The Attention and Intention of the Minister

19. On due attention. Attention is an act of the intellect, namely the application of the mind to those things which are being done. One is internal, which is defined as the very advertence of the mind to that which is being done; the other is external, which consists in the absence of any external action which cannot coexist with internal attention. Therefore external attention requires nothing else than that the external rite be performed in a human manner, that is, in such a way that the minister knows what he is doing.

a. For the valid administration of the sacraments external attention is required and suffices: for that attention is required and suffices by which the administration becomes a truly human act; but for this external attention suffices. Therefore even a distracted minister, and one thinking at the same time about other things, validly confers the sacraments.

b. But for the licit administration of the sacraments that internal attention is required which excludes every voluntary distraction: for the reverence due to the sacraments and the obligation of avoiding the danger of error in the conferral of the sacraments demand internal attention also.

Voluntary distraction in the administration of the sacraments does not exceed venial fault, unless the minister exposes himself to the danger of erring in those things which pertain to the essence, and therefore of frustrating the sacrament. According to certain authors, because of the dignity of so great a sacrament, voluntary distraction in the confection of the eucharist is a grave sin; yet several authors contradict this opinion, which therefore cannot be called certain.¹

¹ Cf. Lacroix, bk. 6, pr. 2, n. 443.

Intention is an act of the will by which we will to do or omit something. It can be considered in three ways: in itself, insofar as it is an act of the will; according to the object which the will intends; and according to the mode by which the act of the will tends toward the object.

20. On intention considered according to itself. Explanations. If it is considered according to itself, four diverse intentions must be distinguished:

a. Actual is called that which exists here and now, flows into the work, and is adverted to reflexively when the work is performed. This intention, by reason of the object, can be explicit or implicit, concerning which below.

b. Virtual is called that which exists here and now and flows into the work, but is not adverted to when the work is placed. This, therefore, is an intention previously had and never retracted, so that by its force and virtue the work now occurs, even if it is not adverted to by the agent.

alpha. A priest, for example, about to celebrate, elicits the intention of celebrating or consecrating; moved by this act of will he prepares himself, goes into the sacristy, puts on the sacred vestments, proceeds to the altar, duly completes all things up to the consecration. Now although at the consecration he does not renew the intention of consecrating, indeed, thinking of other things, does not even advert to the intention of consecrating, nevertheless he has the virtual intention, by whose influence he utters the words of consecration.

beta. Actual and virtual intention agree in this, that each is present and flows into the work; but the difference between the two seems to be this, that the former is present and is adverted to by the agent, while the latter is not adverted to by the agent who thinks about other things, although it is present and moves him to act. In like manner, between internal and external attention the difference seems to be this, that the agent has consciousness of the former, but does not have consciousness of the latter. Therefore external attention is not called external because it is in no way internal, but because it is not reflexive or joined with consciousness.¹

c. Habitual is called that which was had at some time and was never retracted, but no longer exists and therefore does not flow into the work. Therefore this intention can be present even in those sleeping, mad, and drunk.

If someone previously had the intention of confecting a sacrament and afterward, having become drunk, confects it, he confects the sacrament with a habitual intention. Likewise he who yesterday proposed today to offer Mass for a friend, and today, not moved by yesterday's proposal, indeed forgetful of it, offers Mass, is said to have the habitual intention of offering for the friend.

d. Interpretative is called that which was never present, but which nevertheless, because of the habitual inclination of the will toward the object, would be present if that object came into mind.

He who never had the intention of consecrating a particle unknowingly placed on the corporal, which nevertheless he would wish to consecrate if he had knowledge of it, has an interpretative intention of consecrating. He who never expressly desired baptism, and yet would desire it if the thought of it came into his mind, is said to will baptism interpretatively, or to have an interpretative intention of baptism.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri IV, n. 653.

21. Principles. 1. Actual intention is best and greatly to be recommended, but it is not required for validly confecting the sacraments: for neither from the nature of the thing nor from any positive law is it prescribed. Moreover, actual intention, considering human frailty, is morally impossible; but it cannot be affirmed that Christ required for the validity of the sacraments something which is morally impossible for their ministers.

2. Virtual intention is required and suffices for validly confecting the sacraments: for an intention is required which flows into the sacramental action and therefore into its effect; but only actual and virtual intention flow into the work: therefore at least virtual intention is required. But since from the nature of the thing this one thing is demanded, that the sacramental action proceed from the deliberate will of the minister, virtual intention certainly suffices.

It is not permitted to repeat the form of the sacraments, even if it was uttered with distraction, whether voluntary or involuntary, because distraction does not impede virtual intention nor therefore the validity of the sacrament.

3. Neither habitual nor interpretative intention suffices for validly confecting the sacraments: for, in order that the sacrament be valid, it must be confected from the intention of the minister as from a cause; but neither habitual nor interpretative intention flows into the work; wherefore if the minister does not have another intention, the sacrament is not confected from his intention (n. 17).

Therefore there would be no sacrament if it were administered in sleep, or by a madman or by a drunk man, even if the one administering had intended it before drunkenness or sleep.

22. On intention considered according to the object. Explanations. According as the willed object is represented by the intellect and intended by the will in a diverse manner, one must distinguish:

a. Determinate and indeterminate, according as a certain and definite object, or a vague and uncertain one, is intended; for example, he who from ten diverse Mass intentions intends to discharge one definite intention has a determinate intention; but he who intends to discharge one of them, not defining which one, has an indeterminate intention.

b. Explicit and implicit, according as the thing itself is expressly intended in itself, or not in itself but in another thing (in which, expressly known and willed, it is contained) is intended.

Thus he who expressly thinks of and desires to receive extreme unction has an explicit intention; but he who expressly desires to die as Christians are accustomed to die has an implicit intention of extreme unction. Likewise he who explicitly thinks of and intends to receive the subdiaconate, but thinks nothing about the obligation of preserving chastity, which he knows to be joined to the order, at the same time implicitly wills and intends to receive this obligation.

23. Principles. 1. For validly confecting a sacrament there is required at least the implicit intention of doing what the true Church does.¹ Certainly some intention of confecting the sacrament is required, both because matter and form must be determined to the sacramental action by the minister's intention of confecting the sacrament (n. 9), and because the minister becomes the instrumental cause of the sacrament only by this intention (n. 17, 1); but in the intention of doing what the Church does, that intention is contained implicitly and confusedly. But in order to have the intention of doing what the Church does, it suffices that the minister wishes to perform the rite which he has seen or heard to be done by the Church of Christ, or the rite which either he himself or others hold as sacred: for in this intention is contained the intention of doing what the Church does.

a. Therefore, for validly confecting a sacrament, it is not required that the minister wish to confer this determinate sacrament (to baptize, to confirm), nor that he wish generally to confer a sacrament or a sacramental effect, nor that he wish to do what the Catholic Church or the Roman Church does, but it suffices that he wish to do what the true Church instituted by Christ does, even if he falsely thinks his own sect to be the true Church.

b. Therefore certainly he would not confect a sacrament who positively did not wish to do what Christ instituted or what the Catholic Church does. For this reason especially Anglican ordinations are invalid: for it is established that the Anglican bishops changed the rite of ordination for this reason, lest they should do and confer what the Catholic Church does and confers.² Likewise he does not confect a sacrament who would wish only to place the external rite, that is, to place this matter and utter these words. Likewise he who would place the whole external rite, say of baptism, for another end, for example, for the sake of washing another, of jest, of mockery, or of practice.

c. Therefore a heretic who by error thinks that there are no sacraments, or that sacraments confer no grace, can nevertheless validly baptize or consecrate, if he wishes to do what Christ instituted. Indeed, an unbeliever baptizes validly, provided he wishes to place the rite which Christians hold as sacred, or wishes to do what Christians are accustomed to do.

2. The intention must be determinate toward certain matter or toward a certain person: for the very words of the sacramental form demand this (I baptize you; I absolve you; this is my body), which designate certain matter or a certain person as present in some way. Yet an error of the minister concerning the person requesting the sacrament or concerning the quantity of matter to be consecrated does not render the sacrament invalid (except in matrimony), provided he intends to confer the sacrament on the one requesting it or to consecrate the matter present; which intention indeed he is always judged to have, unless he expressly restricts it to a determinate person or to definite matter.

a. Therefore he who intended to consecrate one from several particles placed on the corporal, or in time of plague to absolve one from several dying persons in a hospital, not determining whom, would do nothing. If someone absolving a penitent whom he thinks to be Peter, when nevertheless he is Paul, intended to absolve Peter and no other, he would absolve no one. If someone consecrating, as he judges, three particles, when nevertheless there are four, intended to consecrate only three, he would consecrate none.

b. Wherefore it is best to direct the intention to the matter or person present, whatever it may be; for then truly, to remain in the examples just given, Paul is absolved, although he is thought to be Peter, and four particles are consecrated, although they are judged to be only three, because the intention of the one confecting the sacrament is referred to this determinate present matter.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 11: "If anyone shall say that in ministers there is not required the intention at least of doing what the Church does, let him be anathema." Cf. prop. 28 of Alexander VIII.

² Cf. constitution of Leo XIII, Apostolicae curae, 13 Sept. 1896.

24. On intention considered according to the mode. Explanation. According to the mode by which the will is borne toward the object, absolute and conditional intention is to be distinguished, according as the will is borne toward the object independently of every event or circumstance, or only depending on some event or circumstance. But the condition added can be of the present: if you are alive, I baptize you; or of the past: if you have made restitution, I absolve you; or of the future: if it rains tomorrow, I baptize you.

What is said here concerning conditional intention is to be understood of a suspensive condition, namely by which the effect is suspended until the condition is fulfilled.

25. Principles on conditional intention. 1. A sacrament conferred under a condition of the present or of the past is valid if the condition has been fulfilled; but if the condition does not obtain, it is null: for if the condition added is true, the intention of the one conferring the sacrament passes into an absolute intention; but if the condition added is not true, the intention of conferring the sacrament is lacking.

Therefore the effect of a sacrament which is conferred under a condition of the present or of the past is always certain: either valid or null. Thus a sacrament conferred in this way: I absolve you, if you wish to dismiss the concubine, if you are capable; I baptize you, if you are not baptized, is valid if the condition is true; otherwise it is null.

2. A sacrament conferred under a condition of the future is null: for it is not valid immediately, when the sacramental action is placed, because then the intention of confecting the sacrament is lacking; nor is it valid afterward, when, the condition having been fulfilled, the intention of the minister is had, because then the matter and form of the sacrament no longer exist; therefore a sacrament conferred in this way is never valid.

If a condition of the present is added, but one hidden and known to God alone: I baptize you, if you are predestined; I absolve you, if God sees that you will die this year, some with Viva and Lacroix think that the sacrament is valid, because the added condition is of the present; but others, with Coninck, Dicastillo, and St. Alphonsus (n. 26), teach that the sacrament is invalid, because it cannot be supposed that God gave men the power of confecting sacraments under such a condition: for since God committed the administration of the sacraments to the knowledge and will of men, a condition cannot be added which cannot be known by the human mind. Whatever the case may be, to add a condition of this kind is certainly gravely illicit, because the sacraments would be rendered uncertain and men would not know whether they had received them validly or invalidly.

3. For a just cause it is licit to confer a sacrament under a condition of the present or of the past: for what can be valid is also licit in a case of necessity; but it is never licit to confer a sacrament under a condition of the future (except matrimony), because it is not permitted to confer a sacrament which is certainly invalid.

a. Without reasonable cause it is not permitted to confer a sacrament under a condition, because the sacramental action is performed in vain and therefore irreverence is inflicted on Christ. There is a just cause for conferring a sacrament under a condition whenever a sacrament conferred absolutely would be exposed to the danger of nullity, while, if denied absolutely, it would deprive a man of the effect of a necessary sacrament or at least a very useful one, as if it is doubted whether a man to be baptized or absolved or anointed is still living, whether the matter is valid, etc.

b. To add a condition which the minister believes to have been fulfilled, for example, to absolve under the condition if you are disposed someone whom he judges to be disposed, does not seem to exceed venial sin: for since the danger of nullity of the sacrament itself is excluded, the mere addition of a superfluous condition does not seem to be a grave irreverence.¹

25. Principles on conditional intention.

4. If a sacrament of doubtful validity must be confected or repeated, it must be confected or repeated under a condition, so that, as far as can be done, provision may be made for the reverence due to the sacraments: for if the condition is verified, the sacrament has been validly conferred; but if the condition is not verified, the sacrament is not really conferred. But that in this case matter and form are applied in vain is without fault, because this can licitly be done from a just cause: for the sacraments are for men.

a. Whether the condition which is to be added must be expressed by words. Where the rubric prescribes this, as in baptism² and extreme unction,³ the condition must be added orally; but if positive law does not prescribe this, it suffices that it be conceived in the mind: for the condition affects the intention; but this intention does not have to be expressed orally for the validity of the sacrament; therefore neither does the condition. Indeed, there are those who think (Gobat n. 272) that it is enough if the condition is had implicitly and virtually in the mind, as he has it who wishes to administer the sacrament according to the institution of Christ or the intention of the Church.

b. If someone has elicited two contrary intentions, the predominant intention is valid. But that intention is judged predominant which would be chosen if the incompatibility of the intentions were known. Hence it can happen that a habitual intention prevails over an actual one which is had at the same time.

alpha. Thus if a priest had resolved on a determinate day to apply a Mass owed from a stipend for the happy outcome of a business to be transacted on that very day, but afterward, forgetful of the obligation contracted, on that day celebrated for himself, the former intention, although habitual, would prevail over the second, actual intention.

beta. If a confessor had resolved to defer absolution for Mark, habituated in sins though disposed, in order to strengthen his will, and nevertheless absolved him because he did not recognize him as he approached among several others, the absolution would be valid, because if he had foreseen the future error, he would have wished the absolution to be valid.⁴

¹ St. Alphonsus, n. 28.

² Rituale Romanum, tit. 2, c. 1, n. 9.

³ Ibid., tit. 5, c. 1, n. 12.

⁴ Cf. Lugo, disp. 8, sect. 8; Gury, Casus, II, n. 162.

While administering a sacrament the minister should attend to what he is doing and remember that he is engaged in a religious function. If he voluntarily allows his mind to wander on other and profane matters, he is guilty of irreverence toward God for whose worship the sacraments were instituted and should be administered. This irreverence, however, is not grave in itself, probably not even if a priest is voluntarily distracted during the consecration in Mass, so that voluntary distractions while administering the sacraments are only venial sins. Attention, then, or advertence of the mind to what is being done, is not necessary for the validity of a sacrament; only three things are necessary for its validity, as we saw above —the matter, the form, and the intention of the minister to do what the Church does.

Intention is an act of the will directing an action to a certain end. Divines distinguish between an actual, a virtual, an habitual, and an interpretative intention, wishes here and now to administer When a minister a sacrament, he has an actual intention to perform the rite. If he had such a wish and in consequence set about his task, but became distracted while administering the sacrament, he has a virtual intention. An habitual intention is a wish to do something, which wish has not been retracted but which does not issue in action. An interpretative intention is a wish which would be conceived if one thought of it, but for want of thinking of it is not elicited.

An intention of some sort in the minister is necessary for the validity of a sacrament; the Council of Trent anathematized anyone who should say that there is not required in ministers while they make and confer the sacraments at least an intention to do what the Church does.¹ Now the Church by her ministers and through the sacraments baptizes, confirms, absolves from sin, and so forth; so that the minister while making a sacrament must intend to baptize, confirm, absolve. However, it is not necessary to have an actual intention of doing this; distractions cannot always be avoided, and always to have an actual intention while engaged in conferring the sacraments would be an impossible requirement. Nor would an habitual intention suffice, for it does not exist while the action is put, nor has it any effect upon the action. Much less would an interpretative intention be sufficient. It remains, then, that a virtual intention is necessary and sufficient in the minister while he makes a sacrament.

¹ Sess. vii, c. 11.

Ambrosius Catharinus, Salmeron, Contenson, and other theologians thought that an intention to perform the external rite of a sacrament, even if the minister internally expressly withheld his intention to do what the Church does, would be sufficient for the validity of a sacrament. Such an intention to perform the merely external rite while internally withholding the intention to baptize, absolve, and so forth, is called an external intention, ‘The common opinion is that such a merely external intention is not sufficient, but that an internal intention or a positive wish to baptize, absolve, and so forth, is necessary for the validity of the sacrament. On December 7, 1690, Alexander VIII condemned the proposition that Baptism is valid when it is conferred by a minister who observes all the external rite and form of Baptism but inwardly in his heart makes this resolution, ‘‘ I do not intend to do what the Church does.” This decree would seem to settle the matter, for it seems to have been directed against Fr. Farvacques, O.S.A., who, in a little book published ten years earlier, had defended the opinion of Catharinus and Salmeron. A few theologians even subsequently to the decree of Alexander VIII have defended the same view, on the ground that the decree was aimed at the Lutheran error which asserted the validity of the sacraments even when administered in joke. No Catholic, however, defended the Lutheran doctrine at the time, and it had already been condemned by the Council of Trent. We must, then, at least say with Benedict XIV that the condemnation of the above proposition inflicted a serious blow on the opinion of Catharinus, and no theologian of note now defends it. The Church does not merely apply the matter and form when ministering the sacraments, but by means of those external rites she intends to do what Christ instituted the sacraments to effect—that is, to baptize, to absolve, and so forth. An intention, then, to do this—to baptize, to absolve, or an internal intention—is necessary for the validity of a sacrament.

It is not sufficient for the minister while making a sacrament to have a vague intention of conferring it on somebody or other, or of taking and applying some matter in general for the making of the sacrament. The intention must be definite in its scope and object, otherwise there is no reason why this matter should be taken rather than that, or why one person should be benefited rather than another. An intention, therefore, to absolve anyone in a crowd who may need it, or to consecrate five hosts out of a larger number on the altar would not be effective.

Neither ignorance nor mistake on the part of the minister about the nature or effect of a sacrament makes it invalid. Baptism conferred by one who knows nothing of its nature, or by one who denies baptismal regeneration, is valid, provided that the three essential elements of the sacrament are not wanting.

Difficulties may arise from the fact that a minister while making a sacrament had mutually contradictory intentions. Thus an heretical priest while saying Mass may have the intention to do what Christ instituted but not to offer sacrifice, as he denies that Mass is a sacrifice. In this and in similar cases divines give the following rules for discovering whether the sacrament is effected or not. When the contradictory intentions are present in the mind at the time of making the sacrament, that will prevail which is the stronger, and that is the stronger which would be chosen by the minister if he realized the contradiction. So that, in the example given, the heretical minister will actually say Mass if the intention to do what Christ instituted be the prevailing and stronger one; he will not say Mass if his intention not to offer sacrifice is the stronger. When the contradictory intentions follow one another, the last will ordinarily prevail, unless the former revoked all subsequent intentions.

Except in case of necessity the minister of a sacrament may not use probable opinions with reference to what belongs to the validity of the sacrament. As we saw when treating of the matter and form, it would be against the reverence due to the sacraments, against justice, and against charity, if the minister exposed the sacraments to the danger of nullity through following a merely probable opinion. He is bound to follow the safer opinion when he can do so in what relates to the validity of the sacraments. In questions, however, which only touch the lawfulness or the integrity of the sacraments, and when the Church supplies what is wanting in order that the sacrament may be valid, which she sometimes does, as we shall see later, there is no reason why the minister should not use probable opinions. The same doctrine applies also to the recipient of the sacraments.

I. Notion. Intention is here understood as the deliberate will of confecting a sacrament.

II. Division. Intention is distinguished:

1. By reason of itself into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. Actual intention is had when the minister, at the time at which he confects the sacrament, actually wills to confect it. It is reflex, or rather in actu signato, if there is had an express and formal volition of confecting the sacrament; it is in actu exercito if someone actually wills indeed, but nevertheless less expressly and formally, to confect the sacrament, as if someone, recognizing a rite as a sacrament, administers it under this recognition. Virtual intention is had when someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament, and that will, though not actually, nevertheless perseveres virtually, so that he operates by force of the will once had, as if someone, from the intention of celebrating Mass, puts on the vestments and performs the other things, even if perhaps at the time of the ministry he is wholly distracted. Habitual intention exists if someone has actually and explicitly willed to confect a sacrament and that will has not indeed been retracted, but nevertheless does not persevere virtually. Interpretative intention is had when someone neither actually and explicitly wills nor actually and explicitly has willed to confect a sacrament, but is presumed to be going to will it if thought about it should occur.¹ (St. Alphonsus, VI, 15.)

2. By reason of the object into merely external and internal. Merely external intention is had when someone wills and outwardly seriously performs only the external rite, but lacks the mind of confecting a sacrament, or even intends the contrary. It is called merely external because, although in itself it is internal, nevertheless its whole object is external, namely only the placing of the external rite. Internal intention is had when someone wills the external rite insofar as it is sacred, or at least insofar as it is held as such by the Church.

By reason of the object, intention is further distinguished into determinate and indeterminate, according as the thing intended is certain and defined; or is uncertain, as if someone intends to consecrate only ten hosts out of a multitude of hosts.

3. By reason of mode into explicit and implicit, according as someone expressly wills such a sacrament known and thought of, or by a more general will wills such a sacrament, whether not known, or known but not thought of.

By reason of mode it is also distinguished into absolute and conditioned, according as someone intends to confect a sacrament independently of, or dependently upon, some circumstance or event; as if someone absolves another under the condition: if you are attrite; or: if you make restitution.

¹ Some call interpretative the intention which others call implicit habitual intention.

III. The intention required. It is of faith that intention is required, and indeed intention "at least of doing what the Church does."¹ In order that these things may be unfolded and completed, observe the following:

1. In itself, actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices; habitual intention does not suffice, much less interpretative intention; fear, however, does not hinder intention. I said:

a) Actual intention is not required, but virtual intention suffices. For it must be judged that the intention suffices which truly flows into the act or sacramental rite, and therefore can be called its cause. Such is not only actual intention, but also virtual intention. There is added the fact that actual intention is not always within man's power, and its necessity would give occasion for anxieties about the validity of the sacraments (St. Thomas, III, q. 64, a. 8, ad 3;² St. Alphonsus, VI, 17, 18).

Corollary. A priest validly acts who, in the customary way, betakes himself to the baptistery, confessional, or altar and there baptizes, absolves, or consecrates; for there is had at least virtual intention; indeed practically everywhere actual intention is present, even if remiss. Likewise, a priest validly consecrates who has placed on the corporal the hosts to be consecrated, even if at the time of consecration he does not think of them. Indeed, in general it must be said that one imprudently doubts the value of the act who has placed the required rite, unless he has expressly excluded the due intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 18).

b) Habitual intention does not suffice; since it cannot be admitted that an intention suffices which in no way flows into the action of the minister; such is habitual intention (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16). Much less, as is clear, does interpretative intention suffice (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16).

c) Fear does not hinder, because, as we posit, it does not take away the voluntary (St. Alphonsus, VI, 19). Except, however, Matrimony, as will be said in its place.

2. As regards the object, there is required the intention or will of confecting a sacrament. This is established against those who judge that external intention suffices; in other words, that it suffices for someone outwardly and seriously to place the external rite, even if inwardly he does not will to confect the sacrament. This doctrine, first defended by Roland Bandinelli, and afterwards revived by Ambrosius Catharinus (1553), is today almost commonly abandoned and rightly seems to be rejected. For: 1. as we have said, it is of faith that intention is required in the minister, "at least of doing what the Church does." But these words seem to have to be understood according to the sense which they had in the schools, in other words, of the intention of doing what the Church intends to effect through the rite. 2. Proposition 28 was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes every external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, even though inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: I do not intend what the Church does."³ Here it seems entirely that there is discussion of one who outwardly and seriously places the external rite. Therefore this does not suffice. 3. The Roman Missal has these words: "If someone has before him eleven hosts and intends to consecrate only ten, not determining which ten he intends, ... he does not consecrate, because intention is required,"⁴ namely, as the Missal, according to the obvious sense, supposes, the intention of consecrating, and that a determinate one (St. Alphonsus, VI, 23).

It suffices, however, that the minister implicitly will to confect the sacrament, for example, that he will the rite as sacred, that he will to do what Christ instituted, what the Church does, what is asked by a Christian, etc.

Corollary I. A sacrament is not valid: 1. if someone places the external rite without any intention; this, for example, will have place if someone does not place a human act, as if he baptizes someone in sleep or drunkenness; 2. if someone performs the external rite for the sake of jest, mockery, or mere exercise.

Corollary II. A sacrament can be valid, even if someone does not regard the rite placed by himself as sacramental, provided he truly wills, for example, what Christ instituted, what he who admits the sacrament asks, etc. Hence heresy or infidelity of itself is not a reason for doubting the required intention;⁵ otherwise if there is added hatred of the Christian name, which, for example, we can easily suspect in a Jew.

3. As regards the term, intention must be borne toward a determinate person or matter; yet it suffices that the intention be directed to the person or to the whole matter present, without being directed to the parts individually. But he consecrates invalidly who would will to consecrate ten hosts out of eleven and would not determine those ten.

4. As regards the mode, especially as regards a sacrament to be confected under a condition, several things must be noted:

a) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the present or the past generally is valid or not valid at once, according as the condition is verified or not verified. I said "generally," because it is disputed whether a sacrament conferred under a condition naturally unknowable is valid; as if someone were to absolve another if he were predestined. Further, it seems this must be denied, because "since God has committed the administration of the sacraments to the knowledge and will of men, a condition cannot be placed which cannot fall under human knowledge" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 26).

b) A sacrament conferred under a condition concerning the future, for example: I absolve you, if you will make restitution, that is, as soon as you shall have made restitution, generally is not valid, neither before nor after the condition has been fulfilled. Not before the condition is fulfilled, because there is not had the intention of confecting the sacrament before the fulfilled condition; not after the condition is fulfilled, because then the matter and form no longer exist (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). I said generally, because Matrimony is excepted, which follows the nature of a contract. But a contract entered into under a condition is perfected when the condition has been fulfilled.

¹ Council of Trent, Session 7, On the Sacraments, canon 11.

² St. Thomas in the cited place indeed says: "Although he who is thinking of something else does not have actual intention, nevertheless he has ... habitual intention, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament." But St. Alphonsus responds: "By habitual intention here the holy Doctor without doubt understands virtual intention; for immediately after he adds thus: Suppose that when a priest approaches to baptize, he intends to do with respect to the one to be baptized what the Church does; hence if afterwards in the very exercise of the act his thought is carried off to other things, the sacrament is perfected from the force, note well, of the first intention" (VI, 18).

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1318.

⁴ De Defectibus, title 7, n. 1.

⁵ Holy Office, 18 December 1872 (Collectanea, n. 1392).

Authors do not agree in explaining the nature and morality of simulated or fictitious administration of a sacrament. It seems to us that the following must be said:

I. Notion. 1. Simulated administration of a sacrament, taken in the full sense, consists in this: that someone uses the matter and form of a sacrament, and this in such a way that he signifies the will of confecting a sacrament, which nevertheless he does not actually have (St. Alphonsus, VI, 60 and 61, where he denies simulation because matter and form are lacking).

2. Simulated administration, accepted in a less full sense, is had when someone uses the matter or form of a sacrament, and this again in such a way that he signifies the will of confecting a sacrament, which in reality he does not have (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Each simulated administration is called formal or material, according as deception of one's neighbor is intended as an end, or is chosen as a means.

3. Simulated administration of a sacrament, taken improperly, consists in this: that someone applies something which bears the appearance of the matter and form of a sacrament, or of either one, and this for the end that he may be judged to confect a sacrament.

From every simulated administration there differs the dissimulation of a denied sacrament, which has place when someone applies something which bears the appearance of the matter and form, or of either one, for the end that he may hide the denial of the sacrament; for example, if someone gives a blessing instead of absolution to one who is indisposed, lest the denial of absolution be disclosed to others (St. Alphonsus, VI, 59).

II. Morality. 1. Simulation of a sacrament, accepted in the full sense, is gravely evil, because it contains a sacrilegious lie, that is, a lie which, as having been committed through a sacramental rite, redounds upon the sacrament itself and inflicts grave injury upon it. Add that the said lie will often be gravely harmful. There is added proposition 29 condemned by Innocent XI: "Urgent grave fear is a cause for simulating the administration of the sacraments";¹ concerning which note: 1. by that proposition at least the simulation of a sacrament accepted in the full sense is condemned; 2. the authors of the said proposition understood it of material simulation (St. Alphonsus, VI, 59); hence formal simulation is to be rejected a fortiori.

2. Simulation of a sacrament accepted in the less full sense likewise seems gravely illicit, because the argument just brought forward also has force if the lie is committed through the partial rite of a sacrament.²

3. Simulation of a sacrament taken improperly of itself is quite probably not gravely illicit; for since the rite of the sacrament is applied neither wholly nor partially, the injury inflicted on the sacrament seems to be lacking, so that only a lie remains. I said of itself, because grave sin can be committed from another source, for example against charity or even against justice with respect to the subject to whom the sacrament, owed by charity or by justice, is thus denied.

4. The dissimulation of a denied sacrament, when there is a just cause, is of itself licit. For in the case neither is injury inflicted on the sacrament, nor is a lie committed, but only the truth is hidden (St. Alphonsus, VI, 59). I said of itself, because again grave sin can be had from another source, for example with respect to the subject, who can have a grave right that the truth not be hidden from him.

And these things which we have said concerning simulated administration of a sacrament, with the necessary adjustments, should also be applied to simulated reception.

Corollary I. It is neither simulation of a sacrament nor sin:

1. To place the matter and form for the sake of practice, because it is not signified that the sacrament is being confected, and therefore a lie is lacking; nor does the placing of the rite for the sake of practice inflict any injury upon the sacrament.

2. For the sake of avoiding infamy, to pronounce the customary words before one pretending to receive Communion, while not handing over the host but replacing it in the ciborium (St. Alphonsus, VI, 61). Nevertheless the case is little practical.

3. To enter the confessional and there speak to the confessor about some business. "For since matter and form are lacking there, I do not know how to understand where there is simulation of a sacrament" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 60). Nor is there a lie, unless someone "approached with the intention that bystanders believe that he is confessing" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.); otherwise if he did it in order to hide from others the fact that he was not confessing.

4. In contracting Matrimony, to which someone is compelled, to simulate consent; since consent of this kind is invalid, so that the matter and form of the sacrament are lacking. Nor is there sin because consent is simulated, since, on account of the opposing impediment, the words of consent can be uttered with a restriction that is not purely mental, so that a lie also is lacking (St. Alphonsus, VI, 62).

Corollary II. It is simulation of a sacrament, or at least grave sin:

1. To pronounce without intention the words of absolution over one who is indisposed, or the words of consecration over bread, or in the celebration of Mass to omit the words of consecration; indeed, also from chapter De homine, 7, de celebratione missarum, the priest who in Mass did not consecrate would sin more gravely than one who consecrated and communicated sacrilegiously (St. Alphonsus, VI, 59, 61).

2. To hand over a non-consecrated host as consecrated; here indeed there is not simulation of a sacrament, but cooperation in idolatry, at least material idolatry (St. Thomas, III, q. 80, a. 6, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, VI, 61).

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1179.

² Cf. Holy Office, 6 September 1625 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1489).

In order that a sacrament be validly confected, besides intention these things are required:

I. The minister must place the external rite in a human manner, or by a human act. For it cannot be admitted that Christ instituted a sacrament in such a way that it can be confected by an act which is not human; as if someone wholly drunk or sleeping were to baptize. For the rest, in the case, at least practically, the required intention will also be lacking (St. Alphonsus, VI, 16).

II. The same minister must apply the matter and pronounce the form. If there is discussion of Baptism, this seems certain, both because otherwise the words of the form are not verified, and because the Sacred Congregation of the Discipline of the Sacraments¹ declared Baptism conferred in another way invalid, adding these words: Catholic doctrine holds most certainly that the matter must be placed by one and the same minister and at the same time the form of Baptism must be uttered; otherwise the form I baptize you, I wash you would labor under falsity (St. Thomas, III, q. 67, a. 6, ad 3). The same seems almost certain with regard to Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Order, considering namely both the analogy with Baptism and the doctrine of theologians and the practice of the Church. There is added that otherwise the moral union in the sacrament does not seem to be sufficiently preserved. Except the sacrament of Penance, whose nature requires the contrary. With regard to the sacrament of the Eucharist, the question cannot be posed. For the rest, note:

1. Different ministers can validly minister a sacrament which consists of parts, if you grant that this occurs; concerning which consult the treatise on Extreme Unction, provided that the individual parts are placed whole by one and the same minister, that is, with their own matter and form. This is clear from what will be said in the treatise on Extreme Unction. Nevertheless, since that is gravely contrary to the rite, it is forbidden under grave obligation outside a case of necessity.

2. Even if a sacrament does not consist of parts, nevertheless several ministers can validly confect one and the same sacrament, provided that each places everything which is required for the sacrament. This is urged first, with regard to other sacraments, from the analogy with the sacrament of the Eucharist, which can certainly be confected by several at the same time. The reason is that the individual ministers do not confect the sacrament except in the person of Christ, and therefore in and with Christ they are one. Then, since the individuals, as we suppose, possess the power of confecting the sacrament and exhibit all the requisites, it does not appear that anything is lacking to the conferral of the individuals (cf. St. Thomas, III, q. 67, a. 6; q. 82, a. 2, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, VI, 120, 232; can. 803). But this also is gravely illicit, except the consecration in the ordination of priests and the consecration of Bishops.

Even if several confect a sacrament, nevertheless it will be one sacrament, because Christ, who is the one principal minister, effects one thing through several (St. Thomas, III, q. 67, a. 6).

3. Finally, one and the same person can confer a sacrament on several at the same time, for example baptize or absolve several. Yet this too is illicit outside a case of necessity (St. Alphonsus, VI, 29).

¹ 17 November 1916 (A.A.S. 1916, p. 479); cf. Roman Ritual, title 2, chapter 1, n. 10.

III. The minister must confer the sacrament on a subject distinct from himself. This is drawn both from the common doctrine of theologians and the constant practice of the Church, and from the form of several sacraments. There is added that Innocent III declared null the Baptism which a certain Jew had ministered to himself in danger of death, adding this reason: "Since there ought to be a distinction between the one baptizing and the one baptized, as is clearly gathered from the words of the Lord, saying to the Apostles: Go, baptize all nations in the name, etc." (St. Thomas, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4; q. 82, a. 4, ad 2).¹ Except the Most Holy Eucharist and Matrimony.

¹ Cf. Decretals, IV, III, 42.

IV. The minister must duly unite matter and form, because they must constitute one sign. A moral union suffices, or rather that union by which the words of the form, according to common estimation, affect the matter and so constitute one thing with it (St. Alphonsus, VI, 9). Now:

1. In Baptism, Confirmation, Order, and Extreme Unction it certainly suffices that matter and form coexist in some part of themselves, or that one be begun before the other is completed. Likewise, it seems to suffice that the form be pronounced immediately before or immediately after the application of the matter. The reason is that even on this supposition the words "I baptize you," etc., "I sign you," etc., still seem to signify the actual application of the matter. There is added that the Holy Office several times resolved that the sacrament of the priesthood was not to be repeated in the case in which the Bishop had had his extended hand over the ordinands immediately before the prayer Oremus;¹ likewise in the case in which the ordinand had touched the instruments after the form had been uttered.² These resolutions seem also to be applicable to Baptism, Confirmation, and Extreme Unction. Nevertheless, the reason for doubting with regard to these three sacraments, especially with regard to Baptism, is taken from the fact that the Holy Office on 2 May 1858 declared that Baptism is always to be repeated under condition whenever "after the washing has been wholly completed, the form is pronounced, or conversely, when the pronouncing of the form has been completed, one proceeds to the washing."³ For the rest, a very brief delay would render the sacrament doubtful, but the delay of one Our Father would render it null (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). For liceity it is required that matter and form perfectly coexist.⁴

2. In Penance, because it was instituted after the manner of a judgment, a greater interval can intervene.

3. In Matrimony there is always had union of matter and form when the consent of one is placed, the consent of the other not having been retracted; for it has and follows the nature of a contract (St. Alphonsus, VI, 9).

4. In the Eucharist there is discussion rather of the presence of the matter than of its union with the form; here, however, it is required that the matter be physically present, because otherwise the words "this" and "here" are not verified (St. Alphonsus, VI, 9).

¹ 12 September 1877; 30 November 1898; 14 December 1898.

² 17 March 1897.

³ Note, however, that at the time the response was given, the value of Baptism conferred in this way was doubted more than today. Considering this together with the declarations afterwards issued concerning Order, it is permissible to doubt whether the Sacred Congregation, if again consulted, would give the same response.

⁴ Roman Ritual, title 2, chapter 1, n. 8; title 5, chapter 1, n. 18.

V. The minister must use neither matter nor form substantially vitiated. Now:

1. A substantial change of matter is had when a thing is used which, according to common estimation, differs from the thing which the Church uses, as if in Baptism you should use wine instead of water. If, however, the matter is the same thing in reality, either wholly or as to the greater quantity, but is called by a different name and is used for a different use, it is rather doubtfully valid than certainly invalid, as if someone were to baptize with moisture flowing from a vine (St. Alphonsus, VI, 11).

2. A substantial change of form is had when the words, according to common estimation, have a meaning different from that which must be expressed according to the mind of Christ (St. Alphonsus, VI, 11, 221). If the change is made into words which can be taken in a twofold sense, namely a sacramental one and a foreign one, the change is substantial or accidental according as the minister intends the foreign or the sacramental sense; since even in the common intercourse of men an ambiguous sense must be determined by the speaker himself. Besides, it can happen that a change which, considering only the grammatical sense, is substantial, is in fact accidental or substantial according as it proceeds from inadvertence or ignorance, or from a heretical mind. Thus if someone in consecration, from inadvertence, were to say, "Here" in place of "This is My Body," the consecration would be valid; otherwise if he intended the word "here" in the sense of Luther, or adverbially (St. Alphonsus, VI, 110). For the rest, a change of form can occur:

a) By substitution of words, as if in Baptism it were said: I wash you, etc. But it is accidental or substantial according as the substituted words are synonymous or not synonymous.

b) By transposition, as if someone says: I baptize you, etc. This will generally be accidental.

c) By omission, as if in consecration the word for is omitted. It must be seen whether or not an essential word is omitted, namely one by which the due sense is taken away.

d) By corruption, as can happen because of stammering, haste, or inexperience, as if someone says: This is my boby. In the case the change is generally accidental.

e) By addition, as if in Baptism it is said: I baptize you in the name of the Father, who created you, etc. Further, a change of this kind is more easily substantial if what is false is added than if what is true is added; likewise if the change is made with a heretical mind than otherwise.

f) By interruption. Further:

a) Interruption of the words of the form is substantial or accidental according as it is or is not so great that the words before those hearing no longer effect the complete sense intended by Christ.

b) Interruption of the syllables of the same word, if it occurs by the interposition of several words or of one word, as if it were said: I bap- (be silent) -tize you, etc., renders the value doubtful. Otherwise if it occurs by a cough or a similar way and is very brief (St. Alphonsus, VI, 11, 221).

3. A substantial change, as one which renders the sacrament invalid, is a grave sin; an accidental change is gravely or lightly forbidden according as it greatly or lightly opposes the use and precept of the Church.

VI. The minister must utter the sacramental form by voice, that is, by the organs ordered to speaking. Therefore vocal pronunciation is required. Besides, at least practically, the pronunciation ought to be audible of itself, because it is doubtful whether pronunciation which of itself is not audible can be called vocal (St. Alphonsus, VI, 414).

Is attention required in the administration of the sacraments? - Attention is the application of the mind to those things which are being done, or it is the act of the intellect by which a man considers that which he does. - For the validity of the conferral of sacraments, no other attention is required except that which is found in every truly human act. Therefore the sacraments can commonly be validly ministered even by a distracted minister, or one thinking at the same time about other business. The reason is that the morality of the act proceeds not from actual attention, but from at least the virtual intention of the one acting. Besides, attention often does not depend on the will of man; but Christ could not require a condition sometime impossible in the minister of the sacraments. - For the licit conferral of the sacraments, such attention is required that every voluntary distraction be absent.

The reason is that the reverence owed to the sacrament requires that it be treated with attention. But voluntary distraction ordinarily does not exceed venial sin, according to the common opinion of theologians, unless someone exposes himself to the danger of gravely erring in the form. Yet more probably and more commonly they except the Eucharist, in whose confection they judge every voluntary distraction a mortal sin because of the greater dignity of the sacrament. But La Croix l. 6, p. 2, n. 443; Mazzotta and others deny this not improbably. Not improbably, namely provided the danger of erring is absent. - St. Thomas 3 p., q. 64, a. 8 ad 3; 4 d. 6, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1 ad 4; L. 14; l. 4, n. 75.

Is intention required in the administration of the sacraments? - Intention is an act of the will tending toward some end, or an act of the will by which someone intends to do or omit something. - For the validity of a sacrament, there is required in the minister some true and serious will at least of doing that which the Church, namely the Catholic Church, does. For those things which are done in the sacraments can be done in diverse ways, and are determined to sacramental action only through the intention of the minister. St. Thomas 3 p., q. 64, a. 8; Trent s. 7, c. 11.

Hence St. Thomas 3 p., q. 83, a. 4 ad 7, says: "The efficacy of sacramental words can be impeded by the intention of the priest." - Yet actual intention is not required, but virtual suffices. The reason is that actual intention, although best and desirable, is sometimes morally impossible; but virtual intention sufficiently flows into the action of the minister, so that this can be called truly human and deliberate. - Habitual intention does not suffice, nor interpretative. The reason is that for a human act some will is required, by force of which the act is placed.

Now neither habitual nor interpretative intention is of this kind: not the first, because it is neither actually elicited by the will, nor, although once elicited, does it persist in some effect or in a series of actions; not the second, because it is neither actually elicited nor ever was actually elicited, but would only be elicited if the mind were thinking about the thing to be done. Suarez d. 16, s. 2; Lugo d. 8, n. 28, 35. "A coerced intention of the minister, or one extorted by fear, also suffices, except in matrimony. Likewise error of the minister about the person of the recipient does not invalidate the sacrament, excepting matrimony." L. 19; E. M.

Note: For casting away scruples in this matter it is to be noted that implicit intention suffices. Hence St. Alphonsus 18 says: "Viva, etc., rightly say that the minister who in the customary way places the actions required for the sacrament, unless he positively excludes the due intention, imprudently doubts about it, because at least he wishes to do what he is otherwise accustomed to do, and what other ministers do. Add that through this, that he recognizes that action to be sacred and not to be placed in vain, he intends in exercise to place it according to its end. Therefore there is no need that the minister by mouth or in heart should say reflectively that he intends to confect the sacrament, but it suffices that he be present in mind and attentively do what he does." And at n. 25 the same holy Doctor says these things: "He ought not repeat the consecration who has brought smaller hosts to the altar, about which, while consecrating the larger, he did not explicitly think, nor uncover them."

If someone intends to do what another schismatic or heretical Church does, if this truly makes a sacrament, it is valid, from Trent sess. 7, de Bapt., c. 4; Sporer n. 121; L. l. 6, n. 21. Hence, the rite of ordination in England having been publicly changed, so that from it there would be excluded the power of consecrating and of offering sacrifice, by defect of intention, indeed by contrary intention, presbyteral and episcopal ordinations performed according to the Anglican rite are invalid. Leo XIII, Const. Apostolicae curae, Sept. 13, 1896.

It is necessary that the intention precede the sacramental action, which takes its force from the intention; i.e., that it be elicited before you begin to apply the matter and to pronounce the form. Therefore, if someone, without the intention of baptizing or confirming, washes or anoints, and immediately after the washing or anointing, having conceived this intention, pronounces the form, he accomplishes nothing. St. Thomas 3 p., q. 64, a. 8; 4 d. 6, q. 1, a. 2, q. 1.

Is internal intention required, or the intention of doing the rite which the Church intends? - Here one intention is internal, another external. Internal intention is had whenever the minister, when he perfects the sacrament, wills to effect that which is to be effected by that sacrament; external intention is had when he seriously performs the whole external rite, and as if as a minister of the Church.

Therefore if he has both wills, the sacrament is valid. If he has neither, it is not valid, as if he baptizes or absolves for the sake of jest, Trent sess. 14, de Poenit., c. 9; or for the sake of example or devotion, as if a pastor washes an infant just born, not in order to baptize him, but in order to teach the midwife the rite of baptizing; or if a nurse, while washing a child in the morning according to custom, says: I wash you in the name of the Father, etc. If he has internal intention only, it is still valid, as if someone washes the head of a dying infant, the child of unbelievers, as if making a cleansing or a medicine for him, and meanwhile says in a low voice: I baptize you, etc. If he has only external intention, the question is not yet entirely settled. The first opinion denies it, that is, denies that internal intention is required. The reason is that from Trent there is not required in the minister the intention of doing what the Church intends, but only of doing what the Church does; and therefore it suffices that the minister seriously apply the due form to the matter, as the Church does. Moreover, it seems difficult to admit that the minister can, by a hidden motion of soul, frustrate a rite which he seems seriously to perform in the name of the Church. Hence, if a newly ordained priest, for the sake of practice, were to go through the whole Mass without the intention of confecting the sacrifice, he certainly would not confect it, because both internal and external intention are lacking, for externally he does not present himself as seriously celebrating in the name of the Church. If, on the contrary, he were to celebrate publicly and pronounce the words of consecration, while within himself not willing to confect the sacrifice, he would still confect it. But the second opinion, common and to be held in practice, affirms it. It is proved from Trent sess. 7, c. 11, where there is required the intention of doing what the Church does; therefore the intention merely of seriously applying the form to the matter, as the Church does, does not suffice, for in reality this intention, while the external action is placed, is inseparable from the action; but beyond this there is required the intention of doing the sacramental rite which the Church does; otherwise both Trent and Florence would have required in vain, besides matter and form, the intention of the minister of doing what the Church does. The Church does not perform only the external rite; and therefore the minister who uses the external action alone does not do what the Church does. Hence if it is his purpose, e.g., while consecrating, to consecrate only this host out of two hosts, and not that one; while ordaining, not to ordain those who perhaps are not his subjects; if he absolves under this tacit condition, if you shall restore; he does not consecrate, does not ordain, does not absolve. Likewise, if someone has eleven hosts before him, and intends to consecrate only ten, not determining which ten he intends, he does not consecrate. Therefore external intention does not suffice, but internal intention is required. Moreover, this is established by the same reason by which the necessity of the minister's intention for confecting the sacrament is proved. This intention is necessary so that the minister act not in his own name, but in the name of Christ, bearing his person. L. 23, 26; St. Thomas 3 p., q. 64, a. 8, 10; Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 7, c. 4, n. 9; l. 8, c. 11, n. 2; E. M.

Does ignorance or error of the minister invalidate the sacrament? - If the minister has at least an implicit and virtual intention of doing what the true Church does, the sacrament is valid, even if by error he thinks his heterodox Church to be the true Church, even if he does not have an explicit intention of confecting the sacrament, provided he does not exclude this intention, even if he does not understand the form, even if he errs concerning the true meaning of the form, e.g., if he thinks these words: This is my Body, signify only the mystical presence of Christ, even if he falsely thinks that either the matter or the form is not suitable, e.g., if someone, in consecrating bread, judges the words, which shall be given up for you, to be necessary and omits them. The reason is that our ignorance or error does not change the truth of the thing. Therefore if sacraments are perfected by three things and only by three things, namely by things, words, and a minister with the intention of doing what the Church does, the truth of the sacrament stands notwithstanding the ignorance and error of the minister. Moreover, if it were otherwise, it would follow that, since Protestants do not believe that a sacrament is effected by matrimonial consent, their marriage would be null, which is false. L. 21, 22; E. M.

Must the intention of the minister be determined to certain matter and person? - Resp. In the affirmative. The reason is: as regards the matter, because otherwise it would remain in a state of indifference; for it cannot be drawn out of that state and determined to the sacrament except through the intention of the minister. As regards the person, because the effect of the sacrament cannot be applied in general, but to some subject; otherwise no application would be made. Namely, according to the nature of the matter at issue, the object or term of the action must be determined; for if, for example, you were to say, I give, but did not determine what, or to whom, you have an act void of all force. - But the Eucharist is to be excepted, which is not confected in a subject, and consequently determination of the person is not required for the validity of consecration.

If the minister has two contrary intentions, which one ought to prevail? - If those wills are simultaneous, the predominant one prevails, namely the one which would be chosen if the impossibility were known. - If among contrary wills one succeeds another, the later one is valid, unless the prior one has revoked, at least virtually, every subsequent will; for then the prior will, provided it is not expressly revoked, certainly prevails. But in these matters, if doubt still remains, the validity of the sacrament will be doubtful. - And this also holds for the application of Masses. L. 24, 784; l. 3, n. 700; Lugo d. 8, n. 121, 123. Cf. V. 1, n. 18.

Is the conferral of a sacrament with a conditioned intention valid and licit? - The condition can regard those things which in some way pertain to the validity of the sacrament; the dispositions of the subject licitly and fruitfully receiving the sacrament; or any other matter. - Licitly, in a case of necessity, a condition can and must be added which regards the validity of the sacrament, if it is doubted, e.g., whether it is water with which baptism is given; whether the dying person to be fortified by extreme unction still lives; whether a sacrament was invalidly received, and therefore is to be repeated. The reason is that the reverence due to the sacrament is safeguarded, as far as possible. And here it must be carefully observed that, if besides this reverence due to the sacrament, something else would have to be guarded against which cannot be guarded against by the condition added, it is not licit to use that condition and therefore to confect the sacrament under that condition. And thus it is never licit to confect the Eucharist conditionally with doubtful matter because of the danger of material idolatry; it is never licit to confer orders with the same doubtful matter because of the very grave inconveniences of an invalid ordination. - Outside the aforesaid case of necessity and doubt, to administer a sacrament conditionally would often be grave, because it would not be without trifling in a grave matter.

A condition regarding the dispositions of the recipient, in conferring the sacrament of penance from an urgent cause, can be added and must be added, lest the sacrament be exposed to nullity. But in the other sacraments it is generally not licit; for, if afterward it is clear that the dispositions were lacking, either someone would have to lack them forever, or the sacraments would be repeated not without scandal. If extreme unction, for example, is given to the sick person under the condition: if you are disposed, i.e., in the state of grace; and the sick person is not then disposed, he is deprived of the sacrament, although afterward he may be disposed and remove the obstacle; and thus sufficient provision will not have been made for his salvation. Generally it is not licit; for at the point of death, when matters are desperate, St. Alphonsus n. 82 says: "if perhaps the sick person has been deprived of his senses, in an act of mortal sin, Viva says probably that extreme unction at least conditionally is to be ministered to him, as we shall also say concerning the sacrament of penance n. 483." And the same Doctor has the same at n. 732, concerning extreme unction.

It is not licit to add other conditions, and it would be grave. For, if the condition is about the future, the sacrament is null. For it is not valid when the matter and form are placed, because the intention is lacking, nor is it valid when the condition is verified, because then the matter and form are lacking. Matrimony is excepted, which, after the manner of all other contracts, can be celebrated under a condition concerning the future; when this is fulfilled, they are perfected, no differently than if from the beginning they had been entered into purely and without condition. Nor is the aforesaid inconvenience therefore to be feared. For since the consent is referred to the event of the condition, then in reality the contract is perfected, and therefore then the sacrament is made. But if the condition concerns the present or the past, the sacrament is exposed to the danger of nullity; indeed it is null if the event of a condition of this kind cannot be known in a human manner, since the sacraments certainly must be administered in this way; e.g., if you are predestined. - L. 25, 26, 431; E. M.

Is the conferral of sacraments with a conditioned intention always licit, in doubt whether they have been validly conferred? - As regards the sacraments imprinting a character, it is certain that it is licit. C. De quibus 2, de Bapt., where this form is indicated in doubt concerning conferred baptism: If you are not yet baptized, I baptize you, etc. - As regards the other sacraments, it is also licit if a sufficient cause is present for adding the condition. The reason is that the sacraments are for men, and by conditioned conferral of the sacrament provision is made, insofar as it can be done, both for the good of those who receive the sacrament, if perhaps they are capable of it, and also for the reverence of the sacrament. - L. 27, 28; E. M. "It is licit for a confessor prudently doubting whether he has absolved a penitent, to absolve conditionally.

And Tournely, etc., say the same when a child is to be absolved about whom it is doubted whether he is capable of reason. But if someone, judging the penitent to be disposed, were to absolve him conditionally, saying: I absolve you, if you are disposed, they rightly say that he would not sin mortally, but he would not be excused from venial fault, since this would be contrary to the rite of the Church." L. 28.

"It is certain that in the case in which there is extreme necessity of one's neighbor, and no matter is had except doubtful matter, then the minister not only can, but is bound under grave obligation to minister the sacrament to him conditionally. Lugo nevertheless notes that if afterward certain matter is had, and there is opportunity, the sacrament is to be repeated conditionally, if perhaps the first was invalid. Understand this of sacraments which are not repeatable, such as baptism, confirmation, and order." L. 29. As regards the other sacraments there is no special difficulty, since they of themselves do not prevent repetition. And they are to be repeated when prudent doubt is had concerning their validity, and grave harm would follow if they had truly been conferred invalidly. Cf. n. 345.

Must the condition be expressed in words? - Resp. In the negative. The reason is that, for the reverence of the sacrament, it suffices that it be conceived in the mind. Indeed, there is not even need to have the condition explicitly and formally in mind; but it is enough if it is had implicitly and virtually, as he has it who has willed to hear Confessions according to the institution of Christ or the intention of the Church; because thus the reverence due to the sacrament is still sufficiently preserved. Yet it must be added orally and expressly where the rubric prescribes this, as in conditional baptism, especially if it is conferred publicly, lest bystanders believe that baptism is being repeated absolutely; and in conditional extreme unction. Roman Ritual de Sacr. bapt., de Sacr. extr. unct. - L. 29; H. A. tr. 14, n. 3; La Croix 83; Gobat 272; E. M.

In conferring or receiving the sacraments, is it licit to use a probable opinion? - As regards the conferral of sacraments, where their validity is at issue, generally speaking this is illicit from proposition 1 condemned by Innocent XI. The reason is that irreverence would be done to the sacrament; and for the subject there would be danger of harm, especially in baptism because of its greatest necessity, and in order because of the public harm also of others. Consequently it is licit: 1. If necessity is present, or grave utility on the part of one's neighbor. The reason is that the sacraments are for men; nor indeed is there an obligation of rendering to the sacraments more than probable reverence. Cf. 1031. 2. If there is a probable opinion concerning the jurisdiction of the confessor, or concerning the validity of matrimony. The reason is that the Church then supplies by her authority as regards jurisdiction to be conferred on the confessor, and as regards convalidating the contract, if perhaps that contract is null because of an impediment which the Church removes by supplying.

3. When the administration of the sacrament would otherwise be exposed to excessive scruples or difficulties; for otherwise an infant could not be baptized whom the parents assert not to have been baptized, since such testimony is only probable; nor could a penitent be absolved, concerning whose disposition only a prudent probability can be had. L. 57, 633; l. 1, n. 50, 51.

But as regards the reception of sacraments with a probable opinion, if again the validity of the sacraments is at issue, the same must be said, for the same reasons. But in those things which do not pertain to the validity of the sacraments, in sacraments either to be conferred or to be received, the same rule holds as in other laws. For if, while probability stands, other laws are not contemned, certainly, while the same probability stands, the sacraments are not contemned. This is especially true as regards the dispositions of those ministering and receiving. For in these things grave probability is held as certainty. Moreover, both the administration and the reception of the sacraments would continually be exposed to scruples and anxieties of conscience. Wherefore it is sufficient to approach the sacraments, whether to confer them or to receive them, with probable disposition. Lugo de Poenit. d. 14, n. 109; La Croix 105; L. l. 1, n. 32, 48; l. 6, n. 461, 475, 482, 560, 573.

204. Questions. - QUESTION 1º. Is internal intention required?

Resp. Affirmatively, because if the Minister intended only the external act, he would not have a true intention of doing what the Church does ¹. For the Church intends to place a sacramental rite: but he who proposes only to do the external rite does not intend this ². - St. Ligorius, n. 20.

¹ ** Someone perhaps could deny this in truth; since even the Church does nothing else except that it places the external rite, as Christ the Lord commanded to be employed.

² ** Nor nevertheless is it required that the minister explicitly intend to do a sacramental rite; otherwise, if someone either is ignorant or does not believe that by that action a sacramental rite is perfected, as for example Protestants do not believe that a sacrament is effected by matrimonial consent, he would not confer the sacrament validly; which is false. Therefore it ought to be enough that the minister wishes confusedly to do what Christians do.

But the condemned proposition which is subjoined perhaps does not fit the matter. For in this proposition there is question not of a mere defect of the required intention, but of a contrary intention.

This is also clear from the 28th proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, which sounds thus: Baptism conferred by a Minister is valid who observes the whole external rite and form of baptizing, but inwardly in his heart resolves within himself: I do not intend to do what the Church does.

QUESTION 2º. Is there required in the Minister an intention of doing what the Roman Church does?

Resp. Negatively, provided that he has the intention, at least implicit, of doing that which the true Church does, even if from error he should think his own heterodox church to be the true Church. - St. Ligorius, n. 21.

QUESTION 3º. Is there required in the Minister an intention of confecting a Sacrament?

Resp. Negatively, at least explicitly, provided this intention is not excluded. For it suffices that he intends in general and implicitly to do what the Church does. - St. Ligorius, n. 21, and others commonly.

205. • QUESTION 4º. Must the intention of the Minister be determined to certain matter and person?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is 1º as to the matter, because otherwise it would remain in a state of indifference: for it cannot be drawn out from that state and be determined to a Sacrament except through the minister's intention; 2º as to the person, because the effect of the Sacrament cannot be applied in general, but to some subject; otherwise no application would be made ³.

³ ** Namely the object or term of the action must be determined according to the nature of the thing of which there is question: for if, for example, you were to say, I give, but did not determine what, or to whom, you have an act void of all force.

QUESTION 5º. Is a Sacrament conferred with a conditioned intention valid?

Resp. 1º Negatively, if the condition added is concerning the future; because the condition suspends the intention of the Minister, and therefore prevents the form from being applied here and now to the matter; nor can it be applied afterwards, when the condition has been fulfilled, since the matter and form have already ceased to be present ⁴.

⁴ ** Matrimony, however, like all other contracts, can be celebrated under a condition concerning the future; when this has been fulfilled, they are perfected no otherwise than if they had been entered into purely and without condition from the beginning. Nor for that reason is the inconvenience to be feared of which the Author speaks. For since the consent is referred to the event of the condition, then in reality the contract is perfected, and therefore then the sacrament is made.

Resp. 2º Affirmatively, if the condition concerns the past or the present, and this in reality exists; because here and now the conditioned intention passes into an absolute intention: but if the condition is not fulfilled, then there is no intention, as being restricted to a condition not existing. - St. Ligorius, n. 26, and others commonly.

1. Titius, a priest, determines to celebrate Mass on the following day for Sempronius, who asked that it be celebrated according to his intention, an alms having been given, but with no determined time. But on the following day Titius is asked in the sacristy by Caius that he be willing soon to celebrate Mass, and to sing it for his father, who died that very night. Forgetful of the prior intention, Titius celebrates and sings the Mass for Caius's father. Still forgetful of the Mass to be celebrated for Sempronius, he celebrates on the third day for himself, since he thinks he has no other obligation which he must satisfy. But behold, after some days the same Sempronius asked several other Masses from Titius, and then Titius remembered that prior Mass to be celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius.

Q. 1. What is intention; and can several things be intended? 2. Which intention of Titius prevailed in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17-19. To the second: the Mass which Titius celebrated and sang on the following day was celebrated for Caius's deceased father. For this was the predominant intention, which prevails over the other, which was incompatible with it. This can be confirmed even from that circumstance, that he sang the Mass.

The Mass which Titius celebrated on the third day was celebrated according to the intention of Sempronius. For this intention, although habitual, was evidently predominant over the intention of celebrating for himself, although this latter was actual. For the predominant intention is that which would actually be chosen, once its incompatibility with the other were known. But, once each intention was known, the intention which would have been chosen by Titius would have been the intention of celebrating for Sempronius, because he celebrated for himself only insofar as he was persuaded that he had no obligation which he had to satisfy. Therefore. And this must be asserted a fortiori if Titius had had no intention specially on that day. "If it is applied to no one, or to one incapable, the fruit remains in the treasury of the Church, or yields to the priest himself, or to those for whom he is specially held to offer, since he is thus judged implicitly to have intended." St. Alph. l. 6, n. 336. Cf. n. 335, q. 1. Moreover, in practice, when a doubt stands, it would be safer to celebrate the Mass another time for the one for whom the application did not avail. - G. 5, 6; v. 2, 335; Elbel 403.

2. Franciscus, administering the sacrament of baptism, is distracted by a sudden noise made in the church, and pronounces the form of baptism without attending to it in any way. A little later, he hears confession, and, finding the penitent little disposed, resolves not to absolve him. But again he is distracted, thinking of the cause of that noise, and, distracted, pronounces the form of absolution.

Q. 1. What is actual and virtual intention? 2. Do baptism and absolution avail in the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 17, 18, 41, 42. To the second: Franciscus administers baptism validly and licitly. Validly, because, although there is no actual intention and voluntary; nevertheless there is virtual intention and voluntary, which suffices in the administration of the sacraments. Licitly, because that distraction, since it was voluntary neither in itself nor in its cause, can be attributed to Franciscus as no fault. S. Th. 3 p., q. 64, a. 8, ad 3.

The absolution given by Franciscus was invalid, nor in giving it did Franciscus sin in any way. It was invalid because, of two intentions simultaneously incompatible, the predominant intention always prevails, and this in the case is the intention of not absolving. Indeed, it was the only one, since he absolved while distracted. But Franciscus sinned in no way, because that wandering of mind was altogether natural and involuntary. - G. 5.

“29. Urgent fear is a just cause for simulating the administration of the Sacraments.” Proposition condemned by Innocent XI.

1. The efficacy of the Sacraments depends solely on the will of God, and hence all that is required for their valid administration on the part of the minister is power and jurisdiction, proper application of matter and form, and an actual or at least a virtual intention of doing what the Church does.¹ It is a mortal sin for any one not in the state of sanctifying grace to administer a Sacrament solemnly. Ignorance, of course, is an excuse, and so is urgent necessity, as when the administration of Baptism or Penance cannot be postponed without danger to the salvation of others. In such urgent cases the minister is called minister necessitatis; in all others, minister called minister necessitatis; in all others, minister solemnitatis.

¹ Conc. Trident., Sess. VII, De Sacr., can. 10, 11, 12; Sess. XIV, De Poenit., can. 10 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 853, 854, 855, 920).

Hence the general rule that no Sacrament should be performed or administered by one who is in the state of mortal sin. One who is so unfortunate as to be called upon to administer a Sacrament in that state, should first cleanse himself by the worthy reception of Penance, if he can conveniently find a confessor (habita copia confessarii)² or else by an act of perfect contrition.

² Conc. Trident., Sess. XIII, cap. 7, can. 11; Rit. Rom., De Administr. Sacram., tit. i, n. 4; Codex Iuris Can., can. 807.

Matrimony is the only Sacrament that is not administered by the priest but by the contracting parties to each other, and hence husband and wife are themselves the ministers.³ They should receive this holy Sacrament in the state of grace, which means, ordinarily, that they should go to confession and Communion before plighting their troth.

³ Conc. Trident., Sess. XXIV, De Reform. Matr., c. i; Rit. Rom.t De Sacr. Matr., tit. 7, c. 1, n. 17.

In regard to the other Sacraments the question arises: If a priest who is in the state of mortal sin be called upon to administer a Sacrament, must he go to confession, or is perfect contrition sufficient? We answer: Perfect contrition suffices for all Sacraments except the Holy Eucharist (i. e., saying Mass). The reason is this: Perfect contrition, including the votum sacramenti, restores sanctifying grace, and the administration of all the Sacraments, with the exception of the consecration of the Eucharist, is always, morally speaking, a matter of necessity. When the celebration of Mass is a matter of necessity, as sometimes happens, it will suffice for the priest to make an act of perfect contrition, but he is bound to receive the Sacrament of Penance as soon thereafter as an opportunity offers, i. e., at least within three days, according to the common interpretation of the law.⁴

⁴ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 5-6.—Missale Rom., De Defect. in Cel. Missae, tit. 8, n. 2 sq.— Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandra VII., 38: "The command of the Council of Trent, given to a priest who celebrates from necessity while in mortal sin, to confess as soon as possible, is a counsel, not a precept."—Prop. 39: "That phrase ‘as soon as possible’ is understood to mean when the priest confesses in his own time." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1138 sq.).—Cfr. Ferreres, Comp. Theol. M., ed. 8a, Vol. II, n. 431, qu. 5.

It follows that all those who are ex officio entrusted with the administration of the means of grace, are in duty bound to hold themselves in readiness to administer the Sacraments, in other words, to be habitually in the state of grace.⁵

⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., CIII, s. i, n. 9: "Let those who use holy things unholily consider what account they will have with God." (Migne, Pat. La*., XXXVII, 1343).

So much for the interior disposition of the minister. Now for the act of administration. As the minister acts in the name and by authority of the Church, the first rule is that he must comply with her directions. Sancta sancte tractanda. Hence it is a mortal sin knowingly to employ the wrong matter or form, or, except in case of necessity, a matter or form of doubtful validity; since this would endanger the Sacrament. In cases of necessity (iusta causa) a doubtful matter or form may be employed, because the Sacraments are instituted for the sake of men (sacramenta propter homines). It is likewise sinful (mortally or venially, according to the circumstances of each case) to alter or mutilate the words of the form, to utter them inarticulately or without devotion, or to omit important rites or ceremonies prescribed by the Church. If this is done out of contempt for Christ or the Church, or if it causes grave scandal, the minister commits a mortal sin, and even when the motive is mere negligence, a mortal sin is committed every time the object is materia gravis.⁶ 2. The faithful have a right to the Sacraments, and hence all duly appointed ministers of the Church are bound in justice to administer the same whenever they are asked, and should always be ready and willing to comply with every reasonable request, nay exhort their people to make frequent use of the divinely appointed means of grace.⁷ It is a mortal sin for a priest entrusted with the care of souls to refuse to administer a Sacrament without good reason, or to administer it with manifest reluctance. Such conduct is apt to deter the faithful from the reception of the Sacraments and easily causes scan- dal. The duty of administering Baptism and Penance, in particular, binds even when there is danger of contracting a contagious disease or incurring grave risk to life or limb.⁸ Of course, all reasonable precautions may and should be taken in such cases. The duty just mentioned does not bind priests who are not officially engaged in pastoral work, though all are bound to respond to urgent calls when there is grave necessity, as, e. g., on the field of battle, or when some one is seriously ill or dying and no other priest can be had. The same rule applies to a pastor in his conduct towards those not under his care. We need hardly add, however, that no true priest will confine himself to what is of strict duty in matters of this kind.

⁶ Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VII, De Sacr., can. 13 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 856); Rit. Rom., De Administr. Sacram., tit. 1, n. 11.

⁷ Cfr. Concilium Trident., Sess. XXIII, De Ref., c. i; Rit. Rom., De Administr. Sacram., n. 5.

⁸ John X, 11-13. —Benedict XIV, De Synodo Dioecesana, XIII, c. 19, n. 8.—Cfr. I. Chapeauville, Tract. de Necessitate et Modo Ministrandi Sacramento, Tempore Pestis, Mayence 1612.

61. Attention is customarily distinguished as twofold: one internal, the other external. Internal attention is the application of the mind to those things which are being done. External attention is partly something negative, namely, the absence of any external action which is incompatible with internal attention, and partly something positive, insofar as it causes the external work truly to be done. Attention was treated more broadly above, II, n. 354.

1. For the valid administration of the sacraments no internal attention is required, but external attention is required and suffices.

Thus all teach, except Lacroix, whose opinion St. Alphonsus²⁴⁵ calls scarcely probable. The reason is that, when external attention exists, even though all internal attention is lacking, the action of administering the sacraments, by force of the prior intention, remains truly human. Moreover, for the valid administration of the sacraments it suffices that the act be truly human and be performed in the person of Christ, as was established above. Therefore, a sacrament is validly conferred whenever the minister truly pronounced the necessary form over valid matter, although he was voluntarily distracted.

2. For the licit administration of the sacraments, internal attention excluding every voluntary wandering of the mind is required in addition.

For the reverence due to the sacraments so requires, as is evident in itself. Hence a minister voluntarily distracted during the administration of the sacraments commits a sin, which nevertheless does not exceed venial guilt unless a true danger of erring in those things which pertain to the essence of the sacrament arises from it. But if a priest during the consecration itself in Mass were altogether voluntarily distracted, then, on account of the great irreverence committed against Christ at the very moment when He miraculously descends into the hands of the one consecrating, according to several authors there would be mortal sin; this, however, is denied by others²⁴⁶ and is not certainly established.

²⁴⁵ L.c., n. 14.

²⁴⁶ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c.

62. Notion. "Intention is the same as reasoned will insofar as it is directed toward an end." Thus St. Bonaventure²⁴⁷ says very well: "For to intend is an act of the will in relation to reason," as St. Thomas²⁴⁸ teaches. There is therefore a difference between willing and intending: "to will tends toward the end absolutely";²⁴⁹ but intention seeks the end through means suitably ordained. In the sacraments the minister must, by means of a sensible sign, intend at least that which the Church does, as will be said below, n. 65.

Divisions. Intention is customarily distinguished in many ways, both by reason of the subject and by reason of the object.

²⁴⁷ IV Sent., dist. 6, P. 2, a. 2, q. 2.

²⁴⁸ De verit., q. 22, a. 13.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

63. By reason of the subject, intention is distinguished as actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative.

1. Actual is said of that intention which is elicited here and now. It can be subdivided into reflex and simply direct. A reflex actual intention is present when a man not only actually wills something, but also knows that he here and now wills it. But if this reflex knowledge is lacking, there is a simply direct actual intention. For example, he who baptizes and attends to the baptism has a simply direct actual intention; but he who in addition reflects that he now wills to baptize has a reflex actual intention.

2. Virtual is said of that intention which was formerly possessed as actual, then was never retracted, and now, although not elicited anew and indeed not even perceived, nevertheless still influences the work to be performed. For example, a priest who goes to hear confessions with the intention of absolving all penitents rightly disposed has a virtual intention of absolving if afterward he no longer attends to that intention and pronounces the words of absolution amid distractions. To avoid ambiguities, it can never be kept too firmly before one's eyes that the older authors not infrequently take habitual and virtual intention interchangeably. Thus, for example, St. Thomas²⁵⁰ says: "Although he who thinks of something else does not have an actual intention, nevertheless he has a habitual intention, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament; for example, when a priest approaching to baptize intends to do concerning the one to be baptized what the Church does; whence, if afterward in the very exercise of the act his thought is carried away to other things, the sacrament is perfected by virtue of the first intention." In the example adduced by the Angelic Doctor there is manifestly a virtual and not a habitual intention²⁵¹ in the sense of modern authors.

3. Habitual, properly speaking, is that intention which indeed was once possessed and was never retracted, but now in no way positively influences the work. For example, a just person possessing the habit of praying prays in sleep from a habitual intention; or a just person sinning venially habitually orders this act to God, because the habit of charity existing in the just person refers all things to God. Nevertheless, it is absurd to say that the habit of charity actually or virtually influences the venial sin and thus refers it to God.

4. Interpretative is the name given to that intention which neither now exists nor formerly existed, but which, as is presumed from clear indications, would be present if the man here and now attended or were able to attend.²⁵² For example, a dying Protestant deprived of his senses, who lived uprightly and was in good faith, is judged to have the interpretative intention of receiving sacramental absolution, and therefore with a safe conscience a confessor can absolve him, at least conditionally. As will be explained more broadly afterward: for receiving sacraments, at least in a case of necessity, any of these four intentions suffices; but for administering sacraments neither an interpretative nor a habitual intention suffices, but an actual or at least virtual intention is required. The reason is that for receiving or undergoing something, so great an act of the will is not customarily required as for doing and positively producing something. But in the reception of the sacraments man is rather one who receives and undergoes; in their administration, however, he is rather one who causes and instrumentally produces grace.

The difference among the four enumerated intentions can be stated briefly in this manner:

Actual intention is present and influences the work with advertence on the part of the agent.

Virtual intention is present and influences the work without advertence on the part of the agent.

Habitual intention was present, but now exercises no influence upon the work insofar as it is a human act.

Interpretative intention neither was present, nor is present, nor influences the work.

²⁵⁰ S. theol. 3, q. 64, a. 8 ad 3.

²⁵¹ Cf. Billuart, De sacr. in gen., diss. 5, a. 7, § 3, and Cajetan, Comm. in h.l.

²⁵² Certain theologians, such as Suarez (In III, disp. 13, s. 3, n. 2), Sylvius (In III, q. 64, a. 8, concl. 5), and Lugo (De sacr. in genere, disp. 8, n. 73), equate interpretative intention with the indirect voluntary.

64. By reason of the object willed, intention can be divided:

a) into clear and confused, according as the intended object is presented to the mind clearly or confusedly.

For example, he who intends to baptize while clearly knowing the essence and effects of baptism has a clear intention; but a Jew who baptizes and intends only to do what the Church does, without precisely knowing the effect of baptism, has a confused intention.

b) into determinate and indeterminate, according as the object is intended as limited in every respect, or the will is borne toward an object designated only in a vague manner.

For example, a priest consecrating a host placed before him on the altar has a determinate intention; but if from a heap of hosts he wills to consecrate only three not specially designated, he has an indeterminate intention, and would consecrate invalidly, as will be proved below.

c) into explicit and implicit, according as a thing clearly known is intended either in itself or in another thing with which it is joined.

Thus, for example, one who freely receives the subdiaconate explicitly intends to receive the order, but implicitly intends to receive celibacy, which is joined with the subdiaconate.

d) into absolute and conditional, according as the object is intended without any added restriction, or only under a certain restriction or condition.

For example, a priest who consecrates a host placed before him on the altar has an absolute intention; but he who absolves a man deprived of his senses under the condition, "if you are alive," has a conditional intention. Above, n. 22, when there was discussion of a conditional form, enough was said concerning the absolute and conditional intention of the minister of the sacraments.

With these things noted beforehand, it must be seen whether intention is required in the administration of the sacraments and what this intention is.

65. Necessity and object of intention. For validly confecting the sacraments, it is required that the minister have at least the intention of doing what the Church does.

What this expression, "the intention of doing what the Church does," means will be explained below. But the doctrine stated in the proposition is of Catholic faith, defined against Luther and Calvin²⁵³ in the Council of Trent:²⁵⁴ "If anyone says that in ministers, while they confect and confer the sacraments, there is not required at least the intention of doing what the Church does, let him be anathema." The Council of Florence had already declared in the Decree of Eugene IV: "All the sacraments are perfected by three things, namely, by things as matter, by words as form, and by the person of the minister conferring the sacrament with the intention of doing what the Church does."²⁵⁵ Since Protestants commonly do not acknowledge the efficacy of the sacraments ex opere operato, and think that the sacraments are efficacious solely because of the faith of the recipient, they logically deduce from this that no intention at all is required on the part of the minister, and consequently that sacraments are valid even if the minister is devoid of reason or acts in mere mimicry and mockery. How absurd this error is plainly evident from the following. For a) baptism would then be valid if some madman from a window poured a bucket of water over a Jewish catechumen passing by and at the same time pronounced the words: "I baptize you, etc."; b) then a priest reading aloud in the refectory the words of consecration in chapter 26 of St. Matthew would consecrate all the loaves placed upon the table and the flasks of wine.

The Catholic doctrine can furthermore be proved directly from theological reasons:

1. Matter and form considered only objectively are still of indeterminate signification, for they can also be employed in a natural or mocking sense. But they are determined to the supernatural signification of the sacrament, which they must have, through the intention of the minister acting. Therefore, this intention is necessary.

2. It was already said above that the minister must act in the person of Christ and in a human manner. Therefore, it does not suffice that he act merely as an inanimate instrument, for example, as a phonograph machine. But a man acts properly in a human manner only when he acts with intention, or for a determinate end.²⁵⁶ As regards the difficulties raised against Catholic doctrine from certain ancient little narratives, see Billuart.²⁵⁷

²⁵³ In a truly shameless style Calvin writes the following in his Antidote to canon 11 of session 7 of the Council of Trent: "They show that they make little of their anathemas, in pouring forth which they are so prodigal. What they prattle about the intention of consecrating was brought forth by the sophists for no probable reason.... For if the intention of the minister is necessary, there is none of us who would dare assure himself with certainty of his own baptism.... What sort of faith will it be which depends upon the secret will of another? And still these swine do not fear to threaten us with their anathemas, that is, their blasts, unless we immediately subscribe to such blasphemies. But I defer so much to the most sacred institution of Christ that, if some Epicurean, inwardly mocking the whole action, were to administer the Supper to me by the command of Christ and according to the rule given by Him and in the legitimate rite, I would not doubt that the bread and chalice offered by his hand are truly for me pledges of the body and blood of Christ. It is irksome to examine those stinking trifles when they say: at least of doing what the Church does."

²⁵⁴ Sess. 7, can. 11 on the sacraments in general (Denz., n. 854).

²⁵⁵ Denz., n. 695.

²⁵⁶ Cf. S. theol. 3, q. 64, a. 8.

²⁵⁷ De sacr. in gen., diss. 5, a. 7, § 1.

66. Quality of the intention required in the minister.

1. An interpretative or habitual intention does not suffice. The reason is that these intentions in no way influence the act of administering and therefore do not render that act human, which is nevertheless required for the validity of the administration.²⁵⁸

2. A virtual intention suffices. An actual intention is indeed best and is to be sought as far as possible; but it is not altogether required, nor is it commanded either by the very nature of the sacrament or by any positive law. Thus teach all Catholic authors.²⁵⁹ The reason is that an actual intention is in truth sometimes morally impossible. How, for example, can a confessor hearing hundreds of confessions renew in each confession the actual intention of administering the sacrament? Moreover, Christ does not command impossibilities in the administration of the sacraments. In addition, for a sacramental action it suffices that it proceed from the deliberate will of the minister. But when a virtual intention exists, the sacramental action is in truth sufficiently deliberate. Therefore, for the administration of the sacraments an actual intention is not required, but a virtual intention suffices.²⁶⁰

3. A determinate intention toward definite matter or a definite person is required. For just as in physical things a thing can never exist except under determinate matter and form, so it is also with the moral reality of a sacrament. But an accidental error which the minister has concerning the quantity or quality of the matter does not annul the sacrament. Thus, for example, if a priest thinks that he is consecrating one host placed before him, but in reality there are two hosts adhering to each other, the consecration is valid; or if a confessor absolves Peter, thinking him to be Paul, he absolves validly, unless, however, he expressly intended to absolve Paul and to leave Peter unabsolved. In practice, to avoid many ambiguities, it is safer that the minister of the sacraments form for himself once and for all determinate and clear intentions; for example, let a priest say to himself: During Mass I will always consecrate all the consecrable matter found upon the altar and placed there for the purpose of being consecrated; likewise, I absolve those penitents who duly make their confession before me, and it matters little what their name, quality, or sex may be, etc.

If anyone in the administration or reception of the sacraments has two incompatible and contrary intentions, then the predominant one prevails, namely, that which would be chosen if the incompatibility were known. For example, if a Protestant were to contract matrimony, altogether intending it to be dissoluble, and with such a mind that if he knew it to be indissoluble he would not contract it, then the matrimony would be null, at least in the internal forum; for in the external forum such an intention would first have to be clearly proved.²⁶¹ But if, even with the indissolubility known, he nevertheless would have contracted, the matrimony is valid.²⁶² If among contrary intentions one succeeds another, the later one customarily prevails, unless, however, the first intention from the beginning annulled every other subsequent intention; for then not the later but the first intention prevails.

A succession of incompatible intentions concerning the same matter of a sacrament does not occur so easily except among scrupulous persons; it can occur much more easily in another matter which is in some way connected with the sacraments, namely, in the application of the Mass. For example, a priest who a week beforehand proposed to say Mass today according to a determinate intention, forgetful of that intention, applies the Mass for another end. To avoid many difficulties in practice, let every priest propose to himself a general rule according to which he intends to order his applications of Masses, for example: I always will to fulfill the prior intention unless it has been expressly revoked (cf. below, n. 245).

4. An internal intention is required, and an external intention does not suffice. Since, according to the definition of the Council of Trent adduced above, the minister of a sacrament is altogether bound to have at least the intention of doing what the Church does, theologians have disputed most sharply for centuries how far this intention extends. For Billuart²⁶³ rightly says that several things can be considered in that which the Church does: a) the external rite itself taken precisely and materially; b) the rite as it is held by the Church as sacred, abstracting from whether the Church errs in such an acceptance or not; c) the rite as it is absolutely sacred in itself and a true sacrament; d) the rite as it produces grace or even a character. Modern theologians commonly admit that an intention of the third and fourth manner is not required for the validity of a sacrament. But there is controversy whether an intention of the first manner alone suffices or not. This first intention is called external by metonymy, not because it would in truth be external - this is altogether impossible, since every intention is an interior act of the will - but because it extends only to the external and physical rite of the sacrament, namely, to the external application of the form to the matter. Certain Catholic theologians taught that this external intention is sufficient, provided that the true form is applied to the true matter seriously and not jokingly or playfully. For thus a man is more certain concerning a sacrament validly administered even by bad ministers.

²⁵⁸ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 16.

²⁵⁹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 18.

²⁶⁰ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol., l.c., and St. Alphonsus, l.c.

²⁶¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 24.

²⁶² Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 1084.

²⁶³ De sacr. in gen., diss. 5, a. 7, § 2.

67. Controversy concerning internal or external intention. Ambrose Catharinus (1487-1553) is not rarely called the first author who taught that external intention suffices; but this is altogether false. Roland Bandinelli, later Alexander III in the twelfth century, had already taught this opinion, saying: "It will be true and ratified baptism, whether he who baptizes has an intention or not, provided that it is handed down in the form of the Church."²⁶⁴ Robert Pullen, who died about 1150, taught the same opinion in book V of the Sentences.²⁶⁵ St. Thomas, although he himself requires internal intention, knows the contrary opinion: "Others say that in baptism and in the other sacraments which have an exercised act in their form, a mental intention is not required, but the expression of intention through the words instituted by the Church suffices; and therefore, if the form is observed and nothing external is said which expresses a contrary intention, the person is baptized."²⁶⁶ Innocent IV in the thirteenth century expressed this opinion rather harshly in his Commentaries,²⁶⁷ which he published not as Supreme Pontiff but as a private man, in these words: "It is not necessary that the one baptizing know what the Church is, what it is that baptizes, who the person baptized is, and whence he is; nor that he bear in mind to do what the Church does. Indeed, even if he should bear the contrary in mind, namely, not to do what the Church does, but nevertheless he does it because he preserves the form, the person is nonetheless baptized, provided that he intends to baptize."²⁶⁸ On account of the authority of St. Thomas and other great Scholastics, the opinion concerning external intention was, as it were, buried for several centuries, until at the time of the Council of Trent Ambrose Catharinus, O.P., and Alphonsus Salmeron, S.J., revived it; they were afterward followed by Contenson, Natalis Alexander, Juenin, Serry, Drouven, Milante, Stattler, Dobmayer, Oswald, Glossner, and others.²⁶⁹

Certain authors²⁷⁰ insinuated that this opinion was proscribed both by the Council of Trent and especially by Alexander VIII, who condemned the proposition: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes the whole external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, although inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: 'I do not intend what the Church does.'"²⁷¹ By this condemnation, says Benedict XIV,²⁷² "it cannot be denied that a grave wound was inflicted upon the aforesaid opinion." Nevertheless, the same Benedict XIV rightly says in the same place: "Theologians of better judgment vindicate the opinion of Catharinus from the censure of heresy, and demonstrate that a broad distinction intervenes between it and the doctrine of Luther and Calvin.... It does not belong to a bishop to reject the former opinion, that is, that of Catharinus." So far is the opinion concerning external intention from being condemned that, on the contrary, it acquired no small weight through the Constitution of Leo XIII concerning Anglican ordinations.²⁷³ Behold the words of the Supreme Pontiff: "Concerning the mind or intention, since it is of itself something interior, the Church does not judge; but insofar as it is manifested outwardly, she must judge concerning it. But when anyone has seriously and duly employed the due matter and form for confecting and conferring a sacrament, by that very fact he is judged to have intended to do what the Church does. Upon this principle assuredly rests the doctrine which holds that even that is truly a sacrament which is conferred by the ministry of a heretical or unbaptized man, provided it is conferred according to the Catholic rite." The doctrine concerning external intention does not seem in practice to differ greatly from these words of the Supreme Pontiff.

²⁶⁴ Cf. Gietl, Die Sentenzen Rolands, 206.

²⁶⁵ In Migne, Patr. lat. 186, 841 sq.

²⁶⁶ IV Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2.

²⁶⁷ Super Libr. Decretal. 3, tit. 42, c. 1.

²⁶⁸ Cf. Pourrat, La theol. sacr., 345; Fr. Morgott, Der Spender der heiligen Sakramente, n. 70.

²⁶⁹ Cf. Hurter, Theol. dogm. III, n. 294; Fr. Morgott, l.c., n. 98 sqq.

²⁷⁰ Thus, for example, Chr. Pesch (Prael. dogm. VI, n. 280) incorrectly says: "Historically it is established that the condemned proposition was indeed not that of Catharinus but of Farvacques, who was a defender of the opinion of Catharinus."

²⁷¹ Denz., n. 1318.

²⁷² De syn. dioec., l. 7, c. 4, n. 8.

²⁷³ September 13, 1896 (Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 1954, p. 345).

68. Nevertheless, besides the external rite and the internal intention of seriously performing this rite, there is further required the intention of performing this rite insofar as it is held sacred by the true Church. For:

1. From the time of William of Auxerre, who seems to have been the first to employ the formula "the intention of doing what the Church does," all the better theologians, the Supreme Pontiffs, and the ecumenical councils alike require for the validity of a sacrament that, besides matter and form, there be present the intention of the minister to do what the Church does. Therefore, a purely external intention, which is nothing other than the voluntary application of the form to the matter, does not suffice, but an internal intention is further required.

2. The minister of the sacraments must act in a human manner and as a mandatory of Christ. Therefore, it is required that he deliberately will to act in the person of Christ, or that he will to apply the form to the matter by perfecting a rite which the Church holds as sacred. Therefore, external intention alone does not suffice.

Let these things suffice concerning this controversy over external or internal intention. Let him who desires more consult Billuart,²⁷⁴ who treats this question clearly, copiously, and profoundly.²⁷⁵ For the rest, in practice there does not seem to us to be so great a difference between the two opinions when rightly explained. The disputes seem rather to have arisen from the point of the question having been explained somewhat obscurely.

²⁷⁴ De sacr. in gen., diss. 5, a. 5.

²⁷⁵ Cf. also Schanz, Die Lehre v. d. Sakr. I, § 11, where this controversy is clearly explained, or Fr. Morgott, Der Spender d. hl. Sakramente, 105 sqq.

69. Note for practice:

a) The intention of doing what the Church does is one thing, and of doing what the Church intends is another. For the Church does the external sacred rite instituted by Christ; but she intends that grace be conferred through this rite. For the validity of a sacrament it is by no means required that the minister intend the conferral of grace. Thus all teach.

b) Seriously to will to perform a rite which the Christian Church holds as sacred is one thing, and for the minister to believe that the rite is truly sacred is another. Thus, for example, a Jew baptizing can have the intention of doing what the Christian Church does, even if inwardly he thinks that this Church errs and that the rite performed is altogether inefficacious. Nevertheless, this baptism is valid, provided that the due matter and form are employed. This is established from the practice of the Church, which has never repeated baptism for the sole reason that it was conferred by heretics or unbelievers.²⁷⁶ Hence St. Thomas says: "Although he who does not believe baptism to be a sacrament or to have any spiritual power does not intend, while he baptizes, to confer a sacrament, nevertheless he sometimes intends to do what the Church does, even if he judges it to be nothing; and because the Church does something, therefore consequently and implicitly he intends to do something, although not explicitly."²⁷⁷

c) Likewise, it is not necessary that the minister have the intention of doing that which the Catholic Church does, provided that he intends to do what is done by the Church which he thinks to be Christian. Thus baptisms conferred by Protestant ministers who think the Catholic Church to be false are not by that very fact invalid on account of this error. But if these ministers, or even any others, are altogether unbelieving, denying the divinity of Christ and even the existence of a personal God, then baptism conferred by them is very doubtfully valid. For how can such ministers baptize seriously and with the true intention of doing what the Church does, since they deny the divinity of Christ and even the Church instituted by Him? Therefore, it is to be feared that on this account innumerable baptisms are invalid, at least if the opinion concerning the sufficiency of external intention is not true. For if external intention suffices, then all those baptisms are valid, because the due form and matter are employed. In practice, all those thus baptized who return to the bosom of the Church are to be rebaptized under condition.

²⁷⁶ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 22.

²⁷⁷ IV Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 ad 1; cf. S. theol. 3, q. 64, a. 9 ad 1.

St. Thomas III, q. 64, a. 8 and 10.

80. Principle I. For the validity of a sacrament, in the minister, besides power, there is required the intention or deliberate will of confecting a sacrament. - This is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 11, and can. 4 on Baptism, defined against the Protestants.

It is proved:

1. From Tradition, whose witnesses are Innocent III, the profession of faith for the Waldensians; the Council of Constance, last session, constitution against Wicleff, a. 22; Florence, decree for the Armenians; and Trent already cited.

2. From the Scriptures, in which it is implicitly asserted, I Cor. IV, 1: A priest, in the ministration of the sacraments, is a minister of Christ; but in order that a man be a minister of Christ, he must will to act in the name of Christ and intend what Christ instituted; therefore. The minor is proved:

a) A minister differs from a blind instrument in this, that he is a voluntary agent; whence he must will to use his ministerial power, and thus through his will subject himself to the principal agent: for a human act does not operate beyond the intention of the agent.

b) Similarly, there was given to ministers not a mere deputation but a power (Mt. XXVIII, 18-19; John XX, 21; Luke XXII, 19); but one who has a power can use it or not use it; and therefore there is required in ministers an intention of using their power or of acting in the name of Christ.

Therefore intention is required on the part of the minister.

3. By reason: The placing of matter and form is an indifferent action which can signify various things and be done for various ends: washing, for example, for bodily cleanliness, for health, for play, for mere exercise, for representation alone; therefore it must be determined to one sacramental signification, which will not be done except by the intention of the minister. Therefore intention is also required on the part of the work.

Nor should you say: the external rite is determined by the words of the form; therefore intention is superfluous. - Reply: supposing that the words are pronounced in the name of Christ, in the person of Christ; otherwise they would not have their sacramental signification.

81. Principle II. The required intention is the will, at least virtual and implicit, absolute or equivalent to this, determined to a certain matter and person, of performing the sacramental rite. - It is said:

1. Will; hence one deprived of reason, perfectly drunk, or dreaming, does not confect a sacrament, even if he previously intended this, because he does not act in a human mode, from intention.

2. On the part of the subject: at least virtual and implicit: for an interpretative intention does not suffice, which someone would have had if he had adverted to this or that; nor a merely habitual intention, i.e., one once had and not retracted, for these do not make a human act (I, n. 55) nor influence the constitution of a sacrament. Nor is an actual intention required, which someone here and now has, because this is not always in man's moral power; but a virtual intention is required, by which someone, from the force or influx of a past actual intention, places or continues to place the sacrament.¹ Likewise an explicit intention is not required, by which someone says: I intend to make a sacrament; but an implicit one suffices, contained in another act, as if someone, having been called, goes to the church and, distracted, performs all things required for Baptism.

¹ Among the older authors, virtual intention is sometimes called habitual, as in St. Thomas, a. 8, ad 3; but he understands virtual, for he adds: "from the power of the first intention the sacrament is perfected." Yet to avoid equivocations, the terminology received today must be preserved.

In practice, one who places the actions according to custom and does not exclude intention has an implicit intention; a fortiori one who fears whether he has sufficient intention, by this very fact has more than sufficient intention.

3. On the part of the mode by which the will is borne toward the object:

a) Absolute or equivalent to this, i.e., conditioned concerning the past or present: for if, at the moment at which the sacrament is made, this condition is verified, the intention passes into an absolute one and the sacrament is valid; otherwise it is not perfected from defect of intention. But a condition concerning a future contingent thing (for example, if you restore), and also concerning a necessary future thing (for example, if the sun rises), with the mind of suspending the sacrament, renders it invalid: for it impedes the union between the intention of the minister and the application of matter and form, since it suspends the present intention and makes it so that the minister does not have the will of confecting the sacrament in the present; moreover, when the condition has been verified, there also is not then a sacrament, because then matter and form no longer exist.

Matrimony is excepted, which follows the nature of a contract; whence, when the condition has been verified, if consent has persevered, the matter and form of matrimony are present, for they coincide with the persevering intention.

b) Determined to a certain matter, because otherwise it would be indifferent, for example, if someone, knowing there are eleven hosts, wished to consecrate ten without indicating which ones; and to a certain person, because otherwise no application would be made, for example, if someone said: I absolve thee, to two persons.

But it suffices that it be determined to the present person, whoever that person may be; whence a man who is thought to be a woman is validly absolved, and Peter who seems to be Paul. Error concerning the person does not invalidate, unless the minister were to bind his intention to a determinate person; in matrimony, however, error of person is substantial, because the person is the very object of the contract.

4. On the part of the object: of performing the sacramental rite. For the rite of itself is indifferent and can be posited for a diverse end: as sacred or as profane, indeed by playing, or by pretending, without, namely, the will of confecting a sacrament; therefore in order that it be a sacrament it must be determined by the intention of doing the rite as sacramental, or of doing what the Church does,² as the Councils say, or what is done in the Church. This must be explained further.

² The first who used the formula was William of Auxerre, on IV Sentences, On Baptism.

82. Principle III. For the validity of a sacrament, external intention does not suffice, i.e., the intention only of doing the external act; but there is required, at least implicitly, an internal intention of doing what Christ instituted, or at least what the Church does. - Therefore the intention of positing the external act, even seriously and in the habit of a minister, but merely materially (although inwardly someone wills to simulate), does not suffice; this intention they call external, namely from the part of the object, and some have said that it suffices;³ for:

³ It is attributed to Alan of Lille; it was formally proposed by Catharinus, Salmeron, Contenson, Juenin, Natalis Alexander, Serry, Drouin, and others.

a) One who has only external intention, but internally does not have the intention of doing what the Church does, implicitly intends to simulate a sacrament, although not openly; but one who simulates a sacrament, whether openly or secretly, cannot be said to act in the name of Christ.

b) The external act, even one posited in a sacred place by a minister clothed in sacred vestments, can be done for a diverse end: it can be a serious or simulated action, done in the name of Christ or in one's own name, a profane representation or exercise, or a sacred action. Therefore it will not be determined to the being of a sacrament except through an internal intention, consonant with the external act, namely of doing the act formally as sacred, as instituted by Christ and intended by the Church.

This opinion in practice must be altogether held, because the sacraments are to be ministered in the safer way (n. 23); indeed the contrary seems not safe even speculatively, because proposition 28 was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes every external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, while inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: I do not intend what the Church does." For although the one who only negatively does not say: I intend what the Church does, but positively does not add: I do not intend what the Church does, has not been explicitly condemned; nevertheless, because he implicitly says this, therefore with Benedict XIV⁴ it is rightly judged that, from the condemnation of the proposition, a grave wound has been inflicted on the opinion which asserts that this suffices.

⁴ On the Diocesan Synod, book VII, 4, 8.

83. Corollaries. - Since implicit intention suffices, hence:

1. There is not required an explicit intention of that which the Church intends, namely, of confecting something sacred, or a sacrament, or of producing its effect.

2. Nor is faith in Christ, the Church, or the sacrament required; but whatever the minister's opinion may be concerning Christ, concerning the sacrament and its efficacy, he ministers validly provided that he wills to perform the rite which the Church performs, and which by her is held as sacred, even if he himself thinks it to be nothing: "for because the Church does something, therefore consequently and implicitly he intends to do something, although not explicitly," says St. Thomas, on IV Sentences, d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 1.

3. Nor is an explicit intention required of doing what the Roman Church does, but a general intention of doing what the true Church does, whatever the minister may think of that Church; whence a heretic, by willing what his own Church does, which he falsely thinks to be true, implicitly wills what the Church of Christ and the Roman Church does.

4. Nor is an express thought about the Church required, but the intention of doing something which identically the Church does suffices, for example, what is commanded in the Gospel, what Christians do, what is asked by the one requesting: thus baptized persons minister the sacrament of matrimony which they are ignorant to be a sacrament of the Church.

5. Indeed even if the minister has two contrary intentions, for example, of doing what Christ instituted but not what the Church does, what the Church does but not what the Roman Church does, of celebrating matrimony but dissoluble or not a sacrament, of making a sacrament but not of giving grace; the sacrament is valid, provided that the general intention of doing what the Church in fact does is predominant and prevails over the intention proceeding from error, i.e., provided that this is the intention which, according to his actual disposition, the minister would choose if he knew that both could not stand together at the same time.

But if each were equal, nothing would be operated, for one would destroy the other; but if there were doubt about this, the sacrament would be doubtful.

84. He sins gravely from defect of due intention:

1. Who ministers a sacrament without intention, or under a future condition suspending the intention, because it is not a valid sacrament, but a simulation and mockery of it.

2. Who ministers under a hidden condition extrinsic to the sacrament, whether it is unknowable in a human way, for example, if you are predestined, if God sees that you will die this year; or whether it is knowable, for example, if you are fasting, if you have recited the Rosary; because from the very placing of the condition there arises doubt concerning the validity of the sacrament, and hence he exposes himself to the danger of doing nothing and of frustrating his neighbor of the sacramental effect; and on the other hand there can be no reason for such ministration. Indeed to some, among whom is St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book VI, n. 28, it seems more probable that a sacrament confected under a hidden condition unknowable in a human way is invalid, because "since God has committed the administration of the sacraments to the cognition and will of men, a condition cannot be placed which cannot fall under human cognition."

3. Who without grave cause ministers under a hidden condition concerning the present or the past and intrinsic to the sacrament, or from its nature required for its value, so that doubt concerning the value does not arise from the very placing of the condition: for he plays in a most grave and most holy matter, because he incurs the danger of making the sacrament null, and thus inflicts irreverence upon Christ and exposes his neighbor to great harm.

On the contrary:

A. It is licit if a sufficient cause is present, such as is generally had when the sacrament here and now is necessary or very useful and cannot be had as certainly valid:

a) if a serious doubt arises whether a sacrament which cannot be repeated was conferred or validly conferred, or whether the confessor absolved the penitent; then let the sacrament be ministered under the condition: if you are not yet baptized, absolved, etc.;

b) if there is doubt whether a capable subject is had, for example, whether a child confessing matter of mortal sin is possessed of reason, whether one deprived of the senses wishes to receive the sacrament or is still alive, whether the one to be absolved repents, whether the fetus is a man; then let the sacrament be ministered under the condition: if you are capable;

c) if there is doubt concerning the validity of the matter or form, for example, whether this is water, or concerning the power of the minister: for doubt concerning the power of the minister, or concerning his jurisdiction for the sacrament of Penance, renders the matters and forms doubtful; then let the sacrament be ministered under the condition: if I can.

Attention is an act of the intellect, namely the application of the mind to those things which are being done, and it is distinguished as twofold: for one is internal, which is the very advertence of the mind to that which is being done, and another is external, which consists in this, that every external action physically incompatible with internal attention be excluded.

But intention is an act of the will tending toward some end, and it is chiefly divided: 1st. into internal and external, according as some true act of the will exists or only an external action; 2nd. into actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative, according as the force and quantity of the tendency of the will is diverse according to those things which have been said in the treatise on human acts under n. 5.

I say 1st. Although for the licit conferral of the sacraments so great an attention is required that every voluntary distraction be absent, nevertheless for their validity only that attention is required and suffices which is found in every truly human act. The reason for the first is taken from the reverence owed to the sacrament and from the obligation of avoiding the danger of error. But the reason for the second is that, on the one hand, the Minister of the sacraments must act as a rational being, and on the other, if the act is supposed to be truly human, the agent is already truly judged to act morally, which certainly suffices for the notion of ministry. Hence a Minister even distracted, or thinking at the same time about other business, validly confers sacraments, but he is not without fault, although ordinarily only venial fault, unless he exposes himself to the danger of gravely erring, or, according to the more common opinion, unless there is question of the confection of the Eucharist. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 11 and 14. - Lacroix, lib. 6, part 2, n. 443.

I say 2nd. Actual intention, although best and desirable, nevertheless is not required for the valid conferral of a sacrament, because sometimes it is morally impossible; but virtual intention is required and suffices. It is indeed required, because otherwise a human act could be present by force of habitual or interpretative intention, which surely is repugnant; it suffices, however, because once the virtual influx of the will upon the action of the Minister has been posited, this can and must truly be called human and deliberate. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 16. - De Augustinis, Thesis 17, p. 222.

I say 3rd. § 1. Since all the Sacraments of the New Law, instituted by Christ Our Lord, are the principal means of sanctification and salvation, the greatest diligence and reverence must be employed in administering and receiving them opportunely and rightly (Can. 731).

Question 1. Does only external intention suffice for validly conferring a sacrament?

Resp. Negatively, because although an intention of confecting the sacrament, or of doing what the Roman Church does, is not properly required in the Minister, nevertheless there is required in him the intention of doing what the Church does, and consequently that his action be determined to a sacred rite; but this cannot be done without some internal intention. Besides, it is clear from proposition 28 condemned by Alexander VIII, which is as follows: "Baptism conferred by a Minister who observes every external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, but inwardly in his heart resolves with himself: I do not intend to do what the Church does." Moreover, even if the opinion of Catharinus, which is here rejected, enjoyed some probability, it could be of no use in the administration of the sacraments. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 21, 22 and 23. - De Augustinis, Thesis 17, p. 228.

Question 2. Is a sacrament valid when conferred with conditioned intention?

Resp. Negatively, if the condition placed is concerning the future; because then, by suspending the intention of the Minister, it prevents the form from being applied here and now to the matter; nor can it afterward be applied, when the condition has been verified, since the matter and form have already ceased to be present. - Except, however, the Sacrament of Matrimony, as will be said in its own place. - But if the condition is concerning the past or concerning the present, and in reality this condition exists, any sacrament whatever will be valid. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 26.

Question 3. Is the conferral of the sacraments with conditioned intention licit, in doubt whether they have been validly conferred?

Resp. Affirmatively, if a sufficient cause is present for placing the condition. The reason is that sacraments are for men, and by conditioned conferral provision is made, insofar as can be done, both for the good of those who receive the sacrament, if perhaps they are capable of it, and also for the reverence of the sacrament. But it is certain that in extreme necessity, where no matter is present except doubtful matter, the Minister not only can, but also is bound under grave obligation to minister the sacrament under condition. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 27, 28 and 29.

Question 4. Must the condition be expressed in words?

Resp. Negatively, and the reason is that it suffices for reverence toward the sacrament if it is conceived in the mind. Indeed, according to some, it is not even necessary to have the condition explicitly and formally in the mind; but it is enough if it is had implicitly and virtually, as he has it who wishes to hear confessions according to the institution of Christ or the intention of the Church; for thus also the reverence owed to the sacrament is sufficiently preserved. Yet it must be added by mouth where the Rubric prescribes this, as in conditioned Baptism, especially if it is conferred publicly, lest, namely, those standing by believe that Baptism is being repeated absolutely and take scandal. Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 3. - Lacroix, lib. 6, part 1, n. 83. - Gobat, tract. 7, n. 272.

II. QUESTION II. Whether in performing the sacraments an intention is required in the minister? ANSWER. Intention is a purpose of the will by which the minister deliberates to confer the sacrament. Theologians distinguish a threefold intention. One is called habitual, which is a certain prompt facility of operating. Another actual, which is a present application of mind and attention to the work which is in fact being done; for example, a priest while he confers a sacrament actually thinks of conferring it, and in fact intends to administer it. The third at last is virtual, which flows from a preceding act and which has not been retracted by a contrary intention, nor interrupted for a long time.

III. It is agreed among all Catholics that a habitual intention does not suffice for performing a sacrament, nor is an actual one necessary, but a virtual one suffices. Luther taught that ministers confer the sacraments even if they baptize in jest and in play, and betray themselves as buffoons and mimes. This error Leo X proscribed, and at last Trent, session 7, canon 11, defined: If anyone shall say that in ministers, while they confect and confer the sacraments, there is not required the intention at least of doing what the Church does, let him be anathema.

IV. Theologians dispute whether, besides the intention which they call exterior, which arises from words seriously uttered, an interior intention of mind is necessary. Some denied it, contending that a minister validly performs a sacrament while he seriously utters the necessary words, although interiorly he say: I will not perform the sacrament.

V. This opinion I reject. Since either the exterior administration of a sacrament performed according to the rite instituted by Christ makes the sacrament valid by its own nature, every internal intention of the minister being altogether excluded, or not. If the first, then in no way does the administration of the sacraments depend upon the interior intention of the minister. But this is condemned by Trent. If the second, then the minister's intention is necessary. Again, either a minister seriously uttering the form and applying the sacramental matter according to the lawful rite can intend the opposite of that which the Church does, or not. If he cannot, but, the external serious administration being posited, is compelled to will to do that which the Church does, the Tridentine canon is altogether superfluous. For it is in vain enjoined that something be posited which the minister cannot omit. According to the opposite opinion, the external serious administration being posited, the minister necessarily intends to do what the Church does: because this exterior serious administration collides with and routs the contrary internal intention. Therefore in vain does Trent require the minister's intention. But it does require it. Therefore the opposite opinion is false. According to the system of our adversaries the Tridentine canon should have been framed thus: If anyone shall say that in ministers, while they confect the sacraments, a jesting administration suffices and a serious one is not required, let him be anathema. What of this, that Trent, session 14, canon 9, condemned a jesting administration, and by another canon already transcribed requires the minister's intention? Two things therefore the Council necessarily asserts: a serious administration and an interior intention of the minister.

VIII. QUESTION IV. Whether for the integrity of a sacrament it is required that the minister intend to do what the Roman Church does? ANSWER. The common and true opinion denies it: for it is enough that the minister will in general to do what the Church of Christ does: because this general intention is not impeded by a private error, by which a man believes the Lutheran or Calvinist Church to be orthodox, since the minister acts not as a private person but as a public one, nor can his private error infect the work of God.

Agnes, because of grave fear instilled by a rather severe father, had promised to enter marriage with Albert, a marriage to which she was greatly opposed. On the very morning of the marriage she seeks Caius, the parish priest, with the intention of declaring that she was compelled by fear. Nevertheless, in the confessional itself she changes her plan, discloses some faults, and asks for absolution. Since Caius cannot obtain certain matter for absolution, he dismisses her with a simple blessing, without, however, warning her at all that absolution was not given. Afterwards Agnes goes through the form of marriage; when it is later lawfully proved that the marriage was entered through grave fear, it is declared null and void by ecclesiastical authority. When Agnes comes to confession the next time and says nothing about the simulated marriage, Caius remains in doubt whether or not he ought to question her. Hence it is asked:

1. What is it to simulate a sacrament?

2. Is it ever lawful to simulate a sacrament?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is simulating a sacrament?

The 29th proposition condemned by Innocent XI asserted: “ Urgent and grave fear is a just cause for simulating the administration of the sacraments.” This false proposition was applied by its defenders to such cases as the following: To avoid death a priest might utter the words of consecration over all the bread in a baker’s shop without the intention of consecrating it; or the words of absolution over an indisposed penitent without intending to absolve him; or might give a non-consecrated Host to one who was unworthy to communicate. Hence simulating the administration of a sacrament acquired a technical meaning and signified the use of the matter or of the form of a sacrament without the intention of completing and making the sacrament.¹

1 Viva, Damnatae theses.

2. Is it ever lawful to simulate a sacrament?

The absolute condemnation of the above proposition by the Holy See shows that it is never lawful to simulate a sacrament either formally, when deception is intended, or materially, when deception is not intended but only permitted. The chief reason is because by such simulation a portion of a sacred rite instituted by Christ for the making of a sacrament and the conferring of grace on the souls of men, is used without the intention of completing the sacrament. Such an illusory use of a sacred sign is greatly injurious to God, and can not be rendered lawful even by the pressure of grave fear.

3. The case. Agnes should have kept to her resolution of telling the parish priest the truth about her case. Still she was not guilty of simulating the sacrament of marriage, for both the matter and form of this sacrament lie in the consent of the parties, and as Agnes did not consent, she did not simulate marriage in the technical sense. A fortiori Caius did not simulate the sacrament of Penance, for he dismissed her with a blessing. Caius, therefore, was under no obligation of questioning Agnes about the simulation of marriage.