Question — Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis
Question Five: On Harms Which Are Inflicted upon the Members of the Body
S. Th. II-II, q. 65.
369. A threefold harm can be inflicted upon the members of the body; for in the goods of the body three things are considered in order:
1° the integrity of the bodily substance, to which detriment is brought, apart from killing, by mutilation, that is, the cutting off of a member, or an operation which suppresses its use or organic function; to this wounding closely approaches, which is the infliction of a wound or lesion in a member;
2° the delight or rest of sense, to which beating or striking is opposed, and everything which affects sense with pain;
3° the motion and use of the members, which is impeded by binding, incarceration, and any detention whatever.
370. Mutilation (and wounding) of oneself and of one's neighbor, even direct, is licit
- if it is necessary for the bodily health of the whole, when otherwise the whole cannot be aided, namely, when the member is harmful to the whole body (whether from within, because it is putrid, or from without, as if someone would be burned or killed unless the member were amputated); and then it is licit for a private person to amputate it for himself or for another with his permission, indeed without his permission if he is not master of himself, but care for his health belongs to another and the amputation is an ordinary and prescribed means;
- if someone has merited it on account of fault, and then it is licit for public authority, just as the killing of a malefactor also is licit for it.
The reason is because the part is for the sake of the whole, the member for the sake of the whole body, and the individual for the good of the whole community; and therefore the good of the part or of the private person yields to the good of the whole body or community.
Outside these cases direct mutilation is illicit, even for the good of the spiritual life, or for avoiding sin, because members from their nature are not ordered immediately except to the good of the body, not to the good of the soul, and because this can be aided otherwise; and therefore this is not judged to have been conceded by God.
This principle, as Catholic doctrine and at the same time as rationally certain, is solemnly confirmed in the recent encyclical Casti connubii, on Christian marriage, issued by Pius XI on 31 Dec. 1930:
"That private men themselves have no dominion over the members of their own body other than that which pertains to their natural ends, and cannot destroy or mutilate them or in another way render themselves inept for natural functions, unless when the good of the whole body cannot otherwise be provided for, this Christian doctrine establishes and it is altogether established from the very light of human reason."
Hence practical cases are understood:
a) Surgical operations are licit if they are truly useful for health; but if they are dangerous they must be very useful, and for knowing this it is expedient to take the counsel not of one only, but of two or more, since some, more than is fair, favor these operations for the sake of experiment or gain.
b) It is certainly illicit to mutilate oneself in order to obtain some gain or advantage for oneself, for example, to flee the burden of military service, to obtain more abundant alms, to preserve the voice by castration and obtain gain from singing: these things are not necessary for the health of the whole body, nor are they a proportionate reason.
c) Eviration or vasectomy is illicit for preserving chastity: for evils are not to be done so that goods may come about, and especially if it is not necessary; "but spiritual health can always be aided otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is subject to the will. And therefore in no case is it licit to cut off a member on account of avoiding any sin whatever" (St. Thomas, q. 65, a. 1, ad 3).
d) Likewise vasectomy is illicit, as also oophorectomy, for impeding generation. Each is a notable and grave mutilation; for this must be weighed not only by reason of danger or of the dimension of the member, but also by reason of the function, if it deprives one of a power or function of great moment, such as the generative function. And the same is to be said of the use of X-rays for procuring sterility, by directing them more intensely upon the ovaries or testicles. Such operations are licit in this case alone, when those organs are infected, and therefore would be necessary for the life or health of the whole body.1
1 The Holy Office declared generally on 24 Feb. 1940: direct sterilization, whether perpetual or temporary, whether of a man or of a woman, is not licit and is prohibited by natural law.
e) Likewise it is illicit for public authority to impose vasectomy or atrophy of organs serving generation for the public good, whether for impeding the generation of infected or weaker offspring, because society does not have direct dominion over the life, liberty, and members of innocent subjects, and because other means are not lacking for obviating this. This is now altogether certain from the mentioned encyclical of Pius XI, according to which public magistrates have no direct power over the members of subjects, nor for preventing future evils is there a right for them to lesion of the body (as St. Thomas says, q. 108, a. 4, ad 2), but only for punishing the crimes of the guilty, or also for preventing new crimes of recidivism in those who are already guilty.
f) Indeed, for punishing certain crimes, however much the power of punishing them by the infliction of vasectomy or sterilization could belong to public authority, - which point is expressly reserved by the Supreme Pontiff in the encyclical, - nevertheless generally it does not seem fitting, because it is not an apt punishment, as being little painful, much repugnant to the moral sense, and rather desired by many so that they may be able with impunity to be free for lust.
g) Illicit mutilation is a grave sin, yet it admits lightness of matter, as if someone uselessly removed one tooth from himself.
h) Indirect mutilation is not licit except on account of a proportionately grave cause.
i) Hence it is a sin not only positively to mutilate the body, but also negatively not to have sufficient care for it. The body is the instrument of the soul, which must be apt to serve the operations of the soul. And therefore for obtaining health and a good disposition of the body there is an office of employing ordinary means; and it is a sin by excesses in food and drink or by immoderate labors, vigils, austerities, gravely to harm health, notably to shorten life, or to render the body unequal to serving the soul. Moderate austerities, however, are licit for taming sensual inclinations and reducing the body into the service of the soul (I Cor. IX, 27), even if life is shortened somewhat; moreover, to avoid all causes of a certain shortening is impossible for man.
371. Beating or moderate striking without mutilation, for the cause of correction, discipline, and punishment:
- is licit for each one with respect to himself, and for another with his permission;
- without permission is licit, not for private persons (who do not have governing or coercive power over others), but for public authority; and also for private authority, namely, for a father with respect to a son, for a master with respect to a slave, or for those to whom they commit this, for example, for teachers with respect to students, because they exercise paternal power; - but not for a master with respect to a servant who is freely hired, nor generally for a husband with respect to a wife, who is a companion, not a slave, nor for an elder brother with respect to the others unless the father himself has mandated it.
For just as, for coercing and punishing by irreparable penalties, perfect power of coercing is required, which is in public authority, so also an imperfect power of punishing by lighter reparable penalties is in those who have imperfect private authority.
372. Incarceration simply so called, for a long time or for the whole of life, is illicit, unless it is done a) by public power, which alone disposes universally concerning the acts and life of another; b) according to the order of justice, as a penalty or safeguard against sin. Namely, the man who abuses the power given to him merits losing it, and therefore incarceration is fitting for him who by sinning has abused the free use of his members.
Nevertheless 1) particular superiors, such as parents and teachers, can for some time detain or shut up children in their own house, for the sake of correction (cf. Belgian law, 15 May 1912, a. 16, 22, 30); 2) indeed every private person can detain someone for an hour from immediately perpetrating an illicit work, as when someone detains another lest he throw himself down or strike another.
373. Corollary. - He who inflicts the aforesaid injuries upon a person joined to certain others, as to a father of a family, or to a king, sins more gravely, other things being equal, than if he inflicted them upon a person joined to no one, because such an injury redounds upon several. Yet it can happen that according to some circumstances that which is done against a person joined to no one is a graver sin, either on account of the dignity of the person, or on account of the magnitude of the harm.
374. Remark. Since animals lack reason and personality and therefore are not their own nor a subject of right, but are totally for the sake of man, who is their lord as of other terrestrial things, man has no obligation toward them, and consequently does not commit an injury if he uses them by killing or in any other way, for example, by vivisection for promoting physiological science or medical art. From this, however, it does not follow that man always kills, tortures, or vexes them licitly, even apart from an honorable end or without sufficient reason, or more than is fitting: for to act without sufficient reason or not on account of an honorable end is never licit.
But if nevertheless he does this, he does not sin by a sin of injustice toward animals or toward God; but he sins toward himself, since he uses his own thing badly, and this sin of itself does not exceed venial sin (q. 64, a. 1).