Question Three: On Obedience and Inobedience

S. Th. II-II, q. 104 and 105.

839. Obedience (obedience) is twofold: one general, by which from any honorable intention whatever we furnish acts prescribed from any virtue whatever; the other special, formal, or strictly so called, which is a virtue inclining the will to fulfilling the precept of a superior from the motive of satisfying the precept, because it is good to obey a superior commanding. This is a virtue, because it renders a debt. It is a special virtue because it has a special object: the precept of a superior formally as precept; from which it follows that to do only the desire or will of a superior when not commanded does not pertain to obedience strictly so called (a. 2, ad 1 and 3). It is one virtue because it has one object: for it regards the authority of anyone commanding, not insofar as it belongs to such or such a person, but precisely insofar as it is sufficient for commanding (ad 4).

840. Object of obedience. - The material object of obedience which it intends to exhibit is the commanded acts; the primary or principal material object is the due equality between the acts executing the precept and the right of the superior to them, by which equality our acts are proportioned to the right of the one commanding to them. The formal object or proximate motive on account of which is the special honesty of this equality.

841. Perfection of obedience. - Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues; if it is considered on the part of the object, it is not greatest among the moral virtues, for religion, for example, approaches more nearly to God; but if it is considered on the part of that which it contemns in order to adhere to God, thus it is greatest, because it contemns a greater good, namely, one's own will, than other moral virtues, which contemn lesser goods, whether of the soul, or of the body, or external goods (a. 3).

842. To whom obedience is to be given. - Obedience is to be given:

1. to God, in all things, because He is Lord of all and as to all things (a. 4; cf. Exod. XXIV, 7);

2. to human superiors, not indeed in those things which pertain only to the motion of the will, but in those things which are voluntarily to be done outwardly through bodies; not indeed as to those things which regard the nature of the human body (that is, the body's sustenance and generation), because in this way all are equal, but as to the disposition of human acts and things, according to the account of superiority (Rom. XIII, 2, 7; Tit. III, 1; I Pet. II, 13; Heb. XIII, 17).

An exception is made: a) if someone commands contrary to the command of a greater superior (Acts V, 29); b) if he commands something to which his power does not extend (a. 5). In doubt whether a superior can command this or that, one must stand by the command, because he cannot be deprived of his right of commanding which he possesses, on account of the doubt of subjects (n. 91, C).

Obedience from its genus obliges under grave obligation because it is altogether necessary for the good of society, for example, of the Church, State, community, family, etc. (q. 105, a. 1).

843. Remarks. - 1. Nothing prevents one and the same act from regarding several virtues, just as a soldier by defending the camp of the king fulfills a work of fortitude and of justice; in this mode the acts of all virtues pertain to obedience insofar as they are commanded, yet not all acts of the virtues, because not all are in precept. But if a work is altogether indifferent and pertains to no virtue, it will belong to obedience alone: thus if it is commanded precisely for proving obedience (q. 104, a. 2, ad 1).

2. Although obedience considered according to itself is of one account and one species, nevertheless it can proceed from causes diverse in species (q. 104, a. 2, ad 4). "And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues... Insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is contained in a certain way under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion" (a. 3, ad 1).

3. Since obedience is a moral virtue, it is in the mean, not indeed according to quantity: for the more obedient someone is, the more he is praised; but according to other circumstances, it can exceed, insofar as someone obeys either one whom he ought not, or in things in which he ought not (a. 2, ad 2).

4. A work is rendered virtuous and laudable and meritorious chiefly according as it proceeds from a free will; and therefore, although to obey is a debt, if someone obeys with prompt will (as if there were no precept), his merit is not on this account diminished, especially before God, who sees not only external works, but also the internal will (ibid., ad 3).

5. For satisfying the precept of obedience, ordinarily it is not necessary that the enjoined work be done from the motive of obedience, but it is enough that the commanded work be placed from an honorable end; but if it is done for this reason, that it has been commanded, it will be an act of the special virtue of obedience.

844. Inobedience is taken either materially and broadly, for the transgression of every precept from any intention whatever, and thus it is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every sin; or formally and strictly, for transgression of a precept from contempt, whether of the precept, or of the one commanding as such, or of the authority itself (q. 104, a. 2, ad 1, and q. 105, a. 1, ad 1). This is a special sin, simply mortal from its genus: to refuse to be subject to a superior or to law directly conflicts with the ordination of God (a. 1); sometimes venial from indeliberation, or from imperfection of contempt, if someone refuses to be subject to a human superior in some light matter only, while being prepared to obey in others.

Yet it is not the gravest, for it is graver to contemn the one commanding than the precept, and thus blasphemy is a greater sin than inobedience toward God, and homicide of a superior is greater than inobedience toward him (a. 2).

Moreover inobedience is so much the graver 1) the more excellent is the one commanding whose commands someone transgresses; 2) the more gravely something is commanded (a. 2).

845. Remark. - If the thing commanded is contemned because it is esteemed little, or if someone does not obey from indignation against a superior, or if he contemns the superior insofar as he is a private person, for instance because he is unlearned, imprudent, austere, there is not formal contempt of authority; nevertheless such sins frequently induce dispositively to contempt.