point — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Point I. On Theft in General
I. Notion. Theft, taken in the broader sense, is taken for every unjust injury in goods of fortune. Taken in the stricter sense it is defined: the occupation of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling. It is said:
Occupation, that is, taking away with the intention of making the thing one's own, or at least of treating it as one's own. Hence he is not guilty of theft who takes wine away from someone so that he may not become drunk, or a sword so that he may not kill someone.
While the owner is unwilling, namely with respect to the occupation. Therefore I note that, morally speaking, he is now not unwilling if, being asked, he would consent, provided he would not do this on account of the petition alone, but on account of, or also on account of, a good affection toward the person taking it away. If, however, the owner is unwilling with respect to the mode, that is, with respect to occupation without express permission, you are not excused from venial sin (St. Alphonsus, III, 700, question 1).
While reasonably unwilling, again with respect to the occupation. Moreover, in general the owner is irrationally unwilling if he refuses to yield a thing which is owed either from justice or from piety (n. 779); otherwise, if it is owed from charity alone. Hence a poor man is guilty of theft who, placed in necessity that is simply grave, occupies the owner's thing; but not a wife who, placed in a similar necessity, against her husband's will takes goods necessary for herself (St. Alphonsus, III, 519).
II. Division. Theft is distinguished into simple theft and robbery. Simple theft is when a thing is taken away while the owner is ignorant of it, or at least without physical or moral force. Robbery is when theft is committed while the owner is present and positively resisting, with force being employed, whether physical or moral, for example unjust fear. Each is called sacrilegious if a sacred thing is taken away.
III. Morality. 1. Theft is a grave sin from its genus, or grave or light according as it regards grave or light matter. Theft which regards grave matter is a grave sin, as is clear both from Sacred Scripture1 and from the reason alleged where injustice in general was discussed (n. 978; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 59, a. 4; q. 66, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, III, 518). Nevertheless:
a) "It is not mortal, speaking per se, to steal any sum whatever with the intention of restoring immediately, for example within a quarter of an hour" (St. Alphonsus, III, 531). But
b) "It is grave, although not in the species of theft, if the thief knows that from the loss of a small thing a very great annoyance will follow for the owner; for example, because he was greatly attached to it, and a similar thing cannot be recovered: unless, however, the thing is of no importance at all" (St. Alphonsus, III, 526).
Simple theft and robbery differ in species, since robbery adds to theft the species of personal injury. Sacrilegious theft adds to both the species of sacrilege2 (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, III, 518).
It remains to determine what matter is grave. Now:
a) Matter both relatively grave and absolutely grave must be established. It is said:
α) Matter relatively grave, that is, matter which is grave considering the condition of him from whom it is taken away. For the gravity of theft also depends on the gravity of the damage which is inflicted on someone. But the gravity of damage is different according as the condition of him on whom it is inflicted is different (St. Alphonsus, III, 527). Here, however, it can be asked whether, in establishing matter relatively grave, account must also be taken of the owner's special and reasonable affection toward some thing which in itself is of lesser value, for example toward a collection of letters from a dear person. Now it seems this must be affirmed, because on account of the special affection the thing is of greater value to the owner, so that for this reason it could be sold for more, and therefore greater damage is inflicted on him.
β) Matter absolutely grave regards the quantity by which the thief is enriched, rather than the damage inflicted on the neighbor. It is called absolutely grave because it is always held as grave, even with respect to the very rich. And it must be admitted, because the act of occupying and having another's thing as such, according to its proper concept, that is, with abstraction made from the damage which is inflicted on the neighbor, involves disorder; in a word: justice forbids inflicting damage on someone and occupying and having another's thing, or, to use the words of St. Alphonsus, "the precept of not stealing obligates not only that grave damage not be inflicted on the neighbor, but also that no one be enriched from another's thing" (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 28). Moreover, if the aforesaid act involves disorder, with abstraction made from the damage inflicted, one must finally arrive at grave matter, even if the individuals from whose goods someone is enriched do not suffer grave damage.3
b) For matter grave, whether relatively or absolutely grave, a greater sum is required the smaller the value of money is; hence for grave sin a greater quantity is required now than formerly, and a greater quantity, for example, in North America than in Europe. Finally a greater quantity is required the less unwilling the owners are judged to be.
c) Considering the things we have just noted, the matter can be more determinately stated for our regions in this way:
α) With respect to a poor person: 1 florin; with respect to workers: 3 florins; with respect to citizens of middle fortune: 5 florins; with respect to the rich: 10 florins. The reason is that the assigned sums, with respect to the assigned persons, are judged to inflict grave harm. With respect to the very rich, absolutely grave matter holds; but the sum of 25 florins can be held as absolutely grave matter.
If there is question of a sacred thing, the gravity of the matter must be judged from the dignity and rarity of the thing. Hence, as regards relics, grave matter is lacking "if someone steals some very small thing, not deforming the relic itself, nor diminishing its esteem: unless it is some notable or rare relic, as for example of the Holy Cross" (St. Alphonsus, III, 532).
β) For spouses and children of the family, a sum twice as great can be established, so that, for example, the child of rich parents would sin gravely if he stole 20 florins from his parents. Indeed, if there is question of spouses, a latitude somewhat greater than for children is admitted. The reason for these things is "that the parent (and spouse) is less unwilling, and the child is something of the father" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 32), and spouses constitute one thing. Moreover, sometimes they are in no way unwilling, or are unwilling only about the mode, so that there can be no question of theft. Finally spouses and parents easily condone thefts committed by the spouse and by children if they have been consumed, so that there is no obligation of restoring (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). If there is an obligation, compare what was said about the mode of restoring in n. 1016.
Note moreover that a wife and children of the family do not steal by taking secretly what is necessary for food and clothing, if the father refuses to grant these things. But as regards those things which are judged to be required by children for recreations fitting to their condition, great prudence is needed if these are denied by the parents. For children are usually more inclined to squander money, whereas parents often have excellent reasons for denying what is desired.
γ) As regards servants, if there is question of money or of a thing carefully guarded, the same quantity as for outsiders suffices. But it is commonly admitted that, by stealing eatables and drinkables, they do not easily arrive at grave sin, provided they themselves consume them, and do not sell them or carry them out of the house, and there is no question of a thing diligently guarded (St. Alphonsus, III, 545; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 34).
δ) As regards religious, in eatables and drinkables what was said about servants holds; in other thefts from the goods of the monastery, a greater quantity is required for grave matter than in thefts by outsiders, but a lesser quantity than in thefts by children (St. Alphonsus, IV, 24).
Here, however, note that the diverse opinions of theologians about the quantity required for grave sin are not to be explained to the people or to penitents.
Corollary I. Considering the notion of theft, sometimes very small things can be secretly taken without sin, for example one apple or another from an orchard by someone passing by, etc.; as regards very small things, owners for the most part are not judged to be unwilling. If, however, the orchard, etc., is fenced in, the owner is reasonably unwilling with respect to entrance into his territory.
Corollary II. He who cuts wood in another's forest or pastures animals in another's pastures:
Does not sin if the forests or pastures belong to some commune, and there is question of inhabitants of that commune, unless, as regards forests, great devastation is done. Otherwise the prohibition can be held as merely penal, and even as such it is not judged to extend to dry branches.
Sins if the forests or pastures belong to some private person, or at least have been leased by a private person. Nevertheless, commonly owners are judged to grant that dry branches may be collected (St. Alphonsus, III, 529). For the rest, in these matters custom must also be attended to.
Corollary III. He who, from money entrusted to him by a society, steals a sum with the intention of returning it, sins, because the owners, on account of the danger of damage, are reasonably gravely unwilling. But what quantity is required for grave sin depends in great part on the gravity of the danger.
1 Zech. 5:3; Hab. 2:16; Exod. 20:15; 1 Cor. 6:10.
2 According to others, both robbery and sacrilege constitute one species of sin, as if coalescing from two, yet distinct from simple theft.
3 Others argue from the grave damage which, according to the contrary opinion, would threaten society or even individual persons; but an intrinsic reason of strict injustice is lacking. Others judge that in the case posited the right of the republic is gravely injured. But the private owner alone, and not the republic as such, enjoys a strict right in the goods of others.