius: Justice is to preserve for each what is his own.

The THIRD is from D. August. de lib. arb. What shall I say justice is, but the virtue by which each is given his own? And lib. 19. de civitate, cap. 21. Justice is the virtue which distributes to each his own. D. Bernardus has the same serm. 3. in adventu Domini, and the Gloss Matth. 5. I referred to other definitions above.

But the definition more commonly received, which D. Bonav. says belongs to the Masters, is that of Ulpianus, l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et iure: Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each his right. D. Thom. approves this quaest. 58. art. 1. and the Doctors commonly.