Chapter I. On The Notion Of The Virtue Of Justice

70. The name of justice is taken in diverse ways, and indeed:

1. In the broadest sense, for the complex of all virtues, or for total and integral moral rectitude (Rechtschaffenheit). In this acceptation it is said: "Blessed are they who hunger and thirst after justice."¹²⁸ "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven."¹²⁹

2. In a broad sense, for justification or the state of sanctifying grace (Rechtfertigung). Thus it is said: "Abraham believed God, and it was reputed to him unto justice."¹³⁰

3. In the strict and proper sense, for a special cardinal virtue. Thus accepted, it can be defined: "the constant and perpetual will of granting to each his own right"; or a little more broadly: a moral virtue inclining the will to rendering to each his own strict right; or according to St. Thomas:¹³¹ "a habit according to which someone, with a constant and perpetual will, grants to each his own right." This definition handed down in the first place is already found in Ulpian¹³² and has always been held as good.

It Is Explained. It is said, first: constant and perpetual will, by which words it is signified that justice is a habit which resides in the will as in its subject and renders it stable and apt for acting perpetually according to justice. Therefore the virtue of justice is not yet present if a man acts justly once or a second time,¹³³ - for this can happen without virtue from natural inclination alone - but if always and everywhere he renders to each one what is his own. It is said, second: of granting to each his own right. For right is the proper object of justice, which renders to each all things which are owed to him in the strict sense. But I say "owed in the strict sense"; for it does not pertain to justice itself to pay a debt in the broad sense, which is rather a certain fittingness. For this pertains to other virtues annexed to justice, as will be said below, n. 73.

The distinction between the virtue of justice and other virtues. From the definition thus explained, the distinction between the virtue of justice and other virtues appears. For justice is distinguished 1. from the other moral virtues both by reason of object and by reason of subject. The object of prudence is practical truth; the object of fortitude and temperance are passions to be moderated; but the formal object of justice is the good and just thing owed to another. The subject of prudence is the intellect; the subject of fortitude and temperance is the sensitive appetite; but the subject of justice is the will.¹³⁴ It is distinguished 2. from the theological virtues, inasmuch as these are always infused and directly have God as object. - Especially to be noted is the distinction between justice and charity toward neighbor. Each virtue, certainly, is toward another, as they say, namely toward neighbor; but in one way and another. If I exercise a work of charity, I give to my neighbor what is mine; but if I exercise a work of justice, I give to my neighbor what is his own. For charity rests altogether upon conjunction between the lover and the beloved. Whence he who rightly loves his neighbor loves him as another self. But justice, on the contrary, rests upon the distinction of one man from another. For each man has his own independence and his own inviolable rights. And so a man can indeed injure charity toward himself, but not justice (properly so called).¹³⁵ To acknowledge the rights of others and not to violate them is the office of justice. Certainly in itself and by reason of object charity far surpasses justice, but the obligation of justice is customarily stricter than the obligation of charity, which admits a certain latitude. Justice does not regard the diverse conditions of persons, but only the thing owed; and therefore it matters little, for example, whether someone is poor or rich, or noble, for he is always bound to render right to each one; and conversely anyone whose right has been injured can demand reparation of the injured right. Whence in justice there must be observed not only the mean of reason, as in all other virtues, but also the mean of the thing.

¹²⁸ Matt. 5, 6.

¹²⁹ Matt. 5, 20.

¹³⁰ Rom. 4, 3.

¹³¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 58, a. 1.

¹³² L. 10, Dig. 1, 1 (lib. primo Regularum).

¹³³ Cf. S. theol. l. c. ad 3.

¹³⁴ Cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 4.

¹³⁵ Cf. ib. a. 2. In a broader sense a man can also commit injury against himself, for example against his own body.