Article I. On the Nature of Theft

605. • Definition. Theft is the hidden taking away ¹ of another's thing, when the owner is reasonably unwilling.

¹ When it is said taking away, theft is distinguished from mere damaging. Wrongly, therefore, do some find an example of grave theft if someone steals from a tailor a needle without which he cannot work. For it will be grave damaging, but not grave theft.

Division. Theft is thus distinguished:

1. Theft simply, if it is done secretly. - 2. Robbery, if it is done openly with violence inflicted on the owner ². - 3. Sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

² If theft is a hidden taking away, but robbery an open taking away with violence, then robbery ought not to be called a species of theft, but of unjust taking away.

Principles. I. Theft, by whatever name it is called, is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it is gravely opposed to the natural law, as is plain both from reason and from Sacred Scripture, in which it is numbered among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven. For thus says the Apostle, 1 Cor. 6:10: Neither thieves..., nor robbers shall possess the kingdom of God.

II. Sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a species of diverse malice: the former because besides justice it violates religion; the latter because to the unjust taking away of another's thing it adds injury inflicted on the person. But other modes, or other objects of theft, do not change the species, because by these the nature of damage is not changed.

606. • Questions. Q. 1. What matter is judged grave in theft?

Resp. 1. It cannot be rigorously determined ³. According to the common sentence, which seems altogether to be held, this matter is not to be considered absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that graver matter is to be required for grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man ⁴. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, especially depends on the greater or lesser deprivation, sorrow, and reluctance of will which he from whom it is stolen suffers; but now no one does not see that the same matter causes sorrow now light, now grave, according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. Nevertheless one must attend to the reluctance of the will as it is commonly and reasonably had among men, not with respect to men drawn by a greater or lesser love of money. - Thus commonly with St. Lig., n. 526, against Billuart and some others, who contend that matter, whether grave or light, must be considered absolutely in itself, and that it consists in that which is required for the daily sustenance of an honest or moderately rich man.

³ Nearly all the Doctors (says Lugo, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 21), after a long inquiry and great study in order to determine some matter of grave theft, ingenuously confess that no fixed rule can be established, but that this whole thing depends on a moral judgment, so that God knows when here and now the matter is grave; but we in doubt ought to abstain. For although we can determine with certainty some matter which is light, for example one obol or one as; and another which is certainly grave, for example one hundred gold coins; nevertheless between those two extremes we cannot define what the boundaries of each matter are, so that short of such a sum it is light, and beyond it it is grave. But they try to assign some moral rules for discerning at least confusedly each matter, some of which according to the genius and character of each one are too strict, others too lax.

Nevertheless, as Lugo himself adds (ibid., n. 35), the law of nature itself demands that some certain quantity of grave theft be determined, short of which a quantity a little smaller, for example by one or two obols, can be taken without grave sin. For otherwise we shall fall into that very great inconvenience, that either all thefts, even the most minute, have grave guilt, or no theft, even the gravest, can be called gravely prohibited. For unless sometimes the transition is made from light to grave matter by the slightest distance, and conversely, from certainly light matter by the smallest increments we shall never arrive at grave matter, and on the contrary from certainly grave matter by slight decrements we shall never come down to light.

These two things certainly, namely both the plainly uncertain boundaries between grave and light matter, and the necessity of some certain term between grave and light matter, make the condition of this treatment, as is plain, exceedingly rough.

⁴ The common distinction is that the matter of theft is called grave, one kind absolutely, another relatively. The former is judged grave with respect to all and always; but the latter is grave with respect to certain persons, although with respect to others it can be held light, since it (as Lugo says, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 27) is taken from the quantity of the thing taken away with proportion to the goods of the one suffering the injury. Nor indeed does the Author reject this distinction in this place; but he seems to have attacked certain persons who perhaps admitted only the absolute gravity of matter, but not the relative.

Nevertheless, some absolute matter must be determined which it would never be lawful to go beyond without grave fault; for otherwise, if an all-mannered proportion had to be observed among all conditions, certainly the greatest quantity would be required for grave matter where someone steals from a very rich prince; but this would surely yield to the damage of society.

607. • Resp. 2. But for grave matter considered relatively (attention being paid to the principal places of Europe and to the circumstances of our times), there seem to be required: 1. approximately the value of one franc, or 20 asses, relatively to the poor, and sometimes less for a greater degree of necessity; 2. approximately two or three francs, or 40 or 60 asses, relatively to workmen who procure food for themselves by long labor; 3. approximately four or five francs relatively to men moderately rich; 4. approximately six or seven francs relatively to ordinary rich men.

But as regards matter absolutely grave, the more common sentence in St. Alphonsus ⁵ is that two or three gold coins are judged grave matter. But a gold coin is equivalent to about five francs. Yet you should wish to call to mind that money at that time, as being more rare, was also more precious ⁶.

⁵ St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 527) enumerates at least 20 authors who, as regards the very rich, require two or even three gold coins for grave matter. Indeed he attributes to very many the sentence that three gold coins are required; and he testifies that this sentence is called common by Laymann. But the common gold coin is equivalent to the Roman scudo. And from this it is plain that in the judgment of these Doctors, absolutely grave matter, namely that which can never be judged light fault, ought to have reached at least the sum of three gold coins.

⁶ The inconstancy of the value of money brings it about that several Doctors thought that the measure of grave matter should by no means be taken from a certain quantity of money. Thus Molina (De Iust., tr. II, disp. 685, n. 2): First of all, I judge that this matter must not be defined by the quantity of money. For as was shown in disp. 406, with money least changed..., its value increases and decreases by its multitude or scarcity... Whence it happens that for defining the sum which is sufficient so that theft is a lethal fault by comparison with all places and times, it is not an apt fixed rule to say that it is a certain quantity of money, such as two, three, or four silver reales. For where they are worth less because of the greatest abundance of money, less wounding and lesser injury is done to the neighbor in theft of the value of the sum of that money than where they are worth more; and where they are worth more because of a great scarcity of money, greater wounding and greater injury is done to the neighbor in theft of that value of the sum of money than where they are worth less. And Cardinal De Lugo (De Iust., disp. 16, n. 25): Nor can the value reduced to so much money for grave matter be designated; because the very value of money, or its estimability, is not equal in every place and time. Therefore it pertains to the Confessor to have before his eyes the circumstances of places. For the daily labor of a workman, for example, will bring three francs somewhere, while elsewhere the same labor will scarcely bring one franc.

Nor is a lesser variety in the value of money found according to the variety of times. And indeed this diversity must be considered even more attentively, so that the mind of the Doctors on this matter may be accurately known. For Molina, who died in the year 1600, already in his own age noted this variety that had been introduced thus (De Iust. et Iur., tract. 2, disp. 685, n. 2): Things which eighty years before were bought or hired for one are not bought or hired today for five or even six. But indeed after half a century Cardinal Lugo, who died in the year 1660, thus notes that the value of money had diminished still more (De Iust. et Iur., disp. 16, n. 25): We also know that among ourselves the estimation of money has so decreased..., that those for whom formerly 50 gold coins sufficed for living, today 150 do not suffice. But what has happened to the value of money from that age up to ours, no one is ignorant. For if St. Alphonsus too (lib. 3, n. 383) notes a great difference in this matter between his own age and that of La-Croix (but La-Croix existed a little at the same time as Lugo), it is easily plain what must be thought in our days, when all are astonished and complain that the prices of things have grown immensely in a short interval of time, or, what comes back to the same thing, that the value of money has decreased immensely.

Hence, moreover, it follows of itself that the measure of grave matter in theft (especially if speech is of matter absolutely grave) is not aptly taken from the older writers in such a way that the limits prescribed by them then ought also now to be judged defined from their authority. Thus since you have (in St. Alphonsus, lib. 3, n. 527) Sylvester, Angelus, Soto, Corduba, Arragonius, Rodericus, etc., who are older than Ludovicus Molina; but these require for matter absolutely grave three gold coins, namely at least three scudi, whose sentence otherwise Laymann, contemporary with Molina, calls common (in St. Alphonsus, l.c.); certainly whoever wishes to define the matter by the judgment of those Doctors must be wholly required to have regard for the change which the value of money has undergone from that age up to us.

608. • Q. 2. What matter is required so that thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Resp. 1. It is certain among all that in thefts of a wife and children more is required for constituting grave matter than in thefts of strangers, because the father of a family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as to the mode (that it is taken secretly) than as to the substance. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 32. But they add that more probably there is required for these a sum twice greater than for strangers; but no general rule can be assigned, for the matter will generally have to be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions ⁷.

⁷ As to what the Author reports concerning a double quantity for sinning gravely against the substance, understand it when the father is reasonably unwilling also as to the substance. Moreover, the sentences of the Doctors which St. Alphonsus (Hom. apost., tract. 10, n. 32) reports, on account of the circumstances which the Author also mentions generally, extend that quantity of matter much more broadly.

Resp. 2. For servants it depends also on the greater liberality or tenacity of masters, on the quality or situation of the thing stolen, for example, whether it is edible or not, guarded or open..., etc. According to many, through minute thefts made by servants in foods and eatables which are not customarily carefully kept, generally one does not come to mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house, or are not of extraordinary price. But if servants steal money ⁸ or things carefully guarded, a greater quantity is not required for grave sin, because then masters are not less unwilling toward them than toward others. Indeed thefts of this sort are punished more severely by civil law on account of the defect of fidelity which intervenes in them. - St. Lig., Hom. apost., n. 34.

⁸ This exception nevertheless does not seem to be extended to the very slight subtractions of some obol or half-obol, not infrequent among maidservants or servants, while they are accustomed to buy daily food for their masters.

609. • Q. 3. Whether minute thefts can coalesce for constituting grave matter?

Resp. 1. Altogether affirmatively, if it is a matter of thefts committed against the same person, because united they can easily bring grave damage on the owner. This is evident also from this proposition 38 condemned by Innocent XI: No one is held under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away through small thefts, however great the total sum may be. - Therefore a grave obligation is given of restoring a grave sum taken away through minute thefts, and therefore minute thefts coalesce.

Resp. 2. Affirmatively, with the common sentence, even if it is a matter of minute thefts committed to the damage of diverse persons. The reason is that the precept not to steal obliges not only lest grave damage be brought on the neighbor, but also lest someone grow rich from another's thing ⁹. Indeed such a thief, if not to individuals taken singly, certainly brings grave damage on the community. And indeed, unless thefts of this sort were prohibited under grave obligation, not a few men would easily wish to grow rich from thefts, since they could do this without the loss of eternal salvation; therefore great disorder in society would follow. Therefore these thefts had to be prohibited under grave obligation by natural right. - St. Lig., n. 534. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 37.

⁹ This reason (says Lugo, De Iust., disp. 16, n. 49) does not seem sufficient; because the precept not to steal does not intend to avoid one's own profit, but the damage of the neighbor... If therefore the neighbor is not gravely injured, that action cannot be gravely prohibited. These are Lugo's words, not as though rejecting the common doctrine concerning the gravity of fault in these thefts, for he soon (ibid., n. 50) defends it with solid reasons; but wishing to suggest the less firm strength of that reason. And indeed by right of finding, alluvion, and prescription a man lawfully grows rich from another's thing.

610. • Q. 4. Whether minute thefts still coalesce if a great interval is placed between them?

Resp. Negatively, according to the more common sentence. The reason is that when a great interval is posited, little thefts from the common estimation of men are not judged to be morally united, nor therefore do they constitute one object in the genus of morals. Besides, then grave damage inflicted on the owner does not appear, since he can scarcely perceive it; and therefore he is not judged gravely unwilling. - St. Lig., n. 530. - Vogler, n. 133.

Q. 5. When is an interval judged great?

Resp. More probably it must be held that thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months, even if they would approach matter as it were grave. - St. Lig., ibid.

Yet some require an interval of one year so that little thefts cease to coalesce; but others contend that it suffices if one month intervenes, or even a shorter time if it is a matter of very minute little thefts. But the former seem to decline into rigor, and the latter perhaps into some laxity ¹⁰.

¹⁰ In this matter the disagreement itself of the Doctors shows that some certain norm can scarcely be handed down. It can be added that this judgment should not be taken from the space of time alone interposed between individual thefts, but also from a comparison of the mind of him who steals, and from other circumstances, from the diversity of which the diverse estimation of men concerning this matter for diverse cases must be derived. Thus, for example, those who, through fields, by rather light thefts often steal and devour grapes, figs, beans, apples, etc., are indeed reprehended; but you will scarcely find one who fears the note of laxity if, even after several years of this custom, he does not inject into them a scruple of grave theft on account of coalescing matter.

Moreover, minute thefts, with whatever interval having been posited, coalesce according to the sentence of all whenever they were committed with the intention of arriving at a notable sum; because through this intention they are truly united among themselves. - St. Lig., n. 530. - Billuart, etc.

611. • Q. 6. When does matter become grave in minute thefts?

Resp. 1. If minute thefts are made against the same person on diverse occasions, the matter will be grave when it exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Thus commonly ¹¹.

¹¹ All admit with Cardenas that for grave matter then more is required, for example twice more than would suffice if it were taken away at the same time. Thus La Croix, lib. 3, part 1, n. 1011. But the sentence reported by the Author is the opinion which St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 530) attributes to Benjamin Elbel.

Resp. 2. If minute thefts are made against diverse persons, matter per se will be judged grave when it is twice greater than the sum commonly required for grave theft ¹². - St. Lig., lib. 3, n. 530, and many others.

¹² St. Alphonsus (lib. 3, n. 530) also reports this opinion as if from Elbel. But in reality Elbel (De Restit., conf. 10, n. 290) does not speak of minute thefts which are made to diverse persons at diverse times, but of thefts perpetrated at the same time, which therefore are called minute because the damage brought to each individual is light, for example if you should once steal from a mass common to several.

Moreover, whether you adhere to this opinion, or with others prefer to require something more on account of thefts perpetrated on diverse occasions, it must be noted that the common measure of grave theft cannot here be taken from relative gravity; for the damage is not inflicted on one person, but on several, to none of whom nevertheless we suppose relatively grave damage to have been inflicted. Therefore the common measure of grave theft, which henceforth must be computed at least doubly in the case, ought to be taken not from relative but from absolute gravity, which namely is used when thefts yield to the damage of a community.

Q. 7. Whether retraction of the will impedes subsequent little thefts from being united with preceding ones?

Resp. 1. Affirmatively, if the retraction was efficacious, that is, if the things previously taken away have in fact been restored, because once separated they now here and now no longer exist. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2. Again affirmatively, if the subsequent theft were made from some particular motive; for then it would not seem efficaciously to destroy the preceding will of restoring; or even if the thief expressly and seriously again at the same time proposes to restore the things previously stolen ¹³. Yet this can scarcely be admitted in practice, since he who seriously proposes restitution here and now does not repeat thefts. - Nevertheless it is denied where this will seems in some way to be revoked through a new theft; for in this case nothing prevents a notable sum from being retained, and the thefts from coalescing into one.

¹³ Thus Lugo (De Iust., disp. 16, n. 40) with Molina, Sanchez, Rebello, Granado, Diana, etc. But the reason (says Lugo) is clear; because to steal with the intention of restoring at once or soon does not seem to be a grave sin, speaking of itself, since that brief detention brings little detriment to the owner, unless by accident in some rare case. Therefore, if you intend quickly to restore the former things, so that for a brief time you retain with yourself the debt of a grave sum, there is not whence that theft would receive grave malice. These things indeed seem valid if the thief intends soon to restore not indeed the things previously taken away, but only those which he steals here and now.

612. • Q. 8. Whether he sins gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, still steals some light thing?

Resp. It is disputed. The first opinion, which seems more probable, denies, the intention of arriving at a new grave sum being excluded. The reason is that that little theft does not seem to be referred to the grave sum already completed, but rather to a new one, which the thief then begins and pursues. - Thus St. Lig., n. 538. - Lessius, c. 12, n. 44. - The Salmanticenses, de Restitutione.

The second opinion affirms, because in this new little theft the thief renews the intention of retaining the grave sum already stolen. - Thus Lacroix, n. 1007, and Lugo, d. 16, n. 43, who nevertheless denies that the sin is multiplied, but says that the same sin is terminated also to the later theft together with the preceding sum ¹⁴, etc. According to others, it must be distinguished thus: that man sins gravely if he does not have a true purpose of restoring the grave sum already possessed; but otherwise, if he has such a purpose. - Thus Billuart, diss. 11, art. 4.

¹⁴ Therefore La Croix alleges Lugo for his opinion without reason, since Lugo rather seems to agree with the opinion of Billuart.

613. • Q. 9. Whether he sins gravely who by a light theft completes grave matter begun by others with the same person?

Resp. 1. Negatively, if he did not know that little thefts had been committed by others, because he is not conscious of the grave damage inflicted on the owner. - Thus all.

Resp. 2. Negatively, at least more probably, even if he knew that almost grave damage had been perpetrated by others, yet with the case of conspiracy excluded. The reason is that this man, taking a very small thing, is neither of himself the cause of grave harm, nor is he in the cause that others took other things; therefore by no way ought the grave damage which the owner suffers to be imputed to him. - Nor should you say that such a thief sins as gravely as a murderer bringing death by a light blow to a man already struck by innumerable light wounds by others; for death is owed to this last wound, which otherwise would not have followed. But the matter has itself otherwise in the case of theft; for on account of the last little theft no notable calamity or damage accedes. - Lugo, d. 16, n. 53 and following. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 2, n. 52, and others commonly, against Bonacina and others.

614. • Q. 10. Whether, if several persons without common counsel but by example commit light thefts, so that the total damage is grave, each sins gravely?

Resp. More probably negatively by reason of justice, although they can sin against charity. The reason is that example is not a positive cause flowing into another's damage ¹⁵. - Thus St. Lig., n. 537. - Lessius, ibid., n. 52, and others more commonly, against some.

¹⁵ If it is a matter of the guilt which someone incurs because by his example he provokes others to evil, in the case not all individuals, but only those who thus moved others to inflict damage, will be held by guilt of this sort.

Q. 11. When on the part of the thief does the taking away of a light thing become a grave sin?

Resp. It happens in a threefold way, namely: 1. through the intention of arriving at grave matter; 2. through multiplication, if minute thefts arrive at a grave sum; 3. through conspiracy, where several conspire among themselves, and the little thefts of the individuals collected constitute grave matter.

615. • Resolutions. 1. If a thief, intending to arrive by little thefts at a grave sum, renews this intention as often as he steals, he sins gravely each time. Yet if from the beginning he intends to steal some determinate sum through minute thefts, for example so that he may not be detected, more probably he admits one sin, because it is one moral act; for all the particular acts tend determinately to effecting one thing ¹⁶. - Recall what was said in the Treatise on Sins, n. 163.

¹⁶ In reality it scarcely appears how this case differs from the preceding one. For in both there is a multiple external act with the purpose of the same wicked end; nor does it change the substance of the matter that in the other the thief gradually steals for this reason, lest he be detected. But perhaps for this reason the resolution of each is diverse: because, since the opinions of the Doctors vary in a question of this sort, one and the same case is resolved now from the opposite opinion of these, now from that of those. See what was said above concerning this question (p. 144, note a).

2. He who takes away from an owner a small thing very dear to him, for example, a rare and singular flower, the first fruits from a tree destined for honoring some distinguished man, and at the same time foresees that the owner will be gravely afflicted from such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage seems about to follow from it.

3. Merchants using false weights sin gravely, although on individual occasions they defraud in small matter; because they intend to arrive at grave matter, or certainly know that they are going to arrive at it.

4. Tailors and their servants sin lethally against justice when, by retaining for themselves or selling fragments of cloth which are left over and otherwise still useful to the owners, they have arrived at grave matter. Except unless somewhere a custom is in force that less be paid and the fragments remain to the tailors; or unless it is established that wealthy owners do not wish the fragments to be restored to themselves, or care little about them. - St. Lig., throughout. - See Casus, n. 553 and following.