Article IV. On The Intention Of The Minister

62. Notion. "Intention is the same as reasoned will insofar as it is directed toward an end." Thus St. Bonaventure²⁴⁷ says very well: "For to intend is an act of the will in relation to reason," as St. Thomas²⁴⁸ teaches. There is therefore a difference between willing and intending: "to will tends toward the end absolutely";²⁴⁹ but intention seeks the end through means suitably ordained. In the sacraments the minister must, by means of a sensible sign, intend at least that which the Church does, as will be said below, n. 65.

Divisions. Intention is customarily distinguished in many ways, both by reason of the subject and by reason of the object.

²⁴⁷ IV Sent., dist. 6, P. 2, a. 2, q. 2.

²⁴⁸ De verit., q. 22, a. 13.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

63. By reason of the subject, intention is distinguished as actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative.

1. Actual is said of that intention which is elicited here and now. It can be subdivided into reflex and simply direct. A reflex actual intention is present when a man not only actually wills something, but also knows that he here and now wills it. But if this reflex knowledge is lacking, there is a simply direct actual intention. For example, he who baptizes and attends to the baptism has a simply direct actual intention; but he who in addition reflects that he now wills to baptize has a reflex actual intention.

2. Virtual is said of that intention which was formerly possessed as actual, then was never retracted, and now, although not elicited anew and indeed not even perceived, nevertheless still influences the work to be performed. For example, a priest who goes to hear confessions with the intention of absolving all penitents rightly disposed has a virtual intention of absolving if afterward he no longer attends to that intention and pronounces the words of absolution amid distractions. To avoid ambiguities, it can never be kept too firmly before one's eyes that the older authors not infrequently take habitual and virtual intention interchangeably. Thus, for example, St. Thomas²⁵⁰ says: "Although he who thinks of something else does not have an actual intention, nevertheless he has a habitual intention, which suffices for the perfection of the sacrament; for example, when a priest approaching to baptize intends to do concerning the one to be baptized what the Church does; whence, if afterward in the very exercise of the act his thought is carried away to other things, the sacrament is perfected by virtue of the first intention." In the example adduced by the Angelic Doctor there is manifestly a virtual and not a habitual intention²⁵¹ in the sense of modern authors.

3. Habitual, properly speaking, is that intention which indeed was once possessed and was never retracted, but now in no way positively influences the work. For example, a just person possessing the habit of praying prays in sleep from a habitual intention; or a just person sinning venially habitually orders this act to God, because the habit of charity existing in the just person refers all things to God. Nevertheless, it is absurd to say that the habit of charity actually or virtually influences the venial sin and thus refers it to God.

4. Interpretative is the name given to that intention which neither now exists nor formerly existed, but which, as is presumed from clear indications, would be present if the man here and now attended or were able to attend.²⁵² For example, a dying Protestant deprived of his senses, who lived uprightly and was in good faith, is judged to have the interpretative intention of receiving sacramental absolution, and therefore with a safe conscience a confessor can absolve him, at least conditionally. As will be explained more broadly afterward: for receiving sacraments, at least in a case of necessity, any of these four intentions suffices; but for administering sacraments neither an interpretative nor a habitual intention suffices, but an actual or at least virtual intention is required. The reason is that for receiving or undergoing something, so great an act of the will is not customarily required as for doing and positively producing something. But in the reception of the sacraments man is rather one who receives and undergoes; in their administration, however, he is rather one who causes and instrumentally produces grace.

The difference among the four enumerated intentions can be stated briefly in this manner:

Actual intention is present and influences the work with advertence on the part of the agent.

Virtual intention is present and influences the work without advertence on the part of the agent.

Habitual intention was present, but now exercises no influence upon the work insofar as it is a human act.

Interpretative intention neither was present, nor is present, nor influences the work.

²⁵⁰ S. theol. 3, q. 64, a. 8 ad 3.

²⁵¹ Cf. Billuart, De sacr. in gen., diss. 5, a. 7, § 3, and Cajetan, Comm. in h.l.

²⁵² Certain theologians, such as Suarez (In III, disp. 13, s. 3, n. 2), Sylvius (In III, q. 64, a. 8, concl. 5), and Lugo (De sacr. in genere, disp. 8, n. 73), equate interpretative intention with the indirect voluntary.

64. By reason of the object willed, intention can be divided:

a) into clear and confused, according as the intended object is presented to the mind clearly or confusedly.

For example, he who intends to baptize while clearly knowing the essence and effects of baptism has a clear intention; but a Jew who baptizes and intends only to do what the Church does, without precisely knowing the effect of baptism, has a confused intention.

b) into determinate and indeterminate, according as the object is intended as limited in every respect, or the will is borne toward an object designated only in a vague manner.

For example, a priest consecrating a host placed before him on the altar has a determinate intention; but if from a heap of hosts he wills to consecrate only three not specially designated, he has an indeterminate intention, and would consecrate invalidly, as will be proved below.

c) into explicit and implicit, according as a thing clearly known is intended either in itself or in another thing with which it is joined.

Thus, for example, one who freely receives the subdiaconate explicitly intends to receive the order, but implicitly intends to receive celibacy, which is joined with the subdiaconate.

d) into absolute and conditional, according as the object is intended without any added restriction, or only under a certain restriction or condition.

For example, a priest who consecrates a host placed before him on the altar has an absolute intention; but he who absolves a man deprived of his senses under the condition, "if you are alive," has a conditional intention. Above, n. 22, when there was discussion of a conditional form, enough was said concerning the absolute and conditional intention of the minister of the sacraments.

With these things noted beforehand, it must be seen whether intention is required in the administration of the sacraments and what this intention is.

65. Necessity and object of intention. For validly confecting the sacraments, it is required that the minister have at least the intention of doing what the Church does.

What this expression, "the intention of doing what the Church does," means will be explained below. But the doctrine stated in the proposition is of Catholic faith, defined against Luther and Calvin²⁵³ in the Council of Trent:²⁵⁴ "If anyone says that in ministers, while they confect and confer the sacraments, there is not required at least the intention of doing what the Church does, let him be anathema." The Council of Florence had already declared in the Decree of Eugene IV: "All the sacraments are perfected by three things, namely, by things as matter, by words as form, and by the person of the minister conferring the sacrament with the intention of doing what the Church does."²⁵⁵ Since Protestants commonly do not acknowledge the efficacy of the sacraments ex opere operato, and think that the sacraments are efficacious solely because of the faith of the recipient, they logically deduce from this that no intention at all is required on the part of the minister, and consequently that sacraments are valid even if the minister is devoid of reason or acts in mere mimicry and mockery. How absurd this error is plainly evident from the following. For a) baptism would then be valid if some madman from a window poured a bucket of water over a Jewish catechumen passing by and at the same time pronounced the words: "I baptize you, etc."; b) then a priest reading aloud in the refectory the words of consecration in chapter 26 of St. Matthew would consecrate all the loaves placed upon the table and the flasks of wine.

The Catholic doctrine can furthermore be proved directly from theological reasons:

1. Matter and form considered only objectively are still of indeterminate signification, for they can also be employed in a natural or mocking sense. But they are determined to the supernatural signification of the sacrament, which they must have, through the intention of the minister acting. Therefore, this intention is necessary.

2. It was already said above that the minister must act in the person of Christ and in a human manner. Therefore, it does not suffice that he act merely as an inanimate instrument, for example, as a phonograph machine. But a man acts properly in a human manner only when he acts with intention, or for a determinate end.²⁵⁶ As regards the difficulties raised against Catholic doctrine from certain ancient little narratives, see Billuart.²⁵⁷

²⁵³ In a truly shameless style Calvin writes the following in his Antidote to canon 11 of session 7 of the Council of Trent: "They show that they make little of their anathemas, in pouring forth which they are so prodigal. What they prattle about the intention of consecrating was brought forth by the sophists for no probable reason.... For if the intention of the minister is necessary, there is none of us who would dare assure himself with certainty of his own baptism.... What sort of faith will it be which depends upon the secret will of another? And still these swine do not fear to threaten us with their anathemas, that is, their blasts, unless we immediately subscribe to such blasphemies. But I defer so much to the most sacred institution of Christ that, if some Epicurean, inwardly mocking the whole action, were to administer the Supper to me by the command of Christ and according to the rule given by Him and in the legitimate rite, I would not doubt that the bread and chalice offered by his hand are truly for me pledges of the body and blood of Christ. It is irksome to examine those stinking trifles when they say: at least of doing what the Church does."

²⁵⁴ Sess. 7, can. 11 on the sacraments in general (Denz., n. 854).

²⁵⁵ Denz., n. 695.

²⁵⁶ Cf. S. theol. 3, q. 64, a. 8.

²⁵⁷ De sacr. in gen., diss. 5, a. 7, § 1.

66. Quality of the intention required in the minister.

1. An interpretative or habitual intention does not suffice. The reason is that these intentions in no way influence the act of administering and therefore do not render that act human, which is nevertheless required for the validity of the administration.²⁵⁸

2. A virtual intention suffices. An actual intention is indeed best and is to be sought as far as possible; but it is not altogether required, nor is it commanded either by the very nature of the sacrament or by any positive law. Thus teach all Catholic authors.²⁵⁹ The reason is that an actual intention is in truth sometimes morally impossible. How, for example, can a confessor hearing hundreds of confessions renew in each confession the actual intention of administering the sacrament? Moreover, Christ does not command impossibilities in the administration of the sacraments. In addition, for a sacramental action it suffices that it proceed from the deliberate will of the minister. But when a virtual intention exists, the sacramental action is in truth sufficiently deliberate. Therefore, for the administration of the sacraments an actual intention is not required, but a virtual intention suffices.²⁶⁰

3. A determinate intention toward definite matter or a definite person is required. For just as in physical things a thing can never exist except under determinate matter and form, so it is also with the moral reality of a sacrament. But an accidental error which the minister has concerning the quantity or quality of the matter does not annul the sacrament. Thus, for example, if a priest thinks that he is consecrating one host placed before him, but in reality there are two hosts adhering to each other, the consecration is valid; or if a confessor absolves Peter, thinking him to be Paul, he absolves validly, unless, however, he expressly intended to absolve Paul and to leave Peter unabsolved. In practice, to avoid many ambiguities, it is safer that the minister of the sacraments form for himself once and for all determinate and clear intentions; for example, let a priest say to himself: During Mass I will always consecrate all the consecrable matter found upon the altar and placed there for the purpose of being consecrated; likewise, I absolve those penitents who duly make their confession before me, and it matters little what their name, quality, or sex may be, etc.

If anyone in the administration or reception of the sacraments has two incompatible and contrary intentions, then the predominant one prevails, namely, that which would be chosen if the incompatibility were known. For example, if a Protestant were to contract matrimony, altogether intending it to be dissoluble, and with such a mind that if he knew it to be indissoluble he would not contract it, then the matrimony would be null, at least in the internal forum; for in the external forum such an intention would first have to be clearly proved.²⁶¹ But if, even with the indissolubility known, he nevertheless would have contracted, the matrimony is valid.²⁶² If among contrary intentions one succeeds another, the later one customarily prevails, unless, however, the first intention from the beginning annulled every other subsequent intention; for then not the later but the first intention prevails.

A succession of incompatible intentions concerning the same matter of a sacrament does not occur so easily except among scrupulous persons; it can occur much more easily in another matter which is in some way connected with the sacraments, namely, in the application of the Mass. For example, a priest who a week beforehand proposed to say Mass today according to a determinate intention, forgetful of that intention, applies the Mass for another end. To avoid many difficulties in practice, let every priest propose to himself a general rule according to which he intends to order his applications of Masses, for example: I always will to fulfill the prior intention unless it has been expressly revoked (cf. below, n. 245).

4. An internal intention is required, and an external intention does not suffice. Since, according to the definition of the Council of Trent adduced above, the minister of a sacrament is altogether bound to have at least the intention of doing what the Church does, theologians have disputed most sharply for centuries how far this intention extends. For Billuart²⁶³ rightly says that several things can be considered in that which the Church does: a) the external rite itself taken precisely and materially; b) the rite as it is held by the Church as sacred, abstracting from whether the Church errs in such an acceptance or not; c) the rite as it is absolutely sacred in itself and a true sacrament; d) the rite as it produces grace or even a character. Modern theologians commonly admit that an intention of the third and fourth manner is not required for the validity of a sacrament. But there is controversy whether an intention of the first manner alone suffices or not. This first intention is called external by metonymy, not because it would in truth be external - this is altogether impossible, since every intention is an interior act of the will - but because it extends only to the external and physical rite of the sacrament, namely, to the external application of the form to the matter. Certain Catholic theologians taught that this external intention is sufficient, provided that the true form is applied to the true matter seriously and not jokingly or playfully. For thus a man is more certain concerning a sacrament validly administered even by bad ministers.

²⁵⁸ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 16.

²⁵⁹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 18.

²⁶⁰ Cf. St. Thomas, S. theol., l.c., and St. Alphonsus, l.c.

²⁶¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 24.

²⁶² Cf. Code of Canon Law, c. 1084.

²⁶³ De sacr. in gen., diss. 5, a. 7, § 2.

67. Controversy concerning internal or external intention. Ambrose Catharinus (1487-1553) is not rarely called the first author who taught that external intention suffices; but this is altogether false. Roland Bandinelli, later Alexander III in the twelfth century, had already taught this opinion, saying: "It will be true and ratified baptism, whether he who baptizes has an intention or not, provided that it is handed down in the form of the Church."²⁶⁴ Robert Pullen, who died about 1150, taught the same opinion in book V of the Sentences.²⁶⁵ St. Thomas, although he himself requires internal intention, knows the contrary opinion: "Others say that in baptism and in the other sacraments which have an exercised act in their form, a mental intention is not required, but the expression of intention through the words instituted by the Church suffices; and therefore, if the form is observed and nothing external is said which expresses a contrary intention, the person is baptized."²⁶⁶ Innocent IV in the thirteenth century expressed this opinion rather harshly in his Commentaries,²⁶⁷ which he published not as Supreme Pontiff but as a private man, in these words: "It is not necessary that the one baptizing know what the Church is, what it is that baptizes, who the person baptized is, and whence he is; nor that he bear in mind to do what the Church does. Indeed, even if he should bear the contrary in mind, namely, not to do what the Church does, but nevertheless he does it because he preserves the form, the person is nonetheless baptized, provided that he intends to baptize."²⁶⁸ On account of the authority of St. Thomas and other great Scholastics, the opinion concerning external intention was, as it were, buried for several centuries, until at the time of the Council of Trent Ambrose Catharinus, O.P., and Alphonsus Salmeron, S.J., revived it; they were afterward followed by Contenson, Natalis Alexander, Juenin, Serry, Drouven, Milante, Stattler, Dobmayer, Oswald, Glossner, and others.²⁶⁹

Certain authors²⁷⁰ insinuated that this opinion was proscribed both by the Council of Trent and especially by Alexander VIII, who condemned the proposition: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes the whole external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, although inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: 'I do not intend what the Church does.'"²⁷¹ By this condemnation, says Benedict XIV,²⁷² "it cannot be denied that a grave wound was inflicted upon the aforesaid opinion." Nevertheless, the same Benedict XIV rightly says in the same place: "Theologians of better judgment vindicate the opinion of Catharinus from the censure of heresy, and demonstrate that a broad distinction intervenes between it and the doctrine of Luther and Calvin.... It does not belong to a bishop to reject the former opinion, that is, that of Catharinus." So far is the opinion concerning external intention from being condemned that, on the contrary, it acquired no small weight through the Constitution of Leo XIII concerning Anglican ordinations.²⁷³ Behold the words of the Supreme Pontiff: "Concerning the mind or intention, since it is of itself something interior, the Church does not judge; but insofar as it is manifested outwardly, she must judge concerning it. But when anyone has seriously and duly employed the due matter and form for confecting and conferring a sacrament, by that very fact he is judged to have intended to do what the Church does. Upon this principle assuredly rests the doctrine which holds that even that is truly a sacrament which is conferred by the ministry of a heretical or unbaptized man, provided it is conferred according to the Catholic rite." The doctrine concerning external intention does not seem in practice to differ greatly from these words of the Supreme Pontiff.

²⁶⁴ Cf. Gietl, Die Sentenzen Rolands, 206.

²⁶⁵ In Migne, Patr. lat. 186, 841 sq.

²⁶⁶ IV Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2.

²⁶⁷ Super Libr. Decretal. 3, tit. 42, c. 1.

²⁶⁸ Cf. Pourrat, La theol. sacr., 345; Fr. Morgott, Der Spender der heiligen Sakramente, n. 70.

²⁶⁹ Cf. Hurter, Theol. dogm. III, n. 294; Fr. Morgott, l.c., n. 98 sqq.

²⁷⁰ Thus, for example, Chr. Pesch (Prael. dogm. VI, n. 280) incorrectly says: "Historically it is established that the condemned proposition was indeed not that of Catharinus but of Farvacques, who was a defender of the opinion of Catharinus."

²⁷¹ Denz., n. 1318.

²⁷² De syn. dioec., l. 7, c. 4, n. 8.

²⁷³ September 13, 1896 (Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 1954, p. 345).

68. Nevertheless, besides the external rite and the internal intention of seriously performing this rite, there is further required the intention of performing this rite insofar as it is held sacred by the true Church. For:

1. From the time of William of Auxerre, who seems to have been the first to employ the formula "the intention of doing what the Church does," all the better theologians, the Supreme Pontiffs, and the ecumenical councils alike require for the validity of a sacrament that, besides matter and form, there be present the intention of the minister to do what the Church does. Therefore, a purely external intention, which is nothing other than the voluntary application of the form to the matter, does not suffice, but an internal intention is further required.

2. The minister of the sacraments must act in a human manner and as a mandatory of Christ. Therefore, it is required that he deliberately will to act in the person of Christ, or that he will to apply the form to the matter by perfecting a rite which the Church holds as sacred. Therefore, external intention alone does not suffice.

Let these things suffice concerning this controversy over external or internal intention. Let him who desires more consult Billuart,²⁷⁴ who treats this question clearly, copiously, and profoundly.²⁷⁵ For the rest, in practice there does not seem to us to be so great a difference between the two opinions when rightly explained. The disputes seem rather to have arisen from the point of the question having been explained somewhat obscurely.

²⁷⁴ De sacr. in gen., diss. 5, a. 5.

²⁷⁵ Cf. also Schanz, Die Lehre v. d. Sakr. I, § 11, where this controversy is clearly explained, or Fr. Morgott, Der Spender d. hl. Sakramente, 105 sqq.

69. Note for practice:

a) The intention of doing what the Church does is one thing, and of doing what the Church intends is another. For the Church does the external sacred rite instituted by Christ; but she intends that grace be conferred through this rite. For the validity of a sacrament it is by no means required that the minister intend the conferral of grace. Thus all teach.

b) Seriously to will to perform a rite which the Christian Church holds as sacred is one thing, and for the minister to believe that the rite is truly sacred is another. Thus, for example, a Jew baptizing can have the intention of doing what the Christian Church does, even if inwardly he thinks that this Church errs and that the rite performed is altogether inefficacious. Nevertheless, this baptism is valid, provided that the due matter and form are employed. This is established from the practice of the Church, which has never repeated baptism for the sole reason that it was conferred by heretics or unbelievers.²⁷⁶ Hence St. Thomas says: "Although he who does not believe baptism to be a sacrament or to have any spiritual power does not intend, while he baptizes, to confer a sacrament, nevertheless he sometimes intends to do what the Church does, even if he judges it to be nothing; and because the Church does something, therefore consequently and implicitly he intends to do something, although not explicitly."²⁷⁷

c) Likewise, it is not necessary that the minister have the intention of doing that which the Catholic Church does, provided that he intends to do what is done by the Church which he thinks to be Christian. Thus baptisms conferred by Protestant ministers who think the Catholic Church to be false are not by that very fact invalid on account of this error. But if these ministers, or even any others, are altogether unbelieving, denying the divinity of Christ and even the existence of a personal God, then baptism conferred by them is very doubtfully valid. For how can such ministers baptize seriously and with the true intention of doing what the Church does, since they deny the divinity of Christ and even the Church instituted by Him? Therefore, it is to be feared that on this account innumerable baptisms are invalid, at least if the opinion concerning the sufficiency of external intention is not true. For if external intention suffices, then all those baptisms are valid, because the due form and matter are employed. In practice, all those thus baptized who return to the bosom of the Church are to be rebaptized under condition.

²⁷⁶ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 22.

²⁷⁷ IV Sent., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 ad 1; cf. S. theol. 3, q. 64, a. 9 ad 1.