Article I. On the Nature of Justice

The name of justice seems to be derived from the just. But that is called just which is adequate and commensurate with its rule; whence justice in general is called whatever effects this adequation. - Hence sanctifying grace, and the complex of all virtues, and any good habit whatever, are accustomed and are able to be called justice; for in all these a certain adequation is had either with the ultimate end or with the total or partial rule of uprightness.

But in the stricter sense justice is defined by St. Thomas, after Ulpian: "The constant and perpetual will of rendering to each one his right." - It is called 1st. constant, because it is a habitual, deliberate, and firm purpose. - It is called 2nd. perpetual, not indeed on the part of the act, but on the part of the object, insofar as the just man wills that each one's right always be rendered to each one. - It is called 3rd. to each one, because justice is always toward another, and therefore requires diversity of persons; for no one can be called just toward himself or do injury to himself, because this is the violation of right, against another's will.

The definition of St. Thomas, a little changed by more recent authors, is presented thus: "A moral virtue inclining the will to rendering to each one his right constantly and perpetually according to equality." - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 58, art. 1. - Lugo, disp. 1, nn. 1 and seq. - Lessius, lib. 2, sect. 1, n. 1. - Crolly, vol. 1, nn. 17 and 22. - Scavini, lib. 2, tract. 6, n. 287.

Justice is distinguished fourfold, namely legal, distributive, vindicative, and commutative, not insofar as they are so many species of the same genus, but because the first three participate in some way in commutative justice, which alone is such strictly.

1st. Legal justice inclines each one to render to the society of which he is a part all the duties which are required by the common good. Hence it pertains both to the subject and to the Prince himself, insofar as it orders both to the community as a part to the whole. It is called legal, because its principal office is to promote the observance of laws by which the common good is procured. It is also called general, because there is no act of virtue which it cannot, and sometimes must, command on account of the common good. - But this virtue falls short of the nature of rigorous justice, both because it is not wholly toward another, since the part is not something altogether diverse from the whole, and because it does not regard right strictly so called, or the right of property. Hence those who do not observe the laws are called rebels or wicked, but not unjust. Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 58, art. 5. - Lugo, disp. 1, n. 68. - Crolly, vol. 1, nn. 36 and seq. - Baller., note (e), p. 473.

2nd. Distributive justice is that by which honors, offices, and common burdens are distributed among the members of society according to the due proportion of merits or faculties. It resides properly in the superior; nevertheless subjects also participate in it, not formally, but affectively, insofar as they acquiesce in the just distribution made by the superior; not otherwise than the guilty person who acquiesces in a just penalty exercises vindicative justice in his own way. - Yet observe that, if the discussion is about the distribution of honors and of other common goods, the debt is in the superior himself, as such, toward society, which alone has the right that honors be given to the more worthy, but not toward the more worthy themselves; and therefore no one has ever thought that the Prince is held to restitution toward someone, however much more worthy, because he has not conferred some common good or honor upon him. But if the discussion is about the distribution of burdens, often other justices concur: for on the part of the superior there exists the right of imposing necessary burdens, and on the part of subjects the debt of obeying the laws by which these burdens are imposed; and this is legal justice. Besides, the superior has the debt of imposing a proportionately greater burden on him who has greater faculties; and this is distributive justice, which he certainly would violate if, after a burden of ten, which otherwise is reputed just, has been imposed upon a rich citizen as one hundred, afterward he imposes the same burden upon another who is twice as rich.

Finally, commutative justice can concur, both if the superior exacts burdens not necessary from citizens, and if he oppresses some persons with unequal burdens. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 61, art. 1 and 2. - Lugo, disp. 1, n. 59. - Crolly, vol. 1, disp. 4, § 1, nn. 48 and seq.

3rd. Vindicative justice inclines the Prince to punish the guilty with congruous penalties for the good of society. Therefore it consists in the congruous punishment of the guilty for the public good, and it can easily be reduced to other justices: to legal justice, indeed, insofar as it promotes the common good; to distributive justice, insofar as it observes due proportion in inflicting penalties upon the guilty; and to commutative justice, insofar as the judge exercises it by office. For from all these things it comes about that punishment is called congruous; whence many do not hold vindicative justice as a peculiar species of justice distinct from the others. - Cf. Baller., note (b), p. 475.

4th. Commutative justice inclines the will to rendering to each private person his own strict right, by preserving equality of thing to thing, that is, of the thing rendered to the thing owed. This regards only private persons, as distinct from one another; and if sometimes it intervenes between the community and citizens, this happens where the community conducts itself or is taken not as a whole, but as a part or particular person which by contract or quasi-contract is obligated to another particular person. But it is called commutative because it is chiefly concerned with exchanges and contracts. Of this alone we shall treat, because it alone claims for itself the name of justice in the strict sense.