Question Two: On Theft

S. Th. II-II, q. 66, a. 3-6 and 8-9.

403. Theft, taken generically, is the unjust taking of another's thing, for the sake of gain, the owner being reasonably unwilling. It is said:

1. unjust taking or usurpation, i.e., either removal, or voluntary detention, since to detain is equivalently to take, and he who detains while he can and ought to return morally takes: "to detain," says St. Thomas, a. 3, "that which is owed to another has the same nature of harm as unjust taking"; and thus to theft are reduced: not paying debts, snatching something away by fraud or deceit, not restoring a thing found;

2. of another's thing, belonging to another by right of dominion, whether perfect or imperfect; whence theft is committed even against a depositary, borrower for use, lessee, etc., if you take away from them a deposited, lent, or leased thing;

3. for the sake of gain, i.e., with the intention of retaining the thing and receiving profit, whether for oneself or for another: for if it were done with the intention of returning the thing to the owner, or safely preserving it, or destroying or lending it, it would not properly be theft; and thus it is distinguished from simple unjust taking or damage, by which no profit is obtained but the good of another is destroyed without advantage;

4. the owner being reasonably unwilling, which is added for the sake of greater explanation, because it is already included in the word: unjust. For if the owner were not unwilling, or if he were unwilling but not reasonably, because there is a just cause of taking away, there would be no injustice, nor theft strictly so called: thus if a poor man in extreme necessity takes, or if a maidservant gives to him; or if someone accepts under the title of compensation, or takes a sword or book from one who is now about to abuse it; or if a wife takes for her honest support, or lest the husband dissipate it in games or feasting.

A double species of theft is distinguished:

1. theft simply, or strictly so called (vol; diefstal), the hidden taking of another's thing, while the owner or the one who keeps the thing is absent or ignorant: this is negatively involuntary for the owner, through ignorance;

2. robbery (roof), or the open and violent taking of another's thing, while the owner is present, seeing, and, insofar as he can, resisting and struggling: this is positively involuntary for the owner on account of violence, whether physical and properly so called, or moral and improperly so called, namely, grave fear unjustly inflicted, as if a robber threatens death in order to extort money. This differs in species from simple theft, because it adds a new malice diverse in species: there is not only real injury in goods, but also personal injury against the person and his honor or liberty, to whom violence is brought or fear. Hence one can sin mortally in the species of robbery, and venially in the species of theft, as if you take a slight thing from a distinguished man who is present and gravely resisting; and vice versa.

Moreover theft, and say the same of robbery, can be simple, - or qualified, to which there is joined a certain circumstance, whether

a) changing the species, by reason of religion, namely, sacrilegious theft, whether the thing is sacred (real sacrilege), or it is taken from a sacred place provided it had been handed over to the custody of that place (local sacrilege), or a sacred thing is taken from its own sacred place (real and at the same time local sacrilege); or

b) notably aggravating. Thus formerly in law they distinguished peculatum, he who steals from public goods, to which the falsification of money pertains; plagiatum, he who abducts a man constituted in slavery; abigeatum, by which someone steals cattle in pastures. In present-day law other distinctions are usefully made in order to diverse penalties.

404. Principle I. Theft is a sin against justice, mortal from its genus. - For:

1° In itself and immediately it is against natural law and is opposed to commutative justice, and in the Decalogue (Exod. XX, 15) it is placed where grave precepts are enunciated (Mt. XIX, 18). For the right of dominion over external goods is derived from the law of nature and is legitimate, indeed necessary both to the individual and to society; but this right is openly violated by theft, since another's thing is taken away while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

2° Mediately and consequently it is opposed a) to charity, insofar as it takes away a good from one's neighbor and brings sadness upon him, and is apt to disturb peace and introduce quarrels, contentions, and hatreds;

b) also to the good of the community and of legal justice, since it tends so as gravely to disturb the tranquility of citizens and the public peace, necessary for the common good of society: "if men everywhere stole from one another," says St. Thomas, a. 6, "human society would perish."

Hence the Apostle says, I Cor. VI, 10: "Neither thieves... nor robbers will possess the kingdom of God."

Nevertheless theft admits lightness of matter, if the matter is divisible and admits more and less: for he who steals a few cents does not gravely offend private right, nor greatly disturb public peace, nor is the owner reasonably very unwilling or unwilling except against the manner of taking; - and similarly he who takes away a thing of greater moment from an owner who does not much care about it, or who in fact is known not to be very unwilling.

405. Principle II. Theft per se grave is constituted by that quantity or value whose taking, of itself gravely harmful, is done while the owner is reasonably and gravely unwilling, or which of itself is apt to cause grave sorrow of soul or indignation, and to which therefore society also is gravely unwilling, because it is apt to harm public peace.

Matter grave of itself, or from intrinsic damage, is not to be estimated only from the value or quantity of the thing taken away, so that the quantity required for grave matter is the same whether it is taken away from a rich man or from one not rich, as Bannez, Maldonatus, Dicastillo, Billuart, Carriere, Gousset, and others said, establishing it as that which morally equals the daily wage of an honest worker, or at least that which is necessary for the support of one day for an honest man. But according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus already calls common, the gravity of matter is probably to be determined from the value of the thing together with the condition and circumstances of the person from whom it is taken.

The reason is that theft essentially consists in the taking of another's thing, considered not as it were in the abstract, but in the concrete, insofar as it harms the owner and is joined with the reasonable dissent of the owner. Therefore the matter of theft and its gravity must be taken partly by order to the thing taken away, partly to the reasonable will of him from whom it is taken. "Sins," says St. Thomas, a. 3, "which are committed against one's neighbor, are to be weighed in themselves indeed according to the harms which are brought upon the neighbor; because from this they have the nature of fault." But the taking away of a thing which gravely harms one man is not therefore gravely harmful generally and to all. Whence the condition of the person is not extrinsic to theft considered under the aspect of damage, and the right in a good possessed by a poor man, according to utility and necessity, is worth more to the one having it. Therefore although theft may be materially equal, it is not so formally.

Hence a double grave matter is distinguished by modern authors: absolutely grave, from the value alone of the thing taken away, no account being taken of the condition of the person, and relatively grave, taken from the value of the thing and from the condition of the owner. For the gravity of matter, they say, is to be determined from the gravity of the detriment which by theft is brought against the end on account of which dominion of things ought to be preserved. But this end is twofold: the good of individuals, to whom this dominion is pleasing, useful, and necessary; and the good of the whole society, in which without private dominion of things public peace and security and the due incentive of labor cannot be had. Whence theft is distinguished as relatively and absolutely grave, according as grave detriment is directly brought either upon the possessor himself or upon the good of society.

a) A relatively grave quantity, according to the varied fortune and necessity of the person, is damage notable of itself, although the thing is not very notable; namely, that which, given the condition of the owner, of itself brings grave harm. This is generally judged to be that which suffices someone for one day for the support of himself or also of his own; whence for a worker it is a value somewhat less than a daily wage, and for a true poor man still a little less. Therefore it differs much for various nations and diverse conditions of men, for great cities and remote rural regions.

b) An absolutely grave quantity is a thing notable in itself which of itself procures a great advantage, even if its taking from someone, for example from a very rich man, is not gravely harmful, as are an ox, a horse, a sheep, a hundred gold coins. For although such theft does not much harm the owner, nevertheless it gravely harms society, public tranquility and security, because if these thefts were not prohibited under grave obligation, they would become most frequent and thus the greatest detriment to all and a disturbance of peace and security would threaten the whole society. Whence public power and the whole community are deservedly gravely unwilling that such things be committed in its territory; and therefore the owner himself is reasonably very unwilling in such a theft, even if he himself does not directly undergo grave damage from it.

Grave matter, expressed in money, depends upon the relative value of money, upon the greater or lesser abundance of money and things, and upon common estimation. Thus, for example, in America and England grave matter is not unless the sum is greater than in Belgium, because of the lesser value of money and greater abundance. Hence:

1. As the value of money decreases, the sum required for grave matter also increases.

2. Nevertheless it does not always increase in the same proportionate ratio: for the thing depends also upon other factors, such as more difficult economic circumstances, relative need, and common estimation. Nor does adaptation in minds and morals to the new value of money happen suddenly. And even when money decreases, those thefts will be grave which, in the given circumstances, are apt to have repercussion upon common security, because then there is grave harm to society.

3. With all these things considered, in Belgium before the European war of the year 1914-18, absolute grave matter was judged by authors to be 25-30 francs or somewhat more.¹ But after the war, the value of money being greatly diminished, it seemed to many that it could be extended to 150-200 or even more. In the uncertain economic circumstances prevailing after the second universal war of the year 1940-45, one should rather abstain provisionally from computation, because no definitive one can be established.

¹ Bulot says 25-30 fr.; Tanquerey 20 or 30 fr., in the Federated States of America 7-8 dollars; Noldin 30 fr.; but these in present circumstances are to be increased somewhat. Whence Ferreres, who for various regions places it between 30 and 40 fr., now permits this to be doubled; Arregui, however, establishes it between 40 and 50 fr.; Vermeersch 50 fr., but in a region where money has been made extraordinary from use, up to 150-200 fr. Before the war Palmieri for richer regions held a probable computation to be 100 fr.; but Garriepy, an American, thinks this too benign and places it at 8-10 dollars. One must abstain from laxer estimations, such as that which Arendt proposed in N. Th. 1926.

4. Let these things be an aid to confessors in ministry; but they are not to be proposed ex professo to penitents, nor a fortiori to the faithful in a sermon: for they would easily be badly understood and become a stimulus to stealing.²

² Tanquerey noted this, o. c., n. 436, and Vermeersch, Th. M. II, n. 639.

5. In practice, the matter is not of such great moment. For a) true thieves also steal, or intend or are ready to steal, more than matter strictly grave; b) subjectively, grave matter is that which the thief thought to be grave; and objectively, that which in the region is generally judged a mortal sin by good faithful. Nor is such a common opinion, if it is sufficiently strict, to be reformed; because this would be to stimulate thefts and thus would harm the common good. Therefore c) before the fact, one must speak more rigorously, so that the faithful may be turned away from theft, for example, by asking: would you not be gravely unwilling? or by saying that it is imprudent to expose oneself to acts which perhaps are grave injustice; - after the fact, lest an obligation of restoring under grave obligation be imposed, unless it is certain. d) In this matter, however, ordinarily attention will have to be given to relatively grave matter.

406. Principle III. Theft light of itself can by accident be grave on account of a great extrinsic harm; and on the contrary theft grave of itself can by accident be light on account of the disposition of the owner, if he is not very unwilling.

Just as absolutely grave matter is given, so there is an absolutely light quantity, namely, that which morally is less than daily support; and nevertheless, by reason of a special circumstance, theft of absolutely light matter can be a grave sin, or on the contrary theft of matter grave of itself can be only a light sin; for:

1. Theft of absolutely light matter, which brings upon another grave sadness or annoyance or notable damage, is by accident a grave sin against charity toward one's neighbor, or also against justice. Thus if someone takes away a thing of slight value which is very dear to the owner; or an instrument, for example, a needle from a tailor, while another cannot be had, so that he is deprived of a means necessary for support or for making gain; or a small coin from one who needs it lest he be reduced to extreme necessity. But in these cases the grave sin is not under the aspect of theft, but under the aspect of offense or injury or damage.

2. Theft of matter grave of itself can by accident be light, if the owner is not gravely unwilling. For since the opposition of the owner is an essential condition of injustice, one must attend to the disposition of the injured person in determining the gravity of theft, which will be graver or lighter according as the owner is reasonably more or less unwilling. Hence thefts grave of themselves but committed among domestics, or among near kinsmen or very close friends, can easily be light, if the owner is or reasonably ought to be not very unwilling. In particular:

a. Thefts of spouses. On account of mutual union and a certain community of goods, at least in use, a spouse is judged to be less unwilling toward a spouse than toward others; whence the matter required for grave theft is greater for spouses than for strangers, greater for common goods than for proper goods: thus according to the prudent estimation of St. Alphonsus, which many follow, a quantity twice as great is required, and sometimes more. Indeed it can happen that secret takings by the wife are not thefts, if the permission of the husband can deservedly be presumed; not however always, as if she expends notable money in buying ornaments wholly superfluous.

b. Thefts of children from the goods of parents. On account of the intimate union and common destination of goods, parents are rightly judged to be less unwilling; and according to the estimation of St. Alphonsus, for grave matter a quantity twice as great is required as that which otherwise would be required in similar conditions. In practice, for food or tobacco, parents are not unwilling except concerning the clandestine manner in which they are taken, unless it concerned things altogether precious; for money they are unwilling concerning the manner, namely, that it is done secretly, and concerning the end, namely, that it is consumed in play and pleasures, unless the sums were greater.

c. Thefts of religious from the goods of the community. It is said by many that religious are to be considered as sons, and therefore a quantity twice as great is required for grave theft, unless however great detriment were brought to a poor monastery. But this rightly seems too lax to others, since the condition is disparate, both because a religious is not, as a son is, a necessary heir of goods, and because religious superiors are much more unwilling than parents, on account of the spiritual detriment of subjects. Nevertheless a greater quantity is required than in other thefts. But in those sins there is always malice against religion, on account of violation of the vow of poverty.

d. Thefts of servants from certain goods of masters. For common food or things of lesser moment which are not cautiously kept, provided they are not sold or handed over to others or carried out of the house, but consumed by the servants themselves, masters are not very unwilling or are unwilling only as to the manner. But for things carefully kept, for choice and very precious foods or extraordinary things or things of great value, for money not small, the quantity sufficient for grave theft seems to be the same as for strangers, because masters are not accustomed to be less unwilling; especially for things specially committed to the custody of servants, which also can be reputed graver as an abuse of faith or denial of due fidelity.

e. Thefts of workers in the workshops of the master. These are to be judged by analogy as for the little thefts of servants; but special attention seems to have to be given to the damage really caused and perhaps to the customs existing in the workshop. For if the master knows the custom in some way and does not strongly contradict it, he is certainly to be judged less unwilling; unless however he would not dare to contradict it from fear of a greater evil.

f. Thefts of domestics generally can be estimated according to the aforesaid rules, unless something else is established. In practice the matter also depends on the fortune and personal disposition of the possessor and on the custom of places or families. Thus a rich man, one liberal, indulgent, a friend, is presumed to be less unwilling than a poor man, one avaricious, severe, or little loving; less also as to foods than as to other things; less if they take something moderate and rarely, than if something great and frequently; less if by simply taking secretly than by breaking in or by contracting debts in his name; less if domestics steal for their own uses, than if for giving or selling to others; less if a domestic is very useful, industrious, than if negligent, idle; less if one is a son, than if there are several or many.

Nevertheless all, whoever they are, are carefully to be deterred from the aforesaid little thefts, because they are repugnant to natural honesty, and because they easily introduce the proximate danger of gravely evil injustice.

407. Principle IV. Small thefts can morally be united and coalesce, both by reason of intention into one grave injustice, and by reason of moral conjunction into one gravely unjust damage, and by reason of physical conjunction into one gravely unjust detention.

1° By reason of intention, if someone commits small thefts either against one person or against several persons, with the intention of arriving at a notable sum, or of becoming notably richer, or of bringing grave damage. This man, on account of the intention, sins gravely from the first theft, and commits only one mortal sin, unless he revokes the intention and afterward renews it.

Thus he who, intending to steal two hundred coins, so that he may carry out his plan more safely, again and again steals two or three coins; he who uses false weights, although on each occasion he defrauds little; he who, under a feigned pretext, successively begs a great sum of money from various persons. The same holds of an innkeeper who is accustomed to mix a little water with wine, unless there is a general custom; - of tailors who retain for themselves or sell fragments of cloth still useful to the owners, which are left over, unless somewhere a custom is in force or less is paid while the fragments remain to the tailor, or unless it is established that wealthy owners do not wish the fragments to be restored to them or care little about them; - and something similar holds of millers who retain for themselves a small part of the grain or flour.

2° By reason of moral conjunction and unjust damage, if someone has committed several light thefts without the intention of arriving at grave matter, - which besides he did not preserve by accumulating but consumed by dissipating successively, - nevertheless afterward, by adding theft, in fact arrives at a quantity gravely harmful; provided that a) the thefts are not too distant, so that they cannot morally coalesce into one; b) the individual thefts have not been efficaciously revoked or restored; c) and the thief notices that relatively grave matter is being completed. This man sins venially on each occasion, but in the last act by which he completes grave damage he sins mortally, because then knowingly and willingly he inflicts notable damage. Thus if a grave quantity is taken away from the same owner; for if it is done from diverse persons, grave damage is brought to no one and only light thefts are committed, unless they were so very frequent that from this great damage threatened the common good and public security.

In practice: only those are judged to be morally united which are committed within a short interval, for example, within two months; and for very small thefts, still less time is required. Things rather notable, repeated rather often, finally coalesce at some point, because it is scarcely possible that the intention of arriving at a notable sum be lacking; the contrary is true for very small things.

3° By reason of physical conjunction and unjust detention, if someone, knowingly and willingly, retains in itself or in an equivalent a great quantity of another's good, even if taken away from several persons through light thefts. This man sins mortally, even if no moral union is present among the little thefts committed, because the detention of another's thing in a great quantity, no less than taking away, brings great detriment upon society. For just as it is disordered to become rich unjustly, so it is gravely disordered to become notably rich from injustice. Whence Innocent condemned proposition 38: "One is not bound under the penalty of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away by a few thefts, however great the total sum may be."

Light thefts following upon grave matter already completed do not constitute a new mortal sin, unless they again reach a new grave quantity, or unless they are considered as one thing with the preceding grave matter, because then they include approval of it (I, n. 550).

Many add: also by reason of conspiracy; but this pertains to another question, namely, concerning cooperation in others' sins (n. 317).

408. Remarks. - 1. All concede that, for constituting a grave sin by coalescing small thefts, a greater quantity is required than if a thing of great value were stolen at once and once for all; because the damage is not felt so much and does not bring equally grave sadness and displeasure; - unless however a little time intervenes, for example, one or two days: for then the same quantity suffices, because the taking is judged to be one and the owner to be equally unwilling.

2. That greater quantity can be determined only from the estimation of prudent men, all circumstances having been considered. In ordinary circumstances, the prudent estimation of St. Alphonsus can be observed, according to whom, if the thefts are made at intervals from the same owner, a quantity greater by half is required; if from diverse owners, a quantity twice as great as otherwise would be demanded in the same circumstances.

3. Even if small thefts do not attain grave sin, some restitution under light obligation is to be imposed, lest penitents make a step from small thefts to greater ones, and lest by multiplying small ones they then attain grave matter.