Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question I: On magnanimity
Magnanimity, as it is a virtue annexed to Fortitude, has for its matter honors and dishonors. So D. Thomas art. 1. ex Aristotele 4. Eth. cap. 3. For he is Magnanimous who has a mind for something great, or who has a mind rightly affected concerning those things which among exterior goods are absolutely and simply the greatest, as is honor: both because honor is nearest to virtue, as its testimony; and because it is rendered to God and to the best of men; and because, in pursuing honor and forbidding vituperation, men postpone all other things: therefore he who is rightly affected concerning honors is called Magnanimous.
De Magnanimitate.
Magnanimitas, ut est virtus Fortitudini adiuncta, pro materia habet honores, et inhonorationes. Ita D. Thom. art. 1. ex Aristotele 4. Eth. cap. 3. Est enim Magnanimus, qui habet animum ad aliquid magnum, seu qui habet animum recte affectum circa ea, quae inter res exteriores absolute, et simpliciter sunt maxima, uti est honor, tum quia honor est propinquissimus virtuti, tanquam testimonium eius; tum quia Deo, et optimis quibusque exhibetur, tum quia honori consequendo, et vituperio vetando homines omnia alia postponunt: ergo qui circa honores recte affectus est, dicitur Magnanimus.
This the Seraphic Doctor intended in his Opusc. declarator. terminorum Theol., when he defines Magnanimity: It is a spontaneous and rational undertaking of difficult things.
ID voluit S. Doctor in Opusc. declarator. terminorum Theol. dum Magnanimitatem definit : Est difficilium spontanea, et rationabilis aggressio.
And in serm. 5. Hexaëmer., where he says that Magnanimity is that which appreciates great things and despises vile ones. But he corrects what Aristotle says, lib 4. moral. Nicom. cap. 3, The magnanimous man is in the appetite of honor, and explains it to be about the true honors of eternal things, not about worldly praises. Therefore the magnanimous man tends toward those things which are truly worthy of honor, as D. Thomas says loco cit. and Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 2. num. 56., nor is true magnanimity opposed to humility, since under different aspects the former wills honors, the latter refuses them, as D. Bonaventure teaches loco cit. and D. Thomas ad 4.; for magnanimity esteems one worthy of great things with consideration of the gifts of God: but humility, so that one may lie open to contempt, with consideration of his own vileness.
ET serm. 5. Hexaëmer. ubi ait, Magnanimitatem esse, quae appreciat magna, et despicit vilia. Corrigit autem id, quod ait Aristoteles lib 4. moral. Nicom. cap. 3. Magnanimus est in appetitu honoris, et explicat, esse in veris honoribus aeternorum, non in laudibus mundanis. Itaque magnanimus ad ea, quae honore sunt vere digna, tendit, ut ait D. Thom. loco cit. et Tannerus disp. 3. quaest. 2. num. 56. neque magnanimitas vera opponitur humilitati, cum sub diversis rationibus illa honores velit, haec recuset, ut docet D. Bonavent. loco cit. et D. Thom. ad 4. nam magnanimitas aestimat dignum magnis consideratis Dei donis: Humilitas vero, ut se patui pendat; considerata sua vilitate.
It is PROVED because it pertains to virtue that the good of reason be preserved in human affairs; but among other exterior human goods, honors hold the principal place: therefore magnanimity, which sets the mode of reason about great honors, is a virtue.
PROBATUR quia ad virtutem pertinet, ut in rebus humanis bonum rationis servetur; inter caeteras autem res humanas exteriores praecipuum locum tenent honores: Ergo magnanimitas, quae modum rationis ponit circa magnos honores, est virtus.
THIS also the affections, or dispositions, of the body confirm, which Aristotle attributes to the Magnanimous man, 4. Eth. cap. 3., highly consonant with the disposition of an honest mind, when he says: The movement of the magnanimous man seems slow, and his voice grave, and his speech steady. For velocity of movement (says S. Thomas ad 3.) proceeds from this, that a man attends to many things, which he hastens to accomplish; but the magnanimous man attends only to great things, which are few, and which also require great attention, and therefore he has a slow movement.
HOC etiam confirmant affectiones, seu dispositiones corporis, quas Aristoteles 4. Eth. cap. 3. Magnanimo tribuit, valde consentaneas honestae mentis dispositioni, eum ait: Motus lentus magnanimi videtur, et vox gravis, et locutio stabilis. Velocitas enim motus (ait S. Thom. ad 3.) provenit ex eo, quod homo ad multa intendit, quae explere festinat; sed magnanimus solum ad magna intendit, quae pauca sunt? quae etiam egent magna attentione, et ideo habet motum tardum.
SIMILARLY also sharpness of voice, and velocity, belong especially to those who wish to contend about anything whatsoever, which does not pertain to the magnanimous, who meddle only with great things. Tannerus notes these things num. 58. from D. Bonaventure in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 2. cap. 58., where he also brings forward other signs of the magnanimous man, as a square forehead of moderate size, long strides, etc.
SIMILITER etiam acuitas vocis, et velocitas praecipue competit his, qui de quibuslibet contendere volunt, quod non pertinet ad magnanimos, qui non intromittunt se, nisi de magnis. Haec notat Tannerus num. 58. ex D. Bonavent. in Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 2. cap. 58. ubi etiam alia magnanimi indicia affert, ut frontem quadratam, et modetatae magnitudinis, longos passus, etc.
I ASSERT secondly, that Magnanimity is a special virtue. So D. Thomas quaest. 129. art. 4. from Aristotle 2. Eth. cap. 7. The reason is, because it constitutes a mode about a determinate matter, namely about honors, as I said. But because honor is the reward of every virtue, therefore magnanimity consequently, by reason of its matter, regards all the virtues.
ASSERO secundo, Magnanimitatem esse specialem virtutem. Ita D. Thom. quaest. 129. art. 4. ex Aristotele 2. Eth. cap. 7. Ratio est, quia modum constituit circa determinatam materiam, scilicet circa honores, ut dixi. Quia tamen honor est cuiuslibet virtutis praemium, ideo magnanimitas consequenter, ratione suae materiae, respicit omnes virtutes.
I ASSERT thirdly, that Magnanimity is a certain potential part of Fortitude. So D. Thomas art. 5. and D. Bonaventure above. It agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind in arduous things; but it falls short of it, because it confirms in that about which it is easier to preserve firmness.
ASSERO tertio, Magnanimitas est pars quaedam potentialis Fortitudinis. Ita D. Thom. art. 5. et D. Bonavent. supra. Convenit cum fortitudine, confirmando animum in arduis; sed deficit ab ea, quia firmat in eo, circa quod facilius est firmitatem servare.
To Magnanimity, Confidence contributes, and Security to Fortitude; but consequently Security belongs to magnanimity, and Confidence to fortitude. So S. Thomas in the same place art. 6. et 7.
AD Magnanimitatem confert Fiducia, et securitas ad Fortitudinem, ex consequenti vero securitas ad magnanimitatem, et fiducia ad fortitudinem pertinet. Ita S. Thom. ibidem art. 6. et 7.
Now confidence is a certain hope of the mind of bringing to the end the thing begun. Security is the habit by which imminent evils are not dreaded, as S. Bonaventure teaches in opusc. declarat. terminorum Theologiae.
Est autem fiducia certa spes animi perducendi ad finem rem inchoatam. Securitas est habitus quo imminentia incommoda non formidantur, ut docet S. Bonavent. in opusc. declarat. terminorum Theologiae.
The goods of fortune also contribute to magnanimity. So S. Thomas art. 8.
Etiam bona fortunae ad magnanimitatem conferunt. Ita S. Thom. art. 8.