Mutilation

327. On the killing of oneself. 1. It is never licit by one's own authority directly to kill oneself, even if life has become hard for us and useless to others.

For the destruction of a thing is an act of dominion; but man does not have dominion over his own life. Therefore by the killing of oneself the supreme and exclusive dominion of God over the life of man is injured.¹ Moreover, charity is injured, by which man is bound to love himself, since he inflicts the greatest evil upon himself. Finally life, even if bitter or useless to others, always retains its principal importance of meriting eternal life. Wherefore self-killing is against justice toward God and against love of oneself. Also in sacred Scripture the killing of oneself is rather often prohibited,² and the Church punishes self-killing by deprivation of ecclesiastical burial.

a. He directly kills himself or another who posits a killing action with the intention of inflicting death upon himself or another; he indirectly kills himself or another who does not intend the killing of himself or another, but knowingly does something from which he foresees that his own or another's death will follow. In order that someone be said directly to kill himself or another, it is required that the action and intention be immediately and directly killing. But the intention is necessarily directly killing where the action immediately has only one effect and that a killing one. But if neither the action nor the intention is immediately and directly killing, or if the action alone is so but not the intention, someone is not judged directly to kill himself or another, as is clear from the deed of Samson.³

b. Therefore self-killing is not permitted, not even for escaping the gravest evil, for example, the miseries of the present life, vehement shame because of a crime committed, fear of punishment, or fear of ignominy. For temporal evils, however great, are lower than the good of life; but to choose a greater evil for escaping a lesser is against reason and against ordered love of oneself. Therefore it is not licit even for a virgin to kill herself to escape violent corruption or to preserve the good of integrity.

c. It is not licit, with certain loss of life, to throw oneself from a window into a river or to leap into the midst of flames to baptize a child; for this would be direct self-killing, because the action posited immediately tends to the killing of oneself, and only by this action posited can the child be baptized. In order that this can be done licitly, there must be at least some hope of escaping from the waves or flames.

2. It is licit directly to kill oneself by divine authority; for then man leaves life with the permission of the supreme lord of life itself. The same is probably also licit by public authority: for where someone has been justly condemned to death, by natural right the judge can commit the execution of the sentence to anyone, even to the guilty person. Therefore the guilty person who must be punished by death, with the judge permitting, can licitly kill himself or execute the penalty of death upon himself.⁴

The deeds which are read in the lives of the saints, namely that some killed themselves either from desire of martyrdom or to preserve chastity, are explained by some through divine inspiration by which God granted them permission to kill themselves; by others rather through invincible ignorance, which indeed can be supposed more easily because from an obvious consideration of the matter it is not immediately evident that self-killing for preserving a great good is illicit.⁵

3. From a proportionately grave cause it is licit indirectly to kill oneself. Although even indirect self-killing is of itself prohibited, nevertheless it is licit to posit an action indifferent in itself from which one's own death follows, if at least equally immediately a good effect follows, and if there is a grave cause of common or private good for positing that action. In this way the deed of Eleazar, killing the elephant by which he himself was crushed, is explained.⁶

a. It is licit to leap from a window with certain danger of death to escape a harder death, for example, one about to be undergone immediately in flames. It is licit to cast oneself from a high tower with certain danger of death to flee an atrocious death which a tyrant is actually about to inflict. But the same is not licit if the tyrant, otherwise about to inflict an atrocious death, demands it; for if death is not yet actually inflicted, the casting down is not an action from which each effect immediately follows, one's own death and the flight from the more atrocious death, but is self-killing which is chosen as a means to escape a greater evil.

b. It is licit for a virgin to cast herself from a very high cliff with certain loss of life, in order to free herself from the hands of an impure violator and thus preserve virginity, even if she reasonably hopes that she will not consent. Yet this is not licit unless force is morally being actually inflicted; for if force is not yet being inflicted, self-killing is chosen to avoid a grave evil, which is illicit.

c. It is licit to burn a ship or tower to submerge or destroy enemies, even if one's own death will certainly follow from it.

d. It is licit in shipwreck to yield to another a plank which one had already seized, even if the one who, yielding the plank, lowers himself into the sea, is certainly going to perish. And indeed St. Thomas calls this action of yielding the plank and handing oneself over to death for a friend an act of most perfect virtue.⁷

e. It is licit to present oneself to a tyrant by whom one certainly knows he will be killed, to strengthen others in faith or to save others from death, etc. For when a proportionately grave cause exists, both the obligation of preserving one's own life and the obligation of impeding another's sin cease.

Note. The two principles which follow are already contained in the preceding matter; nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, it is useful to propose them explicitly.

4. From a just cause it is licit indirectly to shorten life, even by several years. Since the precept of preserving life is affirmative, which does not oblige always and in every case, from a grave cause it is licit to do or omit something from which a shortening of life or hastening of death follows. Indeed the conditions of human life are such that sometimes even a more notable shortening of life must be admitted.⁸ - A just cause either of shortening life or of exposing life to danger is moral necessity and the exercise of virtue.

a. Blacksmiths do not sin who, handling fire daily, shorten life for themselves, nor other workers, such as those blowing glass, gilding metals, etc., whose labors bring no small shortening of life.

b. One who by labors, penances, fasts, and austerities of this kind undertaken in honor of God hastens death somewhat does not sin, provided he is ruled by the rules of prudence and discretion in undertaking them.

c. One who, on the authority of a physician, can prolong life for some time by abstaining from moderate use of wine is not bound under grave obligation to abstain. - Likewise one who, on the authority of a physician, can prolong life by drinking wine or eating meats which he was not accustomed to use, is not bound under grave obligation, because in each case the shortening is slight; indeed from a motive of virtue in the latter case he can licitly abstain.

d. Those who by excessive drink or food shorten life for some time do not sin gravely against the fifth precept, provided they do not bring on a proximate danger of death or grave disease, or a notable shortening of life.

5. From a just cause it is licit to expose oneself to danger of life; indeed to remote danger from a light cause, but to proximate danger only from a grave cause. He who without cause exposes himself to remote danger of life sins lightly; he who without cause exposes himself to proximate danger of life sins gravely. The greater the danger of death which is induced from the action, the greater must be the reason on account of which it is licit to induce it.

He is said to expose himself to proximate danger of life who exposes himself to a very probable danger of death to be undergone either proximately or after some time. He is said to expose himself to remote danger of life who exposes himself to a danger of death in some way probable, either proximately or after some time. In order that someone be judged to expose himself to proximate danger of life, he must have at least some hope of escaping; he who has no hope of escaping is said not to expose life to danger, but to destroy it. A danger is called probable in some way where death follows from some action rarely or not so frequently; on the contrary it is very probable where death follows from some action frequently or for the most part.

a. It is licit to serve those infected by plague or another contagious disease; likewise to administer the sacraments with great danger of contracting the disease. - It is licit for guilty persons detained in prison to cast themselves down from a height to escape a certain sentence of death or perpetual prison, provided there is some hope of preserving life; but the same would not be licit to escape prison of only a few years, unless the danger of life which they induce by throwing themselves down were very remote.

b. Artisans do not sin who climb upon roofs of buildings and expose themselves to various dangers where the work requires it.

c. Audacious men sin gravely who from a rash wager, from vainglory, or solely for the sake of making profit, cast themselves into proximate danger of life, for example, by provoking wild beasts, exercising the art of the rope-dancer, prolonging a fast for a very long time, etc., unless from experience it is established that probable danger of life is absent, as happens in horse races.

d. He sins who, laboring under a grave fever, makes a journey or undertakes great labor without necessity.

¹ Lugo, disp. 10, n. 21; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 64, a. 5.

² Ex. 20:13; Gen. 9:6; Deut. 32:39; Wis. 16:13 ss.; Rom. 14:7-9.

³ Judg. 16:30.

⁴ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 369; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 861 s., where also the reasons of each opinion are submitted to examination.

⁵ Lessius, De iustitia, l. 2, c. 9, n. 23.

⁶ 1 Macc. 6:43 ss. Cf. Lessius, De iustit., l. 2, c. 9, n. 32; Lugo, De iustit., disp. 10, n. 55.

⁷ In 3, dist. 29, a. 15, ad 3.

⁸ Ballerini-Palmieri, II, n. 866 ss.

328. On the mutilation of oneself. Mutilation of oneself is of itself gravely illicit, unless it is necessary for preserving life itself. The reason for the first is that man, just as he is not lord of life, so also is not lord of his members, so that he can dispose of them at will. The reason for the second is that he is guardian and preserver of his body, and therefore he can cut off a part or member to preserve the whole body; for a part is ordered to the whole, and therefore must be postponed to the good of the whole.

a. Therefore it is licit, for example, to cut off for oneself a hand bound by a chain in order to escape a fire. And just as self-mutilation is licit for the preservation of life, so for the same reason it is licit to consent to the amputation of a member. - Yet in light matter, as if someone without cause cuts off for himself a little part of the ear or a joint of the little finger, grave sin is not committed.

b. Mutilations of themselves which are read as having been done by holy virgins must be explained either from divine inspiration or from good faith, as was said above concerning self-killing (n. 327, 2).

Resolutions. From another end, which does not tend to the preservation of the whole, self-mutilation does not seem licit. 1. It is not licit to castrate oneself for spiritual good, namely to avoid the sin of incontinence or to calm temptations;¹ for that end can always be obtained by other means. Moreover, mutilation of this kind renders one impotent for generating and yet does not exempt from carnal temptations.

2. Much less is it licit to mutilate oneself for procuring some profit or advantage for oneself; wherefore it is not licit for a youth to mutilate himself in order to escape the burden of military service, nor for a poor man in order to obtain greater alms.

3. Some authors admit as at least probable the opinion of those who say that castration in boys is licit so that with a sweeter voice they may sing the praises of God in church and prepare for themselves an honorable livelihood, provided this twofold condition is had: that danger of life be morally absent, and that it not be done to unwilling boys.² But if it is illicit for obtaining a notable spiritual good, much more will it be illicit for attaining a temporal good.³

The supreme pontiffs have never approved the castration of boys, nor ever said it to be licit; indeed they declared irregular those who culpably had made themselves or others eunuchs. Yet they admitted to ecclesiastical concerts eunuchs who without their own fault were made such.⁴

4. There is a surgical operation which is called by physicians, from its inventor, the physician Porro, the Porro operation. It consists in the extirpation of the uterus with the ovaries, by which a woman is rendered impotent for generating. Certainly this operation is licit for preserving life; but from another end besides the preservation of life, for example, for impeding future conception or for forestalling the necessity of Caesarean operation, it cannot be admitted.⁵

¹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3.

² St. Alphonsus, n. 374.

³ Cf. Lugo, De iustit. et iure, disp. 10, n. 23.

⁴ Benedict XIV, De synodo, l. 11, c. 7, n. 3.

⁵ Cf. Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis^6 (Aquisgrani: Barth, 1893), p. 26 ss.

329. Whether it is licit to wish death for oneself. - It is licit from the motive of obtaining a good which is better than life, or escaping an evil which is worse than death, because in this way neither God's dominion over man's life nor the charity owed to oneself is in any way violated.¹

a. Indeed, alpha. it is one thing to inflict death on oneself, another to wish death for oneself: for he who inflicts death on himself injures the divine right; he who wishes death for himself awaits death to be inflicted on him by God. beta. The desire of death, as of a thing indifferent, receives morality from its motive; therefore from an honest end it is licit to wish death for oneself, but from an evil end to wish it for oneself is of itself a grave sin. But neither to reason nor to charity is it repugnant to wish for oneself death which would be the beginning of greater goods or the end of greater evils; but it is repugnant to reason and to charity owed to oneself to will for oneself the gravest evil for avoiding another light evil.

b. Therefore death can licitly be desired in order to enjoy eternal beatitude, to love God more perfectly, never again to offend God, to avoid truly most grave evils, for example, long illness, troublesome vexations and snares, etc.; therefore sacred Scripture has: "Death is better than a bitter life."² But it is a grave sin to wish death for oneself on account of the ordinary troubles of life, unless this is done in the heat of anger or in some disturbance of mind without sufficient deliberation.

¹ Cf. 3 Kings 19:4.

² Ecclus. 30:17.

As we have not the ownership of life, so neither are we the owners of our limbs so as to be able to dispose of them at will. A man is not justified in mutilating himself in order to avoid military conscription, or to excite commiseration, or to gain money. The amputation of a limb is permissible when such an operation is necessary in order to preserve life; for we may sacrifice a part for the safety of the whole.

IV. Mutilation of oneself. 1. Notion. Mutilation properly so called occurs when, with cutting off, an organic function or use of members is suppressed; hence under the name of mutilation there do not come, for example, circumcision, cutting off the extremity of the ear or nose; yet there are certain mutilations, even if less properly so called. Woundings are generally reduced to the latter. Now we shall present all mutilations and woundings in one treatment and under the one name of mutilation.

2. Division. Mutilation of oneself is distinguished, as killing of oneself, as direct and indirect. It is direct when the mutilating act, as such, is chosen as an end or assumed as a means by which another end is obtained; otherwise it is indirect.

3. Morality. a) Direct mutilation of oneself is lawful if it is ordered and necessary for the preservation or well-being of the whole body. Otherwise it is illicit; nevertheless mutilation improperly so called admits smallness of matter (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65; St. Alphonsus, III, 373). It is said:

Alpha) It is lawful if it is ordered and necessary for the preservation or well-being of the whole body. The reason is that a mutilation done so that you may preserve the whole, insofar as otherwise it cannot be preserved or be well, for the Lord, and so that you may use the whole well, does not contain an act of one's own dominion, but an acknowledgment of divine dominion, and it consults the end for which the whole has been granted, namely its use. Hence it is lawful to amputate a member infected with gangrene, lest the whole body be infected. The same is lawful if danger of death threatens from an extrinsic necessary cause, for example if the hand is attached to a burning beam. The same seems lawful if danger threatens from an extrinsic free cause, as if a tyrant says: I will kill you unless you cut off a member. For it does not appear why that should rather be permitted if danger threatens from an intrinsic cause than if it threatens from an extrinsic free cause. Yet it is not lawful to perform a lawful mutilation on another except by the consent of the one whose interest it concerns, or, if it is a question of one who lacks the use of reason, of the one under whom the person to be mutilated is subject.

Beta) Otherwise it is illicit; that is, it is illicit if it is not ordered to the good of the whole body, or indeed is ordered to it, at least by the agent, but is not necessary for obtaining that end. The reason is that mutilation of oneself in either hypothesis - that is, both in the case in which it is not ordered to the good of the whole body, and in the case in which it is indeed ordered to the said good, but is not necessary for that end, because the whole can be helped in another way - involves an act of dominion over a thing which belongs to God alone. Hence Aquinas: "A member is not to be cut off for bodily health except when the whole cannot be aided otherwise" (II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3). And St. Alphonsus: "It is not lawful to mutilate oneself unless it is necessary for the preservation of the whole" (III, 373).

Gamma) Mutilation improperly so called admits smallness of matter; as if someone without cause extracted a tooth, or amputated a little piece of the ear, or slightly weakened the eyes, or underwent the operation which is called transfusion of blood. Indeed, an altogether slight amputation is lawful for a proportionate cause, even if it is not ordered to the well-being of the whole, but to another end, for example that notable gain may be acquired; likewise it is lawful for a virgin to disfigure herself so that she may repel an assailant from herself. Yet note again that the gravity of mutilation must also be judged from the gravity of the function by which the member functions. Hence the operation which in a man is called vasectomy, and in a woman oophorectomy or fallectomy, even though light in itself, must be counted among grave mutilations, because it deprives a human being of a grave function, namely the power of procreating offspring. The same seems to have to be said about amputation or severing of one gland, even if the other suffices for intercourse; namely, by almost the same right as that is admitted concerning the removal of one eye.

b) Indirect mutilation of oneself is of itself illicit, but becomes lawful on account of a proportionate cause, as was said about indirect killing of oneself (n. 525).

Corollary I. It is illicit to mutilate oneself: 1. for collecting alms, for exercising a profitable art, or for avoiding military service.

The reason is that in the said cases there is direct mutilation - since the mutilating act, as such, is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained - which is not ordered to the good of the whole body (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 373). For the same reason, 2. castration for preserving sweetness of voice and singing divine praises is illicit. To this is added that a manner of acting of this sort does not serve the common good, that is, the piety of the faithful, since the singing of castrati feminizes minds and ears (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 374).

Corollary II. It is illicit to admit castration, vasectomy,¹ oophorectomy,² extirpation of the ovaries or procurement of their atrophy, for the end that conception and procreation of offspring may be prevented. For again there is direct mutilation - since the mutilating act, as such, that is, insofar as it is injurious to a genital organ, is assumed as a means by which another end is obtained - which is not ordered to the good of the whole body. To this is added that the acts set forth in the proposed hypothesis directly impede the good of the species; and this is always illicit, because the good of the species is ordered immediately to God alone, and therefore cannot be directly impeded on account of any intermediate end. Nor do the aforesaid operations become lawful if they are done because danger to life threatens from conception, and therefore at least by the agent they are ordered to the preservation of the whole. For even in that case avoidance of conception is directly and proximately intended as a means, so that even such a manner of acting is directly and proximately opposed to the good of the species. To this is added that the intended end, that is, the good of the whole, can be obtained in another way, namely by abstaining from intercourse.

Nor are the assigned mutilations lawful if they are done for quieting temptations and preserving chastity, because again there is direct mutilation - since the mutilating act, as such, that is, insofar as it is injurious to a genital organ, is assumed as a means by which the said end is obtained - which is not ordered to the good of the whole body. To this is added that the said mutilations commonly do not conduce to the intended end: for the stimulus of the flesh remains. Finally, chastity can be preserved by other means. "Spiritual welfare," says St. Thomas, "can always be helped otherwise than by cutting off a member; because sin is subject to the will, and therefore in no case is it lawful to cut off a member for avoiding any sin whatsoever" (II-II, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3).

But the aforesaid mutilations seem lawful for forestalling sexual erethism arising from the fact that the genital organs are abnormally affected. The reason is that in the case, the mutilation is ordered to the well-being of the whole body, almost as the amputation of a member infected by disease.³

To what extent public authority can impose the said operations, see in the treatise on the Fifth Precept.

¹ Vasectomy is a surgical operation by which someone is rendered impotent for generating through the cutting of the organ which in a man carries seed to the penis.

² Oophorectomy is done through the cutting of the organ which in a woman carries ova to the womb.

³ Cf. De Smet, De sponsalibus et matrimonio, n. 440, 441; Grosam in Linzer Quartalschrift 1910, pp. 59, 285, 497.

V. Ecclesiastical penalties established for suicide and self-mutilation are:

1. Those who have mutilated themselves or others, or have attempted to take life from themselves, are irregular from delict (can. 985, 5).

2. Those who have killed themselves by deliberate counsel are deprived of ecclesiastical burial (can. 1240, § 1, 3); to one excluded from ecclesiastical burial there must also be denied both any funeral Mass, even anniversary Mass, and other public funeral offices (can. 1241).

3. Those who have laid hands on themselves, if death has not followed, are to be barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and if they are clerics, they are to be suspended for a time to be determined by the Ordinary, and removed from benefices or offices having care of souls annexed in the internal or external forum (can. 2350, § 2).

4. A lay person who has been lawfully condemned for the delict of grave mutilation or wounding or violence is to be considered excluded by the law itself from legitimate ecclesiastical acts and from any office, if he has any in the Church, with the obligation of repairing damages remaining firm (can. 2354, § 1).

What mutilation is, and what direct and indirect mutilation are, has been set forth in the treatise on charity (n. 526). Now proceed:

I. Direct mutilation of an innocent person, with the required consent posited, is lawful if it is ordered and necessary for the preservation or well-being of the whole body. Otherwise it is illicit. For the reasons brought forward where there was discussion of direct mutilation of oneself have force (n. 526).

II. Indirect mutilation of an innocent person is per se illicit; but for a proportionate cause it becomes lawful, as was said about indirect mutilation of oneself (n. 526).

III. Imprisonment of an innocent person is likewise illicit, because each person has a right of procuring his own good even by external action; this right is violated by one who imprisons someone (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 3).

IV. Finally, beating of an innocent person is illicit, because each person has a right to the delight or quiet of his senses, "to which beating is opposed, or anything whatever that affects the sense with pain" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.).

V. Nor is it lawful for public authority directly to mutilate an innocent person; for just as it is not lawful for it to deprive an innocent person of life (n. 731), so also and for the same reason it is illicit to deprive him of the integrity and use of members (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 108, a. 4, ad 2). Likewise it is illicit for it to imprison or beat an innocent person, because neither can public authority injure the goods of the body of innocent persons; and goods of the body, besides life and integrity of members, are the use of members, which is impeded by imprisonment, and the quiet of the sense, to which beating is opposed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 3).

Nor does public authority lawfully impose mutilation, for example vasectomy, oophorectomy, and so forth, for this end, that the procreation of weak, miserable, and similar offspring may be forestalled. Thus expressly Pius XI in the encyclical Casti connubii.¹ And the Holy Office, to the question, "What must be thought of the theory called eugenic, whether positive or negative, and of the means indicated by it for improving human progeny, with laws, whether natural, divine, or ecclesiastical, concerning marriage and the rights of individuals set aside," answered on March 31, 1931: "That it is altogether to be disapproved and to be held as false and condemned, as in the encyclical letter on Christian marriage, Casti connubii, given on December 31, 1930."² And indeed, first, the end does not justify a perverse means, such as the mutilation of an innocent person. Next, neither can public authority directly impede the good of the species, since it is ordered to no intermediate end, but to God alone, and therefore cannot be impeded for any intermediate end.³

Objection 1. Public authority can provide for the common good; consequently it can mutilate an innocent person and impede the good of the species, if that is necessary for the common good.

Resp. I deny the consequence; or rather, public authority can provide for the common good, but not by an evil means, of which sort are mutilating an innocent person and impeding the good of the species.

Objection 2. Public authority can provide for the good of the species. But by impeding the procreation of weak offspring it provides for the species.

Resp. That public authority can provide for the good of the species by using an evil means, such as mutilation of an innocent person, I deny. Besides, the Minor must be denied, because the good of the species pertains in no way to the accidental condition of the offspring.

¹ December 31, 1930.

² Acta Apostolicae Sedis, 1931, p. 118.

³ Cf. Brouillard in Etudes, 1931, p. 440 sq. and 578 sq.; Dr. Grosam in Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift, 1931, p. 497 sq.

I. Public authority, just as it can kill a criminal, so a fortiori can mutilate, imprison, and beat him. But it is another question whether public authority lawfully imposes certain mutilations, namely vasectomy, oophorectomy, and so forth, as a punishment. Now, speaking theoretically, a punishment of this kind, although it can be defended from the fact that it deprives criminals of a great good, that is, of the faculty of procreating, seems less congruent with the common sense of morality. I said theoretically, because in practice it will impose the said punishment for this end, that the procreation of offspring to be procured by the criminal may be impeded. But that is illicit, because it is not lawful even for public authority directly to impede the good of the species (n. 740).

II. Superiors lacking supreme power, for example parents and those taking their place, cannot mutilate or strictly imprison their delinquent subjects; nevertheless they can beat them moderately. It is said:

1. They cannot mutilate them, because "man himself and all his parts" belong to society (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1); but it belongs only to the supreme governor of society to subtract from the community what pertains to the community (n. 741).

2. They cannot strictly imprison them, because not only man and all his parts belong to the community, but also his activity; hence again it belongs only to the supreme governor of society to impede the activity of man by strict imprisonment (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 3). Nevertheless inferior Superiors can keep their subjects at home for just causes.

3. They can beat them moderately. For they enjoy the power of coercing subjects insofar as by acting thus they do not inflict injury on the community. But beating a subject inflicts no injury on the community, because it removes neither life, nor the integrity of members, nor activity (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 2). Yet it is not lawful for a man to beat his wife, unless a most grave necessity urges, since the wife is not his servant but his companion (St. Alphonsus, VI, 972).

III. Equals, for example brothers and sisters, even if older by birth, cannot even beat delinquents, unless by consent of a superior. The reason is that by beating some harm is inflicted on the body of him who is beaten; moreover, it is not lawful to inflict harm on someone except by way of punishment, on account of justice. But no one can punish someone unless he is subject to his power. Therefore an equal cannot beat an equal (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 2).

I. Spiritual damages consist in this: that the one killed is deprived of the last sacraments, of time for meriting, etc. Moreover, they must be restored only if both the damage that followed is certain and the damage can truly be compensated; for example, if the killer prevented Masses from being celebrated which the one killed certainly would have taken care to have celebrated for his soul.

IV. Cases of impotence. The following are impotent:

1. A man who lacks the male member.¹

2. One who is deprived of both testicles.² For men of this sort, although at least sometimes they can penetrate the vagina and ejaculate some liquid, nevertheless cannot produce true semen. The same must be said of one who has testicles broken, bruised, or wholly atrophied or dried up, because he cannot elaborate semen.

3. One who is so frigid that he cannot erect the male member, or so ardent that he always pours forth the whole semen before he can penetrate the female vessel. But the aforementioned impotences are rarely perpetual, so that commonly they do not diriment marriage.

4. One who pours forth semen not at the extremity of the member but near its root, so that he can indeed enter into the female vessel, but cannot inject semen into it.

5. One who has undergone vasectomy.³ For he is impotent who cannot posit an act of itself apt for generation, in other words, who cannot penetrate the vagina together with effusion of semen into it. But one who has undergone vasectomy cannot posit an act of this sort, as follows from its nature, described in the note.

6. A woman who lacks a vagina or has it closed at the very entrance. There is dispute concerning a woman who has a vagina closed in this way near the uterus. But she seems to be called impotent, because the vagina is like a flaccid canal open on both sides, so that a vagina closed near the uterus is substantially vitiated, and therefore in the stated case a properly so-called vagina seems to be lacking. The responses of the Sacred Congregation of the Council favor this in the Salernitana,⁴ in the Verulana,⁵ and in the Monasteriensis.⁶ Namely, those responses declare null the marriage of a woman who lacked a uterus but had a short vagina closed near the uterus. But lack of a uterus does not seem to obstruct potency, as will be said under 9; therefore it remains that the closing of the vagina is the obstacle. For the rest, the stated impotences, if they can be cured without grave danger, are only temporary.

7. A woman who indeed has an open vagina but one so narrow that the male member cannot enter it. Some few, indeed, judge that in this case impotence is absent, or in other words, that it suffices that the man can deposit male semen at the exterior part of the vulva, or at least, the vulva having been penetrated, at the orifice or entrance of the vagina. But these opinions seem wholly to be rejected. For first, chapter 6, title 15, de frigidis et maleficiatis, declares that the impediment of impotence is had if a man cannot penetrate the woman's vagina. Next, for potency there is required aptitude for consummating marriage in that mode by which generation can follow of itself and not only by accident (cf. canon 1081, § 2). But from the deposition of semen either at the exterior part of the vulva or at the orifice of the vagina, generation does not seem to follow except by accident. Finally, this opinion is recommended by the fact that in the stated case there is lacking the faculty of consummating marriage according to the mode instituted by nature, that is, by penetrating the vagina. St. Thomas so thinks (In IV, dist. 41, q. un., a. 1, sol. 4, ad 2), and St. Alphonsus teaches the same at least implicitly (VI, 1075-1097). But the fact that the vagina can be penetrated only partially does not constitute impotence, or does not prevent there from being an act or copula of itself apt for generation. This is first deduced from the fact that copula which, as to substance, follows the mode indicated by nature, must be judged of itself apt for generation. But the copula of which we have spoken follows, as to substance, the mode indicated by nature; for it involves some penetration of the vagina, and more perfect and less perfect penetration differ only according to more and less, or are judged substantially similar to each other. Add that no theologian up to this point has taught that those who cannot coire more perfectly are impotent; indeed, the practice of the Roman Curia supposes that they are potent.

8. A woman who suffers from vaginismus, that is, hyperesthesia of the vaginal nerves, by which she cannot endure the contact of the man.

9. There is dispute whether a woman is impotent who lacks a uterus or ovaries, or who has the aforesaid organs wholly atrophied⁷ or dried up. Now a woman of this sort seems to be potent, because for potency it suffices that one be capable of copula of itself apt for generation. But the copula of which the stated woman is capable is of itself apt for generation, or in other words, from itself or by its nature it is ordered to generation, although generation in fact cannot follow because of the defect of another organ required for it. Therefore all things are present which are required for generation insofar as generation depends on human action; once that action has been posited, the act of nature begins. This opinion is confirmed by the fact that, if the contrary opinion is admitted, or if capacity for generating is required for potency, it would also have to be admitted - something admitted with difficulty - that many men and many women, as being totally impotent for generating, are incapable of marriage: for example, men who have semen irremediably vitiated, and women who have ovaries irremediably inert. That there are many such persons in advanced age cannot be denied, although which persons are such cannot be determined with certainty.⁸

This controversy cannot be decided by authority. "Since authors dispute," says the Sacred Congregation of the Council,⁹ "whether a marriage entered with a woman lacking ovaries is valid or not, and since ecclesiastical authority has not yet defined this question, and indeed the Congregation of the Holy Office has several times declared in particular cases, when the matter concerned a marriage to be contracted, that this is not an impediment,¹⁰ but when the matter concerned a marriage already contracted, that the spouses are not to be disturbed, now in practical reality it does not seem opportune to institute a process for declaring the nullity of marriage from defect of ovaries in a woman." The Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments¹¹ indeed permitted marriage to a woman for whom, after the matters set forth and the express attestation of a surgeon were considered, the ovaries had certainly and completely been excised; but it can be said that, while the theoretical doubt stands, the marriage was declared licit for practice, without the theoretical question thereby being settled.

What has been said concerning a woman deprived of ovaries, you should also apply to a woman who has undergone oophorectomy, that is, resection or division of the canal by which male semen is carried to the ovaries, and ova to the womb.

10. Finally it is evident that a woman is impotent who cannot be fertilized except artificially, supposing artificial fertilization properly so called.¹²

11. It belongs to physicians to decide whether hermaphrodites¹³ or androgynes can contract, and according to which sex (St. Alphonsus VI, 1095).

¹ He is called an ectomus if his male member has been cut off.

² Constitution of Sixtus V, Cum frequenter, June 22, 1587. From those deprived of both testicles must be distinguished those apparently such, or cryptorchids, who carry their testicles in the groins and can produce true semen, although infertile.

³ Vasectomy consists in this: after an incision has been made through the scrotum, the organ carrying the semen elaborated by the testicles is resected, so that the path to ejaculation is broken off for the semen. One who has undergone vasectomy can indeed produce semen, but cannot pour it into the vagina, nor secrete it internally, since it is absorbed by the body (cf. De Smet, De spons. et Matrim., n. 550). Moreover he can preserve the erectibility of the male member and penetrate the vagina, indeed even ejaculate a certain liquid; but this liquid is not, as follows from what has been said, true semen, but some watery humor secreted by the prostate gland (cf. De Smet, op. cit., n. 550).

⁴ March 21, 1863.

⁵ January 24 and June 22, 1871.

⁶ December 16, 1899.

⁷ Note that complete atrophy can scarcely be established; hence, even in the opinion of those who hold perfect atrophy of the ovaries to be a cause of impotence, scarcely anyone can be barred from nuptials.

⁸ Cf. Collectanea Brugenses, 1910, p. 701.

⁹ December 16, 1905.

¹⁰ Holy Office, February 3, 1887; July 23, 1890 (Collectanea, n. 1733); July 31, 1895 (Collectanea, n. 1007).

¹¹ April 2, 1907.

¹² It consists in this: that the physician receives in a little vessel male semen poured forth by the man solitarily or onanistically, and by means of a syringe pours it into the woman's genitals. In this case copula is lacking, so that a woman who cannot be fertilized except in such a way is incapable of copula and therefore impotent.

¹³ That is, those who, besides the perfect organs of one sex, display some essential thing of the other, or who are endowed incompletely and monstrously with the organs of both sexes. But more commonly it happens that persons are born apparently hermaphrodites: namely boys who, since they still have testicles hidden in the abdomen, imitate in part the female sex; or girls who, having obtained a more extended clitoris, seem to be endowed with a male member (cf. Eschbach, op. cit., p. 53).

Bodily Injuries.-Injustice is done not only by destroying the life of a human being, but also by harming him in his rights to bodily integrity or well-being. The chief bodily injuries are the following:

(a) mutilation, which deprives a person of limbs or members, without inflicting death;

(b) wounding, which by an act of violence (such as a stab or blow) breaks the continuity of the body, or impairs its strength or beauty;

(c) enfeeblement, which impairs or destroys the health, strength, or comfort of the body in unlawful ways (e.g., by deprivation of necessary food, sleep, fresh air, by communication of infection, by beating, hazing, etc.);

(d) restraint, which hinders the lawful exercise of the bodily powers (e.g., by holding a person against his will, by chaining him to a post, by locking him in a room).

Mutilation. In general, any kind of act which injures or impairs bodily integrity is called mutilation. In the strict sense, mutilation is any cutting off, or some equivalent action, through which an organic function or a distinct use of a member is suppressed or directly diminished. Accordingly, three distinct types of mutilation are possible: (a) when a part of the body with a distinct function is excised; (b) when a distinct organic function is totally suppressed, without excision of the organ; (c) when the function is directly lessened or partially suppressed.

Morality of Sterilization. Mutilations which frustrate the power of procreation in men and women are called sterilization. Two kinds are distinguished; indirect, to remove diseased organs; direct, to prevent conception.

(a) Indirect sterilization (also called by many therapeutic) is lawful when it is necessary to save life or health. The ethical principle involved is the indirect voluntary or the principle of double effect. Hence, vasectomy may be used to prevent idiocy or death, or to remove or allay physiological abnormalities that bring on certain sexual perversities or disturbances, if it is likely that these evils are imminent or present and that the operation will be beneficial.

(b) Direct sterilization by public authority includes both punitive and eugenical sterilization. The latter was condemned by Pope Pius XI in Casti Connubii. In context the Holy Father was dealing with the false claims made in the name of eugenics that the State might legitimately sterilize those who by reason of hereditary defect might be considered likely to generate defective offspring. This position is vehemently rejected: “Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of their subjects. Therefore where no crime has taken place and there is no cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or tamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of eugenics or for any other reason. St. Thomas teaches this when, inquiring whether human judges for the sake of preventing future evils can inflict punishment, he admits that the power indeed exists as regards certain other forms of punishment, but justly and properly denies it as regards the maiming of the body.”

In the same context, punitive sterilization, whether as punishment for crime or as deterrent, was also declared to be unlawful. However, fasciole 14 of the AAS for 1930 emended the text and seems to have withdrawn the formal condemnation of punitive sterilization. a subject of theological discussion at the time. The matter had not been closed and the emendation had the force of reopening the question.

Theological opinion is still divided as to the liceity of punitive sterilization. Some still maintain that since the state can inflict the superior penalty of death for serious crime, a fortiori also the lesser punishment of sterilization. Others deny the liceity, for sterilization does not achieve the essential purposes of punishment; it is not corrective, preventive, retributive, or emendatory. Accordingly punitive sterilization is unreasonable and inconvenient. This latter view prevails among most modern moral theologians. Confirmation for the view is sought in the response of the Holy Office (AAS 32-73) that direct sterilization is prohibited by the law of nature. Since punitive sterilization has as its immediate effect, whether as an end or as a means, sterility of the generative potency, it may well fall under the category of direct and hence also under condemnation of the Holy Office.

Is mutilation of oneself lawful? It is not lawful to mutilate oneself, or even to mutilate another, unless this is necessary for the conservation of the whole body, and with the consent of him whose member it is, or of him "to whom it pertains to care for the safety of him who has a member corruptive" of the other members. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 1. But otherwise to mutilate someone in a member is altogether unlawful; and this even if it is done to preserve chastity and avoid temptations. The reason is that God is the absolute and direct master of human life; but man has only useful or indirect dominion over his own body. Unless this is necessary for the conservation of the whole body; for since the part is ordered to preserving the whole body, under the pressure of such necessity, some member certainly can be cut off, for example, to cut off for oneself a hand bound by a chain in order to avoid death impending from a beast, or a tyrant, or fire. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 64, a. 2; q. 65, a. 1; Lugo de Iust. d. 10, n. 22; La-Croix 786. Even if it is done, etc., because this remedy is neither absolutely necessary, nor in fact does it exempt from carnal temptations, although someone becomes impotent for generating. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 1. Hence, a fortiori, it is more probably not lawful to castrate boys in order to preserve the voice in them, L. 374. "And indeed the reason is most valid... For man is not so the master of the members of his body that he is able to assent to the cutting off of any one of them, except if the safety and conservation of the whole body cannot otherwise be obtained." Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 11, c. 7, n. 4; Lugo d. 10, n. 23; S. Th. l. c. The discipline of the Church, moreover, brands with the mark of irregularity a eunuch who, outside the necessity of saving life, has given assent to his own mutilation. Benedict XIV, l. c. n. 5. 1. Nor indeed is it lawful for someone to cut off his own fingers in order to avoid military service. Struggl 9, 10; L. l. 7, nn. 416-418.

714bis. Note: The Porro operation, so called from the Italian physician Porro, consists in the extraction of the uterus with the ovaries and other annexed parts. It is a true mutilation and utero-ovarian castration of the woman. Therefore it is not lawful unless for the conservation of one's own life. Just as mutilation and castration, whether in a man or in a woman, is unlawful, so also unlawful is atrophization or cutting of the canals conducting spermatozoa "or nemaspermata in a man." This atrophization or cutting is equivalently a grave mutilation, and a grave sin, unless it is done to save life itself. Nor indeed can public authority introduce this vasectomy, as it is called, lest degenerate men be procreated from degenerate parents, whether as the punishment of some crime, or as a necessary means because of the common good. For the power of procreating offspring pertains to personal dignity itself, and to the species, or to the propagation of the human race, over which public authority has no power. Nor can it be a punishment of crime, since it would render them still more criminal and unbridled in lust, and against the order of nature; nor can it of itself be a necessary and useful means because of the common good, for which wholly other, quite different means are necessary and useful, especially moral ones.

From inflicted mutilation of a member irregularity is had if someone, namely by grave fault, mutilates either himself or another, or positively and efficaciously cooperates toward mutilation of this kind. Chaps. 3, 4, 5, de Corp. vit.; Clementina Si furiosus un., de Hom.; L. 365, 379, 388. Most commonly and more probably they say that by the name of member are understood only those parts of the body which have their own office, distinct from others, such as hand, foot, eye, tongue. But mutilation is understood here when the aforesaid member is separated from the body. L. 365, 379. In this irregularity because of mutilation Bishops can well dispense, if it is occult and from delict, from the faculty of Trent, sess. 24, chap. Liceat 6, where only irregularity on account of voluntary homicide is excepted. L. 381, de Priv. 51; Suarez, disp. 44, n. 2, n. 4.

You will resolve: Because of impediment of exercise, the following are irregular:

1. A blind man, who altogether lacks sight. Chap. ult., Dist. 55. But if someone is already a priest, and it is established that he cannot err, he will be able to obtain dispensation from the Supreme Pontiff; and several times dispensation has already been given in such a case. But then he must use the assistance of another priest. Sacred Congregation of Rites, April 12, 1822. If someone lacks the sight of the right eye, he is not irregular; otherwise if of the left, unless he can read the Canon with the right eye without great deformity. If someone is not altogether blind, but so weak-sighted that he cannot read in the missal, he also is irregular for receiving orders. Dispensation has also been given several times to the weak-sighted even as regards receiving orders. But as regards exercising them, "Lugo, Palao, etc., probably say that a priest licitly celebrates who, because of weakness of sight, recites the Mass from memory, provided he discerns the chalice and host as much as suffices for avoiding irreverence, and provided that, to escape notice, he has a missal on the altar, or another book in place of it." But he needs an Apostolic Indult to celebrate the votive Mass of the Blessed Virgin or of Requiem. L., book 6, n. 390. He is not irregular who is weak in sight so that he needs spectacles, or who looks obliquely. Therefore the cross-eyed are not irregular, unless the deformity is great. But he is irregular who has a spot in the eye. Chap. Cum de tua 2, de Corp. vit. ord.; L. 404; Navarrus, chap. 27, n. 199; Laymann, book 1, tract. 5, chap. 7, n. 2; Pirhing, book 1, tit. 20, n. 6.

2. A deaf man, who hears nothing at all from either ear, because such a priest, since he cannot hear the voice of the minister, cannot celebrate without indecency. If nevertheless deafness supervenes after priesthood has been received, celebration is not interdicted to the priest; for a defect supervening in one promoted is more easily tolerated than in one to be promoted, as was said of the weak-sighted. But one somewhat deaf, or hearing with difficulty, is by no means irregular. L. 405.

3. A mute, who cannot speak or pronounce entire words, so that he cannot pronounce any voice without omitting something, or except with great difficulty. But the lisping or stammering, or those lacking teeth, are not irregular, even if they pronounce words with some difficulty, unless they bring cause for laughter or contempt. L. 406.

4. A lame man, who cannot go to the altar without a staff, chap. Nullus episcopus 57, de Cons., Dist. 1, if he cannot be supported at the altar without a staff. A lame man who does not need a staff is by no means irregular, just as neither is he who has crooked legs; because such a defect can easily be covered by the cassock; otherwise if great deformity were present in this. But if someone is equipped with a wooden foot, he is irregular because to celebrate with a wooden foot has great indecency. But if the defect is moderate and in some way the indecency can be repaired, celebration can be permitted by the judgment of the Bishop. L. 407. Dispensation has already been given several times to infirm priests so that they could celebrate while sitting, when they could not while standing.

5. He who lacks a hand, or all fingers, or the thumb is irregular. Chap. ult., de Corp. vit. They say the same of him who lacks the index finger, or part of the thumb or index finger, or who has them so weak that he cannot elevate or break the host. Whence he is irregular whose right or left arm has become stiff. Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 7, pp. 81, 82. Otherwise, if someone lacks the nail of the thumb or index finger, as is said in the said final chapter. But if someone has already been ordained and has the thumb impeded, in a case of necessity he could probably minister the Eucharist with the later fingers. If someone lacks the three later fingers, he is also irregular. But if he lacks only one smaller finger, he is not irregular, and the same holds if he lacks two. Nor likewise is he irregular who has six fingers, provided the sixth finger does not impede the use of the others. L. 408. Dispensation has several times been given, both after priesthood had been received and before it, when the left arm, or even the right, had been amputated, or only part of it had been amputated, or the thumb or index finger had been amputated.

6. No disease induces irregularity unless it either impedes the exercise of order or brings notable indecency and scandal. Hence he is irregular who labors under paralysis or coughing in such a way that, because of trembling of the hands, there is danger of spilling the chalice or ejecting the Eucharist. Likewise he is irregular who is an abstainer, who cannot take wine except with danger of vomiting. L. 409. Cf. Acta Sanctae Sedis, vol. 7, p. 80 ff.

But by reason of deformity the following are irregular: 1. those to whom some member is lacking, namely those who lack a nose or have it too deformed; those whose eye has been plucked out, unless it can be repaired by a glass eye; those who lack ears, unless such defect can be hidden by hair. 2. Lepers, chap. Tua nos, de Cler. aegr., unless scandal is absent, e.g., if they celebrate in a private place; those who have corroded or cut lips, or a very spotted face. 3. Monstrous persons, namely those who have an enormous hump; pygmies or dwarfs, so short in stature that they move to laughter, or cannot extend their arms sufficiently for the ministry of the altar; giants, who by very great stature excite a certain terror; Ethiopians, who would beget horror if they exercised the ministry habitually among us; hermaphrodites, although the male sex predominates. But those are not irregular who are of dusky or reddish color. Chaps. 2-5, this title; L. 410-412, 416.

The life of the body is indeed a precious thing, but it is by no means the greatest of blessings,¹ and consequently the duty of preserving and safeguarding it does not bind absolutely. There are circumstances in which it may be necessary or advisable to sacrifice one's life. This is the case, for instance, when the duty of conserving life cannot be reconciled with some higher obligation, or when superior spiritual blessings must be purchased at the expense of life, either by the individual, or by the multitude. Hence man has the right, nay, under certain conditions he is in duty bound, to give up his life for the sake of a higher good.

¹ Cfr. Matt. X, 28, 39; XVI, 25 sq.; Mark VIII, 35–37; Luke IX, 24; XVII, 33; John XII, 25.

This duty must now be more closely determined, both negatively and positively.

No man is allowed without a just cause (sine iusta causa) to destroy his own life or health, or to expose himself to the danger of certain death, or seriously to mutilate his body. 1. SUICIDE (suicidium, αὐτοχειρία)² is the direct and intentional compassing of one's own death. This need not always be the immediate object of the will. If I will an action, I will its evident effect; and therefore, were I to refuse food, or, out of bravado, to leap from the top of a sky-scraper into the street below, I should be guilty of suicide, even though self-destruction was not my direct object. In suicide a man somehow aims at direct death.

² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 64, art. 5; Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5. n. 366–407; St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 366–374 (ed. Gaudé, Vol. I, pp. 622 sqq.); M. Inhofer, Der Selbstmord, Augsburg 1886; E. Federici, La Prevenzione del Suicidio, Venice 1901, pp. 37 sqq.; K. A. Geiger, Der Selbstmord im klassischen Altertum, Augsburg 1888; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, Dublin, 1917, pp. 52 sqq.; A. Van der Heeren in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, pp. 326 sqq.; A. O'Malley, The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation, N. Y., 1919, pp. 7 sqq.

Suicide is plainly forbidden by the fifth commandment: 'Thou shalt not kill," ³ "either another or yourself," as St. Augustine explains; "for he who kills himself kills none other than a man." ⁴ The Lord God alone "has power of life and death." ⁵ Suicide is also forbidden indirectly because of the immoral motives that usually inspire it, e. g., unbelief, cowardice, false notions of honor, an excessive craving for glory, wealth, etc., or that dullness of mind which results from overindulgence in carnal pleasures and usually ends by making its victim incapable of further enjoyment.⁶ Seneca enumerates several causae frivolae that lead to suicide and mentions circumstances in which it is morally illicit to seek refuge in death.⁷ a) Suicide is diametrically opposed to the strongest instinct of nature, that of self-preservation. "The tendency to persevere in life," says Goyau, "is the necessary law of life, not of human life only, but of all life." ⁸ Hence it must always remain a difficult psychological problem why so many people commit this unnatural crime. In the light of recent investigations there can hardly be a doubt that most of those who compass their own death do so in a state of mental derangement. "Most suicides," says Dr. James J. Walsh, "are persons that have been recognized as paranoiacs and likely to do queer things for a long time beforehand. Indeed, some of the melancholic qualities on which the unfortunate impulse to self-murder depends are likely to have exhibited themselves in former generations.... As a matter of fact, suicides are not in possession of free will as a rule, but are the victims of circumstances and are unable to resist external influences." ⁹ However, it would be wrong to conclude from this that every case of suicide can be traced to some condition of organic disturbance in which the use of reason, and consequently responsibility, are suspended. Not every perturbation of the moral life springs from physical or physiological causes, and melancholia, idiosyncrasy, fixed notions, hallucinations or illusions do not always hinder the use of reason and destroy freedom of action. It would be equally wrong to ascribe every case of suicide to personal guilt, and positively foolish to adopt the Stoic view that suicide is not an act of cowardice, but rather a proof of courage, on the plea that by killing himself a man not only escapes evil and thereby follows an instinct implanted in his soul by God, but likewise relieves society of an intolerable burden, and, moreover, by an act of supreme self-sacrifice, atones for his crime and thus conciliates the eternal Judge.¹⁰ This view is radically false. For, in the first place, he who despairs in a difficult or hopeless situation and tries to escape the tribulations of life by committing suicide, does not display courage and strength of character, but the very opposite, and, secondly, all misfortunes, even those which a man incurs through his own guilt, must, from the Christian point of view, be regarded as trials in which he should exercise patience, faith, and confidence in God.¹¹ The decisive factor is not public opinion but the duty which the individual owes to society and which he is still able to fulfill, even though it be only by giving an example of Christian fortitude. Finally, for man to try to escape his judge instead of atoning for his sins in the way prescribed, namely, by contrition and penance, is a pagan, not a Christian motive. ¹²

³ Ex. XX, 13; cfr. Deut. XXXII, 39-

⁴ De Civitate Dei, l. I, c. 20: “It remains that we understand of man what was said: ‘You shall not kill’—therefore neither another nor yourself. For one who kills himself kills none other than a man.” (Migne, P. L., XLI, 35).

⁵ Wisd. XVI, 13.

⁶ A. Van der Heeren in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, p. 328; H. Rost, Der Selbstmord als sozialstatistische Erscheinung, Cologne 1905, pp. 23 sqq.; H. A. Krose, S.J., Der Selbstmord im 19ten Jahrhundert, Freiburg, 1906, pp. 28 sqq. IDEM, Die Ursachen der Selbstmordhäufigkeit, Freiburg 1906.

⁷ Cfr. M. Baumgartner, L. A. Seneca und das Christentum, pp. 135 sqq.

⁸ M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, p. 53 sq.; Vol. I, p. 90. The objection that it is incorrect to say that in committing suicide a person desires to compass his own destruction, because the soul does not disappear at death, while the body will rise again, and that, therefore, what is desired and accomplished in suicide is not annihilation, but a new life, more perfect than the present, and consequently suicide is not a violation of our natural appetite for continued existence and well-being, is refuted by Dr. Cronin as follows: "Natural tendencies are all tendencies to the well-being of the natural agent, the agent regarded as a product of nature. Nature could not set up in any thing a tendency towards a condition which is either unnatural or which is even above nature. But the natural constitution of man, from which spring all our natural powers and appetites, is that of a composite of body and soul combined to form one person. And, therefore, our natural desire for happiness is a desire for the happiness and well-being of the natural person, consisting of body and soul, In suicide, therefore, we use our natural powers for an end which is the frustration of their own natural purpose." (Ibid., Vol. II, p. 55).

⁹ O’Malley-Walsh, Essays in Pastoral Medicine, New York, 1906, p. 306.

¹⁰ K. Joest, Das Recht auf den Tod, Göttingen, 1895.

¹¹ St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, l. I, c. 26: "This we say, this we assert, this we approve in every way: that no one ought to inflict voluntary death upon himself as though fleeing temporal troubles, lest he fall into everlasting ones; no one on account of another’s sins, lest he himself begin that most grave sin of his own when another’s sin did not defile him; no one on account of past sins, for which this life is all the more necessary so that they may be healed by penance; no one as though from desire of the better life hoped for after death, because the better life after death does not receive those guilty of their own death." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 39).

¹² Ps. XXXIII, 19; L, 19. —A. von Oettingen, Die Moralstatistik, 3rd ed., p. 761, says: "The Protestant misses the energetic spiritual leadership of the Church; when unhappy, he does not so readily find consolation because he must do without the human mediation of the priesthood (confession)."

According to the principles of Christian morality a person who commits suicide while in the full possession of his mental faculties is not only a murderer and a criminal, but renounces God and the hope of salvation and forfeits every right to the blessings of the Church, including that to a Christian burial.¹³ In denying any one the last-mentioned privilege the Church, of course, does not mean to pass judgment on his probable fate in the other world.

¹³ Codex Iuris Canonici, can. 1240, § 1, n. 3: "Those who have killed themselves by deliberate design are deprived of ecclesiastical burial unless before death they have given some signs of repentance...." —Cfr. Rit. Rom., tit. 6, c. 2, n. 3; S. Offic., d. 16 Maii 1866.

Does suicide always result from (temporary or permanent) insanity, or is it sometimes committed by persons who are quite sane? While some eminent scientists ¹⁴ hold that perfectly normal persons can and do commit suicide, others ¹⁵ adopt the theory of Esquirol, who nearly a century ago¹⁶ asserted that "suicide is a disease." No doubt suicide is very often due to dementia, but it is equally undeniable that many who compass their own death are impelled by pique, despair or anger, which usually involve malice or culpable cowardice.¹⁷

¹⁴ E. g., J. Maschka, Handbuch der gerichtlichen Medizin, Vol. I, Tübingen, 1881, p. 477.

¹⁵ For instance, R. Gaupp, Ueber den Selbstmord, 2nd ed., Munich, 1910, p. 32.

¹⁶ He died 1840.

¹⁷ "Despair and anger," rightly observes Van der Heeren (Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, p. 328), "are not as a general thing movements of the soul which it is impossible to resist, especially if one does not neglect the helps offered by religion, confidence in God, belief in the immortality of the soul and in a future life of rewards and punishments."

Suicide is a moral, a social, a biological, and a psychological problem. Its frequency is governed by laws whose existence seems to be established by statistics, but whose nature we are but just beginning to surmise.¹⁸ b) As the theological notion of suicide implies the full use of reason and the deliberate intention, direct or indirect, of ending one's life, a man does not commit suicide if he kills himself accidentally, or through carelessness, or in order to escape certain danger of death, or when in a state of mental derangement, be it complete or partial, permanent or temporary; or indirectly by doing or omitting something the fatal consequences of which he might and should have foreseen, but does not advert to on account of their remoteness; e. g., leading a dissolute life, indulging in anger or intemperance, or mortifying his body beyond the bounds of reason. An act which is not in itself sinful and of which it cannot be foreseen that it will lead to the destruction of life (as, e. g., firing a gun, eating a food not known to be poisonous) is no sin. If death can be foreseen as the result of such a non-sinful act, the latter is forbidden, unless commanded by duty, as when a priest or a physician visits a patient who is suffering from a contagious disease or when a soldier goes into battle. If the act that results in self-destruction is in itself sinful, it is a voluntarium in causa with regard to such destruction, and may be imputed as a sin tending to self-destruction, which, however, is not suicide in the specific sense.

¹⁸ Cfr. Familler, Pastoralpsychiatrie, pp. 142 sqq.

The ecclesiastical penalty inflicted upon those who are guilty of direct suicide does not affect those who commit suicide indirectly. If direct suicide has been committed in a state of mental derangement, the victim should not be buried in the customary solemn manner, but quietly, i. e., without song, bell, or sermon; not as if the Church wished to judge the soul of the departed, but merely to indicate her sorrow at his misfortune and dreadful end. Where there is doubt as to the condition in which the act was committed, charity demands that the deceased be given the benefit of the doubt, and be buried with ecclesiastical honors. Mental alienation may be presumed, not only on the strength of expert opinion, but also on the testimony of trustworthy relatives or friends who were in personal touch with the deceased.¹⁹

¹⁹ Regulae Iuris in VIto Decret. Bonifat. VIII, n. 30: "In obscure matters the least burdensome course is to be followed." Ibid., n. 49: "In penalties the more favorable interpretation is to be made."

A point to which attention should be called is that the power of suggestion and example have much to do with the increase of suicide. Dymond, an authority in the matter, says: "The power of the example of the suicide is much greater than has been thought. Every act of suicide tacitly conveys the sanction of one more judgment in its favor. Frequency of repetition diminishes the sensation of abhorrence and makes succeeding sufferers, even of less degree, resort to it with less reluctance." Dr. Walsh, who quotes this passage, adds: "Our modern newspapers, by supplying all the details of every suicide that occurs, especially if it presents any criminally interesting features or morbidly sentimental accessories, familiarize the mind, particularly of the impressionable young, with the idea of suicide. When troubles come, lack of experience in life makes the youthful mind forecast a future of hopeless suffering. Love episodes are responsible for most of the suicides in the young, while sickness and physical ills are the causes in the old. In a certain number of cases, however, domestic quarrels, and especially the infliction of punishment on the young at an age when they are beginning to feel their independence and their right to be delivered from what they are prone to consider restriction, are apt to be followed in the morbidly unstable by thoughts of suicide." ²⁰ In order to forestall the putting into action of the suicidal impulse, Doctor Walsh suggests that those who are close to the patient should have some realization of the possibility of its occurrence. There are usually some previous indications of the suicidal trend. Many especially early suicides have distinct tendencies to and stigmata of hebephrenic melancholia. The best known symptoms of this condition are those described by Dr. Peterson in his book on mental diseases. The symptoms noted are extraordinarily rapid and paradoxical changes of disposition. Depressed ideas intrude themselves in the midst of boisterous gaiety, and untimely jocularity in the deepest depression, or at solemn moments. Then there is the paradoxical facial expression, the so-called paramimia, that is, a look of joy and pleasure when really mental depression is present, or a look of depression when joyful sentiments are being expressed.²¹

²⁰ Essays in Pastoral Medicine, p. 309.

²¹ Ibid., p. 309 sq.

The tendency of suicide to repeat itself in families is now well known and recognized. It is "not directly inherited, but there is a mental weakness that makes the individual incapable of withstanding the sufferings life may entail." ²² 2. SELF-MUTILATION. —As we are not masters of life, so neither are we owners of our limbs, and hence cannot dispose of them at will. A man is not justified in mutilating himself, but as the limbs of the body are subordinate to life, they may be sacrificed as parts for the whole if life can thereby be preserved. Hence the amputation of one or several limbs is permissible when it is the only means of preserving life. A sick man may allow an infected limb to be amputated in order to prevent infection of the whole body, and one who is handcuffed, e. g., in prison, may tear or cut off a hand or an arm, or both, in order to escape certain death, e. g., from fire.²³

²² Ibid., p. 310.

²³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 65, art. 1: "Since a member is a part of the whole human body, it exists for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect exists for the perfect. Therefore a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it benefits the whole. Now, a member of the human body is of itself useful for the good of the whole body; accidentally, however, it can happen that it is harmful—for example, when a putrid member is corruptive of the whole body." —IDEM, Summa contra Gent., l. III, c. 112, n. 5: "It is manifest that all the parts are ordered to the perfection of the whole; for the whole does not exist for the parts, but the parts exist for the whole." —Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Lyons and Paris, 1850, Vol. I, n. 403, 9; H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., Innsbruck, 1914, pp. 351 sq.

To mutilate oneself or to allow oneself to be mutilated for any other purpose than that of saving one's life, for instance, to escape military conscription, is not permissible.

Except as a remedy for diseased conditions of the body, castration or emasculation (eviratio) is never allowed, not even from religious motives, as, for instance, to preserve chastity or avoid temptations, because the operation is neither necessary nor useful for that purpose;²⁴ still less, of course, for minor ends, e. g., to keep the voice unbroken, because the preservation of a youthful voice is not a sufficient good to justify the commission of an act against nature. Following many censures of his predecessors, Leo XIII expressly forbade this practice for the singers of the Sistine Chapel.²⁵

²⁴ St. Jerome, Ep., 84 (al. 65), n. 8: "Origen fled pleasures to such an extent that, with zeal for God but not according to knowledge, he cut off his genital organs with a knife." (Migne, P. L., XXII, 750).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 65, art. 1, ad 3: "A member is not to be cut off for the bodily health of the whole except when the whole cannot otherwise be helped. Spiritual health, however, can always be helped otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is subject to the will. Therefore in no case is it lawful to cut off a member in order to avoid any sin whatsoever." —J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 403, 10: "It is not lawful to castrate oneself in order to preserve chastity or to quiet temptations, because emasculation is wholly useless for that end: it does not remove the temptations of the flesh so as to avoid sin, but merely prevents generation." —Cfr. O'Malley and Walsh, Essays in Pastoral Medicine, p. 339.

²⁵ Decree of Feb. 3, 1902. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., p. 352: "The supreme pontiffs never approved the castration of boys, nor ever declared it lawful; indeed, they declared irregular those who culpably made themselves or others eunuchs...." Cfr. Benedict XIV, De Syn. Dioec., l. XI, c. 7, n. 3; C. Richert, Die Anfänge der Irregularitäten, Freiburg, 1901, pp. 104 sqq.

Vasectomy and the excision of the uterus or ovaries are operations which, though permissible when necessary for the direct preservation of life or health, would be sinful if performed for the sole purpose of superinducing sterility.²⁶

²⁶ S. C. S. Off., 22 May, 1895: "Si sia lecita la practica sia attiva sia passiva di un procedimento il quale si propone intenzionalmente come fine espresso la sterilizzazione della donna. R. Negative." Sabetti-Barrett, Comp. Theol. Mor., n. 267. —Cfr. H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 352: “Vasectomy consists in cutting the man’s semen-bearing ducts, so that all communication between the testicles and the male organ is prevented. A vasectomized man who has undergone this operation can indeed perform sexual acts through carnal intercourse, but he is altogether incapable of fertilization, since he cannot emit true semen produced in the testicles. This operation, which is performed in a very short time and is furthermore neither dangerous nor very painful, must morally be called unlawful unless it is necessary to preserve life or health.” —On vasectomy, see A. O'Malley, The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation, pp. 244 sqq.

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 64, art. 5. —James J. Walsh, Essays in Pastoral Medicine, Ch. xxvii, New York 1906.—F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. II, 6th ed., pp. 6 sqq., Paderborn 1909. —Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 301 sqq., New York 1908. —Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 403 sqq. —Ad. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis et Pastoralis, Vol. III, pp. 124 sqq., Tournai 1904. —Westcott, Suicide, its History, Literature, etc., London 1885. —Bonomelli, Il Suicidio, Milan 1892. —E. Durckheim, Le Suicide, Paris 1897. —Masaryk, Der Selbstmord als soziale Massenerscheinung, Vienna, 1881. —J. E. Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, New York 1919, pp. 178 sqq. —Austin O'Malley, The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation, New York 1919, pp. 7 sqq., 244, 260 sqq.

2. Mutilating another or injuring his health is sinful if done against his reasonable will. To this class of forbidden acts belong corporeal maltreatment, the infliction of unnecessary pain by beating or wounding, overburdening with work, cruel treatment, handing out insufficient or adulterated and consequently injurious food, etc. Strong emotions, too, such as, for instance, fear, anger, and even excessive joy, can injure the human organism and imperil its existence, nay, destroy it, by causing paralysis of the heart, or psychoses and serious derangements of the nervous system, such as epileptiform or hysterical convulsions, and so forth.⁷

⁷ Cfr. Maschka, Handbuch der gerichtlichen Medizin, Vol. I, pp. 809 sqq.

Any injury unjustly done to the health or members of another against his reasonable will is a violation of justice and a mortal sin, unless passion, previously suffered injury or smallness of matter (parvitas materiae) diminish the guilt. Mutilations which entail the loss of the procreative faculty (castratio, emasculatio) are inspired by greater malice and are therefore more severely punished by the civil law.

I. In order to solve the preceding questions rightly, it is necessary to recall certain principles of moral theology: namely, one from the general doctrine concerning human acts, and several other special principles from the particular matters concerning justice and charity.

III. From the doctrine concerning justice we know that man does not have dominion over the human body and life, but only its author, God, has it. Hence man cannot directly dispose of life, whether his own or another's, except according as it has been conceded to him by God. Now:

1. God has conceded this for the public good, but only to public authority, whether a) in a just war to be carried on by that authority, or b) for punishing evildoers by that authority, and perhaps c) for a private good to individual men for defending life against unjust aggression, although this rather seems to be, and is better called, indirect killing:¹ for this is permitted only because from the action there follows equally immediately a compensating good effect, namely the defense or preservation of the one attacked;

¹ Thus Saint Thomas explains it, II-II, q. 64, a. 7.

2. God has conceded no right over the life of an innocent person, which therefore in no case can be directly taken away, because this is always gravely unjust;

3. indirect killing can be licit if it follows from a legitimate action which equally immediately produces a greater, or at least equal, good effect; namely, this is not directly to kill, but to expose oneself to the danger of killing.

A fortiori, one's neighbor has a right to the salvation of the soul, and it is unjust to impede it.

IV. From the doctrine concerning charity we know that we are bound to love our neighbor more with respect to his soul and salvation than our own body and bodily life; likewise more with respect to the life of the body than our own temporal goods, but not more than our own life. Although licitly we can expose that life, this is not because we love another's life more, but because of the good of virtue, which is a spiritual good of the soul and thus surpasses bodily life. Hence:

1. In the extreme danger of our neighbor's salvation, we are bound under grave obligation to aid him even with certain danger of life, provided there is probable hope of helping him and no graver evil is feared.

2. In grave danger of our neighbor's salvation, we must aid him under grave obligation with some rather great detriment in temporal goods, but not with danger of life, unless someone is bound from justice by reason of office.

3. In extreme danger of our neighbor's life, we are bound under grave obligation to aid him with notable temporal detriment of our own, but not by extraordinary means nor with danger to our own life.

4. Although we are not bound, nevertheless we can licitly, charity persuading it, expose our life in grave danger of another's salvation, because this is worth more than our life; likewise in grave danger of another's life, because of the good of virtue, gratitude, friendship, the honor of God, or the public good; not because we esteem another's life more than our own, but because the good of virtue, which is spiritual, can be preferred to the good of one's own life, which is bodily.

Fortified with these principles, we now approach the solution of the questions.

I. Sterilization pertains to eugenic science.

Genetic science is the experimental science of hereditary transmission and variation among living things, namely, plants and animals, and of the laws which govern it; these laws have hitherto been uncertain.

Eugenics is the same science applied to human beings; this latter science is therefore less developed than the former.

The foundation of this science is investigation of the cell.

Eugenism etymologically means good birth. Eugenics intends a good race, a strong and robust people. It proposes to itself the end of rendering the human stock and species better and more robust, since at present there are several causes infecting it, especially certain diseases which continually increase to the great detriment of the family and civil society, such as tuberculosis, syphilis, mental diseases including dementia, alcoholism, morphinism, cocainism, and so forth, and many others. Several of these are transmitted by heredity, arise from a disturbed organic alteration, and are exceedingly frequent. Tuberculosis and syphilis bring the greater injuries upon society.

It is certainly licit to employ means for diminishing and extirpating them, provided that the means themselves are licit, not evil.

But several means which have been employed are illicit and evil. Some are indirect, which positive eugenics uses, such as the legal prohibition of every marriage with any such person, and the obligation of producing a medical certificate establishing health as an indispensable condition of marriage. Others are direct, which negative eugenics uses, such as sterilization, neo-Malthusianism, the procuring of abortion, and so forth.¹

¹ Hence Payen, Déontologie médicale, ch. XII, art. 4, §2, establishes the following concerning false eugenism: False eugenism prevents marriage by the obligatory prenuptial certificate, upon which legal authorization is made dependent; it prevents conception by neo-Malthusianism and sterilization; it prevents birth by abortion; it prevents life by infanticide, before which certain persons do not draw back after birth; it prevents survival in society by the rejection of laws protecting the weak, which, however, it regards as inhuman and cruel.

In what follows we shall speak of sterilization.

II. Sterilization (onvruchtbaarmaking) signifies an action or operation which renders something sterile, so that it produces no fruit, for example, the action of preventing fermentation. Thus they speak of sterilization of a liquid, such as milk.

In biology, it is an action by which a living being is rendered infertile or incapable of reproduction. In physiology, it is an action which deprives a human being, male or female, of the possibility of procreation, or renders that person incapable of generation.

Sterility is distinguished as twofold: one is mere sterility or solely the incapacity to generate; the other arises from incapacity to perform carnal intercourse apt for generation. The former is called by theologians and canonists simply sterility or impossibility of generating; the latter is not customarily called sterility, but impotence, because it includes impotence to have intercourse, which, if perpetual, is a diriment impediment to marriage.

Theologians understand this of intercourse considered physiologically, or of an action of itself apt for generation, whereby the seed of the man is deposited in the due vessel or in the vagina of the woman. But physicians often consider the matter merely physically, namely, the mere physical possibility of copulation, whether seed is deposited or not. Hence a man who can perform intercourse, although he does not emit seed and cannot emit it, is not impotent for physicians. For theologians, however, he is truly impotent, indeed by natural law, so that if this condition is perpetual, he cannot enter marriage.²

² Physicians do not thereby deny the doctrine of theologians, but use a different terminology.

III. There are various manners of effecting sterilization.

1. Biological means can produce temporary sterilization in the woman. Thus:

a. by injection of a certain element of semen, for example, hormones especially of a ram, which acts after the manner of a vaccination rendering her immune for a period of six to eight and one-half months; but perhaps the time could be increased by repeated injections;

b. likewise by injection of an extract from the ovaries, placenta, or fetus.

Similarly, by injection of an anaphrodisiac substance, sterility or impotence can perhaps be obtained in the man, but only for a time.

2. Physical means likewise. By the so-called X-rays or Roentgen rays, or by rays produced from radium and directed upon the testicles of the man or ovaries of the woman, temporary or perpetual sterility can arise according to the dose. Thus genital activity is destroyed or atrophy of the testicles and ovaries is procured. But the means is not always infallibly certain. With a weak dose, there is rather a stimulation to ovulation.

Other physical means are painful and uncertain.

3. Surgical means especially:³

³ Cf. Muret, De la stérilisation sexuelle.

A. In the man there are:

a. castration, or removal or extirpation of the two testicles; but its effect is injurious to the organism, namely, it injures health and the virile character because of the absence of the internal secretion of hormones;

b. vasectomy, or the ligation or resection of the two vasa deferentia, that is, the canals which carry sperm or seed from the testicles into the penis, so that the seed cannot be ejaculated. The operation is very simple, not painful, dangerous, or injurious; it lasts five to ten minutes, so that the man can return to ordinary work almost immediately or already on the following day. Nor does it modify the virile character or sexual appetite, for the man retains perfect seed, but cannot ejaculate it.

It is disputed whether a remedy can be applied to the cutting or resection and communication through the vasa deferentia restored, at least in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, no example is known in which the possibility of generation has been restored to a man.

B. In the woman:

a. ovariotomy or hysterectomy, that is, removal of the two ovaries or the uterus, which is performed by the natural way through the vagina (colpotomy), or through the abdomen (laparotomy), in which latter case it brings some danger. Its effects are injurious and it changes the character of the woman; but it injures less than castration does in the man;

b. fallectomy or salpingectomy, that is, ligation or resection of the oviducts, or the two tubes which provide communication between the ovaries and the uterus; by this the ovum is prevented from descending into the uterus and the male seed from reaching and fertilizing it. It includes some danger and can be performed in eight different ways. Nevertheless, it is not always an infallibly certain means; the more efficacious manner is cutting between two ligatures;

c. inclusion of the uterus or its isolation; but this does not provide an always certain means.

Above, n. 6, when there was discussion concerning the object of ownership, it was proved that useful ownership of his body indeed belongs to man, but not absolute ownership. For man is, as it were, the steward of God, and therefore he commits injury toward God if he abuses his body or destroys it. But strictly speaking the suicide does not commit injury against his own body, since injury is always toward another and not toward oneself. Suicide (and the same holds of every homicide) is either direct or indirect. It is called direct when it is directly both intended and follows from an action freely placed. But it is called indirect when it is not intended, but is foreseen as going to follow from an action placed, which nevertheless does not directly cause death but only induces a most grave danger of death. Therefore in direct suicide (say the same of homicide and the procuring of abortion) the end both of the work and of the worker is death to be inflicted; but in indirect suicide neither the end of the work nor the end of the worker is death.

112. Principle 1. Direct suicide, done by private authority, is always a most grave sin.

Thus all Catholics teach against the Stoics, Epicureans, and several modern non-Catholics.

Proof. The sin of suicide is most strictly prohibited by law a) divine, b) natural, c) ecclesiastical.

a) In the fifth precept of the Decalogue divine law inculcates: "You shall not kill."

b) By a threefold reason direct suicide injures natural right itself;⁷⁵ for it is against charity toward oneself, violates the rights of the human community, and violates the rights of God himself. Therefore suicide first injures charity toward oneself. For each person ought to love himself, and from this love there arises the most vehement inclination of preserving oneself and resisting death. Hence suicide is something unnatural and injuring charity toward oneself. Moreover, it does injury to human society. For every man ought to be a useful member of human society. But by departing from life by his own motion, a man can now bring no utility to society. Therefore he commits injury. Finally, suicide is very injurious to God, who gave life to man and continually conserves it, and therefore is the perfect owner of every human life. Wherefore St. Paul says very well: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself. For whether we live, we live to the Lord; or whether we die, we die to the Lord. Therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."⁷⁶ But he who destroys his own life by suicide destroys the property of God and therefore inflicts grave injury upon God;⁷⁷ to him alone belongs the authoritative judgment of life and death, according to that saying: "You are, O Lord, he who has power of life and death."⁷⁸

c) Suicide is gravely prohibited by ecclesiastical law, which, as a penalty for so great a crime, forbids the body of a suicide to be buried in a sacred place or Mass or other liturgical suffrages to be celebrated for him.⁷⁹ But these ecclesiastical penalties are not incurred a) if the suicide was committed from madness or another cause impeding the use of reason; b) if the suicide gave signs of repentance before he expired; c) if the crime was wholly occult, lest the reputation of the survivors be violated; d) if there was doubt whether death arose from suicide, or whether the suicide was committed from madness. He who attempted suicide is irregular,⁸⁰ is barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and incurs other penalties if he is a cleric.⁸¹

But it is said that suicide done by private authority is a most grave sin. For either from divine authority or sometimes from public authority suicide would be lawful. It is plain that God can command suicide to some man; for he himself is the supreme owner of life and death. But whether in reality God ever gave such a precept is not certainly established. For the deeds which are read in the lives of the saints (e.g., St. Apollonia, St. Pelagia, St. Sophronia) do not certainly prove that a divine precept was present. Those saints most certainly had the best intention, but through invincible ignorance they could have done something which objectively was illicit.⁸²

But could someone kill himself by command of public authority? E.g., can someone justly condemned to death by poison or hanging himself take the poison or hang himself? This case occurred in the East, and Socrates, condemned to death, is said to have obeyed the law of the republic and himself taken poison.⁸³ Billuart⁸⁴ and St. Alphonsus⁸⁵ deny (and call their opinion the more common), but it is not certainly established that this is intrinsically evil; wherefore it would be lawful for one justly condemned to death to employ this mode of dying when the supreme judge commands it. "For if the accused can open his mouth so that poison may be poured into it, so also he can draw it up with his hands, and so also he can transfix himself with a sword. For then the judge constitutes the accused as executioner of himself." Yet this is cruel and not very becoming.

Scholion. On The Principal Causes Of Suicide. In our times suicides become more frequent from day to day. The fundamental cause of this mournful experience seems to be the defect of faith creeping in more and more. For it is impossible that a man well conscious of the punishments of Gehenna (which he will certainly suffer through all eternity if with full advertence and deliberation he commits suicide) would not prefer to tolerate all the pains of this world rather than commit suicide. Hence suicides also happen much more frequently among unbelievers than among Catholics.⁸⁶ Another cause of suicides is books and theaters, in which suicide is very often glorified and therefore commended. Priests should not omit to deter the people from the enormous crime of suicide.

⁷⁵ St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5.

⁷⁶ Rom. 14, 7 sq.

⁷⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5, where also the excuses which are sometimes brought forward for suicide are refuted.

⁷⁸ Wis. 16, 13.

⁷⁹ Rit. Rom. tit. 6, c. 2, n. 3. Code of Canon Law c. 1240, 3.

⁸⁰ Code of Canon Law c. 985, 4.

⁸¹ L. c. 2350, § 2.

⁸² Cf. Lessius l. 2, c. 9, n. 23, cited by Noldin, De praeceptis n. 327.

⁸³ Cf. Plato, Phaedo (LVII): τι χρή ποιεῖν.

⁸⁴ De iust. diss. 14, a. 4, dico 4.

⁸⁵ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 369.

⁸⁶ Paulsen rightly says: "Suicide is, as a rule, the unbeautiful end of an unbeautiful life" (System der Ethik II, 120).

113. Principle 2. Indirect suicide is not licit unless a proportionately grave cause is present.

It is explained. An action indirectly causing death is not intrinsically evil, and therefore, when a proportionately grave cause comes in, it is licit in the same way in which an indirectly voluntary evil is permitted. But what is a proportionately grave cause must be prudently estimated in individual cases. The nearer and more certainly the action is going to induce death, the greater the cause required. Among causes permitting indirect suicide are enumerated the public good and the spiritual good. For it is certain that a man can and ought to expose his life to the greatest danger if the public good demands this. Thus soldiers with evident danger of life ought to fight in battle; pastors ought to administer the sacraments, even if on account of a raging epidemic they expose themselves to mortal contagion. The spiritual good also, and notably the good of virtue, is an excusing cause. Hence missionaries laudably set out into foreign and unhealthy regions with manifest danger of death; religious sisters can serve the sick laboring under plague. If the danger of death is not so proximate, even a lighter cause can excuse. Hence it is lawful, e.g., for workers to blow glass, to gild metals, to work in sulfur mines, etc., with danger of notably shortening life. Nevertheless he always sins who from a futile reason exposes or abbreviates his life, e.g., men who from vainglory fight in a duel, some tightrope walkers, those prolonging a fast for a very long time (for the sake of mere experiment or wager). Likewise those who hasten death for themselves by gluttony, by immoderate passions, by morphinism; those who undertake altogether unusual labors without sufficient reason; those who refuse to take even ordinary remedies for preserving or recovering health.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ Cf. Billuart, De iure et iust. diss. 10, a. 3.

114. Authors raise two questions here: 1. Is it lawful to kill oneself in order to avoid a certain and harsher death? St. Alphonsus responds:⁸⁸ "Directly to kill oneself is never lawful ... it is lawful to kill oneself indirectly: for instance, if someone throws himself out through a window in order to escape a fire; especially if there is some hope of escaping death. Thus teach Busenbaum, Lugo with Lessius, Continuator Tournely, and Sporer. And Elbel permits this even to accused persons detained in prison, for escaping a certain sentence of death, or even perpetual prison." Whatever may be the case concerning this indirect killing, which seems to be licit, since there it is not a question of death itself to be inflicted upon oneself, but rather of exposing oneself to the greatest danger of death, nevertheless the opinion defended by Elbel does not seem able to be sustained, unless it is a question only of undergoing the danger of death, but not of certain death itself. Otherwise those suicides which happen rather often, which evildoers condemned to perpetual labor in prisons commit, would also be licit. And indeed no one will sanely say this. For the rest, from the very words of Elbel it appears that he speaks only of danger of death. For he says: "Even in these circumstances they [soldiers] do not intend to kill themselves, but only by flight to seek liberation from the squalor of perpetual prison, which to many seems, not without merit, more intolerable than death itself; therefore if death follows from such flight besides their intention, they must by no means be judged to have intended it, but rather to have held themselves permissively in order to it."⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 367.

⁸⁹ De homicid. n. 16, ed. Bierbaum.

115. 2. Can a virgin choose death rather than her own violation? a) It is certain that a virgin cannot directly kill herself in order to avoid violation, e.g., by transfixing her heart with a sword. It is also the express opinion of St. Thomas,⁹⁰ saying: "Similarly, it is also not lawful for a woman to kill herself, lest she be corrupted by another; because she ought not to commit in herself the greatest crime, which is the killing of herself, in order to avoid the lesser crime of another; for it is not the crime of a woman violated by force, if consent is absent, because the body is not stained except from consent of the mind, as Lucia said." Hence the things which are had in the Decree of Gratian⁹¹ from St. Jerome,⁹² "In persecutions it is not lawful to perish by one's own hand, apart from where chastity is endangered, but to submit the neck to the one striking," are either to be piously explained or to be abandoned. Then b) it is also certain that a virgin in that case can flee with evident danger of death, e.g., by throwing herself from a high window; but c) it is not certain whether a virgin ought rather to allow herself to be killed than violated, e.g., when the aggressor threatens her with death unless she permits intercourse. Several authors affirm,⁹³ because, since the woman can impede intercourse, if she rests induced by fear, then her cooperation becomes truly moral and voluntary. Other theologians⁹⁴ deny, provided that the virgin bears herself merely passively and the danger of consent is absent. The reason is that in that case the violation is something merely physical; and just as a virgin can, for recovering health, permit physical violation through a surgical operation, so at least on account of the most eminent danger of death she can permit that violation through extorted intercourse. Certainly in the second case the virgin provides material and proximate cooperation in the sin of the aggressor, and therefore a much greater cause is required than in the case of a surgical operation; but nevertheless that aggressor is already in heart guilty of deflowering before the external work perpetrated, and besides he would become guilty of both internal and external homicide if the virgin did not bear herself permissively. Therefore the merely passive permission of the virgin helps rather than harms the soul of the aggressor. St. Augustine⁹⁵ also seems to favor this opinion.

⁹⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 64, a. 5 ad 3.

⁹¹ c. 11, C 23, Q. 5.

⁹² Comm. in Jonah l. 1, n. 402 (Migne, Patr. lat. 25, 1129).

⁹³ Lugo, Salmanticenses, Azor, Bonacina, etc., cited by St. Alphonsus, l. c. n. 368.

⁹⁴ Navarrus, Toletus, Soto, Schindler.

⁹⁵ De civ. Dei l. 1, c. 18.

116. On Self-Mutilation. By almost the same right by which suicide is prohibited, mutilation of oneself is also prohibited. For just as man does not have full ownership of his life, so neither can he dispose concerning his members except for the uses determined by God. But because the parts are for the sake of the whole, it is lawful to cut off a member if this is necessary for saving the whole bodily life. Thus all theologians teach with St. Thomas.⁹⁶ Therefore it is lawful to submit oneself to surgical operations when they are truly useful or necessary for preserving health. Moreover, it is lawful to cut off a bound hand, if this is necessary for taking flight and thus for escaping death.⁹⁷ But for other ends mutilation cannot be done licitly, because God never, either explicitly or implicitly, conceded such a right to men. Hence it is not lawful for an adolescent to mutilate himself in order to escape military service, nor for a poor man in order to obtain greater alms, nor to do emasculation or castration for preserving chastity, as Origen is narrated to have done.⁹⁸ Hence deservedly the Church has established the penalty of irregularity against those who have castrated themselves or have otherwise mutilated themselves or others.⁹⁹

On Artificial Sterilization. In former times castration of boys came into use for preserving a boyish voice. This castration indeed was held licit by some authors, if danger of life was absent and it was not done to boys unwilling.¹⁰⁰ There is no leisure to refute this opinion and practice, today deservedly obsolete. In our times the so-called artificial sterilization rages more and more from day to day; it can very easily be obtained not only by vasectomy but also by Roentgen rays (X-rays); but it is usually employed for recovering health, for avoiding generation, and for other ends. But since this sterilization is true bodily mutilation (of the ovaries or testicles), it is not morally licit unless for curing diseased organs and for obtaining the health of the whole body. Therefore it is not lawful to employ it, e.g., for preventing the generation of numerous offspring, for preventing a man altogether depraved from transmitting his very bad habits into offspring by generating.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 65, a. 1.

⁹⁷ Several authors (Lugo, Lessius, Molina, Salmanticenses, Billuart, Lehmkuhl, Marc, Aertnys) more probably think that someone can mutilate himself in order to avoid death unjustly threatened by a tyrant. Wherefore if, e.g., a husband says to an adulterer caught in the act: either castrate yourself or I shall kill you, the adulterer could castrate himself in order to avoid the death threatened by the husband. I am unable to grasp how that opinion is probable, since such mutilation is manifest and proximate cooperation in the sin of another.

⁹⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 65, a. 1 ad 3.

⁹⁹ Code of Canon Law c. 985, 5.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 374.

¹⁰¹ Pius XI, encyclical Casti connubii, Dec. 31, 1930 (Act. Ap. Sed. XXII, 230), and S. C. S. Off., Mar. 21, 1931 (Act. Ap. Sed. XXIII, 118).

117. Scholion. The desire of death can be something 1. licit; 2. illicit; 3. imperfect. This desire is licit if it arises from a good motive, namely because someone desires to be joined with God, to be no longer able to sin, etc. In this sense St. Paul teaches that it is much better to have the desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ than to remain in the flesh.¹⁰² But it is illicit if it arises from a wicked motive, e.g., if someone with rebellion against the divine will wishes death for himself, if someone from impatience now no longer wishes to tolerate this life. Rarely, however, is this desire of death gravely illicit, because often it is not so voluntary and serious. Finally, the desire of death is something morally imperfect if someone so abhors some earthly evil, for example grave illness, incarceration, a very hard state of life, etc., that he prefers bodily death rather than to sustain that evil. Although such a desire is not gravely sinful, because already in Sacred Scripture it is said: "Death is better than a bitter life,"¹⁰³ nevertheless it is something imperfect and a venial sin, because by patiently tolerating such very grave evils of earthly life a man will have a precious reward in heaven, which he loses by desiring death.

There are some men who, even in the ordinary distresses of this life, often exclaim: Would that I were dead! Would that I were in the tomb! etc. Exclamations of this kind certainly are to be avoided and are objectively illicit, but often they are semi-deliberate acts and not seriously willed; hence they are either no sin or a venial sin.

¹⁰² Cf. Phil. 1, 23-24.

¹⁰³ Eccli. 30, 17.

756. Principles. I. Mutilation of oneself is illicit of itself. For man possesses absolute dominion neither over life nor over the body.

The sin will be grave or light according to the matter. Concerning irregularity contracted by reason of mutilation, see n. 1946.

II. Mutilation sometimes becomes licit for preserving the good of the whole. The reason is that, although mutilation is against the particular order, nevertheless it is required by nature or the universal order. This universal order requires that whatever is lower be ordered to what is higher. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 65, a. 1 ad 1; St. Alph., III, n. 373.

III. This mutilation is licit for a private man. Reason: a part of the body is not like the life of man, to which the other things that are in man are ordered, and over which, therefore, man cannot have power (St. Thomas, ibid., ad 2). Therefore, with the conditions placed as above, a private man can accomplish mutilation by his own action.

Hence: 1. It is licit for him to cut off for himself a hand bound by a chain, in order to flee a fire, or to avoid death to be inflicted by a beast or tyrant (Lugo, de Just., disp. 10, n. 22); it is licit for a virgin to disfigure herself, in order to turn procurers away from herself; it is licit by a small mutilation to render oneself fit for a lucrative art.

2. It is not licit to castrate oneself, nor to permit this to be done to oneself by another, for preserving chastity and overcoming temptations. The reason is that such a remedy does not remove temptations, and besides it deprives one of a power of the greatest moment. Cf. Antonelli, I, n. 287. Otherwise one must speak of cutting off the organ of pleasure in a woman (Lehmkuhl, I, 735).

3. It is not licit to castrate boys, even consenting ones, that they may be useful for singing. Indeed not a few permit this from custom, and from the good that comes to those boys themselves; but among most the negative opinion has prevailed; for conservation of the voice is not a good of such moment that what nature so greatly reproves may be licit (III, 374). Cf. Benedict XIV (de Syn., l. XI, c. 7), who learnedly proves that the Supreme Pontiffs never approved the castration of singers.

4. Likewise, it is not licit to exercise grave cruelty upon oneself on account of private advantage, for example for a young man, so that, by help of a grave and lasting sickness, he may obtain immunity from military service; for a poor man, so that, on account of a mutilated body, he may obtain more abundant alms.

5. A woman cannot permit her ovaries to be cut out, unless there is question of conserving life. To be sure, in our times the operation is easily accomplished; but from this it does not become licit (Antonelli, II, n. 277).

756 bis. This new mode of mutilation consists in this, that in a man the seminal ducts are divided by a very brief operation throughout in the scrotum: from this it happens that the man cannot procreate offspring, although he remains apt for copulation. This mutilation is temporary, if namely it happens (which, however, only a most skilled man can effect) that the divided parts of the ducts are joined together again.

They say that vasectomy can be sought or permitted by married persons for this end, that they may more freely enjoy the act of matrimony, without having to fear the burdens that would follow from new offspring. It is also imposed by public authority with this intention, that it may be guarded against lest unhealthy offspring be begotten by a man infected with disease.

Leaving aside for now the question whether vasectomy induces the impediment of impotence (concerning this matter in the treatise on Matrimony), let us see whether this operation is licit in itself.

Principles. I. Vasectomy constitutes grave mutilation. Reason: all organs that serve for the conservation of the species are conferred by the Creator for undertaking a grave function; therefore their conservation is of the greatest moment, and it is consonant with reason that all things that are more intimately connected with the procreation of life be withdrawn from the discretion and dominion of private persons.

II. Vasectomy is gravely illicit mutilation. The question is not whether vasectomy is licit, supposing that it must be done to restore or preserve the health of the body: the principles explained above (n. 756) are too clear. The question is whether, on account of the ends indicated above, notwithstanding the gravity of the mutilation, vasectomy can be called licit.

And one must respond: entirely in the negative, indeed that it is prohibited under grave sin. The reasons are: 1. Vasectomy sought by married persons serves for nothing except unbridled pleasure, and very often carries with it injury to the right of the other spouse. Besides, even if we suppose that vasectomy is therefore sought lest the woman suffer great inconveniences from a new childbirth, it will always be verified that these evils can be avoided by continence; therefore mutilation is not a necessary means.

2. Vasectomy imposed by public authority constitutes an aggression against the intimate goods of an innocent man, which were given to him by the Creator, so that the human species might rightly be propagated. The reason of the common good indeed avails against malefactors, who can be deprived of life or liberty; it avails also against those who can spread disease outwardly, and therefore it is right for lepers to be separated from others; nevertheless it does not avail against an innocent man who would wish to preserve his members and use his native right. Public authority indeed ought to consult the common good, but in those things that pertain to better being, the primary rights of private persons must not be injured. Cf. Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 42, p. 417; Wouters (ap. Nouv. Rev. Theol., vol. 43, p. 340); Gury-Ferreres, II, n. 856 ter; Ferreres, de Vasectomia duplici.

S. Th. II-II, q. 65.

369. A threefold harm can be inflicted upon the members of the body; for in the goods of the body three things are considered in order:

1° the integrity of the bodily substance, to which detriment is brought, apart from killing, by mutilation, that is, the cutting off of a member, or an operation which suppresses its use or organic function; to this wounding closely approaches, which is the infliction of a wound or lesion in a member;

2° the delight or rest of sense, to which beating or striking is opposed, and everything which affects sense with pain;

3° the motion and use of the members, which is impeded by binding, incarceration, and any detention whatever.

370. Mutilation (and wounding) of oneself and of one's neighbor, even direct, is licit

1. if it is necessary for the bodily health of the whole, when otherwise the whole cannot be aided, namely, when the member is harmful to the whole body (whether from within, because it is putrid, or from without, as if someone would be burned or killed unless the member were amputated); and then it is licit for a private person to amputate it for himself or for another with his permission, indeed without his permission if he is not master of himself, but care for his health belongs to another and the amputation is an ordinary and prescribed means;

2. if someone has merited it on account of fault, and then it is licit for public authority, just as the killing of a malefactor also is licit for it.

The reason is because the part is for the sake of the whole, the member for the sake of the whole body, and the individual for the good of the whole community; and therefore the good of the part or of the private person yields to the good of the whole body or community.

Outside these cases direct mutilation is illicit, even for the good of the spiritual life, or for avoiding sin, because members from their nature are not ordered immediately except to the good of the body, not to the good of the soul, and because this can be aided otherwise; and therefore this is not judged to have been conceded by God.

This principle, as Catholic doctrine and at the same time as rationally certain, is solemnly confirmed in the recent encyclical Casti connubii, on Christian marriage, issued by Pius XI on 31 Dec. 1930:

"That private men themselves have no dominion over the members of their own body other than that which pertains to their natural ends, and cannot destroy or mutilate them or in another way render themselves inept for natural functions, unless when the good of the whole body cannot otherwise be provided for, this Christian doctrine establishes and it is altogether established from the very light of human reason."

Hence practical cases are understood:

a) Surgical operations are licit if they are truly useful for health; but if they are dangerous they must be very useful, and for knowing this it is expedient to take the counsel not of one only, but of two or more, since some, more than is fair, favor these operations for the sake of experiment or gain.

b) It is certainly illicit to mutilate oneself in order to obtain some gain or advantage for oneself, for example, to flee the burden of military service, to obtain more abundant alms, to preserve the voice by castration and obtain gain from singing: these things are not necessary for the health of the whole body, nor are they a proportionate reason.

c) Eviration or vasectomy is illicit for preserving chastity: for evils are not to be done so that goods may come about, and especially if it is not necessary; "but spiritual health can always be aided otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is subject to the will. And therefore in no case is it licit to cut off a member on account of avoiding any sin whatever" (St. Thomas, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3).

d) Likewise vasectomy is illicit, as also oophorectomy, for impeding generation. Each is a notable and grave mutilation; for this must be weighed not only by reason of danger or of the dimension of the member, but also by reason of the function, if it deprives one of a power or function of great moment, such as the generative function. And the same is to be said of the use of X-rays for procuring sterility, by directing them more intensely upon the ovaries or testicles. Such operations are licit in this case alone, when those organs are infected, and therefore would be necessary for the life or health of the whole body.¹

¹ The Holy Office declared generally on 24 Feb. 1940: direct sterilization, whether perpetual or temporary, whether of a man or of a woman, is not licit and is prohibited by natural law.

e) Likewise it is illicit for public authority to impose vasectomy or atrophy of organs serving generation for the public good, whether for impeding the generation of infected or weaker offspring, because society does not have direct dominion over the life, liberty, and members of innocent subjects, and because other means are not lacking for obviating this. This is now altogether certain from the mentioned encyclical of Pius XI, according to which public magistrates have no direct power over the members of subjects, nor for preventing future evils is there a right for them to lesion of the body (as St. Thomas says, q. 108, a. 4, ad 2), but only for punishing the crimes of the guilty, or also for preventing new crimes of recidivism in those who are already guilty.

f) Indeed, for punishing certain crimes, however much the power of punishing them by the infliction of vasectomy or sterilization could belong to public authority, - which point is expressly reserved by the Supreme Pontiff in the encyclical, - nevertheless generally it does not seem fitting, because it is not an apt punishment, as being little painful, much repugnant to the moral sense, and rather desired by many so that they may be able with impunity to be free for lust.

g) Illicit mutilation is a grave sin, yet it admits lightness of matter, as if someone uselessly removed one tooth from himself.

h) Indirect mutilation is not licit except on account of a proportionately grave cause.

i) Hence it is a sin not only positively to mutilate the body, but also negatively not to have sufficient care for it. The body is the instrument of the soul, which must be apt to serve the operations of the soul. And therefore for obtaining health and a good disposition of the body there is an office of employing ordinary means; and it is a sin by excesses in food and drink or by immoderate labors, vigils, austerities, gravely to harm health, notably to shorten life, or to render the body unequal to serving the soul. Moderate austerities, however, are licit for taming sensual inclinations and reducing the body into the service of the soul (I Cor. IX, 27), even if life is shortened somewhat; moreover, to avoid all causes of a certain shortening is impossible for man.

371. Beating or moderate striking without mutilation, for the cause of correction, discipline, and punishment:

1. is licit for each one with respect to himself, and for another with his permission;

2. without permission is licit, not for private persons (who do not have governing or coercive power over others), but for public authority; and also for private authority, namely, for a father with respect to a son, for a master with respect to a slave, or for those to whom they commit this, for example, for teachers with respect to students, because they exercise paternal power; - but not for a master with respect to a servant who is freely hired, nor generally for a husband with respect to a wife, who is a companion, not a slave, nor for an elder brother with respect to the others unless the father himself has mandated it.

For just as, for coercing and punishing by irreparable penalties, perfect power of coercing is required, which is in public authority, so also an imperfect power of punishing by lighter reparable penalties is in those who have imperfect private authority.

372. Incarceration simply so called, for a long time or for the whole of life, is illicit, unless it is done a) by public power, which alone disposes universally concerning the acts and life of another; b) according to the order of justice, as a penalty or safeguard against sin. Namely, the man who abuses the power given to him merits losing it, and therefore incarceration is fitting for him who by sinning has abused the free use of his members.

Nevertheless 1) particular superiors, such as parents and teachers, can for some time detain or shut up children in their own house, for the sake of correction (cf. Belgian law, 15 May 1912, a. 16, 22, 30); 2) indeed every private person can detain someone for an hour from immediately perpetrating an illicit work, as when someone detains another lest he throw himself down or strike another.

373. Corollary. - He who inflicts the aforesaid injuries upon a person joined to certain others, as to a father of a family, or to a king, sins more gravely, other things being equal, than if he inflicted them upon a person joined to no one, because such an injury redounds upon several. Yet it can happen that according to some circumstances that which is done against a person joined to no one is a graver sin, either on account of the dignity of the person, or on account of the magnitude of the harm.

374. Remark. Since animals lack reason and personality and therefore are not their own nor a subject of right, but are totally for the sake of man, who is their lord as of other terrestrial things, man has no obligation toward them, and consequently does not commit an injury if he uses them by killing or in any other way, for example, by vivisection for promoting physiological science or medical art. From this, however, it does not follow that man always kills, tortures, or vexes them licitly, even apart from an honorable end or without sufficient reason, or more than is fitting: for to act without sufficient reason or not on account of an honorable end is never licit.

But if nevertheless he does this, he does not sin by a sin of injustice toward animals or toward God; but he sins toward himself, since he uses his own thing badly, and this sin of itself does not exceed venial sin (q. 64, a. 1).

That mutilation is illicit per se, all affirm with D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 1. and D. Thom. quaest. 65. art. 1. and others: Yet it is licit for the public Magistrate to mutilate someone, just as to kill for a just cause. The Saintly Doctor supposes this serm. 6. in Decal. The reason is that the part ought to be given for the good of the whole, as D. Thom. also says, and Valentia disp. 5. quaest. 9. puncto unico.

In the case also in which Surgeons judge mutilation to be necessary: he is not bound to it, if it must be done with great pain. So Sotus Lib. 5. de iust. quaest. 2. art. 1. Lessius Tom. 1. tract. 2. dub. 14. num. 96. Fagundez in 5. praeceptum, lib. 5. cap. 13. num. 6.

But except the case in which he is a Prince, or greatly necessary to the Republic; for then he is bound to endure mutilation even with great pains. So the authorities cited, Petrus Nauar. lib. 2. de restit. cap. 3. num. 102. Sayrus lib. 7. cap. 9. num. 39. Fagundez num. 8.

Nor indeed is anyone bound, or able, to mutilate himself, even if he would be put to death by a Tyrant should he refuse. So D. Thom. art. cit. Sotus lib. 5. de iust. quaest. 2. art. 1. Salon l. 2. quaest. 65. art. 1. The reason is that it is against the law of nature. Yet Bassaeus num. 32. says it is possible even in the case where death would thus be escaped.

Anna, a Catholic and married, because of deformity of the body is unable to bring forth offspring by the natural way. Hence the first was extracted by craniotomy, the second was brought forth alive by a Caesarean operation, and the third will come forth into the light after a short space of time; the surgeon wishes to extract it and at the same time to prevent future dangers by the operation which is called after Porro or Tait-Porro, by which the infant together with the uterus and appendages is removed by abdominal section. Anna therefore consults her confessor whether it is lawful or necessary to undergo the said operation. Hence it is asked:

1. Is a mother bound to lose temporal life in order to procure eternal salvation for her offspring?

2. Is the mutilation of a human being lawful?

3. Does Anna lawfully engage in married life?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. Is a mother bound to give her life for the eternal salvation of her child?

Yes; per se it is a general rule of charity that we must be prepared to sacrifice our temporal life for the eternal salvation of our neighbor, as St. John teaches: “We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.”¹ This obligation, however, does not arise frequently, because in ordinary circumstances the necessity for doing so is not certain, nor is the expected result certain.

1 1 John iii. 16.

2. Is it lawful to mutilate a man?

No; except in so far as it is necessary to preserve the man’s life, or unless it is commanded by competent authority in punishment of crime, according to the law of the country. Otherwise as man is not the owner of his life or limbs, but the ownership of them belongs to God, man can not dispose of life or limb, because he can not dispose of what does not belong to him.

3. Does Ann lawfully lead a married life?

As she cannot bring forth children in the ordinary way it would have been better if she had never married, and even now that she is married it would be better if, by mutual consent, husband and wife abstained from marital intercourse. However, there is no strict obligation to abstain, as if children are conceived, they can absolutely be delivered either by Cesarian section, or perhaps after the seventh month by bringing on premature labor, without killing either mother or child.

4. The case. The operation of craniotomy on the first child was unlawful if the child were alive, for it is the direct killing of the innocent. Cesarian section, of course, is lawful in such cases of necessity. The operation called Tait-Porro is also lawful if it is necessary in order to save the mother's life, “provided that serious and timely provision be made, as far as possible, for both the life of the fetus and that of the mother.” If it is not necessary, and if ordinary Cesarian section would suffice, then it is unwarrantable mutilation of a human being.