I. Obligations of Children Toward Parents

What is the fourth precept of the Decalogue? - The fourth precept of the Decalogue is: Honor your father and your mother. Ex. 20:12. This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents, because "they are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 3. But secondarily and implicitly it regards both the obligations of parents toward children, and also the mutual obligations of other blood-relatives, and of other inferiors and superiors. Roman Catechism, p. 3, c. 6, nn. 2, 8. Therefore this precept concerns acts per se of the virtues of piety, observance, dulia, obedience, legal justice, and gratitude.

Piety is a certain special virtue, to which it pertains to exhibit worship toward parents and one's fatherland, from whom and in which we are born, because they are "a connatural principle producing in being and governing." For piety regards this "principle, insofar as it spends duty and worship upon parents and fatherland, and upon those things which are ordered to these." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 101, a. 3. Besides this, piety also exhibits worship toward other blood-relatives, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; and likewise toward benefactors of the fatherland, because in them we behold the favor and help of the fatherland. S. Th. l. c., a. 1. "Through the fact that we are born from parents, both blood-relatives and fatherland pertain to us." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 5. Hence piety is also between spouses and with respect to children, "because between spouses there is worship and duty toward each other, as coadjutors for the preservation of the blood-relationship of both, which each spouse has from his own parents; for by the propagation of children the blood of each parent is preserved. And we say the same about children, namely because they are regarded by the virtue of piety as preservers of the blood-relationship received from parents." Cajetan, on 2. 2, q. 101, a. 1.

Worship is an act by which someone professes his own subjection to another in testimony of the latter's excellence. Hence the worship owed to parents imports reverence, obedience, and duty. Obedience imports compliance. Duty imports obedience and assistance.

Observance is a virtue "through which worship and honor is exhibited to persons constituted in dignity." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1. Honor imports a certain testimony concerning someone's excellence, either by words or by deeds, such as inclinations, or also by exterior things, for example, the offering of gifts. It is distinguished from praise, because praise consists in words alone. It is distinguished from glory, which is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness shines out in the knowledge of many, and this the name of glory imports, which is clear knowledge with praise. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 1.

Observance also pertains reductively to this fourth precept; since, just as parents are for us a principle producing in being and governing, so persons constituted in dignity not only have a certain excellence in themselves, but also a certain power of governing with respect to some things, whence the nature of principle also belongs to them, as a Prince of a city is in civil matters, a leader of an army in military matters, a teacher in disciplines. Hence it is that all such persons are also called fathers because of the likeness of care. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 63, a. 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; Quodl. 10, a. 12; Roman Catechism, n. 8.

Dulia is "a certain species of observance, because through observance we honor any persons whatever who excel in dignity; but through dulia, properly taken, servants venerate their masters. For dulia in Greek is called servitude." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 3. They venerate, by furnishing due service to masters. A certain species of observance. For observance has diverse species according to the diverse nature of excellence. And thus in one way a servant reveres a master, a soldier a commander, a disciple a teacher. S. Th. l. c., a. 4; q. 104, a. 2 ad 4.

Obedience properly is "a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept" of a superior. "But if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for omission of the same from any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 2. The former is usually called formal obedience; the latter, material obedience. "Obedience proceeds from reverence, which exhibits worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered in itself, insofar as it regards the nature of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for Prelates it is contained in some way under observance; insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 3 ad 1. But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Cf. 835.

Gratitude or thankfulness is a virtue which recompenses benefactors for some particular and private benefit received, by the action of thanks, and by spending something gratuitously. Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude, which according to the diversity of circumstances is sometimes a lethal, sometimes a venial sin. It is not grave unless the ingratitude was great. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 107.

Therefore gratitude is a certain virtue which comes after piety and observance, as deficient from them, since "not whatever we owe to a father or to a person excelling in dignity do we owe to some benefactor from whom we have received some particular benefit." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 106, aa. 1, 3, 6; q. 107. But honor and reverence are owed to a benefactor because he has the nature of a principle, and per accidens relief or support, if he is in need.

What about legitimate and illegitimate, natural and adoptive children? - Some children are legitimate and natural, others natural, others legitimate. Legitimate and natural children are those who are born from a man and his wife. Those are presumed by law legitimate and natural who are born from a mother joined in lawful marriage, unless it is juridically certain that their origin is from another than the husband of the mother. For he is held as father whom marriage points out. The mother indeed is certain; but the father is presumed. And this presumption also has force in the forum of conscience. C. B. 1591, 1717, 1720; C. L. 101 seqq.; C. He. 252.

The fetus is usually brought forth in the ninth month from the time it was conceived, sometimes at the beginning of the seventh, sometimes at the full tenth, namely not before 180 days, nor after 300 days. C. I. 161 seqq.; C. G. 315; C. H. 108; C. A. 138, 163; C. B. 1592, 1717; C. L. 101; C. He. 252, 254.

Hence, of him who is born either after the seventh month from the marriage entered, or before the tenth month from the marriage dissolved, he is the father whom marriage points out, unless something else is most evident. C. L. 103; C. He. 254, 255. Nor indeed does it at all stand in the way that the mother was adulterous, C. I. 165; C. G. 313; C. H. 109; C. A. 158, or that she herself has declared the son adulterine, C. A. 158, unless she brings forward such indications as would suffice in the external forum, Lugo, de Iust., d. 12, n. 26, although she be most worthy of faith, and sworn, and assert this while dying; for no one deserves belief when alleging his own baseness. C. Inter 8, § ult., de Donat.; L. 654, 924.

A fetus brought forth before the seventh month from the marriage entered is held legitimate only if the husband either married the woman knowingly and willingly while she was pregnant, or, since he was present, did not altogether repudiate the child born. C. I. 161; C. G. 314; C. H. 110; C. L. 102. A fetus brought forth later after the tenth month from the dissolution of marriage is held as illegitimate, unless the health and morals of the mother and the circumstances of things suggest otherwise. C. I. 169; C. G. 315; C. H. 111; C. L. 102 seqq.

Natural or illegitimate children are those who are born outside marriage. These by canon law are irregular; by civil law they are distinguished from legitimate children chiefly as to succession to paternal inheritance. C. A. 155, 165; C. H. 114, 127, 134, 139. These natural children, if they were born from a man and woman between whom marriage could not have been entered, whether by natural law or by divine and canon law, by the same canon law are called spurious, or born from condemned intercourse. C. 3, 10, Qui fil. sint legit. And they are adulterine, sacrilegious, incestuous, and nefarious, if they were born from ascendants and descendants. But by civil law all are called illegitimate, and if they are adulterine or incestuous, they cannot be recognized. C. I. 180; C. G. 335; C. He. 304.

Other illegitimate children can be acknowledged and legitimated. C. I. 179, 195; C. G. 331, 334. They are acknowledged by the confession of parents, in civil law, authentic, C. I. 181; C. G. 334; C. H. 131; C. He. 503; in canon law, simple and bare, C. 10, de Probat.; and after they have been acknowledged they follow the condition of the one acknowledging, whether of the mother, or of the father, or of both. C. I. 185. But those acknowledged are legitimated by subsequent marriage by the law itself, C. I. 194; C. G. 331; C. H. 120, 121; C. He. 258 seqq.; C. A. 161; C. B. 1719; and they can also be acknowledged after the marriage has already been contracted. C. I. 197; C. H. 121; C. L. 119. Cf. C. G. 331.

By Canon Law, C. 1, 6, Qui filii sint legitimi, and C. H. 119, by marriage only children are legitimated from parents who freely could contract marriage between themselves. But whether those legitimated by dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff, as to canonical effects, are also legitimated as to civil effects, some affirm, others deny.

But from the time when they have been legitimated, they are held as if they had been born from lawful marriage. C. 6, Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 333; C. H. 122; C. A. 161; C. He. 263. Cf. Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 13, c. 24, n. 16. But one merely acknowledged is understood as the child only of him who acknowledged him. C. I. 182; C. G. 336; C. H. 129, 134. From C. B. 1589, 1705, a natural child and father are not reputed blood-relatives; and on the contrary, in his relations with the mother and the mother's blood-relatives he has the juridical condition of a legitimate child. But the same code admits investigation of the natural father and obligations, arts. 1708, 1717. Almost the same is had from C. He. 302 seqq., which also admits investigation of the natural father and obligations. C. H. 135 and C. L. 130 admit investigation of the father in a limited way, and the same codes admit investigation of the mother in the following articles. C. I. 189, 190, 193 admits investigation of maternity. But investigation of paternity is limited to the case of abduction and seduction. C. G. 340, 341, 342 likewise admits investigation of maternity, but investigation of paternity is restricted to the case of abduction. But by each Code and by C. L. 132, investigation of paternity and maternity is forbidden to adulterine and incestuous children whose recognition is prohibited; and by C. H. 141 investigation of paternity is prohibited to children in whom the legal condition of natural children does not concur. In doubt whether someone was born from legitimate marriage, he is to be presumed legitimate. C. I. 120; L. l. 3, n. 951.

Legitimate children are natural children legitimated, and adoptive children. C. I. 737. Adoption is an act by which one is taken into the place of a child who is not such by nature. From more recent laws, the adopted person is held as the legitimate and natural child only of him who adopted him, and he acquires the right of succession to him. C. I. 202, 204, 210, 737; C. G. 343, 344, 350; C. B. 1741, 1757; C. L. 124, 129; C. He. 268. But he is not withdrawn from the power of his natural father, nor does he pass into the power and family of the adopting father. C. I. 210, 212; C. G. 348, 349. But it is otherwise from C. A. 183; C. H. 177; C. B. 1765. This adoption is perpetual and is not dissolved even by mutual consent. C. I. 217. And so also the French Jurists. It is otherwise from C. A. 185; C. B. 1768; C. He. 269.

Legitimate and natural children, as to receiving donations and as to the right of succession, are held such from the time when they were truly conceived, provided they are afterwards born viable. C. I. 724; C. G. 725; C. A. 138. He is born viable who is born after the 180th day from conception, C. I. 160, 162; C. G. 312, 314; C. A. 138, and is perfectly born. In doubt, one who was brought forth alive is presumed to have been born viable. C. I. 724. Abortive children, if they do not survive, are held as born dead.

Natural children only, whether legitimated or acknowledged, acquire the right of succession from the marriage entered by the parents, or from that later time when they have been acknowledged. C. I. 197; C. H. 124. Merely legitimate children acquire the right of succession from the time when they were adopted, as if they had then first been conceived. C. I. 210, 217; C. B. 1754, 1757. From C. H. 177, an adopted person acquires no right of succession except from a testament, or from a previous agreement. From C. B. 1767, the right of succession can be excluded in the contract of adoption. To spurious, incestuous, and adulterine children the laws concede only support, namely when their filiation is duly established. C. L. 134, 135, 136; C. G. 762; C. I. 193, 752; C. H. 139, 140, 141.

What about infants; about those below puberty and pubescents; about minors and majors; about wards? - Those less than seven years old are called infants, as if not speaking, unable to speak. Unless they have already attained the use of reason, although they are not held by human laws, nevertheless they are held by the natural law.

From the seventh year to the fourteenth year, if male; to the twelfth, if female, they are called below puberty; but beyond the aforesaid age they are called pubescent, namely from the proximate power of generation attained at that age. Those below puberty, if they cease to be under the power of the father, by the death of the father or by the emancipation of the children, are called wards. L. 239, de Verb. sign. Having become pubescent, sons are called minors up to the twenty-fifth year of age from Roman Law. L. 1, de Minoribus. By more recent Law, every other distinction having been removed, he or she who has not yet completed the twenty-first year of age is called a minor; after such an age has been completed, he or she is called a major. C. I. 323, 240; C. G. 388, 488; C. B. 2; C. L. 97, 311. From C. H. 320, majority is established when the twenty-third year has been completed; C. A. 21, 174, at the twenty-fourth year; C. He. 14, when the twentieth year has been completed and by marriage.

A cleric is major in benefice matters and other spiritual causes when he has completed the fourteenth year of age. C. Si annum 3, de Iudic., in 6. At a minor age a son, unless he has been emancipated, is constituted under paternal power. C. I. 220; C. B. 1626. But a major regularly manages his own affairs. He can freely dispose of his person and goods. C. L. 311. He is called a son of the family who is still subject to paternal power.

What is the proper obligation of children? - Since children have existence from parents, therefore, besides love, they owe piety to them. For as the love of parents is for doing good, so the love of children is for honoring parents. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 31, a. 3 ad 3; q. 26, a. 9 ad 1, ad 3. But although love does not import honor, honor includes love, since him whom we honor from the soul we also love. Therefore when by the sin of children charity alone toward parents is injured, the only malice contained in it is that alone which is against filial piety. But if that sin has another malice against another virtue, then this new species is added to the former.

Piety per se demands two things, reverence and obedience, but per accidens help to be furnished if they need it. Hence it is that sin against piety can injure both love and reverence and obedience toward parents. For example, if a son conceives internal hatred against parents, or externally by words or in another way saddens them, he sins against love; if he curses parents, he sins against love and against reverence; if he contemns parents and the precept of parents, he sins against reverence and obedience. Another species can also be added to the species against piety, for example, if a son defames or strikes his father, he sins against piety and against justice. C. He. 273, 275.

Even at a greater age children owe love, honor, and reverence to parents, because they are always children, and the others always parents. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 26, aa. 9, 10; q. 101, a. 7; L. 333; C. I. 220; C. G. 371; C. H. 154; C. A. 144, 154. Reverence can be injured by words, gestures, and deeds, namely gravely, even in those things which as to others are light, provided they are not altogether light. Therefore children sin gravely: by words, by commonly addressing parents harshly, or even by showing them no sign of benevolence; by calling them with contumelious words in their presence; or by cursing them from the soul. By gestures, by looking at them with grim eyes, by laughing at them in their presence, by mocking them. By deeds, by deliberately raising hands against them as a sign of striking them, by accusing them of crimes, unless the matter concerns crimes pernicious to the commonwealth, such as heresy, treason, etc. L. 333, 334.

Likewise obedience is gravely injured by not obeying parents in those things which regard domestic governance and economy, or pertain to good morals, if however parents command seriously and in a grave matter; excepting the choice of state, of entering marriage, of entering religion, unless however parents contradict children in this matter from a just cause. Likewise a grave sin is committed by not recognizing them as parents, unless this is done from a just cause and only externally by hiding that one is their child. But they by no means sin by fulfilling duties of religion against the prohibition of parents. For as to all those things which pertain to salvation, "they are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 5 ad 2; L. 334, 335; S. Th., Quodl. 2, a. 9; 2. 2, q. 104, aa. 2, 5; C. A. 148; C. L. 142.

Children owe help to needy parents, and consequently must support them; and it is grave even to enter religion by abandoning them in need. Likewise it is grave under this heading not to take care that the sacraments be conferred upon them when sick; that the dead be handed over to burial; that some sacrifice be offered for their soul. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 101, a. 2, a. 4 ad 4; q. 102, a. 2; q. 123, a. 5 ad 3; L. 333, 335; C. I. 139; C. G. 205; C. A. 154; C. B. 1617; C. He. 271, 272.

Do children also owe their own goods to parents? - R. Negatively. Children owe piety to parents, not labors. Therefore if a son furnishes labors in the paternal house, for example, as a craftsman or shoemaker, what he gains from them is his own, after deducting the support which he receives from the father, since he is now able to be sustained by his own work and labor, and no longer needs paternal sustenance. But if he asks nothing, he seems to remit these things to the father from grateful mind and piety. The same must be said about goods acquired by the son by donation, testament, etc.; the son indeed makes them his own, but he is bound to refund the expenses of education to the father. C. A. 150, 154; C. B. 685, 1618. Nor is he bound to pay the father's debts from his own goods. These things are clear by natural law, and it is confirmed by positive law, which, determining the natural obligation, assigns to parents the usufruct of the goods of children. As to positive Law, dominion, or ownership of goods, usufruct, and administration must be distinguished. Likewise the various goods and various Laws must be distinguished: Common or Roman Law, and various More Recent Laws, which are in force in various regions.

Since the right of parents as to the goods of children constitutes part of those rights from which paternal power is had, we shall speak of it more particularly soon, while explaining paternal power. L. 488; C. B. 1627; C. He. 271, 272, 284, 293, 295.

What is paternal power? - Paternal power is the complex of rights of parents over children, and it arises from a twofold cause: 1. because children have had life from them; 2. because parents must educate them fittingly. C. A. 147; C. L. 137. It is from Natural and Positive Law at the same time, positive law defining and determining natural right. For the rights of parents over children flow from natural and civil law. By Natural Law, piety is owed to parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, namely to father and mother, and it belongs to them equally and perpetually as to love and honor, but not however as to obedience after the son has become major, or has been emancipated. C. I. 220. Besides this, power belongs to parents as to those things which pertain to the spiritual salvation of children. And this also belongs equally to each, indeed also to grandfather and grandmother. But if they disagree among themselves, he prevails who consults the salvation of the child. And, when the father has died, if the mother as tutor and the paternal grandmother disagree, the latter will be stronger. Benedict XIV, Ep. Probe te, §§ 20, 21, 23; Ep. Postremo mense, §§ 16, 17; C. Ex litteris 2, de Conv. infid. - The natural power of parents in those things which pertain to the salvation of the soul ends when infancy has passed; in those things which pertain to the choice of state it ends at puberty, C. Cum virum 12, de Regul.; C. A. 148; in those things which pertain to domestic care and discipline it ends by emancipation. But in those things which regard the sustenance of the body and generation of offspring, children are their own masters. And as to entering marriage, they commonly are bound only to seek the counsel of parents. L. 335.

But emancipation is naturally had when the son of the family has already grown sufficiently by age, so that he himself can now be father of a family, and by himself duly consider and oblige himself concerning those things which pertain to his own person and to his exterior goods. C. 11, 12, de Regul.; S. Th. 4 D. 27, q. 2, a. 2; D. 38, q. 1, a. 1, q. ult., sol. 3; 2. 2, q. 104, a. 5; S., q. 43, a. 2; q. 58, a. 5; St. Basil the Great, Epist. 276, Migne, vol. 32, col. 1011.

By Common Law paternal power belongs only to the father of the family, and it was per se perpetual. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 9, §§ 2, 3; t. 12; lib. 1, tit. 6, ff., §§ 3-5, de Patr. pot.; l. 8, t. 46, C.; C. 2, de Convers. infid. But from the More Recent Laws it belongs also to the mother of the family. C. I. 220; C. G. 372; C. B. 1634, 1684, 1685; C. L. 138; C. He. 274. But the mother does not use it as long as the father uses it, to whom it principally belongs. C. I. 46, 220, 230, 331; C. G. 141, 373, 507; C. A. 144, 147; C. H. 154; C. B. 1634; C. L. 139, 155. Moreover it belongs over legitimate and natural children, over natural children acknowledged, over natural children acknowledged and legitimated, and at least in some way also over adoptive children. C. I. 66, 184, 194, 210, 211, 220; C. H. 154; C. A. 183; C. B. 1306, 1757, 1765; C. L. 166. Cf. here n. 663.

Paternal power is exercised by the father, and when he has died or is absent, by the mother with equal right. C. I. 46, 220, 231; C. H. 154; C. G. 141, 390; C. A. 144, 147; C. B. 1627, 1684; C. He. 274. Yet a father dying has the right to prescribe to the surviving mother the manner he wishes to be observed in the education of the children and the administration of goods. C. I. 235, 1059. Cf. C. G. 391; C. B. 1852 seqq. If the mother enters second nuptials, it will be in the power of the family Council or pupilary Judge to permit or remove guardianship from her. C. I. 237; C. G. 395; C. A. 255. When parents are lacking, and a tutor has not been named, guardianship by law belongs to the paternal grandfather; and, he being lacking, to the maternal grandfather. C. I. 244; C. B. 1776.

Moreover paternal power is exercised partly over the persons, partly over the things of children. C. B. 1627.

Paternal Power is exercised, 1. over persons by the faculty which the father has of retaining the son at home, C. He. 273, unless the son wishes voluntarily to give his name to military service. C. I. 221; C. G. 374; by the faculty which the father has of moderately correcting and punishing a disorderly son, C. He. 275; also of barring him from his own house, and even having recourse, where there is need, to the tribunal, and of placing him in another house of education or correction. C. I. 222; C. H. 155, 156; C. G. 375 seqq.; C. A. 145; C. B. 1631, 1632; C. L. 143; L. 3, de Patr. pot., C. Moreover the son is prohibited without the consent of parents from giving himself into adoption, C. I. 208; C. G. 346; C. A. 181; C. B. 1747, and from entering marriage. C. I. 63; C. G. 148; C. A. 49, 153; C. H. 1305; C. L. 1058, 1061; C. He. 98. But when the mother dissents, the consent of the father suffices. C. I.; C. G., ll. cc.; C. He. 274. Finally the right of appointing a tutor belongs to the last surviving parent. C. I. 242; C. G. 397; C. B. 1777; C. He. 274.

Excepting marriage, which before puberty is null from canon law, as to other acts and contracts sons of a family who are minors are only naturally obligated; and if in due time they do not seek restitution in full, they can also be civilly obligated, and those who contract with them are naturally and civilly obligated. Therefore, if they have entered betrothals, if they have emitted a vow, they are bound by the betrothals and by the vow. If they have donated anything, they transfer dominion to the recipient; and if they themselves receive something as a gift, they licitly acquire and retain dominion. C. I., de Desp. impub.; C. I. 1304; C. G. 1314; C. H. 160, 161; C. A. 244, 246; C. B. 106; C. L. 98, 99; Inst. 1, l. 3, t. 19, § 6; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; 4 D. 27, q. 2, a. 2; L. l. 3, n. 918; Lugo, de Iust., d. 22, nn. 228, 295, 300.

But although a minor validly contracts, from the More Recent Laws he does not contract firmly if various prescriptions of those laws are not observed, and then restitution in full is conceded to them, which also holds in the forum of conscience, since a law of this sort is definitive of right and just; since it is for protecting good morals, for the peace and good of families, and for the common good. C. G. 2012; C. I. 317, 319, 1899.

From C. I. a minor is restored because he is a minor, and an action of nullity is admitted: 1. If a non-emancipated minor performed an act by himself without the intervention of the father or his legitimate representative. 2. If an emancipated minor performed by himself an act for which the law requires the assistance of a curator. 3. When the formalities constituted for certain acts by special dispositions of law are not observed. But an action of nullity is not admitted: 1. If the minor by evil art and deceit concealed his condition as a minor. 2. If the matter concerns an obligation arising from delict or quasi-delict. 3. If it is proved that what was paid was turned to the convenience and utility of the minor. C. I. 1300, 1303, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1899.

From C. G. a minor is restored because he was harmed, and an action of nullity is admitted if the prescriptions of the law in contracts of minors were not observed. Rescission is not admitted: 1. If the harm happened from a chance event. 2. If a minor exercises commerce or some art, as to contracts entered by reason of his commerce or art. 3. If the matter concerns an obligation flowing from delict or quasi-delict. 4. If it is proved that what was paid went to their convenience and utility. C. G. 1304, 1305, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1312, 2012; L. l. 3, nn. 514, 918. Cf. Troplong, della Vendita, cap. 2, art. 1594, num. 166 seqq.

From C. H., the formalities of law not having been observed, the contract of a minor becomes liable to rescission. But he is not bound to restitution except insofar as he became richer by the thing received. C. H. 317, 420, 1163, 1304, 1764, 1765. From C. A., in general a minor indeed cannot be validly obligated without the consent of the father and the other prescriptions of the law. Yet he can freely dispose of things acquired by his own industry, and of others given to him for his own use after puberty has been attained. C. A. 151, 152, 244, 246, 248. From C. B., a minor needs the consent of his representative for any declaration of will whatever, unless this procures a juridical advantage for him, or unless the matter concerns things left to his free disposition. Without the aforesaid consent of the representative, the act can be rescinded. C. B. 108 seqq. From C. L. 297 seqq., the acts of a minor are null if they are made without due authority. But they themselves cannot use this nullity as to obligations upon things of their own art or profession, or if they use deceit so that they may be held as majors.

The power of the father is exercised, 2. over the things of children. From common Law the son was at first a thing of the father of the family; whatever he acquired belonged to the father. Afterwards peculium was recognized. Peculium is any good whatever proper to the son, separated from paternal goods. It is fourfold: 1. Castrense, acquired by military service or on the occasion of military service; and this whole thing, in perfect dominion, belongs to the son. Yet one below puberty does not have its administration.

2. Quasi-castrense, acquired by the profession of sciences or liberal arts, or by some civil office, for example, of judge, advocate, physician, teacher, from an ecclesiastical office or benefice; and the perfect dominion of this also belongs to the son. Yet administration belongs to the father if he himself is below puberty.

3. Adventitious, which comes to the son from elsewhere than from paternal goods, and not by regard for the father, for example, what comes to the same son from the mother, from the maternal line, or by regard for the mother, or what is acquired by his own industry and labor, by the liberality of others, by chance and fortune. The dominion of ownership belongs to the son; the usufruct and administration of this peculium belongs to the father as long as he lives. Therefore by Roman Law the father has the usufruct of all these goods of the son; and this usufruct ends only by the death of the father, otherwise than is had by More Recent Law.

4. Profectitious, which either is acquired from paternal goods, or has been donated to the son by regard for the father. And this whole thing belongs to the father, in ownership, usufruct, and administration. Inst. 1, l. 2, t. 9, §§ 1, 2; l. 3, t. 29; Lugo, d. 5, n. 23 seqq. The father can dispose of adventitious goods if they are consumable, with the burden however of restitution. If the son trades outside the father's house from goods other than paternal goods, the gain is adventitious. If he labors in the paternal house and is fed by the father, or trades from the father's goods, it is profectitious. "If a son trades with the money of the father, either received as a loan or secretly stolen, at his own risk, so that he seriously determines to preserve the father unharmed in any event whatever, it is certain from the common opinion of all cited by Laymann, l. 3, tr. 4, c. 8, n. 12, that the whole gain pertains to the ownership of the son as adventitious peculium. Why is this? Because although he obtains the whole gain by the money of the father, he obtains it in such a way that the whole gain is derived not from the money of the father, sterile of its own nature, but from the industry of the son, which renders the money fruitful." Ithur., Cas. 3, n. 6; L. 488.

The father of the family and the son of the family are held as one person. Since therefore no one can contract with himself, if they contract, the pact is civilly void. Civilly, for naturally they are mutually obligated and obligate. Inst. 1, l. 3, t. 19, § 6. A son of the family, not even with the father consenting, can make a testament concerning adventitious or profectitious peculium; but he can, even against the father's will, concerning castrense or quasi-castrense peculium. Inst. 1, l. 2, t. 12.

From More Recent Laws, minors are held by law incapable of protecting themselves and their own goods. Hence as to each, he with whom paternal power is represents them. C. B. 1630; C. L. 98, 100; C. He. 279.

The administration of all goods of minor children is in the hands of the father or mother, or tutor, who must supply the incapacity or lack of skill of the children until they become majors or obtain emancipation. Exceptions must be made, from C. B. 1638; C. L. 147; C. He. 294; C. I. 224, of goods given to the son with exclusion from this administration of the father. Cf. C. L. 146, 147. Majors are altogether free in managing their own affairs, unless in some case the law specially forbids this to them, and therefore they have full administration of their own goods; but emancipated persons have it only limited. C. I. 323, 310 seqq.; C. G. 488, 476 seqq.; C. A. 149, 187, 251. Cf. C. L. 305 seqq., 311.

Hence he who exercises paternal power manages the affairs of the son. C. I. 224, 242; C. G. 389; C. A. 149, 152. He, not the son, acts in judgment, enters upon inheritances coming to the son after an inventory has been made, accepts donations, C. I. 226, 1059; C. A. 205, 222 seqq., 243, and administers his goods, C. I. 224; C. G. 389; C. H. 159; C. A. 149. But goods, whether immovable or movable, excepting those which cannot be preserved by being preserved or become worse, he cannot alienate, bind by mortgage or pledge, nor likewise receive a loan in the name of the son, nor exercise other acts which exceed acts of simple administration, except from a cause of necessity or evident utility and by decree of the civil tribunal. C. I. 224, 225; C. H. 164; C. G. 389; C. B. 1640 seqq.; C. L. 150; C. He. 290, 299, 300.

The father, or mother exercising paternal power, has the usufruct of those things which come to the son by succession, donation, or another lucrative title. C. I. 228, 229, 231; C. G. 384, 386; C. H. 160; C. B. 1640, 1685; C. He. 294, unless the goods were left to the son by testament, or given by donation, on this condition, that the usufruct not pertain to the parents, C. I. 229; C. G. 387; C. B. 1651; or were left to the son by testament, or given by donation for undertaking some course of life, art, or profession, C. I. 229; or for his education and instruction, C. H. 162; or unless, against the will of the parents, the son accepted the donation or legacy, or entered upon the inheritance, C. I. 229. Likewise excluded from that usufruct are those things which the son acquired for himself by labor, profession, or separate industry, C. I. 229; C. G. 387; C. B. 1650, 1651, and the goods of the succession of a son as to which parents have been declared unworthy. C. I. 728; C. G. 730.

To this usufruct there inheres the obligation of feeding, sustaining, educating, and instructing the children. C. I. 230; C. G. 385; C. B. 1602, 1603, 1606, 1656; C. L. 148; C. He. 293. Neither father nor mother has the usufruct of the goods of natural children. They can only administer their goods, but with the burden of rendering an account also concerning the fruits. Gousset on a. 384, C. G.; C. I. 184. Cf. C. L. 166, 167.

From C. A. 149, 150, 151, 154, all goods, administration excepted, simply pertain to the son; yet the father can deduct the expenses of education from the revenues. From C. H. 161, goods acquired by children from the goods of the same parents simply pertain to the parents. From the same C. H. 160, the usufruct even of those goods which the son acquired by his own labor and industry pertains to the parent exercising paternal power. From C. L. 145, 146, 147, the usufruct of goods which a son of the family acquires by his labor, his industry, his means, or by any other gratuitous title whatever, pertains to the parents, unless they were given with exclusion of this usufruct, or the children acquire by arms, letters, liberal arts, or acquire by their own labor and industry, but live from themselves with the father's permission.

Usufruct of this sort ends by the emancipation of the son, or by death, or when minority or legitimate age has been completed; by the widowed father or mother passing to other nuptials; if the father abuses paternal power, either by not caring for the obligations imposed or by administering goods badly, with a sentence of the tribunal added; and likewise it ceases with respect to the spouse by whose fault divorce has legally been pronounced. C. I. 156, 228, 232, 233; C. G. 384, 386; C. H. 167, 172; C. B. 1666, 1673, 1679, 1680; C. He. 297 seqq. From C. B. 1661, 1662, usufruct also has an end by the marriage of the son, and by renunciation of the father. From C. G. 384, 386, usufruct is conceded to the father, and after he has died to the mother remaining unmarried, up to the eighteenth year of the children, or their emancipation. Cf. C. L. 149; C. He. 274, 292.

But when the son has become a major, those things which have been done by the parents, if they were done according to law, remain ratified; but otherwise they can be made void by him. And if meanwhile a conflict arises as to goods between father and son under paternal power, the latter will be able to have recourse to the tribunal. C. I. 224, 227, 1304; C. G. 1314; C. H. 165; C. A. 271; C. B. 1667, 1668; C. L. 153; L. 488, 543, 544; Gousset 682; C. He. 283, 284, 297 seqq.

Paternal power is dissolved by the death of the father or son, C. H. 167; C. L. 170; C. He. 274; by adoption of the son, C. H. 167; C. B. 1757, 1765; C. A. 183; by emancipation of the son, C. I. 220, 311; C. G. 372, 476-479; C. L. 170; C. H. 167; C. A. 172, 252. But a son is emancipated by the law itself through marriage, C. I. 310; C. G. 476; C. L. 304; C. He. 14, otherwise from C. A. 175. Emancipation is a legitimate act by which a father dismisses his minor son from his power, so that he is made his own master. Emancipation cannot be made before the completed eighteenth year, C. I. 311; C. He. 15. It is dissolved besides by majority of age, C. I. 220;

C. G. 372; C. A. 172; C. L. 170. Cf. here 664. From C. B. 386, which does not admit emancipation, declaration of majority can be had in the eighteenth year of age. It is likewise dissolved if the father abuses paternal power, with a sentence for the crime added. C. I. Poen. 392; C. H. 171; C. B. 1666, 1680; C. A. 177, 178. Paternal power ought to consist in piety, not in atrocity. If the mother survives, she does not simply lose it, although she passes to other nuptials. Yet in this case, from C. I. 237, she can be removed from the administration of the son's goods. From C. B. 1697, a mother passing to other nuptials loses paternal power in part. Cf. C. L. 155 seqq.; C. He. 286. When parents are interdicted, insane, or mad, their paternal power remains suspended. C. I. 220, 229 seqq.; C. A. 179; C. B. 1676 seqq.

When paternal power has been dissolved, the son of the family becomes his own master. But whether he is his own master or is still subject to paternal power, the father of the family can usefully contract with him, and from the eighteenth year of age he can make a testament. C. I. 763, 1107; C. A. 271, 596; at the sixteenth year, but in a limited way, from C. G. 903, 904. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 12.

Can a son of the family retain gains which come to him from his own labor, but not from separate industry, in the paternal house? - Several and grave theologians deny. The reason is that then the son of the family laboring is judged to act not in his own name, but as a member of the family, and thus every gain ought to fall to the good of the family. Besides, positive Law does not favor him, but altogether stands against him.

Several also and grave theologians affirm. The reason is that a son is not of worse condition than a servant; therefore at least the wage which would be owed to a servant or to an extraneous person laboring ought to fall to the son. That would certainly be owed to the son if by his condition he is not bound to labor, and he supplies for an extraneous person, or if he spends extraordinary and altogether undue labor in the paternal house. C. L. 144. Nor indeed in these two cases does positive Law seem to stand against him, since they are extraordinary, and, by legitimate epikeia, are not comprehended by positive Law, which regards cases commonly occurring. But then the expenses which the father made in feeding, sustaining, educating him, etc., must always be deducted. For he was not bound to make these for a son able and willing to earn. C. He. 272; Inst. 1, l. 2, tit. 9; L. l. 3, nn. 488, 3; 544, 910; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; Ithur., Cas. 3; Gousset 683, 684, 991.

Does a son have perfect dominion over movable goods given to him by parents or relatives? - R. Affirmatively, if they are consumable by first use, because they are given to him absolutely for use, unless perhaps some restriction has been added, as would be money for buying books, for paying a pension, etc. "If they are not consumable by first use, as books, clothes, etc., the son generally has only useful dominion, because parents almost do not intend to confer anything else upon him." Thus Gury, 546. But rather it seems that it must be said that, by this very fact that children can by continued use for their own utility consume and destroy these things, they have dominion over these things also directly, although perhaps restricted and not altogether absolute, insofar as, from the mind of the giver, the whole thing is to be turned only to their utility, as, for example, is seen in books, clothes, etc.

Is a son judged to renounce the usufruct to which he has a right, if, with him seeing and silent, the father receives this usufruct? - R. Negatively, at least speaking generally. The reason is that silence would be equivalent to renunciation only insofar as the son could easily protest. Now reverential fear for the most part stands in the way of his being able to do this easily. From C. I. 234, if, after usufruct has ceased, the parents still continue to receive it, with the son staying with them, and without the condition of rendering an account having been established, the parents or their heirs are bound only to the fruits existing from the day on which they are demanded.