Magnanimity

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

IV. The daughters of pride are:

1. Presumption, "which is the inordinate appetite of undertaking something beyond one's powers. It is commonly only venial. It becomes mortal, however, if it brings harm to God or one's neighbor; for example, if you presume ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the power of sacred Order, likewise the office of physician, advocate, confessor, etc., without due skill" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66).

2. Ambition, "which is the inordinate appetite for dignity and honor not owed, or greater than is owed; as if you seek a benefice or office of which you are unworthy; or by an illicit manner and means, for example, by simony. It is per se a venial sin. But it becomes mortal either by reason of the means through which honor is sought, or by reason of the harm which is brought upon one's neighbor. Finally, if honor is sought moderately for an honorable end, it will be an act of magnanimity" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

3. Vain glory, which is the inordinate appetite of praise and fame to be obtained by the manifestation of one's own excellence. "It is called vain when it is sought from a bad, false, or fictitious thing; or from something which is not worthy of glory, or not of so much glory, as from riches, trifles, etc.; or among those who do not judge rightly about the thing; or without a due end. It is per se a venial sin; often mortal by accident, as was said concerning ambition" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

By vain glory one sins in two ways:

a) "Directly; and this either by words, and it is boasting, which is venial per se, if it is about good things, for example, fasting, prayer, etc., although by accident, often by reason of harm, if it is false, it becomes mortal; as also: 1. If one says something against the glory of God, as in Ezekiel 28: 'I am God.' 2. If he breaks forth into insults; for example, 'I am not as the rest of men, an adulterer, etc., or even as this man.' 3. From an evil end. 4. If it is done with notable harm to one's neighbor. 5. If it is about a mortally evil matter... Or by deeds, which, if they are true and have something of admiration, is called the invention of novelties, for the common people are accustomed to admire these, such as foreign garments, opinions, etc.; mortal, if it notably corrupts youth or morals. But if the deeds are false, it is hypocrisy; for example, if someone does some good thing so that he may seem good, although he is not" (St. Alphonsus, V, 66; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 132, a. 5).

b) "Indirectly, insofar as someone does not wish to be less than another. This happens in four ways: 1. Through the intellect; and it is pertinacity, by which someone adheres too tenaciously to his own opinion, which is mortal if truth of great moment is opposed, or if it is joined with danger to a third party, for example, if a physician remains in his opinion with danger to the sick person. 2. Through the will; and it is discord, by which one sins mortally when it concerns the good of God or of one's neighbor, in which they ought to be concordant. 3. Through words; and it is contention, which is mortal when, with a mind to contradict, you wrangle about truth pertaining to the faith or to the salvation of soul or body. 4. Through deeds, when someone does not wish to carry out what he ought; and it is disobedience" (St. Alphonsus, cited place; St. Thomas, cited place).

I. Notion of Magnanimity. Magnanimity is a moral virtue inclining man to work great things, and things worthy of great honor, insofar as they are such. It is said:

1. To work great things, and things worthy of great honor. By these words is indicated the object around which this virtue is occupied.

2. Insofar as they are such. Thus is indicated the reason under which these works are attained by magnanimity.

II. Object of Magnanimity. 1. The material object is constituted by all works great in any genus of virtues whatever, and consequently, insofar as they are such, worthy of great honor. Moreover, because great honor is owed to great works, it also belongs consequently and secondarily to the virtue of magnanimity to moderate the appetite for honor. Therefore it inclines one to despise small honors, since greater honors are owed to great works; on the contrary, it inclines one to accept great honors according to the due measure of reason, that is, not on account of the honors themselves, but insofar as they are owed to great works; and in such a way that one neither lifts up the soul in receiving them, nor desists from virtue because of their absence (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 129, a. 1 and a. 2, corpus, and a. 3).¹

2. The remote formal object is the reason of the greatness of these works; and thus it is clear that this virtue differs specifically from those virtues which attain the same material object. For it considers this object under the respect of greatness, which is proper to it alone. The proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in working great things worthy of great honor.

¹ Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 98 (p. 472); Billuart, diss. 2, a. 2. On the principal acts of this virtue, which the Stagirite enumerates in book 4 of the Ethics, c. 3, one should by all means read St. Thomas, on book 4 of the Ethics, c. 3, lessons 9-10; Salmanticenses, cited place, n. 99 (pp. 472-473); Lessius, De iure et iustitia, nn. 14-17 inclusive.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess there are opposed to magnanimity: presumption, by which someone attacks great things above his powers; ambition, by which someone inordinately seeks honor; vain glory, by which someone inordinately seeks glory. By defect there is opposed pusillanimity, or excessive diffidence, by which someone shrinks from great works, and from honor and glory owed to him (St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 130-133; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, V, 66).

Presumption and Unbelief.—(a) Presumption is joined with unbelief whenever it proceeds from a speculatively false judgment about matters of faith. Persons, however, who are in error (e.g., Pelagians, Lutherans, Calvinists, etc.), may be in good faith, and hence guiltless of the formal sin of presumption. Examples: Caius expects to win heaven by his own unaided efforts (Pelagian presumption). Balbus expects to be equal in glory to the greatest Saints, and to be saved by the merits of Christ without repentance or observance of the Commandments (Lutheran presumption). Titus expects to be saved on the strength of wearing scapulars, practising certain devotions, or giving alms, while he wholly disregards church duties and important Commandments (Pharisaic presumption). Sempronius thinks that all members of his sect are predestined, and hence concerns himself little about the Commandments, being persuaded that all must end well with the elect (Calvinistic presumption).

(b) Presumption is committed without unbelief, when it proceeds from a practical judgment that one should act as if salvation were obtainable without merits or repentance, or as if natural efforts were alone sufficient, although speculatively one does not accept such errors (see 1067). The same is true when presumption springs from a failure to consider the divine justice or the established means of obtaining salvation.

The Subjects of Envy.—(a) The persons most inclined to envy are of two quite different types, namely, the ambitious and the pusillanimous. The ambitious man ardently covets honors, and he is correspondingly saddened when others surpass him, especially if he already enjoys repute or is not far removed from the object of his desires. The pusillanimous man, being petty, holds every small advancement of others as great and as a blow to his own prestige. He is, therefore, filled with intense envy, where a different person would see little or no cause for such a feeling. On the contrary, those who recognize their own unsuitability for what is above them, and those who are great of soul, are not so much inclined to envy. There are few, however, even among the most perfect, who are not tempted to envy in some form.

(b) The persons who are most likely to be envied are those who in some way or other are one’s likes or equals, for one does not feel that one is thrown into the shade by a person who is always far above one, or by those who are far removed in time, place, age, etc. Thus, a beggar will envy a fellow-beggar who becomes a millionaire, but not those acquaintances who were always rich, and still less the fortunate persons whom he knows only from hearsay. The elder son envied his brother, not his father (Luke, xv. 28). Many exceptions to this are only apparent. Thus, persons sometimes are envious of those far above them, but it is because these have advanced at their expense, as when a poor person envies those who have the property he once owned. Persons are sometimes envious of their equals who have not surpassed them, but it is because these latter have obtained with little or no effort what they themselves have gained only by hard work. Persons are sometimes envious of their inferiors, but this is because they make a comparison from some viewpoint in which there is equality, as when an old man envies a youth the advantages that were not enjoyed in his own youth, or the present promotion that surpasses his own.

The Origin of Discord.—(a) The disagreement with the will of a neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not take what he regards as a position of inferiority.

The Causes of Sinful Contention.—(a) The cause of that which is principal in contention—namely, the departure from the truth held by another and the stand made for error—is envy, pride and vainglory, as said above (see 1854) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which is secondary in contention—namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and the shouts or screams of the contenders—is anger.

Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.—The vices opposed to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.

(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities, taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in good faith and from inculpable ignorance.

(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is a just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary, seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25). This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not per se mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously sinful (e.g., if one’s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments) or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).

(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269). The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575 sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded, and their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man. The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g., those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity, like ambition, is per se only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes one boast of one’s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others, or neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are the publication by word or deed of one’s own true or pretended exploits (boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in pronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of intellect which make one hold obstinately to one’s views (stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others (discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention), sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).

Vice Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Defect.—The sin opposed to greatness of soul by defect is pusillanimity (littleness of soul), which does not desire great things when one should desire them.

(a) Pusillanimity is sinful, because it excludes nobility of soul, springs from a lazy ignorance of one’s own ability and worth and from a false fear of failure, and leads to the loss of great things that could be done for God and humanity. The Scriptures reprove Jonas, who fled from the great task set for him by God (Jonas, i. 1 sqq.), and the fearful servant who hid his talent in a napkin (Matt, xxv. 24 sqq.). Pusillanimity is not to be confused, therefore, with humility; for humility excludes the unreasonable or immoderate desire of excellence, whereas pusillanimity represses even that desire of greatness which is reasonable and moderate. Indeed, meanness of spirit may be associated with pride on account of obstinate refusal to take upon oneself what is commanded (Prov., xxvi. 16). Thus, Moses and Jeremias showed humility by their fears of unworthiness (Exod, iii. 11; Jerem., i. 6), but they would have sinned by pusillanimity, and also by pride, had they held out against God’s charge to them.

(b) Pusillanimity is per se a venial sin (see 2450), but it may become mortal on account of its matter or consequences, as when one is so self-depreciative as to neglect grave obligations of correcting abuses. It is essentially more evil than presumption, for it turns one away from things and pursuits that are noble, and is thus more opposed to greatness of soul; but radically presumption is more evil, as it springs from pride (Ecclus., xxxvii. 3). The dread of attempting great deeds or pursuits is sometimes no sin at all, as when it is due to inculpable ignorance of what one can do or what one deserves, or from a fear that overpowers judgment, or from bodily disease, or from a sense of inferiority caused by education, excessive repression and habit (Col., iii. 21).

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What are the daughters of acedia? - They are the following: 1. Malice, namely a special malice by which, by reason of sadness to be fled, someone hates and detests spiritual goods, and would wish them not to exist, or by which he is sorry that he has done well or fulfilled that to which he was bound, or by which he contemns a benefit of God, e.g., by desiring not to have been born, or not to have known Christ, etc. It is mortal from its genus. - 2. Pusillanimity, by which someone flees those things which are arduous and which fall under counsels. 3. Torpor, by which someone flees those things which pertain to common justice, or precepts, and does good things without due fervor.

4. Rancor, by which those who induce to spiritual things are wearisome; whence rancor is a certain indignation. 5. Wandering of mind, by which someone in the exercise of spiritual things wanders toward exterior illicit delights, whether by thought, and it is called curiosity; or by speech, and it is called verbosity; or by bodily restlessness, and it is called restlessness, which are commonly venial. 6. Despair of salvation, which is flight from the end itself, and mortal. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, a. 4; q. 35; L. 84.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

1068. (B) To this virtue there is opposed, by excess, presumption, and by defect, pusillanimity.¹⁰

¹⁰ Two others are commonly enumerated, ambition and empty glory; but of these there was treatment above, where the capital vices were discussed, n. 515-516.

(a) Presumption is the sin by which someone attacks that which is far beyond his powers; for example, he who undertakes the offices of judge, confessor, pastor, etc., for the fulfilling of which he is altogether unequal, from defect of knowledge, prudence, and other virtues; or he who, existing in the state of imperfect virtue, at once tries to do the greatest works. Let Peter be an example, who, trusting too much in himself, was ready to die for Christ, and soon at the voice of a maidservant denied the Master. (b) Pusillanimity is a disposition of soul by which someone flees those things which, all circumstances being considered, he could and ought to do; thus he who, frightened by difficulties and not sufficiently trusting in divine help, flees offices proposed to him by superiors,¹¹ or does not fulfill the duties of his own state from empty fear.

¹¹ Accordingly there is no question here of him who, for the sake of humility, declines offices and honors, but of him who is frightened by difficulties and lacks trust in God.

For judging the malice of sins arising from this double vice, attention must especially be paid to the gravity of the effects which follow from them.

626. Notion. Magnanimity¹¹²⁷ is a virtue inclining one to execute great works in every genus of virtue, which are truly worthy of great honor. Therefore, he is not truly magnanimous who seeks great things outside virtue, because these are not truly great nor do they merit true honor.

The material object of magnanimity is great and true honors, whence true magnanimity despises the riches, pleasures, and honors of this world, as being in reality of small moment; but it aspires to great honors before God. These great true honors cannot be obtained except through the exercise of Christian virtues, and indeed arduous ones.

The formal object of magnanimity is not honors of any kind whatsoever to be rightly obtained, but great and arduous honors; but another unnamed virtue is occupied with obtaining small honors.¹¹²⁸ Magnanimity tends toward great honors, not precisely because they are honors, since this is not so difficult, but on account of their excellence. Therefore the office of magnanimity is rightly to direct the passion of hope, so that it may tend in an orderly manner toward great honors through excellent works of the virtues.¹¹²⁹ Honor exercises a great attractive force upon man, and therefore we see many men desire honors inordinately; and the greater the honors are, the more vehemently they are accustomed to entice a man. Hence, on account of an inordinate thirst for great honors, many sins are committed in the world, concerning which there will be discussion below, n. 639.

From what has been said it is also permissible to deduce how magnanimity is related to the other virtues, especially if they are in a heroic state. For every virtue tends toward its object even when arduous, but it does not attain it precisely because it is arduous, but because it pertains to its own province; hence, for example, virginity attains a very arduous object, namely, perfect immunity from every contamination of venereal pleasure, but it does not attain that object because it is arduous, but rather notwithstanding its arduousness. On the contrary, magnanimity attains in the matter of all the other virtues precisely that which is great and arduous, and because it is arduous.

¹¹²⁷ Hochherzigkeit, Seelengröße [high-mindedness, greatness of soul].

¹¹²⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 129, a. 2.

¹¹²⁹ Ib., a. 1 ad 2.

627. Magnanimity is a true virtue. It is not difficult to prove that magnanimity accepted in this sense is a true and special virtue; for it has a most noble and most special object, namely, it instigates one rightly to obtain great honors through great works of the virtues. On account of the peculiar conditions of this object and end, the virtue of magnanimity is indeed possessed by all the just and by those possessing the other virtues in a perfect state - for with sanctifying grace all the virtues are infused, and the virtues are connected - but an act of magnanimity does not belong to all virtuous persons, but only to great men.¹¹³⁰

¹¹³⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 129, a. 3 ad 2.

628. Relation to humility. Magnanimity is not opposed even to the most perfect humility. For "in man there is found something great, which he possesses from the gift of God, and some defect, which belongs to him from the infirmity of nature. Therefore magnanimity brings it about that a man deems himself worthy of great things according to the consideration of the gifts which he possesses from God; as, if he has great virtue of soul, magnanimity brings it about that he tends toward perfect works of virtue; and the same must be said concerning the use of any other good, such as knowledge or some good of fortune. But humility brings it about that a man esteems himself little according to the consideration of his own defect. Similarly, magnanimity also contemns others insofar as they fall short of the gifts of God; for he does not esteem others so greatly that for their sake he would do something unbecoming. But humility honors others and esteems them superiors insofar as it beholds in them something of the gifts of God.... And thus it is clear that magnanimity and humility are not contrary, although they seem to tend toward contraries, because they proceed according to diverse considerations."¹¹³¹

¹¹³¹ Ib., ad 4.

629. Properties. St. Thomas,¹¹³² from Aristotle, enumerates several properties of magnanimity, among which the following are the more principal: 1. the magnanimous man is moderately delighted by honors offered, even great ones; 2. in prosperity and adversity he shows himself moderate; 3. he willingly offers assistance to others, but he himself asks no one, or scarcely anyone, for assistance for himself; 4. with the great he shows himself truly great, that is, he does not flatter them nor allow his liberty to be oppressed by their authority; but with those of middling rank he shows himself moderate; 5. he is not ambitious, and therefore does not thrust himself into more honorable places or functions; 6. he speaks his opinion openly if it is necessary, for he does not fear men nor desire to flatter anyone; 7. he does not remember injuries received, for this belongs to a base soul; 8. in his external bodily gestures he is slow; for he does not act precipitately, because he involves himself only in great affairs, which do not occur so often, and when they occur they must be conducted with serious deliberation; 9. according to Aristotle he often employs irony. Irony, however, is not taken here in the ordinary sense of mockery, but insofar as it is a fiction of something less.¹¹³³ The ancients distinguished a twofold fiction: fiction which is toward more, namely, when someone pretends greater things concerning himself than are true (this is boasting), and fiction toward less, namely, when someone pretends lesser or base things concerning himself, and this fiction was called irony. Therefore the magnanimous man is not accustomed to demonstrate his entire greatness (especially not to the multitude), because this could seem to be boasting.

¹¹³² Ib., ad 3 and 5; a. 4 ad 2.

¹¹³³ Cf. above, n. 167.

639. 2. Four vices are opposed to magnanimity, namely, three by excess: presumption, ambition, and vainglory; one by defect, namely, pusillanimity.

a) Presumption,¹¹⁶⁴ which is opposed to magnanimity, is not to be confused with presumption which is contrary to hope.¹¹⁶⁵ The former is a vice inducing one to undertake works which surpass the powers of the agent; the latter is that which hopes for eternal beatitude through means not ordained by God. If it is said that presumption opposed to magnanimity undertakes those things which altogether exceed the powers of the agent, the powers to be understood are not only his own but also those of others which are nevertheless available to the agent; for that which we can do with the assistance of friends and especially of God is not considered altogether to exceed our powers; whence we are not presumptuous when we undertake works of the virtues, even difficult ones, with confidence in the assisting aid of divine grace. An example of sinful presumption is Peter, who, led by excessive confidence, said: "Lord, I am ready to go with thee, both into prison and to death,"¹¹⁶⁶ and nevertheless afterward denied Christ at the voice of a maidservant. Those also sin by such a sin of presumption who, without sufficient capacity, undertake the offices of judge, pastor, confessor, etc. The origin and culpability of this presumption were already discussed above, I, n. 412. Seneca describes presumption very vigorously: "If magnanimity raises itself beyond its measure, it will make a man threatening, inflated, turbulent, restless, and hasty toward whatever excellences of words and deeds, honorableness being neglected."¹¹⁶⁷

b) Ambition,¹¹⁶⁸ which is opposed to magnanimity by excess, is a vice by which someone inordinately desires an honor which he does not merit or which he refers not to God but only to his own utility; or it can be defined more briefly: an inordinate appetite for honor.¹¹⁶⁹ Since honor is a thing good or indifferent in itself, an inordinate appetite for it is of itself only a venial sin; nevertheless, it can become mortal on account of circumstances, for example, if someone places his last end in such human honor, or if he seeks honor from some mortal sin (boasting concerning sins committed), or if someone seeks his own honor with grave harm to others. The inordinate appetite for honor, or ambition, often has very contrary effects, since instead of true honor, mockery and contempt befall the ambitious man.

c) Vainglory,¹¹⁷⁰ insofar as it is opposed to magnanimity by excess, is taken for an inordinate appetite for empty glory. The appetite for one's own glory is not of itself something vicious, whence we are admonished: "So let your light shine before men";¹¹⁷¹ but the appetite for empty glory is sinful; for to desire something vain is vicious, according to this: "Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?"¹¹⁷² Glory can be called vain in three ways: in one way on the part of the thing concerning which someone seeks glory, as when someone seeks glory concerning that which is not worthy of glory, such as some fragile and perishable thing (for example, bodily beauty); in another way on the part of the one from whom someone seeks glory, such as a man whose judgment is not certain (for example, if someone wishes to be praised by an ignorant man as learned); in a third way on the part of the very person who desires glory, namely, when he does not refer the appetite for his glory to a due end, such as the honor of God or the salvation of his neighbor. Thus St. Thomas.¹¹⁷³ Vainglory in itself is only a venial sin, because it is not simply repugnant to charity and because it is only an inordination concerning a thing indifferent in itself; nevertheless, it can easily become not only a mortal sin, but also a capital sin from which many other sins spring, as was said above, I, n. 414.¹¹⁷⁴

d) Pusillanimity¹¹⁷⁵ is opposed to magnanimity by defect, and it is a disposition of soul by which someone shrinks from undertaking or doing something as though it were too great and surpassed his powers, when in reality it does not surpass them. Whence, just as the magnanimous man rightly tends toward great things, so the pusillanimous man, from culpable ignorance of his own condition, shrinks from great things which befit him. An example of such pusillanimity in the Gospel is the slothful servant who hid his talent in a napkin and on that account was gravely rebuked. Pusillanimity of itself does not signify a grave sin; nevertheless, it can become a grave sin if someone from pusillanimity omits a grave duty; for example, if parents omit correcting disobedient children because they think themselves unable to make an effective correction; if someone no longer fights against temptations, thinking himself unable to conquer them. Pusillanimity which concerns things altogether necessary for salvation can become the sin of despair. Pusillanimity is conquered by placing hope in divine assistance, which will never fail men of good will. Pusillanimity often arises from a morbid quality of the body or from fixed ideas.

¹¹⁶⁴ Selbstüberschätzung, Vermessenheit [self-overestimation, presumption]; cf. above, I, n. 412.

¹¹⁶⁵ Cf. I, n. 549.

¹¹⁶⁶ Luke 22:33.

¹¹⁶⁷ In St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 130, a. 2 ad 3.

¹¹⁶⁸ Cf. above, I, n. 413.

¹¹⁶⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 131, a. 1.

¹¹⁷⁰ Cf. above, I, n. 414.

¹¹⁷¹ Matt. 5:16.

¹¹⁷² Ps. 4:3.

¹¹⁷³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 132, a. 1.

¹¹⁷⁴ Pascal says very wittily and truly concerning vainglory: "Vanity is so rooted in the heart of man that a lackey, a kitchen boy, and a porter boast and wish to have their admirers; and the philosophers themselves want them. Those who write against glory wish to have the glory of having written well; and those who read it wish to have the glory of having read it; and I who write this perhaps have this desire, and perhaps those who will read it will also have it" (Pensées [1907] 400).

¹¹⁷⁵ Kleinmütigkeit [pusillanimity, faintheartedness].

S. Th. II-II, q. 129.

915. Magnanimity (groot- of edelmoedigheid) is a virtue inclining to great or excellent works in every genus of virtues, worthy of great honor. It is immediately concerned with hope and the arduous good, and therefore is in the irascible appetite; mediately it is concerned with great honors. Yet it does not tend to great things on account of honor, but on account of their excellence under the special account of the great and arduous, because it is good to do great and arduous things with generosity; secondarily, however, it also rightly uses honor according to right reason.

Hence 1. it differs from ambition, which attacks great things on account of honors: for the magnanimous man wills to perform things which are great before God, because it befits a rational creature to intend not only things which are common, but also things which are excellent.

2. It is a special virtue, because it has a special object: for it places the mode of reason concerning great honors and excellent works to be attacked; hence it is annexed to fortitude, because like fortitude it strengthens the soul concerning something arduous, but it falls short of it because great goods to be hoped for or obtained have less of the arduous and of difficulty than the very dangers of death.

3. The object which it seeks is great and true honors, for concerning small honors there is another unnamed virtue, which by some is called philotimy; hence true magnanimity despises riches, pleasures, and the honors of this world, as things which in reality are of little moment, but aspires to great honors before God. "And therefore he is not lifted up by great honors, because he does not reckon them above himself, but rather contemns them, and much more moderate or small honors. And likewise he is not broken by dishonors, but contemns them, as things which he judges to be brought against him unworthily," a. 2, ad 3.

4. Therefore true magnanimity is not opposed to humility: "In man there is found something great, which he possesses from the gift of God; and some defect, which belongs to him from the infirmity of nature. Therefore magnanimity makes a man dignify himself with great things according to consideration of the gifts which he possesses from God; as, if he has great virtue of soul, magnanimity makes him intend perfect works of virtue... But humility makes a man esteem himself little, according to consideration of his own defect. - Likewise also magnanimity contemns others according as they fall short of the gifts of God: for he does not esteem others so much that he would do something unbecoming for them. But humility honors others and esteems them superior, insofar as it beholds something in them of the gifts of God... And thus it is clear that magnanimity and humility are not contrary, although they seem to tend toward contraries, because they proceed according to diverse considerations" (a. 3, ad 4).

916. Properties of magnanimity. - St. Thomas, from Aristotle, Eth. IV, enumerates several properties of magnanimity, among which the following are the more principal:¹ 1) the magnanimous man is moderately delighted by honors offered to him, even great ones; 2) in prosperity and in adversity he shows himself moderate; 3) he willingly furnishes help to others, but he himself asks no one, or scarcely anyone, for help for himself; 4) with great men he shows himself truly great, that is, he does not flatter them nor allow his liberty to be oppressed by their authority; but with mediocre men he shows himself mediocre; 5) he is not ambitious and accordingly does not thrust himself into more honorable places or functions; 6) he openly states his opinion if it is necessary: for he does not fear men nor desires to flatter anyone; 7) he does not remember injuries received, for this belongs to a base soul; 8) he does not speak greedily about men, nor is he a flatterer of others or an evil-speaker; 9) in his exterior gestures of body he is slow: for he does not act precipitously, because he involves himself only in great affairs, which do not occur so often, and when they occur, must be handled with serious deliberation; 10) according to Aristotle he often uses irony, that is, fiction of the lesser (not mockery), by which someone feigns lesser or base things about himself. The magnanimous man is not accustomed to demonstrate his whole greatness, because this seems to be boasting.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, q. 129, a. 3, ad 3 and 5; a. 4, ad 2; Billuart, diss. II, art. 2; Prummer, Th. M. II, n. 629.

917. Remarks. - 1. The virtue of magnanimity according to the disposition of the soul is among all the just; but as to acts it belongs only to great men (a. 3, ad 2).

2. Virtue is required for repressing passions which have great force in resisting reason. But some passions not only have great force in resisting reason on the part of the passion because of vehemence, but also "from the external things themselves which are the objects of the passions, such as love or desire either of money or of honor. And in these things there must be virtue not only concerning that which is greatest in them, but also concerning moderate or lesser things, because existing external things, even if they are small, are very appetible, as being necessary for the life of man. And therefore concerning the appetite for money there are two virtues: one indeed concerning moderate or measured sums, namely, liberality; another concerning great sums of money, namely, magnificence... Similarly also concerning honors there are two virtues: one indeed concerning moderate honors, which is unnamed (it could be called philotimy)... but concerning great honors there is magnanimity" (a. 2).

3. To magnanimity there contribute and pertain: a) directly indeed confidence (zelfvertrouwen), which imports strength of hope, proceeding from a firm and vehement opinion concerning the good to be obtained; but because hope causes daring, which pertains to fortitude, hence confidence consequently pertains to fortitude (a. 6);

b) security (gerustheid), or perfect rest of the soul from fear: this directly pertains to fortitude; but because, just as hope is the cause of daring, so fear is the cause of desperation, therefore "just as confidence consequently pertains to fortitude, insofar as it uses daring, so also security consequently pertains to magnanimity, insofar as it repels desperation" (a. 7);

c) goods of fortune, which help instrumentally toward the end of magnanimity, because through them, namely, through riches and powers and friends, the faculty of doing great things is given to us (a. 8).

Magnanimity, as it is a virtue annexed to Fortitude, has for its matter honors and dishonors. So D. Thomas art. 1. ex Aristotele 4. Eth. cap. 3. For he is Magnanimous who has a mind for something great, or who has a mind rightly affected concerning those things which among exterior goods are absolutely and simply the greatest, as is honor: both because honor is nearest to virtue, as its testimony; and because it is rendered to God and to the best of men; and because, in pursuing honor and forbidding vituperation, men postpone all other things: therefore he who is rightly affected concerning honors is called Magnanimous.

This the Seraphic Doctor intended in his Opusc. declarator. terminorum Theol., when he defines Magnanimity: It is a spontaneous and rational undertaking of difficult things.

And in serm. 5. Hexaëmer., where he says that Magnanimity is that which appreciates great things and despises vile ones. But he corrects what Aristotle says, lib 4. moral. Nicom. cap. 3, The magnanimous man is in the appetite of honor, and explains it to be about the true honors of eternal things, not about worldly praises. Therefore the magnanimous man tends toward those things which are truly worthy of honor, as D. Thomas says loco cit. and Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 2. num. 56., nor is true magnanimity opposed to humility, since under different aspects the former wills honors, the latter refuses them, as D. Bonaventure teaches loco cit. and D. Thomas ad 4.; for magnanimity esteems one worthy of great things with consideration of the gifts of God: but humility, so that one may lie open to contempt, with consideration of his own vileness.

I ASSERT first, that Magnanimity is a virtue.

It is PROVED because it pertains to virtue that the good of reason be preserved in human affairs; but among other exterior human goods, honors hold the principal place: therefore magnanimity, which sets the mode of reason about great honors, is a virtue.

THIS also the affections, or dispositions, of the body confirm, which Aristotle attributes to the Magnanimous man, 4. Eth. cap. 3., highly consonant with the disposition of an honest mind, when he says: The movement of the magnanimous man seems slow, and his voice grave, and his speech steady. For velocity of movement (says S. Thomas ad 3.) proceeds from this, that a man attends to many things, which he hastens to accomplish; but the magnanimous man attends only to great things, which are few, and which also require great attention, and therefore he has a slow movement.

SIMILARLY also sharpness of voice, and velocity, belong especially to those who wish to contend about anything whatsoever, which does not pertain to the magnanimous, who meddle only with great things. Tannerus notes these things num. 58. from D. Bonaventure in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 2. cap. 58., where he also brings forward other signs of the magnanimous man, as a square forehead of moderate size, long strides, etc.

I ASSERT secondly, that Magnanimity is a special virtue. So D. Thomas quaest. 129. art. 4. from Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 7. The reason is, because it constitutes a mode about a determinate matter, namely about honors, as I said. But because honor is the reward of every virtue, therefore magnanimity consequently, by reason of its matter, regards all the virtues.

I ASSERT thirdly, that Magnanimity is a certain potential part of Fortitude. So D. Thomas art. 5. and D. Bonaventure above. It agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind in arduous things; but it falls short of it, because it confirms in that about which it is easier to preserve firmness.

To Magnanimity, Confidence contributes, and Security to Fortitude; but consequently Security belongs to magnanimity, and Confidence to fortitude. So S. Thomas in the same place art. 6. et 7.

Now confidence is a certain hope of the mind of bringing to the end the thing begun. Security is the habit by which imminent evils are not dreaded, as S. Bonaventure teaches in opusc. declarat. terminorum Theologiae.

The goods of fortune also contribute to magnanimity. So S. Thomas art. 8.

6. We are come to Magnanimity and the Magnanimous Man, the great creation of Aristotle. As Magnanimity ranks under Fortitude, there must be some fear to which the Magnanimous Man rises superior, as the brave man rises superior to the fear of death. What Magnanimity overcomes is the fear of undeserved dishonour. The Magnanimous Man is he who rates himself as worthy of great honours, and is so worthy indeed. When honour is paid to such a one, he makes no great account of it, feeling that it is but his due, or even less than his due. If he is dishonoured and insulted, he despises the insult as an absurdity, offered to a man of his deserts. He is too conscious of his real worth to be much affected by the expression of his neighbour's view of him. For a man is most elated, when complimented on an excellence which he was not very sure of possessing: and most sensibly grieved at an insult, where he half suspects himself of really making a poor figure, whereas he would like to make a good one. It is doubtless the serene and settled conviction that Englishmen generally entertain of the greatness of their country, that enables them to listen with equanimity to abase of England, such as no other people in Europe would endure levelled at themselves.

7. Proud is an epithet pretty freely applied to Englishmen abroad, and it seems to fit the character of the Magnanimous Man. He seems a Pharisee, and worse than a Pharisee. The Pharisee's pride was to some extent mitigated by breaking out into that disease of children and silly persons, vanity: he "did all his works to be seen of men." But here the disease is all driven inwards, and therefore more malignant. The Magnanimous Man is so much in conceit with himself as to have become a scorner of his fellows. He is self-sufficient, a deity to himself, the very type of Satanic pride. These are the charges brought against him.

8. To purify and rectify the character of the Magnanimous Man, we need to take a leaf out of the book of Christianity. Not that there is anything essentially Christian and supernatural in what we are about to allege: otherwise it would not belong to philosophy: it is a truth of reason, but a truth generally overlooked, till it found its exponent in the Christian preacher, and its development in the articles of the Christian faith. The truth is this. There is in every human being what theologians have called man and man: man as he is of himself, man again as he is by the gift and gracious mercy of God. The reasonably Magnanimous Man is saved from pride by this distinction. Of himself, he knows that he is nothing but nothingness, meanness, sinfulness, and a walking sore of multitudinous actual sins. "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is, in my flesh, any good." (Rom. vii. 18.) If he is insulted, he takes it as his due, not any questionable due, for then he would resent the insult, but as being undoubtedly what he deserves. If he is honoured, he smiles at the absurdity of the compliments paid to him. It is as if an old gentleman, a prey to gout and rheumatism, were lauded for his fleetness of foot. He is then truly magnanimous on this side of his character by a kind of obverse magnanimity, that bears insults handsomely, as deserved, and honours modestly, as undeserved.

9. But let us go round to the other side of the reasonably Magnanimous Man. He was defined to be, "one that deems himself worthy of great honours, and is so worthy indeed." Now, nothing is truly worthy of honour but virtue. He must then be a good man, full of all virtues; and all this goodness that he has, he recognises as being in him of God. He has "received God's Spirit"—or something analogous in the natural order to the gift of the Holy Ghost—"that he may know the things that are given him of God." (2 Cor. ii. 12.) It is told of St. Francis of Assisi, the humblest of men, that on one occasion when he and his companions received from some persons extraordinary marks of veneration, he, contrary to his usual wont, took it not at all amiss: and said to his companions, who wondered at his behaviour, "Let them alone: they cannot too much honour the work of God in us." This magnanimity bears honours gracefully, and insult unflinchingly, from a consciousness of internal worth, which internal worth and goodness however it takes not for its own native excellence, but holds as received from God, and unto God it refers all the glory.

10. Thus the genuine Magnanimous Man is a paradox and a prodigy. He despises an insult as undeserved, and he takes it as his due. He is conscious of the vast good that is in him; and he knows that there is no good in him. Highly honoured, he thinks that he gets but his due, while he believes that vials of scorn and ignominy may justly be poured upon him. He will bear the scorn, because he deserves it, and again, because it is wholly undeserved. The Magnanimous Man is the humble man. The secret of his marvellous virtue is his habit of practical discernment between the abyss of misery that he has within himself, as of himself, and the high gifts, also within him, which come of the mercy of God. Aristotle well says, "Magnanimity is a sort of robe of honour to the rest of the virtues: it both makes them greater and stands not without them: therefore it is hard to be truly magnanimous, for that cannot be without perfect virtue." We may add, that in the present order of Providence none can be magnanimous without supernatural aid, and supernatural considerations of the life of Christ, which however are not in place here.

Readings.—Ar., Eth., III., vii.; St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 123, art 3, in corp.; Ar., Eth., III., viii.; St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 123, art. i, ad 2; Ar., Eth., III., vi.; St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 123, art. 4, 5. For the Magnificent and Magnanimous Man, Ar., Eth., IV., ii., iii.; St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 129, art. 3, ad 4, 5.