Section — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
§ 1. On the Indifference of Acts
127. Preliminary Note. 1. Here we speak of truly human acts, but not of first-first acts, which occur without deliberation. For it is certain that first-first acts of this kind have no morality at all, or are amoral.106
2. Here we speak only of human acts in order to morality, but not in order to supernatural merit. For an act morally good is not by that very fact meritorious in the strict sense (or de condigno), since for merit properly so called habitual grace is required.107
3. A human act can be considered in two ways: a) in abstracto according to species and on the part of the object only; just as also man can be considered according to species only, under which consideration he is a rational animal and nothing else. Thus, for example, in the abstract can be considered the acts of walking, painting, writing, etc., without relation to the circumstances of the act and the intention of the agent; - b) in concreto or in the individual, insofar as such a man in such circumstances with such an intention places the act; for example, Peter, wearied from labor, takes a walk in order to restore his strength.
106 Sometimes first-first acts are also called morally indifferent, but then moral indifference is taken in a wholly negative sense. The Angelic Doctor writes to the point: "It is necessary that every act of man proceeding from deliberative reason, considered in the individual, be good or evil. But if it does not proceed from deliberative reason, but from a certain imagination (as when someone strokes his beard or moves his hand or foot), such an act is not, properly speaking, moral or human, since the act has this from reason; and thus it will be indifferent, as if existing outside the genus of moral acts" (S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 9).
107 Nevertheless I cannot admit the opinion of P. Lehmkuhl (Theol. mor.11 I, 106), saying: "I am altogether in that opinion: that there can be acts which are neither evil, nor in any way supernaturally good or meritorious." For since man has been elevated to the supernatural order, every truly human act merits or demerits something at least by congruity broadly so called (cf. below n. 137). Vermeersch agrees with us, Theol. mor. I, n. 142.
128. Principle 1. There are human acts indifferent from their species, that is, which, considered abstractly, are neither morally good nor morally evil. Thus the very common opinion, against a few Scotists.108
The reason is that human acts considered abstractly take their morality from the moral object alone. But there are certain objects wholly indifferent morally, as the objects of walking, painting, eating, etc. Wherefore St. Thomas teaches: "If therefore we speak of a moral act according to its species, then not every moral act is good or evil, but some act is indifferent."109
108 Scotus himself seems to have taught the very common opinion (in the place cited below).
109 De malo q. 2, a. 5.
129. Principle 2. There neither is nor can be any act indifferent in the individual. Thus St. Thomas, St. Alphonsus,110 all Thomists, and almost all more recent authors, such as Müller,111 Simar,112 Bouquillon,113 Pruner,114 Noldin,115 Lehmkuhl,116 Frins.117 On the contrary, that human acts even in the individual and concrete sometimes remain indifferent, either from an erroneous conscience, or because they turn upon the mere convenience of nature or upon the nolition of a greater perfection, is taught by Scotus,118 St. Bonaventure,119 Vasquez,120 Reuter,121 Viva,122 very many Scotists, and among moderns Walsh.123
It is proved. St. Thomas124 says pointedly: "It is necessary that every individual act have some circumstance by which it is drawn to good or to evil, at least on the part of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to a due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the character of evil; but if it is ordered to a due end, it agrees with the order of reason, whence it has the character of good. But it is necessary that it either be ordered or not ordered to a due end. Hence it is necessary that every act of man proceeding from deliberative reason, considered in the individual, be good or evil." The same argument can also be proposed under this form: Whenever man acts deliberately, he is bound to act as man, that is, according to the dignity and exigency of rational nature, and insofar as he is distinguished from brutes. Therefore in every act he must seek an honorable end and one fitting to reason, not mere delectation, as brutes do. But if man in any act whatever intends such an honorable end, he acts well; otherwise he sins. Therefore there is not given an indifferent act in concrete. - Billuart125 further brings forward the following argument, which nevertheless does not differ from the proofs adduced except according to form: "The end of a human act, in which the agent rests, is either God (whether actually or explicitly or implicitly intended) or a creature; for under these two ends all ends are contained. If the first, it is good; if the second, it is evil, because this is to use things to be enjoyed and to enjoy things to be used, in which the whole perversity of life is situated, as St. Augustine says somewhere."
From these arguments it clearly appears that this opinion concerning the impossibility of an indifferent act in concrete follows logically from the third principle of the preceding paragraph. Moreover it follows that those authors who deny this third principle proceed illogically if nevertheless they teach that no human act is indifferent in concrete.
110 Theol. mor. l. 5, tract. praeamb., n. 44.
111 Theol. mor. I, § 97.
112 Moraltheologie § 56.
113 Theol. mor. fund. n. 377.
114 Lehrbuch der kath. Moraltheologie n. 66.
115 Princ. Theol. mor. l. 7, n. 92 sqq.
116 Theol. mor. I11, 106.
117 De act. hum. II, n. 498 sqq.
118 2, dist. 41, quaest. unic., Corollaria.
119 2, dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3. Note also in the Quaracchi edition the Scholion in this place.
120 I-II, disp. 52, c. 3, 4.
121 Theol. mor. pars I, tract. 1, n. 55.
122 Curs. theol. II, disp. 7, q. 3.
123 De act. hum. n. 558.
124 S. theol. I-II, q. 18, a. 9; cf. also 2 dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5.
125 De act. hum. diss. 4, a. 5.
130. Objections. There is no time to solve all the objections brought by the Scotists against the Thomistic opinion. See Billuart, l. c. It is useful to solve one and another rather specious objection. Someone can judge the opinion of Scotus more probable and be invincibly ignorant that he ought to set before each action an honorable end and at least an implicit relation to God. If such a man does a work indifferent from the object and because of an indifferent end, his act will not be good, because from the object and end it is indifferent; nor yet is it evil, because he is excused by reason of invincible ignorance. Therefore this act in concrete is indifferent. - I answer: Certain authors126 think that in this case there can truly exist an indifferent act even in concrete, but that this is by accident and from invincible ignorance; and therefore that the opinion of St. Thomas is to be understood per se and from the nature of the thing. But it seems better to deny the possibility of invincible ignorance concerning the obligation of setting before one's actions an honorable end and at least an implicit relation to God. The reason is that no one possessing reason can be invincibly ignorant that he is bound to act as a man, that is, according to reason. For thus synderesis dictates, which flourishes in any man whatever who possesses reason.127
Elbel-Bierbaum objects:128 "The probability of this [Scotistic] opinion can be most clearly urged even from this: because if on a weekday, on which I am not obliged, I voluntarily do not wish to hear Mass, such a nolition is a human act; but it is not evil, as being contrary to no law, nor also positively good, because it is not conformed to a law, except one permitting; therefore it is not good, especially if I do not intend positive goodness, just as I can licitly not intend it; therefore it is and remains indifferent in the individual." - That objection is easily solved. This nolition indeed is a human act, but nevertheless it is not indifferent. For if such nolition is caused by weariness of labor, by an itching desire of exercising liberty, or by other similar causes, it is an evil act; but if it is caused by a sufficient reason, for example, on account of care for health, of avoiding too much labor, or on account of some other rational motive, such nolition is a morally good act.
126 In Frins (De act. hum. II, 519) are cited Suarez, Valentia, Marinus, Salmanticenses, Mayr.
127 Cf. Billuart, l. c. a. 6, obj. 4.
128 Theol. mor. per modum conferentiarum I, conf. 5, n. 86.
131. Scholion. On the influence of the proposed doctrine in asceticism. The Thomistic doctrine concerning the good or evil morality of each of our deliberate actions is very consoling for men of good will. For a man who habitually follows the guidance of reason and not of pleasure acts well even in the least deliberate actions; indeed, if he is in the state of sanctifying grace, by those same least actions he merits from day to day an increase of grace and glory.
Yet this same doctrine also excludes the so-called "imperfections," which according to some authors are acts neither good nor evil (or sins). Under the name of such imperfection modern ascetical writers are accustomed to understand chiefly the voluntary omission, not approved by reason, of a good work which is of mere counsel; for example, without any sufficient reason at all, not to wish to assist at Mass on weekdays. If truly no indifferent act exists in the individual - as has been proved - it follows that such an omission made without any sufficient reason at all is an evil act or venial sin. Therefore per se such an omission would be sufficient matter of confession; but since in practice it can rather difficultly be perceived that it truly was made without any sufficient reason at all, modern authors commonly teach that so-called "imperfections" are not sufficient matter of sacramental absolution (cf. below III, n. 324). Such an omission made from a sufficient reason is a good act, although perhaps it is better to perform the work and, in the case, to hear Mass. For ordinarily it is better to perform a work of counsel than to omit it. Thus, for example, as St. Paul testifies, 1 Cor. 7:25: "He who joins his virgin in marriage does well, and he who does not join her does better."