What theft is and its gravity

413. Declarations. 1. Another's thing can be taken away in a twofold way, either secretly and without force brought upon the owner, or openly and by force brought upon the owner. If the first, theft is committed; if the second, robbery.

Therefore two things are required for robbery: a. that the thing be taken away with the owner present; b. that it be taken away with violence brought upon him, which is judged to be employed also by any fear unjustly instilled, as when someone threatens another with death or a grave evil and thus compels him to hand over the thing. Hence a thief who breaks open doors but takes away the thing while the owner does not notice does not commit robbery; nor he who takes away the thing while the owner is indeed present, but without force brought upon him.

2. Theft and robbery are sins specifically distinct: theft is against commutative justice through real injury concerning goods of fortune; robbery is against commutative justice through injury concerning goods of fortune and through personal injury against the owner.

414. Notion and malice. 1. Theft is defined as the hidden taking away of another's thing, while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

a. Taking away is understood as done with the mind of retaining the thing for oneself and receiving profit. Therefore he who takes another's thing to destroy it is not called a thief. Hidden, so that theft may be distinguished from robbery.

b. Unwilling: for committing theft it is required that the owner be unwilling, and indeed as to the substance or as to the taking itself, not only as to the mode of taking away, namely that the thing be taken away secretly while the owner is ignorant. He who takes something away while the owner is unwilling only as to the mode sins venially, because in the mode of taking he acted against the will of the owner, but he does not commit theft.

c. Reasonably unwilling: he is reasonably unwilling about the taking away of a thing who is not bound to leave his own thing; but he who is bound to yield his thing is unreasonably unwilling about its taking away. But he is unreasonably unwilling only if he is bound to give or leave it from justice or from piety, not however if he is bound from mere charity. Hence he who takes away a thing in extreme necessity or to compensate himself does not commit theft; nor a son who secretly takes from the goods of the parents what is necessary to himself for honest sustenance. But a poor man who takes away the goods of a rich man in grave necessity commits theft.¹ - Likewise he who abuses his own thing (for example, a wicked book) for sinning is reasonably unwilling if the book is taken away from him lest he commit sin, because he is not bound to deprive himself of the book either from justice or from piety.

2. Theft is a sin grave from its genus: a. For by theft commutative justice is injured, which of itself obliges under grave obligation. b. By the Apostle theft is reckoned among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God: "Neither thieves ... nor robbers shall possess the kingdom of God."² That theft can become a light sin from smallness of matter will be conceded the more easily because here the matter is divisible, which can be diminished so much that it is no longer capable of grave fault.

¹ Cf. Vermeersch, n. 150 ss.; Ballerini-Palmieri, III, n. 274 ss.

² 1 Cor. 6:10.

THEFT, as we have seen, is the secret taking away of what belongs to another against his reasonable wish.

Not only the taking away, but also the keeping of what belongs to another against his reasonable wish is theft, as when a borrower fails to return what has been lent him on the day appointed, to the disappointment of the lender. Moreover, the use of, or any unlawful dealing with, the property of another against his wish is theft, as when a tramp makes himself at home for the night on another’s premises, or when a passenger travels on the railway or tram without paying his fare.

In order that a sin of theft may be committed, the owner of the property must be unwilling that it should be thus dealt with by the thief; there is no theft committed by using another’s property if the user knows that the owner would not object. Moreover, he must be reasonably unwilling, and so a man who is in danger of dying from starvation, or who is in extreme necessity of any other kind, may take or use what is necessary to save life, even if the owner be unwilling that he should do so. The reason of this is that, by the primary intention of our Creator and Lord, material things were created for the preservation of human life, and no rights of ownership can prevail against the higher claim of one who is in extreme necessity.

The sin of theft is of itself grievous, as is clear from the fact that it is against justice and charity; and St Paul classes it among the sins which shut the kingdom of heaven to the sinner. However, like other sins of injustice, it is sometimes venial on account of light matter, and a practical question here arises as to when theft is a mortal sin, and when it is only venial. The same question is put in other words when we ask, What amount must be taken to constitute a mortal sin of theft? .

I. Notion. Theft, taken in the broader sense, is taken for every unjust injury in goods of fortune. Taken in the stricter sense it is defined: the occupation of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling. It is said:

1. Occupation, that is, taking away with the intention of making the thing one's own, or at least of treating it as one's own. Hence he is not guilty of theft who takes wine away from someone so that he may not become drunk, or a sword so that he may not kill someone.

2. While the owner is unwilling, namely with respect to the occupation. Therefore I note that, morally speaking, he is now not unwilling if, being asked, he would consent, provided he would not do this on account of the petition alone, but on account of, or also on account of, a good affection toward the person taking it away. If, however, the owner is unwilling with respect to the mode, that is, with respect to occupation without express permission, you are not excused from venial sin (St. Alphonsus, III, 700, question 1).

3. While reasonably unwilling, again with respect to the occupation. Moreover, in general the owner is irrationally unwilling if he refuses to yield a thing which is owed either from justice or from piety (n. 779); otherwise, if it is owed from charity alone. Hence a poor man is guilty of theft who, placed in necessity that is simply grave, occupies the owner's thing; but not a wife who, placed in a similar necessity, against her husband's will takes goods necessary for herself (St. Alphonsus, III, 519).

II. Division. Theft is distinguished into simple theft and robbery. Simple theft is when a thing is taken away while the owner is ignorant of it, or at least without physical or moral force. Robbery is when theft is committed while the owner is present and positively resisting, with force being employed, whether physical or moral, for example unjust fear. Each is called sacrilegious if a sacred thing is taken away.

III. Morality. 1. Theft is a grave sin from its genus, or grave or light according as it regards grave or light matter. Theft which regards grave matter is a grave sin, as is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from the reason alleged where injustice in general was discussed (n. 978; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 59, a. 4; q. 66, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, III, 518). Nevertheless:

a) "It is not mortal, speaking per se, to steal any sum whatever with the intention of restoring immediately, for example within a quarter of an hour" (St. Alphonsus, III, 531). But

b) "It is grave, although not in the species of theft, if the thief knows that from the loss of a small thing a very great annoyance will follow for the owner; for example, because he was greatly attached to it, and a similar thing cannot be recovered: unless, however, the thing is of no importance at all" (St. Alphonsus, III, 526).

2. Simple theft and robbery differ in species, since robbery adds to theft the species of personal injury. Sacrilegious theft adds to both the species of sacrilege² (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, III, 518).

3. It remains to determine what matter is grave. Now:

a) Matter both relatively grave and absolutely grave must be established. It is said:

α) Matter relatively grave, that is, matter which is grave considering the condition of him from whom it is taken away. For the gravity of theft also depends on the gravity of the damage which is inflicted on someone. But the gravity of damage is different according as the condition of him on whom it is inflicted is different (St. Alphonsus, III, 527). Here, however, it can be asked whether, in establishing matter relatively grave, account must also be taken of the owner's special and reasonable affection toward some thing which in itself is of lesser value, for example toward a collection of letters from a dear person. Now it seems this must be affirmed, because on account of the special affection the thing is of greater value to the owner, so that for this reason it could be sold for more, and therefore greater damage is inflicted on him.

β) Matter absolutely grave regards the quantity by which the thief is enriched, rather than the damage inflicted on the neighbor. It is called absolutely grave because it is always held as grave, even with respect to the very rich. And it must be admitted, because the act of occupying and having another's thing as such, according to its proper concept, that is, with abstraction made from the damage which is inflicted on the neighbor, involves disorder; in a word: justice forbids inflicting damage on someone and occupying and having another's thing, or, to use the words of St. Alphonsus, "the precept of not stealing obligates not only that grave damage not be inflicted on the neighbor, but also that no one be enriched from another's thing" (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 28). Moreover, if the aforesaid act involves disorder, with abstraction made from the damage inflicted, one must finally arrive at grave matter, even if the individuals from whose goods someone is enriched do not suffer grave damage.³

b) For matter grave, whether relatively or absolutely grave, a greater sum is required the smaller the value of money is; hence for grave sin a greater quantity is required now than formerly, and a greater quantity, for example, in North America than in Europe. Finally a greater quantity is required the less unwilling the owners are judged to be.

c) Considering the things we have just noted, the matter can be more determinately stated for our regions in this way:

α) With respect to a poor person: 1 florin; with respect to workers: 3 florins; with respect to citizens of middle fortune: 5 florins; with respect to the rich: 10 florins. The reason is that the assigned sums, with respect to the assigned persons, are judged to inflict grave harm. With respect to the very rich, absolutely grave matter holds; but the sum of 25 florins can be held as absolutely grave matter.

If there is question of a sacred thing, the gravity of the matter must be judged from the dignity and rarity of the thing. Hence, as regards relics, grave matter is lacking "if someone steals some very small thing, not deforming the relic itself, nor diminishing its esteem: unless it is some notable or rare relic, as for example of the Holy Cross" (St. Alphonsus, III, 532).

β) For spouses and children of the family, a sum twice as great can be established, so that, for example, the child of rich parents would sin gravely if he stole 20 florins from his parents. Indeed, if there is question of spouses, a latitude somewhat greater than for children is admitted. The reason for these things is "that the parent (and spouse) is less unwilling, and the child is something of the father" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 32), and spouses constitute one thing. Moreover, sometimes they are in no way unwilling, or are unwilling only about the mode, so that there can be no question of theft. Finally spouses and parents easily condone thefts committed by the spouse and by children if they have been consumed, so that there is no obligation of restoring (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). If there is an obligation, compare what was said about the mode of restoring in n. 1016.

Note moreover that a wife and children of the family do not steal by taking secretly what is necessary for food and clothing, if the father refuses to grant these things. But as regards those things which are judged to be required by children for recreations fitting to their condition, great prudence is needed if these are denied by the parents. For children are usually more inclined to squander money, whereas parents often have excellent reasons for denying what is desired.

γ) As regards servants, if there is question of money or of a thing carefully guarded, the same quantity as for outsiders suffices. But it is commonly admitted that, by stealing eatables and drinkables, they do not easily arrive at grave sin, provided they themselves consume them, and do not sell them or carry them out of the house, and there is no question of a thing diligently guarded (St. Alphonsus, III, 545; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 34).

δ) As regards religious, in eatables and drinkables what was said about servants holds; in other thefts from the goods of the monastery, a greater quantity is required for grave matter than in thefts by outsiders, but a lesser quantity than in thefts by children (St. Alphonsus, IV, 24).

Here, however, note that the diverse opinions of theologians about the quantity required for grave sin are not to be explained to the people or to penitents.

Corollary I. Considering the notion of theft, sometimes very small things can be secretly taken without sin, for example one apple or another from an orchard by someone passing by, etc.; as regards very small things, owners for the most part are not judged to be unwilling. If, however, the orchard, etc., is fenced in, the owner is reasonably unwilling with respect to entrance into his territory.

Corollary II. He who cuts wood in another's forest or pastures animals in another's pastures:

1. Does not sin if the forests or pastures belong to some commune, and there is question of inhabitants of that commune, unless, as regards forests, great devastation is done. Otherwise the prohibition can be held as merely penal, and even as such it is not judged to extend to dry branches.

2. Sins if the forests or pastures belong to some private person, or at least have been leased by a private person. Nevertheless, commonly owners are judged to grant that dry branches may be collected (St. Alphonsus, III, 529). For the rest, in these matters custom must also be attended to.

Corollary III. He who, from money entrusted to him by a society, steals a sum with the intention of returning it, sins, because the owners, on account of the danger of damage, are reasonably gravely unwilling. But what quantity is required for grave sin depends in great part on the gravity of the danger.

¹ Zech. 5:3; Hab. 2:16; Exod. 20:15; 1 Cor. 6:10.

² According to others, both robbery and sacrilege constitute one species of sin, as if coalescing from two, yet distinct from simple theft.

³ Others argue from the grave damage which, according to the contrary opinion, would threaten society or even individual persons; but an intrinsic reason of strict injustice is lacking. Others judge that in the case posited the right of the republic is gravely injured. But the private owner alone, and not the republic as such, enjoys a strict right in the goods of others.

Theft.—Theft is the secret taking of what belongs to another, with the intention of appropriating it to oneself, against the reasonable wishes of the owner.

(a) It is a taking, that is, a carrying away of goods. But theft also includes the receiving or keeping of property, since the harm done is the same as when the goods are carried away. Hence, he who does not restore borrowed or deposited or found objects, or who does not pay back a loan, when he could and should, is a thief.

(b) It is a secret taking, that is, the property is taken away without the knowledge of the owner or lawful possessor, even though he be present. In this respect theft differs from robbery.

(c) It is the taking of property. This includes not only corporeal things (e.g., books, money, jewelry, clothing), but also incorporeal things (e.g., patents, trademarks, copyrights), and even persons if they are looked on as possessions. Hence, plagiarism or infringement of copyright or man-stealing or kidnapping (i.e., the carrying off of another’s slave or child) are forms of theft.

(d) It is the taking of property that belongs to another, that is, of goods of which another person is the owner, or lawful possessor as usufructuary, guardian, depositary, etc. Hence, one can steal from oneself by taking one’s goods by stealth from the bailee with the design of charging him for their value or of depriving him of their use to which he has a right.

(e) It is the taking away of goods with the intention of appropriating them to one’s own possession, use or enjoyment to the exclusion of the rightful owner. Hence, strictly speaking, it is not theft to carry away property with the intention of borrowing it for a time or of destroying it; but these are acts of unlawful possession or of unlawful damage. It is obligatory to take an object from another, if this is necessary to prevent the commission of a crime (e.g., to take away and hide the gun with which another intends to kill).

(f) It is against the wishes of the owner. This refers to the substance (that is, the conversion of the property to one’s use), not to the mode (that is, secrecy with which it is done). Hence, if the owner is unwilling that the property be taken, he who takes it is guilty of theft; if the owner is not unwilling that it be taken, but is unwilling that it be taken without his knowledge, he who takes it in this way sins at least venially, but is not guilty of theft in the strict sense.

(g) It is against the reasonable wishes of the owner or possessor; for no injury is done if he does or should consent to the loss. The owner does consent if the person who takes the goods is acting according to a general and recognized custom (e.g., when a servant takes things left over from her employer’s table, which it is certain the latter does not wish to keep); the owner should consent, if justice forbids that he prevent the taking (e.g., when a starving man is taking food from one who has plenty), or if domestic duty commands that he should give the thing taken (e.g., when a wife takes from her husband’s pockets the needed money he denies his family, for a wife and family have the right to receive from the head of the house support according to their station and means). But the owner is not bound to consent to the loss of his goods from the mere fact that he misuses them to his own spiritual disadvantage, or owes them in charity to the taker. Hence, it is theft to take a flask from the pocket of one who drinks too much, or to steal a book from one who is harmed by reading it, or to filch money from a rich man because one is poor and he will not give an alms.

Comparison of Theft and Robbery.—(a) They differ in species, for theft contains injustice to an owner in his property, but robbery, which is an unjust and violent taking of what belongs to another, contains injustice both to property and to person. The unwillingness of the owner in the case of theft is due to his ignorance of his loss; in the case of robbery it is due to intimidation or force. (b) They differ in gravity, robbery being according to its nature the more serious kind of stealing; for the robber does a twofold injury, and the owner’s unwillingness to be robbed is greater.

Kinds of Theft and Robbery.—(a) There are many varieties of theft, the differences arising from the circumstances in which the stealing is done. Thus, he who steals from the Church is guilty of sacrilegious theft; he who uses the public goods for his private ends commits peculation; he who takes from his parents practises domestic thievery.

(b) There are also many ways in which robbery or rapine is committed. The following persons are guilty of robbery: pirates, bandits, highwaymen, burglars, usurers, profiteers, venal judges, unmerciful creditors who deprive debtors of necessaries, debtors who escape payment by fraudulent bankruptcy, profiteers, laborers who extort unjust wages, those who force subordinates to contribute graft, and blackmailers. Two forms of robbery are described in Scripture as sins that cry to heaven for justice, namely, defrauding laborers of their wages (James, v. 4) and oppression of the poor, which happens especially when one denies their rights to those who are unable to defend them. The following persons are also classed as thieves: pickpockets, spongers, smugglers, forgers, counterfeiters, embezzlers, and those who misappropriate funds entrusted to them.

In the civil law theft is also known as larceny, and is defined as the unlawful severance of personal property from the possession of its owner. The following kinds of larceny are distinguished:

(a) in respect to the manner of perpetration, a theft is larceny when the property is taken from the possession of the owner by one who had no possession, whether the latter be a stranger or a custodian; it is embezzlement when committed by one upon whom the owner had conferred temporary possession on account of a fiduciary relationship between them; it is false pretence when committed by one who procures permanent possession or ownership through fraudulent representations;

(b) In respect to the matter or quantity stolen, theft is called petit larceny when it falls below a certain sum fixed by the law, grand larceny when it exceeds that sum.

The Sinfulness of Theft.—(a) From its nature theft—and, much more, robbery—is a grave sin; for it is opposed to the virtues of charity and justice, it is expressly forbidden in the Seventh Commandment (“Thou shalt not steal,” Exod., xx. 15), and it excludes from eternal life (“Neither thieves nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10). The thief attacks the sacred right of the individual to his property, and imperils the peace and stability of society itself. Theft is a grave sin, even when it is committed by little and little, as happens when a merchant gives underweight habitually: “A deceitful balance is an abomination to the Lord” (Prov., xi. 1). The proposition that restitution for a large sum taken in parts at different times is not a grave duty was condemned by Innocent XI (Denzinger, 1188). Canonical penalties for theft include exclusion from acts and offices, censures, and deposition (Canon 2354).

(b) From the imperfection of the act theft may be only a venial sin, for example, when the thief is a kleptomaniac and steals without advertence, or when he is invincibly ignorant that the thing taken is not his own or is of great value, or from the smallness of the matter involved (e.g., when the thing taken has little value, or the owner is opposed rather to the stealthy manner of taking than to the taking, or is only slightly unwilling to lose the goods).

605. • Definition. Theft is the hidden taking away ¹ of another's thing, when the owner is reasonably unwilling.

¹ When it is said taking away, theft is distinguished from mere damaging. Wrongly, therefore, do some find an example of grave theft if someone steals from a tailor a needle without which he cannot work. For it will be grave damaging, but not grave theft.

Division. Theft is thus distinguished:

1. Theft simply, if it is done secretly. - 2. Robbery, if it is done openly with violence inflicted on the owner ². - 3. Sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

² If theft is a hidden taking away, but robbery an open taking away with violence, then robbery ought not to be called a species of theft, but of unjust taking away.

Principles. I. Theft, by whatever name it is called, is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it is gravely opposed to the natural law, as is plain both from reason and from Sacred Scripture, in which it is numbered among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven. For thus says the Apostle, 1 Cor. 6:10: Neither thieves..., nor robbers shall possess the kingdom of God.

II. Sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a species of diverse malice: the former because besides justice it violates religion; the latter because to the unjust taking away of another's thing it adds injury inflicted on the person. But other modes, or other objects of theft, do not change the species, because by these the nature of damage is not changed.

606. • Questions. Q. 1. What matter is judged grave in theft?

Resp. 1. It cannot be rigorously determined ³. According to the common sentence, which seems altogether to be held, this matter is not to be considered absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that graver matter is to be required for grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man ⁴. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, especially depends on the greater or lesser deprivation, sorrow, and reluctance of will which he from whom it is stolen suffers; but now no one does not see that the same matter causes sorrow now light, now grave, according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. Nevertheless one must attend to the reluctance of the will as it is commonly and reasonably had among men, not with respect to men drawn by a greater or lesser love of money. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., n. 526, against Billuart and some others, who contend that matter, whether grave or light, must be considered absolutely in itself, and that it consists in that which is required for the daily sustenance of an honest or moderately rich man.

³ Nearly all the Doctors (says Lugo, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 21), after a long inquiry and great study in order to determine some matter of grave theft, ingenuously confess that no fixed rule can be established, but that this whole thing depends on a moral judgment, so that God knows when here and now the matter is grave; but we in doubt ought to abstain. For although we can determine with certainty some matter which is light, for example one obol or one as; and another which is certainly grave, for example one hundred gold coins; nevertheless between those two extremes we cannot define what the boundaries of each matter are, so that short of such a sum it is light, and beyond it it is grave. But they try to assign some moral rules for discerning at least confusedly each matter, some of which according to the genius and character of each one are too strict, others too lax.

Nevertheless, as Lugo himself adds (ibid., n. 35), the law of nature itself demands that some certain quantity of grave theft be determined, short of which a quantity a little smaller, for example by one or two obols, can be taken without grave sin. For otherwise we shall fall into that very great inconvenience, that either all thefts, even the most minute, have grave guilt, or no theft, even the gravest, can be called gravely prohibited. For unless sometimes the transition is made from light to grave matter by the slightest distance, and conversely, from certainly light matter by the smallest increments we shall never arrive at grave matter, and on the contrary from certainly grave matter by slight decrements we shall never come down to light.

These two things certainly, namely both the plainly uncertain boundaries between grave and light matter, and the necessity of some certain term between grave and light matter, make the condition of this treatment, as is plain, exceedingly rough.

⁴ The common distinction is that the matter of theft is called grave, one kind absolutely, another relatively. The former is judged grave with respect to all and always; but the latter is grave with respect to certain persons, although with respect to others it can be held light, since it (as Lugo says, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 27) is taken from the quantity of the thing taken away with proportion to the goods of the one suffering the injury. Nor indeed does the Author reject this distinction in this place; but he seems to have attacked certain persons who perhaps admitted only the absolute gravity of matter, but not the relative.

Nevertheless, some absolute matter must be determined which it would never be lawful to go beyond without grave fault; for otherwise, if an all-mannered proportion had to be observed among all conditions, certainly the greatest quantity would be required for grave matter where someone steals from a very rich prince; but this would surely yield to the damage of society.

607. • Resp. 2. But for grave matter considered relatively (attention being paid to the principal places of Europe and to the circumstances of our times), there seem to be required: 1. approximately the value of one franc, or 20 asses, relatively to the poor, and sometimes less for a greater degree of necessity; 2. approximately two or three francs, or 40 or 60 asses, relatively to workmen who procure food for themselves by long labor; 3. approximately four or five francs relatively to men moderately rich; 4. approximately six or seven francs relatively to ordinary rich men.

But as regards matter absolutely grave, the more common sentence in St. Alphonsus ⁵ is that two or three gold coins are judged grave matter. But a gold coin is equivalent to about five francs. Yet you should wish to call to mind that money at that time, as being more rare, was also more precious ⁶.

⁵ St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 527) enumerates at least 20 authors who, as regards the very rich, require two or even three gold coins for grave matter. Indeed he attributes to very many the sentence that three gold coins are required; and he testifies that this sentence is called common by Laymann. But the common gold coin is equivalent to the Roman scudo. And from this it is plain that in the judgment of these Doctors, absolutely grave matter, namely that which can never be judged light fault, ought to have reached at least the sum of three gold coins.

⁶ The inconstancy of the value of money brings it about that several Doctors thought that the measure of grave matter should by no means be taken from a certain quantity of money. Thus Molina (De Iust., tr. II, disp. 685, n. 2): First of all, I judge that this matter must not be defined by the quantity of money. For as was shown in disp. 406, with money least changed..., its value increases and decreases by its multitude or scarcity... Whence it happens that for defining the sum which is sufficient so that theft is a lethal fault by comparison with all places and times, it is not an apt fixed rule to say that it is a certain quantity of money, such as two, three, or four silver reales. For where they are worth less because of the greatest abundance of money, less wounding and lesser injury is done to the neighbor in theft of the value of the sum of that money than where they are worth more; and where they are worth more because of a great scarcity of money, greater wounding and greater injury is done to the neighbor in theft of that value of the sum of money than where they are worth less. And Cardinal De Lugo (De Iust., disp. 16, n. 25): Nor can the value reduced to so much money for grave matter be designated; because the very value of money, or its estimability, is not equal in every place and time. Therefore it pertains to the Confessor to have before his eyes the circumstances of places. For the daily labor of a workman, for example, will bring three francs somewhere, while elsewhere the same labor will scarcely bring one franc.

Nor is a lesser variety in the value of money found according to the variety of times. And indeed this diversity must be considered even more attentively, so that the mind of the Doctors on this matter may be accurately known. For Molina, who died in the year 1600, already in his own age noted this variety that had been introduced thus (De Iust. et Iur., tract. 2, disp. 685, n. 2): Things which eighty years before were bought or hired for one are not bought or hired today for five or even six. But indeed after half a century Cardinal Lugo, who died in the year 1660, thus notes that the value of money had diminished still more (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 16, n. 25): We also know that among ourselves the estimation of money has so decreased..., that those for whom formerly 50 gold coins sufficed for living, today 150 do not suffice. But what has happened to the value of money from that age up to ours, no one is ignorant. For if St. Alphonsus too (lib. 3, n. 383) notes a great difference in this matter between his own age and that of La-Croix (but La-Croix existed a little at the same time as Lugo), it is easily plain what must be thought in our days, when all are astonished and complain that the prices of things have grown immensely in a short interval of time, or, what comes back to the same thing, that the value of money has decreased immensely.

Hence, moreover, it follows of itself that the measure of grave matter in theft (especially if speech is of matter absolutely grave) is not aptly taken from the older writers in such a way that the limits prescribed by them then ought also now to be judged defined from their authority. Thus since you have (in St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 527) Sylvester, Angelus, Soto, Corduba, Arragonius, Rodericus, etc., who are older than Ludovicus Molina; but these require for matter absolutely grave three gold coins, namely at least three scudi, whose sentence otherwise Laymann, contemporary with Molina, calls common (in St. Alphonsus, l.c.); certainly whoever wishes to define the matter by the judgment of those Doctors must be wholly required to have regard for the change which the value of money has undergone from that age up to us.

608. • Q. 2. What matter is required so that thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Resp. 1. It is certain among all that in thefts of a wife and children more is required for constituting grave matter than in thefts of strangers, because the father of a family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as to the mode (that it is taken secretly) than as to the substance. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 32. But they add that more probably there is required for these a sum twice greater than for strangers; but no general rule can be assigned, for the matter will generally have to be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions ⁷.

⁷ As to what the Author reports concerning a double quantity for sinning gravely against the substance, understand it when the father is reasonably unwilling also as to the substance. Moreover, the sentences of the Doctors which St. Alphonsus (Hom. apost., tract. 10, n. 32) reports, on account of the circumstances which the Author also mentions generally, extend that quantity of matter much more broadly.

Resp. 2. For servants it depends also on the greater liberality or tenacity of masters, on the quality or situation of the thing stolen, for example, whether it is edible or not, guarded or open..., etc. According to many, through minute thefts made by servants in foods and eatables which are not customarily carefully kept, generally one does not come to mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house, or are not of extraordinary price. But if servants steal money ⁸ or things carefully guarded, a greater quantity is not required for grave sin, because then masters are not less unwilling toward them than toward others. Indeed thefts of this sort are punished more severely by civil law on account of the defect of fidelity which intervenes in them. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 34.

⁸ This exception nevertheless does not seem to be extended to the very slight subtractions of some obol or half-obol, not infrequent among maidservants or servants, while they are accustomed to buy daily food for their masters.

609. • Q. 3. Whether minute thefts can coalesce for constituting grave matter?

Resp. 1. Altogether affirmatively, if it is a matter of thefts committed against the same person, because united they can easily bring grave damage on the owner. This is evident also from this proposition 38 condemned by Innocent XI: No one is held under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away through small thefts, however great the total sum may be. - Therefore a grave obligation is given of restoring a grave sum taken away through minute thefts, and therefore minute thefts coalesce.

Resp. 2. Affirmatively, with the common sentence, even if it is a matter of minute thefts committed to the damage of diverse persons. The reason is that the precept not to steal obliges not only lest grave damage be brought on the neighbor, but also lest someone grow rich from another's thing ⁹. Indeed such a thief, if not to individuals taken singly, certainly brings grave damage on the community. And indeed, unless thefts of this sort were prohibited under grave obligation, not a few men would easily wish to grow rich from thefts, since they could do this without the loss of eternal salvation; therefore great disorder in society would follow. Therefore these thefts had to be prohibited under grave obligation by natural right. - St. Lig., n. 534. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 37.

⁹ This reason (says Lugo, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 49) does not seem sufficient; because the precept not to steal does not intend to avoid one's own profit, but the damage of the neighbor... If therefore the neighbor is not gravely injured, that action cannot be gravely prohibited. These are Lugo's words, not as though rejecting the common doctrine concerning the gravity of fault in these thefts, for he soon (ibid., n. 50) defends it with solid reasons; but wishing to suggest the less firm strength of that reason. And indeed by right of finding, alluvion, and prescription a man lawfully grows rich from another's thing.

610. • Q. 4. Whether minute thefts still coalesce if a great interval is placed between them?

Resp. Negatively, according to the more common sentence. The reason is that when a great interval is posited, little thefts from the common estimation of men are not judged to be morally united, nor therefore do they constitute one object in the genus of morals. Besides, then grave damage inflicted on the owner does not appear, since he can scarcely perceive it; and therefore he is not judged gravely unwilling. - St. Lig., n. 530. - Vogler, n. 133.

Q. 5. When is an interval judged great?

Resp. More probably it must be held that thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months, even if they would approach matter as it were grave. - St. Lig., ibid.

Yet some require an interval of one year so that little thefts cease to coalesce; but others contend that it suffices if one month intervenes, or even a shorter time if it is a matter of very minute little thefts. But the former seem to decline into rigor, and the latter perhaps into some laxity ¹⁰.

¹⁰ In this matter the disagreement itself of the Doctors shows that some certain norm can scarcely be handed down. It can be added that this judgment should not be taken from the space of time alone interposed between individual thefts, but also from a comparison of the mind of him who steals, and from other circumstances, from the diversity of which the diverse estimation of men concerning this matter for diverse cases must be derived. Thus, for example, those who, through fields, by rather light thefts often steal and devour grapes, figs, beans, apples, etc., are indeed reprehended; but you will scarcely find one who fears the note of laxity if, even after several years of this custom, he does not inject into them a scruple of grave theft on account of coalescing matter.

Moreover, minute thefts, with whatever interval having been posited, coalesce according to the sentence of all whenever they were committed with the intention of arriving at a notable sum; because through this intention they are truly united among themselves. - St. Lig., n. 530. - Billuart, etc.

611. • Q. 6. When does matter become grave in minute thefts?

Resp. 1. If minute thefts are made against the same person on diverse occasions, the matter will be grave when it exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Thus commonly ¹¹.

¹¹ All admit with Cardenas that for grave matter then more is required, for example twice more than would suffice if it were taken away at the same time. Thus La Croix, lib. 3, part 1, n. 1011. But the sentence reported by the Author is the opinion which St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 530) attributes to Benjamin Elbel.

Resp. 2. If minute thefts are made against diverse persons, matter per se will be judged grave when it is twice greater than the sum commonly required for grave theft ¹². - St. Lig., lib. 3, n. 530, and many others.

¹² St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 530) also reports this opinion as if from Elbel. But in reality Elbel (De Restit., conf. 10, n. 290) does not speak of minute thefts which are made to diverse persons at diverse times, but of thefts perpetrated at the same time, which therefore are called minute because the damage brought to each individual is light, for example if you should once steal from a mass common to several.

Moreover, whether you adhere to this opinion, or with others prefer to require something more on account of thefts perpetrated on diverse occasions, it must be noted that the common measure of grave theft cannot here be taken from relative gravity; for the damage is not inflicted on one person, but on several, to none of whom nevertheless we suppose relatively grave damage to have been inflicted. Therefore the common measure of grave theft, which henceforth must be computed at least doubly in the case, ought to be taken not from relative but from absolute gravity, which namely is used when thefts yield to the damage of a community.

Q. 7. Whether retraction of the will impedes subsequent little thefts from being united with preceding ones?

Resp. 1. Affirmatively, if the retraction was efficacious, that is, if the things previously taken away have in fact been restored, because once separated they now here and now no longer exist. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2. Again affirmatively, if the subsequent theft were made from some particular motive; for then it would not seem efficaciously to destroy the preceding will of restoring; or even if the thief expressly and seriously again at the same time proposes to restore the things previously stolen ¹³. Yet this can scarcely be admitted in practice, since he who seriously proposes restitution here and now does not repeat thefts. - Nevertheless it is denied where this will seems in some way to be revoked through a new theft; for in this case nothing prevents a notable sum from being retained, and the thefts from coalescing into one.

¹³ Thus Lugo (De Iust., disp. 16, n. 40) with Molina, Sanchez, Rebello, Granado, Diana, etc. But the reason (says Lugo) is clear; because to steal with the intention of restoring at once or soon does not seem to be a grave sin, speaking of itself, since that brief detention brings little detriment to the owner, unless by accident in some rare case. Therefore, if you intend quickly to restore the former things, so that for a brief time you retain with yourself the debt of a grave sum, there is not whence that theft would receive grave malice. These things indeed seem valid if the thief intends soon to restore not indeed the things previously taken away, but only those which he steals here and now.

612. • Q. 8. Whether he sins gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, still steals some light thing?

Resp. It is disputed. The first opinion, which seems more probable, denies, the intention of arriving at a new grave sum being excluded. The reason is that that little theft does not seem to be referred to the grave sum already completed, but rather to a new one, which the thief then begins and pursues. - Thus St. Lig., n. 538. - Lessius, c. 12, n. 44. - The Salmanticenses, de Restitutione.

The second opinion affirms, because in this new little theft the thief renews the intention of retaining the grave sum already stolen. - Thus Lacroix, n. 1007, and Lugo, d. 16, n. 43, who nevertheless denies that the sin is multiplied, but says that the same sin is terminated also to the later theft together with the preceding sum ¹⁴, etc. According to others, it must be distinguished thus: that man sins gravely if he does not have a true purpose of restoring the grave sum already possessed; but otherwise, if he has such a purpose. - Thus Billuart, diss. 11, art. 4.

¹⁴ Therefore La Croix alleges Lugo for his opinion without reason, since Lugo rather seems to agree with the opinion of Billuart.

613. • Q. 9. Whether he sins gravely who by a light theft completes grave matter begun by others with the same person?

Resp. 1. Negatively, if he did not know that little thefts had been committed by others, because he is not conscious of the grave damage inflicted on the owner. - Thus all.

Resp. 2. Negatively, at least more probably, even if he knew that almost grave damage had been perpetrated by others, yet with the case of conspiracy excluded. The reason is that this man, taking a very small thing, is neither of himself the cause of grave harm, nor is he in the cause that others took other things; therefore by no way ought the grave damage which the owner suffers to be imputed to him. - Nor should you say that such a thief sins as gravely as a murderer bringing death by a light blow to a man already struck by innumerable light wounds by others; for death is owed to this last wound, which otherwise would not have followed. But the matter has itself otherwise in the case of theft; for on account of the last little theft no notable calamity or damage accedes. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 53 and following. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 52, and others commonly, against Bonacina and others.

614. • Q. 10. Whether, if several persons without common counsel but by example commit light thefts, so that the total damage is grave, each sins gravely?

Resp. More probably negatively by reason of justice, although they can sin against charity. The reason is that example is not a positive cause flowing into another's damage ¹⁵. - Thus St. Lig., n. 537. - Lessius, ibid., n. 52, and others more commonly, against some.

¹⁵ If it is a matter of the guilt which someone incurs because by his example he provokes others to evil, in the case not all individuals, but only those who thus moved others to inflict damage, will be held by guilt of this sort.

Q. 11. When on the part of the thief does the taking away of a light thing become a grave sin?

Resp. It happens in a threefold way, namely: 1. through the intention of arriving at grave matter; 2. through multiplication, if minute thefts arrive at a grave sum; 3. through conspiracy, where several conspire among themselves, and the little thefts of the individuals collected constitute grave matter.

615. • Resolutions. 1. If a thief, intending to arrive by little thefts at a grave sum, renews this intention as often as he steals, he sins gravely each time. Yet if from the beginning he intends to steal some determinate sum through minute thefts, for example so that he may not be detected, more probably he admits one sin, because it is one moral act; for all the particular acts tend determinately to effecting one thing ¹⁶. - Recall what was said in the Treatise on Sins, n. 163.

¹⁶ In reality it scarcely appears how this case differs from the preceding one. For in both there is a multiple external act with the purpose of the same wicked end; nor does it change the substance of the matter that in the other the thief gradually steals for this reason, lest he be detected. But perhaps for this reason the resolution of each is diverse: because, since the opinions of the Doctors vary in a question of this sort, one and the same case is resolved now from the opposite opinion of these, now from that of those. See what was said above concerning this question (p. 144, note a).

2. He who takes away from an owner a small thing very dear to him, for example, a rare and singular flower, the first fruits from a tree destined for honoring some distinguished man, and at the same time foresees that the owner will be gravely afflicted from such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage seems about to follow from it.

2. The unjust appropriation of the property of another (acceptio iniusta), in which may be included the retention of ill-gotten goods (retentio iniusta), may take place secretly and furtively (theft), or openly and violently (robbery), or deceitfully (fraud), by charging an excessive rate of interest on loans (usury), by the careless incurring of debts, by fraudulent bankruptcy, and by refusing to pay wages, interest, or rent due to others.

A) Theft is the secret taking away of the property of another against his reasonable will. It may be simple or qualified. Species of qualified theft are sacrilege and the embezzlement of public funds (peculatus).

“Three things,” says St. Thomas, “combine together to constitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is another’s. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another’s, not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carries off his daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in a thing being taken secretly; and in this respect it belongs properly to theft that it consists in taking another’s things secretly.”¹¹

¹¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 3: “Three things combine in the definition of theft. The first belongs to it insofar as it is contrary to justice, which renders to each his own, and from this it belongs to theft that it usurps what belongs to another. The second belongs to the definition of theft insofar as it is distinguished from sins against the person, such as homicide and adultery; and accordingly it belongs to theft that it concerns a possessed thing. For if anyone takes what belongs to another not as a possession, but as a part (as if he amputates a limb) or as a connected person (as if he carries off a daughter or wife), it does not properly have the definition of theft. The third difference is what completes the definition of theft, namely that what belongs to another is usurped secretly, and accordingly the proper definition of theft is that it is the secret taking of another’s property.” Cfr. Gury, I, n. 591.

a) The sins against the seventh commandment are as various as the social connections of men and their economic condition. Unfortunately small thieves are often punished, while big ones not only go scot free, but are honored as leaders of society. Theft is by its very nature and according to the teaching of Sacred Scripture always a sin, for two reasons: “first, because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each one his due . . . ; secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the thief when he lays hands on another’s property secretly and cunningly.”¹²

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 5: “If anyone considers the definition of theft, he will find two reasons for sin in it: first, because of its opposition to justice, which renders to each his own, and thus theft is opposed to justice insofar as theft is the taking of another’s property; secondly, because of the guile or fraud which the thief commits secretly and, as it were, by ambush in usurping another’s property. Hence it is manifest that every theft is a sin.”—Gury, I, n. 592: “Theft, by whatever name it may be called, is of itself gravely opposed to the natural law, as is evident both from reason and from Sacred Scripture, in which it is numbered among the sins that exclude from the kingdom of heaven. Sacrilegious theft and robbery are graver sins than simple theft and constitute a different species of malice: the former because, in addition to justice, it violates religion; the latter because it adds to injustice an injury to the honor owed to one’s neighbor. Other methods or other objects of theft, however, do not change its species, because by them the nature of the damaging is not changed.”

b) The degree of sinfulness which stealing involves is determined, first, by the greater or less value of the property stolen (pretium absolutum, relativum, affectionis),¹³ and, secondly, by the personal relation of the thief to his victim and the gravity of his obligation to avoid this particular sin. Hence, even though the stolen object be of little value, theft is a mortal sin if the thief, either by reason of his office or by contractual stipulation, is under a particular obligation to protect the victim against property damage. On the other hand, an important or valuable object is required to render a theft mortally sinful if the thief is bound to his victim by the ties of consanguinity, friendship, or marriage. Generally speaking, therefore, the so-called domestic thefts (furta domestica), i. e., those committed by married people against each other, or by children against their parents, must be judged leniently, provided the stolen object is of no great value, because the violation of justice involved in such an act may be presumed to be less invito domino than in ordinary cases.

¹³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 5.

Thefts committed by servants against their masters or employers are more serious, because they involve infidelity and a breach of trust. Note, however, that if servants steal foodstuffs which are not usually kept under lock and key, and not extraordinarily rare or costly, the fault may be extenuated, provided, of course, they do not sell them or take large quantities.¹⁴

¹⁴ Prov. XXVIII, 24; Matth. XV, 4–6.—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 526, 539 sqq. (ed. Gaudé, II, 36, 48 sqq.).—Gury, op. cit., I, n. 595: “It is asked what matter is required for thefts by wives, children, and servants to become grave. Answer: 1. It is certain among all that, on the part of wives and children, more is required to constitute grave matter than on the part of strangers, because the head of the household is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling, in the former case than in the latter. They say that more probably a sum twice as great is required for these than for strangers, but no general rule can be assigned; for this generally depends on various circumstances of persons or conditions; 2. For servants it depends also on the greater lib- erality or tenacity of the masters, on the quality or location of the thing stolen, e. g., whether it is edible or not, guarded or open, etc. According to many, petty thefts committed by servants in food and victuals which are not usually carefully guarded do not generally amount to mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house and are not of extraordinary value. But if servants steal money or things diligently guarded, a greater quantity is not required for a grave sin, because masters are no less unwilling, and such thefts are punished more severely by civil law.”—Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 9: “Nor are servants and unfaithful custodians of their masters’ property distinguished from thieves; indeed, they are more detestable than other thieves, who are shut out by keys, because nothing at home can be sealed or locked against a thieving servant.”

78. Definition. Theft is the hidden taking or taking away of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling.⁸

It Is Explained. It is said, first: hidden, because if it were an open taking away, there would be rapine.

It is said, second: taking, which includes unjust detention; for "to detain that which is owed to another has the same ratio of harm as an unjust taking."⁹ Therefore to theft are reduced: not paying debts, stealing something by fraud or deceit, not restoring to the owner a thing found, etc. - The taking away or detention is understood to have been done with the intention of retaining the thing for oneself and of using and enjoying it; for if the taking away was done from another intention, for example of lending the thing, or of soon returning it, or of destroying it, it is not theft strictly so called.

It is said, third: while the owner is reasonably unwilling. Theft strictly so called¹⁰ is not present if the owner either consents to the taking away, or if he is unwilling not so much concerning the taking away itself as concerning the mode of taking away (for example, if a wife secretly takes away certain lesser goods, the husband is not unwilling concerning the very taking away of the thing, since it is of lesser moment, but concerning the mode of taking away, namely concerning the wife's furtive mode of acting), or if he is unreasonably unwilling. But the owner is unreasonably unwilling if from justice or from piety or from another just cause he is bound to permit the taking away of the thing. Hence a wife does not steal if she takes away from her husband money which he would squander in games or drinking; likewise if in necessity she secretly takes from him things necessary for suitable sustenance. Nor can the husband reasonably be unwilling against such a mode of acting by the wife. Similarly a rich man is unreasonably unwilling that a poor man living in extreme necessity should take from the goods of the rich man the things necessary for life, or that a maidservant should give to the poor fragments of foods which otherwise would perish.

⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 3.

⁹ Ib. ad 2.

¹⁰ Sometimes theft is taken in a broader sense, and then it is the deceitful taking away of any thing whatever (even one's own) deposited with another (cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 5 ad 3); or it also includes the unjust damaging of another's thing.

79. Malice Of Theft. Theft from its genus is a mortal sin.

This is clear from the things said above concerning injustice. For theft is injustice, which is a mortal sin from its genus. Besides, thieves are excluded from the kingdom of heaven, as is clear from the text cited above, n. 74. Moreover no one is excluded from the kingdom of heaven except on account of mortal sin. But by Christ the precept of not stealing is reckoned among the commandments which one must observe if he wishes to enter into life.¹¹ - But let no one say that from these texts it follows that theft is not only a mortal sin from its genus, but also from its whole genus, because it always excludes from the kingdom of heaven. For it would hardly be fitting to divine mercy if, for example, a boy stealing an apple were on that account thrust down into hell for all eternity. Therefore the texts of Sacred Scripture must not be understood concerning those very small thefts, which scarcely deserve the name of theft, but concerning greater thefts, which before God and men are acknowledged as shameful.

¹¹ Cf. Matt. 19, 18.

80. Gravity Of Matter In Theft. There are few matters in the whole of Moral Theology in which there exists so great a variety of opinions as in determining the gravity of theft. Nevertheless, it seems that here there is question not so much of the gravity of the sin of theft - which depends much on the lax or scrupulous conscience of the agent - as rather of the grave obligation of restitution arising from the taking away of another's thing. Certainly it is arbitrary enough if some moralist should wish to determine, for example, that he who took away 10 francs goes to hell; he who stole 9 francs goes to purgatory. On the contrary, moral theologians rather reasonably - while the Church is silent, indeed even consenting - try to determine the cases in which after the fact of theft there is a grave obligation of restitution. For restitution repairs the injured social order. As a rule in determining the grave obligation of restitution, above all there must be attended to the damage which has been caused by the unjust taking away. For theft is against the virtue of justice, and in sins committed against justice the gravity must be taken not so much from the affection with which the owner is borne toward the thing taken away, nor from the indignation or sadness with which he is affected from it, as from the damage inflicted. Whence, for example, he who unjustly takes away some little bird much loved perhaps sins gravely against charity, because he has saddened the mistress of the little bird most vehemently, but he does not sin gravely against justice, because he has not inflicted grave material damage. But grave material damage is judged to be present when either the injured person himself or the legitimate guardian of the social order is reasonably and gravely unwilling on account of that damage.

Most commonly modern theologians assign grave matter in theft, one kind absolutely, another relatively.¹²

Absolutely grave matter is taken from the value alone of the thing taken away, without any relation being had to the condition of the person from whom the thing has been taken. And therefore absolutely grave matter always and everywhere constitutes a grave obligation of restitution. But concerning what is absolutely grave matter authors do not agree. Tanquerey¹³ thinks it to be in the regions of Europe 20-30 francs; but in the States of North America 7-8 dollars; Noldin¹⁴ opines it to be 30 marks; Lehmkuhl¹⁵ teaches the same; but Waffelaert¹⁶ says it is about 40 francs. Since today the value of money has been enormously diminished, I think that there is always a grave obligation of restitution if someone altogether unjustly and without any excuse has taken away another's things at a price of about 100 francs (of gold value). The reason is that in our times the common persuasion of the people holds the unjust taking away of 100 francs to be a grave matter and to be punished severely on account of the injured public order. But I say: altogether unjustly and without any excuse; for if the thief has some excuse, or if the owner is not so unwilling, then a greater sum is necessary for inducing a grave obligation of restitution. Whence, for example, I would indeed admonish, but I would not strictly oblige to restitution, a son who took away 150 francs from his very rich father.

Relatively grave matter is that which brings grave harm to the owner, his condition being considered. Some authors assign the quantity by which a head of household needs for his daily sustenance with his family;¹⁷ others better define a certain fixed amount in about this way:

a) with relation to the poor and wretched, about 2 francs;

b) with relation to men of middling fortune, about 10-12 francs;

c) with relation to the rich, about 30-50 francs;

d) with relation to the very rich, about 100 francs, or the same quantity which is judged as absolutely grave.

Note concerning these fixed amounts: 1. They are not wholly certain rules, because no authentic sanction of them is found anywhere. They are nothing other than a reasonable and sufficiently founded opinion. 2. In them there is not attended to damage which perhaps can follow by accident from the theft: for example, if someone takes away from a workman an instrument of the price of 1 franc, ordinarily he does not sin mortally; nevertheless if the workman, because that instrument is lacking, cannot work for a notable time, then the thief foreseeing this omission of labor sins mortally, not indeed on account of the taking away of the instrument, but on account of the unjust damaging caused. 3. When it is unknown upon whom damage has been inflicted, it is permitted to presume that it has been inflicted upon one moderately rich. Wherefore if the value of the thing does not exceed 10 francs, there is not a grave obligation of restitution.

¹² But Billuart teaches that more probably the gravity of matter in theft is not to be estimated relatively, but absolutely (De iure et iust. diss. 11, a. 3).

¹³ Synopsis theol. mor. de virt. iust. n. 436.

¹⁴ De praeceptis n. 416.

¹⁵ Theol. mor. I, n. 1114.

¹⁶ De iust. II, n. 215.

¹⁷ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 527, calls this rule confused and obscure.

81. Scholion. On The Gravity Of Theft To Be Cautiously Weighed. In weighing the quantity absolutely or relatively grave, the circumstances of times and places must be attended to. Whence, for example, the quantity assigned by authors of past centuries is too small in our times, since the value of money is now greatly diminished. Similarly the value of money is much less in great industrial cities than in distant rural regions.¹⁸ But let the confessor always be mindful of what St. Augustine said concerning the distinction between venial and mortal sin: "It is most difficult to discover, most dangerous to define." Whence Billuart wisely warns:¹⁹ "Therefore let directors of souls not presume to resolve individual and singular cases with certainty: this is mortal, this is venial, unless this is openly evident.... And when they are questioned by penitents about that matter, let them prudently decline an absolute response, and let them instill in them horror of all sins, even venial ones."

¹⁸ Cf. Waffelaert, De iust. II, n. 215, where there is a long computation of the difference of value according to diverse times.

¹⁹ De iure et iust. diss. 9, a. 3.

903. Definition. Theft is: the carrying away of another's thing, while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

It is said 1. Carrying away of another's thing, namely with the mind of having it as one's own. Hence he does not commit theft who takes away a thing by jest, or on account of the good or advantage of the owner; for example wine lest he become drunk, a heretical book lest he read it. - 2. Owner, under which name comes he to whom any strict right whatever belongs, for example the right of usufruct, of deposit. - 3. Reasonably unwilling, for if the owner is presumed to consent, or if he cannot, by force of right, dissent (for example when a thing is taken away by title of necessity or compensation), the carrying away of another's thing is not theft.

904. Principles. I. Theft is from its genus a mortal sin. This is certain from 1 Cor., 6, 10: Neither thieves ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God. The reason is that by theft commutative justice is injured, which of itself obliges under grave matter. Add that, if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish, as the Angelic Doctor observes (l.c., a. 6). - Theft nevertheless admits smallness of matter.

905. II. Grave matter of theft must be determined from the gravity of the damage that through it is inflicted upon one's neighbor. Thus commonly, from the Rule of the Angelic Doctor (2. 2, q. 73, a. 3): "Sins that are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed of themselves according to the harms that are inflicted upon one's neighbor; because from this they have the character of fault" (cf. n. 337, II).

Hence: a) The matter must be measured relatively, namely so that attention is given to the various conditions of men, places, and times, and to the varied value of money; for the end of the right of property for a private person (namely that he enjoy life in peace) can be more or less impeded and injured. - b) Some absolutely grave matter must also be determined, that is, matter that never, without grave fault, can be stolen even from the very richest; this is required by the end of the right of property as regards society: otherwise the greed of thieves would grow excessively, and society itself would certainly suffer grave damage. For the crowd scarcely attends to venial sins.

906. On this account the following Rules are established:

Rule 1. Matter is judged relatively grave when it would suffice for the injured person according to his condition for daily sustenance of himself and his family.

Therefore, with consideration given to the present value of money (which is at least twice lower than in the time of St. Alphonsus), and with attention given to the common estimate of more recent theologians (whose opinions here become intrinsically more probable), we judge that the following grades can be established, as a general norm in the principal places of Europe:

a) With respect to beggars, grave matter would be the value of one franc, or 20 asses; and less, if some poor person gains less by his daily begging. - b) With respect to ditch-diggers and similar workers, about 2-5 francs. - c) But with respect to craftsmen and merchants of slender fortune, 4-8 francs. - d) With respect to the moderately rich, or those who live from their own revenues, 8-10 francs. - e) But with respect to the absolutely rich, for example with respect to merchants sufficiently wealthy, 10-20 francs. - f) With respect to magnates, 30 francs and above.

In doubt, for example if you do not know to whom the damage was done, theft of 8-10 francs is reputed grave; because the damage is presumed to have been inflicted on one moderately rich. - Thus today commonly. Cf. Gousset, Theol. mor., I, 980; Crolly, III, n. 272; Konings, n. 695; Aertnys, l. III, n. 285.

Rule 2. Absolutely grave matter is that which, of itself and independently from the damage that the owner suffers, is commonly reputed to have notable utility or value.

Hence St. Alphonsus (III, 528) assigned as grave, with respect to kings, a sum exceeding 2 aurei, or about 10 francs. But today, with circumstances changed, 30-40 francs seem to be assigned, or even more, in places where the value of money is lower. Thus for England 1 1/2-2 golden pounds, in North America 7-10 dollars, can be named absolutely grave matter.

Note. 1. The relatively grave matter indicated above regards of itself theft that is committed by one action against one and the same person. As regards little thefts that inflict damage either upon one person by diverse actions, or upon diverse persons at one time, see n. 908.

2. In sacrilegious theft, if the thing, as regards physical species, is estimable by price, conclude in the same mode as for a profane thing; if otherwise (for example in sacred relics), consider its dignity, rarity, or attend to the special prohibition of the Church (cf. n. 583, 1342).

3. Theft with respect to a community (for example a commercial society), that it may be grave, ordinarily must reach the matter indicated for the absolutely rich. Others require absolutely grave matter. Except if the community is poor or small. - Say the same if a religious community is injured. Cf. St. Alphonsus, III, n. 528; IV, n. 25, with the notes added beneath.

693. Definition. - Theft, taken generically, is the taking away of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

Division. - Theft is thus distinguished:

1° Theft simply, if it is done secretly. - 2° Robbery, if it is done while the owner is positively resisting (morally or physically). - 3° Sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

694. Principles. - I. Theft, by whatever name it is called, is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it is gravely opposed both to charity and to justice, and in Sacred Scripture it is numbered among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven. For thus the Apostle Paul says:¹ Neither thieves, ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God.

II. Sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a species of malice diverse from theft: the former because besides justice it violates religion; the latter because to the unjust taking away of another's thing it adds injury inflicted upon the person. But the other modes, or the other objects of theft, do not change the species, because through them the nature of the damaging is not changed.

695. Questions. - A. Concerning theft grave of itself. - Query 1° What matter is judged grave in thefts of outsiders?

Resp. 1° According to the common opinion, this matter is not to be looked at absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that a graver matter is required for grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends especially upon the greater or lesser privation, pain, and reluctance of the will which he from whom it is stolen suffers; but now no one fails to see that the same matter causes sadness now light, now grave, according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. - Thus commonly with S. Alph.² against some, who contend that matter, whether grave or light, must be looked at absolutely in itself, and that it consists in that which is required for the daily support of an honorable man or of one moderately rich.

Yet some absolute matter must be determined, which it is never licit to pass beyond without grave fault; otherwise, if complete proportion had to be preserved among all conditions, surely the greatest quantity would be required for grave matter when someone steals from a very rich man. But this would certainly yield to the harm of society. - Hence:

Resp. 2° According to S. Alph.,¹ and with attention to the circumstances of this region and of our times, it will be grave approximately - relatively 1) to beggars, $0.50, and less if some poor man would not collect so much daily; 2) to diggers and similar laborers, $1.00; to artisans and merchants of slender fortune, $1.25; 3) to those moderately rich or living from their own incomes, $2.00, but less if from their own they live wretchedly; but relatively to the absolutely rich, for example merchants sufficiently wealthy, $2.50 or $3.00; 4) to a wealthy community, $5.00, or even, if it is very wealthy, $7.50; 5) to the very rich, $10.00, which sum indeed can be judged absolutely grave.

In practical doubt, generally that which does not reach $2.50 or $3.00 is not to be reputed grave.

Resp. 3° The value of a sacred thing, as to the physical species estimable by price, for example of a chalice, is the same as that of a profane thing; otherwise, as in Relics, its dignity and rarity must be considered,² or the special prohibition of the Church (n. 1730).

696. • Query 2° What matter is required, so that thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Resp. 1° It is certain that in thefts of a wife and of children more is required than in thefts of outsiders; because the father of the family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling, in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as to the mode (that it is taken secretly) than as to the substance;³ but no general rule can be assigned. For the matter must generally be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions. Thus S. Alph.⁴ with others resolves that a son does not sin gravely who steals two or three scuta from a rich father (today and among us, I think, he would say $10 or 15).

Resp. 2° For servants it depends also upon the greater or lesser liberality of the masters, upon the quality or situation of the thing stolen, for example if it is edible or not, guarded or open, etc. According to the common opinion, through small thefts committed by servants in foods and edible things which are not usually kept carefully, generally one does not arrive at mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house, or taken in extraordinary quantity, or are of extraordinary price.¹ But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, a greater quantity is not required for grave sin, because masters then are not less unwilling toward them than toward others.

Query 3° Must the circumstance be explained by a son, that he stole from his father?

Resp. Negatively, because theft regularly is not directly and gravely opposed to piety, as for example hatred is. I say: regularly; for it is otherwise if the father would suffer much from it concerning his state. Scav.²

697. Questions. - B. Concerning theft grave by accident. - Query 4° In how many ways does theft of matter light of itself become grave by accident?

Resp. 1° By the intention of arriving at grave matter (n. 703. 2°); 2° by conspiracy, where many conspire among themselves and the little thefts of individuals gathered together constitute grave matter (n. 701. 702); 3° on account of grave damage coming to the owner from a light theft (n. 703. 3°); 4° by multiplication, concerning which in the questions n. 697-700.

Query 5° Do multiplied small thefts suffice to constitute grave matter?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively - whether it is a question of thefts committed against the same person, because united they can easily bring grave damage upon the owner; or it is a question of thefts committed to the damage of diverse persons, because, if not to individuals taken singly, certainly they bring grave damage to the community. Cf. prop. 38 condemned by Pius V.

Resp. 2° By multiplication they coalesce into grave matter either physically or morally. Physically, if they are conserved and the heap becomes grave; for then another's property is retained in a notable quantity. Morally, if indeed they are consumed, but between them there intervenes an interval which is morally or proportionately estimated as brief. - S. Alph.,³ Lugo.⁴

698. • Query 6° Do small thefts also coalesce if a great interval is placed between them?

Resp. Negatively, according to the more common opinion. The reason is that, when a great interval has been posited, small thefts are not judged to be morally united by the common estimation of men, nor therefore do they constitute one object in the genus of morals. Moreover, then grave damage inflicted upon the owner does not appear, since he can scarcely perceive it; and thus he is not judged gravely unwilling.²

Query 7° When is the interval judged great?

Resp. To S. Alphonsus³ the opinion teaching that thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months is more pleasing, even if they were approaching matter as it were grave. But if it is a question of little thefts whose matter each time is very small, he considers a month or even a fortnight as a great interval. - Except, as I said above n. 697. q. 4° and 5°, if an accumulation is made or there is the intention of arriving at a grave sum.⁴

699. • Query 8° When does matter become grave in small thefts?

Resp. 1° If small thefts are made from the same person at diverse times, or by diverse persons at the same time, the matter will be grave when this exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° If small thefts are made from diverse persons, and discontinuously, grave matter of itself will be judged present when it is double the sum commonly required for grave theft.⁴

Query 9° Does retraction of the will prevent following little thefts from being united with preceding ones?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the retraction was efficacious, that is, if in fact the things previously taken have been restored, because once separated they now no longer exist here and now. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° Again affirmatively, if the subsequent theft were done from some particular motive; for then it would not seem efficaciously to destroy the preceding will of restoring. Or even if the thief expressly and seriously proposes again at the same time to restore the things previously stolen; which, nevertheless, can scarcely be admitted in practice, since one who seriously proposes restitution does not here and now repeat thefts. - Negatively, however, where this will seems in some way to be revoked by a new theft; for in this case nothing prevents a notable sum from being retained, and the thefts coalescing into one.

700. • Query 10° Does he sin gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, still steals some light thing?

Resp. It is disputed. An opinion, very probable, denies it, the intention of arriving at a new grave sum being set aside. The reason is that that little theft does not seem to be referred to the grave sum already completed, but rather to a new one, which the thief then begins and pursues. - Thus S. Alph.¹

701. • Query 11° Does he sin gravely who by a light theft completes grave matter begun by others with the same person?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if he did not know that little thefts had been committed by others, because he is not conscious of grave damage inflicted upon the owner. - Thus all.

Resp. 2° Negatively, at least more probably, even if he knew that nearly grave damage had been perpetrated by others, nevertheless with the case of conspiracy set aside. The reason is that this man taking a little thing neither is per se the cause of grave harm, nor is he the cause that the others accepted other things. Therefore the grave damage which the owner suffers ought in no way to be imputed to him. - Nor say that such a thief sins as gravely as a murderer inflicting death by a light blow upon a man already struck by others with innumerable light wounds; for death is owed to this last wound, which otherwise would not have followed. But the matter is otherwise in the case of theft; for by the last little theft no notable calamity or damaging is added. - Lugo,² and others commonly, against Bonacina and others.

702. • Query 12° If many, without common counsel but by example, commit light thefts, so that the total damage is grave, do individuals sin gravely?

Resp. More probably negatively by reason of justice, although they can sin against charity. The reason is that example is not a per se cause, but only an occasional cause, of the damage. - Thus S. Alph.³ and others more commonly against some.

703. Resolutions. - 1° "Probably," says S. Alphonsus,¹ "those who would eat fruits in others' vineyards" or orchards, "provided they are not rare and of great price, can be excused at least from grave sin, if they do not carry them out in great quantity; for in this kind of things, which are too exposed, a greater quantity is required for constituting grave matter."

2° If a thief, intending to arrive by little thefts at a grave sum, renews this intention as often as he steals, as often as he steals he sins gravely. The reason is that the external act derives its malice from the internal act, which is gravely sinful.² Say the same of him who steals a small quantity with the intention of taking a notable quantity. Recall what was said n. 225. 8°. a).

3° He who takes from an owner a trifling thing very dear to him, for example a rare and singular flower, the first fruits from a tree destined to honor some special man, and foresees at the same time that the owner is to be gravely afflicted by such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage seems likely to follow from it.

4° Merchants using false weights sin gravely, although each time they defraud in small matter; because they intend to arrive at grave matter, or certainly know that they will arrive at it.

5° Tailors and their servants sin lethally against justice, when by retaining for themselves or selling fragments of cloth which remain over, otherwise still useful to the owners, they have arrived at grave matter. Except unless in some place a custom prevails that less be paid and the fragments remain to the tailors; or unless it is established that wealthy owners do not wish the fragments to be restored to them, or care little about them.

6° They must be accused of theft who by deceitful beggary (not those who truly beg with exaggeration), or by going about with fabricated reasons, draw money from citizens. Yet those are not to be condemned who have a certain modest amount of money placed in a savings bank, in order to provide for old age and infirmity, lest they be forced to withdraw into a public poorhouse, or so that funeral expenses may be paid, meanwhile collecting alms from private persons whoever they may be, or from pious societies.

collecting alms, so that provision may be made for daily necessities. Indeed, that little money which they keep saved would shortly be spent, and they themselves would be a burden either to pious societies or to hospices. It must be said otherwise if they have money which is sufficient for the support of life. These things likewise can be understood of those who deposit a modest sum of money with a friend, when they betake themselves to a hospice, so that, if afterward it happens that they leave it, they may not lack every aid, or, if they die, their bodies may be committed to burial.¹

7° Concerning youths educated gratis in seminaries, or at the expense of private persons, with that hope that they will serve the ecclesiastical ministry, it must be held that they commit fraud if they enter seminaries without the intention of dedicating themselves to sacred duties, and with this purpose only, that they may be imbued with letters or indulge leisure; and therefore that they are bound to repair the damage. It is not necessary, however, that they be altogether certain of their vocation; for holy leisure is conceded to them for this reason, that they may have more mature counsel concerning so great an undertaking. But they ought neither rashly to enter nor to remain in sacred buildings after they have cast off hope and purpose. But if by their own fault they bring it about that they are held unworthy, they do not seem for that reason bound to make restitution, whenever the mind of defrauding was lacking; for donors are not to be judged to have placed the condition of restitution on account of sluggishness or other customary faults.²

8° Those who dig out coals are prohibited from carrying them away for their own use, unless a certain price has been paid; nevertheless, from the convenience of the thing, it easily happens that each one takes the coals necessary for his family. That custom indeed must be reprehended, but restitution does not seem to be exacted, since there is so great an abundance of coals there, and the owners are scarcely to be judged altogether unwilling; for they do not use solicitude to detect thieves. Those who carry away some coals for their own use from the banks of canals and rivers, where coals are deposited from boats, sin, and indeed gravely if they take a great abundance; not so if a few, especially those which lie scattered here and there. Moreover those who have been accustomed through the whole winter, or another long time, thus to take coals for themselves are guilty of grave theft, and ought to make satisfaction according to an equitable estimation of the damage. But often it is very difficult to send the price safely to the owners. The same must be said concerning those collecting wood which another cut for his own use, or carrying away what another procured for himself; for it is a grave fault of theirs to take an abundance for themselves without the owner's permission.¹

S. Th. II-II, q. 66, a. 3-6 and 8-9.

403. Theft, taken generically, is the unjust taking of another's thing, for the sake of gain, the owner being reasonably unwilling. It is said:

1. unjust taking or usurpation, i.e., either removal, or voluntary detention, since to detain is equivalently to take, and he who detains while he can and ought to return morally takes: "to detain," says St. Thomas, a. 3, "that which is owed to another has the same nature of harm as unjust taking"; and thus to theft are reduced: not paying debts, snatching something away by fraud or deceit, not restoring a thing found;

2. of another's thing, belonging to another by right of dominion, whether perfect or imperfect; whence theft is committed even against a depositary, borrower for use, lessee, etc., if you take away from them a deposited, lent, or leased thing;

3. for the sake of gain, i.e., with the intention of retaining the thing and receiving profit, whether for oneself or for another: for if it were done with the intention of returning the thing to the owner, or safely preserving it, or destroying or lending it, it would not properly be theft; and thus it is distinguished from simple unjust taking or damage, by which no profit is obtained but the good of another is destroyed without advantage;

4. the owner being reasonably unwilling, which is added for the sake of greater explanation, because it is already included in the word: unjust. For if the owner were not unwilling, or if he were unwilling but not reasonably, because there is a just cause of taking away, there would be no injustice, nor theft strictly so called: thus if a poor man in extreme necessity takes, or if a maidservant gives to him; or if someone accepts under the title of compensation, or takes a sword or book from one who is now about to abuse it; or if a wife takes for her honest support, or lest the husband dissipate it in games or feasting.

A double species of theft is distinguished:

1. theft simply, or strictly so called (vol; diefstal), the hidden taking of another's thing, while the owner or the one who keeps the thing is absent or ignorant: this is negatively involuntary for the owner, through ignorance;

2. robbery (roof), or the open and violent taking of another's thing, while the owner is present, seeing, and, insofar as he can, resisting and struggling: this is positively involuntary for the owner on account of violence, whether physical and properly so called, or moral and improperly so called, namely, grave fear unjustly inflicted, as if a robber threatens death in order to extort money. This differs in species from simple theft, because it adds a new malice diverse in species: there is not only real injury in goods, but also personal injury against the person and his honor or liberty, to whom violence is brought or fear. Hence one can sin mortally in the species of robbery, and venially in the species of theft, as if you take a slight thing from a distinguished man who is present and gravely resisting; and vice versa.

Moreover theft, and say the same of robbery, can be simple, - or qualified, to which there is joined a certain circumstance, whether

a) changing the species, by reason of religion, namely, sacrilegious theft, whether the thing is sacred (real sacrilege), or it is taken from a sacred place provided it had been handed over to the custody of that place (local sacrilege), or a sacred thing is taken from its own sacred place (real and at the same time local sacrilege); or

b) notably aggravating. Thus formerly in law they distinguished peculatum, he who steals from public goods, to which the falsification of money pertains; plagiatum, he who abducts a man constituted in slavery; abigeatum, by which someone steals cattle in pastures. In present-day law other distinctions are usefully made in order to diverse penalties.

404. Principle I. Theft is a sin against justice, mortal from its genus. - For:

1° In itself and immediately it is against natural law and is opposed to commutative justice, and in the Decalogue (Exod. XX, 15) it is placed where grave precepts are enunciated (Mt. XIX, 18). For the right of dominion over external goods is derived from the law of nature and is legitimate, indeed necessary both to the individual and to society; but this right is openly violated by theft, since another's thing is taken away while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

2° Mediately and consequently it is opposed a) to charity, insofar as it takes away a good from one's neighbor and brings sadness upon him, and is apt to disturb peace and introduce quarrels, contentions, and hatreds;

b) also to the good of the community and of legal justice, since it tends so as gravely to disturb the tranquility of citizens and the public peace, necessary for the common good of society: "if men everywhere stole from one another," says St. Thomas, a. 6, "human society would perish."

Hence the Apostle says, I Cor. VI, 10: "Neither thieves... nor robbers will possess the kingdom of God."

Nevertheless theft admits lightness of matter, if the matter is divisible and admits more and less: for he who steals a few cents does not gravely offend private right, nor greatly disturb public peace, nor is the owner reasonably very unwilling or unwilling except against the manner of taking; - and similarly he who takes away a thing of greater moment from an owner who does not much care about it, or who in fact is known not to be very unwilling.

Theft in general is the taking away of another's thing, the owner being reasonably unwilling. But it is called simply theft if it is done secretly; robbery, if it is done openly with force inflicted upon the owner; sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

I say. Every simple theft is a grave sin from its genus, because it is opposed to justice, which obliges under grave sin, and because in the Scriptures, e.g., I Cor. vi, 10, thieves are excluded from the kingdom of God. But sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a diverse species of malice: the former because, besides justice, it violates religion; the latter because it adds an injury inflicted upon the person to the unjust taking away of another's thing. But other modes or other objects of theft do not change the species, because through these the nature of the damaging is not changed.

Question 1. What matter is to be considered grave in theft, considering the circumstances of this our region?

Before response is made, certain things must be premised:

I. It is very difficult to determine this matter rigorously, as is clear both from the acknowledgment itself of the Doctors and from the lack of some measure. But it is altogether necessary that what appears more equitable be determined, lest the salvation of souls and the existence of property be brought into danger. Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 21 and seq. - Baller., note (a), p. 527.

II. According to the common opinion, which seems altogether to have to be held, this matter is to be regarded both absolutely and relatively. Matter absolutely grave is that which it is never licit to touch without grave fault, since its taking away is always considered gravely injurious with respect to all. The reason is that if complete proportion had always to be preserved among all conditions, certainly a very great quantity would be required for grave theft where someone stole something from a very rich man: but this would surely turn to the damage of society. Yet it is necessary that the matter of theft be considered also relatively, and the reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends especially upon the greater or lesser privation, pain, and reluctance of will which he suffers against whom the theft is committed. Yet attention must be paid to reluctance of will as it is commonly and reasonably had among men, but not with respect to men drawn by a greater or lesser love of money. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 526. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 28 and 29. - Baller., note (b), p. 527. - Slater, Questions on Moral Theology, pp. 144 and seq.

These things having been noted beforehand, now to the question:

Response. With respect to this matter absolutely grave, authors vary much, so that it is most difficult to determine the matter definitively. But these things seem certain to us: first, that the same or almost the same sum is not to be assigned as had been assigned by ancient authors; second, that the value of money is in no way immutable; that in various regions that value varies: that the matter is to be determined from the quantity of money existing in some region; from its commutative force; from the price of labor; from the moral estimation of men. These things are clear to us from the rather usual manner of acting of some persons, e.g., many European workers come to us, here support themselves by their own labor and send no small sums of money to their own, or carry them with themselves to Europe; but others, otherwise not poor, who now receive a half pension for an office now resigned on account of age or illness, betake themselves to foreign nations, where they can live comfortably, because they receive food, etc., at a cheaper price. The distinguished author Palmieri says: "I have heard other learned men who, on account of the price of money very much diminished day by day, would now wish absolutely grave matter to be that which equals more or less one hundred francs, to whom we assent without difficulty." - Gury-Ballerini, Edit. a. 1898. - "They do not seem to depart from the true who at least below 100 lire do not acknowledge matter of theft absolutely grave." Thus Ojetti, Synopsis, under the word Furtum. This opinion pleases us; indeed, since the value of money among us is different from that among foreign nations, it seems that one does not err who assigns the sum of about 35 dollars for our region.

But relatively grave matter seems to be established thus: a fourth part of a dollar or thirty cents for the needy who beg; one dollar for ordinary laborers; two for mechanics; and three for ordinary rich persons. The reason is that the taking away of such matter seems respectively to involve grave damage.

Question 2. What matter is required so that the thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Response 1st. As regards wives, a case of grave matter in theft is held with difficulty, both because, as was said elsewhere, among us they make one person with husbands as regards common goods, and because these are not ordinarily considered reasonably unwilling regarding donations and other expenses, even secret ones, which are not altogether prodigal. But if a wife uses common riches prodigally, that quantity is required for the gravity of theft which suffices for inflicting grave damage upon the husband, which must be judged from the circumstances. But then it is more commonly taught that she is held to restitution either from paraphernal goods or by working more diligently or by taking care of the family estate. Cf. Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 169.

Response 2nd. It is certain among all that in thefts of children more is required for constituting grave matter than in thefts of strangers; because the father of the family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as regards the manner, namely that it be taken secretly, than as regards the substance. Wherefore many theologians say that for them a sum twice greater than for strangers is required; but no general rule can be assigned, for the matter will generally have to be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 32.

Response 3rd. For servants it also depends upon the greater liberality or stinginess of masters, upon the quality or situation of the thing stolen, e.g., whether it is edible or not, guarded or exposed, etc. According to many, by small thefts committed by servants in foods and eatables which are not usually carefully kept, generally one does not arrive at mortal sin, provided these are not sold or taken out of the house or are of extraordinary value. But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, no greater quantity is required for grave sin, because the masters then are not less unwilling toward them than toward others. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 34. - Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 168.

Question 3. Do small thefts coalesce for constituting grave matter?

Response. Affirmatively, whether they have been committed against the same person or against several, provided nevertheless that a great interval is not placed between them. For in the former case those little thefts, easily united by reason of time, certainly inflict grave damage: besides, proposition 38, which reads thus, was condemned by Innocent XI: "One is not held under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away through a few thefts, however great the total sum may be." - But in the other case there would be grave damage inflicted upon society, whose order would be disturbed if those little thefts committed against different persons, and repeated with a brief interval, were not prohibited under grave sin. Cardinal de Lugo adds another reason, namely that each owner in particular is then gravely damaged, not indeed formally, but radically. - I said provided that a great interval is not placed between them; for little thefts which would be committed rarely bring no grave harm either to society or to private persons. But according to the truer opinion a great interval is computed as the space of two months. Yet except the case in which from the beginning there is the intention of arriving at a notable sum, because then the little thefts always coalesce, however long the interval may be by which they are separated from one another. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 530 and seq. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 37 and seq. - Vogler, n. 133.

Question 4. How is the gravity of matter in small thefts to be computed?

Response. It seems that it must be said more equitably and more commonly that if the little thefts are committed against the same person, whether physically or morally one, for instance some railway company, and at the same time discontinuously, namely more often than every two months, but not on one day or on the same occasion; or if they are committed against diverse persons indeed, but at the same time, namely on one day, on one and the same occasion or under the same circumstances, then the matter is considered grave when it exceeds by one half the sum required for grave theft. - But if both concur, that is, if the little thefts are committed against persons altogether diverse, and at the same time not on one and the same day or occasion, then the matter will be judged grave when it is twice greater. Yet observe that since these little thefts are committed against persons altogether diverse, the common measure of grave theft in each aforesaid case must not be taken from relative but from absolute gravity; for the damage then is brought not upon one, but upon several individuals or particular societies without grave injury to each one, as is supposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 530. - Baller., note (c), p. 531.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. If, after an efficacious retraction of preceding little thefts, whether that efficacy was effective or only affective, but nevertheless true and serious, another little theft is committed from some new motive or from some different occasion, this does not seem to coalesce with the preceding ones.

2nd. He who after grave matter has been completed still steals some slight thing either sins only venially, or if gravely, only in that sense insofar as the same mortal sin already committed terminates in this later little theft. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 538. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 12, n. 44. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 43.

3rd. He who by a slight theft completes grave matter begun by others against the same person, excluding the case of conspiracy, sins only lightly. Nor should you say that he sins gravely who by a light blow kills someone already wounded by others; for life is something indivisible, and the whole is destroyed by this light blow. Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 53 and seq. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 12, n. 52.

4th. Merchants using false weights sin gravely, although on individual occasions they defraud in small matter; because they intend to arrive at grave matter, or certainly know that they are going to arrive at it.

5th. Among thieves are to be reckoned those who wander about, draining citizens of money by feigned reasons. But if they are truly poor, yet exaggerate or lie about their hardships, they will indeed sin against truthfulness, but not against justice. - Cf. Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 176.

6th. "Concerning youths educated gratuitously in seminaries, or at the expense of private persons, with the hope that they may serve in the ecclesiastical ministry, it must be held that they commit fraud if they enter seminaries without the intention of dedicating themselves to sacred offices, and with this plan only, that they be instructed in letters or indulge leisure; and therefore they are held to repairing the damage. But there is no need that they be altogether certain of their own vocation; for holy leisure is granted to them for this reason, that they may deliberate more maturely concerning so great an undertaking; but they must neither enter rashly nor remain in sacred buildings after they have cast away hope and purpose. But if by their own fault they bring it about that they are held unworthy, for that reason they do not seem obligated to restore, whenever the intention of defrauding was lacking: for donors are not to be considered to have placed a condition of restoring on account of idleness or other customary faults." - Thus Kenrick, n. 178.

V. No one is bound under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away by a number of small thefts, however great the total sum may be. This is the 38th of Innocent.

Theft is wont to be defined by Theologians: Theft is the occult taking of another's thing. Thus D. Thom. quaest. 66. art. 3. Covar. approves this definition, from the Jurists, Relect. in Regulam Peccatum, p. 1. §. 1.; for by the very fact that "occult taking" is said, Fraudulent taking, against the will of the owner, is signified. Therefore it is defined more clearly by D. Bonav. p. 1. Centil. sect. 31., where he says: Theft is the handling of another's thing, occult, and with the owner ignorant and unwilling. And in the speculo animae, chapter 2: Theft is the occult handling of another's thing, against the will of the owner. And serm. 6. decal: Theft is the touching of another's thing, against the will of the owner.

He notes, however, that theft ought to be furtive, and through occult fraud; otherwise, if it is done through open violence, it will be rapine; or if through occult means, it is called robbery; whence also he elicits, with D. Thom., that under theft are contained all fraudulent contracts by which a neighbor is defrauded of his thing against his reasonable will. Whence also the unjust detention of another's thing is theft, as D. Thom. also says ad 2., and Valentia disp. 5. quaestion. 10. p. 4., and D. Bonav. in speculo animae, cap. 2. in fine, who also in 3. dist. 37. dub. 7. litterali uses the same definition.

Therefore the Holy Doctor everywhere holds constantly that theft is defined through contrectation, which does not signify mere material contact, as Sayrus, Valentia, and Fagundez think, who carp at this term; but a formal contrectation, which is the taking, or usurpation, or abstraction. Thus by the term contrectation it is defined by the Jurists, ad Leg. 1. §. furtum, ff. de furtis, and Institut. de obligatione, quae ex debito etc. §. 1., which Iulius Clarus explains l. 5. sent. §. Furtum. And Navar. in summa, cap. 17., and Sylvest. v. Furtum. At least that contrectation is a condition without which theft cannot exist, as he admits lib. 1. §. 1., is granted by Sayrus lib. 9. cap. 13., who however does not rest in it.

From what has been said you have that Theft differs in species from Rapine, as D. Bonav. above, D. Thom. quaest. 66. art. 4., Caietanus there, Lessius lib. 2. cap. 12. dub. 1., and the Jurisconsults ad Leg. 1. §. 1. et seq. ff. de vi bonorum raptorum, Molina Tract. 4. disp. 683. et 684., Fagundez in septimum praeceptum, l. 7. cap. 1. num. 14. teach. For rapine requires two things, knowledge, and violence inflicted on the owner: but theft requires neither of these; Therefore rapine is graver. Moreover theft is an enemy of the light, since it is wont to be done in secret, but not rapine, according to that verse.

Fur non est latro, quia tempore iur rapit atro : Tempore non atro rapit omnes res tibi latro.

All concede that in extreme necessity this is lawful. So teach the Doctors cited by Fagundez in 7. praeceptum, l. 7. cap. 26. Therefore in extreme necessity, dominion is thereby transferred — so many assert: Scotus in 4. dist. 15. quaest. 2. §. ad argumenta, Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 7. concl. 1. controv. 1., Aragon. 2. 2. quaest. 32. art. 5., Azorius Tomo 2. l. 12. cap. 8. quaestio 7. and cap. 9. quaestio 1., Sotus l. 4. de Iust. quaest. 7. art. 1. ad 4., Sayrus l. 10. tract. 5. cap. 6. num. 12., Suarez de charitate disp. 7. sect. 5., Sylvest: v. Restit. 5. num. 4., Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 8. n. 126., citing others.

Others, however, deny that dominion is transferred to the person in extreme need. So Medina Cod. de restit. quaest. 3., Nauar. Sum. cap. 17. num. 61., Tolet. l. 5. cap. 24. num. 10., Lessius l. 2. cap. 16. disp. 1. num. 8., Bellarminus T. 3. l. 3. de bonis operibus, cap. 8., Vasquez opusc. de eleem. cap. 1. dub. 6., Malderus Tract. 4. cap. 7. dub. 7. §. respondeo, Fagundez l. 7. cap. 26. num. 7., Couar. 2. p. var. §. 1.

As regards D. Bonaventure, he certainly sides with the first opinion, in speculo animae, cap. 2., where he says: A man may take the property of another out of extreme or urgent bodily necessity, because in necessity all things are common, and then it ought not to be called theft, for what he takes in necessity is his own, or even out of the necessity of another. Hence Ambrosius, in Dom. 8. post Pentec. serm. 64: The bread of the hungry is what you keep back. Along with him, besides those already cited, are Sarmiento 1. p. ment. 4. n. 5. and Caspens. Tract. 18. disp. 5. sect. 6.

From this it is deduced, with the first opinion, that one who has taken something in extreme necessity is not bound to restore its value if he should come to better fortune.

The foundation of D. Bonaventure is most solid, because property was introduced by the law of nations, after the usurpation of things which before were common; yet on this condition, that others should not perish from poverty. Wherefore in extreme necessity all things are common, not only as regards use, and they belong to the first who takes them, unless the same necessity presses upon the possessor; nor is it absurd that the same thing should be common to the use of several, even if we concede that dominion in consumables is not separated from use, once that independence is added to use which surely in our case must be added; then dominion is transferred to the person in extreme need for the time being, and it is no longer the possessor's. I said in consumables; for as regards other things only the use is transferred, as if someone were compelled to take a horse to avoid death, so as to make a swift flight; then that horse must be restored after use. By this doctrine whatever Fagundez opposes in num. 6. is washed away — that is, that this foundation is weak; for thus it is explicit, unshaken, strengthened by the common opinion of the Doctors, and is founded also on §. cum in eadem, ff. ad Legem Rhodiam, de iactu, where he declares that in extreme necessity things are held in common.

Nor let Fagundez say that things become common as to use only, not as to dominion; for once independence is added to use, dominion is joined to it, as I showed in the first question.

The greater difficulty is: whether in necessity that is not extreme, yet nevertheless grave and urgent, it is lawful to seize the property of another by one's own authority.

The first opinion is that in grave necessity of sickness, hunger, or nakedness, such taking is licit. So Petrus Nauar. l. 3. de restit. cap. 1. dub. 5. num. 367., Angelus v. Furtum, §. 37., Sà v. Furtum., Nauar. Summae l. 1. c. f. 17. num. 118., Medina Cod. de eleem. quaest. 3. et de restit. quaest. 3. causa 1.; and Lessius indicates it is probable, T. 1. l. 2. cap. 22. dub. 12. num. 71. et cap. 16. dub. 1. num. 17. et 18., as do Vasquez de eleem. cap. 1. disp. 7. num. 60., Malderus tract. 4. cap. 7. dub. 1., Caspensis Tract. 18. disp. 5. sect. 6., Bonacina de contract. disp. 11. quaest. ult. p. 1. num. 32., Diana p. 1. tract. 17. resol. 29.

The second opinion teaches that it is not licit in urgent necessity to take the goods of another: so Sotus l. 5. de Iust. quaest. 3. art. 4., Salon. 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 7. controv. 1., Valentia tom. 3. disp. 5. quaest. 10. punct. 5. dub. 1., Sayrus l. 9. cap. 14. num. 17., Sylvest. v. restit. 5. num. 2., Lessius r. t. de Iust. l. 2. cap. 12., Fagundez in 7. praeceptum decal. l. 7. cap. 27. num. 5., Azor. p. 2. l. 12. cap. 8. quaest. 8., Turtianus 2. 2. disp. 88. dub. 8., Reginaldus T. 1. l. 4. cap. 20. num. 267., Caiet. 2. 2. quaest. 66. art. 7., Tanner. disp. 4. quaest. 8. num. 126.; but Bassaeus, v. Furtum 1. num. 12., remains wavering, as is his custom.

The Seraphic Doctor plainly stands with the first opinion, as is clear from his words cited above.

I assert therefore that in urgent necessity it is lawful to take what is necessary.

It is proved first from D. Bonaventure, because the division of goods was ratified, yet so that others, from whom they had been wrested — naked, hungry, sick — should not lie cast off like aborted children; for this reason Christ, describing himself as King of Kings, Matth. 25., gravely threatens with his saying against those who in grave necessity had refused to clothe the naked, feed the hungry, visit and help the sick, and he protests that an injury was done to him as supreme Lord of goods, who had transferred dominion to those in grave need.

So Ezech. 16. This was the iniquity of thy sister Sodom: pride, fullness of bread, and abundance: and they did not stretch forth their hand to the needy and the poor. Therefore since the rich man is bound to give that thing (if only out of charity, if not out of justice), he is treated unjustly if it is taken from him against his will.

RESPONDET Fagundez num. 5.: he is indeed bound to give, but not to this man or to THAT man. Therefore he is unjustly deprived of this liberty, when he is compelled to leave it to this man.

This foundation, however, collapses before Vasquez. And indeed he is bound to give to the needy who present themselves, as is said in Matth. 25., nor is he free so as to be able to pass over this one and seek another in Galicia, even if he has nothing wherewith to relieve all.

OBIICIUNT. Cap. si quis de furtis, where a penalty is imposed upon one who steals in grave necessity; but a penalty presupposes guilt: therefore.

RESPONDET S. Thom. quaest. 66. art. 7. ad 1.: the Decretal speaks of a necessity that is not urgent. Caspensis subscribes. This canon D. Bonaventure cites in the Confessionale, cap. 3. particula 55.

DEINDE cap. 4. particula 2. he says that no penance is to be imposed upon thieves, because they are incapable, unless they restore. He supposes, therefore, that the Decretal does not condemn as theft the taking by one in grave, urgent necessity; but him who does not take in grave necessity so urgent that he could avoid taking the property of another; for in urgent necessity he asserts it is not theft, as I said above, citing the words of the S. Doctor.