Section — Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)
§ II. On the Intention of the Minister
- DEFINITION. Intention is an act of the will tending toward some end, or an act of the will by which someone intends to do or omit something.
DIVISION. It is manifold, namely: 1º actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative; 2º internal or true, or external, which regards only the external act; 3º determinate, or indeterminate or in the confused; 4º absolute, or conditioned. Recall the definitions given throughout, for example in the Treatise on Human Acts, where voluntary action is treated, tom. 1, n. 5.
II. Nevertheless an actual intention is not required, but a virtual one suffices. The reason is that actual intention, although best and to be desired, is sometimes morally impossible; but virtual intention sufficiently flows into the action of the Minister, so that this action can be called truly human and deliberate. - Thus all.
III. A habitual intention does not suffice, nor an interpretative one. The reason is that for a human act some will is required, by force of which the act is placed. But neither habitual nor interpretative intention is of this kind: not the first, because it is neither actually elicited by the will, nor, although it was once elicited, does it endure in some effect or in a series of actions; not the second, because it is neither actually elicited, nor was it ever actually elicited, but would only be elicited if the mind were thinking about the thing to be done. - St. Ligorius, n. 16.
- Questions. - QUESTION 1º. Is internal intention required?
Resp. Affirmatively, because if the Minister intended only the external act, he would not have a true intention of doing what the Church does 1. For the Church intends to place a sacramental rite: but he who proposes only to do the external rite does not intend this 2. - St. Ligorius, n. 20.
1 ** Someone perhaps could deny this in truth; since even the Church does nothing else except that it places the external rite, as Christ the Lord commanded to be employed.
2 ** Nor nevertheless is it required that the minister explicitly intend to do a sacramental rite; otherwise, if someone either is ignorant or does not believe that by that action a sacramental rite is perfected, as for example Protestants do not believe that a sacrament is effected by matrimonial consent, he would not confer the sacrament validly; which is false. Therefore it ought to be enough that the minister wishes confusedly to do what Christians do.
But the condemned proposition which is subjoined perhaps does not fit the matter. For in this proposition there is question not of a mere defect of the required intention, but of a contrary intention.
This is also clear from the 28th proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, which sounds thus: Baptism conferred by a Minister is valid who observes the whole external rite and form of baptizing, but inwardly in his heart resolves within himself: I do not intend to do what the Church does.
QUESTION 2º. Is there required in the Minister an intention of doing what the Roman Church does?
Resp. Negatively, provided that he has the intention, at least implicit, of doing that which the true Church does, even if from error he should think his own heterodox church to be the true Church. - St. Ligorius, n. 21.
QUESTION 3º. Is there required in the Minister an intention of confecting a Sacrament?
Resp. Negatively, at least explicitly, provided this intention is not excluded. For it suffices that he intends in general and implicitly to do what the Church does. - St. Ligorius, n. 21, and others commonly.
- QUESTION 4º. Must the intention of the Minister be determined to certain matter and person?
Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is 1º as to the matter, because otherwise it would remain in a state of indifference: for it cannot be drawn out from that state and be determined to a Sacrament except through the minister's intention; 2º as to the person, because the effect of the Sacrament cannot be applied in general, but to some subject; otherwise no application would be made 3.
3 ** Namely the object or term of the action must be determined according to the nature of the thing of which there is question: for if, for example, you were to say, I give, but did not determine what, or to whom, you have an act void of all force.
QUESTION 5º. Is a Sacrament conferred with a conditioned intention valid?
Resp. 1º Negatively, if the condition added is concerning the future; because the condition suspends the intention of the Minister, and therefore prevents the form from being applied here and now to the matter; nor can it be applied afterwards, when the condition has been fulfilled, since the matter and form have already ceased to be present 4.
4 ** Matrimony, however, like all other contracts, can be celebrated under a condition concerning the future; when this has been fulfilled, they are perfected no otherwise than if they had been entered into purely and without condition from the beginning. Nor for that reason is the inconvenience to be feared of which the Author speaks. For since the consent is referred to the event of the condition, then in reality the contract is perfected, and therefore then the sacrament is made.
Resp. 2º Affirmatively, if the condition concerns the past or the present, and this in reality exists; because here and now the conditioned intention passes into an absolute intention: but if the condition is not fulfilled, then there is no intention, as being restricted to a condition not existing. - St. Ligorius, n. 26, and others commonly.
- QUESTION 6º. Is the conferral of Sacraments with a conditioned intention licit, in doubt whether they have been validly conferred?
Resp. 1º As to Sacraments impressing a character, it is certain that it is licit. This is clear from Canon Law, Decretals, c. 2, on Baptism, where this form is indicated in doubt concerning Baptism conferred: If thou art not yet baptized, I baptize thee, etc.
Resp. 2º Also as to the other Sacraments it is licit, if there is present a sufficient cause for placing the condition. The reason is that the Sacraments are for men, and by a conditioned conferral of the Sacrament provision is made, insofar as can be done, both for the good of those who receive the Sacrament, if perhaps they are capable of it, and also for the reverence of the Sacrament. - Thus commonly with St. Ligorius, nn. 27, 28, against some. But it is certain that in extreme necessity, where there is no matter present except doubtful matter, the Minister not only can, but also is held under grave obligation to minister the Sacrament under condition. - St. Ligorius, n. 29.
QUESTION 7º. Must the condition be expressed in words?
Resp. Negatively. The reason is that it suffices for reverence of the Sacrament if it is conceived in the mind. - Thus St. Ligorius, Homo apostolicus, tr. 14, n. 3. - Lacroix, n. 85, etc. Indeed according to Gobat, n. 272, there is not even need to have the condition explicitly and formally in the mind; but it is enough if it is had implicitly and virtually, as he has it who wishes to hear confessions according to the institution of Christ or the intention of the Church; because thus also the reverence due to the Sacrament is sufficiently preserved. Nevertheless it must be added orally where the Rubric prescribes this, as in conditional Baptism, especially if it is conferred publicly, lest, namely, the bystanders believe that Baptism is repeated absolutely. - St. Ligorius, Homo apostolicus, tr. 14, n. 3, etc. 5.
5 ** To this response, which otherwise is of St. Doctor Alphonsus, VV. (p. 928, n. 82) append, as a gloss, that which St. Alphonsus has thus in the seventeenth of the more recent Retractions: Whether it is licit to confer a sacrament under condition, without the condition being expressed orally, in Lib. 6, n. 29, was affirmed with Tournely, Roncaglia, Castro-Palao, and others most commonly. But because there are not lacking some authors, such as Gonet, Juenin, Contenson, Serry, etc., who hold (although little probably) that the validity of the Sacrament does not depend on the intention of the minister, but only on the conferral itself of the Sacrament seriously performed, it is safer to express the condition also in words.
Resp. 1º The most learned Father Haringer (in note to Lib. 6, n. 29) explains the words of the holy Doctor thus: The word safer placed here seems to signify nothing else than more advisable. Therefore the holy Doctor merely gives counsel; and to this counsel the words of Gury, who raises the question only about the necessity of expressing the condition, do not stand opposed. 2º The holy Doctor in the words described above seems to hint, although obscurely, at the doctrine of those who went into the celebrated opinion of Catharinus concerning the nature of the intention necessary for conferring the sacraments. I said, obscurely; because these Authors did not deny, indeed they expressly asserted for the validity of the sacraments, the necessity of some intention in the minister, as may be seen in Juenin (De Sacram., Dissert. 1, Q. 1, Cap. 2, art. 1). But if the matter thus stands, then that also remains sufficiently obscure: why, on account of that singular opinion of theirs, it should generally be expedient also to have expressed the condition orally.