Question One: On the Notion and Definition of Justice

St. Th. II-II, q. 57, a. 1; q. 58, a. 1 and 2.

134. Justice according to the name is a habit which inclines one to doing what is just (recht-vaardigheid). Etymologically it is from just;¹ what is adequate or commensurate and adjusted to another, and it imports a certain equality: for commonly those things which are made equal are said to be adjusted;² but equality is toward another, for nothing is equal to itself but to another, and therefore justice in the proper sense, by its own nature, signifies the special virtue which renders us equal to another, or which orders man, in those things which are toward another, as he ought, and inclines him to rendering to each one what is his, up to equality.

¹ In Greek, dikaios, as if divided in two, imports equality of thing to thing, according to Aristotle, V Eth., c. 7.

² Thus they are said: just parts, a just measure, a just price, a just petition.

Nevertheless, according to a likeness, in one and the same man diverse principles of actions are considered as if they were diverse agents; and therefore metaphorically justice is said to be in one and the same man, insofar as reason commands the other faculties and these obey reason as they ought, according as to each part of man there is attributed what is suitable and due to it. Thus justice consists in the due ordering of the parts of the soul and in adequation or conformity to its rule (gerechtigheid), and thus it includes every virtue.

Hence in sacred usage justice is more often taken in a metaphorical and general sense, and signifies:

1. either holiness, or the complex of all virtues by which we are made adequate to the divine rule or law (Mt. V, 6; I, 19; "original justice"; S. Th. II-II, q. 79, a. 1);

2. or any act of virtue and all good works (Mt. VI, 1; V, 20; Prov. VIII, 20);

3. or the root of justice, namely, justification, in which grace making one pleasing and the virtues are infused (Rom. IV, 3; V, 17 and throughout); - but

4. also it is sometimes taken in the strict sense, as the special virtue of justice (Acts XVII, 31: "He will judge the world in equity," Greek dikaiosyne = in justice strictly so called).

135. Justice according to the thing, as a special virtue, is usually defined from Ulpian: The perpetual and constant will of giving to each one his right, where perpetual and constant will is not put for the power of willing, or for a passing act, but for a habit inhering in the soul by which the will perpetually and constantly wills. For stable will is required for virtue, which immovably operates the good; and this cannot exist without habit. Whence, if someone wished to put the definition in due form, he could say with St. Thomas: A habit according to which someone, with constant and perpetual will, gives his right to each one (q. 58, a. 1), or with more recent authors: a virtue inclining the will to rendering to another his right unto equality. It is said:

1. habit, i.e., a firm and permanent disposition which inclines the power to operating either well or badly, and thus is distinguished from a power and from an act, because it mediates between each;

2. by which with constant and perpetual will: for he who would wish to render right only by turns, for a time, or only in some business, and only to certain persons, could by no means be called endowed with justice.³ Whence will is required:

³ Otherwise this can be without habit, from natural inclination alone.

a) perpetual, not on the part of the act, as if it were to endure perpetually, but on the part of the object, insofar as the just man has the purpose of preserving justice at every time and in every business;

b) moreover constant (which is not the same as perpetual) on the part of the subject, namely, of the will itself, insofar as it firmly perseveres in the said purpose, and someone has a firm and constant will of preserving justice perpetually and in all things;

3. someone gives to each one his right, not only positively by procuring that which is owed, but also negatively (through omission, by which the right of another is left intact), by abstaining from every violation of right. By these words there is indicated that by which justice is distinguished from all other virtues, namely, its own proper act, and its proper object: right owed to another, which namely a) belongs not to me the agent, but to another, b) is owed to each one not from mere fittingness or the honesty of virtue or charity (a moral debt), but by strict obligation (a legal or rigorous debt), and c) is rendered integrally unto equality; otherwise the whole due right would not be given, and under this respect the act would fall short of the perfection of justice. In which case there is present justice not strict and perfect, nor metaphorical, but imperfect and according to something, which "by an enlarged name" (i.e., by extension) is called justice (I-II, q. 60, a. 3, ad 1).

136. Three conditions are required for justice strictly so called:

1. that it be toward another: for since justice is concerned with establishing equality, it has from its nature that it tend toward another for giving right to another, because nothing is equal to itself but to another;⁴

⁴ It pertains essentially to the just that it be commensurated according to equality to another to whom it ought to be equaled. Whence St. Thomas, in III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 4, qc. 1: the adequation of justice comprises three things: 1st, that it be ordered to another; 2nd, that it be owed to him, otherwise it would exceed; 3rd, that as much be rendered as is owed, otherwise it would fall short in less.

2. that right, and indeed right properly so called, or a true legal debt, be present to the other for that which is given to him, for example, if he has bought a thing or has merited it as the wage of labor. Thus almsgiving is not an act of justice, by defect of right in the poor person to whom it is given;

3. that it be given to another adequately, i.e., unto equality, so that as much is rendered as is owed. Thus if someone owes one hundred francs, he must render one hundred, neither more nor less: if less is rendered, justice is not preserved, because something owed remains; if more, the excess does not pertain to justice but to charity or liberality, or to vice.

By defect of the first condition, there is not justice of man toward himself;

by defect of the second condition, fidelity, gratitude, and liberality fall short of the character of strict justice, in which there is only a moral debt, though one obliging under sin;

by defect of the third condition, religion, piety, and observance do not pertain to strict justice, because we cannot render an equal thing to God, to parents, and to superiors.

Hence a) if the three conditions are present, there is justice in the proper, strict, and perfect sense;

b) if only the third is lacking, there is justice in the proper sense, but imperfect and according to something; - a fortiori, if the second is lacking, there is a greater recession from the character of justice, so that there can scarcely be speech of justice except in a very diminished sense;

c) if even the first is lacking, only metaphorical justice remains.

Therefore there is a threefold sense of the word "justice," but only the first is strictly so called.

137. Corollaries. - 1st. Justice, because it is toward another, supposes distinction of persons. For justice, because "it imports equality, by its own nature is toward another... And because it pertains to justice to rectify human acts, it is necessary that this equality which justice regards be of diverse persons capable of acting... But actions belong to persons and wholes, not, properly speaking, to parts and forms, or powers: for it is not properly said that the hand strikes, but that man strikes by the hand. Therefore justice properly so called requires diversity of persons, and therefore it exists only from one man to another" (q. 58, a. 2).

2nd. Therefore no one renders justice to himself, nor can he exercise justice or commit injustice toward himself, since he cannot be creditor to himself; and if this is sometimes said, it is a metaphorical locution. Nor does anyone, properly speaking, have rights toward himself; but rights and duties are so coordinated that to the right which inheres in someone, there corresponds a duty in another.⁵ "It pertains to justice to render his right to each one, yet presupposing diversity of one from another: for if he gives to himself what is due to himself (for example, necessary food), this is not properly called just" (q. 57, a. 4, ad 1).

⁵ Properly, there are not duties toward oneself, but toward God with respect to oneself.

3rd. Since justice supposes distinction of one from another, therefore a debt of justice strictly so called cannot intervene between son and father (servant and master, wife and husband), if they are considered as such: for thus the son is something of the father; but justice strictly so called can exist between them if they are regarded as men, as to those things which are common to all men, because thus each is something subsisting according to itself, distinct from others (q. 57, a. 4, ad 2).

4th. Justice renders right to each one, i.e., to another of whatever condition, whether he be superior, inferior, or equal.

5th. Justice differs from charity toward neighbor. Justice rests on the distinction of one man from another; charity, on the conjunction of men in God, or on the union between the lover and the beloved, whom the lover loves as another self. Namely, charity gives to the beloved other, not because it is owed, but because it is the good of the beloved. Whence man can also have charity toward himself, not justice.

6th. In God, justice properly so called cannot be given, because He is the absolute Lord of all, namely, who owes nothing to creatures, and consequently these can have no right properly so called in respect to God. Nevertheless, supposing that God wishes to act as if we had a right to our end and to the means necessary for this end, He owes it to Himself to preserve the mode of justice in His works, and in this sense a certain justice, and rather distributive than commutative, can be said to be in Him.

But strict justice toward God cannot be in us under the respect by which we are something of God (for example, servants or adoptive sons) (q. 57, a. 1, ad 3); but insofar as God leaves ourselves and those things which pertain to us under our own proper dominion, justice can exist in some way, yet not positively and according to the complete character, because we do not render to God as much as we owe, but partially and negatively, insofar as we do not violate but preserve the right of God; whence those who violate and injure it are guilty of injustice strictly so called.

138. Observation. - The definition handed down is verified both of the natural acquired virtue and of the supernatural infused virtue; but in the first case man renders to each one his right on account of the sole motive of natural honesty or conformity to right reason; in the other case he also acts from the supernatural motive of faith in order to a supernatural end.