Section 3. On the Intention of the Minister

Intention is an act of the will by which we will to do or omit something. It can be considered in three ways: in itself, insofar as it is an act of the will; according to the object which the will intends; and according to the mode by which the act of the will tends toward the object.

20. On intention considered according to itself. Explanations. If it is considered according to itself, four diverse intentions must be distinguished:

a. Actual is called that which exists here and now, flows into the work, and is adverted to reflexively when the work is performed. This intention, by reason of the object, can be explicit or implicit, concerning which below.

b. Virtual is called that which exists here and now and flows into the work, but is not adverted to when the work is placed. This, therefore, is an intention previously had and never retracted, so that by its force and virtue the work now occurs, even if it is not adverted to by the agent.

alpha. A priest, for example, about to celebrate, elicits the intention of celebrating or consecrating; moved by this act of will he prepares himself, goes into the sacristy, puts on the sacred vestments, proceeds to the altar, duly completes all things up to the consecration. Now although at the consecration he does not renew the intention of consecrating, indeed, thinking of other things, does not even advert to the intention of consecrating, nevertheless he has the virtual intention, by whose influence he utters the words of consecration.

beta. Actual and virtual intention agree in this, that each is present and flows into the work; but the difference between the two seems to be this, that the former is present and is adverted to by the agent, while the latter is not adverted to by the agent who thinks about other things, although it is present and moves him to act. In like manner, between internal and external attention the difference seems to be this, that the agent has consciousness of the former, but does not have consciousness of the latter. Therefore external attention is not called external because it is in no way internal, but because it is not reflexive or joined with consciousness.¹

c. Habitual is called that which was had at some time and was never retracted, but no longer exists and therefore does not flow into the work. Therefore this intention can be present even in those sleeping, mad, and drunk.

If someone previously had the intention of confecting a sacrament and afterward, having become drunk, confects it, he confects the sacrament with a habitual intention. Likewise he who yesterday proposed today to offer Mass for a friend, and today, not moved by yesterday's proposal, indeed forgetful of it, offers Mass, is said to have the habitual intention of offering for the friend.

d. Interpretative is called that which was never present, but which nevertheless, because of the habitual inclination of the will toward the object, would be present if that object came into mind.

He who never had the intention of consecrating a particle unknowingly placed on the corporal, which nevertheless he would wish to consecrate if he had knowledge of it, has an interpretative intention of consecrating. He who never expressly desired baptism, and yet would desire it if the thought of it came into his mind, is said to will baptism interpretatively, or to have an interpretative intention of baptism.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri IV, n. 653.

21. Principles. 1. Actual intention is best and greatly to be recommended, but it is not required for validly confecting the sacraments: for neither from the nature of the thing nor from any positive law is it prescribed. Moreover, actual intention, considering human frailty, is morally impossible; but it cannot be affirmed that Christ required for the validity of the sacraments something which is morally impossible for their ministers.

2. Virtual intention is required and suffices for validly confecting the sacraments: for an intention is required which flows into the sacramental action and therefore into its effect; but only actual and virtual intention flow into the work: therefore at least virtual intention is required. But since from the nature of the thing this one thing is demanded, that the sacramental action proceed from the deliberate will of the minister, virtual intention certainly suffices.

It is not permitted to repeat the form of the sacraments, even if it was uttered with distraction, whether voluntary or involuntary, because distraction does not impede virtual intention nor therefore the validity of the sacrament.

3. Neither habitual nor interpretative intention suffices for validly confecting the sacraments: for, in order that the sacrament be valid, it must be confected from the intention of the minister as from a cause; but neither habitual nor interpretative intention flows into the work; wherefore if the minister does not have another intention, the sacrament is not confected from his intention (n. 17).

Therefore there would be no sacrament if it were administered in sleep, or by a madman or by a drunk man, even if the one administering had intended it before drunkenness or sleep.

22. On intention considered according to the object. Explanations. According as the willed object is represented by the intellect and intended by the will in a diverse manner, one must distinguish:

a. Determinate and indeterminate, according as a certain and definite object, or a vague and uncertain one, is intended; for example, he who from ten diverse Mass intentions intends to discharge one definite intention has a determinate intention; but he who intends to discharge one of them, not defining which one, has an indeterminate intention.

b. Explicit and implicit, according as the thing itself is expressly intended in itself, or not in itself but in another thing (in which, expressly known and willed, it is contained) is intended.

Thus he who expressly thinks of and desires to receive extreme unction has an explicit intention; but he who expressly desires to die as Christians are accustomed to die has an implicit intention of extreme unction. Likewise he who explicitly thinks of and intends to receive the subdiaconate, but thinks nothing about the obligation of preserving chastity, which he knows to be joined to the order, at the same time implicitly wills and intends to receive this obligation.

23. Principles. 1. For validly confecting a sacrament there is required at least the implicit intention of doing what the true Church does.¹ Certainly some intention of confecting the sacrament is required, both because matter and form must be determined to the sacramental action by the minister's intention of confecting the sacrament (n. 9), and because the minister becomes the instrumental cause of the sacrament only by this intention (n. 17, 1); but in the intention of doing what the Church does, that intention is contained implicitly and confusedly. But in order to have the intention of doing what the Church does, it suffices that the minister wishes to perform the rite which he has seen or heard to be done by the Church of Christ, or the rite which either he himself or others hold as sacred: for in this intention is contained the intention of doing what the Church does.

a. Therefore, for validly confecting a sacrament, it is not required that the minister wish to confer this determinate sacrament (to baptize, to confirm), nor that he wish generally to confer a sacrament or a sacramental effect, nor that he wish to do what the Catholic Church or the Roman Church does, but it suffices that he wish to do what the true Church instituted by Christ does, even if he falsely thinks his own sect to be the true Church.

b. Therefore certainly he would not confect a sacrament who positively did not wish to do what Christ instituted or what the Catholic Church does. For this reason especially Anglican ordinations are invalid: for it is established that the Anglican bishops changed the rite of ordination for this reason, lest they should do and confer what the Catholic Church does and confers.² Likewise he does not confect a sacrament who would wish only to place the external rite, that is, to place this matter and utter these words. Likewise he who would place the whole external rite, say of baptism, for another end, for example, for the sake of washing another, of jest, of mockery, or of practice.

c. Therefore a heretic who by error thinks that there are no sacraments, or that sacraments confer no grace, can nevertheless validly baptize or consecrate, if he wishes to do what Christ instituted. Indeed, an unbeliever baptizes validly, provided he wishes to place the rite which Christians hold as sacred, or wishes to do what Christians are accustomed to do.

2. The intention must be determinate toward certain matter or toward a certain person: for the very words of the sacramental form demand this (I baptize you; I absolve you; this is my body), which designate certain matter or a certain person as present in some way. Yet an error of the minister concerning the person requesting the sacrament or concerning the quantity of matter to be consecrated does not render the sacrament invalid (except in matrimony), provided he intends to confer the sacrament on the one requesting it or to consecrate the matter present; which intention indeed he is always judged to have, unless he expressly restricts it to a determinate person or to definite matter.

a. Therefore he who intended to consecrate one from several particles placed on the corporal, or in time of plague to absolve one from several dying persons in a hospital, not determining whom, would do nothing. If someone absolving a penitent whom he thinks to be Peter, when nevertheless he is Paul, intended to absolve Peter and no other, he would absolve no one. If someone consecrating, as he judges, three particles, when nevertheless there are four, intended to consecrate only three, he would consecrate none.

b. Wherefore it is best to direct the intention to the matter or person present, whatever it may be; for then truly, to remain in the examples just given, Paul is absolved, although he is thought to be Peter, and four particles are consecrated, although they are judged to be only three, because the intention of the one confecting the sacrament is referred to this determinate present matter.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 11: "If anyone shall say that in ministers there is not required the intention at least of doing what the Church does, let him be anathema." Cf. prop. 28 of Alexander VIII.

² Cf. constitution of Leo XIII, Apostolicae curae, 13 Sept. 1896.

24. On intention considered according to the mode. Explanation. According to the mode by which the will is borne toward the object, absolute and conditional intention is to be distinguished, according as the will is borne toward the object independently of every event or circumstance, or only depending on some event or circumstance. But the condition added can be of the present: if you are alive, I baptize you; or of the past: if you have made restitution, I absolve you; or of the future: if it rains tomorrow, I baptize you.

What is said here concerning conditional intention is to be understood of a suspensive condition, namely by which the effect is suspended until the condition is fulfilled.

25. Principles on conditional intention. 1. A sacrament conferred under a condition of the present or of the past is valid if the condition has been fulfilled; but if the condition does not obtain, it is null: for if the condition added is true, the intention of the one conferring the sacrament passes into an absolute intention; but if the condition added is not true, the intention of conferring the sacrament is lacking.

Therefore the effect of a sacrament which is conferred under a condition of the present or of the past is always certain: either valid or null. Thus a sacrament conferred in this way: I absolve you, if you wish to dismiss the concubine, if you are capable; I baptize you, if you are not baptized, is valid if the condition is true; otherwise it is null.

2. A sacrament conferred under a condition of the future is null: for it is not valid immediately, when the sacramental action is placed, because then the intention of confecting the sacrament is lacking; nor is it valid afterward, when, the condition having been fulfilled, the intention of the minister is had, because then the matter and form of the sacrament no longer exist; therefore a sacrament conferred in this way is never valid.

If a condition of the present is added, but one hidden and known to God alone: I baptize you, if you are predestined; I absolve you, if God sees that you will die this year, some with Viva and Lacroix think that the sacrament is valid, because the added condition is of the present; but others, with Coninck, Dicastillo, and St. Alphonsus (n. 26), teach that the sacrament is invalid, because it cannot be supposed that God gave men the power of confecting sacraments under such a condition: for since God committed the administration of the sacraments to the knowledge and will of men, a condition cannot be added which cannot be known by the human mind. Whatever the case may be, to add a condition of this kind is certainly gravely illicit, because the sacraments would be rendered uncertain and men would not know whether they had received them validly or invalidly.

3. For a just cause it is licit to confer a sacrament under a condition of the present or of the past: for what can be valid is also licit in a case of necessity; but it is never licit to confer a sacrament under a condition of the future (except matrimony), because it is not permitted to confer a sacrament which is certainly invalid.

a. Without reasonable cause it is not permitted to confer a sacrament under a condition, because the sacramental action is performed in vain and therefore irreverence is inflicted on Christ. There is a just cause for conferring a sacrament under a condition whenever a sacrament conferred absolutely would be exposed to the danger of nullity, while, if denied absolutely, it would deprive a man of the effect of a necessary sacrament or at least a very useful one, as if it is doubted whether a man to be baptized or absolved or anointed is still living, whether the matter is valid, etc.

b. To add a condition which the minister believes to have been fulfilled, for example, to absolve under the condition if you are disposed someone whom he judges to be disposed, does not seem to exceed venial sin: for since the danger of nullity of the sacrament itself is excluded, the mere addition of a superfluous condition does not seem to be a grave irreverence.¹

25. Principles on conditional intention.

4. If a sacrament of doubtful validity must be confected or repeated, it must be confected or repeated under a condition, so that, as far as can be done, provision may be made for the reverence due to the sacraments: for if the condition is verified, the sacrament has been validly conferred; but if the condition is not verified, the sacrament is not really conferred. But that in this case matter and form are applied in vain is without fault, because this can licitly be done from a just cause: for the sacraments are for men.

a. Whether the condition which is to be added must be expressed by words. Where the rubric prescribes this, as in baptism² and extreme unction,³ the condition must be added orally; but if positive law does not prescribe this, it suffices that it be conceived in the mind: for the condition affects the intention; but this intention does not have to be expressed orally for the validity of the sacrament; therefore neither does the condition. Indeed, there are those who think (Gobat n. 272) that it is enough if the condition is had implicitly and virtually in the mind, as he has it who wishes to administer the sacrament according to the institution of Christ or the intention of the Church.

b. If someone has elicited two contrary intentions, the predominant intention is valid. But that intention is judged predominant which would be chosen if the incompatibility of the intentions were known. Hence it can happen that a habitual intention prevails over an actual one which is had at the same time.

alpha. Thus if a priest had resolved on a determinate day to apply a Mass owed from a stipend for the happy outcome of a business to be transacted on that very day, but afterward, forgetful of the obligation contracted, on that day celebrated for himself, the former intention, although habitual, would prevail over the second, actual intention.

beta. If a confessor had resolved to defer absolution for Mark, habituated in sins though disposed, in order to strengthen his will, and nevertheless absolved him because he did not recognize him as he approached among several others, the absolution would be valid, because if he had foreseen the future error, he would have wished the absolution to be valid.⁴

¹ St. Alphonsus, n. 28.

² Rituale Romanum, tit. 2, c. 1, n. 9.

³ Ibid., tit. 5, c. 1, n. 12.

⁴ Cf. Lugo, disp. 8, sect. 8; Gury, Casus, II, n. 162.