I. On the Nature and Remote Matter of Penance

What is penance? - Penance is a virtue, and it is a sacrament. Under the first respect, it is a moral virtue inclining to hatred, abomination, or detestation of sin and to sorrow or sadness, insofar as sin is an offense and injury against God, namely insofar as it makes God turned away from us and indignant, on account of the due honor of God being harmed by reason of his supreme dominion; and consequently it inclines to the efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future and of satisfying divine justice, so that God may be reconciled to us. Hence penance is a virtue pertaining to justice, as its potential part. Suarez, d. 2, s. 3, n. 4 ff.; Lugo, d. 2, nn. 50, 52; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85. - Hatred, because it is evil; sorrow, because it is present or because it is apprehended as present.

Under the other respect, it is a sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ the Lord after the manner of a judgment, for remitting, through priestly absolution, sins committed after baptism to a man who is contrite and has confessed. After the manner of a judgment: for there is present the penitent, at once the accused, witness, and accuser, and the priest, the judge pronouncing sentence, who is held by the strictest obligation of secrecy. But this judgment tends toward absolving the accused and reconciling him with God. Hence the difference is evident between this sacramental judgment and a forensic judgment. - Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 1, 2, 3, 4, cc. 1, 2, 3; Decree of the Holy Office Lamentabili, July 3, 1907, props. 46, 47; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 1; L. 246; E. M.

Is it lawful in the sacrament of penance to follow probable opinions? - Resp. In the affirmative, in those things which pertain to the judgment, provided the form of the judgment is preserved: for form gives being to the thing, and judgment pertains to the validity of the sacrament. And thus in those things which pertain to the integrity of Confession, to the jurisdiction of the confessor, etc., it is lawful to follow probable opinions. L. 468; H. A., tr. 16, n. 29. To jurisdiction, for when its probability stands, the Church supplies it. - In the negative in those things which pertain to the validity of the sacrament, because the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity; except, however, in a case of necessity; for the sacraments are for men. Wherefore it is not lawful to follow probable opinions concerning the very substance of Confession and of contrition. For sins pertain to penance, as sacrament, under the generic aspect of sin; as judgment, as individual things in themselves; and the same must consequently be said of the Confession of sins. Hence Confession pertains to penance especially insofar as it is a judgment. Contrition, on the other hand, pertains to penance especially insofar as it is a sacrament. But satisfaction rather looks to integrity, since it is added extrinsically. Finally, in the words of absolution is contained the form of the sacrament and the sentence of the judgment. - Cf. 348.

Is the sacrament of penance necessary? - Resp. In the affirmative, for those who have fallen after baptism. It is necessary for justification both by necessity of precept and by necessity of means, at least in desire. Trent, sess. 6, C. 14; sess. 14, C. 2, 4, 5; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 5; q. 87, a. 6; Suppl., q. 6, a. 1. - Hence the sacrament of penance is customarily called the second plank after shipwreck. Trent, sess. 6, C. 14; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 6. - But since no actual sin can be remitted in this life without the virtue of penance, it is also evident that this virtue is altogether necessary for the justification of adults who have fallen after baptism. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, a. 2; q. 87, a. 1. - St. Thomas, Quodl. 4, a. 10; E. M.

What is the effect of the sacrament of penance? - The effect of this sacrament is absolution from sins and reconciliation with God, and, as a consequence, remission of eternal punishment. Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 3, cc. 12, 15; sess. 6, C. 7; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, aa. 3, 4, 6. "For him who through contrition has obtained remission of sins as to guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal punishment, which is dismissed together with guilt, by the power of the keys... grace is increased and temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of which had still remained after the remission of guilt, though not entirely, as in baptism, but a part of it.... By the power of the keys, which works in the sacrament of penance, not all punishment is remitted, but something of the temporal punishment whose debt could remain after absolution from eternal punishment; and not only from that punishment which the penitent has or undertakes from absolution in confessing... but also something is remitted of that punishment which is due in Purgatory, so that one absolved who dies before satisfaction is punished less in Purgatory than if he died before absolution." St. Thomas, 4 d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2. - E. M.

What are the parts of the sacrament of penance; what is their efficacy? - The parts of the sacrament of penance are, as in the other sacraments, matter and form. The form is the words of absolution which the priest pronounces. The matter or quasi-matter is the acts of the penitent, which are distinguished into three parts. The first is contrition of heart. The second is confession of mouth. The third is satisfaction. Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 2, 3, c. 4. "Every sacrament produces its effect not only by the power of the form, but also by the power of the matter; for from both there is one sacrament.... Hence remission of guilt is the effect of penance principally indeed by the power of the keys, which the ministers have, from whose side that which is formal in this sacrament is received; but secondarily by the force of the acts of the penitent pertaining to the virtue of penance, nevertheless insofar as these acts are in some way ordered to the keys of the Church. And thus it is clear that remission of guilt is an effect of penance according as it is a virtue, but more principally according as it is a sacrament." St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, a. 6; q. 90, aa. 1, 2. - E. M.

What is the remote matter of the sacrament of penance? - The remote matter is all sins committed after baptism. But they are called the matter about which, because absolution is concerned with destroying them. - Necessary remote matter is all mortal sins committed after baptism and not yet directly remitted through the keys of the Church, even if already destroyed by perfect contrition, or inculpably omitted in a preceding Confession. Hence they must be manifested in the immediately following Confession, since they are not free matter but necessary; and therefore the penitent must necessarily be absolved from these, and a new penance must be imposed, even if someone confesses them immediately after absolution. L. 513. Nevertheless, as to sins omitted from forgetfulness or another just cause, there is no obligation to confess them as soon as possible, since they have already been destroyed, nor therefore is there danger to the soul in delay.

Wherefore their Confession can be deferred until, by force of another obligation, or spontaneously, someone confesses again. - Sufficient but free remote matter is all venial sins committed after baptism, and all sins, whether mortal or venial, already otherwise duly subjected to the keys of the Church. Their remission is confirmed and grace is increased. C. 12, de Poenit.; Extrav. 1, de Privileg.; 2, de Haeret.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, C. 7; prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII; L. 425, 427. - For a certain greater security, besides ordinary light sins, it is expedient to add either some certain sin for which one grieves more vehemently, or at least a generic accusation of all the sins of one's past life. Reuter 202; Elbel 19. - St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 2; E. M.

Resolutions: "Venial sins can be omitted, either all or some; likewise mortal sins once duly confessed, e.g., in a general Confession. In this, it is also not necessary to add to a mortal sin that it was committed after the last Confession..., unless some circumstance, e.g., one changing the species, or reservation of the case, or a proximate occasion of sinning, requires otherwise, and a sufficient penance is imposed." L. 425; St. Thomas, 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, q. 5, ad 4; d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 4. - Insufficient matter consists in imperfections which are not sins: that someone did not do the good which he could have done, did not respond to divine inspirations in those things which are of mere counsel. La-Croix, l. 5, n. 211; L. 425. - The Confession of all lethal sins, certainly invalid, must necessarily be repeated. For all mortal sins must of themselves be subjected to the keys. Nevertheless, Confession need not be repeated unless its invalidity is morally certain. The reason is: 1. Because when an act has certainly been placed, if a doubt arises whether it was rightly placed, that rule of Law obtains: one must stand for the value of the act. 2. Because the obligation of the divine law concerning making Confession has already probably been satisfied. L. 505; La-Croix 1221; Elbel 263. "Even if through culpable mortal error you have omitted such a sin, e.g., of self-abuse, or its number, or another necessary circumstance, you are not therefore bound to repeat the intervening Confessions made in good faith and legitimately, in which from natural forgetfulness you did not confess that defect, since they were valid and remain valid." L. 503. - Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, §§ 1, 2.

What is the proximate matter of the sacrament of penance? - The proximate matter, from which, intrinsic and essential, consists in the acts of the penitent, namely contrition, Confession, and satisfaction to be accepted, which however, as to its execution, pertains to the integrity of the sacrament. Lugo, d. 12, n. 40. But these acts are called quasi-matter by Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; by Trent, sess. 14, C. 3; and by St. Thomas, 4 d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, q. 1; not because "they do not have the nature of true matter, but because they are not matter of that kind which is applied extrinsically, as water in baptism and chrism in confirmation." Roman Catechism, n. 13. Several, who with Scotus think that the whole substance of the sacrament consists in absolution alone, raise a doubt about the mind of St. Thomas, whom they affirm stands for them. But, to pass over other things now, this holy Doctor has it in 3 p., q. 84, a. 1, ad 1: "In those sacraments which have an effect corresponding to human acts, the sensible human acts themselves are in place of matter, as happens in penance and matrimony." Cf. ibid., ad 2, ad 3. And a. 2 of the same question: "The proximate matter of this sacrament is the acts of the penitent, whose matter is the sins for which he grieves, and which he confesses, and for which he satisfies." Cf. ibid., q. 90, aa. 1, 2. But from the Council of Trent the acts of the penitent are parts of this sacrament. Moreover, in chapter 2 it says that this sacrament is completed by matter and form, and in chapter 3 it assigns the form, namely the words of absolution. Therefore the acts of the penitent are the matter, which immediately there it calls quasi-matter.

Note: A sin is said to be directly remitted when it is remitted by the power of the keys of the Church. For this it is necessary that the penitent confess the sin and that the confessor have jurisdiction over it. It is said to be indirectly remitted when it is remitted by the power of sanctifying grace, which is infused in the sacrament of penance, because this grace is incompatible with any grave sin whatever, and one grave sin cannot be remitted without another. This has place when the sin has been inculpably omitted or reserved. La-Croix 597; L. 478, 504.

Are mortal sins committed in the very reception of baptism matter of this sacrament? - "They very commonly affirm it.... The reason is that these sins, although they are simultaneous in time with baptism, nevertheless by nature are posterior to it. - But the reason which they adduce... does not seem to prove conclusively... for the sin of fiction, namely if he were to receive baptism while existing in mortal sin without sorrow." L. 427. D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 301, generally denies it for all sins admitted in the very reception of baptism, and says this is the true opinion. The reason is that the material object of penance, from Trent, sess. 14, c. 2, is the sins which one has committed after he began to be subject to the Church through baptism; and the sin is completed by the fiction itself of the one feigning in his entrance into the Church.

But if the sin is continued for some space of time after baptism, it is already matter of penance. - St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 69, a. 10; 4 d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, q. 3; Lugo, d. 16, s. 1.

Must an adult to be baptized conditionally, in doubt about a preceding baptism, confess sins already accused? - Resp. In the negative. The reason is that those sins either are already destroyed if the prior baptism was valid; or if it was invalid, they are destroyed by the later valid baptism and are not matter of Confession. Reuter 118; E. M.

Must the aforesaid adult confess sins committed since the last Confession and not yet accused? - It is disputed. The first opinion affirms it, because the obligation of confessing sins urges whenever it is not established that they were committed before baptism. Wherefore, after the later baptism has been conferred, those sins are then to be accused. This is confirmed from the response of the Holy Office, Dec. 17, 1868. The second opinion denies it, because, given the probable invalidity of the prior baptism, those sins are probably not matter of Confession; and therefore there is no certainty about a certain obligation. The matter of Confession consists in sins committed after baptism. Therefore whenever it is not established that those sins were committed after baptism, the obligation of Confession is not established. In order that the obligation of Confession can be urged, sins committed after baptism must be proved. Trent, sess. 14, C. 2, 4. But if the prior baptism was in fact valid, those sins will be able to be remitted either through perfect contrition, or indirectly through absolution with attrition. Nor does the praised response of the Holy Office settle the controversy generally, because it was given for Neoconverts in England, on account of special reasons of that region. His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of the Holy Office publicly declared at St. Apollinaris in 1897 that that response was not a general decree, when this question was being debated expressly in the customary conference of cases of conscience. This also D'Annibale, assessor of the Holy Office and afterward Cardinal, explicitly affirms, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 301, note 3. And the Plenary Council of Latin America, adopting the same rule of acting, since it well knew that that response was not a general decree, carefully added in a note: "having before the eyes the norm of the decrees of the Holy Office, July 17, 1715, and Dec. 2, 1874," Collect. S. C. de P. F., nn. 644, 957, which contain almost the same prescription as the praised response of the Holy Office, Dec. 17, 1868. Mention of that decree is in fact omitted, and in place of it another decree, still more particular, of June 17, 1715, is cited, to which the response of Dec. 17, 1868, refers itself. And those words "having before the eyes," etc., after I myself proposed them to His Eminence Cardinal Vives, President of that Council, were then added in the note without any difficulty, for precisely this reason, since they were lacking in the prior schema: that there should be no place for a false interpretation of the mind of the Council concerning the universality of the decree cited. - Hence, when there was doubt about the priestly ordination of a certain beneficed coadjutor with care of souls, the Holy Office, Jan. 17, 1900, decreed that the ordination was to be repeated under condition, that the Masses celebrated were to be supplied from the treasury of the Church, and it said nothing about Confessions heard being repeated by penitents. Cf. 674; La-Croix, l. 6, p. 1, n. 324; L. 473, 474, 505; Monit. Eccles., vol. 11, p. 523; vol. 12, p. 540 ff.; E. M.

Nor indeed can a demonstrative argument, as is evident of itself, be taken from the Instruction of the Holy Office, July 20, 1859, cf. Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Baptismus, n. 15, in which an order is established, if baptism is to be repeated under condition, that there be: 1. abjuration, or profession of faith; 2. conditional baptism; 3. sacramental Confession with conditional absolution.

Formal abjuration of the sect is to be made by heretics who are converted to the Catholic faith and are baptized under condition. But from those who have not yet completed the fourteenth year of age only profession of faith is required. Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1680.

672 bis. The adversaries object against the preceding opinion set forth that the decree of the Holy Office, Dec. 17, 1868, is universal by reason of the matter. The argument of the adversaries in fact does not prove what is intended, and contradicts itself. For if in fact in the case of doubtful baptism one must stand for its validity until its nullity is established, and consequently the one doubtfully baptized is certainly held by the laws of the Church, among which is the law of confessing sins committed after baptism, it would follow from this also that he cannot be baptized again even under condition, and that a layman doubtfully baptized, who after that baptism has committed no grave sin, can and must approach Holy Communion at Easter time. Indeed the parish priest and Bishop doubtfully baptized could and would have to celebrate Mass for the people, etc.

Moreover, what they say, that a very slight doubt suffices for repeating baptism, but does not suffice for exempting from the certain law of confession, is in fact nothing. For first, the doubt in the case is not always very slight. Moreover, in order for it to suffice for repeating baptism, there must be at least some true probability, in the lowest degree. And consequently the principle remains entire and unshaken: a doubtful law does not oblige.

Finally the response which is brought forward as unknown, S. C. de P. F., July 12, 1869, in fact was not unknown, but was already known by private knowledge. But that response also does not prove the matter, because it is not a decree of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide. And therefore it was not related in the first edition of the Collectanea of this Congregation. But in the other edition it was placed not in the series of decrees, but in a certain note. And besides, even in that response of July 12, 1869, Collectan. n. 1338, it is not said absolutely that the decree of Dec. 17, 1868, concerning the law of confession after repeated baptism by reason of the preceding doubt, is absolutely universal, but at most universal for neoconverts, of whom alone there is question in that decree and in the praised response. And the decrees in fact are always referred to Protestants converted to the Catholic faith. Cf. Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Baptismus, n. 15, and if they are read well, it will surely appear that they wholly cohere with those things which have been handed down here, and that it does not seem gratuitously asserted that they do not cohere.

Is a sin accused only in general ever sufficient matter of Confession, as to its validity and liceity, e.g., if someone says: I accuse myself of all the sins of my life? - Resp. In the affirmative as to validity. For all agree that, in order that sick persons at the point of death, soldiers when battle is imminent, sailors when shipwreck is imminent, etc., be validly absolved, some external sign of Confession is sufficient, e.g., the taking of the hand, striking of the breast, etc. But since the essence of the sacrament is not changed outside a case of necessity, but is always the same for various cases, both in a case of necessity and outside a case of necessity, the aforesaid Confession will be sufficient as to the validity of the sacrament.

La-Croix 620; Reuter 303; Lugo, d. 17, n. 8; L. 480, 481, 482, 486, 504. - It seems that the same must probably be affirmed also as to liceity, for, granted the certain validity of the sacrament, illicitness cannot arise from elsewhere than from a positive divine precept. But this precept is not had, as is clear from Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, according to which the divine precept of explaining sins both as to number and as to species is had only for grave sins not yet directly remitted through the keys of the Church. Therefore where grave sins necessarily to be accused in Confession are lacking, there is no remaining obligation to accuse sins both in a determinate number and in a definite species. Dicastillo, de Sacr. poenit., d. 9, n. 760 ff.; Apicella, Ai Confessori Studio sull'assoluzione, etc.; A. S. S., vol. 4, p. 320.

Is there an obligation of confessing doubtful sins? - There is no obligation of confessing a positively doubtful mortal sin, namely when "on both sides there are probable reasons that a mortal sin was or was not committed." Thus "the very common opinion.... The reason: each person can licitly conform himself to a truly probable opinion." L. 473.

There is likewise no obligation of confessing a mortal sin doubtfully committed, namely when there is no prudent reason for affirming that the said sin was committed. The reason is, "because Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, does not oblige penitents except to confess all mortal sins of which they have consciousness... which imports having certain knowledge of the sin; for conscience is nothing other than knowledge of the heart and practical judgment concerning a sin committed. But a doubtful conscience is neither knowledge nor judgment, but a suspension of judgment; hence he who has no reason that he committed it can by no means be said to have consciousness of sin." L. 474. And indeed, if according to the very common opinion there is no obligation of confessing a positively doubtful sin, namely when it can probably be affirmed that it was committed, although it can also probably be affirmed that it was not committed, how will an obligation be able to be present when it could not even probably be said that the sin was committed? Since such a doubt does not rest upon a solid foundation, it cannot arise except from vain suspicion and fear of a sin committed, as frequently happens to scrupulous and fearful consciences. Ithur., Cas. 44, nn. 15, 18, 20 ff.

If it is a question of a sin certainly committed, and certainly grave in itself or objectively, but there is doubt about the consent given and about sufficient advertence, the following rule is handed down by St. Alphonsus, 476: "Those who are of a fearful conscience must be exempted from the obligation of confessing doubtful mortal sins. For these, in doubt, can reasonably, indeed morally certainly, believe that they did not consent, because presumption is taken from what commonly happens.... Conversely, the opposite must be judged about one who is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins, because in doubt he is presumed to have consented. For if he had resisted, he would certainly remember that effort which he brought upon himself to repel the temptation. Hence La-Croix rightly concludes, 612, that scarcely ever in men of this kind, whether of the first or second genus, is there given a merely negative doubt; for presumption founds a probability of consent given or dissent." Ithur., Cas. 44, n. 15 ff.

If it is a question of a sin doubtfully grave, namely in itself and objectively speaking of itself, there is no obligation of confessing such sins. For after diligence has been applied, one can form for himself a practical judgment from the very well-known rule "that there is no certain obligation where the offense is doubtful." L. 474. Speaking of itself; for he "who is certain about his evil action, and does not know how to discern whether it was mortal or not, is indeed bound to stand by the judgment of the confessor, whose office it is to discern between leprosy and leprosy." L. 474; St. Thomas, 4 d. 21, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3. But, scrupulous persons excepted, generally speaking, it is useful to confess doubtful sins, both for greater peace of conscience and so that the confessor, knowing the dangers in which the penitent is placed, can admonish him and suggest suitable remedies for avoiding them. L. 476.

If there is doubt whether someone has or has not confessed a mortal sin certainly committed, and the doubt is negative, he is certainly bound to confess it. For the law of Confession is certain, and no prudent reason suggests that it has been satisfied. But if the doubt is positive, St. Alphonsus, 427, holds that the penitent must confess it, "since the obligation of Confession is certain and the satisfaction doubtful." But Lugo, d. 16, nn. 58, 59, says: "All commonly teach that someone is not bound to confess that sin which he probably judges he has already confessed.... Nothing is more frequent among theologians than to excuse from repeating Confession one who confessed... according to some probable opinion concerning its validity." And St. Alphonsus himself handed this down, in the Roman edition of 1757, dedicated to Benedict XIV, l. 6, n. 477, as common doctrine.

The reason is clear: for although the general law is certain, nevertheless, with probable satisfaction of it standing, its obligation in the concrete, in the particular case, now becomes doubtful. Besides, the same holy Doctor adds in the same place "that one who was diligent in confessing his sins, if afterward he doubts whether he omitted some sin, after much time has elapsed since he committed it, is not bound to confess it, since in that case he can believe morally certainly that he has already confessed it.... If someone previously, from a bad habit, had fallen into several sins, and afterward has been truly converted through constant integrity of life, if then he doubts whether in a general or particular Confession made with due diligence he omitted some sin or circumstance, let the confessor forbid him even to think back over his past life." But scrupulous persons, as the doctors very commonly say, are never bound to confess past sins unless they are certain that they were mortal and certain that they have never confessed them. L. ibid.

674 bis. Whether one who has confessed a sin as doubtful must confess it again if he recognizes it as certain is disputed. - St. Alphonsus, 478, 504, affirms it, because that sin was not accused as to its individual substance; for the accusation of a certain sin is not included in the accusation of a doubtful sin. Thus several other grave theologians. Reuter 332, Tamb., Meth. conf., l. 2, c. 1, § 4, n. 24, and also several other grave theologians deny it, since that sin was directly remitted through the keys of the Church; therefore it is not to be subjected to the keys again. - "Sanchez, etc., very commonly and most probably say that if someone confesses a sin which neither he nor the confessor knew to be mortal, and afterward knows that it is mortal from its genus, he is not bound to confess it again. The reason is that in this case the penitent has already exposed his sin to the confessor as it then was in his conscience and now is; and in the present nothing new occurs except that he now knows the matter of that sin to be grave, which he previously did not know." L. 478, 500.

Strictly speaking, someone can approach the sacred synaxis, without a preceding Confession, with a doubtful or probable mortal sin. The reason is that Trent requires Confession before Communion only for those who are conscious of mortal sin. Hence a priest doubting whether he adhered to a bad thought, or judging probably that he did not adhere to it, can celebrate, contrition nevertheless having been made first, without Confession, although he has abundance of a confessor. Yet contrition should first be made, lest he rashly expose the sacrament to the danger of being frustrated of its effect, and perhaps in fact lack the fruit of the Eucharist; and lest Jesus Christ be exposed at least to material irreverence and dishonor, if perhaps, really coming into us, the soul is defiled by mortal sin.

At least; for there seems to be a certain formal irreverence in this, that someone knowingly and prudently receives Christ himself in himself while doubtfully approved. L. 475. In practice, however, Confession is to be counseled. - Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, §§ 3, 4.

If the penitent offers only doubtful sufficient matter, is the confessor bound to seek certain matter from the past life, so that he can absolve? - Resp. In the affirmative, if he wishes to absolve, because otherwise the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity. Except unless a case occurs in which the penitent can be absolved conditionally, concerning which below. In the negative, if he does not wish to absolve, but to dismiss the penitent with only a blessing, because the penitent who does not bring certainly sufficient matter does not have a right to absolution. Likewise, if the penitent seems to have doubtful sorrow about venials alone, the confessor is not ordinarily bound to apply great diligence to move him to sorrow, although he would do this much better. But it would have to be said otherwise if it were a question of doubtful mortals, because of the danger to the penitent. - L. 432.

Must one who brings not necessary matter, but free and certain matter, necessarily be absolved? - Resp. In the affirmative, speaking of itself. The reason is that, on the one hand, the penitent duly disposed, after he has performed confession, has an acquired right to absolution; but on the other hand, the confessor has no right to grant or deny absolution according to his own judgment, and thus to defraud the penitent of those spiritual gifts of grace which follow absolution. L. 604.