Obedience

Obedience.—Obedience is a moral virtue annexed to justice which inclines one to comply promptly and willingly with the command of one’s superior, because it is a command and obligatory.

(a) Obedience is prompt and willing, and so it differs from forced or unwilling or tardy submission and from servile and politic obedience (which would not obey were it not for fear or self-interest), for these lack either the good will or the good motive required by virtue. Note also that the virtue of obedience differs from the vow of obedience in this, that the vow obliges to the external performance of a command, while the virtue includes also internal submission.

(b) It is shown to a superior. Between equals there is not obedience in the strict sense, though one of them may out of charity or friendship yield to what the other desires.

(c) It is compliance with a command, that is, with a law or precept imposed by authority. Some authorities hold that it is an act of obedience to fulfill the known will of a superior, even though it has not been imposed as obligatory; but others see in such a fulfillment, not obedience, but the perfection or spirit of obedience. Thus, if a son knows that his father wishes him to perform a certain work, but has received no orders to do it and leaves it undone, this omission according to the first opinion is disobedience, while according to the second it is a want of the spirit of obedience.

(d) It obeys precisely because the superior’s will has been expressed as a command. It is this intention that sets off obedience from other acts of virtue about commanded matters. There is a material obedience which is a circumstance of other virtues and may be called a general virtue (e.g., when one keeps the first commandment out of love for God, there is charity; when one keeps the seventh commandment out of love of honesty, there is justice). The formal obedience of which we now speak is a peculiar and distinct virtue, because it keeps the law simply because it is law and as such should be kept.

Power of Jurisdiction and Dominative Power.—There are two kinds of power that confer moral authority to impose a command—the power of jurisdiction and dominative power.

(a) The power of jurisdiction is had by one who rules in a perfect society (Church or State), which has supreme authority and the right to impose laws.

(b) Dominative power is had by one who rules in an imperfect society, which has dependent authority and the right to impose precepts only. This power arises either from the very nature of society as a body composed of superior and subjects (e.g., in the family the children are necessarily subject to the father), or from agreement between the parties concerned (e.g., the wife by marrying becomes subject to her husband, the servant by taking employment becomes subject to the employer, the religious by entering a community or by vowing obedience becomes subject to the superior).

Degrees of Obedience.—Ascetical authors distinguish three degrees of obedience: (a) external obedience, which performs with exactness the thing commanded though there is no heart or willingness in its act; (b) internal obedience, which joins willingness to external submission though the judgment doubts the wisdom or value or good faith of the command; (c) blind obedience, which submits the judgment itself to the superior’s judgment, provided of course the thing ordered is not clearly sinful (Matt, ix. 9; Gen., xxii. 3 sqq.; Matt., ii. 13 sqq.).

Comparison of Obedience with the Other Virtues.—(a) Obedience, as was explained above (2355), is distinct from the other virtues on account of its different formal object. Its act is found sometimes joined with other virtues (e.g., to fast during Lent in order to keep the law is an act of obedience, but it is also an act of temperance if actuated by love of moderation, or an act of religion if offered as homage to God); but obedience may be separate from other virtues, as when a superior commands or forbids something indifferent in order to try a subject’s obedience (e.g., to take a walk solely because it has been commanded is an act of obedience only).

(b) Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues, since it belongs to the moral virtues, which are not directly concerned with God Himself but with the means to union with Him (I Tim., i. 5). Among those moral virtues that consist in contempt of temporal things, obedience which serves God in all things has a certain preeminence, inasmuch as it contemns for God’s sake the noblest human good, one’s own will, whereas the other virtues contemn lower goods (those of the body and external things); on the other hand, obedience is inferior to religion, since, while obedience consists in veneration of the law, religion consists in veneration of God Himself. But acts of worship performed without devotion or without regard for God’s will are not to be compared with respectful obedience, since the former are sins and the latter is both religious and obedient; hence, it is said that obedience is better than sacrifice (I Kings, xv. 22), which means that internal devotion is to be preferred to mere external worship. Spiritual writers praise obedience as the guardian of all the virtues and the safe road in which they walk (Prov., xxi. 28).

Comparison of Acts of Obedience.—(a) All acts of obedience are of the same species, since in spite of diversity of superiors or of laws there is always in obedience the same essential character on account of the motive. Whoever may be the superior or whatever may be the law, the reason for obedience is always the authority that commands and the obligation that it imposes. Thus, whether one obeys God, or the Church, or the State, or parents, the virtue is always one and the same.

(b) All acts of obedience are not of the same perfection, for circumstances (e.g., the willingness, the duration, the difficulty) add to the merit of obedience. It should be noted, however, that to obey by performing what one likes is not necessarily less virtuous than to obey by performing what one dislikes; for the thing liked may be something hard that appeals to few and may be performed from a spirit of willing obedience, whereas the thing that is disliked may be something easy and may be performed with less willingness.

The Duty of Obedience.—Since obedience is obligatory because a superior has the right to command, the extent of the duty depends on the extent of the superior’s authority.

(a) Thus, God must be obeyed in all things that He commands, for He is Lord of all and cannot command what is unlawful: “Let us do all that the Lord has spoken and we shall be obedient” (Exod., xxiv. 7). Man is not bound, however, to wish all that God wishes in particular, since God wishes things from the viewpoint of the universal good, and the creature from the viewpoint of the limited good known to him (e.g., it is not lawful for man to wish the damnation or the misfortune of those whom God will permit to suffer these evils); but man is bound to wish that which God desires him to wish (e.g., that his neighbor will not be lost, that his father will not now die). Neither is man bound to perform what God proposed to him as a counsel. In certain instances (Gen., xxii. 2; Exod., xii. 36; Osee, i. 2) it appears that God commanded sin, but only a foolish or blasphemous person would interpret the facts in that impossible sense. In the physical order, a miracle wrought by God is not contrary to the law of nature established by Him, but to the usual course of nature; and similarly the commands referred to were not contrary to the laws of virtue, but to the usual manner of virtue, as was explained in 308 sqq.

(b) Man must be obeyed in all those things in which he has lawful authority to command, first, because God Himself requires this and he who resists resists God (Rom, xii. 2); next, because without obedience the peaceful order of society cannot be maintained. Even though the superior be wicked or an infidel, obedience is due him, for it is given him, not in his personal, but in his official capacity (Matt, xxiii. 2, 3). The Scriptures command obedience to all classes of lawful superiors, whether ecclesiastical (Heb, xiii. 17), civil (Titus, iii. 1; I Peter, ii. 13), or domestic (Eph, vi. 1, v. 22-24, vi. 5-8).

When Obedience Is Not Lawful or Obligatory.—Obedience to a human superior is not lawful or not obligatory in those matters in which the superior has no authority to command.

(a) It is not lawful to obey a human superior when his command is clearly contrary to the command of a higher superior, and therefore unlawful. Thus, one may not obey any human superior when he orders sin, even a venial sin, for we must obey God rather than man (Acts, v. 29; Rom., iii. 8); neither may one obey a subordinate official who commands something clearly opposed to the law or to the regulations of his own superior. It does not belong to the subject, however, to sit in judgment on his superior, and hence, unless the unlawfulness of a command is manifest, the subject must presume that it is lawful.

(b) It is not necessary to obey a human superior when his command exceeds his competency, or when he orders things over which he has no control. Thus, God alone has authority over the internal action of the soul and over the natural state of the body; and as regards these things all men are equal, one indeed being less perfect mentally or bodily than another, but none being subject to another in these matters. Divine law regulates the interior (e.g., the command to believe, the prohibition to covet), but human law is confined to external acts; divine law can regulate things pertaining to the nature of the body (e.g., God could command an individual to marry, or to observe virginity, or to abstain from all food), but human law is concerned with external things, in which men are unequal, and it cannot take away natural rights to life or the means thereto (see 292 on Inalienable Rights). Moreover, even as regards external acts and things, the authority of a superior is limited by the bounds which its nature gives it; for example, temporal authority cannot command spiritual acts, a ruler placed over one territory or group cannot command for others, a constitutional body cannot make laws beyond the powers conferred by its constitution, ecclesiastical laws or customs rejected by the Code cannot be enforced, etc. It is clear, too, that no superior may command the execution of what is physically or morally impossible, and generally a subject should not be required to practise heroic virtue (e.g., to expose his life to danger; see 374). If a command is plainly ridiculous (that is, if it lacks a reasonable motive), it would be more perfect to obey, but it seems it would not be a sin to disregard it.

Obedience in Cases Where There Is Normally No Obligation.—If a superior oversteps his authority, the subject may obey when the matter is lawful and the motive of submission is good. In certain cases it is even obligatory to obey a superior in matters over which normally he would not have authority. Such cases are the following:

(a) on account of a vow or other free and moral agreement, a subject is held to obedience in matters pertaining to the nature of the body (e.g., when he has made a vow of virginity). The Church cannot impose virginity, but he who has vowed to observe it, must fulfill the conditions and precautions necessary for its observance, and can be ordered so to do;

(b) on account of circumstances, such as scandal or danger of great evils, it is sometimes necessary to yield submission to a command that is not of itself obligatory (see 376, 377).

Internal Actions and Human Superiors.—Internal actions in themselves do not fall under human authority, and hence the Apostle says: “Judge not before the time until the Lord come, who will make manifest the counsels of the heart” (I Cor., iv. 5). But in two ways these actions may be dealt with authoritatively by human superiors.

(a) Thus, in the internal forum and there alone, internal acts themselves are subject to a human superior; for the confessor knows and acts there, not as man, but as the representative of God, and hence he may pass on and prescribe internal thoughts and desires just as God may pass on them and prescribe them.

(b) In the external forum, the Church deals with internal acts in so far as they enter into an external act as a necessary ingredient of its goodness or malice, as when she commands a devout communion or pronounces censure against judges who are swayed by fear or favor. This question was treated above in 426.

Obligation of the Vow of Obedience.—(a) The vow obliges a religious to observe the commands of superiors that are given according to the rule which the religious professed. Hence, there would be no obligation in virtue of the vow of performing commands that are not authorized explicitly or implicitly in the rule (e.g., if a cloistered religious were bidden to engage in hospital work), nor, unless otherwise vowed, of keeping each prescription of the rule or constitutions. A command to accept a relaxation from the rule is obligatory, unless the dispensation is clearly invalid (cfr. 2225, 2237).

(b) The obligation is grave only when superiors command in a grave matter and with the intention of imposing a grave precept. The intention of a superior is indicated by a form of words and other circumstances which the rule or constitutions prescribe for the imposition of a grave precept.

Sins against Obedience.—Since obedience is a moral virtue and therefore observes a mean, there is both an excess and a defect that it avoids.

(a) Thus, the sin of excess is not found in the quantity of obedience, for the more obedient a subject is, the more is he worthy of praise. It is found, therefore, in other circumstances of the act of submission, as when one obeys a person or a command which one should not obey. Sinful submission is just as foreign to obedience as superstition is to religion; cringing submission or servility in matters where one should think and judge for oneself is only a simulacrum of obedience.

(b) The sin of defect is found in disobedience to a lawful command. This sin may also be said to include both excess and defect—the former because the subject follows his own desires more than he should, and the latter because the superior does not receive what he is entitled to (see 1711 sqq.).

Definition of Disobedience.—Disobedience is the transgression of the lawful command of a superior.

(a) It is a transgression, that is, a voluntary neglect or refusal to perform what is ordered or to omit what is forbidden, or to perform or omit at the time or in the manner ordered. Thus, there is no disobedience if fulfillment is impossible—for example, if a subject who is summoned to present himself at a certain place does not receive the notice or becomes too ill to make the journey, or if he is asked to give what he cannot give, or if he is burdened with so many laws or regulations that he cannot even know what they are, much less attempt to observe them.

(b) Disobedience transgresses a lawful command, that is, one which is morally good and issues from competent authority. It is not disobedience to refuse to do what is evidently illicit (e.g., to lie or steal), or what is illegally ordered (e.g., to submit to arrest blindly, to perform what the law forbids the superior to order).

(c) It is violation of a command, that is, of a law or precept. Hence, it is not disobedience to neglect advice or exhortations or requests made by superiors, if the subject-matter is not otherwise obligatory (e.g., a daughter is not disobedient if she does not choose the husband picked out for her by her parents).

(d) It is against the command of a superior, and hence, if there is opposition between laws or precepts, the higher law and the higher superior prevails (288 sqq.).

The Kinds of Disobedience.—(a) By reason of the subject, disobedience is either material or formal, according as the transgressor intends only the satisfaction of his sinful desire against some other virtue, or intends the violation of obedience itself. Material disobedience is found in every sin, since every sin is a transgression, and in this sense the pride of the original sin is called disobedience (Rom., v. 19); but formal disobedience is a special sin, and it is committed only when the sinner transgresses purposely in order not to submit.

(b) By reason of the object, formal disobedience is contempt either for the law or for the superior. In the former case the transgressor despises the commandment given him and vents his dislike in disobedience; in the latter case the transgressor belittles the authority of the lawmaker or superior who made the law or who gave the precept; or scorns his sinfulness, ignorance, or low birth; or hates or envies him, and therefore proceeds to break his laws or precepts. If contempt moves one to rebel against every command, it is perfect; if it extends to only one or another matter, it is imperfect.

It is not sinful contempt of a person in authority, however, if the subject does not admire his character, or agree with his opinions, or approve of his courses, when the subject has good reason for his view and does not forget the respect and obedience due to authority and law.

Theological Sinfulness of Formal Disobedience.—(a) From its nature formal disobedience is a grave sin, since it is contrary to charity, which is the life of the soul and the end of the law. Love of God demands that we keep His commandments and be submissive to His representatives (Rom., xiii. 2; John, xiv, 21; Rom., ii. 23, xiii. 2; Luke, X. 16). Disobedience is classed by St. Paul with the worst sins of the ancient pagans (Rom., i. 30) and of the sinners of the last days (II Tim, iii. 1), with witchcraft and idolatry (I Kings, xv. 23).

(b) From the imperfection of the act formal disobedience is sometimes only a venial sin, as when in a sudden fit of anger against his superiors a child refuses to obey his teachers or parents.

(c) From the lightness of the matter, formal disobedience is only a venial sin, if the contempt is imperfect and not directed against God, and the matter of the command or transgression is not serious (e.g., if one gets up a few minutes late in the morning once or twice as a protest against a regulation). But, even though the matter is not serious in itself, formal disobedience is a grave sin, when the contempt is perfect (e.g., if in a spirit of defiance and of anarchistic contempt for all his laws one pays no heed to some minor regulation of a superior), and perhaps also when contempt is directed against a divine precept (e.g., if with the feeling that the eighth commandment is foolish or useless, one tells small lies); for in the former case there is grave contempt, in the latter case blasphemy.

Moral Species of Disobedience.—(a) In formal disobedience, if the command belongs to some special virtue, there are two sins, namely, that against obedience and that against the virtue intended by the lawgiver (e.g., when out of contempt one violates the third commandment); but, if the command was given for the sake of obedience only, there is but the one sin of formal disobedience (e.g., when out of stubbornness a child refuses to do the study or other work imposed by parents or teachers).

(b) In material disobedience, if the command was given for the sake of some special virtue, there is but the one sin against that virtue, as when one breaks the fifth or sixth commandment to satisfy passion; but if the command was given for the exercise of submission only, there is but the one general sin of disobedience, as when a child eats between meals against the command given by his mother.

Circumstances that Aggravate Formal Disobedience.—One act of formal disobedience can be worse than another such act in two ways:

(a) by reason of the rank of the person who gave the command. Thus, it is more serious to disobey God than to disobey man, and more serious to disobey a higher than a lower superior;

(b) by reason of the rank which the thing commanded has in the intention of the superior. Thus, when disobeying God it is more serious to transgress against the higher than against the lower good, for God always prefers the better good; but in disobeying man alone it is more serious to transgress against the good, higher or lower, which the lawgiver has more at heart.

Comparison of Formal Disobedience with Other Sins.—(a) Disobedience against God (e.g., contempt for His law) is worse than sins against the neighbor (e.g., murder, theft, adultery). This is true when these latter sins do not include formal disobedience against God, for, per se and other things being equal, a sin against God is more serious than a sin against a creature; it is also true when sins against creatures include formal disobedience against God but offend a less important commandment, as when the one sin is perjury and the other theft.

(b) Contempt for the lawgiver, even without disobedience, is worse than contempt for the law with disobedience, since the lawgiver is of greater importance than his precept. Thus, it is worse to blaspheme God than to despise His commandment; it is worse to hold a superior in contempt than to disregard his precept.