Morals of the Church
Library › Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology › Volume I › Book I. On the General Principles of the Christian Life › Treatise III. On Those Things which Dispose Toward Human Acts, or on Habits › Dissertation I. On Virtues › Part II. On Virtues in Particular › Section II. On Supernatural Moral Virtues › Chapter II. On Supernatural Moral Virtues in Particular › Article II. On Justice › § III. On the Potential Parts of Justice

point — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Point IV. On Observance

397.

I. Notion of Observance. Observance is a moral virtue inclining man to show due honor and reverence to persons excelling in dignity, insofar as they are a principle of governance with respect to some matters (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, a. 1). It is said:

  1. Due honor and reverence. By these words is indicated the material object of the virtue of observance, namely the reverence and honor which correspond to the dignity of the person.

  2. To persons excelling in dignity. This indicates the terminus to whom, namely one excelling in dignity. But as the Angelic Doctor observes, "because through knowledge and virtue and all other things of this sort someone is rendered suited for a state of dignity, the reverence which is shown to some on account of any excellence whatever pertains to the same virtue" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, a. 1, ad 2). "And hence it happens," the Salmanticenses rightly say,1 "that there is no person to whom we do not owe some observance; because in all we can consider some perfection which does not belong to us, at least from ourselves; and so, considering in ourselves that which is from ourselves, and in others what they have from God, there will be no person to whom we ought not in some way to submit ourselves, according to that saying of the Apostle: 'Esteeming others better than themselves,'2 and 'In honor preventing one another.'"3

  3. Insofar as they are a principle of governance with respect to some matters. By these words is indicated the reason why reverence and honor must be shown.

1 Arb. praed., n. 77 (t. 6, p. 459).

2 Phil. 2:3.

3 Rom. 12:10.

Observance (Dulia and Obedience)

398.

II. Object of Observance. 1. The material object is all acts by which we honor the terminus to whom of this virtue, insofar as he enjoys the power of ruling us, but not insofar as he exercises this power, since as such he demands from us an act of obedience.

  1. The remote formal object is the reason of debt on account of the excellence of the principle of governance, belonging more or less to these persons. And thus observance is distinguished from piety, which has its formal reason in being a principle; observance, however, in the excellence or dignity of the principle. The proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering this debt.

Observance (Dulia and Obedience)

399.

III. Opposed Vices. To observance is opposed any sin of irreverence, whether of omission or of commission; and this whether internal or external, whether by defect or by excess.

Observance (Dulia and Obedience)

400.

IV. Species of Observance. Since there are as many different grades of excellence and dignity as there are those whom observance regards, this virtue is not an ultimate species, but a subaltern one, divided into several ultimate species, of which nevertheless only three obtain a special name, namely dulia, hyperdulia, and obedience; while the others claim for themselves the common name of special observance or courtesy. Concerning the first three, take the following:

  1. Dulia, in Greek douleia, although by the force of the word it signifies servitude, and thus as regards the native signification of the word is that ultimate species of observance by which a servant honors his master, has already for a long time among theologians designated that species of observance by which, on account of supernatural excellence, we honor and venerate the angels and saints in heaven, except the Blessed Virgin Mary, whose cult enjoys the name of hyperdulia (can. 1255, § 1).

  2. Hyperdulia, from hyper, that is, above, and douleuo, that is, to serve, is that species of observance by which we honor and venerate the Blessed Virgin Mary on account of the special and singular dignity of divine motherhood. And this virtue is more probably distinct in species from dulia, because, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, "where there is a different reason of debt, there must be a different virtue which renders the debt" (II-II, q. 103, a. 3).1

  3. Obedience. a) Notion. Obedience, as if obaudientia, in a broad sense is taken for every fulfillment of a precept, even when it is not done with the intention of fulfilling it. But in the strict sense, and insofar as it is a special virtue, it is defined: a moral virtue inclining a subject to comply with an honorable precept of a legitimate superior, because and insofar as it is such a precept. It is said:

alpha. With an honorable precept. This indicates the material object of obedience.

beta. Of a legitimate superior. This indicates that the honorable precept is the material object of the virtue of obedience of this subject.

gamma. Because and insofar as it is such a precept. This indicates the formal object of obedience; or it indicates that the precept under this respect alone is the material object of obedience.

b) Object. alpha. The material object is constituted by all precepts which, and insofar as, they are imposed by a legitimate superior, whether the precepts are express or tacit. "For the will of the superior," says the Angelic Doctor, "in whatever way it becomes known, is a certain tacit precept; and obedience seems the more prompt, the more it anticipates an express precept by obeying once the will of the superior is understood" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 2). "The object of obedience ... is ... the precept of any superior whatever, whether express or interpretative, namely a simple word of a prelate indicating his will, to which the prompt obedient person obeys" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 2, ad 2).2

But if the superior does not command either expressly or tacitly, or commands beyond his legitimate authority, desires or precepts of this sort do not properly constitute the material object of obedience; and their execution in the subject is formally an act of that virtue by whose formal object he is moved, for example observance, piety, religion, etc. Reductively, however, acts of this sort can be referred to the virtue of obedience, insofar as they are placed from the affection of perfectly disposing and preparing oneself for the fulfillment of a precept, and of removing the danger of disobedience to a legitimately imposed precept.

beta. The remote formal object is the reason of debt arising from the legitimate power of the superior to command. Hence it is clear, on the one hand, that not every fulfillment of the precept of a legitimate superior is formally an act of the virtue of obedience, but only if the fulfillment is done from the motive of obedience; on the other hand, neither is there a sin of disobedience if the precept is fulfilled from another motive, unless an act of obedience from the motive of obedience had been prescribed. The proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering this debt.

  1. Opposed vices. To obedience is opposed the sin of disobedience; note, however, that the transgression of a precept is then only a sin of disobedience when the precept was made from the motive of obedience, which often does not occur (n. 148).

1 Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 78 (t. 6, p. 459); Haine, De Hyperdulia, Prolegomena, § 5, n. 10, pp. 33 ined.-36 inclusive; Sylvius, on II-II, q. 103, a. 4.

2 Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 80 (t. 6, p. 461); Billuart, d. 2, a. 1, dico 2; Pesch, nn. 257-260 inclusive.

Observance (Dulia and Obedience)