Observance (Dulia and Obedience)

The potential parts of justice are several. For justice is a virtue toward another, rendering to him what is owed according to equality. Therefore every virtue which by its nature is toward another, but falls short of justice by reason either of debt or of equality, must be joined to justice as a potential part. Now the virtues which fall short by reason of debt, or in other words which regard not a juridical debt but only a moral debt, that is, one to be rendered from the moral goodness of virtue alone, are of two species. For some regard a debt "so necessary that without it moral goodness of conduct cannot be preserved" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 80, single article); and these are truth, gratitude, and vindication. Others regard a debt which "is necessary as contributing to greater moral goodness, without which nevertheless moral goodness can be preserved" (St. Thomas, cited place); and these are liberality and affability. By reason of equality those virtues fall short, or in other words regard a debt which can in no way be rendered according to equality: religion, penance, piety, and observance.

Therefore there are nine virtues which are referred to justice as potential parts; two of them regard a debt toward God, namely religion and penance; the remaining seven have as their object a debt toward the neighbor.

I. Notion of Observance. Observance is a moral virtue inclining man to show due honor and reverence to persons excelling in dignity, insofar as they are a principle of governance with respect to some matters (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, a. 1). It is said:

1. Due honor and reverence. By these words is indicated the material object of the virtue of observance, namely the reverence and honor which correspond to the dignity of the person.

2. To persons excelling in dignity. This indicates the terminus to whom, namely one excelling in dignity. But as the Angelic Doctor observes, "because through knowledge and virtue and all other things of this sort someone is rendered suited for a state of dignity, the reverence which is shown to some on account of any excellence whatever pertains to the same virtue" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, a. 1, ad 2). "And hence it happens," the Salmanticenses rightly say,¹ "that there is no person to whom we do not owe some observance; because in all we can consider some perfection which does not belong to us, at least from ourselves; and so, considering in ourselves that which is from ourselves, and in others what they have from God, there will be no person to whom we ought not in some way to submit ourselves, according to that saying of the Apostle: 'Esteeming others better than themselves,'² and 'In honor preventing one another.'"³

3. Insofar as they are a principle of governance with respect to some matters. By these words is indicated the reason why reverence and honor must be shown.

¹ Arb. praed., n. 77 (t. 6, p. 459).

² Phil. 2:3.

³ Rom. 12:10.

II. Object of Observance. 1. The material object is all acts by which we honor the terminus to whom of this virtue, insofar as he enjoys the power of ruling us, but not insofar as he exercises this power, since as such he demands from us an act of obedience.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt on account of the excellence of the principle of governance, belonging more or less to these persons. And thus observance is distinguished from piety, which has its formal reason in being a principle; observance, however, in the excellence or dignity of the principle. The proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering this debt.

III. Opposed Vices. To observance is opposed any sin of irreverence, whether of omission or of commission; and this whether internal or external, whether by defect or by excess.

IV. Species of Observance. Since there are as many different grades of excellence and dignity as there are those whom observance regards, this virtue is not an ultimate species, but a subaltern one, divided into several ultimate species, of which nevertheless only three obtain a special name, namely dulia, hyperdulia, and obedience; while the others claim for themselves the common name of special observance or courtesy. Concerning the first three, take the following:

1. Dulia, in Greek douleia, although by the force of the word it signifies servitude, and thus as regards the native signification of the word is that ultimate species of observance by which a servant honors his master, has already for a long time among theologians designated that species of observance by which, on account of supernatural excellence, we honor and venerate the angels and saints in heaven, except the Blessed Virgin Mary, whose cult enjoys the name of hyperdulia (can. 1255, § 1).

2. Hyperdulia, from hyper, that is, above, and douleuo, that is, to serve, is that species of observance by which we honor and venerate the Blessed Virgin Mary on account of the special and singular dignity of divine motherhood. And this virtue is more probably distinct in species from dulia, because, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, "where there is a different reason of debt, there must be a different virtue which renders the debt" (II-II, q. 103, a. 3).¹

3. Obedience. a) Notion. Obedience, as if obaudientia, in a broad sense is taken for every fulfillment of a precept, even when it is not done with the intention of fulfilling it. But in the strict sense, and insofar as it is a special virtue, it is defined: a moral virtue inclining a subject to comply with an honorable precept of a legitimate superior, because and insofar as it is such a precept. It is said:

alpha. With an honorable precept. This indicates the material object of obedience.

beta. Of a legitimate superior. This indicates that the honorable precept is the material object of the virtue of obedience of this subject.

gamma. Because and insofar as it is such a precept. This indicates the formal object of obedience; or it indicates that the precept under this respect alone is the material object of obedience.

b) Object. alpha. The material object is constituted by all precepts which, and insofar as, they are imposed by a legitimate superior, whether the precepts are express or tacit. "For the will of the superior," says the Angelic Doctor, "in whatever way it becomes known, is a certain tacit precept; and obedience seems the more prompt, the more it anticipates an express precept by obeying once the will of the superior is understood" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 2). "The object of obedience ... is ... the precept of any superior whatever, whether express or interpretative, namely a simple word of a prelate indicating his will, to which the prompt obedient person obeys" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 2, ad 2).²

But if the superior does not command either expressly or tacitly, or commands beyond his legitimate authority, desires or precepts of this sort do not properly constitute the material object of obedience; and their execution in the subject is formally an act of that virtue by whose formal object he is moved, for example observance, piety, religion, etc. Reductively, however, acts of this sort can be referred to the virtue of obedience, insofar as they are placed from the affection of perfectly disposing and preparing oneself for the fulfillment of a precept, and of removing the danger of disobedience to a legitimately imposed precept.

beta. The remote formal object is the reason of debt arising from the legitimate power of the superior to command. Hence it is clear, on the one hand, that not every fulfillment of the precept of a legitimate superior is formally an act of the virtue of obedience, but only if the fulfillment is done from the motive of obedience; on the other hand, neither is there a sin of disobedience if the precept is fulfilled from another motive, unless an act of obedience from the motive of obedience had been prescribed. The proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering this debt.

3. Opposed vices. To obedience is opposed the sin of disobedience; note, however, that the transgression of a precept is then only a sin of disobedience when the precept was made from the motive of obedience, which often does not occur (n. 148).

¹ Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 78 (t. 6, p. 459); Haine, De Hyperdulia, Prolegomena, § 5, n. 10, pp. 33 ined.-36 inclusive; Sylvius, on II-II, q. 103, a. 4.

² Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 80 (t. 6, p. 461); Billuart, d. 2, a. 1, dico 2; Pesch, nn. 257-260 inclusive.

II. Division of worship. Worship taken generally is divided into civil and religious or sacred worship. Civil worship is that which is paid to men because of their natural excellence. Religious worship is that which is shown either to God because of his infinite excellence, or to angels or the blessed because of their supernatural excellence. We speak of religious worship, which is divided:

1. Into the worship of latria, hyperdulia, and dulia, according as it is offered to God, the Blessed Virgin Mary, or other heavenly citizens. The worship of latria pertains to religion (n. 385), the worship of hyperdulia and dulia to observance (n. 400).

2. Into absolute and relative worship. Absolute worship is that by which God and the heavenly citizens are honored in themselves; relative worship is that by which relics and images are honored with a view to the person to whom they are referred.

3. Into public and private worship. Worship is called public if it is offered in the name of the Church by persons legitimately deputed for this, and through acts which by institution of the Church are to be shown to God, the Saints, and the Blessed only; otherwise, private (can. 1256).

With these things noted, we shall speak first of the acts of worship prescribed by the first precept, then of the vices opposed to it, with a scholion added on the worship of heavenly citizens, images, and relics.

I. Notion. Superstitious observance occurs when someone does not indeed show divine worship to the demon, but nevertheless "assumes the help of demons for doing or knowing something" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 95, a. 2). Moreover, the help of demons can be invoked and assumed both explicitly and implicitly.

Explicit invocation, besides by other modes, also has place when someone uses a means or sign concerning which he has come to an agreement with the demon; or has in any way entered into a pact with the demon, so that he may be helped by him. Implicit invocation has place when someone, in order to obtain something, uses a means which neither of itself nor from divine or ecclesiastical institution is apt for producing the effect, so that, if the effect follows, it must be ascribed to the devil (St. Alphonsus, III, 6, 14).

II. Signs for discerning superstitious observance are: 1. "The insufficiency of the cause applied for the effect; namely if it has neither natural power, nor is there legitimate evidence of a supernatural power; 2. the addition of a false or vain circumstance; as, for example, if a scourging must be done at a certain hour, number, hand, or with a silken scourge; if unknown names are used, or foreign characters, false or apocryphal words, for example that Christ had fevers or spasm, etc. Likewise if force is placed in the mode of writing, for example the Gospel of St. John, by a virgin, at sunrise, etc." (St. Alphonsus, III, 16; St. Thomas, II-II, q. 96, a. 2, ad 1); 3. a certain expectation of the effect.

III. Morality. 1. Superstitious observance of itself is a grave sin. For first, Sacred Scripture declares that divination, which is a mode of superstitious observance, is an abomination to God;¹ and this must also be applied to the other modes of superstitious observance, since they do not differ in species, as we shall note soon. Then, an act which involves no other than hostile commerce with a person who has been forever reprobated and condemned by almighty God, such an act, I say, inflicts grave injury on God. But such an act is contained in superstitious observance, as is clear from the notion handed down (St. Alphonsus, III, 5).

I said that superstitious observance of itself is gravely evil; for implicit invocation not at all rarely is not gravely sinful, namely: 1. because of ignorance, since many do not notice that the means are inept; 2. because of the absence, and indeed the manifest absence, of a serious intention, as if someone even externally acts only for the sake of a joke; 3. because of defect of deliberation, as if someone, disturbed by fear of a grave evil, uses an inept means; 4. because of defect of faith given to the event (St. Alphonsus, III, 7, 15).

2. Explicit and implicit invocation of the demon do not seem to differ in species, because the same account belongs to the explicit and the implicit. The same must be said a fortiori of the diverse modes among themselves both of explicit and of implicit invocation. Yet commonly in confession it must be expressed "whether an express or tacit invocation or pact intervened... because express invocation often has other sins joined to it, namely heresy, adoration of the demon, etc." (St. Alphonsus, III, 6).

3. In doubt whether an effect can be ascribed to a natural cause, it is lawful to use the means, at least if a protestation against diabolical intervention is first made. For since the powers of natural causes are wonderful and very often unknown even to the learned, there is no reason for presuming diabolical intervention. This being posited, no irreverence toward God is found in our manner of proceeding (St. Alphonsus, III, 20).²

But in doubt whether the effect must be ascribed to God or to the demon, it is not lawful to use the means, both because in the case the effect "is judged rather to come from the demon than from God" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.), who does not work such things except exceptionally; and because commonly there will be, for we suppose that the effect is intended as to be produced by God and not by the demon, a temptation of God, namely an inordinate petition or expectation of a miracle (n. 608).

¹ Deut. 18:10-12.

² Cf. Holy Office, July 26, 1899 (Collectanea de Propaganda Fide, n. 2061).

IV. Penalties. One who has practiced superstition or has perpetrated sacrilege is to be punished by the Ordinary according to the gravity of the fault, without prejudice to the penalties established by law against certain superstitious acts or sacrileges (can. 2325).

The species of superstitious observance are distinguished as divination and vain observance. Yet these differ only by reason of the material object, not by reason of the formal object, or specifically; for under the moral aspect it is the same whether knowledge (divination) or some other thing (vain observance) is acquired by the help of the demon.

Simony Against Divine Law.—Simony against divine law is committed in reference to spiritual things when a temporal price is formally or virtually given or received for them.

(a) Thus, the temporal thing is formally set up as the price, when it is regarded or treated as the end of the spiritual thing or action itself (finis operis), one of the things exchanged being used as the measure of value of the other. This happens when a person wills to buy or sell a spiritual thing, either because he thinks that its value may be expressed in terms of money or other temporal thing, or because he judges that he should treat it as though money were its equivalent, as when one fulfills a spiritual office and excludes every other motive than that of lucre (Denzinger, n. 1196).

(b) The temporal thing is virtually set up as the price, when it is intended as the sole proximate end of the agent himself (finis operantis), though there is no explicit thought about values or prices or comparisons. This happens when one gives a temporal thing and has no other immediate personal purpose in this act than the acquisition of a spiritual thing, or performs a pretendedly gratuitous service, intending thereby to obligate the beneficiary to the grant of some spiritual benefit, or bestows a “gratuitous” temporal favor as compensation for a spiritual benefit or vice versa (Denzinger, n. 1195). This is simony, for he who explicitly intends only an exchange, implicitly intends a price; and if it were not simony, then simony would be almost entirely an entity of the mind, since it is a very simple matter to will that the temporal thing exchanged shall be not the price, but only the motive of the contract or gratuitous compensation.

Obligation of the Religious Cult of Dulia.—(a) There is no strict duty of giving veneration to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels, Saints, images, or relics, for absolutely speaking it suffices for salvation to adore God. But it is of faith that the cult of these holy persons and things is lawful and useful; hence he who should neglect it would not merely disregard the earnest advice of the Church, but he would also deny to God’s friends and heroes the honors they deserve (Ecclus., xliv. 1; Heb., xi), and would deprive himself of precious helps of intercession and inspiration. Some believe it is at least venially sinful never to invoke the Blessed Virgin, and surely there would be sin—and perhaps even grave sin, per accidens—if the neglect was scandalous or perilous to salvation.

(b) There is an obligation in performing acts of cult to make the veneration suitable to the dignity of the object (e.g., to the Mother of God belongs hyperdulia, to the Saints of God dulia; to holy persons is given absolute cult, to holy objects relative cult) and conformable to the laws of the Church (e.g., the titles of Venerable, Blessed, Saint are conferred only by the Church; public cult may be performed only by those authorized to act in the name of the Church and only by such rites as have been approved). It is lawful privately to pray to infants who died after Baptism, and, according to many, to the souls in Purgatory; but it would be superstitious to give to the damned or false saints the cult that belongs only to the canonized Saints.

Obedience.—Obedience is a moral virtue annexed to justice which inclines one to comply promptly and willingly with the command of one’s superior, because it is a command and obligatory.

(a) Obedience is prompt and willing, and so it differs from forced or unwilling or tardy submission and from servile and politic obedience (which would not obey were it not for fear or self-interest), for these lack either the good will or the good motive required by virtue. Note also that the virtue of obedience differs from the vow of obedience in this, that the vow obliges to the external performance of a command, while the virtue includes also internal submission.

(b) It is shown to a superior. Between equals there is not obedience in the strict sense, though one of them may out of charity or friendship yield to what the other desires.

(c) It is compliance with a command, that is, with a law or precept imposed by authority. Some authorities hold that it is an act of obedience to fulfill the known will of a superior, even though it has not been imposed as obligatory; but others see in such a fulfillment, not obedience, but the perfection or spirit of obedience. Thus, if a son knows that his father wishes him to perform a certain work, but has received no orders to do it and leaves it undone, this omission according to the first opinion is disobedience, while according to the second it is a want of the spirit of obedience.

(d) It obeys precisely because the superior’s will has been expressed as a command. It is this intention that sets off obedience from other acts of virtue about commanded matters. There is a material obedience which is a circumstance of other virtues and may be called a general virtue (e.g., when one keeps the first commandment out of love for God, there is charity; when one keeps the seventh commandment out of love of honesty, there is justice). The formal obedience of which we now speak is a peculiar and distinct virtue, because it keeps the law simply because it is law and as such should be kept.

Power of Jurisdiction and Dominative Power.—There are two kinds of power that confer moral authority to impose a command—the power of jurisdiction and dominative power.

(a) The power of jurisdiction is had by one who rules in a perfect society (Church or State), which has supreme authority and the right to impose laws.

(b) Dominative power is had by one who rules in an imperfect society, which has dependent authority and the right to impose precepts only. This power arises either from the very nature of society as a body composed of superior and subjects (e.g., in the family the children are necessarily subject to the father), or from agreement between the parties concerned (e.g., the wife by marrying becomes subject to her husband, the servant by taking employment becomes subject to the employer, the religious by entering a community or by vowing obedience becomes subject to the superior).

Degrees of Obedience.—Ascetical authors distinguish three degrees of obedience: (a) external obedience, which performs with exactness the thing commanded though there is no heart or willingness in its act; (b) internal obedience, which joins willingness to external submission though the judgment doubts the wisdom or value or good faith of the command; (c) blind obedience, which submits the judgment itself to the superior’s judgment, provided of course the thing ordered is not clearly sinful (Matt, ix. 9; Gen., xxii. 3 sqq.; Matt., ii. 13 sqq.).

Comparison of Obedience with the Other Virtues.—(a) Obedience, as was explained above (2355), is distinct from the other virtues on account of its different formal object. Its act is found sometimes joined with other virtues (e.g., to fast during Lent in order to keep the law is an act of obedience, but it is also an act of temperance if actuated by love of moderation, or an act of religion if offered as homage to God); but obedience may be separate from other virtues, as when a superior commands or forbids something indifferent in order to try a subject’s obedience (e.g., to take a walk solely because it has been commanded is an act of obedience only).

(b) Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues, since it belongs to the moral virtues, which are not directly concerned with God Himself but with the means to union with Him (I Tim., i. 5). Among those moral virtues that consist in contempt of temporal things, obedience which serves God in all things has a certain preeminence, inasmuch as it contemns for God’s sake the noblest human good, one’s own will, whereas the other virtues contemn lower goods (those of the body and external things); on the other hand, obedience is inferior to religion, since, while obedience consists in veneration of the law, religion consists in veneration of God Himself. But acts of worship performed without devotion or without regard for God’s will are not to be compared with respectful obedience, since the former are sins and the latter is both religious and obedient; hence, it is said that obedience is better than sacrifice (I Kings, xv. 22), which means that internal devotion is to be preferred to mere external worship. Spiritual writers praise obedience as the guardian of all the virtues and the safe road in which they walk (Prov., xxi. 28).

Comparison of Acts of Obedience.—(a) All acts of obedience are of the same species, since in spite of diversity of superiors or of laws there is always in obedience the same essential character on account of the motive. Whoever may be the superior or whatever may be the law, the reason for obedience is always the authority that commands and the obligation that it imposes. Thus, whether one obeys God, or the Church, or the State, or parents, the virtue is always one and the same.

(b) All acts of obedience are not of the same perfection, for circumstances (e.g., the willingness, the duration, the difficulty) add to the merit of obedience. It should be noted, however, that to obey by performing what one likes is not necessarily less virtuous than to obey by performing what one dislikes; for the thing liked may be something hard that appeals to few and may be performed from a spirit of willing obedience, whereas the thing that is disliked may be something easy and may be performed with less willingness.

The Duty of Obedience.—Since obedience is obligatory because a superior has the right to command, the extent of the duty depends on the extent of the superior’s authority.

(a) Thus, God must be obeyed in all things that He commands, for He is Lord of all and cannot command what is unlawful: “Let us do all that the Lord has spoken and we shall be obedient” (Exod., xxiv. 7). Man is not bound, however, to wish all that God wishes in particular, since God wishes things from the viewpoint of the universal good, and the creature from the viewpoint of the limited good known to him (e.g., it is not lawful for man to wish the damnation or the misfortune of those whom God will permit to suffer these evils); but man is bound to wish that which God desires him to wish (e.g., that his neighbor will not be lost, that his father will not now die). Neither is man bound to perform what God proposed to him as a counsel. In certain instances (Gen., xxii. 2; Exod., xii. 36; Osee, i. 2) it appears that God commanded sin, but only a foolish or blasphemous person would interpret the facts in that impossible sense. In the physical order, a miracle wrought by God is not contrary to the law of nature established by Him, but to the usual course of nature; and similarly the commands referred to were not contrary to the laws of virtue, but to the usual manner of virtue, as was explained in 308 sqq.

(b) Man must be obeyed in all those things in which he has lawful authority to command, first, because God Himself requires this and he who resists resists God (Rom, xii. 2); next, because without obedience the peaceful order of society cannot be maintained. Even though the superior be wicked or an infidel, obedience is due him, for it is given him, not in his personal, but in his official capacity (Matt, xxiii. 2, 3). The Scriptures command obedience to all classes of lawful superiors, whether ecclesiastical (Heb, xiii. 17), civil (Titus, iii. 1; I Peter, ii. 13), or domestic (Eph, vi. 1, v. 22-24, vi. 5-8).

When Obedience Is Not Lawful or Obligatory.—Obedience to a human superior is not lawful or not obligatory in those matters in which the superior has no authority to command.

(a) It is not lawful to obey a human superior when his command is clearly contrary to the command of a higher superior, and therefore unlawful. Thus, one may not obey any human superior when he orders sin, even a venial sin, for we must obey God rather than man (Acts, v. 29; Rom., iii. 8); neither may one obey a subordinate official who commands something clearly opposed to the law or to the regulations of his own superior. It does not belong to the subject, however, to sit in judgment on his superior, and hence, unless the unlawfulness of a command is manifest, the subject must presume that it is lawful.

(b) It is not necessary to obey a human superior when his command exceeds his competency, or when he orders things over which he has no control. Thus, God alone has authority over the internal action of the soul and over the natural state of the body; and as regards these things all men are equal, one indeed being less perfect mentally or bodily than another, but none being subject to another in these matters. Divine law regulates the interior (e.g., the command to believe, the prohibition to covet), but human law is confined to external acts; divine law can regulate things pertaining to the nature of the body (e.g., God could command an individual to marry, or to observe virginity, or to abstain from all food), but human law is concerned with external things, in which men are unequal, and it cannot take away natural rights to life or the means thereto (see 292 on Inalienable Rights). Moreover, even as regards external acts and things, the authority of a superior is limited by the bounds which its nature gives it; for example, temporal authority cannot command spiritual acts, a ruler placed over one territory or group cannot command for others, a constitutional body cannot make laws beyond the powers conferred by its constitution, ecclesiastical laws or customs rejected by the Code cannot be enforced, etc. It is clear, too, that no superior may command the execution of what is physically or morally impossible, and generally a subject should not be required to practise heroic virtue (e.g., to expose his life to danger; see 374). If a command is plainly ridiculous (that is, if it lacks a reasonable motive), it would be more perfect to obey, but it seems it would not be a sin to disregard it.

Obedience in Cases Where There Is Normally No Obligation.—If a superior oversteps his authority, the subject may obey when the matter is lawful and the motive of submission is good. In certain cases it is even obligatory to obey a superior in matters over which normally he would not have authority. Such cases are the following:

(a) on account of a vow or other free and moral agreement, a subject is held to obedience in matters pertaining to the nature of the body (e.g., when he has made a vow of virginity). The Church cannot impose virginity, but he who has vowed to observe it, must fulfill the conditions and precautions necessary for its observance, and can be ordered so to do;

(b) on account of circumstances, such as scandal or danger of great evils, it is sometimes necessary to yield submission to a command that is not of itself obligatory (see 376, 377).

Internal Actions and Human Superiors.—Internal actions in themselves do not fall under human authority, and hence the Apostle says: “Judge not before the time until the Lord come, who will make manifest the counsels of the heart” (I Cor., iv. 5). But in two ways these actions may be dealt with authoritatively by human superiors.

(a) Thus, in the internal forum and there alone, internal acts themselves are subject to a human superior; for the confessor knows and acts there, not as man, but as the representative of God, and hence he may pass on and prescribe internal thoughts and desires just as God may pass on them and prescribe them.

(b) In the external forum, the Church deals with internal acts in so far as they enter into an external act as a necessary ingredient of its goodness or malice, as when she commands a devout communion or pronounces censure against judges who are swayed by fear or favor. This question was treated above in 426.

Obligation of the Vow of Obedience.—(a) The vow obliges a religious to observe the commands of superiors that are given according to the rule which the religious professed. Hence, there would be no obligation in virtue of the vow of performing commands that are not authorized explicitly or implicitly in the rule (e.g., if a cloistered religious were bidden to engage in hospital work), nor, unless otherwise vowed, of keeping each prescription of the rule or constitutions. A command to accept a relaxation from the rule is obligatory, unless the dispensation is clearly invalid (cfr. 2225, 2237).

(b) The obligation is grave only when superiors command in a grave matter and with the intention of imposing a grave precept. The intention of a superior is indicated by a form of words and other circumstances which the rule or constitutions prescribe for the imposition of a grave precept.

Sins against Obedience.—Since obedience is a moral virtue and therefore observes a mean, there is both an excess and a defect that it avoids.

(a) Thus, the sin of excess is not found in the quantity of obedience, for the more obedient a subject is, the more is he worthy of praise. It is found, therefore, in other circumstances of the act of submission, as when one obeys a person or a command which one should not obey. Sinful submission is just as foreign to obedience as superstition is to religion; cringing submission or servility in matters where one should think and judge for oneself is only a simulacrum of obedience.

(b) The sin of defect is found in disobedience to a lawful command. This sin may also be said to include both excess and defect—the former because the subject follows his own desires more than he should, and the latter because the superior does not receive what he is entitled to (see 1711 sqq.).

Definition of Disobedience.—Disobedience is the transgression of the lawful command of a superior.

(a) It is a transgression, that is, a voluntary neglect or refusal to perform what is ordered or to omit what is forbidden, or to perform or omit at the time or in the manner ordered. Thus, there is no disobedience if fulfillment is impossible—for example, if a subject who is summoned to present himself at a certain place does not receive the notice or becomes too ill to make the journey, or if he is asked to give what he cannot give, or if he is burdened with so many laws or regulations that he cannot even know what they are, much less attempt to observe them.

(b) Disobedience transgresses a lawful command, that is, one which is morally good and issues from competent authority. It is not disobedience to refuse to do what is evidently illicit (e.g., to lie or steal), or what is illegally ordered (e.g., to submit to arrest blindly, to perform what the law forbids the superior to order).

(c) It is violation of a command, that is, of a law or precept. Hence, it is not disobedience to neglect advice or exhortations or requests made by superiors, if the subject-matter is not otherwise obligatory (e.g., a daughter is not disobedient if she does not choose the husband picked out for her by her parents).

(d) It is against the command of a superior, and hence, if there is opposition between laws or precepts, the higher law and the higher superior prevails (288 sqq.).

The Kinds of Disobedience.—(a) By reason of the subject, disobedience is either material or formal, according as the transgressor intends only the satisfaction of his sinful desire against some other virtue, or intends the violation of obedience itself. Material disobedience is found in every sin, since every sin is a transgression, and in this sense the pride of the original sin is called disobedience (Rom., v. 19); but formal disobedience is a special sin, and it is committed only when the sinner transgresses purposely in order not to submit.

(b) By reason of the object, formal disobedience is contempt either for the law or for the superior. In the former case the transgressor despises the commandment given him and vents his dislike in disobedience; in the latter case the transgressor belittles the authority of the lawmaker or superior who made the law or who gave the precept; or scorns his sinfulness, ignorance, or low birth; or hates or envies him, and therefore proceeds to break his laws or precepts. If contempt moves one to rebel against every command, it is perfect; if it extends to only one or another matter, it is imperfect.

It is not sinful contempt of a person in authority, however, if the subject does not admire his character, or agree with his opinions, or approve of his courses, when the subject has good reason for his view and does not forget the respect and obedience due to authority and law.

Theological Sinfulness of Formal Disobedience.—(a) From its nature formal disobedience is a grave sin, since it is contrary to charity, which is the life of the soul and the end of the law. Love of God demands that we keep His commandments and be submissive to His representatives (Rom., xiii. 2; John, xiv, 21; Rom., ii. 23, xiii. 2; Luke, X. 16). Disobedience is classed by St. Paul with the worst sins of the ancient pagans (Rom., i. 30) and of the sinners of the last days (II Tim, iii. 1), with witchcraft and idolatry (I Kings, xv. 23).

(b) From the imperfection of the act formal disobedience is sometimes only a venial sin, as when in a sudden fit of anger against his superiors a child refuses to obey his teachers or parents.

(c) From the lightness of the matter, formal disobedience is only a venial sin, if the contempt is imperfect and not directed against God, and the matter of the command or transgression is not serious (e.g., if one gets up a few minutes late in the morning once or twice as a protest against a regulation). But, even though the matter is not serious in itself, formal disobedience is a grave sin, when the contempt is perfect (e.g., if in a spirit of defiance and of anarchistic contempt for all his laws one pays no heed to some minor regulation of a superior), and perhaps also when contempt is directed against a divine precept (e.g., if with the feeling that the eighth commandment is foolish or useless, one tells small lies); for in the former case there is grave contempt, in the latter case blasphemy.

Moral Species of Disobedience.—(a) In formal disobedience, if the command belongs to some special virtue, there are two sins, namely, that against obedience and that against the virtue intended by the lawgiver (e.g., when out of contempt one violates the third commandment); but, if the command was given for the sake of obedience only, there is but the one sin of formal disobedience (e.g., when out of stubbornness a child refuses to do the study or other work imposed by parents or teachers).

(b) In material disobedience, if the command was given for the sake of some special virtue, there is but the one sin against that virtue, as when one breaks the fifth or sixth commandment to satisfy passion; but if the command was given for the exercise of submission only, there is but the one general sin of disobedience, as when a child eats between meals against the command given by his mother.

Circumstances that Aggravate Formal Disobedience.—One act of formal disobedience can be worse than another such act in two ways:

(a) by reason of the rank of the person who gave the command. Thus, it is more serious to disobey God than to disobey man, and more serious to disobey a higher than a lower superior;

(b) by reason of the rank which the thing commanded has in the intention of the superior. Thus, when disobeying God it is more serious to transgress against the higher than against the lower good, for God always prefers the better good; but in disobeying man alone it is more serious to transgress against the good, higher or lower, which the lawgiver has more at heart.

Comparison of Formal Disobedience with Other Sins.—(a) Disobedience against God (e.g., contempt for His law) is worse than sins against the neighbor (e.g., murder, theft, adultery). This is true when these latter sins do not include formal disobedience against God, for, per se and other things being equal, a sin against God is more serious than a sin against a creature; it is also true when sins against creatures include formal disobedience against God but offend a less important commandment, as when the one sin is perjury and the other theft.

(b) Contempt for the lawgiver, even without disobedience, is worse than contempt for the law with disobedience, since the lawgiver is of greater importance than his precept. Thus, it is worse to blaspheme God than to despise His commandment; it is worse to hold a superior in contempt than to disregard his precept.

17. Obedience, although it is comprehended under religion, piety, and observance, nevertheless properly is a special virtue. "For since inferiors must show many things to their superiors, among the rest this is one special thing, that they are bound to obey their precepts. Hence obedience is a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept. For the will of the superior, in whatever way it becomes known, is a certain tacit precept. And obedience seems so much the more prompt, as it anticipates the expressed precept by obeying, once the will of the superior has been understood." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2. Indeed the will of the superior is the rule of the subject. But this subject can be subject to a superior, even if the superior does not expressly command; and therefore then he still renders true obedience. - And q. 104, a. 3, ad 1, the same Holy Doctor says: "It must be said that obedience proceeds from reverence, which shows worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered according to itself, insofar as it regards the account of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is in some way contained under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Indeed, "if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for the omission of the same from whatever intention, thus obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2.

What is justice, and what are its parts? - R. To the first. Justice is the virtue which renders what is owed according to equality. Hence other moral virtues hold the mean of reason, according namely to prudent estimation. For since they are concerned with ruling passions, that which is right for one person is little or too much for another. But justice attains the mean of the thing, according namely to the equality of thing to thing, so that as much is rendered as is owed. For the equal is really the mean between greater and lesser. And thus the mean of justice cannot vary according to persons, places, and time; but whoever it may be, wherever and whenever, who owes one hundred, and whoever the creditor may be, he ought to render one hundred to him. If he renders fifty he injures justice; if one hundred and fifty he exercises liberality. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 58, 59, 61, 80.

R. To the second. The parts as it were integral of justice are: to decline from evil and to do good, namely to do owed good and to decline from the opposite evil. Owed; for if the speech is about good and evil in common, then to do good and to avoid evil pertains to every virtue. But if it is considered under the account of what is owed, then it pertains to justice. For justice is one kind general, namely legal, another special, namely distributive and commutative; these are the three subjective parts, or its species. To general or legal justice it pertains to do owed good in order to the Community and to God, in order to divine or human law; and accordingly as to the proper account of legal justice it pertains to attend to the debt of the precept, to do good, so to the proper account of transgression it pertains to attend to contempt of the precept, to decline from evil. - But to special justice, distributive and commutative, it pertains to do good owed to the neighbor and to avoid the opposite evil, namely that which is harmful to the neighbor. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79.

But as to do good is a certain special part of justice distinct from the declining of evil, so omission, which is opposed to the former, is altogether distinguished from transgression, which is opposed to the latter. For omission is properly of owed good, e.g., if someone does not show owed reverence to parents; and transgression is properly in doing evil, e.g., if someone inflicts contumely or any injury upon parents. The former is opposed to the affirmative precept, to do good; the latter to the negative precept, to decline from evil. Properly omission; for this imports the passing over of good not just any whatsoever, but of owed good. But good under the account of what is owed properly pertains to justice; to legal justice indeed, if the debt is taken in order to divine or human law; but to special justice if in order to neighbor. Properly transgression; for transgression materially taken is common to all species of sins, because by any species of sin man transgresses some divine precept. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 79. "But these two parts of justice, general or special, are called as it were integral, because each of them is required for the perfect act of justice. For it pertains to justice to constitute equality in those things which are toward another. But it belongs to the same thing both to constitute something and to conserve what has been constituted in those things which are toward another. But someone constitutes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e., by rendering to another what is owed to him; and he conserves the equality of justice already constituted by declining from evil, i.e., by inflicting no harm upon the neighbor." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 1.

The potential parts of justice, or the virtues annexed to it, are: religion, piety, observance, truth, gratitude, vindication, friendship, liberality. For these virtues are annexed to justice because they too in some way render what is owed according to equality. In some way; for since it belongs to justice to render what is owed according to equality, some of these fall short of the account of the equal, others of the account of what is owed. Religion, piety, and observance fall short of the account of rendering the equal, as is clear of itself. But truth, gratitude, vindication, liberality, and friendship fall short of the account of what is owed. For religion, piety, and observance cannot render worship and service to God, Parents, and Persons constituted in dignity according to equality. But the debt is deficient on the part of the one owing, in truth, so that namely man shows himself in words and deeds such as he is. Likewise the debt is deficient on the part of him to whom it is owed, in gratitude, by which someone recompenses another according to the things he has done in good things; and in vindication, by which another is recompensed according to the things he has done in evil things. Finally the debt is deficient in the account of the debt itself, in liberality and friendship, which are only toward a certain greater honorableness. For liberality renders us prompt to spend easily our things estimable by price, when right reason requires it; to this liberality avarice and prodigality are opposed. But friendship moderates our intercourse with neighbor, so that it may be pleasing to him, and such as according to right reason it ought to be. Likewise the debt is deficient in other things of this sort, which have little of the account of debt. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 80, a. 1.

Obedience is included in observance; for to preeminent persons there is owed both reverence of honor and obedience. In truth is included fidelity, through which the things said are done, as regards the observance of promises. But vengeance which is done by the authority of public power, according to the sentence of a judge, pertains to commutative justice; but vengeance which someone does by his own motion, not however against the law, or which someone requires from a judge, pertains to the virtue joined to justice. S. Th. 2. 2. l. c. ad 1, 3. Friendship or affability is a special virtue according to which "man is fittingly ordered to other men both in deeds and in words." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 114, a. 1. Flattery and quarrelsomeness are opposed to friendship. Flattery is a sin by which someone beyond the due mode of virtue wishes to delight others by words or deeds in common intercourse, with the intention of obtaining some advantage. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 115, a. 1. But quarrelsomeness, by which someone contradicts another because of defect of love toward the person speaking, is a species of discord contrary to charity; but that by which someone contradicts another rather in order to sadden him than to contradict him is especially opposed to the virtue of affability and friendship. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 116, a. 1.

Since justice renders what is owed according to equality, it of itself brings a precept, and injustice is opposed to justice, which falls short of rendering that debt and of preserving that equality. Justice and its various species are treated especially in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth precepts of the Decalogue. But the other virtues annexed to justice are treated in the first, second, third, fourth, and eighth precepts of the Decalogue. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 122.

What is adoration and of how many kinds is it? - Adoration is honor exhibited to another by an external gesture of the body, by which we testify our submission and the excellence of another; or insofar as it is a sign of internal estimation, reverence, and submission toward another, and consequently also of his excellence. Therefore adoration requires two internal acts: one of the intellect, the other of the will. The former is a speculative judgment concerning the excellence of another, and a practical judgment that it is honorable for us to be submitted to him on account of his excellence and our inferiority with respect to him. But the latter is the command of the will to lower oneself on account of that superior excellence in another. Whence at last the execution itself exists in the exterior gesture of the body.

Adoration is one thing political, another religious, according as it exhibits worship to another on account of a merely civil dignity or excellence, or on account of a supernatural excellence which is found in God and in his Saints. The latter comprehends under itself three species or quasi-species. The first is latria, which, with the genus taken for the species, is also simply accustomed to be called adoration; it is supreme and singular, which we owe to God alone, on account of the divine excellence proper to him, and which therefore is communicable to no other, according to Matt. 4:10. The second is dulia, which belongs to the Angels and other Saints, on account of the supernatural and created excellence which is in them. The third is hyperdulia, which is exhibited to the Blessed Virgin, on account of her supernatural and created excellence, but one altogether singular and greater and more eminent than all other created excellences. Species or quasi-species, because there is not sufficient agreement whether they are one species from one relation to God or threefold from a threefold diverse proper excellence.

Moreover any species of adoration is divided into absolute and respective. It is absolute when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence intrinsic to itself; and thus God, the Most Holy Trinity, Christ also as man, and the Most Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist are adored with absolute worship of latria; but the Saints with absolute worship of dulia, and the Most Holy Virgin with absolute worship of hyperdulia. It is respective when something is adored or worshiped on account of an excellence and sanctity extrinsic to itself, but intrinsic to him to whom it is referred in moral estimation; and thus the Most Holy Name of Jesus Christ, the instruments of the Passion, and the Cross are adored with respective worship of latria; relics and images of the Saints, etc., with respective worship of dulia; images of the Most Holy Virgin, etc., with respective worship of hyperdulia. The title "The Penitent Heart of Jesus" is altogether condemned. Holy Office, 15 July 1892. The image of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, representing the Heart alone, is permitted only for private devotion, but is by no means to be exposed on an altar for public veneration. Holy Office, 26 Aug. 1891. Because there is one excellence of the Three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is owed to them, and consequently one adoration. Trent, sess. 25, Decree on Invocation, etc.; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 81, a. 3; q. 82, a. 2 ad 3; q. 84; q. 103, aa. 3, 4; Suarez, de Relig., tr. 2, l. 1, c. 2; Struggl 11 seqq.

A determinate place is not required for adoration as though by necessity of the thing itself, but only according to fittingness, not on account of God who is adored, as though he were enclosed by place, but on account of the adorers themselves: first indeed on account of the consecration of the place, from which those praying conceive special devotion, so that they may be heard more; secondly on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of sanctity which are contained there; thirdly on account of the gathering of many adorers, from which prayer becomes more fit to be heard. The obligation of adoration is abundantly satisfied by otherwise fulfilling obligations toward God, in which adoration of God is contained implicitly and often also explicitly, as, for example, when prayers are poured forth to God, when one assists at the sacrifice of Mass, etc. E. M.

What is vain observance? - Vain observance consists in this, that someone employs means neither proportioned by their nature nor instituted by God or by the Church for obtaining a certain effect. It differs from divination in that the latter is ordered to knowledge of hidden things, but vain observance to any effects whatsoever to be obtained. It agrees with divination because it also rests upon a pact, express or tacit, with a demon. It matters little indeed that a demon is not expressly invoked; for he is invoked equivalently. For since God does not mingle himself with vain things, the effect can be expected only from a demon. Since someone uses inept means, he uses them not as causes but as signs, and thus they pertain to pacts of significations entered into with demons. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 96, aa. 1, 2, 3; L. 24.

What is the third precept of the Decalogue? - The third precept of the Decalogue is: Remember that you sanctify the sabbath day ... you shall not do any work in it. Ex. 20:8, 10. Two things are contained in this precept: that man be free on the sabbath for divine things, and that he cease from every servile work. This precept is natural insofar as it commands that some time be dedicated to public divine worship; but insofar as in the Old Law it designates the sabbath, in the New Law Sunday by the determination of the Church, and other feast days, it is positive. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 4 ad 4.

This precept, as determined by the Church, insofar as it is negative, chiefly prohibits servile works on a feast day. But insofar as it is affirmative, it commands under grave obligation to be present at Mass on Sundays and other feast days. And this is clear: 1. from various places of Canon Law, especially from C. Missas 64, de Consecr., D. 1, likewise from C. Omnes 63, de Consecr., D. 1; 2. from all Catechisms, by which the indubitable precept of hearing Mass on these days is declared; 3. from proposition 52 condemned by Innocent XI. But each, both to be present at Mass and to cease from servile works, is more truly from the precept of the Church; for this third precept of the Decalogue as to the sabbath day was ceremonial; and otherwise the Church could not dispense in these things, at least as to Sundays. S. Th. l. c. Besides this, however, it commands nothing else under grave obligation, or even under light obligation per se. The reason is that in fact nothing else is found prescribed in Law, or legitimately introduced by custom.

Hence it is clear: 1. That in reality there is no obligation from the force of this precept, insofar as it is natural or insofar as it is ecclesiastical, under grave or under light obligation, per se, of assisting at the evening office on Sundays and feast days, or of hearing a sermon. From the force of this precept; for perhaps someone could sin against other virtues and obligations of his state by omitting a sermon, catechesis, and other works of piety. 2. That he who hears a single Mass on the day of the Nativity of Jesus Christ satisfies this precept. 3. That there is no obligation of hearing Mass on Ash Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday of greater week, nor on the days of Rogation, and on the day of all the faithful departed.

But this precept obliges all the baptized who have the use of reason, even priests not celebrating, but not infants before the completed seventh year, or catechumens. The first reason is because it is universal. The second reason is because then they are not yet regularly capable of observing it in a human manner. The third reason is because they are not subject to the Church.

Finally the obligation of a feast day begins from one midnight to another. For such is the present use of the Roman Church. Roman Catechism, n. 1 seqq.; L. 263-271, 308; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 4; Struggl 12-14; Ithur., Cas. 20, nn. 1-4; E. M.

What is the fourth precept of the Decalogue? - The fourth precept of the Decalogue is: Honor your father and your mother. Ex. 20:12. This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents, because "they are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 3. But secondarily and implicitly it regards both the obligations of parents toward children, and also the mutual obligations of other blood-relatives, and of other inferiors and superiors. Roman Catechism, p. 3, c. 6, nn. 2, 8. Therefore this precept concerns acts per se of the virtues of piety, observance, dulia, obedience, legal justice, and gratitude.

Piety is a certain special virtue, to which it pertains to exhibit worship toward parents and one's fatherland, from whom and in which we are born, because they are "a connatural principle producing in being and governing." For piety regards this "principle, insofar as it spends duty and worship upon parents and fatherland, and upon those things which are ordered to these." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 101, a. 3. Besides this, piety also exhibits worship toward other blood-relatives, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; and likewise toward benefactors of the fatherland, because in them we behold the favor and help of the fatherland. S. Th. l. c., a. 1. "Through the fact that we are born from parents, both blood-relatives and fatherland pertain to us." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 5. Hence piety is also between spouses and with respect to children, "because between spouses there is worship and duty toward each other, as coadjutors for the preservation of the blood-relationship of both, which each spouse has from his own parents; for by the propagation of children the blood of each parent is preserved. And we say the same about children, namely because they are regarded by the virtue of piety as preservers of the blood-relationship received from parents." Cajetan, on 2. 2, q. 101, a. 1.

Worship is an act by which someone professes his own subjection to another in testimony of the latter's excellence. Hence the worship owed to parents imports reverence, obedience, and duty. Obedience imports compliance. Duty imports obedience and assistance.

Observance is a virtue "through which worship and honor is exhibited to persons constituted in dignity." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1. Honor imports a certain testimony concerning someone's excellence, either by words or by deeds, such as inclinations, or also by exterior things, for example, the offering of gifts. It is distinguished from praise, because praise consists in words alone. It is distinguished from glory, which is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness shines out in the knowledge of many, and this the name of glory imports, which is clear knowledge with praise. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 1.

Observance also pertains reductively to this fourth precept; since, just as parents are for us a principle producing in being and governing, so persons constituted in dignity not only have a certain excellence in themselves, but also a certain power of governing with respect to some things, whence the nature of principle also belongs to them, as a Prince of a city is in civil matters, a leader of an army in military matters, a teacher in disciplines. Hence it is that all such persons are also called fathers because of the likeness of care. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 63, a. 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; Quodl. 10, a. 12; Roman Catechism, n. 8.

Dulia is "a certain species of observance, because through observance we honor any persons whatever who excel in dignity; but through dulia, properly taken, servants venerate their masters. For dulia in Greek is called servitude." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 3. They venerate, by furnishing due service to masters. A certain species of observance. For observance has diverse species according to the diverse nature of excellence. And thus in one way a servant reveres a master, a soldier a commander, a disciple a teacher. S. Th. l. c., a. 4; q. 104, a. 2 ad 4.

Obedience properly is "a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept" of a superior. "But if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for omission of the same from any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 2. The former is usually called formal obedience; the latter, material obedience. "Obedience proceeds from reverence, which exhibits worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered in itself, insofar as it regards the nature of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for Prelates it is contained in some way under observance; insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 3 ad 1. But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Cf. 835.

Gratitude or thankfulness is a virtue which recompenses benefactors for some particular and private benefit received, by the action of thanks, and by spending something gratuitously. Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude, which according to the diversity of circumstances is sometimes a lethal, sometimes a venial sin. It is not grave unless the ingratitude was great. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 107.

Therefore gratitude is a certain virtue which comes after piety and observance, as deficient from them, since "not whatever we owe to a father or to a person excelling in dignity do we owe to some benefactor from whom we have received some particular benefit." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 106, aa. 1, 3, 6; q. 107. But honor and reverence are owed to a benefactor because he has the nature of a principle, and per accidens relief or support, if he is in need.

572. Definition. Observance⁹⁶⁵ is "a virtue by which homage and honor are offered to persons constituted in some dignity." Thus St. Thomas,⁹⁶⁶ after St. Augustine⁹⁶⁷ and Cicero,⁹⁶⁸ who say: "Observance is the virtue by which men excelling in some dignity are judged worthy of a certain homage and honor."

The name observance seems to have been imposed upon this virtue because to observe is attentively to behold or notice something; hence the veneration by which we honor those who are in some dignity is called observance, because we attentively observe such persons when they need our service.⁹⁶⁹ That which observance chiefly regards in a person excelling in some dignity is governance. For just as piety offers homage to parents because they are the authors of our life, so observance honors superiors because they govern us. Nevertheless, as St. Thomas aptly observes,⁹⁷⁰ by this virtue we honor not only our superiors, but also all those who are endowed with learning, virtue, and other excellences, so that although they do not actually govern us, nevertheless, should the occasion arise, they would be fit to govern us. Hence also that subscription commonly used in letters, "your most observant," is very significant and honorable toward the recipient of the letters.

⁹⁶⁵ Hochachtung, Ehrerbietung [high esteem, reverence].

⁹⁶⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 102, a. 1.

⁹⁶⁷ Liber octoginta trium quaest. q. 31.

⁹⁶⁸ De invent. Rhet. l. 2, c. 53.

⁹⁶⁹ Cf. Billuart, De virt. iustitiae annexis diss. 1, a. 3.

⁹⁷⁰ L.c. ad 2.

573. Distinctions. A threefold observance is customarily distinguished, according as the dignity on account of which observance is offered is threefold: a) civil observance, if the dignity is civil, as in kings, teachers, masters, etc.; b) religious observance, if the dignity is ecclesiastical, as in the Pope, a bishop, a priest, etc.; c) supernatural observance, if the dignity is founded upon the heroic virtues of the saints. In this last sense observance is customarily called dulia in the strict acceptation. Sometimes, however, dulia is taken in a broader acceptation for honor also rendered to men still living.

574. The principal obligations which observance causes are honor with reverence and obedience; and these obligations are frequently inculcated in Sacred Scripture.⁹⁷¹ It is evident of itself that not only piety but also observance is due to parents; for they are at once the authors of our life and our governors. Cajetan subtly observes⁹⁷² that piety is due to the fatherland, since it is, as it were, the principle of our origin; but to the prince governing the fatherland observance alone is due, since he is not the principle of our origin, but only the governor of the citizens.

Observance is a special virtue because it has a special object distinct from the object both of piety and of the other virtues. For piety offers the homage due to someone as the principle of our origin; observance, however, furnishes the homage due to someone as the principle of our governance. Observance is violated in a manner similar to piety; nevertheless, sins against observance are (other things being equal) lighter than sins against piety, since piety introduces a closer obligation. For piety renders due homage to persons more closely joined to us, to whom consequently we are more obligated and whose injury is a graver sin.⁹⁷³

⁹⁷¹ Cf. Ecclus. 7:31; Rom. 13:1-7; 1 Pet. 1:17ff.

⁹⁷² Comm. in 2, 2, q. 102, a. 1.

⁹⁷³ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 102, a. 3.

575. Definition. Obedience is a moral virtue which renders the will of a man prompt to fulfill the will of another, namely, of one commanding. Thus St. Thomas.⁹⁷⁴

Obedience seems to be the same as to hearken, or to be one who listens to a word, and consequently by force of the word denotes a certain inclination of the will toward the words of another, especially of a superior.

Distinction. A twofold obedience must be distinguished: one material, the other formal. Material obedience is nothing other than the execution of any commanded virtuous act; for example, if someone elicits an act of faith without intending thereby to fulfill any command. This material obedience is a circumstance of any commanded virtuous act, and consequently is not a special virtue, just as material disobedience is not a special sin but is found in every sinful act,⁹⁷⁵ since this is a transgression of the eternal law. Formal obedience is the execution of a work insofar as it is commanded by a superior. Therefore the proper motive of this obedience is the command of the superior.

Theologians dispute whether formal obedience demands a true command of the superior (although tacit and interpretive), or whether a manifestation of will short of a command suffices. For example, Peter knows the will of his father, who desires that some work be performed by him. Does Peter exercise an act of true obedience if he fulfills this work without his father having commanded it? Cajetan,⁹⁷⁶ Lehmkuhl,⁹⁷⁷ and others stand for the affirmative opinion; Lessius⁹⁷⁸ and Billuart⁹⁷⁹ for the negative. This controversy is of little importance. For that act, whether it is said to be elicited by the virtue of obedience strictly so called or not, is certainly virtuous and pertains to the spirit, so to speak, of the virtue of obedience. Certainly if Peter does not fulfill his father's will, known indeed but not joined with a manifest command, he does not commit a sin of disobedience; but the Angelic Doctor rightly says:⁹⁸⁰ "The will of a superior, in whatever manner it becomes known, is a certain tacit command, and obedience appears the more prompt, the more it anticipates the express command by obeying, once the will of the superior has been understood."

Hence ascetical authors are also accustomed to distinguish three grades of obedience: 1. to fulfill the commanded work at the determined time and in the determined manner; 2. not only to fulfill the external work, but also interiorly to submit one's own will entirely, and thus to will the same and not to will the same as the superior commanding; 3. to comply with the will of the superior, in whatever manner it is known, not only by execution of the work and submission of the will, but also by submission of judgment in simplicity of heart. This is that blind obedience which is undeservedly reproached by some. For all right obedience must be most clear-sighted and therefore keenly discern whether the thing commanded is pleasing to God and lawful in itself, since God must always be obeyed more than man.

But the most perfect obedience is blind in this sense: that it does not judge concerning the natural reason, motive, or value of the thing commanded, but leaves all these things to the prudent discretion of the superior. In this sense St. Gregory the Great says:⁹⁸¹ "For true obedience neither examines the intention of prelates nor discriminates among commands.... For whoever has learned to obey perfectly does not know how to judge." We must render this perfect submission of judgment to God and the Church, especially when she employs her infallible magisterium; and therefore the so-called respectful silence does not suffice.⁹⁸²

⁹⁷⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 104, a. 2 ad 3. B. Raus, C.Ss.R., has discussed De sacrae oboedientiae virtute et voto very learnedly, Lyon, 1923.

⁹⁷⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 104, a. 2 ad 1.

⁹⁷⁶ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 104, a. 2.

⁹⁷⁷ Theol. mor. I, n. 924.

⁹⁷⁸ De iust. l. 2, c. 46, n. 22.

⁹⁷⁹ De relig. diss. 2, a. 1.

⁹⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 104, a. 2.

⁹⁸¹ In 1 Reg. l. 2, c. 4, n. 11 (Migne, Patr. lat. 79, 131).

⁹⁸² Cf. Clement XI, Bull Vineam Domini, 1713.

576. The object of obedience is a command of a superior, whether explicit, tacit, or interpretive.⁹⁸³ But since this object has a special aspect of good, obedience is also a special virtue, the exercise of which can indeed be commanded by diverse other virtues. For obedience proceeds from reverence, which offers homage and honor to a superior; therefore, if it proceeds from the reverence due to God, it pertains to religion and especially to devotion; if it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is contained in a certain manner under observance.⁹⁸⁴

⁹⁸³ S. theol., l.c.

⁹⁸⁴ Ib., a. 3 ad 1.

577. Excellence of obedience. That obedience is a very excellent virtue is evident both from Sacred Scripture, from the praises of the holy Fathers, and from reason. In Sacred Scripture it is said: "Obedience is better than victims."⁹⁸⁵ Explaining these words, St. Gregory the Great says:⁹⁸⁶ "Obedience is rightly preferred to victims, because through victims the flesh of another is slain, but through obedience one's own will is slain." St. Thomas says:⁹⁸⁷ "Man can give nothing greater to God than that, for His sake, he subject his own will to the will of another."

Because of this excellence of its own, obedience is also accustomed to command the other virtues, causing, for example, now a fast, now an act of religion, now an act of love, etc. If obedience is compared objectively with the other virtues, then it is certainly inferior not only to the theological virtues, but also to the virtue of religion, whose object approaches much more closely to God. But if obedience is considered on the part of that which it despises in order to adhere to God, then it excels the other moral virtues. For while the other virtues despise material or bodily goods for the love of God, for example, riches and carnal pleasures, obedience binds and sacrifices one's own will in the service of God, which certainly excels material and bodily goods.⁹⁸⁸

⁹⁸⁵ 1 Kings 15:22.

⁹⁸⁶ Moral. l. ult., c. 14 (Migne, Patr. lat. 76, 765).

⁹⁸⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 186, a. 5 ad 5.

⁹⁸⁸ Ib., q. 104, a. 3.

578. Extent of obedience. Since obedience is limited by the authority of the superior, its extent is as great as the authority of the superior. Now the authority of God is unlimited and infinite, and His will is most holy. Hence God must be obeyed in all things, and a case in which it is lawful to resist a certainly known command of God is impossible.⁹⁸⁹

But the authority of a human superior is limited by not only divine but also human law. Hence a subject cannot obey a superior commanding something which is contrary to natural or positive divine law. For such obedience would be indiscreet, since God must be obeyed more than men.⁹⁹⁰ If a human superior indeed exceeds his competence but commands nothing unlawful, the subject can, but is not bound, to obey. But if a doubt arises concerning the liceity of an act commanded by a superior, then this doubt is to be examined according to one's ability. But if the doubt persists, the subject is bound to obey, because the presumption stands for the superior, who is not considered to have commanded something unlawful unless this is certainly established. Authors do not agree whether a human superior can command merely internal acts. This controversy was discussed above, I, n. 183, in the tract on laws. Whether parents can command their children concerning the choice of some state will be discussed in the following chapter.

⁹⁸⁹ Ib., a. 4.

⁹⁹⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 104, a. 5.

579. Opposed vices. To obedience is opposed: 1. by excess, servility or indiscreet obedience, which complies even in unlawful things; 2. by defect, disobedience, which is either material, and then is not a special sin because it is found in the violation of every virtue; or formal, which arises from formal contempt either of the command or of the one commanding. Someone transgresses a command from formal contempt when his will refuses to be subjected to an ordinance and transgresses it precisely from this motive. For if someone transgresses a command because of anger, concupiscence, or another disordered passion, he sins neither from contempt nor from formal disobedience.

Formal contempt of a (particular) command is called imperfect, but contempt of the one commanding is called perfect formal contempt and is a sin much graver than formal contempt of a command.⁹⁹¹ Indeed, it is a mortal sin in its whole genus because it is a grave injury to despise a superior and precisely from this contempt to transgress his command, although it concerns matter light in itself.⁹⁹² The same holds if someone does not despise a particular command but already refuses in whole, that is, in all commands, to be subject to the superior. Formal contempt of a particular command indeed constitutes formal disobedience and therefore is a mortal sin from its genus, but admits slightness of matter.

For all formal disobedience is opposed to the charity both of God and of one's neighbor, since the charity of God demands that we comply with His commandments. Hence Christ said: "He that hath my commandments and keepeth them; he it is that loveth me."⁹⁹³ But in the divine precepts is contained the requirement that human superiors also be obeyed. And "therefore also disobedience, whereby someone is disobedient to the commands of superiors, is a mortal sin, as contrary to divine love, according to that saying: He that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God.⁹⁹⁴ It is opposed moreover to the love of one's neighbor, insofar as it withdraws from a superior who is one's neighbor the obedience which is due to him."⁹⁹⁵

Disobedience admits slightness of matter and consequently can be a venial sin. In general it can be said: A sin of disobedience is the graver, the higher the one commanding and the graver the command violated.

⁹⁹¹ Ib., q. 105, a. 2.

⁹⁹² Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 2, De oboed., a. 4.

⁹⁹³ John 14:21.

⁹⁹⁴ Rom. 13:2.

⁹⁹⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 105, a. 1.

S. Th. II-II, q. 102.

833. Observance (respect; reverence, high esteem) is the virtue by which men excelling in dignity are deemed worthy of a certain worship and honor. It is a virtue, because it renders a debt. For in superiors two things can be considered: 1) the excellence of state with a certain power over subjects (for that which moves to an end has excellence over that which is moved), by reason of which there is owed to them the simple worship of honor, which is testimony of excellence (a. 2), from which fear follows by reason of the power which they have for coercing (ad 3); 2) the very office of governance, by reason of which there is owed to them a special worship of service, by which someone obeys their command and repays a return for benefits (a. 2 and ad 3). But to those who excel in knowledge, virtue, and other gifts, although they do not govern actually, because nevertheless they are fit for governing, therefore honor is owed, which pertains reductively to the same virtue of observance (a. 1, ad 2). Hence this is divided into two parts or species: dulia and obedience.

834. Object of observance. - The material object which it intends to exhibit is worship and service toward superiors, namely, acts by which we render due honor to them and attest their excellence and our subjection.

The primary material object which principally, per se, and by reason of itself it intends to exhibit by worship, is the due equality between the honor exhibited and the right of superiors to it, by which equality the honor is proportioned to the right which superiors have to it.

The formal object by which, or proximate motive on account of which we exhibit worship to them, is the special honesty of the said equality.

835. Corollaries. - 1. Piety toward country differs from observance toward the prince: the former, even in the prince, wishes to honor the country as the principle of our origin, so that the term of the honor is not the prince himself but the community; the latter honors the prince in himself for his personal glory, so that the term is the prince himself, who is not the principle of origin but only the governor (a. 3).

2. Just as religion, which gives worship to God, surpasses piety, by which parents are honored (a. 3), and is more eminent piety; so piety surpasses observance, which exhibits worship to persons constituted in dignity, and is more eminent observance: for parents are joined to us more substantially, and therefore we are more obliged to them (a. 1, ad 1 and a. 3).

3. The debt which observance attends to is a strict or legal debt, because our superiors have a true right that they be honored; which is necessary to urge for the order of society. Yet since in the same order of things, namely, of governance, it cannot render that debt to equality, therefore it falls short of strict justice and is a virtue annexed to it (a. 2, ad 3). But if it is a question of superiors to whom we are not subject, honor is owed to them from a certain honesty only and a moral debt (a. 2, ad 2).

S. Th. II-II, q. 103.

836. Dulia (service) is taken: a) in a very broad sense, insofar as it says reverence exhibited to any lord and subjection to him, and thus it includes religion, by which we are subjected to divine lordship and which is eminent dulia on account of the excellence of that lordship (a. 3);

b) in a stricter sense, insofar as it says reverence exhibited to the excellence of any man, and thus it is divided into various species according to the various excellence which is found in saints, father, king, commander, teacher, etc., for example, civil dulia, sacred dulia, natural, supernatural, etc.

This is distinguished from latria because service is owed to God and to man under a different account, just as lordship belongs to God under one account (universal through essence because He is creator) and to man under another (particular through participation). Among the various species the first and more perfect is hyperdulia, by which we exhibit worship to the Blessed Virgin Mary because of the affinity which she has to God, as Mother of God (a. 4, ad 2, and III, q. 25, a. 5).

c) in the strictest sense, insofar as it says the reverence which a servant exhibits to a lord, and thus it is only one species of observance (a. 4).

837. The honor of dulia supposes some superiority or excellence. - It is not indeed necessary that he who is honored be more excellent than the one honoring, but perhaps than certain others, or even than the one honoring himself in some respect and not simply. And thus equals can be honored by equals and inferiors by superiors (a. 2). Moreover due honor is internal and external at the same time, because it is not sufficient that we honor superiors before God, but it is also necessary that we honor them before others (a. 1).

838. Honor or worship of supernatural dulia is owed to the Blessed as friends of God, who have supernatural excellence, virtue, and merits, and are our intercessors. Whence we ought to revere them 1) as lords and esteem ourselves happy if they deign to receive us among their servants; 2) as intercessors on whom we are dependent (can. 1276).

Public worship of dulia is licitly exhibited only to Saints recognized for the universal Church by solemn decree, or common consent, or immemorial course of time; and to the Blessed, by special concession of the Roman Pontiff, only in those places or by those persons to whom it was conceded (can. 1256 and 1277).

Private worship is licitly exhibited to servants of God or venerable persons who have died with a reputation for sanctity or martyrdom, indeed even to baptized infants, for example, a private vow or fast in their honor.

The same holds concerning their images and relics (can. 1279, 1283, 1287). Thus, for example, images of servants of God can in no way be placed on altars; nor outside an altar be painted with halos, rays, or other signs of sanctity; likewise lamps cannot be lit at their tomb; yet they can be displayed on the walls of a church or in colored glass or in painted tablets, provided they carry before themselves no indication of worship or sanctity (S. C. R. 14 Aug. 1894); likewise private worship can be exhibited to relics of servants of God by carrying them with oneself, kissing them, applying them to the sick, etc.

S. Th. II-II, q. 104 and 105.

839. Obedience (obedience) is twofold: one general, by which from any honorable intention whatever we furnish acts prescribed from any virtue whatever; the other special, formal, or strictly so called, which is a virtue inclining the will to fulfilling the precept of a superior from the motive of satisfying the precept, because it is good to obey a superior commanding. This is a virtue, because it renders a debt. It is a special virtue because it has a special object: the precept of a superior formally as precept; from which it follows that to do only the desire or will of a superior when not commanded does not pertain to obedience strictly so called (a. 2, ad 1 and 3). It is one virtue because it has one object: for it regards the authority of anyone commanding, not insofar as it belongs to such or such a person, but precisely insofar as it is sufficient for commanding (ad 4).

840. Object of obedience. - The material object of obedience which it intends to exhibit is the commanded acts; the primary or principal material object is the due equality between the acts executing the precept and the right of the superior to them, by which equality our acts are proportioned to the right of the one commanding to them. The formal object or proximate motive on account of which is the special honesty of this equality.

841. Perfection of obedience. - Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues; if it is considered on the part of the object, it is not greatest among the moral virtues, for religion, for example, approaches more nearly to God; but if it is considered on the part of that which it contemns in order to adhere to God, thus it is greatest, because it contemns a greater good, namely, one's own will, than other moral virtues, which contemn lesser goods, whether of the soul, or of the body, or external goods (a. 3).

842. To whom obedience is to be given. - Obedience is to be given:

1. to God, in all things, because He is Lord of all and as to all things (a. 4; cf. Exod. XXIV, 7);

2. to human superiors, not indeed in those things which pertain only to the motion of the will, but in those things which are voluntarily to be done outwardly through bodies; not indeed as to those things which regard the nature of the human body (that is, the body's sustenance and generation), because in this way all are equal, but as to the disposition of human acts and things, according to the account of superiority (Rom. XIII, 2, 7; Tit. III, 1; I Pet. II, 13; Heb. XIII, 17).

An exception is made: a) if someone commands contrary to the command of a greater superior (Acts V, 29); b) if he commands something to which his power does not extend (a. 5). In doubt whether a superior can command this or that, one must stand by the command, because he cannot be deprived of his right of commanding which he possesses, on account of the doubt of subjects (n. 91, C).

Obedience from its genus obliges under grave obligation because it is altogether necessary for the good of society, for example, of the Church, State, community, family, etc. (q. 105, a. 1).

843. Remarks. - 1. Nothing prevents one and the same act from regarding several virtues, just as a soldier by defending the camp of the king fulfills a work of fortitude and of justice; in this mode the acts of all virtues pertain to obedience insofar as they are commanded, yet not all acts of the virtues, because not all are in precept. But if a work is altogether indifferent and pertains to no virtue, it will belong to obedience alone: thus if it is commanded precisely for proving obedience (q. 104, a. 2, ad 1).

2. Although obedience considered according to itself is of one account and one species, nevertheless it can proceed from causes diverse in species (q. 104, a. 2, ad 4). "And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues... Insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is contained in a certain way under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion" (a. 3, ad 1).

3. Since obedience is a moral virtue, it is in the mean, not indeed according to quantity: for the more obedient someone is, the more he is praised; but according to other circumstances, it can exceed, insofar as someone obeys either one whom he ought not, or in things in which he ought not (a. 2, ad 2).

4. A work is rendered virtuous and laudable and meritorious chiefly according as it proceeds from a free will; and therefore, although to obey is a debt, if someone obeys with prompt will (as if there were no precept), his merit is not on this account diminished, especially before God, who sees not only external works, but also the internal will (ibid., ad 3).

5. For satisfying the precept of obedience, ordinarily it is not necessary that the enjoined work be done from the motive of obedience, but it is enough that the commanded work be placed from an honorable end; but if it is done for this reason, that it has been commanded, it will be an act of the special virtue of obedience.

844. Inobedience is taken either materially and broadly, for the transgression of every precept from any intention whatever, and thus it is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every sin; or formally and strictly, for transgression of a precept from contempt, whether of the precept, or of the one commanding as such, or of the authority itself (q. 104, a. 2, ad 1, and q. 105, a. 1, ad 1). This is a special sin, simply mortal from its genus: to refuse to be subject to a superior or to law directly conflicts with the ordination of God (a. 1); sometimes venial from indeliberation, or from imperfection of contempt, if someone refuses to be subject to a human superior in some light matter only, while being prepared to obey in others.

Yet it is not the gravest, for it is graver to contemn the one commanding than the precept, and thus blasphemy is a greater sin than inobedience toward God, and homicide of a superior is greater than inobedience toward him (a. 2).

Moreover inobedience is so much the graver 1) the more excellent is the one commanding whose commands someone transgresses; 2) the more gravely something is commanded (a. 2).

845. Remark. - If the thing commanded is contemned because it is esteemed little, or if someone does not obey from indignation against a superior, or if he contemns the superior insofar as he is a private person, for instance because he is unlearned, imprudent, austere, there is not formal contempt of authority; nevertheless such sins frequently induce dispositively to contempt.

Of these but little remains to be said, since what is understood of Observance can be applied by a certain proportion to Reverence and Dulia, though they differ essentially from one another; I shall treat of each with one brief question or another.

OBSERVANCE is a special Virtue, by which cult and honor are rendered to persons constituted in dignity. So St. Bonaventure in the cited opuscula, serm. 1. question 1. St. Thomas here art. 1. and Cicero lib. 2. de Invent.

For in it is found a special reason of honesty and of duty, just as the same persons in a certain order of things are, by a kind of analogy, called Fathers, as being certain principles of governance with respect to those same things: as the Prince of a city in civil matters; the Commander of an army in military matters; the Master in the disciplines, namely, by reason of the likeness of the care which they have in their way in common with parents. For this reason also the servants of Naaman called their master father, 4. Kings 5.

To the same virtue pertains Reverence, which is rendered to some on account of knowledge and virtue, or any excellence whatsoever. The reason is that by knowledge and virtue a man is rendered fit for the dignities, to which the deference of observance is owed.

To observance pertains, toward persons constituted in dignity, not only to show honor, but also the cult of obedience and beneficence. So St. Thomas art. 2. For in persons constituted in dignity there is a twofold preeminence: one of excellence of status, and to this Observance is owed; the other of governance, and to this obedience and deference are owed.

SINCE, however, we are bound by legal debt only to our Prelates and Magistrates, therefore to these alone are we bound out of legal debt to observance and cult, because they hold prelation over us; to others, however, only out of moral debt, or out of a kind of honesty. So St. Thomas loc. cit.

DULIA is defined by St. Bonaventure 3. part. Centil. sect. 44. It is the servitude, or cult, owed to a rational creature ruling over one. So also St. Thomas art. 3. from St. Augustine lib. 10. de Civitate, cap. 1. ¶ Of this I shall treat more fully in part 3, Tract. 1. d. 17.

DULIA in Greek is called servitude, and differs from Latria, which is the servitude owed to God, as the Seraphic Doctor teaches loc. cit. and in the opusc. declaratio terminorum Theol. and in 6 other places cited in sect. 1. question 1. Hence Hyperdulia signifies the servitude owed to the preeminent creature, having a special affinity with God, as St. Bonaventure teaches in the places cited.

ABOVE I treated of Obedience insofar as it is the matter of the Vow; now insofar as it is a Virtue common to all subjects I shall discuss it. Its excellence Sacred Scripture everywhere describes, and indeed since men's happiness consists in this, that they be subject to God, which is wrought by this virtue, not undeservedly should it be proclaimed by the mouth of all.

OBEDIENCE is a special virtue, whereby inferiors obey their superiors commanding: hence its object is the command of the superior. So D. Thom. quaest. 104. art. 1. D. Bonavent. in the places cited, quaest. praeced. See him 3. part. Centil. sect. 44. citing many other definitions of obedience.

IT IS PROVED, because it has a special object, namely to obey the command of superiors, which according to the order of nature is right, just as in natural things the lower are governed by the higher. Obedience is indeed found in every act of virtue; as disobedience in every sin. But no wonder, as D. Thom. says art. 1. ad 1. for nothing prevents several material objective aspects from being contained in one act, just as a soldier, defending the King's castle, exercises acts of fortitude, undergoing the perils of death, and acts of Justice, rendering due service to his Lord. Nevertheless obedience has for its formal object the very command, and therefore it is a virtue distinct from the others.

I ASSERT first, that Obedience is a moral, not a Theological virtue. So S. Bonavent. in the places cited, especially in the declarat. of the Theological termini and 2. p. Brevil. cap. 11. where he also explains bare obedience, which is, when the command binds of itself alone, not from any cause; and such a command is called a command of discipline, because by it is learned how great is the virtue of obedience. Such a command was given to Adam.

THE REASON is, because it does not regard God immediately, but the command of a superior. And although it has no mean, yet it is itself the mean between excess and diminution.

BEST obedience the Saintly Doctor expounds in eight conferences, collat. 3. and de profectu, loc. cit. and in the Mirror of Novices, cap. 4. and de Instit. Novit. 12. and in the rule of novices, cap. 13. and in the Dieta, tit. 3. cap. 2.

I ASSERT second, that obedience, among the moral virtues (except Religion), is the most excellent.

THE REASON is that of D. Thomae art. 3. D. Bonavent. in the exposition of the Rule. Among the moral virtues that one is more excellent which despises better things in order to adhere to God: But obedience despises one's own will, which is the most excellent good: Therefore. For the good of the soul is more excellent than the goods of fortune and of the body, and in the soul the will excels.

EXAMPLES of obedience from scripture the Saintly Doctor reports in the Bibliis pauperum, cap. 25. Its praises indeed in the Pharetra, lib. 2. cap. 43. and in the acceptae vitis, cap. 44.

I ASSERT third, that obedience is owed to God in all things. See the excellent passages in D. Bonavent. de profectu Relig. from cap. 38.

THE REASON of the SS. DD. is; because God, just as He is the first mover of all natural things, so also of all wills: But as first mover of natural things all natural things owe Him obedience: Therefore, etc.

THE DEGREES of obedience see in S. Bonavent. in the Dieta, tit. 3. cap. 2. and de profectu Religiosi, cap. 41.

I ASSERT fourth, that inferiors must obey their superiors in all things in which they are subject to them, and in which it does not conflict with higher powers. See D. Bonavent. on cap. 1. and 10. of our Rule.

THE REASON, D. Bonavent. de profectu Religiosi, cap. 19. gives, is, because God governs the lowest through means, and the middle through the highest, as is evident.

THEREFORE on a double ground they are not bound to obey: First, because of the command of a higher power, according to that of Act. 5. We must obey God rather than men. Second, if he command something to which the subject is not subject, as D. Thom. notes, quaest. 104. art. 5.

HENCE if a Prelate command against the rule, they are not bound to obey, as S. P. Francis rightly teaches cap. 10. of the Rule, and there S. Bonavent. and commonly the DD. as found in Tannerus d. 6. quaest. 1. dub. 2. The reason of the SS. DD. is, because we are bound rather to the universal rule than to the particular. Nay rather, the Minors are bound to obey in all things in which manifest sin does not appear, as our Expositors of the Rule commonly teach. The same concerning the Society of Jesus Lessius teaches lib. 2. cap. 41. dub. 9. num. 75. Of this I treated in the Tract. de Votis.

I ASSERT fifth, that Christians are bound to obey secular Princes. So D. Bonavent. 2. d. 44. art. 3. quaest. 1. D. Thom. quaest. 104. art. 5. It is proved by the Saintly Doctor from Rom. 13. Tit. 3. 1. Petri 2. Heb. 13. Of which I treated sufficiently in the Tract. de legibus, disp. 5. wherein I also showed that the laws of Princes sometimes bind conscience; and whether Clerics are bound by the laws of Princes; And to what tributes and taxes they are bound.

BUT I warned Dynasts to beware of casting the sickle into another's harvest, but according to the decree of Christ, Matth. 22. to distinguish the things that are Caesar's; and the things that are God's.

BUT ONE MUST BEWARE of the pestilent Beza, who interprets that passage of Rom. 13. Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, asserting that Chrysostom in serm. 23. there, expounds it wickedly indeed, as commanding every soul, and Priests too, to be subject to secular Princes in all things. Doubtless this most wicked flatterer, the plague of the Kingdom of France, grinds the Ecclesiastical dignity wholly under the secular power.

TRULY, if this exposition is true, the subjects of the King of England will now be subjected to the Emperor. And the subjects of any Duke to any King, as Fagundez notes, in 4. praeceptum, lib. 4. cap. 15. num. 9. and D. Bonav. de profectu Religiosi, cap. 39. and in 2. loc. cit. rightly expounds. The genuine sense therefore is: Let every soul be subject respectively to its own powers. For so we are subject to Bishops, as is said Actor. 20. 1. Timot. 5. and in other places; and this is the sense of D. Chrysost. l. 1; see the Council of Arelat. II. cap. 2. I do not deny that they are subject in some respect, as I said in the Tract. de Legibus, disp. 6.

NAY MORE, Kings are subject to Bishops in causes of faith, which the Emperor Valentinian confessed, as reported by Theodoret, lib. 4. hist. Eccl. cap. 5. for when the Bishops had been summoned, he said: Place Him upon the Pontifical throne, to whom we too, as moderators of empire, sincerely subject our heads, and whose reproaches we gladly admit. These things we pursued at length in the Tract. de Legibus.

I ASSERT first, that Disobedience is a special sin when it is opposed to Obedience diametrically, by despising the power of the one commanding, or the command, with the intention of not subjecting oneself to it. So D. Thom. art. 1. D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 2. It is evident from the rules of virtues and vices.

I ASSERT second, that it is not the gravest sin. It is evident, because it is not opposed to the highest virtues, but to obedience.

From these Disobedience is defined by D. Bonavent. p. p. Centil. sect. 18. It is the will fleeing the lessening of power, unwilling to be subject to superiors in what is due. Hence see the printer's error in the opusc. declaratio Theologiae terminorum, in the Roman edition, where it says thus: Disobedience is a will feigning.

I ASSERT third, that disobedience is mortal of its genus. It is proved from D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 1. from that of Rom. 13. He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. and Rom 1. Not obeying parents is asserted to be mortal. The same is asserted in 1 Timor. 3.

I ASSERT fourth, that it is not always an equal sin; for from an inequality of those commanding, or of the command, the obligation can be unequal.