Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Article I. On The Nature And Gravity Of Theft In General
78. Definition. Theft is the hidden taking or taking away of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling.8
It Is Explained. It is said, first: hidden, because if it were an open taking away, there would be rapine.
It is said, second: taking, which includes unjust detention; for "to detain that which is owed to another has the same ratio of harm as an unjust taking."9 Therefore to theft are reduced: not paying debts, stealing something by fraud or deceit, not restoring to the owner a thing found, etc. - The taking away or detention is understood to have been done with the intention of retaining the thing for oneself and of using and enjoying it; for if the taking away was done from another intention, for example of lending the thing, or of soon returning it, or of destroying it, it is not theft strictly so called.
It is said, third: while the owner is reasonably unwilling. Theft strictly so called10 is not present if the owner either consents to the taking away, or if he is unwilling not so much concerning the taking away itself as concerning the mode of taking away (for example, if a wife secretly takes away certain lesser goods, the husband is not unwilling concerning the very taking away of the thing, since it is of lesser moment, but concerning the mode of taking away, namely concerning the wife's furtive mode of acting), or if he is unreasonably unwilling. But the owner is unreasonably unwilling if from justice or from piety or from another just cause he is bound to permit the taking away of the thing. Hence a wife does not steal if she takes away from her husband money which he would squander in games or drinking; likewise if in necessity she secretly takes from him things necessary for suitable sustenance. Nor can the husband reasonably be unwilling against such a mode of acting by the wife. Similarly a rich man is unreasonably unwilling that a poor man living in extreme necessity should take from the goods of the rich man the things necessary for life, or that a maidservant should give to the poor fragments of foods which otherwise would perish.
8 Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 3.
9 Ib. ad 2.
10 Sometimes theft is taken in a broader sense, and then it is the deceitful taking away of any thing whatever (even one's own) deposited with another (cf. S. theol. l. c. a. 5 ad 3); or it also includes the unjust damaging of another's thing.
79. Malice Of Theft. Theft from its genus is a mortal sin.
This is clear from the things said above concerning injustice. For theft is injustice, which is a mortal sin from its genus. Besides, thieves are excluded from the kingdom of heaven, as is clear from the text cited above, n. 74. Moreover no one is excluded from the kingdom of heaven except on account of mortal sin. But by Christ the precept of not stealing is reckoned among the commandments which one must observe if he wishes to enter into life.11 - But let no one say that from these texts it follows that theft is not only a mortal sin from its genus, but also from its whole genus, because it always excludes from the kingdom of heaven. For it would hardly be fitting to divine mercy if, for example, a boy stealing an apple were on that account thrust down into hell for all eternity. Therefore the texts of Sacred Scripture must not be understood concerning those very small thefts, which scarcely deserve the name of theft, but concerning greater thefts, which before God and men are acknowledged as shameful.
11 Cf. Matt. 19, 18.
80. Gravity Of Matter In Theft. There are few matters in the whole of Moral Theology in which there exists so great a variety of opinions as in determining the gravity of theft. Nevertheless, it seems that here there is question not so much of the gravity of the sin of theft - which depends much on the lax or scrupulous conscience of the agent - as rather of the grave obligation of restitution arising from the taking away of another's thing. Certainly it is arbitrary enough if some moralist should wish to determine, for example, that he who took away 10 francs goes to hell; he who stole 9 francs goes to purgatory. On the contrary, moral theologians rather reasonably - while the Church is silent, indeed even consenting - try to determine the cases in which after the fact of theft there is a grave obligation of restitution. For restitution repairs the injured social order. As a rule in determining the grave obligation of restitution, above all there must be attended to the damage which has been caused by the unjust taking away. For theft is against the virtue of justice, and in sins committed against justice the gravity must be taken not so much from the affection with which the owner is borne toward the thing taken away, nor from the indignation or sadness with which he is affected from it, as from the damage inflicted. Whence, for example, he who unjustly takes away some little bird much loved perhaps sins gravely against charity, because he has saddened the mistress of the little bird most vehemently, but he does not sin gravely against justice, because he has not inflicted grave material damage. But grave material damage is judged to be present when either the injured person himself or the legitimate guardian of the social order is reasonably and gravely unwilling on account of that damage.
Most commonly modern theologians assign grave matter in theft, one kind absolutely, another relatively.12
Absolutely grave matter is taken from the value alone of the thing taken away, without any relation being had to the condition of the person from whom the thing has been taken. And therefore absolutely grave matter always and everywhere constitutes a grave obligation of restitution. But concerning what is absolutely grave matter authors do not agree. Tanquerey13 thinks it to be in the regions of Europe 20-30 francs; but in the States of North America 7-8 dollars; Noldin14 opines it to be 30 marks; Lehmkuhl15 teaches the same; but Waffelaert16 says it is about 40 francs. Since today the value of money has been enormously diminished, I think that there is always a grave obligation of restitution if someone altogether unjustly and without any excuse has taken away another's things at a price of about 100 francs (of gold value). The reason is that in our times the common persuasion of the people holds the unjust taking away of 100 francs to be a grave matter and to be punished severely on account of the injured public order. But I say: altogether unjustly and without any excuse; for if the thief has some excuse, or if the owner is not so unwilling, then a greater sum is necessary for inducing a grave obligation of restitution. Whence, for example, I would indeed admonish, but I would not strictly oblige to restitution, a son who took away 150 francs from his very rich father.
Relatively grave matter is that which brings grave harm to the owner, his condition being considered. Some authors assign the quantity by which a head of household needs for his daily sustenance with his family;17 others better define a certain fixed amount in about this way:
a) with relation to the poor and wretched, about 2 francs;
b) with relation to men of middling fortune, about 10-12 francs;
c) with relation to the rich, about 30-50 francs;
d) with relation to the very rich, about 100 francs, or the same quantity which is judged as absolutely grave.
Note concerning these fixed amounts: 1. They are not wholly certain rules, because no authentic sanction of them is found anywhere. They are nothing other than a reasonable and sufficiently founded opinion. 2. In them there is not attended to damage which perhaps can follow by accident from the theft: for example, if someone takes away from a workman an instrument of the price of 1 franc, ordinarily he does not sin mortally; nevertheless if the workman, because that instrument is lacking, cannot work for a notable time, then the thief foreseeing this omission of labor sins mortally, not indeed on account of the taking away of the instrument, but on account of the unjust damaging caused. 3. When it is unknown upon whom damage has been inflicted, it is permitted to presume that it has been inflicted upon one moderately rich. Wherefore if the value of the thing does not exceed 10 francs, there is not a grave obligation of restitution.
12 But Billuart teaches that more probably the gravity of matter in theft is not to be estimated relatively, but absolutely (De iure et iust. diss. 11, a. 3).
13 Synopsis theol. mor. de virt. iust. n. 436.
14 De praeceptis n. 416.
15 Theol. mor. I, n. 1114.
16 De iust. II, n. 215.
17 St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 3, n. 527, calls this rule confused and obscure.
81. Scholion. On The Gravity Of Theft To Be Cautiously Weighed. In weighing the quantity absolutely or relatively grave, the circumstances of times and places must be attended to. Whence, for example, the quantity assigned by authors of past centuries is too small in our times, since the value of money is now greatly diminished. Similarly the value of money is much less in great industrial cities than in distant rural regions.18 But let the confessor always be mindful of what St. Augustine said concerning the distinction between venial and mortal sin: "It is most difficult to discover, most dangerous to define." Whence Billuart wisely warns:19 "Therefore let directors of souls not presume to resolve individual and singular cases with certainty: this is mortal, this is venial, unless this is openly evident.... And when they are questioned by penitents about that matter, let them prudently decline an absolute response, and let them instill in them horror of all sins, even venial ones."
18 Cf. Waffelaert, De iust. II, n. 215, where there is a long computation of the difference of value according to diverse times.
19 De iure et iust. diss. 9, a. 3.