Chapter — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Chapter II. On the Matter of the Sacrament of Penance

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417.
  1. As in the other Sacraments, so in the Sacrament of Penance, there is a twofold matter, one remote and the other proximate.
417.

The remote matter consists of all sins committed after Baptism; these are called the matter concerning which, because absolution is occupied with destroying them. It is either necessary or merely sufficient and free.

417.

The necessary remote matter consists of all mortal sins committed after Baptism and not yet directly remitted by the power of the keys, because by divine precept sins of this kind must be submitted to the keys. - But the sufficient and free matter consists of all venial sins 1. It is called sufficient because any sins, even the least, can be the object of sacramental pardon. It is called free because there is no precept of submitting them to the keys. These things are established from the perpetual practice and tradition of the Church, and also from the definition of the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 5.

1 Add all sins, whether mortal or venial, which have already at another time been duly submitted to the keys, as the Author presently has it (q. 1).

417.

The proximate matter of the Sacrament of Penance consists of the three acts of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are called the quasi matter of this Sacrament because they are in the likeness of sensible matter which in the other Sacraments is subjected to the form 2; for through these acts sins are presented to be destroyed by the words of the form. This is established especially from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 4.

2 St. Thomas teaches thus, however, that in the other Sacraments matter is subjected to the form in a different manner: A form of words is applied to sacramental signs in the other Sacraments for their sanctification, because they contain and cause grace; but exterior penance is not a sign causing grace, and therefore it is not necessary that it be sanctified through some form of words. But the words which are pronounced by the absolving Priest are immediately directed to him who subjects himself to the Sacrament; whence he himself is sanctified by the power of absolution and receives grace, but his confession is not sanctified so that he may receive grace from it, as was the case in Baptism concerning the sanctification of the water (In IV Sent., dist. 22, q. 2, art. 1, q. 1, ad 3). But I have said, in the note to no. 414, that the things which the Holy Doctor handed down in the Summa (III, q. 86, art. 6) do not appear contrary to these things. For although in the body of the article he says that the remission of guilt is in some manner an effect of the acts of penance, he nevertheless adds (ibid., ad 1) that this is to be understood of acts which are there as effects of operative grace, produced simultaneously with the remission of guilt. And more clearly (ibid., ad ult.): The act of the virtue of penance has it that without it the remission of guilt cannot take place, insofar as it is an inseparable effect of grace, through which guilt is principally remitted, which also operates in all the Sacraments. If, therefore, an act of this kind is an effect of the grace by which guilt is remitted, it certainly cannot, as something subsequent, be called the cause of the grace remitting guilt.

418.
  1. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Are sins already duly confessed and remitted through absolution sufficient matter for the Sacrament of Penance?
418.

Reply. Affirmative. This is certain among all, says St. Lig., no. 427.

418.

The reason is: 1. because a sin, although remitted, is always a sin committed; and just as contrition for the same sin can be repeated with fruit, so also can confession. It comes about only per accidens that the sin, since it has already been remitted, is not remitted, although per se, since it was committed, it is capable of remission. Nor does it stand in the way that the Sacrament then does not destroy this sin; for it suffices that it have its effect in first act, namely, that it provide grace destructive of sin, although per accidens in second act it does not destroy the sin. Moreover, the Sacrament will no more lack the other effects, namely, an increase of grace, remission of punishment, etc., than if someone, perfectly contrite, were submitting those sins to the keys for the first time.

418.
  1. Furthermore, a sentence already pronounced can be confirmed for greater security and for greater consolation and peace of soul, as is sometimes customary in civil matters; and if perhaps the sin submitted to the keys has not yet been remitted, it can then be remitted.
418.
  1. This is also established from the Declaration of Benedict XI in Canon Law, Extrav. I, de Privilegiis, ch. 4: Although, he says, it is not of necessity to confess the same sins again, nevertheless... we regard it as salutary that the confession of the same sins be repeated. It is established, moreover, from the constant practice of the faithful, with the approval of the Church 3.

3 John XXII (Extrav. Vas electionis, de haereticis) condemns the opposite opinion as false and erroneous. See Croix, bk. 6, part 2, no. 589.

419.
    • QUESTION 2. Must an adult who is to be baptized conditionally because of doubt concerning a preceding Baptism confess sins already accused? Reply. Negative. The reason is that those sins have already been remitted through the Sacrament of Penance if the prior Baptism was valid; but if it was not valid, they are not matter for confession and will be remitted through the second Baptism. - Reuter, no. 118.
419.

QUESTION 3. Must the aforesaid adult accuse sins not yet confessed, or committed since the last confession?

419.

Reply. This was hitherto controverted among writers. The first probable opinion denied it, because, they said, given the probable invalidity of the prior Baptism, these sins are probably not matter capable of the Sacrament of Penance; therefore, they probably are not to be submitted to the keys either. For the obligation of confessing sins cannot follow except subsequently to Baptism duly conferred. Hence, if perhaps these sins are not remitted through the second Baptism, which is invalid because of the validity of the first, they can be remitted either through perfect contrition or indirectly through absolution with attrition. - Lacroix, no. 325, On Baptism, and others.

419.

The second opinion, also probable, affirmed it, because the obligation of confessing sins urges whenever it is not established that they were committed before a valid Baptism. The Author therefore concluded that in practice confession was very much to be advised 4. But now attend to the most recent response of the S. Congregation which was issued on this matter toward the end of the year 1868.

4 This practice was furthermore presented in the preceding Edition as more conformable to the instruction which the Congregation of the Holy Office had given on another occasion, when it taught the order to be observed in reconciling these adults. This instruction indeed supposed confession, if not necessary, at least most opportune. Nevertheless, it was added that if the first opinion were in fact probable - which otherwise could seem consonant with the general principle that the obligation of Confession is not to be imposed when, morally speaking, as St. Alphonsus says, bk. 6, no. 505, it is not established - it should not have been permitted that one be urged to an unnecessary Confession to whom it appeared so hard that, perhaps overcome by the difficulty, he could be deterred from reconciliation.

But now, in favor of the second opinion, there has been added a Response of the S. Inquisition, Dec. 17, 1868. For to the Question proposed in the name of the Bishops of England, Must sacramental Confession be required of new converts in England, and must it be integral? the response to both parts of the doubt was: Affirmative; and the decree rendered on Thursday, June 14, 1715, was to be given.

That this response does not concern only the special circumstances of England is proved by the preceding response of the year 1715. For the following Doubt was proposed: whether full credence is to be given to Charles Wipperman of Rostock in the Duchy of Mecklenburg, a preacher and lecturer of quietistic Lutheran theology, superintendent and principal doctor of the sect of quietistic Lutherans, reconciled to the holy faith in the Holy Office of Parma, concerning certain errors detected in his Baptism; whether he is to be believed concerning the things which he relates; and, insofar as the reply is affirmative, that provision may likewise be made both for his salvation and for that of the others of that sect or region, especially if they are ignorant.

It is asked whether the said Wipperman is to be rebaptized; and, insofar as the reply is affirmative, whether absolutely or conditionally; and, insofar as the reply is affirmative, whether he is bound to confess all the sins of his past life; and, insofar as the reply is affirmative, whether the confession is to precede or follow the Baptism to be conferred conditionally.

The Most Holy Father, having heard the votes of the Most Eminent, said: Charles Ferdinand is to be rebaptized conditionally; and, after Baptism has been conferred, let him confess the sins of his past life and be absolved from them conditionally.

** Although this question appears to have nothing to do with the Vindiciae Alphonsianae, since St. Alphonsus the Doctor has not even one word concerning it, nevertheless, the VV. did not judge that they should remain silent concerning it, and they devote four columns to this argument (pp. 463-465), perhaps so that, from the example of this doctrine set forth in Gury's Compendium, which afterward appears less consonant with the preceding Decree, no one may wonder that in the moral Work of St. Alphonsus also certain opinions are approved which are found to have been condemned by preceding or subsequent Decrees of the Church.

What is now of interest is the conclusion, worthy of notice, which the VV. deduce from the Decree adduced. The Decree of the S. Inquisition, they say (p. 465), proves that a doubtful obligation of confession is not always to be regarded as nonexistent. But if the matter is thus, no more evident apology for Gury's Compendium could now be desired. For the VV., unless you say that their words are devoid of meaning, suppose that the obligation of Confession is in itself doubtful. But it cannot be called doubtful unless the opinion which denies the obligation is judged truly probable. Therefore, by the suffrage of the VV. themselves, Gury must now rightly be said to have written after Lacroix that the opinion which denies the obligation of integral Confession is probable!

But further. That a doubtful obligation is not to be regarded as nonexistent can be effected only by the force of some principle which establishes that in the case the safer side must necessarily be followed. But if the integrity of Confession is at issue, behold St. Alphonsus meets us, saying (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 29): No one is bound to doubtful laws.... Nor does it stand in the way to say here that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow merely probable opinions; because this holds when the validity of the Sacrament is at issue, but otherwise concerning the integrity [of confession]. But the present question is whether confession, and indeed integral confession, is to be required of a neophyte.

But still further. The Decree of the S. Inquisition must here be taken either as a new law of merely ecclesiastical right or as a Declaration of divine right. Yet who would affirm that a new law was enacted by the Church in this case? Where was this law promulgated? It will therefore be a Declaration of divine right. But truly I do not know to whom it could occur to attribute to the S. Inquisition a declaration by force of which a doubtful obligation, with no higher principle supervening, cannot in itself be called nonexistent.

Accordingly, as it seems, the VV. would have devoted their efforts more wisely to bringing forward reasons by which it might be demonstrated, not that a doubtful obligation of Confession is not nonexistent, but rather that the obligation of confession in the case is not doubtful. But, what is to be regretted, they have provided none of these things.

However, we do indeed see certain reasons adduced in the petition which was presented to the Apostolic See concerning this question in the year 1868, and part of which the VV. also relate (loc. cit.). Yet you will perhaps not without reason suspect that those reasons pertain to the special circumstances of England. For it presented the following as necessary reasons for requiring of neophytes an integral confession of their whole life: There is the difficulty of converts in bringing the intellect into the obedience of faith itself, unless through humility and submission of soul, which Christ the Lord deigned to place in the Sacrament of Penance. There is also the impossibility of knowing, except through an integral manifestation of sins, whether the newly converted person is rightly disposed for Baptism itself and is willing, for example, to make restitution of reputation or goods (if he happens to be bound to it), to avoid the proximate occasion of sin, to withdraw from a marriage invalidly contracted, even if through a dispensation of the Holy See (as in the daily more frequent cases of a marriage contracted after a civil divorce) it cannot be convalidated. There is, moreover, the necessity of providing for his salvation through justification

in the Sacrament of Penance, from the integrity of which no one once baptized in infancy can be exempted, regard being had especially to the diligence of the younger members of the English Clergy in faithfully observing the rite of baptizing, and consequently to the greater number of those concerning the validity of whose infant Baptism it is not lawful to doubt. But since it is certain that after several years the obligation of integral confession will lose its force if Theologians are able in practice to follow as safe the opinion of the aforesaid authors (who say with Lacroix, namely, that the obligation of confession in the case is doubtful), the Archbishop of Westminster and the Bishops of England earnestly petition, etc. Thus indeed reads the petition.

Now, if this alone is considered, namely, that such diligence is employed by the younger English Clergy in observing the rite of Baptism that it is not lawful to doubt the validity of infant Baptism, who does not now see that, whenever it is established that Baptism was duly conferred upon someone in this manner, the matter is thereby brought to this point: since scarcely any cause or necessity for repeating Baptism then appears, the integrity of sacramental confession is altogether necessary for justification from sins afterward committed? Nor should it be judged that the other reasons adduced lack their own force because of the circumstances of England. For although the reasons drawn from the necessity either of overcoming the difficulty in bringing the intellect into the obedience of faith, or of knowing whether the neophyte is rightly disposed for Baptism and bears a ready mind to fulfill whatever obligations may perhaps be present of restoring reputation or another's goods, of avoiding proximate occasions of sin, or of withdrawing from an illegitimate marriage which otherwise cannot be convalidated - although, I say, reasons of this kind, if considered in themselves, might generally appear of little efficacy for inferring the necessity of sacramental confession, all the more because they would induce the same necessity of confession even if the neophyte had been converted to the faith from Judaism, Mohammedanism, or idolatry; since such disposition of soul must be established in all neophytes whatsoever who approach Baptism; although, furthermore, if we adhere strictly to the Decree of the Inquisition, confession would appear to contribute little toward the aforesaid ends, namely, toward foreknowing the suitable dispositions of the neophyte for receiving Baptism, because according to the tenor of the Decree confession must not precede but follow Baptism; and, furthermore, even if it preceded, nevertheless, since the knowledge obtained through sacramental confession is certainly not of such a kind that it may be used in the external forum to determine whether or not the neophyte is rightly disposed to receive Baptism - nevertheless, it does not seem doubtful that the very special condition of affairs in England makes it impossible to meet those necessities except through sacramental confession. The same certainly can also be said of the very grave inconvenience which is touched upon in the last place, namely, of the danger that the obligation of confession would for this reason gradually lose its force. And certainly nowhere else has fear come upon theologians that, while they establish that one who has only doubtful or even doubtfully necessary matter is not bound to confession (see St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, nos. 473-474), and add that this matter may be passed over at pleasure if indeed he wishes to confess while presenting other matter, it would therefore come about in the course of time that the obligation of integral confession would entirely lose its force. Yet the words of the Postulation or petition attest as certain that this would have happened in England. Otherwise, no one certainly will be able to deny that, even if no Decree concerning these matters had been issued, nevertheless the manifest utility of this practice appears for this reason, that the Neophyte, vigorously denying himself in a sufficiently difficult matter according to the words of Christ, no differently, namely, than those who, having left all things, followed Christ, will afterward easily, after that victory over himself and strengthened by more abundant powers of grace, walk constantly in the way of the Lord, and indeed will run.

Moreover, since the Decree of the year 1715 related in the Note, upon which the more recent response of the year 1868 rests, referred not to England but to Germany, and nevertheless, as is read there: The Most Holy Father, having heard the votes of the Most Eminent, said: Charles Ferdinand is to be rebaptized conditionally; and, after his Baptism has been conferred, let him confess the sins of his past life and be absolved from them conditionally; it now sufficiently appears that the state of the question altogether required of the VV., not that they contend that a doubtful obligation in the case is not nonexistent, but certainly that they show that the obligation here cannot be called doubtful from an intrinsic reason. But concerning these things in their proper place.

420.
    • QUESTION 4. Should an adult who is to be baptized and absolved conditionally first be baptized or absolved?
420.

Reply 1. Per se it is of little consequence. The reason is that if he has already been validly baptized, absolution will produce its effect whether it is conferred before or after conditional Baptism; but if the prior Baptism was invalid, there will be no effect of the Sacrament of Penance whether it is received before or after the second Baptism; for only one of the two Sacraments can have efficacy in the case.

420.

Reply 2. From considerations of fittingness, it is better to follow the natural order, namely, first to baptize conditionally and then to absolve under condition. Nevertheless, it is expedient that confession be placed before Baptism for the better disposition of the one to be baptized, but that absolution be conferred immediately after Baptism. - Thus commonly in practice 5.

5 If, however, the Response adduced above (in the preceding Note) in the case of Charles Wipperman has any force, the order which the Author calls natural will have to be followed.

421.
    • QUESTION 5. Is a sin accused only in general sometimes sufficient matter for the VALIDITY or LICEITY of confession 6; for example, if someone says: I HAVE SINNED, or, I accuse myself OF ALL MY SINS?

6 The question of liceity can be separated from the question of validity only with regard to the priest, who indeed can sometimes absolve validly and at the same time illicitly. For as regards the penitent, if he acts here in bad faith, the confession will be both illicit and invalid; but if he acts in good faith, the confession will not be illicit.

Moreover, in order to elucidate this question clearly, it is best to distinguish what is required and sufficient for the intrinsic essence of sacramental judgment, and what pertains to the necessity imposed by divine precept. If, therefore, only the essence of this judgment is considered, it can now be doubtful to no one that not merely the formulas adduced by the Author, I have sinned, I accuse myself of all my sins, etc., but also any other sign of penance suffices. Hence all agree that, for soldiers when battle is imminent, or sailors when shipwreck threatens, or the sick at the point of death, etc., to be validly absolved, it suffices that they furnish an indication of penance, for example, by grasping a hand, striking the breast, or in any other manner whatsoever.

The entire question, therefore, turns upon the obligation which the positive law of Christ imposes. But the solution will not be very difficult if it is sought from its native and proper source, namely, from the authentic interpretation of the same law which is found in the doctrine of the Council of Trent. And indeed, from the necessity of a judgment to be rendered by the priest with knowledge of the cause, the Holy Synod (sess. 14, ch. 5) certainly concludes that sins must be declared not merely in general, but individually in species; it concludes that not only all sins, but also those circumstances which change the species of the sin, must be explained in confession. Nevertheless, it never fails to add expressly that it affirms this concerning necessary matter, namely, mortal sins which have never been duly subjected to the keys. For as regards merely sufficient matter, it teaches that venial sins are laudably told by pious men in confession, but at the same time may be concealed without fault; and if the substance of this merely sufficient matter can be concealed, a fortiori its genus and species, and even circumstances which change the species within the slightness of the fault, can be concealed. Indeed, this doctrine shines forth so clearly set out there that, although some have raised many difficulties against the sufficiency of the confession of sin in common (see Lugo, De Poenitentia, disp. 17, from no. 6), not one has ever existed who thought that assistance against it could be sought from the doctrine of the same Synod.

The difficulties were drawn, namely, either from the fact that a confession of this kind gives no new knowledge to the confessor, since it manifests only that the person is a sinner in general, which the confessor already knew, since we are all sinners; or from the fact that a judge cannot judge prudently unless the cause is known in particular; or finally from the fact that in the case nothing appears to which absolution is directly terminated. After Cardinal de Lugo (loc. cit., no. 11 ff.) easily solves these objections even when necessary matter for confession in a case of necessity is at issue, he then extends the doctrine (ibid., no. 17) to the confession of venial sin in general. Hence it is plain that John de Dicastillo (De Sacr. Poenit., disp. 9, no. 760) rightly concluded from these things that not only in a case of necessity, but also speaking per se, the confession of venial sin in general (say the same of even grave sins remitted at another time through absolution) is in itself sufficient matter for absolution in one who has only venial sins. And Suarez agrees (De Poenit., disp. 23, sect. 2, no. 10), both because there is no precept of confessing venial sins in species, and because the confession of venial sin in species declares the conscience no more than if someone should say in general that he had sinned venially, nor does it vary the judgment of the confessor any more. But to what Suarez (ibid.) had added, that this is true speculatively, but that in practice the species must be declared so that the matter may be certain, Dicastillo excellently replies (loc. cit., no. 762): If this is true speculatively, it will also be true practically. For only then in a moral matter is something said to be true speculatively indeed but not practically, when that which is considered in speculation cannot be exhibited in practice without some variation occurring. But when it can be reduced to practice altogether unchanged in the manner in which it is considered in speculation, if it is true speculatively, it must also be judged true practically. Wherefore, since the confession of venial sin in general can be exhibited in practice in the manner which is judged sufficient speculatively, it must also be judged such practically. Otherwise, however, it scarcely appears what Suarez means when he requires certain matter. Is it not certain that there is a sin, or is it not certainly subjected to the keys? But if he wishes the matter to be certain insofar as the safer opinions must be followed in setting forth the circumstances of the sin, this is indeed asserted contrary to the common opinion of all and the common practice, which holds that the precept of confession is satisfied when the precept is probably fulfilled, according to what was said in vol. 1, no. 80.

These things had to be noted, not only so that the rights of truth might be preserved, but also because they can sometimes be usefully serviceable in practice, as will be evident from what is to be said in the resolutions.

** 1. The VV. here object (p. 954, no. 104), as though opposed to this doctrine, the following doctrine of St. Alphonsus: Let the Confessor take care, if he wishes to absolve a penitent without sin, either to dispose him to sorrow especially for some light fault..., or to suggest to him that he confess some graver sin of his past life against some precept; for it suffices that he confess in general without number, so that he may have certain matter upon which absolution can rest.

Reply. Let all of it pass; and I deny the consequence. For we concede that this care of the Confessor is laudable, and likewise that the confession of some sin of one's past life against some precept suffices. But we deny either that the sorrow of the penitent cannot otherwise be established, or that certain matter is lacking for absolution if in the case the particular precept which was violated is not expressed.

2. The VV. relate (pp. 479-480, in the Note) that the doctrine handed down here had already been refuted in the periodical Nouvelle Revue theologique, Tournai, 1869, vol. 1, p. 67; and they refer the reader to it.

Reply. Let it be permitted also to us to refer both the illustrious VV. and others to the excellent little Work of the priest Stephen Apicella, entitled: Ai Confessori, studio sull'Assoluzione a darsi a chi nell'attual confessione non offre materia necessaria. Scafati: Tipogr. Pompeiana, 1874. There they will find the difficulties against our thesis very learnedly solved. Meanwhile, we shall weigh two drawn from it which the VV. put forward as the chief difficulties.

3. After the Tournai authors, therefore, the VV. object (p. 480, in the Note) that only through a logical fault is it deduced from the absolution which is given either to soldiers when battle is imminent or to the dying that a general accusation is valid and licit outside a case of necessity.

Reply. That it is deduced through a logical fault as regards validity, I deny; as regards liceity, let it pass. Namely, as is said in the Note, certain things pertain to the intrinsic essence of the Sacrament, namely, apt and sufficient matter, both proximate and remote, and the form; but certain other things pertain only to the necessity of precept, as, for example, the integrity of confession. Now, as regards the essence, it is false that elements which suffice in necessity do not suffice to effect the Sacrament outside necessity; for the essence is not mutable and of itself always retains the same intrinsic power. Therefore, as regards the sufficiency of the essential elements, an argument is logically made from a case of necessity to other cases. Certainly, one would argue defectively from a case of necessity to other cases as regards things of mere precept, because one can be excused from observing laws in necessity, but not outside necessity. Yet an argument of this kind is falsely ascribed to us. For in the case we say that confession in general is licit, not because one is then excused from a law, but because the law itself requires nothing further.

4. The VV. add (loc. cit.) with the Tournai authors: The nature of the Sacrament, which is effected after the manner of a judgment, requires that the matter be altogether determined through a distinct accusation of sins.

Reply. It requires this according to the norm proposed by the Holy Council of Trent, I concede; otherwise, I deny. See what was said in the Note concerning the doctrine of the Council of Trent.

5. The VV. subjoin with the Tournai authors (loc. cit.): This manner of confessing, which otherwise savors of Protestant usage, favors the laxity and negligence both of the penitent and of the Confessor.

Reply. Objections of this kind, or perhaps better, taunts, savor little of the theological method. Accordingly, as regards Protestant usage, let them consult Bellarmine, Valencia, etc., etc., etc., and learn from them what Protestant usage means. As regards the rest, let it suffice to have replied that those who observe the norm proposed by the Holy Council of Trent cannot be accused either of laxity or of negligence.

6. The VV. insist with the Tournai authors: Even if the doctrine under discussion were probable, nevertheless it would not be lawful to use it, because Proposition 1 among those condemned by Innocent XI stands in the way: It is not illicit in conferring the Sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the Sacrament, with the safer opinion abandoned.

Reply. I deny the supposition, namely, that the validity of the Sacrament is at issue here. For when the essentials are observed, no doubt concerning the validity of the Sacrament remains. But, as has often been said, the essentials are observed here. The present question, therefore, concerns not the essence of the Sacrament but the matter of precept; wherefore what St. Alphonsus replies concerning questions of this kind applies here (Homo apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 29): Nor does it stand in the way to say here that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow merely probable opinions, because this holds when the validity of the Sacrament is at issue; otherwise concerning integrity.

7. Finally, against the opinion of Suarez related in the Note, namely, that the confession of venial sin in species no more declares the conscience nor varies the judgment of the confessor, the VV. object that the judgment of the Confessor can be varied: 1. because he can deny absolution to one relapsing into venial sins; 2. because perhaps that which the penitent judges venial will sometimes be mortal; 3. because venial sins, for example in children, can be insufficiently certain.

Reply. Let all of it pass, and I deny the consequence, since it extends immensely more widely than the premises. For from the fact that sometimes per accidens it is useful to know some fault specifically, it is not lawful to conclude that this is always necessary; but it will belong to the prudence of the Confessor, whenever there is need, to inquire into the things pertinent to the matter. Moreover, from what the VV. observe, namely, that the fault which the penitent believes venial could perhaps be mortal, would this tedious method not bring the matter to the point that the confession of all venial sins would always be judged necessary? But what is the principal point, the VV. cannot be ignorant that this question chiefly concerns whether the specific confession of some sin is necessary when a generic confession of the sins of one's past life is added to the specific confession of light faults, with no sin specifically expressed. For as regards customary confessions of venial sins, the question must rather be called merely speculative, since it is altogether contrary to the custom of the faithful to accuse only venial faults generically. But it happens otherwise with that generic confession of the sins of one's past life. Now, it is manifest that, as regards this confession, the preceding observations of the VV. are not even minimally pertinent. And concerning this argument the cited little Work of the Rev. D. Apicella is worthy of being read. For, among other things, he shows by most apt reasons how vainly certain persons require in this general accusation the confession of some sin in species for the reason that the Confessor might exercise a suitable judgment.

421.

Reply 1. As regards validity: 1. Affirmative, certainly in a case of necessity, or when the penitent, for example, a dying person, cannot accuse any sin in species. - Thus very commonly with St. Thomas. - 2. Affirmative, at least much more probably, even outside a case of necessity, if necessary matter, or matter to be declared in species, is lacking. The reason is that the essence of the Sacrament is not changed for varying cases. - Lacroix, no. 620. - Reuter, no. 303. - Lugo, disp. 17, no. 8.

421.

Reply 2. As regards liceity also, affirmative, at least probably. The reason is that where mortal sins are lacking, there is no obligation to declare the other sins in species, since venial sins can be omitted altogether. For the Council of Trent determined absolutely nothing concerning this except that mortal sins alone are necessary matter for confession. Nevertheless, generally in practice it is expedient (as is also commonly done by all) to confess venial sins in species also, by reason of the direction to be given by the Confessor, etc. But as regards the general accusation of the sins of one's past life which pious penitents are accustomed to submit at the end of confession in order to render the matter of the Sacrament more certain, it is certainly sufficient if someone says: I accuse myself of the sins of my past life, or of my whole life.

422.
    • QUESTION 6. When a penitent presents only doubtful sufficient matter, is the Confessor bound to seek certain matter from his past life in order that he may absolve?
422.

Reply 1. Affirmative, if he wishes to absolve, because otherwise the Sacrament would be exposed to danger of nullity. Except when a case occurs in which the penitent can be absolved conditionally, concerning which below.

422.

Reply 2. Negative, if he does not wish to absolve, but to dismiss the penitent with only a blessing, because a penitent who does not bring certainly sufficient matter has no right to absolution. - Likewise, if the penitent appears to have doubtful sorrow concerning venial sins alone, the Confessor is not ordinarily bound to employ great diligence in order to move him to sorrow, although he does much better if he does so. - But it would have to be said otherwise if doubtful mortal sins were at issue, because of the danger to the penitent.

423.
    • QUESTION 7. Must a penitent who does not bring NECESSARY matter necessarily be absolved?
423.

Reply. Negative per se, if the penitent does not ask for absolution; but even without absolution the reception of Holy Communion can be permitted to him, because, since he is in the state of grace, the Sacrament of Penance is not required to dispose him for it. Nevertheless, ordinarily it is expedient to absolve such a person, so that he may receive both an increase of sanctifying grace and sacramental graces, and an easier remission of venial sins and punishments, etc. - Lacroix, no. 1889, with others.

423.

But if he has not received the Sacrament for a notable time, or if he needs special aids, for example, to overcome temptations, or if the penitent himself desires or requests it, he is to be absolved 7.

7 Whenever it appears that a penitent has approached, even with merely sufficient matter, in order to receive the Sacrament, and is found disposed, it is scarcely possible to understand to what end certain persons mix together so many disputes about whether he is to be absolved or not, or when he is to be absolved and when not. For certainly it will have been free to the priest to hear the confession or not to hear it. But after he has heard the confession and has the penitent rightly disposed, what laws, I ask, give this power to the confessor, that at his own discretion he absolve or not absolve? And even if you set aside the right acquired by the penitent through confession (which certainly does not wholly depend upon the danger otherwise imminent, or upon the greater or lesser gravity of the matter), what sound reason can persuade the confessor, without any cause and according to his own judgment, to deprive a member of the faithful of the increase of sanctifying grace and of the other heavenly gifts which are the fruits of this Sacrament?

424.
  1. Resolutions. - 1. Venial sins, or mortal sins confessed at another time, according to their species, even generically expressed 8, are sufficient and licit matter for confession, apart from number and any circumstances whatsoever. The reason is that thus there is a confession of a determinate sin, at least of one in species; nor is there an obligation to add the number of venial sins or of mortal sins already remitted. For there is nothing in the form of absolution that requires the determination of some particular sin. - Reuter, no. 202.

8 By generic species some also understand a subalternate genus of sin, as if you confess that you have sinned against justice, or religion, or faith. See Dicastillo, De Poenit., disp. 9, no. 743.

424.
  1. If someone does not accuse himself of any sin in particular and says, for example, I know nothing except that I must often have sinned like other men, let him be examined as children are usually examined. If nothing can be elicited since the last confession, let him be questioned about his past life: whether he has ever lied in his life; whether he has ever offended his parents, or been angry, or detracted from his neighbor, etc., etc.
424.
  1. With women, devout women, and others of this kind, who confess only confusedly and concerning very light matters, care must be taken that they add some fault from their past life, either in species or at least in general. Then you will endeavor to excite them to sorrow and purpose, and, having absolved them, will dismiss them in peace. - Elbel, no. 19.
424.
  1. For greater security and for receiving more certain fruit, penitents are to be advised that, besides doubtful sins or even daily light sins, they always append from those already confessed at least generically 9 another certain sin for which they are more vehemently sorry, lest perhaps the Sacrament be exposed to the danger of frustration. - Elbel, no. 19.

9 It is most prudently intimated that the confessor should be content with generic confession. For it sometimes happens as a grave burden to the penitent that the confessor wishes to extort a confession of graver sins in species; nor is it a new thing that certain penitents, wearied by this most troublesome importunity of confessors, have afterward approached confession very rarely and only when compelled, as it were, by necessity.

424.
  1. But penitents who observe the aforesaid practice are to be admonished not to submit a sin of their past life to the keys again merely from a certain custom, especially if that sin is light, because there is a fear that they may not be sufficiently sorry and consequently may not attain the end of providing for the validity and fruit of the Sacrament 10.

10 Nevertheless, for this reason the confessor ought not to vex himself or his penitents excessively. For if those are at issue who are accustomed with some care to avoid not only grave but also light sins, they are affected, so to speak, by a habitual hatred of sin, and very easily proceed to the act, although it can happen that sensible sorrow is less in them than in others who need a certain greater change of affections in order to detest sin.

424.
  1. According to all, confession in general suffices if the Confessor clearly knows the penitent from another source, for example, from a recent confession of his whole life, etc., and knows that he wishes to accuse himself of sins already known to the Confessor; for then it will suffice to say: I accuse myself of all my sins already known to you; or simply: of all the sins of my past life.