Studiosity and Curiosity

I. Notion of Studiosity. Studiosity is a moral virtue inclining man to moderate the appetite for knowing, according to the prescription of reason illumined by faith.

II. Object of Studiosity. 1. The remote material object is constituted by all acts, or all studies, by which knowledge of things is acquired; the proximate object is the inclination itself for knowing. Since on the part of the body there exists in man an inclination to flee studies because of the labor joined to them, but on the part of the soul there is in him a vehement inclination for knowing, it belongs to this virtue both to urge on the inclination of the body and to restrain the desire of the soul.

Although the name studiosity rather designates the first office, nevertheless studiosity is not counted among the potential parts of fortitude, but is reckoned among the potential parts of temperance because of the second office; and this rightly and deservedly. For, as the Salmanticenses rightly observe with St. Thomas (II-II, q. 166, a. 2, ad 3): "the difficulty which is in moderating the appetite for study has more of itself toward virtue, as holding itself on the part of the soul, in which there is an inclination and propensity for knowing, than that which is in impelling, which comes from impediments holding themselves on the part of the body" (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 166, a. 2, corpus).

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt of urging on the sluggishness of the body with respect to studies and restraining the desire of the soul, according to the prescription of reason; the proximate formal object consists in the special moral goodness which shines forth in the said moderation.

III. Opposed Vices. By excess, curiosity is opposed to studiosity, which inclines one to satisfy the appetite for knowing too much, by applying oneself to useless or harmful studies (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 167, a. 1). By defect, negligence, inclining one to omit or to do slackly the studies of those things which one is bound to learn and know.¹

¹ Arb. praed., n. 152 (t. 6, p. 499). Cf. Salmanticenses, Arb. praed., n. 153 (p. 499); Billuart, diss. 7, a. 4, § 3; St. Augustine, Epistula 118 (ed. G., t. 2, col. 490 sqq.), Sermo 355, c. 6, n. 6 (ibid., t. 5, col. 2041), and Epistula 218 (ibid., col. 1227 sqq.); St. Bernard, Sermo 36 on the Canticle (M.P.L. 183, col. 907 sqq.).

The Parts of Temperance.—(a) The subjective parts or species of temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue. These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink; the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act (copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts (kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy) and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement). Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues. They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four: humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

The Sin of Impurity.—This sin, which is also known as lust, is an inordinate desire of sexual pleasure.

(a) Its object is sexual pleasure, that is, the sense of physical enjoyment in the bodily organs or of psychical satisfaction in the lower appetites of the soul derived from acts related to generation. Hence, we should distinguish impurity from sensuality (which is an inordinate attachment to esthetic pleasure or other higher sense-pleasure), from luxury (which is an excessive desire of health and comfort), and from the vice called curiosity (which is an over-fondness for intellectual delights, see 2461). But it should be noted that sensual pleasure easily leads to venereal delight, and that intellectual curiosity about sex matters is dangerous, and hence this sensuality and curiosity may be, and frequently are, a temptation to impurity (see below on Temptations to Impurity).

(b) Impurity is in desire, for the passions in themselves are indifferent (see 121), and they become sinful only when their abuse is consented to by the will.

(c) Impurity is inordinate; that is, it takes pleasure against lhe dictate of reason. This happens when sexual gratifications are indulged by the unmarried, or by the married in unnatural ways. It is a perversion and a sin to cheat the stomach in order to gratify the palate, because God willed that the pleasure of eating should serve the nourishment of the body, or, as the proverb has it, because man does not live to eat, but eats to live. Now, sex pleasure has been ordained by God as an inducement to perform an act which has for its purpose the propagation and education of children, duties that cannot be rightly attended to except in the married state. Hence, those who seek venereal pleasure outside of matrimony, or outside the way intended by nature, act unreasonably, for they sacrifice the end for the means. Instinct guides the animal aright in these matters, but man is a nobler creature and must guide himself by religion and reason.

Studiousness.—Studiousness (studiositas) is the virtue that makes one modest in the desire of knowledge.

(a) Its object is the desire of knowledge; for man is gifted with powers of sensation and understanding, and nature inclines him to desire the exercise of these powers to see, hear, picture, apprehend, judge, reason, etc.

(b) Its function is to make one modest in this desire (see 2465 c); that is, it regulates the inclination of nature according to reason, so that one may avoid both excess and defect in the pursuit of knowledge. On the one hand, the soul has the urge to discover and learn, but just as bodily hunger leads to gluttony, if not restrained, so does mental hunger become a vice (curiosity), if it is not moderated. On the other hand, the body has a disinclination for the labor, weariness and hardship which study demands, and, if this reluctance is not overcome, one becomes guilty of the sin of negligence or ignorance (see 904, 1326, 1671).

(c) Its character, therefore, is that of a virtue, since it holds a natural appetite within moderation, avoiding the extremes of excess and defect, and keeping custody over senses and mind. This virtue is praised in Prov., xxvii. 11: “Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful”; and in I Tim., iv. 13: “Attend to reading.” Essentially, it is a potential part of temperance, for its chief characteristic is moderation of an eager desire; but secondarily, it belongs to fortitude, for great courage, persistence, and self-sacrifice are necessary for a student.

The Vices Opposed to Studiousness.—(a) The vice of excess is called curiosity. It is a desire of knowledge that is inordinate on account of the motive (e.g., when one is curious about the doings of others because one wishes to injure them, when one gazes about to satisfy impure desire) or on account of its circumstances (e.g., a curiosity about the latest news or rumors that keeps one from duty or more important matters, a curiosity that consults fortune-tellers, a curiosity that tries to peer into the inscrutable mysteries of God, Ecclus., iii. 22).

(b) The vice opposed to studiousness by defect is negligence, which is a voluntary omission of study of those matters one is bound to know, as when a schoolboy wastes his time in play and idleness. Curiosity and negligence are usually found in the same person (e.g., those who pry into the affairs of others without reason, do not, as a rule, mind their own business well).

The Malice of the Sins against Studiousness.—(a) Curiosity in itself is venial, for it does not seem a serious offense to busy oneself with things superfluous. But circumstances sometimes make it mortal. Thus, the subject-matter may make it serious, as when one is curious about obscene books, or has a prurient desire to gaze on unbecoming pictures or plays, or tries to fish out of others sacramental or other confidential secrets; or the purpose may make it serious as when one is inquisitive or spying because one wishes to blacken a neighbor (Prov., xxiv. 15), or the means may make it mortal as when recourse is had to calumny, fraud, reading private papers, etc., in order to get information.

(b) Negligence is mortal or venial according to the gravity of the duty of knowledge. Thus, if a lawyer gave no study at all to a case and thereby inflicted a grave loss on his client, the negligence would be a mortal sin.

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

94. Corollaries. 1. The special malice of pollution consists, as is clear from what has been said, in the vain effusion of semen against the order of nature. Therefore this sin differs in species from every impure touch, which indeed is followed by venereal pleasure, but not by any effusion of semen.

2. Voluntary pollution, for the sake of escaping any disease whatever, or the danger of death, is always a mortal sin. This is the most common doctrine of the doctors. It is entirely lawful, for the preservation of life and of the whole supposit, to cut off from a man some member, a hand or a foot. For no inconveniences ever lawfully follow from that cutting off; since the natural appetite vehemently abhors it as a most troublesome thing, men will not easily abuse that means and extend it beyond the case of extreme necessity. On the contrary, since pollution is a thing bringing great pleasure, to which nature itself inclines, the greatest danger is present lest, if it is ever lawful, men abuse it to the detriment of the species itself. And thus, for example, it is never lawful, not even in the case of extreme necessity, to violate the sacramental seal; because if this were lawful even in a most rare case, the sacrament of penance would be rendered hateful to the faithful, and they would be removed from it, to the greatest detriment of souls; just as, in fact, men are often deprived of the good of seeking counsel because they know that in some cases such a secret can be manifested. Sporer 640. 641.

"But if you object that it is sometimes expelled by nature, nothing is thereby concluded; for what is done by nature is not against nature, but by the author of nature; nor for that reason can it be lawfully done by us. Thus it is not against nature that one die from defect of strength; but it would be, if one for that reason wished to take away his strength from himself." Scavini. Cf. Gury, de Matr. et iur. n. 1315.

Lessius, De Iust. et iure, l. 4. c. 3. d. 14. n. 96., rightly says: Pollution "is a deadly sin, even if it is procured not for pleasure, but only for the sake of health or of mitigating temptation; both because temptation is not thus conquered, but yielded to and succumbed to; and because, if this is lawful, why did the saints undergo so much fasting and other austerities for taming the flesh? why was this combat held by the holy fathers to be the hardest and principal combat of the Christian man? finally, because, if one does not wish to use other aids, this work has indeed been granted as a remedy for concupiscence, but in legitimate marriage, not outside it; for a natural institution must not be perverted for an extrinsic and accidental end. Hence if anyone wishes to use this work for this end, he must enter marriage. It is confirmed, because the primary end of that work is offspring, and therefore it requires that state from which offspring can be received and rightly educated, which is marriage."

"For the same reason it is not even lawful for the sake of health, except in legitimate marriage. Nor is it an objection that it is lawful to draw blood for this end, and even to cut off a member, because these are instituted only for the good of the individual: for parts are for the good of the whole; hence we can dispose of them according as it is expedient for the health of the individual. But generation is only for the propagation of nature; hence we cannot use it except in that mode in which generation can follow."

3. To the simple malice of pollution other malices can be added by reason of circumstances, and this generally holds also for other species of lust, "for example, if a priest is polluted, sacrilege is added; if a married person, adultery; if with the desire of sinning with another person, a malice is added according to the quality of the person desired; likewise another malice is added if someone is polluted by delighting in an imaginary intercourse with some person, male or female, married or unmarried. Likewise another malice is added if he is polluted by the touches of another." L. 476.

95. Proposition 2. If the discussion is about pollution indirectly willed in its cause, he who without sufficient cause places an action from which he is going to suffer shameful motions, which nevertheless, although he foresees them, he does not intend, sins gravely, if that action is of itself mortal in the genus of lust and of itself gravely influences the pollution; he sins lightly, if that action is of itself venial in the genus of lust and of itself lightly influences the pollution; he does not sin in any way, if that action is of itself simply honorable and of itself has no influence on pollution. The reason is that, since the pollution is not willed in itself, but only in its cause, and therefore happens apart from every intention, it will be evil in the degree in which the cause itself is evil. Struggl, Tr. 7. q. 7. art. 1. n. 5.; L. 481. and following.

But a cause as such is evil according to the measure of the greater or lesser efficacy which of itself it has for the depraved effect. Moreover, pollution indirectly willed is also in itself, directly in the cause at least implicitly, truly willed, if without some other sufficient reason one wills a cause gravely influencing it of itself. For this shows a depraved affection of the will toward that pollution. But it is only permitted, if one wills its cause which of itself either in no way, or only lightly, influences it. For the cause then by its nature is not necessarily ordered to an effect of this kind, nor is the affection contained in that cause by necessary connection.

To the point are the things which Billuart has, Diss. V. art. 2. par. Confirmatur Conclusio. "If a man," he says, "were bound under mortal sin to avoid every action from which ordinarily a light venereal commotion follows, it would follow that one must condemn as mortal sin for the most part the non-necessary conversations of men with women, especially of young men with girls, familiar conversations, various recreations honest in themselves, in which flattering glances, soothing words, touches, kisses, embraces in honorable parts from friendship, play, lightness, very easily occur, since from these for the most part light venereal motions arise. But although these are to be avoided, nevertheless there are few, if any, who condemn them as mortal sin, where there is absent the danger of consent to venereal pleasure itself, nor is this the practice of confessors in the tribunal. Therefore."

Here also belong the things which Cajetan has apud Ithur., Cas. 18. n. 6., and apud Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 12. par. Confirm. Conc. He speaks of pollution arising from hearing confessions and says: "The voluntary indirectly, that is, because it is in the power of the will, is not imputed to the will except from the fact that it can and ought to act and does not act. In the proposed case this pollution does not fall under the voluntary except indirectly, namely because the will does not turn away from the hearing which is its cause. And although the will can, nevertheless it is not bound to turn away from such an act of hearing, thinking, and the like. Therefore this is not imputed to the will. The minor is declared. Because no artisan ought to omit the beginning and prosecution of his work because of defects consequent from the necessity of the matter; for someone would foolishly omit the construction of a saw or sword because they contract rust, on the ground that they are made of iron, and so with other things. But pollutions and stings of the flesh in the proposed case happen from the necessity of the matter, from the fact that the venereal matter is material to be purged, washed, disputed, preached, thought about; thence by a natural consequence follows commotion of the flesh, etc. Therefore a man ought not, on account of defects occurring from the necessity of venereal matter, to omit not only necessary, but useful thoughts, speeches, hearings, etc. For otherwise it would be necessary that either angels or very privileged men only should dispute, hear, etc., about such matters; the contrary of which ecclesiastical custom has, and reason teaches." Cf. also Elbel, de act. hum. n. 16.; Lessius l. 4. c. 3. dub. 14. n. 97-102.

33. You will resolve from all that has been said about the voluntary in the cause: 1.º “If the cause of pollution is gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed unto sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was foreseen at least confusedly. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which per se are grave faults in the genus of luxury, namely touches or looks upon the shameful parts of another’s or one’s own body with base and deliberate pleasure; the sight of human intercourse and lingering thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions coming from these causes certainly are mortal sins. Thus S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act, which is the cause of pollution, has special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, De Matr. l. 9. D. 45. n. 23, and all consent.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 482. Special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in the pleasure excited from a base object. Cf. Salmant., Theol. Schol., Tr. 13, D. 10, n. 274.

Gravely influencing: wherefore if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow; since then it follows outside the intention and per accidens. Salmant., Theol. Mor., Tr. 26, C. 7, n. 41.

Per se they are grave faults: “the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of luxury... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484. — In the genus of luxury: whence “it is inferred that pollution is not mortal which happens outside the intention from causes illicit still mortally in another genus than luxury, for example from drunkenness, or from eating, excessively immoderate or on a forbidden day.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.

429. Principles. - I. Pollution directly and perfectly voluntary is always a mortal sin, so that it is never lawful to procure it. The reason is, 1. because pollution has intrinsic repugnance with nature, which has ordered the effusion of semen solely to generation ¹; 2. because if it were ever permitted, or prohibited only under venial sin, a habit of pollution would most easily be contracted because of the great proclivity of corrupted nature into lust, and therefore the order of nature would shortly be subverted; 3. it is clear from various texts of Sacred Scripture, for example 1 Cor. 6. 10: "Nor the effeminate... shall possess the kingdom of God"; 4. it is also clear from proposition 49 condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "Mollities is not prohibited by the law of nature; hence if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good..." - See St. Lig., n. 476.

¹ ** It is certainly important to know accurately in what the special malice of this sin resides, so that from this the Confessor may take some norm by which, concerning the questioning of penitents, he may more easily free himself from troublesome scruples. Therefore the proper notion of this sin ought to be sought from the character of a sin against nature. Concerning this, Filliuccius says generally thus (tr. 30, n. 137): "This sin is called against nature, because it is not only repugnant to the rational order - for this is common to any sin of lust, which is against reason and is repugnant to the rational order - but also because it is repugnant to the natural order of the venereal act in the human species; for the natural order of such an act ought to be of such a kind that from it the generation of a human being can follow; for this is its end. Therefore if it cannot follow, such an act will be against the natural order, and therefore will be called a sin against nature." But more briefly and more distinctly Elbel (part 4, conf. 9, n. 254) says of the special malice of this sin: "The reason is that human seed is ordered by nature to generation; therefore to pour it forth for another end (pleasure) is repugnant to the order of nature." Therefore, since this special malice consists in the vain effusion of semen against the order of nature, now it is clear why this sin differs in species from any immodest act which venereal pleasure indeed follows, but no effusion of semen; and therefore why the Confessor (with those cautions indeed which all the Doctors deservedly require) not imprudently asks about this as an object of a peculiar species.

But again, since this special disorder is placed in the vain effusion of semen, which was instituted by nature solely for conjugal copula so that offspring might be received from it, now the reason is clear why the Doctors judge differently about this baseness as regards those who either can emit no semen, or certainly not true semen. Hence what Sporer has (Theol. Sacr., p. 4, c. 2, n. 39) concerning the prepubescent: "If boys or girls, who cannot yet sow seed, touch themselves basely..., it is indeed a mortal sin; ... yet it seems to differ in species from true pollution, through which seed is sown, and in proper species it must be reduced to the immodesty of touch." Likewise Holzmann (part 2, tr. 2, n. 686): "If the prepubescent, whether boys or girls, try by immodest motion to elicit seed, when they cannot yet do so, they commit a sin diverse in species from true pollution, in reality pertaining to the immodesty of touch.... The reason is that... since they do not pour forth semen, they do not commit the sin of true pollution, but another diverse in species." Think the same thing of eunuchs deprived of seed apt for generation. Nor otherwise Babenstuber (tr. 5, disp. 7, art. 2, n. 71): "The prepubescent..., who try by immodest motion to pour forth seed, when they cannot yet do so, do indeed sin mortally...; nevertheless that sin of theirs differs in species from true and properly so-called pollution. The reason is that it belongs to the nature of true pollution to pour forth seed against the end of human generation; but in persons of this sort there is no effusion of seed. Therefore this sin in reality and properly pertains to the immodesty of touch.... What has been said of the prepubescent must also be understood of eunuchs. For in these there is no seed useful for generation." And Tamburini had gone before (De 2. Eccl. Praec., c. 17, n. 13), saying: "Those who from defect of age, or from another cause (such as the prepubescent, as also eunuchs), cannot by immodest motion pour forth seed, or pour forth useless seed, sin mortally...; but certainly this species of sin differs from true pollution, to which it belongs to throw forth seed against the end of generation; this throwing forth is not in the aforesaid persons of this sort; therefore the sin in the prepubescent is reduced in reality to immodest touch." From this, moreover, to the reasons which Doctors are accustomed wisely to bring forward why the Confessor must be most cautious in questioning penitents of this sort about this argument, this peremptory reason accedes: that as soon as they shall prudently have searched sufficiently whether these things were maliciously carried out, no place remains for further questions.

But from these things arises an occasion of almost the same question concerning the same sin, if there is question of women. For however theologians may introduce speech concerning female seed, and indeed for many causes, nevertheless when they then ask about its nature, they commonly have nothing except what is altogether uncertain. Let Bonacina stand for all (De Matr., q. 4, p. 6, n. 13), who writes: "According to the most probable opinion the seed of a woman concurs neither actively nor passively toward generation." And Sanchez (lib. 9, disp. 17, n. 9): "That female seed is not necessary, nor concurs actively toward generation, Galen, contrary to himself, Aristotle, Avicenna, Albertus M., Hugo Senensis, and many others teach, and the whole school of theologians with St. Thomas, 3, q. 31, art. 4, ad 3. This is clear from this, that, experience testifying, women wholly unwilling... conceive when receiving male seed; but then they by no means emit seed. Therefore since without that seed... generation follows," etc. But although the old followers of Scotus, as Sanchez suggests (l. c.), and then Elbel (part 4, conf. 9, n. 252), after Hippocrates thought that the seed of a woman concurs actively toward generation, nevertheless Elbel himself (ibid., n. 253) then confesses that today it is commonly denied by learned Physicians that true seed, or true testicles, are given in women, but rather ovaries filled with certain little things (by others they are called vesicles). Thus Georgius Francus in Paulus Zacchia, Quaest. medic. legal. From this, as from a hypothesis, the same one (l. c.) rightly concludes from the premised principles: "Whatever nevertheless may be about this matter, among theologians it remains certain and undoubted that it is as little permitted to women as to the prepubescent or eunuchs to provoke themselves to venery by their own touch or that of another." Now since the matter is now no longer uncertain or hypothetical, but certain and most thoroughly investigated among Physicians or those skilled in physiology, namely that what has been customarily called female seed is wholly diverse from the nature of true seed, and that no other end has been established by nature for humors of this sort than that they may make the work of marriage easier; from the principles posited before, a reason is supplied for gravely doubting whether as regards this matter one must now judge otherwise about women than we have already seen to be judged about the prepubescent or eunuchs. Whence it would follow that, since the Doctors have already been accustomed to bring forward other causes on account of which questions about any such female pollution are to be spared, much more now it would seem that they are to be spared, while it is now sufficiently clear that in women, however gravely they may sin, nevertheless there is not present the reason of that special malice which is proper to true and strictly so-called pollution. But concerning this whole matter let the more skilled judge.

II. Pollution indirectly, or voluntary only in the cause, is a grave sin whenever the proximate cause, that is, one per se directly and by its nature tending to pollution, for example lingering thoughts concerning very libidinous things, etc., is placed without just reason (Scav. - St. Lig., n. 482); but it is venial whenever the cause which is placed is only remote, or such that danger is joined to it per accidens or rarely. - Thus commonly. - The reason of each is evident. - St. Lig., n. 484.

III. Pollution indirectly voluntary lacks every sin whenever there is sufficient reason for placing its cause, consent or affection of the will into the consequent pleasure being removed. The reason is that where two effects follow from the same cause indifferent in itself, one evil and the other good or equivalent, it is lawful to place the cause by intending the good and permitting the evil ². But a greater reason is required for a greater danger. - Recall the things said concerning Human Acts, n. 9. - See St. Lig., n. 483.

² In these adjuncts neither ought the evil effect in reality to be called voluntary, nor will the agent properly be called its cause. For when there is question merely of the obligation of abstaining from some action by reason of an effect which follows besides the intention, the reason of causality is taken not from physical influence, but from moral influence, and therefore there is question of causality which induces the moral imputation of the effect that followed, so that causality sounds almost the same as something culpable. Therefore then someone will properly be said to be in the cause, when for this reason he was bound to abstain from the action, lest that effect should follow; but he will not be judged to be in the cause when he was not bound for this reason to abstain from the work, but exercised it licitly and according to his right. And in altogether this sense the effect is said to follow per accidens, not as if namely the effect itself does not spontaneously follow from some action, but because it cannot be imputed to the agent as to a moral cause; and by this very fact, when we say that the effect follows besides the intention, we already say that the effect is not voluntary, namely by that will to which it ought morally to be imputed.

431. • 3. Pollution which follows from touch, look, or gravely base reading is a mortal sin even when actual consent is removed, unless a just cause excuses. The reason is that then pollution is voluntary at least in the cause, since these things per se induce grave danger of pollution. But it will be only a venial sin if these things are lightly base, provided the pollution follows besides the intention of the agent and against his at least direct will; because then in these things there is not given a proximate danger of consent either into pollution or into venereal delight. Yet danger remote in itself can become proximate per accidens for someone by reason of his own weakness. - St. Lig., n. 482-485.

4. Every deliberate effusion of seed, however small, is pollution and therefore a mortal sin. - Lacroix, de Poenit., n. 1034. - Likewise it is mortal to acquiesce in the delight of pollution even for the briefest time, and even if it happens besides the intention and spontaneously from whatever cause. - St. Lig., n. 477. A fortiori if pollution begun is promoted by some effort.

5. He who caused pollution in another must explain in confession whether this person is sacred, related by blood, etc.; because he contracted the malice of sacrilege, or incest, etc. - St. Lig., n. 476.

6. It is not a sin per se to ride a horse for the sake of reasonable recreation, to lie in bed in a certain position, to take heating foods temperately, to speak with the other sex from an honorable cause, to serve the sick, to help them in baths, to exercise the surgical art, and similar things, although it is foreseen that pollution is going to follow per accidens, provided it is not intended, and there is a firm purpose of not assenting to it if it happens, and proximate danger of consent is absent. - St. Lig., n. 483.

48. (C) Pollution in itself, or directly voluntary, is a grave sin. For St. Paul numbers effeminacy, that is, pollution, among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God.² In reality the effusion of human seed is ordered solely to the generation of offspring, and the pleasure annexed to it is for attaining this end more efficaciously; but in pollution directly willed, seed is emitted for the sake of pleasure alone, against the order of nature, and therefore it is sin;³ but if it were lightly unlawful, the end intended by nature would be frustrated: for many men, content with this pleasure, would bid farewell to the burdens of matrimony, or would contract nuptials only after lust had been fulfilled, when they have become impotent for generating. - Therefore this proposition 49 was rightly reproved by Innocent XI: "Effeminacy is not prohibited by natural law. Hence if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good and sometimes obligatory under mortal sin."

² 1 Cor. 6:10.

³ The pagans themselves admitted this, the poet Martial testifying (Epigram., l. IX, 42): "Believe nature herself to say of things: That which with your fingers, Ponticus, you destroy, is a man."

49. Moreover, the physical and moral effects which follow from voluntary pollution clearly show how much it is contrary to nature. For young persons addicted to this vice easily contract a wholly tyrannical habit, which greatly weakens their strength: frequency of immodest acts disturbs the whole nervous system and the brain; hence weakness and general weariness, pains of the head, diminution of appetite, convulsions of the limbs, weakening of sight and hearing; then involuntary, or passive, pollutions accede, vehement palpitations of the heart; sometimes also incurable diseases: phthisis, dropsy, epilepsy, tabes dorsalis, and, among women, inflammation of the uterus, hysteria. Often also by frequent masturbation the power of coition and generating is lost. - To these effects must be added others, moral, namely depression of soul, enervation of the will, inability for labors, especially intellectual ones: for the mind, infected with obscene images, can scarcely think about other things; soon noble ideas and pure affections vanish, insane egoism prevails; sometimes madness succeeds. - Not all these effects indeed are always produced, nor in the same degree in all: for this depends on bodily constitution, frequency and duration of acts, and other circumstances; but the danger is certainly present that an inveterate and almost incurable habit be contracted, from which the aforesaid effects will follow more or less.⁴

⁴ Many physicians have described these effects, among whom: Tissot, De l'onanisme, 1760; Garnier, Onanisme; Fournier, L'onanisme, Paris, 1892; Ribbing, L'hygiene sexuelle, Paris, Alcan, 1901, p. 156; Surbled, La Morale, t. II, ch. 3-8; idem, Le vice solitaire, Paris, 1905; Vigouroux, Traite de Medecine, t. IV, pp. 304-317; Stall, What a young boy ought to know, Philadelphia, 1897, pp. 97-118.

Nor are those physicians to be heard who, in order to deter young men from pollution, advise fornication to them, falsely asserting that seed must sometimes be poured forth for the sake of health. - For part of the seed is reabsorbed in the body, to which it adds new strength;⁵ the other part is poured forth naturally during sleep, without any disturbance of the nerves; while fornication, which is morally evil, can induce syphilis.

⁵ Surbled, Vie de jeune homme, ch. 6-7.

323. - The grave question concerning the malice of voluntary or admitted pollution must now be undertaken. This question contains three parts. For these three things are asked concerning voluntary pollution: is its malice intrinsic; is it grave; is it specifically distinct from the malice of a lustful touch?

I. Opinions. That the malice of the sin of pollution, at least in the man, was not unknown to the pagans is already demonstrated by Martial in these verses:

"Do you think this is nothing? It is a crime, believe me, and a great one, Such as you yourself can scarcely conceive in your mind....

Believe me, the very nature of things says: That which you waste with your fingers, Ponticus, is a man ¹."

¹ Epigram 42, book 9, Against Ponticus.

But Caramuel ² again denied that this uncleanness is condemned by nature itself; and from two of his assertions was taken proposition 49, which Innocent XI condemned as at least scandalous and dangerous in practice: "Effeminacy is not prohibited by the law of nature. Wherefore, if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good and sometimes obligatory under mortal sin."

² Cf. Theologia intentionalis, book 4, nos. 1960 and 1965.

Therefore, the common doctrine of Catholics affirms that it is intrinsically and gravely evil. Yet in the accurate demonstration of the doctrine they again experience no slight difficulty and have attempted various ways.

II. Various arguments. Several indicate this rationale, that pollution signifies a futile emission of semen, the exclusive destination of which is the good of the human species. Ballerini ³ still adduces this rationale; and Lehmkuhl himself ⁴ seems to us to have attended excessively to this effusion. You would indeed say that St. Thomas himself ⁵ used an argument from the pouring forth of semen. But in this way he responds rather ad hominem. To one objecting that semen is a superfluity of nourishment, the Holy Doctor replies that "it is a superfluity which is needed." But in the direct demonstration in the body of the article, he places the formal malice of lust in the vicious use of venereal things.

³ Opus theologicum morale, vol. 2, treatise 6, no. 1026.

⁴ Theologia moralis, I, 1036 and 1039.

⁵ II-II, question 153, article 3, reply to objection 1.

Moreover, the rationale deduced from the prodigal effusion of semen is subject to a twofold difficulty. Nature itself, even against the will of the man, lavishes this semen. Why would the same not be lawful for me for a just cause, for example for the sake of health ⁶? Especially since the quantity of this liquid is so great that it can never be said: "this portion of the semen poured forth is necessary for generation." Indeed, a useless outpouring is permitted even to men themselves. For no less than in pollution, in the copulations of sterile persons the semen is lavished.

⁶ Thus already Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 17, no. 16.

Again, the end for which nature prepares semen is not the generation of offspring alone.

For it destines semen for an operation, copulation, which has other immediate utilities; but nature impels to so many copulations that several must necessarily be futile.

And so you will never establish from the outpouring as such why it is not lawful to lavish by pollution this semen which can be lavished in other ways, but rather from another rationale which, if found, will manifest to us the formal malice of pollution.

b) Wherefore others have placed the malice of pollution not in the loss of semen, but in perfect venereal pleasure; and at least principally in it, as they say; indeed exclusively in it, if they wish to speak consistently. Thus Rev. Fr. Eschbach, Disputationes, disputation 4, chapter 4, or the Nouvelle Revue Theologique, vols. 3 and 5, which Palmieri favors, Opus theologicum, note to II, no. 1028.

But they incur this grave criticism, that pleasure follows the nature of the conjoined operation, so that it cannot be the first rationale of dishonesty. Nor can the force of this principle be evaded by a certain arbitrary distinction between venereal pleasure and other pleasures ⁷. At most this can be conceded: that, if it is connected with an operation evil of itself, the pleasure can create such allurements and such a danger of delusion that the disorder must consequently be judged grave and every accidental exception must be rejected. Wherefore Sanchez and other scholastic doctors gathered merely from the pleasure the necessity of a perpetual and grave prohibition ⁸.

⁷ Cf. Eschbach, Disputationes physiologico-theologicae, disputation 4, chapter 4, p. 483.

⁸ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 17, no. 16; and Lessius, book 4, chapter 3, nos. 108, 119, 122.

And furthermore, if the disorder is present in the pleasure itself, since the pleasure of the consummated act and that of the non-consummated act seem to differ only in intensity ⁹, one could scarcely distinguish imperfect lust specifically from perfect lust, so that in matrimony you would be compelled to confess either that all solitary lust is gravely evil or that none is gravely evil ¹⁰.

⁹ Cf. II-II, question 154, article 4.

¹⁰ Cf. those things which the Most Illustrious Dr. Waffelaert most excellently objects, no. 63, De virtutibus cardinalibus.

Yet we do not therefore hold as improbable the opinion of those who, once the intrinsic malice of the action is admitted, contend that, because of carnal pleasure wrongly sought, it is opposed to temperance, so that unless this pleasure were joined to it, a diverse species of malice would have to be sought. Cf. the appendix at the end of the book.

c) But if, with not a few, you appeal to the disadvantages of pollution once permitted, and affirm that if the licitness of pollution were conceded in some case, men, content with this pleasure, would no longer be sufficiently solicitous about entering matrimony, there will be those, such as Lecomte ¹¹, and after him Berardi ¹², who altogether deny the truth of this effect. But it is already evident that this rationale is sought extrinsically.

¹¹ De l'ovulation spontanée, part 2, section 1, chapter 3, § 2.

¹² Praxis confessariorum, no. 849.

d) There are not lacking those who think that the malice of pollution must be derived from the fact that it is an act against nature, but its gravity from the conjoined vehement pleasure and the consequent danger of frequent abuse which would be gravely opposed to the good of the species. Thus, for example, Rev. Dr. Van Roey. This opinion seems to approach the truth more closely. Yet it has this inconvenience: that pleasure follows the nature of the operation, which here would not in itself be gravely evil; and that the vehement pleasure and the very danger of abuse can be absent in various cases in which at least grave guilt would logically have to be denied. Rev. Dr. Van Roey solves this latter difficulty thus, in the cited place: "From the common danger such a law is made, and reasonably must be made, which permits no exception. Otherwise, with the psychological constitution of men again considered, the law would be weakened in itself and the intended end would not be obtained" ¹³. By these words he transfers to the natural law those things which are customarily said of positive law. To the first difficulty he responds that pleasure belongs essentially to the work of pollution itself. (Quaestio specialis, p. 28.)

¹³ Quaestio specialis, pp. 23-24.

Hence Palmieri ¹⁴ again: "It must be confessed that there are certain practical truths necessary for human society, which men perceive and sense by a certain rational instinct, but the altogether demonstrative rationale of which those same men, when they seek it analytically, find only with difficulty.... Among truths of this kind is perhaps also found this one with which we are dealing."

¹⁴ Opus theologicum, vol. 2, no. 1036.

Nevertheless, after those things which we discussed in no. 305 concerning the formal cause of grave sin, when we spoke of fornication, the proof does not seem so difficult; and the difficulty is seen to arise from the manner in which they wished to derive the gravity of the disorder directly from the gravity of the harm.

The question concerning the intrinsic malice of pollution and its gravity is followed by the question concerning its specific distinction from imperfect acts. All Catholic authors affirm this distinction, if you except a few who, after the true organic rationale of female pollution was discovered, began to doubt whether or not there existed in women a true distinction between the perfect and imperfect solitary act. With this distinction destroyed, the burden of sacramental accusation would be lightened. Indeed, there was even one among them who inclined to this consequence ¹⁵: that the rationale of mortal sin seemed consequently to be absent from the solitary acts of a married woman.

¹⁵ Observe that this was in no way defended or admitted by Ballerini, but rather by Lecomte, De l'ovulation spontanée. Cf. Van Roey, Quaestio specialis, who on p. 6 and in note 6 explicitly averts a suspicion of this kind from Ballerini.

324. - III. Therefore, we comprehend both the gravity of pollution in either sex and its distinction from the imperfect act in a conclusion which we can state briefly thus:

Every voluntary pollution, indeed every full consent to casual pollution, whether of the man or of the woman, is infected with intrinsic and grave malice and is specifically distinguished from imperfect lust.

To explain some words: we here call pollution voluntary when it is sought directly or by intention.

Consent to pollution signifies the deliberate enjoyment of the pleasure which accompanies even casual pollution, or, as Lehmkuhl says ¹⁶, the accepted pleasure of a pollution which has arisen.

¹⁶ Theologia moralis, I, 1039.

But casual is any pollution which occurs apart from intention, whether some action of ours or no action has given occasion to it.

With these things posited, we establish the first assertion by this brief argument: Every voluntary pollution is infected with intrinsic and grave malice.

Both the man and the woman who pollute themselves exercise individually an act which was to be exercised by common operation as an act of the species. Therefore, by violating its essential subordination to the species, for the sake of their individual pleasure, they deprive the act of its essential relation to the species. Thus there recurs again, but with greater force, since the very order of animal nature is overthrown here, that twofold grave malice which was demonstrated in fornication, no. 306.

The second assertion, Every full consent to casual pollution is infected with intrinsic and grave malice, is proved briefly thus.

Consent of this kind is not a mere intellectual approval of a physiological fact, but introduces the participation of the mind and furnishes a concurrence which, by increasing it, influences the pleasurable commotion itself and physically changes it, so that in place of corporeal or partial pollution you now have complete pollution. By this active participation, reason is again carried away by sense toward enjoying individually an operation which can be loved only as pertaining to the species. Wherefore this active participation contains a malice of the will lesser indeed in degree, but similar in kind to the production itself. Therefore, the same malice by which the will to pollution is vitiated generically infects consent to casual pollution. Since this malice signifies an inversion of the essential order, it necessarily remains grave.

The third assertion, concerning the specific distinction of pollution from imperfect lust, is established by this rationale:

The non-consummated acts of lust, as is easily evident from the anthropological part, express in themselves a prepara- tion for the consummated act, and immediately derive their morality from the order toward the consummated act, so that they are good or evil according to the act to which they are referred; while the consummated act is judged good or evil immediately from the order toward generation which it possesses or of which it is deprived. And this is common to either sex.

Therefore, although we concede that these acts are referred to the same complete species, nevertheless, specifically, just as the begun and the completed, the beginning and the terminus, the means and the end - yet of the same generic rationale - differ from one another in species.

We rely upon the doctrine which St. Thomas ¹⁷ renders in these words: "Certain things are found to differ in species in two ways: in one way, from the fact that each has a complete species ¹⁸, as a horse and an ox differ in species; in another way, insofar as, according to diverse degrees in some generation or motion, diverse species are taken, as the building is the complete generation of a house, while the placing of the foundation and the erection of the wall are incomplete species, as is evident through the Philosopher (Ethics, book 10, chapter 4)." And below: "The sin of the heart and of the mouth are not distinguished from the sin of deed when they are joined with it at the same time, but insofar as any one of these is found by itself; just as a part of a motion is not distinguished from the whole motion when the motion is continuous, but only when the motion stops in the middle."

¹⁷ I-II, question 72, article 7, body and reply to objection 3.

¹⁸ That is, one individual being which is distinguished from many of the same species by individual notes alone.

421. To no. 327. - Concerning the essential malice of pollution, these things are furthermore to be observed.

Those who place the essential malice of pollution in the complete use of the venereal powers deprived of a relation to the species, and those who place it in pleasure wrongly sought, do not seem to differ so greatly from one another as regards the matter.

For both profess that the order whose privation is principally to be attended to is the order toward the species.

But the former contend that, according to the principles of St. Thomas, pleasure follows the nature of the operation, so that the operation is not evil because of the pleasure, but the pleasure is evil because of the operation, and consequently the rationale of malice cannot be found in the pleasure itself as such; that pleasure, as a subjective affection of the subject, can have no immediate order toward the species: that the subject is pleased is always some good of man; but pleasure is regulated by the operation, which here is regulated by the good of the species; that the abuse of pleasure is not the sole malice of pollution, because that abuse would place merely a disorder in the subject himself, whose reason would be conquered by passion.

But these things do not seem capable of being denied.

The latter, however, assume the principle of St. Thomas: sins are morally specified from the mutable good toward which the sinner turns himself. But here the good is pleasure. Nor does this seem capable of being doubtful to anyone.

Wherefore, the two opinions seem capable of being reconciled in this manner, by distinguishing the gravity of the sin and its specification. Because the sinner seeks pleasure, the sin is against chastity and is referred to Temperance. But there is a privation of the order toward the species which the operation to which the pleasure is joined ought to have. And from this privation pollution has its principal malice. If it were principally an abuse of pleasure as such, it would destroy only the order of man within himself.

But if you judge the controversy to concern this, whether pollution is evil because the pleasure sought is deprived of a relation to the good of the species, or because the operation from which the pleasure is taken is deprived of this relation, we judge that the latter must be held.

S. Th. II-II, q. 166-167.

1052. Studiosity (from study, that is, vehement application of the mind; weetgierigheid) is the virtue moderating the appetite and study of truth to be known according to the rules of right reason. It is subjected principally in the will for intellectual cognition, but secondarily in the concupiscible appetite for sensitive cognition.

The proximate matter of this virtue is not cognition itself of truth, which, speaking per se, is good (nor does it need a moral virtue), but the appetite of truth to be known, which can be good or evil. For on the part of the soul man is inclined to desire for cognition; on the part of the body he is inclined to avoid the labor of seeking knowledge. Hence a virtue is required, which contains each inclination within the limits of reason, lest there be excess toward cognition or the defect of sloth. Insofar as it restrains the immoderate appetite of knowing, lest someone wish to know more and higher things than befits his capacity, nor make knowledge more than truth, it is a potential part of temperance; insofar as it impels to study notwithstanding labor, it rather pertains to fortitude. From this second element it obtained its name, but the first is more essential, for the appetite of knowing per se regards the cognition to which studiosity is ordered; the labor of learning is regarded only per accidens, insofar as it is an impediment of cognition which must be removed. And therefore studiosity rather and simply pertains to temperance.

1053. Curiosity is opposed to studiosity primarily and by excess. - This generally signifies every superfluous care about useless things in clothing, furniture, speech, art, exterior things; properly it imports superfluous diligence in knowing things which either do not pertain to us at all or exceed our grasp, precisely with this mind, that we may know and discern, or from the affection of cognition alone: for if it were done for another end, and not from the delectation of cognition, it is not formal curiosity but material curiosity. Hence it can be defined: the inordinate appetite of knowing.

Vicious curiosity is concerned:

A. About intellective cognition in two general ways: a) per accidens, on the part of the end, namely if knowledge is sought for an evil end, for example, for becoming proud or for harming others, and this is material curiosity; b) per se from the very inordinate mode of seeking knowledge, if it is formal curiosity, and this in four ways: 1. insofar as through less useful study we are withdrawn from necessary study; 2. if someone studies to learn something from him from whom it is not lawful, as from a demon or from magicians or spiritists; 3. if he seeks to know the truth concerning creatures without referring it to the due end (directly or indirectly), namely to the knowledge of God; 4. if he studies to know truth above the faculty of his own talent, because through this men easily slide into errors (Sir. 3:22, 26; Prov. 25:27).

B. Similarly, vicious curiosity is concerned with sensitive cognition in a twofold way: 1. in one way, negatively, if sensitive cognition is not ordered to something useful, but rather turns man away from some useful consideration; 2. in another way, positively, insofar as sensitive cognition is ordered to something harmful: as the curious looking at a woman is ordered to concupiscence, and diligent inquiry concerning the deeds of others is ordered to detraction.

Yet if someone is intent upon cognition of sensible things in an ordered way because of the necessity of sustaining nature, or because of the study of understanding truth, there is virtuous studiosity about sensible cognition.

1054. Curiosity (nieuwsgierigheid) according to itself is a venial sin; because it does not seem a great inordination that man should apply superfluous care in knowing things which do not pertain to him: for it is nothing but an excessive affection and use of a good thing, namely cognition. Yet it can become mortal in many ways per accidens from circumstances:

1. By reason of matter or effect, if from an inordinate desire of knowing someone transgresses a positive law or exposes himself to grave danger: thus they sin mortally who read prohibited books, or amorous books with danger of consent; who from curiosity look for a long time at the dishonorable parts of the other sex; who attempt by the powers of nature to know the mysteries of faith; or intend to know the secret of confession; who watch duels by their own effort, etc.

2. By reason of the end, as if you attempt to know something for gravely harming your neighbor.

3. By reason of the means, as if by magical art, or by inducing someone into mortal sin, you wish to know something, or you open letters in order to read them (n. 856).

1055. Negligence is opposed to studiosity by defect and secondarily. - It is the voluntary omission of knowing those things which someone is bound to learn or know for his state and condition. It is mortal or venial according as the obligation of knowing and the negligence is grave or light, for example, a judge neglecting the study necessary for prudently settling a case.

Negligence here is taken for the appetite of neglecting study and is the root of negligence of the intellect. Namely that negligence contrary to studiosity is the cause of negligence against prudence.

1056. Remarks. - 1. Luxury and gluttony are about pleasures which are in the use of tangible things; but curiosity is about the pleasure of cognition of all the senses and is called the concupiscence of the eyes. Hence merely sensible pleasure sought without reason pertains to curiosity, because it is to experience in order to experience, to know by sense in order to know (a. 2, ad 1).

2. Let the words of St. Thomas, q. 167, a. 2, ad 3, be noted: "To look upon the deeds of others, or to inquire with a good mind, or for one's own utility, namely that from the good works of neighbor man may be provoked to better things, or also for the utility of that person, namely that he may be corrected if anything is done viciously by him, according to the rule of charity and due office, is praiseworthy (Heb. 10:24)... But that someone intends to consider the vices of neighbors, for contemning or detracting, or at least for inquiring uselessly, is vicious" (Prov. 24:15).

716. Studiousness is a virtue moderating the appetite and study for knowing truth according to the rules of right reason.¹⁴¹⁴

Man indeed naturally desires to know truth; but since after original sin knowledge of truths cannot be had without laborious study, some men from laziness neglect to learn even necessary truths. Fortitude impels one to conquer laziness in learning necessary truths. But the virtue of studiousness moderates the inordinate desire of knowing. Studiousness indeed principally concerns the moderation of sensitive cognition in sight and hearing, because disorder more easily arises there; nevertheless, it must not rarely be exercised also in intellectual cognition.

The vice opposed to studiousness by excess is curiosity, which is the inordinate appetite for knowing.¹⁴¹⁵ Curiosity concerns both intellectual and sensitive cognition. Concerning intellectual cognition, disorder can occur: 1. on the part of the end, if, namely, knowledge is sought for an evil end, for example, in order to harm others; 2. from an inordinate mode of desiring knowledge, and this in four ways: a) if someone, on account of the study of useless things, neglects sciences which must necessarily be learned; b) if someone attempts to learn knowledge from the devil, as happens in divination, vain observance, spiritism, etc.; c) if someone does not order knowledge of creatures to knowledge of God; d) if someone studies to know truths exceeding his capacity.

On the part of sensitive cognition, however, disorder can be present either because it is not ordered to something useful and rather turns one away from necessary knowledge, or because it concerns dangerous things, for example, if someone curiously looks upon a woman and thence suffers temptations against chastity. Inordinate curiosity of itself is only a venial sin, since its disorder is not so great; nevertheless, it can become a mortal sin by reason of the matter, the end, and the means employed. Inordinate curiosity is sometimes called the concupiscence of the eyes.¹⁴¹⁶ He who opens and reads another's letters sins not only by the vice of curiosity, but also against justice.¹⁴¹⁷

Opposed by defect to the virtue of studiousness is negligence, that is, the voluntary omission of knowing those things which are necessary according to the state and condition of each person. The gravity of this sin depends upon the evils thence following, or at least upon the probable danger of evils.

¹⁴¹⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 166, a. 3. In German: Wißbegierde [desire for knowledge].

¹⁴¹⁵ Neugierde [curiosity].

¹⁴¹⁶ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 167, a. 2.

¹⁴¹⁷ Cf. above, n. 181, where violation of secrecy was treated.

I say 1st. Pollution directly and perfectly voluntary is always a mortal sin, so that it is never licit to procure it. The reason is 1st. because this is drawn from the words of the Apostle, I Cor. vi, 10: "Nor the effeminate ... shall possess the kingdom of God"; 2nd. because pollution has intrinsic repugnance with nature, which has ordered the emission of semen solely to generation; 3rd. because if it were ever permitted, or prohibited only under venial matter, most easily, on account of so great a proclivity of corrupt nature toward lust, the habit of pollution would be contracted, and therefore the order of nature would shortly be subverted; 4th. because prop. 49 was condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "Mollities is not prohibited by the law of nature; whence, if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good. ..." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 476. - Viva, on this proposition.

I say 2nd. Pollution indirectly or only in the cause voluntary is a grave sin whenever the proximate cause, and one tending by its own nature to pollution, e.g., lingering thoughts about very lustful things, is posited without just reason; but it is venial whenever the cause which is posited is only remote, or such that danger is joined to it by accident or rarely. The reason for each is easily gathered from those things which were said elsewhere concerning the indirectly voluntary. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 483 and 484.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Every deliberate emission of semen, however small, is pollution and therefore a mortal sin. Likewise it is mortal to acquiesce in the pleasure of pollution, even for a very brief time, and although it happens beyond intention and spontaneously. A fortiori if pollution spontaneously begun is promoted by some effort. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 477. - Lacroix, de Paenit., n. 1034.

2nd. Pollution which follows from touch, gaze, or reading gravely base and posited without just cause, is a mortal sin even with actual consent excluded. The reason is that then the pollution is voluntary in the cause, since these things of themselves introduce grave danger of pollution. But the sin will be only venial if these things are lightly base, and the pollution follows beyond the intention of the agent. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 482 and following.

3rd. Nocturnal pollution lacks fault, because it does not arise from the free will, nor is any assent given to it, as is supposed; but neither does it indeed always denote a lustful mind, since it can come from many natural causes, e.g., from superfluity of nature, from weakness of the organs, or from disposition of the nerves. But it will be mortal or venial if before sleep it was caused and foreseen, according to the greater or lesser advertence and influence of the cause. Thus voluntary wicked thoughts, wicked conversations, and other things of this kind preceding sleep will easily render it mortal. But ordinarily intemperance in food or drink, etc., will make it only venial. Likewise nocturnal pollution which happens with imperfect will and liberty, as sometimes occurs in the half-asleep, ought not to be judged mortal; but it must be judged that no consent was present, or at most very imperfect consent, when ordinarily in the state of wakefulness it displeases; because judgment must be made according to ordinary contingencies. The same also must be held concerning nocturnal touches.

4th. Voluntary distillation, even only indirectly voluntary, if it is notable or occurs with notable stirring of the genital spirits, can be a mortal sin; because it is a grave disordering, and introduces proximate danger of pollution. But if it is small and without notable stirring, a distinction must be made: 1st. If it is directly voluntary, it cannot be excused from mortal sin; because any distillation whatsoever always, or for the most part, carries with itself stirring and some emission of semen. 2nd. But if it is only indirectly voluntary, it will easily be excused from every sin; because no more care is to be taken concerning such a flux than concerning the emission of any other excrement by which nature is accustomed to unload itself. - Thus expressly St. Alphonsus, n. 477.

5th. It is licit for someone suffering severe itching in the private parts to remove it by touch, even if pollution follows, provided that the itching arises from acrimony of the blood, as ordinarily happens, but not from ardor of lust. For if pollution then happens, with the danger of consent excluded, it happens by accident and therefore inculpably. For the rest, penitents are to be exhorted that, insofar as it can be done without grave trouble, they restrain themselves from touches of this kind. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 483.

AMONG these vices curiosity first presents itself, which can be taken broadly or strictly; taken broadly it stands for an immoderate eagerness for trying novelties in any way whatever; thus the Holy Doctor takes it in his exposition on the Psalter, Psalm 13, where he sets out four things by which a Christian man is most corrupted; and he puts Curiosity first among them, saying: there are four things that corrupt, Curiosity, loquacity, cruelty, and pleasure.

And since the experience of novelties is perceived chiefly by sight, therefore the Holy Doctor in the place cited ascribes Curiosity to the eyes; for these, while the mind within is distracted through negligence, run about and wander abroad among various objects; whence a multitude of thoughts, creeping into the mind in a throng, empties piety, and by degrees drives the soul on to graver sins.

The Holy Doctor also elegantly sets forth another, more physical reason, in the place cited above: why the eyes are seduced by curiosity more than the other senses? For since the four elements flourish especially in four parts of man, fire shines forth most of all in the eyes, and therefore by nature, being remote from the center, it strives to burst forth in every direction and to course about, and scarcely allows the visual rays to be fixed long on one object; hence the young are more curious than the old, since in the latter that fire lies almost extinct and languishes, while in the former, being more lively, it distracts: The other parts, in which the remaining elements flourish, are the hands, in which, because of the predominance of earth, there is touch; the tongue, in which the air forms the voice; and the genitals, in which the watery humor serves generation: And these parts (the Holy Doctor subjoins) the aforesaid four vices, like a fourfold pestilence, destroy — the eyes namely curiosity, the tongue loquacity, the hands cruelty, and the genitals pleasure. I relate this because those vices oppose that temperance in a special manner, of which more fully elsewhere.

STRICTLY speaking, however, curiosity taken thus is opposed to studiousness by excess, and consists in the desire and immoderate eagerness to know and to be wise, not unto sobriety, but to satisfy the lust of the mind.

Hence this curiosity is very well defined by the Holy Doctor in his exposition on Ecclesiastes on the words I saw all things that are done. It is the lustful prostitution of the human understanding, embracing any truth whatsoever everywhere and committing adultery with it: The reason for this definition is given in the same place by the Seraphic Doctor, because the first Truth is the bride, whose faith the human understanding in a certain way breaks, while it curiously explores other truths and places its satiety, or happiness, in them; And since curiosity advances thus far, it is without doubt deadly, when it turns the soul wholly away from the first Truth.

That this immoderate desire of knowing can occur in four ways is taught by St. Thomas, q. 167, and St. Bonaventure in the mirror of the soul, chap. 1.

FIRST on the part of the end, if he ordains knowledge to an evil end, or does not refer it to God as he ought, as St. Augustine says book on true religion, chap. 29, and book on the morals of the Church, chap. 21, in Valencia's collection.

SECOND on the part of the learner, if by means of it he is hindered from satisfying his duty. On this ground St. Jerome in the epistle to Damasus, on the prodigal son, rebukes Priests, who, setting aside the Gospels and the Prophets, read comedies and love poems, and sing the words of bucolic verses.

THIRD on the part of the one from whom knowledge is sought, as if it be sought from a demon, as I said concerning Superstition and Adjuration, Treatise on Religion.

FOURTH on the part of the thing whose knowledge is sought, if it be above nature. Therefore Ecclesiasticus 3: Seek not the things that are too high for thee.

THE EXCESS of games is opposed to Eutrapelia, as I said when treating of Games and Jests. See St. Thomas question 178, article 3.

And indeed it will be mortal, if the manner of playing is disgraceful and obscene, or pernicious to one's neighbor through mingled frauds: Or if anyone so gives himself to play that he neglects the commandments of God or of the Church, and indeed places in it his ultimate end, as St. Bonaventure teaches in the mirror of the soul, chap. 2, §. The fifth fruit of rapine is the game of dice. Hence some say of this that it is a mortal sin, because it is against Canonical and Civil law. And what is gained from play is possessed by no good title, nor can it be retained, but ought to be distributed to the poor. For since he who gains in play gains unjustly, and he who loses loses justly, therefore he who gains is not bound to restore to him from whom he gains, unless perhaps he led him into playing. And since play seems to have sufficiently from its root the character of mortal sin, because it seems to proceed from avarice, and because many sins are communicated in play — namely fraud, lying, perjury, blasphemy, scandal, loss of time, and anger — therefore this seems to be the reason for the prohibition of play. When one plays for the sake of recreation, the sins said above being excluded, it does not seem to have the character of mortal sin. Thus the Seraphic Doctor.

And chap. 3, §. On dishonesty in gesture, he strikes the same note.

From these gather, first, that the game of dice is not forbidden by the natural law. So Molina Volume 2, on Justice, question 510. Stephanus Costa, Treatise on Play, article 4, number 5. Diana part one, treatise 15, resolution 65, against Scacchius treatise on commerce, §. 1, question 1, number 104.

GATHER, second, that the civil and canonical laws prohibiting these games do not of themselves bind under mortal sin, as the Holy Doctor says, but only by reason of the sins that follow; and that the civil laws have been abrogated by custom, as taught by Homobonus on the examination of churches, part 2, treatise 9, chap. 24, question 25. Regius in the resolution of cases, case 23. Salas treatise on play, disputation 3. Lessius book 2, chap. 26, doubt 1. Filliucius volume 2, treatise 38, chap. 4, number 58. Diana in the place cited, who with others infer that, by force of the said laws, other circumstances set aside, there is not even sin.

THERE is, moreover, the question whether the keepers of houses for these games sin gravely.

THE NEGATIVE opinion is upheld by Vincentius Iustinianus, a Dominican, cited by Lopez, to be quoted below; for by the authority of St. Thomas 1. 2. question 169, article 2, ad 4, and by the examples adduced after Sanchez by Bonacina, Treatise on laws, disputation 2, question 4, point 2, it is lawful to minister and sell indifferent things, even with knowledge of their wicked abuse: And such are these games.

THAT it is nevertheless unlawful St. Bonaventure teaches in the place cited of the mirror, chap. 2, for there those grave sins are perpetrated which the Holy Doctor enumerates, as tearful experience teaches.

He has been followed by Suarez, treatise on Charity, disputation 10, section 4. Sanchez, Volume 1, book 1, chap. 7, number 39. Sylvester, under the word Ludus, question 15. Navarrus, Manual, chap. 19. Comitolus, book 3, question 7. Zanardus, in the Directory, part 2, precept 3, chap. 28. John de la Cruz, in the Directory, part 1, precept 7, article 5, doubt 13. Valencia, volume 2, disputation 5, question 6, point 5, §. 2. Molina, Volume 2, on Justice, disputation 516, and many others among these, with whom Diana subscribes above, referring to others.

It is proved by the argument of St. Bonaventure: Those things from which grave sins follow are gravely forbidden: such are these gatherings of houses, or conventicles: Therefore. The minor is proved from St. Bernard sermon 33, where he enumerates twelve sins. What is Barattry but a betting-house, in which by blasphemies the limbs are cut down of him who redeemed us with his own blood, and of his sweetest Mother, and of all the Saints, as Bellochius says in practice, part 2, question 4, from number 492 to 504, who says it is the seed-bed of all vices, of which St. Antoninus enumerates twenty-one part 2, title 1, chap. 23, §. 6. Wherefore he beseeches Princes, in the bowels of Christ, to root out this most foul pestilence.

Bellochus number 466 infers, and Diana in the place cited and others, that the patrons of these conventicles, should the principal players default, step in and are bound in restitution.

Diana infers, second, that Princes cannot grant a license for exposing a house for play.

From what has been said the adverse argument is answered: it is not lawful to minister things to wicked uses when the wicked use is exercised in the very exhibition itself; and thus dice, dice-games, and candles are exercised while men are actually blaspheming, as Diana notes with Lorca 2. 2, question 10, article 9. Nor does Diana rightly concede in his first answer that these things are indifferent, since on the very fact they are wicked and morally ordered to this.

THE DEFECT opposed to Eutrapelia at the other extreme remains, and is called Rusticity, as Aristotle teaches Nicomachean Ethics 2, chap. 7, and book 4, chap. 8, and St. Thomas question 168, article 4, and St. Bonaventure in the places adduced, and it occurs when a man is so boorish as to make himself burdensome to all, hindering honest recreations, either by not cooperating in them or by biting, carping, and embittering them out of a certain unurbanity which I call Saturnine, which very many hunt after, especially spiritual Cydonians, and by which they vex others.

To Titius, who applies himself to the study of moral theology, knowledge seems to be good, and therefore the desire for it seems unable to be bad. Theologians, however, seem to teach otherwise when they hand down that curiosity is sinful. Thus, according to them, the reading of an indecent book, inquiry by young people about sexual matters, and an indecent look are sins, at least venial, if they proceed from curiosity; but to inquire of the dead about truth out of curiosity is mortal. In order that he may resolve these difficulties, Titius asks:

1. What is curiosity, and in what does its malice consist?

2. Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?

3. Let satisfaction be given to Titius and his difficulties.

1. What is curiosity and in what does its malice consist ?

Curiosity, in the sense in which the word is used by theologians, is an inordinate desire of knowledge. As St. Thomas teaches (II-II, question 167, article 1), knowledge is good in itself, but it may be bad incidentally, as when it is the cause of pride. And although knowledge is good, yet the desire of knowledge may be inordinate and vicious. The desire of knowledge becomes vicious if the end for which it is sought is bad, as if one studies medicine in order to poison an enemy. Moreover, all knowledge is not equally important, and so a desire of knowing what is less useful is inordinate if it stands in the way of acquiring knowledge which is necessary. A law student who requires all his time to qualify for his examinations would do wrong if he spent two hours daily in learning Chinese. If the means taken to acquire knowledge are bad, the desire becomes inordinate. Thus, as St. Thomas says, it is unlawful to seek to know the future from demons. Fourthly, a desire of knowledge is inordinate if it leads one to try to learn what surpasses his powers.

2. Is the desire or pursuit of a good object always good?

No; in order that an action may be good, not only the object, but the end and all the circumstances must be good — good arises from an integral cause, evil from any defect whatsoever. The answer, too, is clear from what was said above.

3. The case. Titius, a theological student, thinks that as knowledge is good the desire of it can not be evil. This difficulty has been met already. It is clear that the desire of knowledge can be inordinate, and if it is inordinate, it is sinful. Theologians are right when they teach that curiosity is at least a venial sin and that it may be mortal. Thus the reading of an improper book out of curiosity, where there is not proximate danger of consenting to evil, is a venial sin; if the book is indecent and there is proximate danger of consenting to evil, it is mortal. Before the proper time youths should not think or talk about sexual matters, as thought and talk about such matters before the time leads to impurity. Hence to indulge curiosity about them in talk, look, or reading, is at least a venial sin, and it becomes mortal if the danger of consent be proximate. To seek to know occult matters by calling up the dead is specially forbidden in Holy Scripture, and is mortally sinful.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 218; Lessius, De Justitia, lib. iv, c. 4, n. 84.