Article I: On Magnanimity Itself According to Itself

915. Magnanimity (groot- of edelmoedigheid) is a virtue inclining to great or excellent works in every genus of virtues, worthy of great honor. It is immediately concerned with hope and the arduous good, and therefore is in the irascible appetite; mediately it is concerned with great honors. Yet it does not tend to great things on account of honor, but on account of their excellence under the special account of the great and arduous, because it is good to do great and arduous things with generosity; secondarily, however, it also rightly uses honor according to right reason.

Hence 1. it differs from ambition, which attacks great things on account of honors: for the magnanimous man wills to perform things which are great before God, because it befits a rational creature to intend not only things which are common, but also things which are excellent.

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object: for it places the mode of reason concerning great honors and excellent works to be attacked; hence it is annexed to fortitude, because like fortitude it strengthens the soul concerning something arduous, but it falls short of it because great goods to be hoped for or obtained have less of the arduous and of difficulty than the very dangers of death.

The object which it seeks is great and true honors, for concerning small honors there is another unnamed virtue, which by some is called philotimy; hence true magnanimity despises riches, pleasures, and the honors of this world, as things which in reality are of little moment, but aspires to great honors before God. "And therefore he is not lifted up by great honors, because he does not reckon them above himself, but rather contemns them, and much more moderate or small honors. And likewise he is not broken by dishonors, but contemns them, as things which he judges to be brought against him unworthily," a. 2, ad 3.

Therefore true magnanimity is not opposed to humility: "In man there is found something great, which he possesses from the gift of God; and some defect, which belongs to him from the infirmity of nature. Therefore magnanimity makes a man dignify himself with great things according to consideration of the gifts which he possesses from God; as, if he has great virtue of soul, magnanimity makes him intend perfect works of virtue... But humility makes a man esteem himself little, according to consideration of his own defect. - Likewise also magnanimity contemns others according as they fall short of the gifts of God: for he does not esteem others so much that he would do something unbecoming for them. But humility honors others and esteems them superior, insofar as it beholds something in them of the gifts of God... And thus it is clear that magnanimity and humility are not contrary, although they seem to tend toward contraries, because they proceed according to diverse considerations" (a. 3, ad 4).

916.

916. Properties of magnanimity. - St. Thomas, from Aristotle, Eth. IV, enumerates several properties of magnanimity, among which the following are the more principal:¹ 1) the magnanimous man is moderately delighted by honors offered to him, even great ones; 2) in prosperity and in adversity he shows himself moderate; 3) he willingly furnishes help to others, but he himself asks no one, or scarcely anyone, for help for himself; 4) with great men he shows himself truly great, that is, he does not flatter them nor allow his liberty to be oppressed by their authority; but with mediocre men he shows himself mediocre; 5) he is not ambitious and accordingly does not thrust himself into more honorable places or functions; 6) he openly states his opinion if it is necessary: for he does not fear men nor desires to flatter anyone; 7) he does not remember injuries received, for this belongs to a base soul; 8) he does not speak greedily about men, nor is he a flatterer of others or an evil-speaker; 9) in his exterior gestures of body he is slow: for he does not act precipitously, because he involves himself only in great affairs, which do not occur so often, and when they occur, must be handled with serious deliberation; 10) according to Aristotle he often uses irony, that is, fiction of the lesser (not mockery), by which someone feigns lesser or base things about himself. The magnanimous man is not accustomed to demonstrate his whole greatness, because this seems to be boasting.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, q. 129, a. 3, ad 3 and 5; a. 4, ad 2; Billuart, diss. II, art. 2; Prummer, Th. M. II, n. 629.

917. Remarks. - 1. The virtue of magnanimity according to the disposition of the soul is among all the just; but as to acts it belongs only to great men (a. 3, ad 2).

Virtue is required for repressing passions which have great force in resisting reason. But some passions not only have great force in resisting reason on the part of the passion because of vehemence, but also "from the external things themselves which are the objects of the passions, such as love or desire either of money or of honor. And in these things there must be virtue not only concerning that which is greatest in them, but also concerning moderate or lesser things, because existing external things, even if they are small, are very appetible, as being necessary for the life of man. And therefore concerning the appetite for money there are two virtues: one indeed concerning moderate or measured sums, namely, liberality; another concerning great sums of money, namely, magnificence... Similarly also concerning honors there are two virtues: one indeed concerning moderate honors, which is unnamed (it could be called philotimy)... but concerning great honors there is magnanimity" (a. 2).

To magnanimity there contribute and pertain: a) directly indeed confidence (zelfvertrouwen), which imports strength of hope, proceeding from a firm and vehement opinion concerning the good to be obtained; but because hope causes daring, which pertains to fortitude, hence confidence consequently pertains to fortitude (a. 6);

b) security (gerustheid), or perfect rest of the soul from fear: this directly pertains to fortitude; but because, just as hope is the cause of daring, so fear is the cause of desperation, therefore "just as confidence consequently pertains to fortitude, insofar as it uses daring, so also security consequently pertains to magnanimity, insofar as it repels desperation" (a. 7);

c) goods of fortune, which help instrumentally toward the end of magnanimity, because through them, namely, through riches and powers and friends, the faculty of doing great things is given to us (a. 8).