Necessary and free matter

a. The remote matter is all sins committed after baptism. It is also called the matter about which, because the acts of the penitent and the absolution of the priest are occupied about these sins themselves as to be detested and destroyed.

b. Remote matter is distinguished: alpha. necessary and free; beta. certain and doubtful; gamma. sufficient and not sufficient.

224. On necessary matter. Those sins are called necessary matter which by divine precept must necessarily be submitted to the keys of the Church through confession. This matter is constituted by all and only mortal sins committed after baptism and not yet directly remitted by force of the keys, or directly indeed remitted, but not accused as is required.¹

a. Sins are said to be directly remitted which are remitted by force of absolution; and in this way are remitted all those sins which by the penitent in themselves are rightly submitted to the keys of the Church and are pardoned by a confessor having jurisdiction over them. Sins are said to be indirectly remitted which are remitted by force of sanctifying grace infused through sacramental absolution. If, for example, a suitably disposed penitent omits a grave sin in confession from inculpable forgetfulness, the absolution of the confessor necessarily produces the remission of sins and the infusion of grace, but it itself cannot remit except sins submitted to the keys; yet grace cannot be infused unless all mortal sins are destroyed; therefore by force of the infused grace even the sin omitted in confession is remitted indirectly and by concomitance.

b. If a penitent because of a legitimate cause excusing from the integrity of confession, e.g., a dying man, accuses his sins only in general, these are directly remitted, but there remains the obligation of declaring them afterward more accurately, if it can be done, because the divine precept of declaring sins according to species and number has not yet been fulfilled.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5. Condemned proposition of Alexander VII, n. 11.

225. Whether an adult who has been rebaptized under condition is bound to confess sins committed before this baptism.

a. A Catholic adult who has again been baptized under condition is not bound to confess again sins already accused: for if the first baptism was valid, the sins have already been remitted through absolution; and if the baptism was not valid, they are remitted through the second baptism. But sins committed from the last confession and not yet accused must be declared integrally in confession.

Nor may it be said that, because these sins perhaps have already been remitted through the baptism now conferred, it is not certainly established that there is an obligation of confessing them; but a doubtful obligation is no obligation. For the obligation of confessing these sins is plainly certain, which will be evident from those things which must immediately be said concerning an acatholic adult baptized again.

b. An acatholic adult who, having been converted to the faith, because of baptism doubtfully conferred is baptized again under condition, must confess his sins integrally.

alpha. Several authors (D'Annibale, Ballerini-Palmieri, Bucceroni, Genicot) teach that confession indeed is to be advised, but is not to be imposed from obligation, except in those places in which it has been prescribed by the bishops. For baptism previously received is doubtfully valid and therefore the obligation of confessing the sins of the past life is doubtful; but a doubtful obligation is no obligation. But the sins themselves committed after the doubtfully valid baptism are certainly destroyed. For if the first baptism was invalid, they are destroyed through the second baptism; if it was valid, they are destroyed through perfect contrition or indirectly through confession performed with attrition.¹ But the decrees of the Holy See issued concerning this matter do not contain a universal law, but only a particular precept given for those to whom they referred, because of their special conditions.

beta. Nevertheless the opinion affirming the obligation of integral confession in the case under discussion seems to be held.

alpha. It is indeed true that there exists no decree of the Holy See by which the obligation of integral confession for those who are rebaptized under condition is expressly declared. For the four decrees of the Holy Office hitherto issued concerning this matter, by which the obligation of confession is proclaimed, are in reality particular: the first in the case of Carl Wippermann, 1715; the other to the bishop of Philadelphia, 1859; the third to the bishops of England, 1868; the fourth to the bishop of Vallispratensis, 1874. But the response of the S. C. de prop. fide, 10 July 1869, given to the bishop of Quebec and finally published in 1899, by which it is declared that the decree of the Holy Office to the bishops of England contains a universal law, is of private authority, published by the secretary of the congregation without the congregation itself having been consulted.² Yet it is rightly affirmed that the Church by these decrees, although in themselves particular, has virtually and equivalently declared that the sins of the doubtfully baptized constitute necessary matter of confession and must be declared in confession by divine law. For although the decrees refer to particular cases, nevertheless, since their circumstances are very diverse and yet the same decision is always presented, it is a sign that the same reason underlies all, which is no other than that the sins of the doubtfully baptized, from the will of Christ, constitute necessary matter of absolution and therefore must be submitted by all to the keys of the Church.

beta. The internal reason by which the certain obligation of confessing sins committed after baptism not certainly valid is proved is this. From the certain conferral of baptism there arises a certain right of the Church over him who received baptism (even if perhaps invalid), and this because of the very grave harms which would follow if the doubtfully baptized were not judged her subjects and subject to all her laws. The very same judgment must be borne in doubt concerning the value of a marriage certainly contracted, in doubt concerning the value of a religious profession certainly emitted, in doubt concerning the value of sacred ordination certainly received, and this because of the grave evils which would otherwise follow.

¹ Cf. Lacroix, l. 6, pr. 1, n. 323.

² Cf. Mannajoli, De obligationibus christianorum propriis, quibus in genere dubie baptizati obstringuntur (Rome: Pustet, 1913), p. 139 ff., p. 197.

226. Sins committed in baptism itself can practically be counted among the doubtful matter of the sacrament of penance; wherefore they need not necessarily be declared in confession, nor can they alone be remitted absolutely through absolution.¹

The sin of fiction or unworthy reception of baptism, or another sin, e.g., of doubt in faith, committed in the very act of baptism, does not indeed impede the value but nevertheless impedes the effect of baptism. Now it is asked whether these sins are destroyed by force of baptism, which revives when the obstacle has been removed, or whether they must be accused in the following confession, so that they may be remitted by force of absolution. Commonly authors, making no distinction between the sin of fiction and other sins, affirm that all sins committed in the reception itself of baptism constitute necessary matter of penance: for these sins must be said to have been committed after baptism; therefore they must be destroyed through penance. - For it can scarcely happen that sin is completed in the very instant of baptism conferred in such a way that it does not continue after baptism has been received; but if nevertheless it were already completed in the very instant of baptism conferred, it could not be destroyed through penance. Since, however, some doubt concerning the obligation of confessing these sins,² others deny it,³ and finally since it can scarcely be discerned whether the sin had already been terminated in the very instant of baptism or also endured afterward, these sins in practice are rightly counted among doubtful matter.

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri, V, n. 18.

² St. Alphonsus, n. 427.

³ D'Annibale, III, n. 164; Lugo, disp. 16, n. 2.

227. On free matter. Those sins are called free matter which can be submitted to the keys of the Church, but need not be. This is constituted by venial sins committed after baptism and not yet remitted, and by sins both mortal and venial already directly remitted.

a. Venial sins are matter of this sacrament, because they are true sins committed against the law of God and therefore can be remitted through the power of the keys, which is not restricted to some genus of sins; but free matter, because in confession they can be concealed without fault and in many other ways they can be destroyed.¹

b. Sins already remitted are matter of this sacrament, because nothing prevents the pardon of a committed sin from being sought and given repeatedly, as will be said below; but they are free matter, because sins already remitted do not need repeated accusation.

c. Since sins both venial and mortal already once remitted are not necessary matter but free matter, it follows that in the confession of mortal sins venial sins may licitly be omitted, whether all or several; but in the confession of venial sins some, even most venial sins, may be omitted; finally in a general confession which is not necessary, not only venial sins, but also mortal sins, whether some or several, whose confession has already once been duly made, may be omitted.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5.

228. On certain and doubtful matter. Certain matter is every true sin certainly committed, whose absolution therefore (with the things to be supposed supposed) is certainly valid; doubtful matter is a doubtful sin, i.e., either one not certainly committed, or one which is not certainly a true sin, whose absolution therefore (even with the other requisites supposed) cannot be called certainly valid. Therefore, if nothing is submitted to the keys except a doubtful sin, of which kind is alpha. a sin doubtfully committed; beta. a doubtfully mortal sin; gamma. a sin doubtfully accused, absolution will be valid if guilt really underlies it, and will be invalid if no guilt underlies it.

a. He who brings nothing except doubtful matter (whether because he doubts concerning consent or because he narrates mere imperfections) of itself can never be absolved absolutely, nor even conditionally without an urgent cause, because the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity. For this reason, if a penitent confesses only doubtful sins, he must be induced to accuse from his past life some certain sin already remitted, whether mortal or at least venial, either by saying: I accuse myself of sins committed formerly against charity, religion, chastity; or by responding affirmatively to the confessor asking: do you accuse yourself and are you sorry for sins committed formerly against charity, religion, chastity?

b. But if this cannot be done, whether because he has committed nothing certain or because from simplicity or weakness he does not remember them, he is to be absolved under condition (if you are capable), if the doubtful sins proposed are mortal. But if the doubtful sins which he confesses are venial and nothing certain from prior life can be added, he is not to be absolved even under condition except rarely, because on the one hand from absolution denied no great spiritual damage arises, and on the other hand the sacrament is not to be exposed to danger of nullity unless spiritual damage is feared which otherwise cannot conveniently be avoided.

c. The practice has grown strong in the Church that penitents, especially pious ones who confess rather often, add to the sins committed since the last confession at least generically one or another sin of the past life; and this is usually done for a twofold reason: first, that certain matter of confession may be had, if perhaps the sins committed since the last confession are only doubtful; then that sorrow for the sins declared in confession may be conceived more certainly, if perhaps true and sincere sorrow is lacking concerning light daily defects. Now, lest the end of this practice be frustrated, namely of providing for the validity and fruit of the sacrament, penitents must be warned that from the sins of their past life they add those which more burden their conscience and for which they truly and sincerely grieve and propose amendment.

d. Not rarely penitents accuse themselves with this or a similar formula: I had doubts against faith, or I had temptations against chastity; of these I accuse myself insofar as before God I am guilty. Ordinarily by this formula they intend to signify a doubt concerning a sin committed. Wherefore if they have not accused other certain sins, they cannot be absolved unless from past life they submit to the keys some certain sin for which they grieve and propose amendment.

229. On sufficient and not sufficient matter. Sufficient matter is said to be sins from which the penitent can validly be absolved; but insufficient matter is said to be sins from which he cannot validly be absolved. Every true personal sin constitutes sufficient matter; but what is not a true personal sin, such as an imperfection, constitutes insufficient matter, cn. 902.

1. That sins already remitted through absolution constitute sufficient matter of absolution is established from the use and practice of the Church: for it would be impious to doubt the value of some sacramental action which the whole Church throughout the world frequents.

That sins already remitted can be matter of absolution is certain and can be declared in this way. Just as we can truly renounce several times a right which we have already once renounced, e.g., by renewing religious vows, so God can truly renounce several times the right to vengeance which he had acquired from our sins. And just as a father, who has already given pardon of an offense to a son, if the son asks again, truly and properly grants the same pardon again, so God grants it again to a sinner asking pardon again in confession, even truly and properly. But the granting of pardon from divine institution is done through the infusion of grace. Nor can it be said that the words of absolution in this case are not true, since no sins are present to be absolved: for the words of absolution signify not only the remission of sin, but also the infusion of grace, which of itself and by its nature is remissive of sin and therefore would remit it if it were present; but since it is not present, the grace itself alone is conferred by accident.¹

2. By the name of imperfection here is understood both an indeliberate transgression of a precept and an action or omission which is opposed not to a precept but to a counsel.² Therefore imperfections of themselves are not sins, and accordingly do not constitute sufficient matter of penance; nevertheless penitents are not to be prevented from confessing their imperfections, both because ordinarily they have an attached venial sin, and because from knowledge of them the confessor can better direct the penitent. But mere imperfections which are submitted to the keys of the Church constitute only doubtful matter, because perhaps they are joined with venial sins.³

a. Imperfections which are committed by this, that counsels or more perfect things are neglected, have an attached sin when the more perfect things are omitted from a disordered affection, not from a reasonable motive.⁴ Now in order that these defects constitute apt matter of absolution, they must in some way be declared in confession, and true sorrow must be conceived concerning them.

b. Although imperfections as such cannot be the object of sacramental absolution, nevertheless they are moral defects concerning which we can grieve, so that we may render God more propitious and beneficent to us. For since God is accustomed to be more liberal toward those who perform even works of supererogation and of mere counsel, but ordinarily denies more abundant helps of grace and providence to those who neglect works of this kind, nothing prevents those desiring more abundant graces from grieving concerning negligences of this kind, so that God may more certainly become more beneficent toward them.

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 13, n. 73.

² Cf. De principiis, n. 286.

³ Lugo, disp. 16, n. 103.

⁴ Cf. De principiis, n. 92.

230. On sins accused only in general. a. The confession of sins is generic if sins are not accused in that specific mode (in the lowest species) in which from the will of Christ they must be accused. Therefore a generic confession of sins can be instituted in three diverse ways: alpha. if the penitent only says that he has sinned, and does not determine whether he has sinned gravely or lightly: I accuse myself of my sins, or if he gives only signs of sorrow without any confession of sin, e.g., by striking the breast or by sighs; beta. if the penitent only says that he has sinned gravely, and does not determine the genus or species of the sin: I accuse myself of my mortal sins; gamma. if the penitent only says the genus or subaltern species of the sin, and does not determine the lowest species: I accuse myself of sins committed against justice, against religion, against the fourth or sixth precept. Concerning the first mode especially the question is instituted, whether sins accused only in general are sufficient matter of valid absolution; for if that accusation suffices for valid absolution, a fortiori the others will be sufficient.

b. To solve the question, one must distinguish between the matter which is required from the precept of Christ, and that which from the essence of the sacrament instituted by way of judgment is required and suffices for valid absolution. Besides this, one must distinguish the case of necessity, where namely specific confession of sins is impossible and absolution is necessary, from the case in which either specific confession is possible or absolution is not necessary.

1. Outside the case of necessity a generic confession of mortal sins does not suffice for receiving valid absolution. For from the precept of Christ grave sins must be declared distinctly and determinately as to species and number, in order that absolution be valid: for Christ willed that absolution, which has the character of a judicial sentence, outside the case of necessity be an exact and perfect judgment, which cannot be instituted without accurate knowledge of the cause. Therefore he who does not confess sins distinctly fails in the precept of Christ, and therefore from defect of disposition is incapable of valid absolution.

2. In a case of necessity, where accurate confession is impossible, for valid absolution it suffices that sins be declared only in general: for impotence excuses from affirmative precepts; wherefore in a case of necessity no other confession is required except that which the essence of the sacrament or judicial sentence demands. But a judgment cannot indeed be had without any knowledge of the cause; nevertheless a true judgment, although imperfect, can be instituted, provided some confused and indistinct knowledge of the judicial cause is supplied; therefore, looking to the essence of judgment, generic and indistinct confession of sins suffices for valid absolution. These things are well confirmed from the practice of the Church, which is the authentic interpreter of the institutions of Christ: for the Church not only permits that, e.g., to soldiers when battle is imminent, or to sailors when shipwreck is threatening, after a generic confession has first been made, absolution be given; but also commands that the dying who can confess only generically be absolved not conditionally, but absolutely.¹ From these things it is rightly inferred that, for certainly valid absolution in a case of necessity, generic confession of sins suffices.

In human judgment, which primarily and principally consists in the condemnatory sentence of the delinquent through the imposition of a punishment suitable to the crime, determinate and perfect knowledge of the cause is required essentially; but in sacramental judgment, which primarily and principally consists in the reconciliatory and absolutory sentence of the penitent, determinate and perfect knowledge of the cause is not essentially demanded. Although of itself a punishment suitable to the crime must also be imposed, nevertheless this is not required for the essence of sacramental judgment.

3. Outside the case of necessity, for valid absolution generic confession of sins seems to suffice where free matter is concerned, and especially where venial sins are concerned: for in the confession of venial sins and of free matter generally, for receiving valid absolution no other confession is required besides that which is necessary for the essence of the sacrament; for there is no precept of confessing venial sins. But for the essence of the sacrament generic confession of sins is sufficient: for the essence of the sacrament is one and immutable; therefore what suffices in necessity for instituting a valid sacramental judgment must also suffice outside necessity. Therefore in the confession of free matter, and specifically of venial sins, generic confession of sins is sufficient.

¹ Roman Ritual, tit. 3, c. 1, n. 24.

231. Whether a wholly generic confession of venial sins only is licit. - No one denies that a wholly generic confession, whether of mortal or venial sins, is licit in a case of necessity: for what is valid is also licit in a case of necessity. But a wholly generic confession of venial sins only (if, for example, a pious penitent who is not guilty of mortal sin only says: I accuse myself of my venial sins and ask absolution) outside a case of necessity is not licit, because it is contrary to the practice of the Church, which has the force of law.

a. From the first centuries of the Church up to these times, by the use and practice of the Church outside a case of necessity, specific confession even of venial sins has flourished; but this long-lasting custom has obtained the force of law in the same manner in which vocal confession of sins has obtained the force of law from custom. Therefore, from a precept of the Church introduced by legitimate custom, a specific confession of venial sins must be made. b. The sacrament of penance was instituted by Christ by way of judgment, which of itself and ordinarily ought to be concerned with matter determined at least in species, as is clear from the obligation of confessing mortal sins according to species and number. But the dignity and fittingness of the sacrament demands that outside a case of necessity, whether mortal or venial sins are submitted to the keys, the sacrament always be administered in that mode in which it was instituted by Christ, namely so that a judgment can be borne concerning determinate matter. c. If once a merely generic confession of venial sins were admitted, several inconveniences would follow: alpha. penitents would lack the admonitions, counsels, and spiritual direction of the confessor; beta. the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity, for several penitents, not distinguishing imperfections from sins, would easily submit only imperfections and therefore doubtful matter to the keys; gamma. several would not satisfy the precept of confession, for holding mortal sins to be venial they would not declare them in species; delta. more indulgent confessors would easily admit a generic confession even of mortal sins.¹

There are indeed some (Gury-Ballerini, Eschbach, Bucceroni, Apicella, Genicot, and among the older authors Dicastillo) who judge that a generic confession of venial sins is licit. But their opinion does not seem probable and therefore is illicit in practice. For they bring no other argument except this: "With the certain validity of the sacrament standing, illicitness cannot arise from elsewhere than from a positive divine precept; but this precept is not had. Therefore, where grave sins necessarily to be accused in confession are lacking, there is no obligation of accusing the remaining sins in determinate number and defined species" (Bucceroni). But the obligation does not arise from an explicit divine precept, but from the reasons brought forward above, especially from custom, which has obtained the force of law. Nor is an exception to be taken against this reason, that it is not established whether the faithful confessing venial sins in species indicate a strict obligation or only that which is better, because they confess only from devotion. For those confessing from devotion know that they can licitly abstain from confession; but if they confess, they think that they must confess in species.

¹ Cf. Laymann, l. 5, tr. 6, c. 5, n. 15.

232. Corollaries: a. From these things this instruction is gathered for practice: if someone, to render absolution more certain, joins to doubtful or lighter sins which he has committed since the last confession sins of the past life already remitted, absolutely speaking it suffices that they be added generically and indeterminately (I accuse myself also of the sins of my whole life). Nevertheless it is to be advised that the genus or subaltern species of one or another sin also be declared (I accuse myself also of sins committed against charity, religion, or against the fourth or sixth precept). And this must especially be advised when the sins declared from the last confession are truly doubtful, so that the sacramental judgment may be more determinate.

b. Therefore generic confession of sins in a case of necessity suffices both for valid and for licit absolution. A case of necessity is present if, on the one hand, specific accusation is impossible, and on the other hand, absolution is necessary. This happens in the following cases: alpha. if a dying man deprived of speech expresses by signs in some way confession and desire of absolution; beta. if soldiers with battle imminent or sailors with shipwreck threatening can confess only generically because of lack of time; gamma. if deaf-mutes or those whose language the confessor does not know ask for absolution; delta. if rude men, or those of failing memory because of old age, come to confession, who can accuse no sin in particular and respond nothing to questions posed except that they are sinners like other men. Therefore penitents of this kind can validly and licitly be absolved, because on account of moral impossibility they are excused from a more accurate accusation just as the dying deprived of speech are excused; but only rarely (three or four times in a year), because only in a case of necessity are they excused from specific confession. For the rest, if the confessor proposes to a penitent of this kind some sins into which he can be presumed once to have fallen, in this way: do you grieve for sins ever committed, but especially for lies, for negligences in divine service, etc., and if the penitent responds that he grieves, a more determinate accusation is also had, since it can certainly be supposed that the penitent formerly committed one or another of the sins proposed.¹ With this effort used, these can be absolved as often as they ask for absolution.

¹ Elbel-Bierbaum, III, pr. 9, n. 15.

THE remote matter of the sacrament of Penance is the sins which have been committed after Baptism, for sins committed before Baptism, when this is received in adult age, are forgiven by Baptism. The matter of Penance is necessary, or free but sufficient. Mortal sins which have never been directly absolved are the necessary matter of confession, for as the Council of Trent teaches,¹ every mortal sin committed after Baptism must be submitted to the keys. The same council teaches that venial sins may be confessed, but that there is no necessity to do so, and so they are sufficient but free or optional matter of the sacrament. The same is true also of mortal sins which have been already absolved directly, for the penitent may with fruit renew his sorrow for them, and nothing prevents the sentence of absolution being repeatedly pronounced over them. The previous sentence of absolution is, as it were, confirmed anew, and thereby fresh grace is infused into the soul (Can. 901, 902).

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 2.

The proximate matter of Penance, according to the more common opinion, is the acts of the penitent: contrition, confession, and satisfaction. According to the Thomist doctrine, the acts of the penitent constitute the material part of the sacrament, so that they are the matter out of which the sacrament is made, and are an essential part of the sacramental sign. If the Council of Trent calls them the quasi-matter,¹ it is not because they are not the true matter in the sense just explained, but because they are not the matter which is used externally in the confection of the sacrament, as is water in Baptism, or chrism in Confirmation.

On the other hand, the Scotists allow, indeed, that contrition, confession, and satisfaction on the part of the penitent are necessary conditions for the administration of Penance, but they hold that the whole sacramental sign is contained in the words of absolution, These words alone are used by the minister of the sacrament, and they signify the grace conferred by the sacrament. Taken materially, they constitute its matter; inasmuch as they signify the giving of grace for the remission of sins, they constitute its form. This opinion has never been condemned by the Church, and it remains probable, but the question belongs rather to dogmatic than to moral theology.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 3.

It is not sufficient to confess one’s sins in general terms, and if they are grievous the law of God requires that they be confessed according to number and species, as the Council of Trent teaches.t As we have seen, venial sins are sufficient matter for absolution, but there is no necessity to confess them.

But supposing that a penitent has only venial sins, and he wishes to confess them, what kind of confession is necessary and sufficient¹ Will it be enough to say, “I accuse myself of some small sins and ask for absolution ”’; or ‘‘ I accuse myself of all the sins of my past life, and I have nothing serious ” All divines agree that it will be sufficient to mention some one sin in particular in this case, or to mention the virtue or obligation which has been violated, as by saying, ‘I accuse myself of slight negligence in prayer,” or ‘“‘ of small faults against charity.” They differ about the lawfulness of using a mere general formula. Such a method of confessing is against the practice of the Church, which, as St Thomas says, we should always follow; it is also liable to abuse, for penitents cannot always decide what is serious and necessary matter for confession or not, and shame might easily lead them to be content with generalities when they should give particulars. However, there is something to be said for the other view, inasmuch as some sort of confession is all that is required for the essence of the sacrament, and when there are only venial sins to be confessed there is no certain law which prescribes confession according to number and species, or even more than in general terms. This opinion is at any rate sometimes of use, as it may at times enable confessors to be satisfied with generalities when they cannot get more.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 5.

I. Object. Remote matter, or that around which the sacramental action is concerned, is sins committed after Baptism, and these alone and all of them (n. 287).

Question 1. Whether the sacrilegious reception of Baptism is remote matter of Penance.

Response. Most affirm it, because the reception is sacrilegious insofar as it places an obstacle to the infusion of grace. But what here and now prevents the sacrament from infusing grace seems to be posterior to the sacrament. Others deny or doubt, because the argument adduced does not convince them (St. Alphonsus, VI, 427). The same seems to have to be said of other sins, such as hatred or lust, if perhaps they are committed in the very reception. For the rest, it is certain that both sacrilegious reception and other sins are matter of penance insofar as, as usually happens, after Baptism has been received the will actually continues to adhere to them. If you posit that sacrilegious reception or other sins are at least by nature prior to Baptism itself, it must be said that they are remitted by the force of Baptism afterward reviving.

Question 2. Whether sins committed after doubtfully valid Baptism, but before the sacrament has been repeated under condition, are remote matter of Penance.

Response. They are or are not remote matter according as Baptism was in fact valid or not valid. But it is another question whether there is an obligation of confessing such sins; concerning this, later.

II. Division. Remote matter is chiefly distinguished into necessary and free.

1. Necessary matter is called that which must be confessed by divine precept. This is constituted by mortal sins committed after Baptism, but not yet duly submitted to the keys, or not yet directly remitted by absolution.

Moreover, a sin directly remitted is called that which - whether completely or not completely¹ - has been subjected to the keys and remitted by absolution. A sin indirectly remitted is one which was not subjected to the keys, but nevertheless was remitted by absolution insofar as the infusion of grace also carries with it the expulsion of mortal sins which are not subject to the power of the keys.

Therefore necessary matter is:

1. Mortal sins not yet submitted to the keys; and it is the same whether they have been omitted culpably or inculpably,² and likewise whether they have already been remitted (namely through perfect contrition or through attrition together with a sacrament of the living) or have not been remitted.

2. Mortal sins submitted to the keys, but not completely declared, as can happen, for example, in a case of necessity.

3. Mortal sins submitted to the keys, and indeed completely, but not remitted by the judge, for example because of omission of absolution, or because of defect of contrition (St. Alphonsus, VI, 425, 480).

2. Free matter is that which can, but need not, be subjected to the keys. This is constituted by:

a) Mortal sins committed after Baptism, and both duly submitted to the keys and remitted by absolution. That these can again be remitted by absolution is clear both from tradition, from the consensus of theologians and the practice of the faithful, and from canon 902. Some deduce this from the fact that the total remission of punishment is not established, and therefore the sin can again be subjected to the keys; others from the fact that one can again and again remit an injury inflicted (St. Alphonsus, VI, 425, 427, doubt 2); these things will be explained more fully in their own place.

b) Any venial sins whatever, whether already declared and remitted, or not yet declared or not yet remitted. That venial sins also are matter of Penance is clear: 1. from the Council of Trent³ and from canon 902; 2. from the consensus of theologians and the practice of the faithful (St. Alphonsus, VI, 425).

Corollary I. Sufficient matter is any sin whatever committed after Baptism, whether remitted or not yet remitted (canon 902).

Corollary II. Not sufficient matter are moral defects which lack the nature of sin. Nevertheless, "confessors should not be rebuked because they do not hinder penitents in saying these things; both because many of those things which seem mere imperfections are not done without some venial fault, and also because it is not necessary that all the things which the penitent says in confession be determinately and absolutely matter of absolution. For many things are said because it belongs more to the confessor to discern what is and what is not matter of absolution, and so that the confessor may have a clearer view of the penitent's conscience and be able to judge better concerning his whole state, in order to apply the due remedy."⁴

¹ For example, if some sin (for instance, in a case of necessity) is declared only generically. Nevertheless, according to some authors, in that case absolution falls directly upon the generic aspect, but not upon the specific aspect of the sin, and therefore it is not called directly remitted by them.

² The following proposition was condemned by Alexander VII: "Sins omitted in confession or forgotten because of imminent danger of life or because of another cause, we are not bound in the following confession to subject to the absolution of the priest" (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1111).

³ Session 14, chapter 5 and chapter 7.

⁴ De Lugo, Disputation XVI, Section II, n. 103.

What is penance? - Penance is a virtue, and it is a sacrament. Under the first respect, it is a moral virtue inclining to hatred, abomination, or detestation of sin and to sorrow or sadness, insofar as sin is an offense and injury against God, namely insofar as it makes God turned away from us and indignant, on account of the due honor of God being harmed by reason of his supreme dominion; and consequently it inclines to the efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future and of satisfying divine justice, so that God may be reconciled to us. Hence penance is a virtue pertaining to justice, as its potential part. Suarez, d. 2, s. 3, n. 4 ff.; Lugo, d. 2, nn. 50, 52; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85. - Hatred, because it is evil; sorrow, because it is present or because it is apprehended as present.

Under the other respect, it is a sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ the Lord after the manner of a judgment, for remitting, through priestly absolution, sins committed after baptism to a man who is contrite and has confessed. After the manner of a judgment: for there is present the penitent, at once the accused, witness, and accuser, and the priest, the judge pronouncing sentence, who is held by the strictest obligation of secrecy. But this judgment tends toward absolving the accused and reconciling him with God. Hence the difference is evident between this sacramental judgment and a forensic judgment. - Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 1, 2, 3, 4, cc. 1, 2, 3; Decree of the Holy Office Lamentabili, July 3, 1907, props. 46, 47; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 1; L. 246; E. M.

Is it lawful in the sacrament of penance to follow probable opinions? - Resp. In the affirmative, in those things which pertain to the judgment, provided the form of the judgment is preserved: for form gives being to the thing, and judgment pertains to the validity of the sacrament. And thus in those things which pertain to the integrity of Confession, to the jurisdiction of the confessor, etc., it is lawful to follow probable opinions. L. 468; H. A., tr. 16, n. 29. To jurisdiction, for when its probability stands, the Church supplies it. - In the negative in those things which pertain to the validity of the sacrament, because the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity; except, however, in a case of necessity; for the sacraments are for men. Wherefore it is not lawful to follow probable opinions concerning the very substance of Confession and of contrition. For sins pertain to penance, as sacrament, under the generic aspect of sin; as judgment, as individual things in themselves; and the same must consequently be said of the Confession of sins. Hence Confession pertains to penance especially insofar as it is a judgment. Contrition, on the other hand, pertains to penance especially insofar as it is a sacrament. But satisfaction rather looks to integrity, since it is added extrinsically. Finally, in the words of absolution is contained the form of the sacrament and the sentence of the judgment. - Cf. 348.

Is the sacrament of penance necessary? - Resp. In the affirmative, for those who have fallen after baptism. It is necessary for justification both by necessity of precept and by necessity of means, at least in desire. Trent, sess. 6, C. 14; sess. 14, C. 2, 4, 5; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 5; q. 87, a. 6; Suppl., q. 6, a. 1. - Hence the sacrament of penance is customarily called the second plank after shipwreck. Trent, sess. 6, C. 14; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 6. - But since no actual sin can be remitted in this life without the virtue of penance, it is also evident that this virtue is altogether necessary for the justification of adults who have fallen after baptism. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, a. 2; q. 87, a. 1. - St. Thomas, Quodl. 4, a. 10; E. M.

What is the effect of the sacrament of penance? - The effect of this sacrament is absolution from sins and reconciliation with God, and, as a consequence, remission of eternal punishment. Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 3, cc. 12, 15; sess. 6, C. 7; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, aa. 3, 4, 6. "For him who through contrition has obtained remission of sins as to guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal punishment, which is dismissed together with guilt, by the power of the keys... grace is increased and temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of which had still remained after the remission of guilt, though not entirely, as in baptism, but a part of it.... By the power of the keys, which works in the sacrament of penance, not all punishment is remitted, but something of the temporal punishment whose debt could remain after absolution from eternal punishment; and not only from that punishment which the penitent has or undertakes from absolution in confessing... but also something is remitted of that punishment which is due in Purgatory, so that one absolved who dies before satisfaction is punished less in Purgatory than if he died before absolution." St. Thomas, 4 d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2. - E. M.

What are the parts of the sacrament of penance; what is their efficacy? - The parts of the sacrament of penance are, as in the other sacraments, matter and form. The form is the words of absolution which the priest pronounces. The matter or quasi-matter is the acts of the penitent, which are distinguished into three parts. The first is contrition of heart. The second is confession of mouth. The third is satisfaction. Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 2, 3, c. 4. "Every sacrament produces its effect not only by the power of the form, but also by the power of the matter; for from both there is one sacrament.... Hence remission of guilt is the effect of penance principally indeed by the power of the keys, which the ministers have, from whose side that which is formal in this sacrament is received; but secondarily by the force of the acts of the penitent pertaining to the virtue of penance, nevertheless insofar as these acts are in some way ordered to the keys of the Church. And thus it is clear that remission of guilt is an effect of penance according as it is a virtue, but more principally according as it is a sacrament." St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, a. 6; q. 90, aa. 1, 2. - E. M.

What is the remote matter of the sacrament of penance? - The remote matter is all sins committed after baptism. But they are called the matter about which, because absolution is concerned with destroying them. - Necessary remote matter is all mortal sins committed after baptism and not yet directly remitted through the keys of the Church, even if already destroyed by perfect contrition, or inculpably omitted in a preceding Confession. Hence they must be manifested in the immediately following Confession, since they are not free matter but necessary; and therefore the penitent must necessarily be absolved from these, and a new penance must be imposed, even if someone confesses them immediately after absolution. L. 513. Nevertheless, as to sins omitted from forgetfulness or another just cause, there is no obligation to confess them as soon as possible, since they have already been destroyed, nor therefore is there danger to the soul in delay.

Wherefore their Confession can be deferred until, by force of another obligation, or spontaneously, someone confesses again. - Sufficient but free remote matter is all venial sins committed after baptism, and all sins, whether mortal or venial, already otherwise duly subjected to the keys of the Church. Their remission is confirmed and grace is increased. C. 12, de Poenit.; Extrav. 1, de Privileg.; 2, de Haeret.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, C. 7; prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII; L. 425, 427. - For a certain greater security, besides ordinary light sins, it is expedient to add either some certain sin for which one grieves more vehemently, or at least a generic accusation of all the sins of one's past life. Reuter 202; Elbel 19. - St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 2; E. M.

Resolutions: "Venial sins can be omitted, either all or some; likewise mortal sins once duly confessed, e.g., in a general Confession. In this, it is also not necessary to add to a mortal sin that it was committed after the last Confession..., unless some circumstance, e.g., one changing the species, or reservation of the case, or a proximate occasion of sinning, requires otherwise, and a sufficient penance is imposed." L. 425; St. Thomas, 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, q. 5, ad 4; d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 4. - Insufficient matter consists in imperfections which are not sins: that someone did not do the good which he could have done, did not respond to divine inspirations in those things which are of mere counsel. La-Croix, l. 5, n. 211; L. 425. - The Confession of all lethal sins, certainly invalid, must necessarily be repeated. For all mortal sins must of themselves be subjected to the keys. Nevertheless, Confession need not be repeated unless its invalidity is morally certain. The reason is: 1. Because when an act has certainly been placed, if a doubt arises whether it was rightly placed, that rule of Law obtains: one must stand for the value of the act. 2. Because the obligation of the divine law concerning making Confession has already probably been satisfied. L. 505; La-Croix 1221; Elbel 263. "Even if through culpable mortal error you have omitted such a sin, e.g., of self-abuse, or its number, or another necessary circumstance, you are not therefore bound to repeat the intervening Confessions made in good faith and legitimately, in which from natural forgetfulness you did not confess that defect, since they were valid and remain valid." L. 503. - Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, §§ 1, 2.

What is the proximate matter of the sacrament of penance? - The proximate matter, from which, intrinsic and essential, consists in the acts of the penitent, namely contrition, Confession, and satisfaction to be accepted, which however, as to its execution, pertains to the integrity of the sacrament. Lugo, d. 12, n. 40. But these acts are called quasi-matter by Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; by Trent, sess. 14, C. 3; and by St. Thomas, 4 d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, q. 1; not because "they do not have the nature of true matter, but because they are not matter of that kind which is applied extrinsically, as water in baptism and chrism in confirmation." Roman Catechism, n. 13. Several, who with Scotus think that the whole substance of the sacrament consists in absolution alone, raise a doubt about the mind of St. Thomas, whom they affirm stands for them. But, to pass over other things now, this holy Doctor has it in 3 p., q. 84, a. 1, ad 1: "In those sacraments which have an effect corresponding to human acts, the sensible human acts themselves are in place of matter, as happens in penance and matrimony." Cf. ibid., ad 2, ad 3. And a. 2 of the same question: "The proximate matter of this sacrament is the acts of the penitent, whose matter is the sins for which he grieves, and which he confesses, and for which he satisfies." Cf. ibid., q. 90, aa. 1, 2. But from the Council of Trent the acts of the penitent are parts of this sacrament. Moreover, in chapter 2 it says that this sacrament is completed by matter and form, and in chapter 3 it assigns the form, namely the words of absolution. Therefore the acts of the penitent are the matter, which immediately there it calls quasi-matter.

Note: A sin is said to be directly remitted when it is remitted by the power of the keys of the Church. For this it is necessary that the penitent confess the sin and that the confessor have jurisdiction over it. It is said to be indirectly remitted when it is remitted by the power of sanctifying grace, which is infused in the sacrament of penance, because this grace is incompatible with any grave sin whatever, and one grave sin cannot be remitted without another. This has place when the sin has been inculpably omitted or reserved. La-Croix 597; L. 478, 504.

Are mortal sins committed in the very reception of baptism matter of this sacrament? - "They very commonly affirm it.... The reason is that these sins, although they are simultaneous in time with baptism, nevertheless by nature are posterior to it. - But the reason which they adduce... does not seem to prove conclusively... for the sin of fiction, namely if he were to receive baptism while existing in mortal sin without sorrow." L. 427. D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 301, generally denies it for all sins admitted in the very reception of baptism, and says this is the true opinion. The reason is that the material object of penance, from Trent, sess. 14, c. 2, is the sins which one has committed after he began to be subject to the Church through baptism; and the sin is completed by the fiction itself of the one feigning in his entrance into the Church.

But if the sin is continued for some space of time after baptism, it is already matter of penance. - St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 69, a. 10; 4 d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, q. 3; Lugo, d. 16, s. 1.

Must an adult to be baptized conditionally, in doubt about a preceding baptism, confess sins already accused? - Resp. In the negative. The reason is that those sins either are already destroyed if the prior baptism was valid; or if it was invalid, they are destroyed by the later valid baptism and are not matter of Confession. Reuter 118; E. M.

Must the aforesaid adult confess sins committed since the last Confession and not yet accused? - It is disputed. The first opinion affirms it, because the obligation of confessing sins urges whenever it is not established that they were committed before baptism. Wherefore, after the later baptism has been conferred, those sins are then to be accused. This is confirmed from the response of the Holy Office, Dec. 17, 1868. The second opinion denies it, because, given the probable invalidity of the prior baptism, those sins are probably not matter of Confession; and therefore there is no certainty about a certain obligation. The matter of Confession consists in sins committed after baptism. Therefore whenever it is not established that those sins were committed after baptism, the obligation of Confession is not established. In order that the obligation of Confession can be urged, sins committed after baptism must be proved. Trent, sess. 14, C. 2, 4. But if the prior baptism was in fact valid, those sins will be able to be remitted either through perfect contrition, or indirectly through absolution with attrition. Nor does the praised response of the Holy Office settle the controversy generally, because it was given for Neoconverts in England, on account of special reasons of that region. His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of the Holy Office publicly declared at St. Apollinaris in 1897 that that response was not a general decree, when this question was being debated expressly in the customary conference of cases of conscience. This also D'Annibale, assessor of the Holy Office and afterward Cardinal, explicitly affirms, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 301, note 3. And the Plenary Council of Latin America, adopting the same rule of acting, since it well knew that that response was not a general decree, carefully added in a note: "having before the eyes the norm of the decrees of the Holy Office, July 17, 1715, and Dec. 2, 1874," Collect. S. C. de P. F., nn. 644, 957, which contain almost the same prescription as the praised response of the Holy Office, Dec. 17, 1868. Mention of that decree is in fact omitted, and in place of it another decree, still more particular, of June 17, 1715, is cited, to which the response of Dec. 17, 1868, refers itself. And those words "having before the eyes," etc., after I myself proposed them to His Eminence Cardinal Vives, President of that Council, were then added in the note without any difficulty, for precisely this reason, since they were lacking in the prior schema: that there should be no place for a false interpretation of the mind of the Council concerning the universality of the decree cited. - Hence, when there was doubt about the priestly ordination of a certain beneficed coadjutor with care of souls, the Holy Office, Jan. 17, 1900, decreed that the ordination was to be repeated under condition, that the Masses celebrated were to be supplied from the treasury of the Church, and it said nothing about Confessions heard being repeated by penitents. Cf. 674; La-Croix, l. 6, p. 1, n. 324; L. 473, 474, 505; Monit. Eccles., vol. 11, p. 523; vol. 12, p. 540 ff.; E. M.

Nor indeed can a demonstrative argument, as is evident of itself, be taken from the Instruction of the Holy Office, July 20, 1859, cf. Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Baptismus, n. 15, in which an order is established, if baptism is to be repeated under condition, that there be: 1. abjuration, or profession of faith; 2. conditional baptism; 3. sacramental Confession with conditional absolution.

Formal abjuration of the sect is to be made by heretics who are converted to the Catholic faith and are baptized under condition. But from those who have not yet completed the fourteenth year of age only profession of faith is required. Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1680.

672 bis. The adversaries object against the preceding opinion set forth that the decree of the Holy Office, Dec. 17, 1868, is universal by reason of the matter. The argument of the adversaries in fact does not prove what is intended, and contradicts itself. For if in fact in the case of doubtful baptism one must stand for its validity until its nullity is established, and consequently the one doubtfully baptized is certainly held by the laws of the Church, among which is the law of confessing sins committed after baptism, it would follow from this also that he cannot be baptized again even under condition, and that a layman doubtfully baptized, who after that baptism has committed no grave sin, can and must approach Holy Communion at Easter time. Indeed the parish priest and Bishop doubtfully baptized could and would have to celebrate Mass for the people, etc.

Moreover, what they say, that a very slight doubt suffices for repeating baptism, but does not suffice for exempting from the certain law of confession, is in fact nothing. For first, the doubt in the case is not always very slight. Moreover, in order for it to suffice for repeating baptism, there must be at least some true probability, in the lowest degree. And consequently the principle remains entire and unshaken: a doubtful law does not oblige.

Finally the response which is brought forward as unknown, S. C. de P. F., July 12, 1869, in fact was not unknown, but was already known by private knowledge. But that response also does not prove the matter, because it is not a decree of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide. And therefore it was not related in the first edition of the Collectanea of this Congregation. But in the other edition it was placed not in the series of decrees, but in a certain note. And besides, even in that response of July 12, 1869, Collectan. n. 1338, it is not said absolutely that the decree of Dec. 17, 1868, concerning the law of confession after repeated baptism by reason of the preceding doubt, is absolutely universal, but at most universal for neoconverts, of whom alone there is question in that decree and in the praised response. And the decrees in fact are always referred to Protestants converted to the Catholic faith. Cf. Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Baptismus, n. 15, and if they are read well, it will surely appear that they wholly cohere with those things which have been handed down here, and that it does not seem gratuitously asserted that they do not cohere.

Is a sin accused only in general ever sufficient matter of Confession, as to its validity and liceity, e.g., if someone says: I accuse myself of all the sins of my life? - Resp. In the affirmative as to validity. For all agree that, in order that sick persons at the point of death, soldiers when battle is imminent, sailors when shipwreck is imminent, etc., be validly absolved, some external sign of Confession is sufficient, e.g., the taking of the hand, striking of the breast, etc. But since the essence of the sacrament is not changed outside a case of necessity, but is always the same for various cases, both in a case of necessity and outside a case of necessity, the aforesaid Confession will be sufficient as to the validity of the sacrament.

La-Croix 620; Reuter 303; Lugo, d. 17, n. 8; L. 480, 481, 482, 486, 504. - It seems that the same must probably be affirmed also as to liceity, for, granted the certain validity of the sacrament, illicitness cannot arise from elsewhere than from a positive divine precept. But this precept is not had, as is clear from Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, according to which the divine precept of explaining sins both as to number and as to species is had only for grave sins not yet directly remitted through the keys of the Church. Therefore where grave sins necessarily to be accused in Confession are lacking, there is no remaining obligation to accuse sins both in a determinate number and in a definite species. Dicastillo, de Sacr. poenit., d. 9, n. 760 ff.; Apicella, Ai Confessori Studio sull'assoluzione, etc.; A. S. S., vol. 4, p. 320.

Is there an obligation of confessing doubtful sins? - There is no obligation of confessing a positively doubtful mortal sin, namely when "on both sides there are probable reasons that a mortal sin was or was not committed." Thus "the very common opinion.... The reason: each person can licitly conform himself to a truly probable opinion." L. 473.

There is likewise no obligation of confessing a mortal sin doubtfully committed, namely when there is no prudent reason for affirming that the said sin was committed. The reason is, "because Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, does not oblige penitents except to confess all mortal sins of which they have consciousness... which imports having certain knowledge of the sin; for conscience is nothing other than knowledge of the heart and practical judgment concerning a sin committed. But a doubtful conscience is neither knowledge nor judgment, but a suspension of judgment; hence he who has no reason that he committed it can by no means be said to have consciousness of sin." L. 474. And indeed, if according to the very common opinion there is no obligation of confessing a positively doubtful sin, namely when it can probably be affirmed that it was committed, although it can also probably be affirmed that it was not committed, how will an obligation be able to be present when it could not even probably be said that the sin was committed? Since such a doubt does not rest upon a solid foundation, it cannot arise except from vain suspicion and fear of a sin committed, as frequently happens to scrupulous and fearful consciences. Ithur., Cas. 44, nn. 15, 18, 20 ff.

If it is a question of a sin certainly committed, and certainly grave in itself or objectively, but there is doubt about the consent given and about sufficient advertence, the following rule is handed down by St. Alphonsus, 476: "Those who are of a fearful conscience must be exempted from the obligation of confessing doubtful mortal sins. For these, in doubt, can reasonably, indeed morally certainly, believe that they did not consent, because presumption is taken from what commonly happens.... Conversely, the opposite must be judged about one who is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins, because in doubt he is presumed to have consented. For if he had resisted, he would certainly remember that effort which he brought upon himself to repel the temptation. Hence La-Croix rightly concludes, 612, that scarcely ever in men of this kind, whether of the first or second genus, is there given a merely negative doubt; for presumption founds a probability of consent given or dissent." Ithur., Cas. 44, n. 15 ff.

If it is a question of a sin doubtfully grave, namely in itself and objectively speaking of itself, there is no obligation of confessing such sins. For after diligence has been applied, one can form for himself a practical judgment from the very well-known rule "that there is no certain obligation where the offense is doubtful." L. 474. Speaking of itself; for he "who is certain about his evil action, and does not know how to discern whether it was mortal or not, is indeed bound to stand by the judgment of the confessor, whose office it is to discern between leprosy and leprosy." L. 474; St. Thomas, 4 d. 21, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3. But, scrupulous persons excepted, generally speaking, it is useful to confess doubtful sins, both for greater peace of conscience and so that the confessor, knowing the dangers in which the penitent is placed, can admonish him and suggest suitable remedies for avoiding them. L. 476.

If there is doubt whether someone has or has not confessed a mortal sin certainly committed, and the doubt is negative, he is certainly bound to confess it. For the law of Confession is certain, and no prudent reason suggests that it has been satisfied. But if the doubt is positive, St. Alphonsus, 427, holds that the penitent must confess it, "since the obligation of Confession is certain and the satisfaction doubtful." But Lugo, d. 16, nn. 58, 59, says: "All commonly teach that someone is not bound to confess that sin which he probably judges he has already confessed.... Nothing is more frequent among theologians than to excuse from repeating Confession one who confessed... according to some probable opinion concerning its validity." And St. Alphonsus himself handed this down, in the Roman edition of 1757, dedicated to Benedict XIV, l. 6, n. 477, as common doctrine.

The reason is clear: for although the general law is certain, nevertheless, with probable satisfaction of it standing, its obligation in the concrete, in the particular case, now becomes doubtful. Besides, the same holy Doctor adds in the same place "that one who was diligent in confessing his sins, if afterward he doubts whether he omitted some sin, after much time has elapsed since he committed it, is not bound to confess it, since in that case he can believe morally certainly that he has already confessed it.... If someone previously, from a bad habit, had fallen into several sins, and afterward has been truly converted through constant integrity of life, if then he doubts whether in a general or particular Confession made with due diligence he omitted some sin or circumstance, let the confessor forbid him even to think back over his past life." But scrupulous persons, as the doctors very commonly say, are never bound to confess past sins unless they are certain that they were mortal and certain that they have never confessed them. L. ibid.

674 bis. Whether one who has confessed a sin as doubtful must confess it again if he recognizes it as certain is disputed. - St. Alphonsus, 478, 504, affirms it, because that sin was not accused as to its individual substance; for the accusation of a certain sin is not included in the accusation of a doubtful sin. Thus several other grave theologians. Reuter 332, Tamb., Meth. conf., l. 2, c. 1, § 4, n. 24, and also several other grave theologians deny it, since that sin was directly remitted through the keys of the Church; therefore it is not to be subjected to the keys again. - "Sanchez, etc., very commonly and most probably say that if someone confesses a sin which neither he nor the confessor knew to be mortal, and afterward knows that it is mortal from its genus, he is not bound to confess it again. The reason is that in this case the penitent has already exposed his sin to the confessor as it then was in his conscience and now is; and in the present nothing new occurs except that he now knows the matter of that sin to be grave, which he previously did not know." L. 478, 500.

Strictly speaking, someone can approach the sacred synaxis, without a preceding Confession, with a doubtful or probable mortal sin. The reason is that Trent requires Confession before Communion only for those who are conscious of mortal sin. Hence a priest doubting whether he adhered to a bad thought, or judging probably that he did not adhere to it, can celebrate, contrition nevertheless having been made first, without Confession, although he has abundance of a confessor. Yet contrition should first be made, lest he rashly expose the sacrament to the danger of being frustrated of its effect, and perhaps in fact lack the fruit of the Eucharist; and lest Jesus Christ be exposed at least to material irreverence and dishonor, if perhaps, really coming into us, the soul is defiled by mortal sin.

At least; for there seems to be a certain formal irreverence in this, that someone knowingly and prudently receives Christ himself in himself while doubtfully approved. L. 475. In practice, however, Confession is to be counseled. - Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, §§ 3, 4.

If the penitent offers only doubtful sufficient matter, is the confessor bound to seek certain matter from the past life, so that he can absolve? - Resp. In the affirmative, if he wishes to absolve, because otherwise the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity. Except unless a case occurs in which the penitent can be absolved conditionally, concerning which below. In the negative, if he does not wish to absolve, but to dismiss the penitent with only a blessing, because the penitent who does not bring certainly sufficient matter does not have a right to absolution. Likewise, if the penitent seems to have doubtful sorrow about venials alone, the confessor is not ordinarily bound to apply great diligence to move him to sorrow, although he would do this much better. But it would have to be said otherwise if it were a question of doubtful mortals, because of the danger to the penitent. - L. 432.

Must one who brings not necessary matter, but free and certain matter, necessarily be absolved? - Resp. In the affirmative, speaking of itself. The reason is that, on the one hand, the penitent duly disposed, after he has performed confession, has an acquired right to absolution; but on the other hand, the confessor has no right to grant or deny absolution according to his own judgment, and thus to defraud the penitent of those spiritual gifts of grace which follow absolution. L. 604.

417. As in the other Sacraments, so in the Sacrament of Penance, there is a twofold matter, one remote and the other proximate.

The remote matter consists of all sins committed after Baptism; these are called the matter concerning which, because absolution is occupied with destroying them. It is either necessary or merely sufficient and free.

The necessary remote matter consists of all mortal sins committed after Baptism and not yet directly remitted by the power of the keys, because by divine precept sins of this kind must be submitted to the keys. - But the sufficient and free matter consists of all venial sins ¹. It is called sufficient because any sins, even the least, can be the object of sacramental pardon. It is called free because there is no precept of submitting them to the keys. These things are established from the perpetual practice and tradition of the Church, and also from the definition of the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 5.

¹ Add all sins, whether mortal or venial, which have already at another time been duly submitted to the keys, as the Author presently has it (q. 1).

The proximate matter of the Sacrament of Penance consists of the three acts of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are called the quasi matter of this Sacrament because they are in the likeness of sensible matter which in the other Sacraments is subjected to the form ²; for through these acts sins are presented to be destroyed by the words of the form. This is established especially from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 4.

² St. Thomas teaches thus, however, that in the other Sacraments matter is subjected to the form in a different manner: A form of words is applied to sacramental signs in the other Sacraments for their sanctification, because they contain and cause grace; but exterior penance is not a sign causing grace, and therefore it is not necessary that it be sanctified through some form of words. But the words which are pronounced by the absolving Priest are immediately directed to him who subjects himself to the Sacrament; whence he himself is sanctified by the power of absolution and receives grace, but his confession is not sanctified so that he may receive grace from it, as was the case in Baptism concerning the sanctification of the water (In IV Sent., dist. 22, q. 2, art. 1, q. 1, ad 3). But I have said, in the note to no. 414, that the things which the Holy Doctor handed down in the Summa (III, q. 86, art. 6) do not appear contrary to these things. For although in the body of the article he says that the remission of guilt is in some manner an effect of the acts of penance, he nevertheless adds (ibid., ad 1) that this is to be understood of acts which are there as effects of operative grace, produced simultaneously with the remission of guilt. And more clearly (ibid., ad ult.): The act of the virtue of penance has it that without it the remission of guilt cannot take place, insofar as it is an inseparable effect of grace, through which guilt is principally remitted, which also operates in all the Sacraments. If, therefore, an act of this kind is an effect of the grace by which guilt is remitted, it certainly cannot, as something subsequent, be called the cause of the grace remitting guilt.

418. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Are sins already duly confessed and remitted through absolution sufficient matter for the Sacrament of Penance?

Reply. Affirmative. This is certain among all, says St. Lig., no. 427.

The reason is: 1. because a sin, although remitted, is always a sin committed; and just as contrition for the same sin can be repeated with fruit, so also can confession. It comes about only per accidens that the sin, since it has already been remitted, is not remitted, although per se, since it was committed, it is capable of remission. Nor does it stand in the way that the Sacrament then does not destroy this sin; for it suffices that it have its effect in first act, namely, that it provide grace destructive of sin, although per accidens in second act it does not destroy the sin. Moreover, the Sacrament will no more lack the other effects, namely, an increase of grace, remission of punishment, etc., than if someone, perfectly contrite, were submitting those sins to the keys for the first time.

2. Furthermore, a sentence already pronounced can be confirmed for greater security and for greater consolation and peace of soul, as is sometimes customary in civil matters; and if perhaps the sin submitted to the keys has not yet been remitted, it can then be remitted.

3. This is also established from the Declaration of Benedict XI in Canon Law, Extrav. I, de Privilegiis, ch. 4: Although, he says, it is not of necessity to confess the same sins again, nevertheless... we regard it as salutary that the confession of the same sins be repeated. It is established, moreover, from the constant practice of the faithful, with the approval of the Church ³.

³ John XXII (Extrav. Vas electionis, de haereticis) condemns the opposite opinion as false and erroneous. See Croix, bk. 6, part 2, no. 589.

419. • QUESTION 2. Must an adult who is to be baptized conditionally because of doubt concerning a preceding Baptism confess sins already accused? Reply. Negative. The reason is that those sins have already been remitted through the Sacrament of Penance if the prior Baptism was valid; but if it was not valid, they are not matter for confession and will be remitted through the second Baptism. - Reuter, no. 118.

QUESTION 3. Must the aforesaid adult accuse sins not yet confessed, or committed since the last confession?

Reply. This was hitherto controverted among writers. The first probable opinion denied it, because, they said, given the probable invalidity of the prior Baptism, these sins are probably not matter capable of the Sacrament of Penance; therefore, they probably are not to be submitted to the keys either. For the obligation of confessing sins cannot follow except subsequently to Baptism duly conferred. Hence, if perhaps these sins are not remitted through the second Baptism, which is invalid because of the validity of the first, they can be remitted either through perfect contrition or indirectly through absolution with attrition. - Lacroix, no. 325, On Baptism, and others.

The second opinion, also probable, affirmed it, because the obligation of confessing sins urges whenever it is not established that they were committed before a valid Baptism. The Author therefore concluded that in practice confession was very much to be advised ⁴. But now attend to the most recent response of the S. Congregation which was issued on this matter toward the end of the year 1868.

⁴ This practice was furthermore presented in the preceding Edition as more conformable to the instruction which the Congregation of the Holy Office had given on another occasion, when it taught the order to be observed in reconciling these adults. This instruction indeed supposed confession, if not necessary, at least most opportune. Nevertheless, it was added that if the first opinion were in fact probable - which otherwise could seem consonant with the general principle that the obligation of Confession is not to be imposed when, morally speaking, as St. Alphonsus says, bk. 6, no. 505, it is not established - it should not have been permitted that one be urged to an unnecessary Confession to whom it appeared so hard that, perhaps overcome by the difficulty, he could be deterred from reconciliation.

But now, in favor of the second opinion, there has been added a Response of the S. Inquisition, Dec. 17, 1868. For to the Question proposed in the name of the Bishops of England, Must sacramental Confession be required of new converts in England, and must it be integral? the response to both parts of the doubt was: Affirmative; and the decree rendered on Thursday, June 14, 1715, was to be given.

That this response does not concern only the special circumstances of England is proved by the preceding response of the year 1715. For the following Doubt was proposed: whether full credence is to be given to Charles Wipperman of Rostock in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, a preacher and lecturer of quietistic Lutheran theology, superintendent and principal doctor of the sect of quietistic Lutherans, reconciled to the holy faith in the Holy Office of Parma, concerning certain errors detected in his Baptism; whether he is to be believed concerning the things which he relates; and, insofar as the reply is affirmative, that provision may likewise be made both for his salvation and for that of the others of that sect or region, especially if they are ignorant.

It is asked whether the said Wipperman is to be rebaptized; and, insofar as the reply is affirmative, whether absolutely or conditionally; and, insofar as the reply is affirmative, whether he is bound to confess all the sins of his past life; and, insofar as the reply is affirmative, whether the confession is to precede or follow the Baptism to be conferred conditionally.

The Most Holy Father, having heard the votes of the Most Eminent, said: Charles Ferdinand is to be rebaptized conditionally; and, after Baptism has been conferred, let him confess the sins of his past life and be absolved from them conditionally.

** Although this question appears to have nothing to do with the Vindiciae Alphonsianae, since St. Alphonsus the Doctor has not even one word concerning it, nevertheless, the VV. did not judge that they should remain silent concerning it, and they devote four columns to this argument (pp. 463-465), perhaps so that, from the example of this doctrine set forth in Gury's Compendium, which afterward appears less consonant with the preceding Decree, no one may wonder that in the moral Work of St. Alphonsus also certain opinions are approved which are found to have been condemned by preceding or subsequent Decrees of the Church.

What is now of interest is the conclusion, worthy of notice, which the VV. deduce from the Decree adduced. The Decree of the S. Inquisition, they say (p. 465), proves that a doubtful obligation of confession is not always to be regarded as nonexistent. But if the matter is thus, no more evident apology for Gury's Compendium could now be desired. For the VV., unless you say that their words are devoid of meaning, suppose that the obligation of Confession is in itself doubtful. But it cannot be called doubtful unless the opinion which denies the obligation is judged truly probable. Therefore, by the suffrage of the VV. themselves, Gury must now rightly be said to have written after Lacroix that the opinion which denies the obligation of integral Confession is probable!

But further. That a doubtful obligation is not to be regarded as nonexistent can be effected only by the force of some principle which establishes that in the case the safer side must necessarily be followed. But if the integrity of Confession is at issue, behold St. Alphonsus meets us, saying (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 29): No one is bound to doubtful laws.... Nor does it stand in the way to say here that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow merely probable opinions; because this holds when the validity of the Sacrament is at issue, but otherwise concerning the integrity [of confession]. But the present question is whether confession, and indeed integral confession, is to be required of a neophyte.

But still further. The Decree of the S. Inquisition must here be taken either as a new law of merely ecclesiastical right or as a Declaration of divine right. Yet who would affirm that a new law was enacted by the Church in this case? Where was this law promulgated? It will therefore be a Declaration of divine right. But truly I do not know to whom it could occur to attribute to the S. Inquisition a declaration by force of which a doubtful obligation, with no higher principle supervening, cannot in itself be called nonexistent.

Accordingly, as it seems, the VV. would have devoted their efforts more wisely to bringing forward reasons by which it might be demonstrated, not that a doubtful obligation of Confession is not nonexistent, but rather that the obligation of confession in the case is not doubtful. But, what is to be regretted, they have provided none of these things.

However, we do indeed see certain reasons adduced in the petition which was presented to the Apostolic See concerning this question in the year 1868, and part of which the VV. also relate (loc. cit.). Yet you will perhaps not without reason suspect that those reasons pertain to the special circumstances of England. For it presented the following as necessary reasons for requiring of neophytes an integral confession of their whole life: There is the difficulty of converts in bringing the intellect into the obedience of faith itself, unless through humility and submission of soul, which Christ the Lord deigned to place in the Sacrament of Penance. There is also the impossibility of knowing, except through an integral manifestation of sins, whether the newly converted person is rightly disposed for Baptism itself and is willing, for example, to make restitution of reputation or goods (if he happens to be bound to it), to avoid the proximate occasion of sin, to withdraw from a marriage invalidly contracted, even if through a dispensation of the Holy See (as in the daily more frequent cases of a marriage contracted after a civil divorce) it cannot be convalidated. There is, moreover, the necessity of providing for his salvation through justification

in the Sacrament of Penance, from the integrity of which no one once baptized in infancy can be exempted, regard being had especially to the diligence of the younger members of the English Clergy in faithfully observing the rite of baptizing, and consequently to the greater number of those concerning the validity of whose infant Baptism it is not lawful to doubt. But since it is certain that after several years the obligation of integral confession will lose its force if Theologians are able in practice to follow as safe the opinion of the aforesaid authors (who say with Lacroix, namely, that the obligation of confession in the case is doubtful), the Archbishop of Westminster and the Bishops of England earnestly petition, etc. Thus indeed reads the petition.

Now, if this alone is considered, namely, that such diligence is employed by the younger English Clergy in observing the rite of Baptism that it is not lawful to doubt the validity of infant Baptism, who does not now see that, whenever it is established that Baptism was duly conferred upon someone in this manner, the matter is thereby brought to this point: since scarcely any cause or necessity for repeating Baptism then appears, the integrity of sacramental confession is altogether necessary for justification from sins afterward committed? Nor should it be judged that the other reasons adduced lack their own force because of the circumstances of England. For although the reasons drawn from the necessity either of overcoming the difficulty in bringing the intellect into the obedience of faith, or of knowing whether the neophyte is rightly disposed for Baptism and bears a ready mind to fulfill whatever obligations may perhaps be present of restoring reputation or another's goods, of avoiding proximate occasions of sin, or of withdrawing from an illegitimate marriage which otherwise cannot be convalidated - although, I say, reasons of this kind, if considered in themselves, might generally appear of little efficacy for inferring the necessity of sacramental confession, all the more because they would induce the same necessity of confession even if the neophyte had been converted to the faith from Judaism, Mohammedanism, or idolatry; since such disposition of soul must be established in all neophytes whatsoever who approach Baptism; although, furthermore, if we adhere strictly to the Decree of the Inquisition, confession would appear to contribute little toward the aforesaid ends, namely, toward foreknowing the suitable dispositions of the neophyte for receiving Baptism, because according to the tenor of the Decree confession must not precede but follow Baptism; and, furthermore, even if it preceded, nevertheless, since the knowledge obtained through sacramental confession is certainly not of such a kind that it may be used in the external forum to determine whether or not the neophyte is rightly disposed to receive Baptism - nevertheless, it does not seem doubtful that the very special condition of affairs in England makes it impossible to meet those necessities except through sacramental confession. The same certainly can also be said of the very grave inconvenience which is touched upon in the last place, namely, of the danger that the obligation of confession would for this reason gradually lose its force. And certainly nowhere else has fear come upon theologians that, while they establish that one who has only doubtful or even doubtfully necessary matter is not bound to confession (see St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, nos. 473-474), and add that this matter may be passed over at pleasure if indeed he wishes to confess while presenting other matter, it would therefore come about in the course of time that the obligation of integral confession would entirely lose its force. Yet the words of the Postulation or petition attest as certain that this would have happened in England. Otherwise, no one certainly will be able to deny that, even if no Decree concerning these matters had been issued, nevertheless the manifest utility of this practice appears for this reason, that the Neophyte, vigorously denying himself in a sufficiently difficult matter according to the words of Christ, no differently, namely, than those who, having left all things, followed Christ, will afterward easily, after that victory over himself and strengthened by more abundant powers of grace, walk constantly in the way of the Lord, and indeed will run.

Moreover, since the Decree of the year 1715 related in the Note, upon which the more recent response of the year 1868 rests, referred not to England but to Germany, and nevertheless, as is read there: The Most Holy Father, having heard the votes of the Most Eminent, said: Charles Ferdinand is to be rebaptized conditionally; and, after his Baptism has been conferred, let him confess the sins of his past life and be absolved from them conditionally; it now sufficiently appears that the state of the question altogether required of the VV., not that they contend that a doubtful obligation in the case is not nonexistent, but certainly that they show that the obligation here cannot be called doubtful from an intrinsic reason. But concerning these things in their proper place.

420. • QUESTION 4. Should an adult who is to be baptized and absolved conditionally first be baptized or absolved?

Reply 1. Per se it is of little consequence. The reason is that if he has already been validly baptized, absolution will produce its effect whether it is conferred before or after conditional Baptism; but if the prior Baptism was invalid, there will be no effect of the Sacrament of Penance whether it is received before or after the second Baptism; for only one of the two Sacraments can have efficacy in the case.

Reply 2. From considerations of fittingness, it is better to follow the natural order, namely, first to baptize conditionally and then to absolve under condition. Nevertheless, it is expedient that confession be placed before Baptism for the better disposition of the one to be baptized, but that absolution be conferred immediately after Baptism. - Thus commonly in practice ⁵.

⁵ If, however, the Response adduced above (in the preceding Note) in the case of Charles Wipperman has any force, the order which the Author calls natural will have to be followed.

421. • QUESTION 5. Is a sin accused only in general sometimes sufficient matter for the VALIDITY or LICEITY of confession ⁶; for example, if someone says: I HAVE SINNED, or, I accuse myself OF ALL MY SINS?

⁶ The question of liceity can be separated from the question of validity only with regard to the priest, who indeed can sometimes absolve validly and at the same time illicitly. For as regards the penitent, if he acts here in bad faith, the confession will be both illicit and invalid; but if he acts in good faith, the confession will not be illicit.

Moreover, in order to elucidate this question clearly, it is best to distinguish what is required and sufficient for the intrinsic essence of sacramental judgment, and what pertains to the necessity imposed by divine precept. If, therefore, only the essence of this judgment is considered, it can now be doubtful to no one that not merely the formulas adduced by the Author, I have sinned, I accuse myself of all my sins, etc., but also any other sign of penance suffices. Hence all agree that, for soldiers when battle is imminent, or sailors when shipwreck threatens, or the sick at the point of death, etc., to be validly absolved, it suffices that they furnish an indication of penance, for example, by grasping a hand, striking the breast, or in any other manner whatsoever.

The entire question, therefore, turns upon the obligation which the positive law of Christ imposes. But the solution will not be very difficult if it is sought from its native and proper source, namely, from the authentic interpretation of the same law which is found in the doctrine of the Council of Trent. And indeed, from the necessity of a judgment to be rendered by the priest with knowledge of the cause, the Holy Synod (sess. 14, ch. 5) certainly concludes that sins must be declared not merely in general, but individually in species; it concludes that not only all sins, but also those circumstances which change the species of the sin, must be explained in confession. Nevertheless, it never fails to add expressly that it affirms this concerning necessary matter, namely, mortal sins which have never been duly subjected to the keys. For as regards merely sufficient matter, it teaches that venial sins are laudably told by pious men in confession, but at the same time may be concealed without fault; and if the substance of this merely sufficient matter can be concealed, a fortiori its genus and species, and even circumstances which change the species within the slightness of the fault, can be concealed. Indeed, this doctrine shines forth so clearly set out there that, although some have raised many difficulties against the sufficiency of the confession of sin in common (see Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 17, from no. 6), not one has ever existed who thought that assistance against it could be sought from the doctrine of the same Synod.

The difficulties were drawn, namely, either from the fact that a confession of this kind gives no new knowledge to the confessor, since it manifests only that the person is a sinner in general, which the confessor already knew, since we are all sinners; or from the fact that a judge cannot judge prudently unless the cause is known in particular; or finally from the fact that in the case nothing appears to which absolution is directly terminated. After Cardinal de Lugo (loc. cit., no. 11 ff.) easily solves these objections even when necessary matter for confession in a case of necessity is at issue, he then extends the doctrine (ibid., no. 17) to the confession of venial sin in general. Hence it is plain that John de Dicastillo (De Sacr. Poenit., disp. 9, no. 760) rightly concluded from these things that not only in a case of necessity, but also speaking per se, the confession of venial sin in general (say the same of even grave sins remitted at another time through absolution) is in itself sufficient matter for absolution in one who has only venial sins. And Suarez agrees (De Poenit., disp. 23, sect. 2, no. 10), both because there is no precept of confessing venial sins in species, and because the confession of venial sin in species declares the conscience no more than if someone should say in general that he had sinned venially, nor does it vary the judgment of the confessor any more. But to what Suarez (ibid.) had added, that this is true speculatively, but that in practice the species must be declared so that the matter may be certain, Dicastillo excellently replies (loc. cit., no. 762): If this is true speculatively, it will also be true practically. For only then in a moral matter is something said to be true speculatively indeed but not practically, when that which is considered in speculation cannot be exhibited in practice without some variation occurring. But when it can be reduced to practice altogether unchanged in the manner in which it is considered in speculation, if it is true speculatively, it must also be judged true practically. Wherefore, since the confession of venial sin in general can be exhibited in practice in the manner which is judged sufficient speculatively, it must also be judged such practically. Otherwise, however, it scarcely appears what Suarez means when he requires certain matter. Is it not certain that there is a sin, or is it not certainly subjected to the keys? But if he wishes the matter to be certain insofar as the safer opinions must be followed in setting forth the circumstances of the sin, this is indeed asserted contrary to the common opinion of all and the common practice, which holds that the precept of confession is satisfied when the precept is probably fulfilled, according to what was said in vol. 1, no. 80.

These things had to be noted, not only so that the rights of truth might be preserved, but also because they can sometimes be usefully serviceable in practice, as will be evident from what is to be said in the resolutions.

** 1. The VV. here object (p. 954, no. 104), as though opposed to this doctrine, the following doctrine of St. Alphonsus: Let the Confessor take care, if he wishes to absolve a penitent without sin, either to dispose him to sorrow especially for some light fault..., or to suggest to him that he confess some graver sin of his past life against some precept; for it suffices that he confess in general without number, so that he may have certain matter upon which absolution can rest.

Reply. Let all of it pass; and I deny the consequence. For we concede that this care of the Confessor is laudable, and likewise that the confession of some sin of one's past life against some precept suffices. But we deny either that the sorrow of the penitent cannot otherwise be established, or that certain matter is lacking for absolution if in the case the particular precept which was violated is not expressed.

2. The VV. relate (pp. 479-480, in the Note) that the doctrine handed down here had already been refuted in the periodical Nouvelle Revue theologique, Tournai, 1869, vol. 1, p. 67; and they refer the reader to it.

Reply. Let it be permitted also to us to refer both the illustrious VV. and others to the excellent little Work of the priest Stephen Apicella, entitled: Ai Confessori, studio sull'Assoluzione a darsi a chi nell'attual confessione non offre materia necessaria. Scafati: Tipogr. Pompeiana, 1874. There they will find the difficulties against our thesis very learnedly solved. Meanwhile, we shall weigh two drawn from it which the VV. put forward as the chief difficulties.

3. After the Tournai authors, therefore, the VV. object (p. 480, in the Note) that only through a logical fault is it deduced from the absolution which is given either to soldiers when battle is imminent or to the dying that a general accusation is valid and licit outside a case of necessity.

Reply. That it is deduced through a logical fault as regards validity, I deny; as regards liceity, let it pass. Namely, as is said in the Note, certain things pertain to the intrinsic essence of the Sacrament, namely, apt and sufficient matter, both proximate and remote, and the form; but certain other things pertain only to the necessity of precept, as, for example, the integrity of confession. Now, as regards the essence, it is false that elements which suffice in necessity do not suffice to effect the Sacrament outside necessity; for the essence is not mutable and of itself always retains the same intrinsic power. Therefore, as regards the sufficiency of the essential elements, an argument is logically made from a case of necessity to other cases. Certainly, one would argue defectively from a case of necessity to other cases as regards things of mere precept, because one can be excused from observing laws in necessity, but not outside necessity. Yet an argument of this kind is falsely ascribed to us. For in the case we say that confession in general is licit, not because one is then excused from a law, but because the law itself requires nothing further.

4. The VV. add (loc. cit.) with the Tournai authors: The nature of the Sacrament, which is effected after the manner of a judgment, requires that the matter be altogether determined through a distinct accusation of sins.

Reply. It requires this according to the norm proposed by the Holy Council of Trent, I concede; otherwise, I deny. See what was said in the Note concerning the doctrine of the Council of Trent.

5. The VV. subjoin with the Tournai authors (loc. cit.): This manner of confessing, which otherwise savors of Protestant usage, favors the laxity and negligence both of the penitent and of the Confessor.

Reply. Objections of this kind, or perhaps better, taunts, savor little of the theological method. Accordingly, as regards Protestant usage, let them consult Bellarmine, Valencia, etc., etc., etc., and learn from them what Protestant usage means. As regards the rest, let it suffice to have replied that those who observe the norm proposed by the Holy Council of Trent cannot be accused either of laxity or of negligence.

6. The VV. insist with the Tournai authors: Even if the doctrine under discussion were probable, nevertheless it would not be lawful to use it, because Proposition 1 among those condemned by Innocent XI stands in the way: It is not illicit in conferring the Sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the Sacrament, with the safer opinion abandoned.

Reply. I deny the supposition, namely, that the validity of the Sacrament is at issue here. For when the essentials are observed, no doubt concerning the validity of the Sacrament remains. But, as has often been said, the essentials are observed here. The present question, therefore, concerns not the essence of the Sacrament but the matter of precept; wherefore what St. Alphonsus replies concerning questions of this kind applies here (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 29): Nor does it stand in the way to say here that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow merely probable opinions, because this holds when the validity of the Sacrament is at issue; otherwise concerning integrity.

7. Finally, against the opinion of Suarez related in the Note, namely, that the confession of venial sin in species no more declares the conscience nor varies the judgment of the confessor, the VV. object that the judgment of the Confessor can be varied: 1. because he can deny absolution to one relapsing into venial sins; 2. because perhaps that which the penitent judges venial will sometimes be mortal; 3. because venial sins, for example in children, can be insufficiently certain.

Reply. Let all of it pass, and I deny the consequence, since it extends immensely more widely than the premises. For from the fact that sometimes per accidens it is useful to know some fault specifically, it is not lawful to conclude that this is always necessary; but it will belong to the prudence of the Confessor, whenever there is need, to inquire into the things pertinent to the matter. Moreover, from what the VV. observe, namely, that the fault which the penitent believes venial could perhaps be mortal, would this tedious method not bring the matter to the point that the confession of all venial sins would always be judged necessary? But what is the principal point, the VV. cannot be ignorant that this question chiefly concerns whether the specific confession of some sin is necessary when a generic confession of the sins of one's past life is added to the specific confession of light faults, with no sin specifically expressed. For as regards customary confessions of venial sins, the question must rather be called merely speculative, since it is altogether contrary to the custom of the faithful to accuse only venial faults generically. But it happens otherwise with that generic confession of the sins of one's past life. Now, it is manifest that, as regards this confession, the preceding observations of the VV. are not even minimally pertinent. And concerning this argument the cited little Work of the Rev. D. Apicella is worthy of being read. For, among other things, he shows by most apt reasons how vainly certain persons require in this general accusation the confession of some sin in species for the reason that the Confessor might exercise a suitable judgment.

Reply 1. As regards validity: 1. Affirmative, certainly in a case of necessity, or when the penitent, for example, a dying person, cannot accuse any sin in species. - Thus very commonly with St. Thomas. - 2. Affirmative, at least much more probably, even outside a case of necessity, if necessary matter, or matter to be declared in species, is lacking. The reason is that the essence of the Sacrament is not changed for varying cases. - Lacroix, no. 620. - Reuter, no. 303. - Lugo, disp. 17, no. 8.

Reply 2. As regards liceity also, affirmative, at least probably. The reason is that where mortal sins are lacking, there is no obligation to declare the other sins in species, since venial sins can be omitted altogether. For the Council of Trent determined absolutely nothing concerning this except that mortal sins alone are necessary matter for confession. Nevertheless, generally in practice it is expedient (as is also commonly done by all) to confess venial sins in species also, by reason of the direction to be given by the Confessor, etc. But as regards the general accusation of the sins of one's past life which pious penitents are accustomed to submit at the end of confession in order to render the matter of the Sacrament more certain, it is certainly sufficient if someone says: I accuse myself of the sins of my past life, or of my whole life.

422. • QUESTION 6. When a penitent presents only doubtful sufficient matter, is the Confessor bound to seek certain matter from his past life in order that he may absolve?

Reply 1. Affirmative, if he wishes to absolve, because otherwise the Sacrament would be exposed to danger of nullity. Except when a case occurs in which the penitent can be absolved conditionally, concerning which below.

Reply 2. Negative, if he does not wish to absolve, but to dismiss the penitent with only a blessing, because a penitent who does not bring certainly sufficient matter has no right to absolution. - Likewise, if the penitent appears to have doubtful sorrow concerning venial sins alone, the Confessor is not ordinarily bound to employ great diligence in order to move him to sorrow, although he does much better if he does so. - But it would have to be said otherwise if doubtful mortal sins were at issue, because of the danger to the penitent.

423. • QUESTION 7. Must a penitent who does not bring NECESSARY matter necessarily be absolved?

Reply. Negative per se, if the penitent does not ask for absolution; but even without absolution the reception of Holy Communion can be permitted to him, because, since he is in the state of grace, the Sacrament of Penance is not required to dispose him for it. Nevertheless, ordinarily it is expedient to absolve such a person, so that he may receive both an increase of sanctifying grace and sacramental graces, and an easier remission of venial sins and punishments, etc. - Lacroix, no. 1889, with others.

But if he has not received the Sacrament for a notable time, or if he needs special aids, for example, to overcome temptations, or if the penitent himself desires or requests it, he is to be absolved ⁷.

⁷ Whenever it appears that a penitent has approached, even with merely sufficient matter, in order to receive the Sacrament, and is found disposed, it is scarcely possible to understand to what end certain persons mix together so many disputes about whether he is to be absolved or not, or when he is to be absolved and when not. For certainly it will have been free to the priest to hear the confession or not to hear it. But after he has heard the confession and has the penitent rightly disposed, what laws, I ask, give this power to the confessor, that at his own discretion he absolve or not absolve? And even if you set aside the right acquired by the penitent through confession (which certainly does not wholly depend upon the danger otherwise imminent, or upon the greater or lesser gravity of the matter), what sound reason can persuade the confessor, without any cause and according to his own judgment, to deprive a member of the faithful of the increase of sanctifying grace and of the other heavenly gifts which are the fruits of this Sacrament?

424. Resolutions. - 1. Venial sins, or mortal sins confessed at another time, according to their species, even generically expressed ⁸, are sufficient and licit matter for confession, apart from number and any circumstances whatsoever. The reason is that thus there is a confession of a determinate sin, at least of one in species; nor is there an obligation to add the number of venial sins or of mortal sins already remitted. For there is nothing in the form of absolution that requires the determination of some particular sin. - Reuter, no. 202.

⁸ By generic species some also understand a subalternate genus of sin, as if you confess that you have sinned against justice, or religion, or faith. See Dicastillo, De Poenit., disp. 9, no. 743.

2. If someone does not accuse himself of any sin in particular and says, for example, I know nothing except that I must often have sinned like other men, let him be examined as children are usually examined. If nothing can be elicited since the last confession, let him be questioned about his past life: whether he has ever lied in his life; whether he has ever offended his parents, or been angry, or detracted from his neighbor, etc., etc.

3. With women, devout women, and others of this kind, who confess only confusedly and concerning very light matters, care must be taken that they add some fault from their past life, either in species or at least in general. Then you will endeavor to excite them to sorrow and purpose, and, having absolved them, will dismiss them in peace. - Elbel, no. 19.

4. For greater security and for receiving more certain fruit, penitents are to be advised that, besides doubtful sins or even daily light sins, they always append from those already confessed at least generically ⁹ another certain sin for which they are more vehemently sorry, lest perhaps the Sacrament be exposed to the danger of frustration. - Elbel, no. 19.

⁹ It is most prudently intimated that the confessor should be content with generic confession. For it sometimes happens as a grave burden to the penitent that the confessor wishes to extort a confession of graver sins in species; nor is it a new thing that certain penitents, wearied by this most troublesome importunity of confessors, have afterward approached confession very rarely and only when compelled, as it were, by necessity.

5. But penitents who observe the aforesaid practice are to be admonished not to submit a sin of their past life to the keys again merely from a certain custom, especially if that sin is light, because there is a fear that they may not be sufficiently sorry and consequently may not attain the end of providing for the validity and fruit of the Sacrament ¹⁰.

¹⁰ Nevertheless, for this reason the confessor ought not to vex himself or his penitents excessively. For if those are at issue who are accustomed with some care to avoid not only grave but also light sins, they are affected, so to speak, by a habitual hatred of sin, and very easily proceed to the act, although it can happen that sensible sorrow is less in them than in others who need a certain greater change of affections in order to detest sin.

6. According to all, confession in general suffices if the Confessor clearly knows the penitent from another source, for example, from a recent confession of his whole life, etc., and knows that he wishes to accuse himself of sins already known to the Confessor; for then it will suffice to say: I accuse myself of all my sins already known to you; or simply: of all the sins of my past life.

529. Explanation: it was said knowingly and willingly; for sometimes penitents, because of ignorance or levity of mind, are not conscious that they are placed in a proximate occasion; this can occur especially when there is question of interrupted and relative occasions, for example, of certain readings, visits, spectacles, companions, etc. Now if in such a case the confessor foresees that warning these penitents will be useless, indeed harmful, he can leave them in good faith, according to the principles set forth above (n. 477), and absolve them, provided that otherwise it is established that they sincerely detest their sins: which they can do in the case, since they are persuaded either that the occasion is not proximate, or that there is no grave obligation of leaving it. But afterward, if they again sin in the same occasion, they must gradually be instructed about fleeing this occasion; which indeed they will understand better if by their own experience they know that they frequently sin because of it.²

² Cf. Berardi, op. cit. vol. II, n. 32 sq., where particular cases are presented.

530. Corollaries. (a) One who is placed in a free and continuous proximate occasion (for example, in concubinage) regularly is not to be absolved before the occasion has in fact been removed. Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus (n. 454). For although the penitent can be contrite before he has removed the occasion, it is greatly to be feared lest, if he is absolved immediately, he will not in fact take away the occasion: for removal of such an occasion is a very arduous thing, and it does not happen unless someone inflicts great force upon himself; moreover, if the occasion is not taken away before absolution, the penitent after absolution will easily deceive himself; for an occasion always present often blinds the mind and weakens the will, so that a purpose previously elicited sincerely is rendered ineffective. Hence the confessor, as a physician, ordinarily ought not to absolve the penitent, lest perhaps he expose him to danger of relapse.³

³ A few indeed hold the contrary (Ball. P., n. 176; Genicot, n. 373; Noldin, n. 408), because the confessor does not have the right of prescribing such a remedy, since it is not established that it is necessary; nevertheless they admit that prudence sometimes advises that, even immediately the first time, absolution be deferred until the occasion has actually been dismissed, where such delay is judged likely to profit the penitent.

I said regularly; for there are cases in which absolution can prudently be given before the dismissal of the occasion: when the occasion, although continuous, is not so dangerous, for example, if there is question of restitution, and the penitent sincerely promises to restore as soon as possible and has not previously broken his promise; - when the penitent has already employed means for removing the occasion, for example, if he has told the maidservant with whom he used to sin to leave the house at the end of the week; - when he exhibits special signs of sorrow, from which it can be judged that his purpose is most firm; - or if he is in moral necessity of receiving absolution immediately, for example, if there is question of one dying, of those betrothed about to contract marriage, of those who cannot defer Communion without danger to reputation, of those who cannot approach the same confessor, as travelers, or those who are converted at the end of a mission; - finally, when they are so disposed that, unless they are absolved immediately, they probably will not return.

531. (b) One who is placed in a proximate voluntary and interrupted occasion, for example, by frequenting eating-houses, depraved companions, or dangerous spectacles, can be absolved immediately, provided he sincerely promises that he will avoid this occasion. But if he has broken this promise several times (for example, three times), absolution must be denied until by flight of the occasion he has shown a sincere purpose of amendment.

The reason for the former is that an interrupted occasion is more easily broken off than a continuous one, and does not constitute so grave a danger; hence the purpose of avoiding it can be firm and efficacious even before proof. The reason for the latter is: one who has broken faith cannot easily be believed; moreover he becomes a relapsed sinner, and one must act with him in the manner to be explained below, n. 539 sq.

320. The remote matter (or rather the matter to be removed) of the sacrament of penance consists of sins subsequent to baptism, not to be accepted but to be detested and destroyed.

Thus St. Thomas.³⁷ It is, however, as is customarily said, the materia circa quam; for just as the matter of medicine is an infirmity to be cured, so the matter of penance consists of sins to be destroyed. This remote matter is distinguished as: 1. necessary and free; 2. certain and doubtful; 3. sufficient and insufficient.

³⁷ S. theol. 3, q. 84, a. 2.

321. The necessary matter of the sacrament of penance consists of all mortal sins committed after baptism which have not yet been manifested in confession nor directly remitted through absolution.

It is said, first: all mortal sins. "For venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, although they may rightly and usefully and without any presumption be stated in confession, as the practice of pious men demonstrates, nevertheless can be kept silent without fault and expiated by many other remedies."³⁸

It is said, second: committed after baptism. For sins committed before baptism are remitted by the sacrament of baptism itself when worthily received. Theologians do not agree concerning the manner in which sins committed before or in baptism are remitted if baptism is indeed received validly but unworthily because of an existing obstacle, for example, because of a defect of sufficient faith and sorrow for past sins. It seems that the answer must be given with a distinction:

a) Sins which were committed before baptism, for example, adulteries, thefts, and so forth, are never the necessary matter of the sacrament of penance, even if baptism was received sacrilegiously, and accordingly there is never a strict obligation to confess them. The reason is that these sins were committed at a time when the Church did not yet have jurisdiction over this sinner and the power of absolving him.

b) The sin of sacrilege which is committed at the very instant baptism is received virtually endures for at least one moment afterward. Therefore it is already the necessary matter of the sacrament of penance, and accordingly must be accused. When, therefore, this sacrilege, confessed with due sorrow, is absolved in the sacrament of penance, baptism revives and all the sins previously committed are blotted out.³⁹

c) If someone receives baptism validly with an obstacle but without sacrilege, for example, he does not grieve over sins committed because he does not perceive the grave obligation of sorrow, then the sins committed before baptism are blotted out when the baptized person elicits sufficient sorrow even outside confession; but not even in this case is he bound to confess those sins.

If an adult Catholic, a serious doubt having arisen concerning the validity of the baptism received, is baptized again, he is not bound to repeat the confessions made before the second baptism. The reason is that, if the prior baptism was valid, then the sins committed afterward were remitted by the subsequent confessions; but if the prior baptism was invalid, then all sins are remitted through the second baptism. Therefore in every case the sins are remitted. But sins committed since the last confession and not yet accused must be declared in confession.

If an adult non-Catholic is baptized again conditionally, he must confess all the sins of his past life and be absolved conditionally. The reason is that those sins have not yet been accused in confession, nor are they certainly remitted through conditional baptism.⁴⁰ The difference therefore arises from this, that a Catholic doubtfully baptized has already confessed all his sins, whereas the non-Catholic has not.

It is said, third: not yet manifested in confession and directly remitted. Those sins are said to be remitted directly which have been explicitly accused and thereafter directly received absolution from a confessor furnished with legitimate jurisdiction. A sin is sometimes remitted indirectly because of the valid absolution of other sins. For since one grave sin cannot be remitted to a sinner without all the others, when one has been duly absolved, all the others also must be absolved. For example, a penitent inculpably forgetting a mortal sin in confession and having universal contrition, with the direct absolution of the sins accused, is indirectly absolved from the sin omitted through forgetfulness. Indirect absolution sometimes also has place if reserved sins are involved.⁴¹

³⁸ Council of Trent, Session 14, c. 5, On Penance (Denz., n. 899).

³⁹ Cf. S. theol. 3, q. 69, a. 10 ad 2. St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 427) concedes that this opinion is the most common, but says that the reasons adduced for it are not convincing.

⁴⁰ Cf. above, n. 139.

⁴¹ Cf. below, concerning the reservation of cases.

322. The free matter of the sacrament of penance consists of: a) venial sins committed after baptism; b) all sins, both mortal and venial, already directly remitted after baptism.

That venial sins are free and not necessary matter is evident from the words of the Council of Trent, Session 14, c. 5, cited above. The reason, however, is that venial sin on the one hand includes true fault and accordingly can be absolved in the sacrament of penance; on the other hand, the fault of venial sin is not so great and of such a kind that it cannot be remitted outside the sacrament of penance, for example, through acts of charity and of other virtues.

That sins, mortal and venial, already remitted are free matter of penance follows from the universal practice of the faithful, who submit sins of this kind again and again to the power of the Church. Concerning this matter Benedict XI⁴² already writes: "But although it is not of necessity to confess the same sins again, nevertheless ... on account of the shame, which is a great part of penance, we judge it salutary that the confession of the same sins be repeated." The chief reason why sins of this kind already remitted may salutarily be submitted again to the power of the keys seems to be this: Sacred Scripture admonishes: Concerning a forgiven sin, be not without fear. And without special revelation a man cannot know with certainty whether he is worthy of the love or hatred of God. Therefore, after a sin has been accused and absolved, a man can nevertheless fittingly ask pardon of God again, and God can through the mouth of the confessor again grant pardon of the same sins.

⁴² It is contained in c. 1, Inter cunctas, V, 7, Extrav. comm.

323. Certain matter is every true and certain sin, whether mortal or venial. But doubtful matter is a doubtful sin. A doubt concerning the existence of a sin can arise from diverse causes, for example, because of an erroneous conscience, doubtful advertence, doubtful consent, and so forth. Doubtful matter is insufficient matter, concerning which immediately.

324. Sufficient matter is that which suffices for receiving sacramental absolution validly. It consists of all necessary and free matter, provided that it is certain.⁴³ Insufficient matter consists of imperfections and all those things which do not certainly have the character of sin; or in other words: insufficient matter is everything which does not constitute even free matter. He who brings to confession only insufficient matter cannot be validly absolved, because sufficient matter belongs to the essence of the sacrament.

By the name of imperfections in this matter are understood less good acts which, considered objectively, constitute no certain transgression of the eternal law.⁴⁴ Indeed, since indifferent acts do not exist in the individual, such so-called imperfections are in reality either evil acts or good acts; but because the confessor ordinarily cannot judge with certainty concerning their sinfulness, they are not sufficient matter for absolution. Thus, for example, he who accuses himself of having sometimes omitted morning prayers, of having suffered involuntary distractions in prayer, or of having had sudden and involuntary movements of anger or concupiscence brings insufficient matter for sacramental absolution. Penitents can indeed laudably declare imperfections of this kind so that the confessor may be able to judge better concerning the state of their soul and give good counsels, but they are altogether to be induced to accuse, besides these imperfections, at least some sin of their past life, even if not described according to its lowest species; for example, they ought to say: Moreover, I accuse myself of the sins of my past life against chastity, against charity, and so forth.

⁴³ Code of Canon Law, c. 902.

⁴⁴ Cf. above, I, n. 131.

325. Scholion. On sins accused only in general. The essence of the sacrament of penance consists in this, that it is a judgment, and indeed a reconciliatory one. Now a judge cannot pronounce a just judgment unless he knows the offenses committed sufficiently. But so great a knowledge of offenses is not required in the sacrament of penance as in human judgments, because in it God, Himself the searcher of hearts, is the principal judge, and because the end of penance is a reconciliatory and liberating sentence. Nevertheless at least some knowledge on the part of the confessor is required for the validity of the sacrament.

In extreme necessity a generic accusation suffices. For example, when battle is imminent for soldiers,⁴⁵ or shipwreck for sailors, or for a dying man deprived of his senses, absolution is lawfully given if by some external sign they manifest themselves generically as contrite sinners, insofar as this is possible. Thus holds the universal practice of the Church. The reason, however, is that Christ, by an affirmative precept in the sacrament of penance, required a moral act of confession so that the confessor might be able to judge concerning the state of the penitent. Now an affirmative precept does not oblige in extreme necessity, provided that the essence of the sacrament is preserved. But the essence of penance consists in a judgment, which is present in some manner even after a merely general accusation.

Outside a case of extreme necessity a somewhat more determinate accusation is altogether required (although perhaps not for validity). But the determination of the accusation has diverse degrees, namely:

a) I accuse myself of all the sins of my life.

b) I accuse myself of all mortal sins.

c) I accuse myself of all sins committed against such a virtue, for example, chastity, charity, and so forth.

d) I accuse myself of having once injured the virtue of justice by secretly taking 1,000 Marks from the civil government.

These distinctions having been premised, the following two propositions seem true:

1. If necessary matter is involved, outside a case of necessity the accusation indicated under a), b), and c) does not suffice, but determination according to the lowest species and number is required. The reason is that by divine law mortal sins must be accused according to species and number, as the Council of Trent⁴⁶ declared: "If anyone says that in the sacrament of penance for the remission of sins it is not necessary by divine law to confess each and every mortal sin of which memory is had with due and diligent premeditation, ... let him be anathema." The manner of accusation indicated under d) is certainly the best and is sometimes necessary, as will be stated below, n. 370 (c), but of itself it suffices that the penitent accuse himself of having stolen grave matter.

2. If free matter is involved, the accusation indicated under c) is valid and lawful; indeed, even outside a case of necessity, the generic accusation under a) and b) is valid, but at least venially unlawful. That the absolution is valid in this case can scarcely be denied. For there is no divine precept to accuse free matter, and moreover one thing is not to be required as essential for a case of necessity and another outside this case. Therefore, since a general accusation is valid in a case of necessity, it must also be valid in other cases. Nor may anyone say that it follows from this that a general accusation of necessary matter also is valid, which nevertheless was denied above. For if necessary matter is involved, there is added the grave divine precept of declaring the individual sins, which is not present if free matter is involved.

That a merely general accusation of free matter is unlawful is very commonly taught by theologians, with a few exceptions, for example, Gury-Ballerini,⁴⁷ Génicot,⁴⁸ and Bucceroni.⁴⁹ The reason is manifold: 1. the universal practice of almost all confessors, who require that at least the species of free matter be declared; therefore there exists a legitimate binding custom; 2. there would be a danger of deficient contrition, since it is sufficiently difficult to elicit sorrow for sins accused only generically; 3. without sufficient reason the judgment of the confessor would remain too imperfect, as is evident. Hence in practice it is to be required of penitents who accuse only free matter that they employ at least the determination indicated under c), namely, that they say they have sinned against such or such a virtue. This obligation does not seem grave, and therefore, if the penitent is so uneducated or so infirm of memory that he remembers no determinate sin, the confessor ought not torture him in order to obtain more determinate matter. He can therefore say to him, for example: Be willing to include all the sins of your past life and especially to elicit contrition for sins against charity or due devotion in exercises of piety, and so forth.

⁴⁵ Thus the Sacred Penitentiary expressly established on February 6, 1915 (Acta Apostolicae Sedis VII, 72). Soldiers thus absolved can also receive the Most Holy Eucharist; but afterward, if they escape the danger, they must make an integral confession.

⁴⁶ Session 14, can. 7, On Penance (Denz., n. 917).

⁴⁷ Comp. Theol. mor. II, 421.

⁴⁸ Theol. mor. II, 262.

⁴⁹ Inst. Theol. mor. 4th ed., III, n. 673.

1654. As in the other Sacraments, so also in the Sacrament of Penance, there is a twofold matter, namely REMOTE and PROXIMATE.

The REMOTE matter, namely that about which the proximate matter is concerned in this Sacrament, is twofold: 1. necessary, which by precept must be subjected to the proximate matter; 2. sufficient only and free, which can indeed, but need not, be subjected to the proximate matter.

1655. Principles. I. The REMOTE matter of the Sacrament of Penance is sins committed after Baptism.¹⁴ Thus all.

It is said, 1. sins, whether mortal or venial; but not mere imperfections, for example that you have not responded to divine inspirations, that you have not done the good which you could, etc. For since these are opposed only to counsels, they do not have of their own nature the notion of sin

to be destroyed through penance.¹ - Except if accidentally they reach venial faults, as was said at n. 341.

It is said, 2. committed after Baptism; the reason is both because original sin and actual sins committed before Baptism are destroyed through Baptism itself, and because the power of the keys extends only to those who through Baptism are subjected to the Church.

It is asked: Whether and how sins must be confessed if, on account of doubt, BAPTISM IS REPEATED under condition?

Resp. 1. If he whose Baptism is to be repeated has already accused his sins in good faith, and was absolved from them, he is not bound to confess again. The reason is that, if the prior Baptism was valid, they have already been remitted through penance; but if otherwise, they will be remitted through Baptism.

2. If he has not yet accused the sins committed after doubtful Baptism, as happens among Protestants, he is bound to confess them; for if the prior Baptism was valid, the sins committed afterward cannot be destroyed through the repeated Baptism, as it is null. - Hence, when the Bishops of England asked: "Whether sacramental confession ought to be required from new converts in England, and whether it ought to be integral?" the Congregation of the HOLY OFFICE, on December 17, 1868, responded affirmatively to both, and that the Decree issued July 14, 1715, was to be given, in which namely it is contained: "that he is to be rebaptized under condition; and, Baptism having been conferred, let him confess the sins of his past life, and be absolved from them under condition."² (cf. n. 1833).

1656. II. The NECESSARY matter of Penance is all mortal sins not yet directly remitted through this Sacrament. - This is clear from Trent, which (sess. 14, cap. 5) declares "that all mortal sins of which penitents, after diligent examination of themselves, have consciousness, must be enumerated in confession." The reason is clear from what was said at n. 1646.

We said sins not yet directly remitted, or those which have not yet been expressly declared in confession, nor pardoned through valid absolution by force of jurisdiction extending itself to them. Hence, the necessary matter of confession is sins remitted through perfect contrition with only the desire of the Sacrament; likewise sins omitted either on account of inculpable forgetfulness, or on account of another just cause in a confession rightly made, and which were remitted together with others indirectly, or necessarily through the infusion of grace; likewise reserved sins, although distinctly declared, over which the absolving priest did not have jurisdiction, even though, from a grave cause, he had to impart absolution over the other sins.

1657. III. FREE and SUFFICIENT matter is both all venial sins not yet remitted by the power of the keys, and mortal or venial sins already directly remitted before, and confessed again. Thus all.³

We said, 1. venial sins not yet remitted by the power of the keys are matter: 1. free, because from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 5) "they can be kept silent without fault and expiated by many other remedies" (cf. n. 1648, q. 2); 2. sufficient, because the words of the Savior, whatsoever you shall loose, etc., do not distinguish between mortal and venial sins, and the Council, loc. cit., declares that venials are rightly and usefully said in confession. And truly, if confession had to be made concerning mortal sins alone, many, because of fear of publicly betraying themselves as gravely guilty, would be drawn back from that Sacrament; many, from false conscience, would judge themselves lightly guilty, etc.

We said, 2. sins already directly remitted are matter: 1. free, because what has once been remitted cannot any longer be called into fault; 2. sufficient, which is more than sufficiently clear from the Constitution of Benedict XI Inter cunctas and from the practice of the faithful. But the theological reason is that sin, although already remitted, nevertheless remains committed; and therefore the sinner can again and again sorrow for it and ask pardon, and likewise the priest can more often in the name of God pardon and remit it, just as among men it is customary that the same injury be more often remitted from the heart. And because the form of absolution, on account of the proximate matter which truly exists, namely confession and contrition, is verified, sanctifying grace is conferred, not indeed first grace, but second grace, with a fuller remission of temporal punishment, and the other effects which the Sacrament produces in a man already justified.

1658. It is asked: Whether a DOUBTFUL sin is sufficient matter of the Sacrament?

Resp. Only a sin actually committed is sufficient matter. Therefore, if the penitent confesses only a sin doubtfully committed, the Sacrament is exposed to danger of nullity. Hence:

1. If someone declares no certain sin, he should first be questioned about the obligations of his own state, about pride, vain glory, evil thoughts, the manner of acting with parents and other neighbors, detraction, anger, envy, etc. For many, unless they are helped in this way, respond that they know nothing more.

2. Pious penitents are to be advised that, to doubtful sins, as also to their lighter daily faults, they always add some certain sin from those already confessed, concerning which namely they sorrow more vehemently and on account of which they can conceive a firmer purpose.⁴ - But those who hold this salutary custom are to be forewarned not to append an accusation of this sort from mere use.

3. It does not seem to suffice if a penitent, whose conscience is not manifest to the confessor, simply says: "I accuse myself of all the sins of my past life." For the Sacrament of Penance was instituted by way of accusation and judgment; hence the accusation and judgment ought, ordinarily speaking, to be concerned with certain matter, and at least determined in species. - Therefore, except in a case of necessity, in which formal integrity of confession suffices, it is preferable to add: "Especially I accuse myself of sins committed formerly against such a precept or such a virtue," without the circumstances or number being expressed.⁵

1659. Scotus indeed and the Scotists contend that the whole essence of the Sacrament of Penance, namely matter and form, consists in the absolution of the priest alone; but that the acts of the penitent are only dispositions prerequired for obtaining the effect of the Sacrament. - But the other Theologians who lived after the Council of Trent commonly teach with St. Thomas that the acts of the penitent with the words of absolution are intrinsic parts of the Sacrament, and that they cooperate for the conferral of grace in Penance, just as washing cooperates in Baptism.⁶ Hence we say:

I. The three acts of the penitent, namely CONTRITION, CONFESSION, and SATISFACTION, are the proximate matter of the Sacrament of Penance. From Trent, sess. 14, cap. 3 and can. 4; from the Roman Catechism,⁷ and from the Ritual, which says absolutely: "The remote matter is sins, but the proximate matter is the acts of the penitent." They are called by the Council quasi-matter, "not because they do not have the notion of true matter," says the Roman Catechism, "but because they are not matter of that kind which is applied extrinsically, as water in Baptism and chrism in Confirmation." "In those Sacraments," says St. Thomas,⁸ "which have an effect corresponding to human acts, the human acts themselves are in place of matter, as occurs in Penance and in Matrimony." Nor is it an obstacle that contrition is not sensible of itself; for it is made sufficiently sensible through confession and other exterior signs of penance.⁹ Hence it can be said that the proximate matter of this Sacrament is properly sorrowful confession, since the Sacrament of Penance is intrinsically composed from it.

Let these other words of St. Thomas also be noted:¹⁰ "Every Sacrament," he says, "produces its effect not only by the power of the form, but also by the power of the matter; for from both there is one Sacrament. Hence, as the remission of fault in Baptism occurs not only by the power of the form, but also by the power of the matter, namely water, nevertheless more principally by the power of the form, from which the water itself also receives power; so also the remission of fault is an effect of penance, more principally indeed from the power of the keys, which the ministers have, on whose part is taken that which is formal in this Sacrament; but secondarily from the force of the acts of the penitent pertaining to the virtue of penance; yet insofar as these acts are ordered in some way to the keys of the Church."

1660. II. Contrition and confession are ESSENTIAL parts of the Sacrament, but satisfaction is only an INTEGRAL part. Thus commonly.¹¹ It is said, 1. Contrition and confession are ESSENTIAL parts, that is, so necessary that if one of them is lacking, the Sacrament cannot in any way stand; for without confession the information of the cause is impossible, and without contrition, in which the will of satisfying is necessarily included, reconciliation cannot be perfected.

It is said, 2. Satisfaction is an INTEGRAL part. By an integral part is understood that without which the Sacrament indeed exists essentially, but not altogether integrally; as he is essentially a man who lacks an arm or a leg, but nevertheless not whole and perfect. Hence sin can be remitted and reconciliation perfected before the satisfactory work imposed by the judge is fulfilled for obtaining remission of temporal punishment. - Yet this remission of punishment, insofar as it is obtained through satisfaction, is also an effect of the Sacrament, although secondary; and therefore it is required for the integrity of the Sacrament, or, as Trent says (loc. cit.), "for the full and perfect remission of sins."¹²

2. As regards ordinary confession, although certain persons of very tender conscience have been accustomed to confess daily, ordinarily, however, it suffices to confess once, or, exceptionally, at most twice in a week.

3. He who lacks the opportunity of confessing and is burdened by venial sin, even one altogether deliberate, ought not on that account to omit communion, both because venial sin does not impede communion, and also because, besides confession, it can be remitted by other remedies, e.g., by an act of contrition or charity virtually retracting it; indeed it can happen that on this occasion he prepares himself for communion by more fervent acts of contrition, confidence, and humility.

4. In the confession of venial sins, one must beware lest they be declared from mere custom and as a mere narration, without contrition or purpose, or only in general; - but let them accuse in species a few sins well determined, with the cause or motive of sinning added; besides, let them add some defect to be extirpated, by which the state of the soul may become more known to the confessor, or even some graver sin from the past life.

5. That confession may be truly devout, let it not be made without preparation, nor only with examination having preceded, humble and sincere accusation, true sorrow and efficacious purpose, but let the penitent also seek means of amendment and resolve to avoid the occasions of sins.

6. When carefully made, confession purifies, restores, and confirms, and joins one more to God.

1339. - As in the other Sacraments, so in the Sacrament of Penance there is a twofold matter, one remote, but the other proximate.

The remote matter is all sins committed after Baptism; which are called the matter about which, because absolution is concerned with destroying them. But it is either necessary, or merely sufficient and free.

The necessary remote matter is all mortal sins committed after Baptism, and never yet directly remitted by the power of the keys; because by divine precept sins of this kind are to be subjected to the keys. - But sufficient and free matter is all venial sins, and all sins, whether mortal or venial, already otherwise duly subjected to the keys. It is called sufficient, because any sins, even the least, can be the object of sacramental pardon. But it is called free, because there is no precept of subjecting them to the keys. Concerning these things there is proof from the perpetual practice and tradition of the Church, and also from the definition of Trent.²

But the proximate matter of the Sacrament of Penance is the three acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are called as it were the matter of this Sacrament, because they are in the place of the sensible matter which in the other Sacraments is subjected to the form; for through these acts sins are proposed to be destroyed by the words of the form. This is clear especially from Trent.¹

1340. Questions. - Query 1° Are sins already duly confessed and remitted through absolution sufficient matter of the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Affirmatively. This is certain among all, says St. Alphonsus.²

The reason is, 1° because a sin, although remitted, is always a sin committed; and just as contrition for the same sin can be repeated with fruit, so also confession; and it happens only per accidens that the sin, as already remitted, is not remitted, though nevertheless per se, as committed, it is capable of remission. - Nor is it an obstacle that then the Sacrament does not delete this sin; for it suffices that it have the effect in first act, namely that it bestow grace destructive of sin, although per accidens in second act it does not delete the sin, as happens when someone approaches the Sacrament already perfectly contrite. For in each case absolution has the same force, namely an increase of grace, remission of punishment, etc.; and this grace, or increase of justice, can truly be called justification, just as an increase of heat is called heating, as Sylvius says.

2° Because a sentence already rendered can be confirmed for greater security, and greater consolation and quiet of soul, as is sometimes wont to be done in civil matters; and if perhaps the sin submitted to the keys has not yet been remitted, then it will be able to be remitted.

3° It is clear also from the Declaration of Benedict XI, in the Canon Law:³ "Although," he says, "it is not of necessity to confess the same sins again, nevertheless ... that the Confession of the same sins be repeated, we judge salutary." It is clear besides from the constant practice of the faithful, with the Church approving.

Query 2° Is an adult to be baptized conditionally, in doubt concerning the preceding Baptism, bound to confess sins already accused?

Resp. Negatively. The reason is that those sins have already been remitted through the Sacrament of Penance, if the prior Baptism was valid; but if it was not valid, they are not matter of Confession, and they will be remitted through the second Baptism. - Reuter.⁴

Query 3° Is the aforesaid adult bound to accuse sins not yet confessed, or committed after the last Confession?

Resp. Affirmatively, as is clear from what has been said n. 1264. IV. 2), and from Resp. S. Inq. p. LIX. related. The reason is that all obligations which are joined by some nexus with an act certainly performed, and which is not established to be null, remain in their force. Wherefore, since after Baptism there remains in the Church no other Sacrament by which sinners can be reconciled to God, they neither ought nor can be sent away freed from this obligation, who certainly have received Baptism, concerning whose valid collation only doubt is present.

Query 4° Must an adult who is to be baptized and absolved conditionally first be baptized or absolved?

Resp. From the Resp. S. Inq. in the preceding question 3°, he ought first to be baptized conditionally, and then to be absolved under condition. Yet it is expedient to premise Confession before Baptism for the better disposition of the one to be baptized, but to confer absolution immediately after Baptism. (6) p. 414.

Query 5° Is a sin accused only in general sometimes sufficient matter of the Sacrament of Penance, e.g. if someone says: I ACCUSE MYSELF OF ALL MY SINS?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, certainly in a case of necessity, or when the penitent, e.g. one at the point of death, cannot accuse any sin in species, even generically. - Thus most commonly with St. Thomas. - But I think the case of moral impossibility is to be likened to the case of necessity, when a sufficient cause is present, on account of which the penitent is not to be sent away without absolution. Such a case would be given if the confessor, as not rarely happens, wastes oil and labor while he tries in vain to induce an untaught person, or one dull from old age, or a pious person not having any certain venial sin, and not absolved from them for a rather notable time, to declare some certain venial sin concerning which they sufficiently grieve, or a mortal sin already confessed. - A general accusation also suffices, when there is question of a penitent whose sins already confessed are sufficiently known to the confessor.¹

Resp. 2° Negatively, at least as to liceity, since Doctors dispute concerning the sufficiency of such accusation for the validity of the Sacrament outside the cases under 1°, and because inconveniences arise from it.²

Query 6° If the penitent offers only doubtful sufficient matter, is the confessor bound to inquire about the past life, so that he can absolve?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if he wishes to absolve, because otherwise the Sacrament would be exposed to danger of nullity. Except if a case occurs in which the penitent can be absolved conditionally, concerning which below.

Resp. 2° Negatively, if he does not wish to absolve, but to send the penitent away with only a blessing; because the penitent who does not bring matter certainly sufficient has no right to absolution. - Likewise, if the penitent seems to have doubtful sorrow concerning only venial sins, ordinarily the confessor is not bound to use great diligence to move him to sorrow, although he does this much better.¹ - But the contrary must be said if there is question of doubtful mortals, on account of danger to the penitent.

But the confessor sending away the penitent with only a blessing is not always bound to procure efficaciously that the penitent himself understand this well. For in fact certain causes sometimes demand that with certain persons, either very ignorant, or scrupulous, or ostentatious of piety, one proceed in this or a similar manner: "You will recite, therefore, three Hail Marys; elicit an act of contrition, and may God bless you. The blessing of God almighty," etc.

Query 7° Must a penitent be necessarily absolved who does not bring necessary matter?

Resp. Negatively per se, if the penitent does not ask for absolution; but even without absolution he can be permitted to receive Holy Communion; because, since he is in the state of grace, the Sacrament of Penance is not required for disposing him to that. Yet ordinarily it is expedient to absolve such a person, if he has confessed sufficient matter, concerning which he sufficiently grieves, so that he may receive both an increase of sanctifying grace and sacramental graces, and an easier remission of venial sins and punishments, etc.

But if he has not received the Sacrament for a notable time, or if he needs special helps, e.g. for overcoming temptations, or if the penitent himself, offering, as above, sufficient matter and being disposed, desires or asks it, he must be absolved.¹

1341. Resolves. - 1° Sufficient and licit matter of Confession is venial sins, or mortal sins otherwise confessed, according to their own species, even generic, prescinding from number and from any circumstances whatever. The reason is that thus there is had Confession of a sin, and indeed of a determinate sin, at least of one in species; nor is there an obligation of adding the number of venial sins, or of mortal sins already remitted.¹

2° If someone accuses himself of no sin in particular, and says, e.g. I know nothing, except that I must often have sinned like other men, he should be examined as children are wont to be examined. If nothing can be elicited from the last Confession, let him be asked about his past life, ... whether he ever lied in his life ... whether he ever offended his parents, or was angry, or disparaged his neighbor, etc., etc.

3° With little women, devout women, and others of this sort, who confess only confusedly and about very light things, care must be taken that they add some fault from their past life in species, at least generically. Then, however, you will try to excite them to sorrow and purpose, and, having absolved them, you will dismiss them in peace.

4° For greater security and for perceiving the fruit more surely, penitents are to be induced so that, besides doubtful sins or even daily light sins, they always join from sins already confessed at least generically some other certain sin, concerning which they grieve more vehemently, lest perhaps the Sacrament be exposed to danger of frustration. But if the accusation of some mortal sin already confessed cannot prudently be obtained, then it will suffice if the penitent accuses himself of some venial sins, at least insofar as he has committed them innumerable times in his life, the confessor leading in this or a similar manner: "Now you accuse yourself of all sins committed in the time before this, i.e. of all disobediences, lies, murmurings, etc."

5° But penitents who observe the aforesaid practice are to be admonished that they not subject again to the keys a sin of past life only from a certain custom, especially if that sin is light; because there is fear lest they do not grieve sufficiently, and so do not attain the purpose of providing for the validity and fruit of the Sacrament.²

431. Notions. - The constitutive elements of a sacrament are matter and form. Matter is distinguished as proximate, which, in transitory sacraments, is the sensible human action itself or the sacred ceremony; and remote, which is that about which the sacred action is concerned. But in the sacrament of Penance only the proximate matter is the matter from which the sacrament is constituted and which enters the very constituted essence (n. 13, 4); - for the remote matter is only the matter about which: it does not enter the composition of the sacrament itself, but is only a necessarily required condition about which the sacramental action is merely exercised, i.e., about which the proximate matter itself is placed and the form is pronounced.

Concerning these things we must speak in particular.

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 2.

432. Remote matter is that about which penance itself is concerned; whence it is all and only sins committed after Baptism that are to be removed, and therefore by some it is called matter to be removed. A distinction is made by theologians between necessary and free matter, or between sins which, in order that they be remitted, must necessarily be subjected to the power of the keys and to the sacrament, and sins which are not necessarily to be subjected, yet are validly subjected.

433. Thesis I. Necessary remote matter is all mortal sins, committed after Baptism, not yet duly subjected to the power of the Church, as things to be detested and destroyed. - This is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 7.

It is said:

1° necessary matter, not to be brought for the validity or constitution of the sacrament, but to be subjected to the sacrament for obtaining the remission of sin and justification;

2° mortal sins committed after Baptism, to exclude both original sin, concerning which there is not penance properly so called, and actual sins committed before Baptism, because they are blotted out through Baptism, and because the power of the keys extends itself only to those who are already subjected to the Church through Baptism; whence the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 1, declares that this sacrament was instituted for reconciling the faithful fallen after Baptism;

3° not yet duly subjected, but not: not yet remitted, because if they are subjected to the keys in a sacrilegious or null confession, they must again be subjected to the sacrament, even if they had already been remitted by perfect contrition or by indirect absolution;

4° as things to be detested and destroyed, because sins are not matter from which the sacrament of Penance is constituted, but about which it is concerned, just as disease is the matter of medicine. And thus they could be called proximate matter, insofar as penance immediately acts upon them; nevertheless, in opposition to the quasi-material parts by which the sacrament of Penance is integrated, they are remote matter.

It is proved: a) From the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7.

b) From the words of Christ, John XX, 23, from which it is clear that independently of the power of the Church no mortal sin can be remitted:

1° not a sin retained by her, otherwise it would be true that some sin had been retained by the Church and remitted by God, and thus the proposition of Christ would be false: whose sins you shall retain, they are retained;

2° nor a sin which has not yet been subjected to the keys of the Church: for then all sins could be remitted directly by God independently of the power of the Church, since it would suffice never to subject sins to her; and thus the power of remitting given by Christ to the Church would be vain.

Whence if mortal sin could be remitted without the authority of the Church, either the power of retaining granted by Christ would be false, or the power of remitting would be vain; neither can be; therefore all mortal sins committed after Baptism are necessary matter of the sacrament of Penance.

Nor is it an obstacle that they are remitted by perfect contrition before the actual reception of the sacrament, because they are not remitted except with the will of subjecting them to the sacrament of Penance, and therefore with intentional subjection to the power of the Church.

434. Thesis II. Free but sufficient remote matter is both a venial sin not yet subjected to the keys, and any actual sin whatever duly subjected and remitted. - This is certain.

It is said: free matter, because for remission and justification it is not to be subjected to the sacrament, although it can validly be subjected.

The first part is proved, concerning venial sin:

a) From the words of Christ, who gave the Church the power of remitting any remissible sin whatever; and venial sin is true sin and remissible; therefore.

b) From the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7: "if anyone shall say that it is not lawful to confess venial sins... let him be anathema"; but it would not be lawful if it were not sufficient matter: for then there would be no sacrament.

The second part is proved, concerning sin already remitted:

a) From the testimony of Benedict XI declaring this practice salutary (Const. Inter cunctas, 1304, in extrav. com., l. 5, t. 7, c. 1).

b) From the universal practice of the Church and of all upright persons, who not only in general confession, but quite often at other times, subject already forgiven sins to absolution (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5).

c) By reason: Sin, from the fact that it was once committed and truly offended God and made for Him a right to aversion from the sinner and to chastisement by punishment, always remains an object about which God's power of forgiving or renouncing His right can be concerned; this forgiveness on the part of God is made through the infusion of new grace destructive of sin of itself.

To remit sin is to bind oneself (through renunciation of right) not to use the right acquired through offense, in order to aversion from the sinner, and moreover to chastising by punishment. But such renunciation can be made repeatedly, because by repeated renunciation there is signified a repeated will not to use the right which was once possessed, whether it is still actually possessed, or whether it has already been renounced: in the same way as religious who have once emitted profession quite often repeat it, and tribunals again judge the same cause, and sinners themselves again grieve and seek pardon for a sin already remitted, and offended men are often accustomed to remit the same offense to themselves. Therefore God too can quite often remit sin already forgiven.

Namely, in each single instance in which absolution is given, a new motive or new title is placed impeding God from making use of that right which He had, a new title and cause for liberation from sin and for the reintegration of divine friendship. But since in the New Law repeated remission or renunciation is made sacramentally, i.e., through the infusion of grace ex opere operato, in each single instance grace is infused, of itself destructive of sin, and which of itself takes away sin if it actually exists, and which per accidens does not take it away if it does not actually exist.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 18, a. 2, ad 4. - "There is added from St. Thomas, l.c.," says Haine (Th. M. III, on Penance, q. 13), "that great goods come from the confession of such sins; for by repeated contrition and confession the soul is removed farther from them; by repeated absolution a fuller remission of punishment is obtained and the penitent is more strengthened against relapse."

435. It is objected: The power of remitting mortal and venial sins is handed down by Christ in the same way. Whence either mortal sins can be remitted independently of the power of the Church, or also venial sins are necessary matter of the sacrament.

Resp. I deny the consequence. The power is handed down in the same way, but it does not extend itself to mortal and venial sin in the same way, but in a diverse way according to the diversity of the matter. Sins in the full sense are mortal, because they totally turn away from God, whom they fully offend, and therefore the remission of them could per se be denied by God forever; venial sins offend God in a qualified way, because they do not take away friendship with God nor the right to beatitude, and therefore per se they are at some time to be taken away and remitted by God. Whence the power of retaining mortal sin is such that, when remission has been denied by the Church, it is denied perpetually and by God Himself; the power toward venial sin is not such, because this is incapable of perpetual retention. But God gave to the Church the power of remitting and retaining sins to be exercised reasonably, just as He Himself would exercise it, and therefore mortal sin can be retained perpetually; venial sin can be retained perpetually neither by God nor by the Church. Therefore the power granted is altogether universal, but according to the nature of the matter: God gave the power of remitting whatever is remissible and of retaining whatever is capable of retention. But venial sin, although it is remissible, is not capable of perpetual retention.²

² Billuart illustrates this thus, on Penance, diss. 5, art. 2: "The disparity is that from the fact that someone can remove a greater impediment, it is rightly inferred that he can remove a lesser one of the same order; and one who has authority to forgive greater injuries, a fortiori can forgive lesser ones also. But it does not follow that from the fact that someone can place an impediment for a grave matter, he can do so for a lesser one; that one who has from a superior the power of retaining or not remitting grave injuries can retain light ones: for a greater authority is required for retaining light injuries than grave ones. Let there be an example in human affairs: legates sent by a king to reconcile or condemn his enemies inquire into grave causes from which they became enemies; they remit them or retain them according to the disposition of the guilty; but light injuries which did not cause enmity they can indeed remit, since they can remit graver ones; but they cannot retain them, because they were not specially sent for retaining these light things, which were not the cause of enmity, and can be remitted in other ways independently of them."

436. Corollaries. - 1) Indeliberate acts of man are not matter of the sacrament of Penance; - nor per se are deliberate imperfections or transgressions of counsel (as if you did not respond to a divine inspiration or did not do the good which you could have done), unless per accidens insofar as they include venial sin, which is their cause or effect, as easily happens if they proceed from a not-right intention or from a certain levity. Whence penitents are not precisely to be impeded from declaring such imperfections, but rather are to be exhorted that they also say from what motive they placed these acts.

2. The valid but sinful reception of Baptism is matter of Penance: for although that sin of sacrilege is committed in time simultaneously with the reception of Baptism, nevertheless it is posterior in nature, since it is the profanation of Baptism, and does not impede its value but only some effect, namely grace. After the impression of the character, namely, it persevered at least for one instant, and thus was an obstacle to receiving grace, and therefore must be accused as committed after Baptism, or at least continued by a Christian man. For the character is infused prior in nature to grace, so that, when a man through sacrilege places an obstacle to baptismal grace, he is already a Christian, and for this reason already subject to the sacrament of Penance as regards that sacrilege.

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 1 and 4.

437. State of the question. - Concerning proximate matter there have been various errors and opinions:

1. Luther taught that the terrors of conscience struck in from sin recognized and from the threats of the Gospel, together with certain confidence of remission obtained, are the proximate matter.

But a) the Council of Trent condemned this, sess. 14, c. 3, can. 4; b) these terrors are not acts of penance, indeed not even a necessary disposition to penance; but confidence itself supposes remission already made.

2. Calvin assigns two parts of penance for its matter, namely, the mortification of passions and vices, and the pursuit of living well.

But these things follow penance; and they also exist if they are not sins. Whence they do not constitute penance.

3. Several scholastics thought that proximate matter is in the imposition of the hand, made by the priest as a sign of jurisdiction while he absolves the penitent. This is attributed, among others, to William of Paris and to Thomas Waldensis.

But a) that rite was not held as essential, but as a mere ceremony, as is gathered from the fact that it was repeated several times in the course of penance over public penitents,¹ and from the fact that sins were at least sometimes remitted by the Church without it; whence the Council of Trent is also silent concerning it; b) nor is it suitable as matter of this sacrament, as St. Thomas shows, q. 84, a. 4: "The imposition of hands in the sacraments of the Church is done to designate some abundant effect of grace, by which those upon whom hands are imposed are, in a certain way, through a certain likeness, continued to the ministers in whom an abundance of grace ought to be. And therefore the imposition of hands is done in the sacrament of Confirmation, in which the fullness of the Holy Spirit is conferred; and in the sacrament of Order, in which a certain excellence of power in divine mysteries is conferred... But the sacrament of Penance is not ordered to obtaining some excellence of grace, but to the removal of sins, and therefore for this sacrament the imposition of hands is not required, just as neither for Baptism, in which nevertheless a fuller remission of sins is made."

¹ A threefold imposition is commemorated: the first was used when public penance was imposed; the second was repeated over penitents whenever they were dismissed from the church after the catechumens, but this was rather a rite of blessing; the third was done in reconciliation.

4. It is disputed between St. Thomas and Scotus whether the acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are true proximate matter from which, and therefore an intrinsically constitutive part of, the sacrament.

I say 1°. As in the other sacraments, so in the sacrament of Penance, the matter is twofold, one remote, the other proximate. The remote matter is all sins committed after Baptism; these are called the matter about which, because absolution is concerned with destroying them. But it is either necessary or merely sufficient and free. Necessary remote matter is all mortal sins committed after Baptism, and never yet directly remitted by force of the keys; because by divine precept sins of this kind are to be subjected to the keys. But sufficient and free matter is all venial sins not yet accused and, as will be said below, mortal and venial sins also already duly subjected to the keys. - It is called sufficient, because any sins, even the least, can be the object of sacramental pardon. But it is called free, because there is no precept of subjecting them to the keys. These things are clear from the perpetual practice and tradition of the Church, as well as from the doctrine of the Council of Trent, sess. 14, chap. 5.

I say 2°. The proximate matter of the sacrament of Penance is the three acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are called the quasi-matter of this sacrament, because they are like the sensible matter which in the other sacraments is subjected to the form; for through these acts sins are proposed to be destroyed by the words of the form. This is clear especially from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 4. - Cf. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 18, p. 227.

Question 1. Whether sins already duly confessed and remitted through absolution are sufficient matter of the sacrament of Penance? Resp. Affirmatively, and the reason is that sin, although remitted, is always a committed sin; but Christ indefinitely subjected every sin to the power of the keys; and besides He had to give to the sacrament that it should have efficacy in all those things to which the virtue of penance extends. Therefore, just as contrition and confession of the same sin can be repeated with fruit, so also absolution. Nor does it obstruct this that then the sacrament does not destroy this sin; for it suffices that it have its effect in first act, namely, that it furnish grace destructive of sin, although by accident in second act it does not destroy sin. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 427. - De Augustinis, part. 2, art. 6, p. 221.

Question 2. Whether an adult to be baptized under condition, in doubt of a preceding Baptism, must confess sins already accused? Resp. Negatively, and the reason is that those sins have already been remitted through the sacrament of Penance, if the prior Baptism was valid; but if it was not valid, they are not matter of confession and will be remitted through the second Baptism. - Cf. Reuter, n. 118.

Question 3. Whether the aforesaid adult must accuse sins not yet confessed, or committed since the last confession? Resp. This was formerly controverted, as may be seen from the opposed opinions of theologians, for example, Lacroix, lib. 6, part. 1, n. 323; and Billuart, on Baptism, diss. 1, art. 5. For when the probable invalidity of the prior Baptism is posited, subsequent sins probably are not matter capable of the sacrament of Penance; therefore also probably they are not to be subjected to the keys; for the obligation of confessing sins cannot follow except consequently to Baptism duly conferred. - But as regards practice, and restricting the question to heretical neo-converts, one must stand altogether by decree 242 of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, which has itself thus: "In receiving converts from heresy to the faith, we will that that manner be observed exactly which is contained in the Form handed down by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, on the 20th day of July, in the year 1859." The Fathers of the Third Plenary Council repeat and confirm this same thing, where in n. 122 it is thus established: "After an investigation has been made, the neo-convert will be received according to the manner described in the Instruction of the Holy Office of the year 1859." - Moreover this manner of which both Councils speak is expounded thus by the Congregation of the Holy Office: "If Baptism is to be repeated under condition, one must proceed in this order: 1°. abjuration or profession of faith; 2°. conditional Baptism; 3°. sacramental confession with conditional absolution." Therefore whenever heretics conditionally to be rebaptized are received into the true Church, of whom alone there can be question here, it is not free to our missionaries to exempt them from the obligation of sacramental confession; but that this must be entire is drawn from the fact that, among both the faithful and theologians and in the decrees of Councils, the obligation of confession always carries integrity with it. To these is added both the universal practice of our missionaries, and the response which S. C. Inquis. gave to the Bishops of England on 17 Dec. 1868, and which Cardinal Barnabo, Prefect of S. C. de Prop. Fide, in letters given to the Archbishop of Quebec on 12 July 1869, testified "to contain a general law."

Observe, however, that the case of some Catholic who would have to be rebaptized under condition because it is prudently doubted concerning the validity of the preceding Baptism is not to be resolved in the same way, because the reasons given cannot be extended to him; and therefore in the preceding solution the question was restricted to heretical neo-converts. Therefore a Catholic of this kind could neither be obliged to a general confession of his whole life, nor to confessing those sins which he committed since his last confession.

Question 4. When must confession be made by neo-converts, before or after conditional Baptism? Resp. According to the Instruction of the Congregation of the Holy Office recently cited, one must proceed in this order:

"(A) Abjuration or profession of faith,

(B) Conditional Baptism,

(C) Sacramental confession with conditional absolution."

But just as the practice of those priests who hear the confession properly so called, or the accusation of sins, either before or after the abjuration has been received, then confer conditional Baptism, and finally impart absolution, does not seem to be against the spirit of the aforesaid Instruction, so the practice of those who, when a just cause occurs, defer confession and absolution for a few days does not seem to be out of harmony with the very words of the Instruction.

Question 5. Whether a sin accused only in general is sufficient matter for the validity or liceity of confession; for example, if someone says: I have sinned, - or, I accuse myself of all my sins? Resp. In a case of necessity, or when a penitent, for example, one dying, can accuse no sin in species, such a confession is certainly valid and licit; both because no one is held to the impossible, and because the most common opinion of theologians, and the sense of the faithful, so bears. But outside a case of necessity it must be said that such a confession is more probably valid, if necessary matter is lacking. The reason is that more is not required either by force of the nature of sacramental judgment, since this nature must be the same outside necessity and in a case of necessity, or by force of the precept of integrity, which then presses only when grave sins are present. But several theologians doubt the validity of an accusation of this kind, because the nature of this sacrament, which is after the manner of a judgment, requires determinate matter; but he who only says that he is a sinner submits nothing determinate to the keys. From this it follows that a confession of this kind is certainly illicit outside a case of necessity, because, while the probability of this reason is not to be despised, he who would perform it would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity without a just cause. Add that this manner of confessing is opposed to the practice of the Church and offers occasion for many inconveniences; for penitents would lack the warnings, counsels, and direction of the confessor, and would be less moved to contrition; nor could the confessor make a judgment concerning sufficient matter subjected to the keys. For a penitent saying, I accuse myself of my sins, not rarely would have mere imperfections in mind. In distant regions, can a Catholic who has been unconfessed for many years, and who only by signs, on account of lack of language, asks for absolution, be absolved without the help of an interpreter? Resp. S. Off. 28 Feb. 1633: "There is no need of an interpreter in the proposed case, just as also absolution of sins can and must be imparted to one showing the signs which he can ... provided that they suffice for expressing some sin in species. But in the case in which someone strives as much as he can to show signs of sins in species but cannot be understood at all, he can be absolved through a manifestation in general alone." Collec. S. S. ad usum Oper. Apost. Soc. Miss. n. 476. - Cf. Suarez, disp. 23, sect. 1. - Lugo, disp. 17, n. 8. - Lacroix, lib. 6, part. 2, n. 620. Nouvelle Revue Theol., vol. 1, p. 67. - Lehmkuhl, nn. 264 and seq. - Amer. Eccl. Review, vol. 13, p. 241.

Question 6. Whether, when the penitent provides only doubtful sufficient matter, the confessor is bound to inquire for certain matter from the past life, so that he can absolve him? Resp. Affirmatively, if he wishes to absolve, because otherwise the sacrament would be exposed to danger of nullity; unless, however, a case occurs in which the penitent can be absolved conditionally, as will be said below. But one would have to respond otherwise if he does not wish to absolve, but only to impart a blessing. But no one doubts that this can be done, since a penitent of this kind does not have a right to absolution.

Question 7. Whether a penitent who does not bring necessary matter, but nevertheless certainly sufficient matter, is necessarily to be absolved? Resp. Affirmatively, and indeed from justice, yet supposing that he is rightly disposed, and no extrinsic reason is present which would advise that absolution is not to be imparted. Nor should you say that such a penitent does not suffer a great inconvenience because he is already in the state of grace; for by refusing absolution you deprive him of an increase of sanctifying grace and of that immense heap of heavenly gifts which are the fruits of this sacrament duly received. - Cf. Lacroix, lib. 6, part. 2, n. 1885. Baller. note (a) p. 297.

You Will Resolve. 1°. The sufficient and licit matter of confession is venial sins, or mortal sins otherwise confessed, according to their species, even generic, for example, I accuse myself of past sins against chastity, charity, etc., prescinding from number and from any circumstances. - The reason is that thus there is had a confession of sin and indeed of determinate sin, at least of one in species; nor is there an obligation of adding the number of venial sins, or of mortal sins already remitted.

2°. If someone accuses himself of no sin in particular, and says, for example, I know nothing, except that I have often had to sin like other men, he is to be examined as children are commonly examined. If nothing can be elicited from the last confession, he is to be questioned about his past life, according to his state and condition. Likewise with little women, little devout persons, and others of this kind, who confess only confusedly and of very slight things, care must be taken that they add some fault from their past life, either in species or at least in genus. But if, after suitable questions have been put, it is possible to draw out nothing determinate, and yet time presses because of the multitude of penitents, there seems to be present a moral necessity which would suffice for giving absolution at least under condition.

3°. For greater security and for receiving a more certain fruit, penitents are to be advised that, besides doubtful sins or even slight daily sins, they always append, from those already confessed, at least generically, some other certain sin concerning which they grieve more vehemently, lest perhaps the sacrament be exposed to danger of frustration.

4°. But penitents who observe the aforesaid practice are to be warned not to subject again to the keys a sin of their past life merely from a certain custom, especially if that sin is slight; because there is fear lest they do not grieve enough, and consequently do not attain the purpose of providing for the validity and fruit of the sacrament.

5°. According to all, confession in general suffices if the confessor plainly knows the penitent from elsewhere, for example, from a recent confession of the whole life, etc., and knows that he wishes to accuse himself of sins already known to him; for then it will be enough to say: I accuse myself of all my sins already known to you; or simply: of all the sins of my past life.

I. QUESTION I. What is the sacrament of Penance? ANSWER. It is wont to be defined: a sacrament instituted by Christ the Lord, by which through the juridical absolution of a priest sins committed after Baptism are remitted to a man contrite and confessed. The first particle betrays the generic character; the other particles express the power in the priest of remitting sins perpetrated after Baptism to a man contrite and confessed. These last particles declare the dispositions necessary in a penitent who would receive this sacrament.

II. The innovators reject Penance from the roll of the sacraments. But their error is disproved from St. Matthew, chapter 16, where Christ says to Peter: I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven. I omit very many other divine testimonies. That this sacrament was instituted by Christ chiefly after the resurrection, Trent declares, session 14, chapter 1.

III. This sacrament is necessary to all who have fallen after Baptism for the obtaining of salvation, as Trent defined, session 14, chapter 2. That this sacrament can be repeated all Catholics teach.

IV. QUESTION II. What is the matter of this sacrament? ANSWER. The matter of this sacrament is twofold, remote and proximate. Of the former now, of the latter afterwards. The remote matter is sins, either mortal or venial, committed after Baptism. For original sin, or actual crimes perpetrated before Baptism, are not the matter of this sacrament. There is no crime, however grave, which cannot be remitted by this sacrament, as the Church defined against the Montanists and Novatians.

V. QUESTION III. What is the proximate matter of this sacrament? ANSWER. They are three acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, as Trent intimates, session 14. Of each in turn discourse is to be instituted by us.

While confessing to Julius, a priest, Anna says that she is anxious about her last confession because she lied in it. Julius asks her how this happened. Anna replies that the confessor asked whether she had eaten meat on days of abstinence since her last confession, which she denied, although she was conscious that she had once eaten meat on a Friday because of weakness, on account of which she thought this was lawful for her; now, however, so that she may enjoy a tranquil conscience, she wishes to confess everything sincerely to Julius. Julius considers whether or not Anna ought to repeat her last confession integrally. Hence it is asked:

1. What is the necessary matter and what is the free matter of the sacrament of Penance?

2. Are aggravating or diminishing circumstances necessary matter of this sacrament?

3. Is there an obligation to answer sincerely when a confessor asks a question?

4. What is to be said of the case?

The first question is answered above, p. 151.

2. Are circumstances which increase or lessen the malice of sin the necessary matter of Penance?

The question is disputed, but probably circumstances which only increase or lessen the malice of sin and do not change its moral or theological species, are not necessary matter for Penance.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 165 f.

3. Is the penitent obliged to give a sincere answer to questions put to him in confession?

Yes, whenever the confessor questions him about what is necessary to make his confession full and integral, or about what is necessary in order to judge of his dispositions or obligations, so as to be able to counsel and direct him aright.²

2 Bucceroni, vol. ii, 716.

4. The case. Ann when asked in confession whether she had eaten flesh meat on days of abstinence denied that she had, although she was conscious that she had taken meat once on a day of abstinence when she thought that she was justified in taking it on account of feeling weak. In her next confession Ann told this to her confessor and said she was anxious about it.

Objectively, of course, Ann committed no fault, for she answered her confessor according to the sense of his question. The confessor wanted to know whether she had broken the law of abstinence, and in answering No, Ann told the truth. Therefore unless Ann thought at the time when she gave the answer to her confessor that she was committing a grave sin, she should now be told not to trouble further about it. Her subjectively erroneous conscience might, of course, have caused her to commit grave sin subjectively, and then it would be necessary to confess this, and repeat the former confession.