Chapter II: Offices of Distributive Justice

Distributive justice, in an equal proportion, which varies according to the nature of the things and of Society itself, as far as the common good allows it, directly distributes common goods, and indirectly common burdens, among citizens. Through it, in this way, Society renders to its members what is owed to them as such.

1. We say that the proportion must be observed as far as the common good allows this, because the things of which there is question are destined first of all to the community, and therefore can reach private persons only with that destination preserved. Therefore distributive justice is in a certain way subordinated to legal justice, so that citizens must not rarely tolerate the very inequality which the common good has demanded.

2. Moreover, since only goods are of themselves desirable, through the distribution of goods alone does Society directly render to its members what it owes them. Yet indirectly it is advantageous not to be too much burdened; and so the equal distribution of burdens itself is commanded by distributive justice.

Indeed, since public power can deprive citizens of their goods only on account of the common good, an inequitable distribution of burdens would offend commutative justice itself.

We have said that material rules vary according to the various society. For in a society of autocratic government, it can happen that all public functions are judged to be in the possession of the monarch, who therefore can legitimately exercise them through suitable persons, but persons acceptable to himself; in an aristocratic society, the ratio of equal distribution will have to be accommodated to privileges. But in our societies, citizens are equal by right, and public offices must be placed among common goods. Therefore these will have to be distributed, not according to the political parties to which citizens belong, but according to the title which exists in them.

The title itself will vary according to the nature of the goods. Hence: a) if goods, such as public offices, even after they have been assigned to one person, retain a principal relation to the common good, they will always have to be conferred first of all with regard to the republic. Therefore all those things must be observed in candidates for offices which permit one to hope for a better procuration of the office, and, other things being equal, account will have to be taken of merits, because offices also possess some ratio of reward; b) if, concerning certain utilities deservedly hoped for from the community, all citizens are pressed by the same necessity in species, even if perhaps not in the same degree, e.g. if there is question of protecting quiet possession of rights and goods, this will have to be furnished equally to all according to the quantity of goods and rights which are exposed to danger, unless nevertheless the particular necessity of certain persons imposes greater solicitude; c) the means by which excessive misery is repelled will have to be procured more for the indigent; and the means by which the arts and science are promoted will have to be procured more for the deserving.

Distributive justice, in an equable proportion, directly distributes common goods, indirectly common burdens, among citizens.

Because it distributes common goods, which by their first destination ought to serve the community, that equality must be observed as far as the common good allows it. Among those goods today public offices also must be counted, which therefore must be conferred, not according to the parties to which citizens belong, but, with the common good preserved, according to the title which exists in the citizens.