Question II: What justice is

D. Bonav. brings forward VARIOUS definitions of Justice in various places in 3. dist. 33. dub. 1. litt. et 3. p. Centil. sect. 44. In Dieta tit. 5. cap. 8. et ad 3. et 20. Lucae et lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 42.

The FIRST is taken from Tully in the first book of the Rhetoric: Justice is a habit of mind, which, preserving the common utility, assigns to each his own dignity.

The SECOND is in Macrobius: Justice is to preserve for each what is his own.

The THIRD is from D. August. de lib. arb. What shall I say justice is, but the virtue by which each is given his own? And lib. 19. de civitate, cap. 21. Justice is the virtue which distributes to each his own. D. Bernardus has the same serm. 3. in adventu Domini, and the Gloss Matth. 5. I referred to other definitions above.

But the definition more commonly received, which D. Bonav. says belongs to the Masters, is that of Ulpianus, l. Iustitia, ff. de Iustitia, et iure: Justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each his right. D. Thom. approves this quaest. 58. art. 1. and the Doctors commonly.

It is called will, not formally, but causally, as if it said: Justice is a habit which produces a voluntary act, one of election; for it belongs to the nature of virtue that it be a voluntary act, as Aristotle teaches lib. 2. Eth. cap. 4. and it is proper to Justice to rectify the will in order to the right of another, as D. Bonav. teaches 3. p. Brevil. cap. 4.

It is said to be constant and perpetual, because Justice has a firm and stable act, namely to operate constantly and immovably, as virtue operates, from Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 4. D. Thom. ad 4. and D. Bonav. in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 31. where on that account he compares Justice to the polar star. By right is understood the just, according to equality, as I explained quaest. 1. By the particle his own is signified that which is due to each according to the laws, as D. Bonav. explains in the places cited, D. Th. art. 11. By the last word rendering is understood not only the very act of rendering to each his right, according to the form of just distribution or commutation; but also the omission of injury; since it belongs to the same virtue to do good in its proper matter and to omit the contrary evil, as Ulpianus says immediately after this definition. Wherefore Buridanus does not rightly find fault with this definition, as though it did not posit the adequate object of Justice, which includes also not injuring.