Truthfulness (Veracity)

634. On veracity. 1. Veracity is a virtue which inclines the will to inducing conformity between our mind and the signs by which we manifest something to our neighbor; therefore it inclines to taking care for truth in signs.

a. Veracity is a special virtue, because it regards a special honesty distinct from the honesty of other virtues, namely truth in sayings and deeds.

b. Veracity is a virtue annexed to justice: alpha. because it is toward another: for signs have been given to us so that we may manifest to others the judgments of our mind; beta. because of itself it induces a moral debt; but per accidens it can happen that a strict right belongs to others of requiring truth, for example, in contracts.

2. The material object of this virtue is signs by which we manifest our mind to our neighbor; the formal object is the honesty which is found in the conformity of the mind with external signs: for that signs which have been given to us for making the mind open to others be discordant from the mind is opposed to the natural order; then, without truth social life cannot stand.

3. The duties of veracity are: a. to love truth in sayings and deeds; b. to take care lest anything be said against the judgment of the mind; c. to express the mind where reason and occasion demand this: for veracity does not require that always and everywhere the judgment of the mind be opened, which rather sometimes must be hidden; d. to inquire into the truth of the thing when something must be absolutely affirmed or denied; e. to execute promises.

¹ Lessius, De iustitia et iure, l. 2, c. 47, n. 29 ss.; Kossing, Uber die Wahrheitsliebe (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1893).

635. On fidelity. 1. Fidelity is a moral virtue inclining the will to conforming deeds to promises, that is, to past words promising.

a. Fidelity is akin to veracity: for just as veracity requires that we conform words to the mind, so fidelity requires that we conform deeds to words.

b. Like veracity, so also fidelity has very great social moment: for faith and trust in one's neighbor (das Vertrauen) are founded on fidelity; but human commerce requires no less that we be able to trust those promising than that we be able to believe those speaking.

2. The obligation of fidelity arises from promise, by which someone freely obligates himself to doing something afterward: for it belongs to the nature of promise that the one promising intends in some way, either from justice or from fidelity, to obligate himself to doing the thing promised.

a. A saying by which someone predicts that a future action will be done or omitted signifies two things: the present will, or purpose, of the future action, and the future execution of the purpose. Therefore the same saying must have a twofold conformity: conformity with the present purpose, which veracity requires, and conformity with future execution, which fidelity requires.

b. Not any purpose whatsoever of a future action or omission expressed before others obliges to execution; only a promise made to others induces the obligation of execution. He who does not execute a purpose, even a serious one, is accused of inconstancy; he who does not execute a promise is accused of infidelity: for a saying in an externally expressed purpose is nothing except a sign of the internal will of doing something; but in a promise a saying is a surety of future execution, or is faith made to another concerning future execution (sein Wort geben).

c. He who seriously promises something must have the will of obligating himself to doing that which he promises, and the will of fulfilling the promise. He who promises without the former will sins by lying; he who promises without the latter will sins by mental infidelity.

3. Fidelity from itself obliges only under light obligation; wherefore infidelity does not exceed venial sin, unless damage follows to one's neighbor because the thing promised is not furnished.

There are those, such as Lessius, Suarez, and Vasquez, who say that fidelity in grave matter obliges under grave obligation; but Lugo rightly notes¹ that the dishonesty which is contained in infidelity is not grave. For he who does not observe faith given to another deceives the other, who had hope, not right, concerning the thing promised; but to frustrate hope of this kind is not grave. Moreover he who does not observe faith given is not worthy that trust be given to his promises; but neither is this deformity and baseness of the one promising grave. The reason is the same on account of which a lie from itself is only a light sin.

¹ De iustitia et iure, disp. 23, sect. 6, n. 90 ss.

I. Notion of Truth. Truth or veracity is a moral virtue inclining man faithfully to signify outwardly his own judgment (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 109, a. 1). It is said:

1. His own judgment, that is, the concepts which he has in his mind about some matter.

2. Faithfully to signify outwardly, that is, to communicate with others in conformity with his own mind.

II. Object of Truth. 1. The material object is formed by all the modes by which something can be communicated, whether signs, words, writings, or deeds.

2. The remote formal object is the special reason of debt of signifying truth to others (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 109, a. 3); the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in rendering the debt.

III. Opposed Vices. To truth is opposed every act of manifestation not agreeing with the internal concept; this act is called a lie if it is done by words, signs, or writings; simulation, if it consists in deeds.

Note. With truth coincides internal simplicity. "Simplicity," says the Angelic Doctor, "is said by opposition to duplicity, namely by which someone has one thing in his heart and shows another outwardly; and thus simplicity pertains to this virtue, that is, to truth" (II-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 4).¹

¹ External simplicity in clothing, etc., according to St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1, corpus, pertains to the virtue which is called modesty of attire, concerning which below; cf. St. Peter Damian, Opusculum 45 (M.P.L. 145, cols. 695-794 inclusive); Benedict XIV, De canonizatione et beatificatione Sanctorum, book 3, c. 24, nn. 11-12 (Padua edition, 1743, t. 3, pp. 211-213 inclusive).

Degrees of Moral Debt.—The remaining potential parts of justice are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.

(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.

(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all. Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and distinction.

The Virtue of Truthfulness.—Having treated the virtues of gratitude and vengeance, which deal with moral obligations caused by an act of the one owed, we now pass on to truthfulness, which is a moral obligation arising from the acts of the one owing in which he communicates with others. For he who speaks, writes, or otherwise manifests his mind to others puts himself under a duty of not deceiving. Truthfulness or veracity is defined as “a moral virtue that inclines one duly and faithfully to express what is in one’s mind.”

(a) It is a virtue, that is, a good habit, and so it differs from truth, which is the object of intellectual habits. Thus, the First Truth or God is the object of faith. Truthfulness is not the object of a virtue, but it is a virtue.

(b) It is a moral virtue. It deals with external things (viz., the words or signs by which we express our thoughts), and so it is not a theological virtue; moreover, though the knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, the right manifestation of truth depends on a good will, and so truthfulness is not an intellectual virtue: the truthful man may be unlearned, but he loves honesty.

(c) It regulates the expression of the mind, that is, the words, writing, gestures, conduct, and other external signs, so as to make them conformable to the mind which they stand for. Truthfulness deals with internal things (e.g., when the speaker says that he has good health or is well disposed towards another) and with external things as they appear to the speaker (e.g., when he says that he is certain or believes that a report is accurate).

(d) It is a faithful expression of what is in the mind or belief. Hence, one may be truthful while making statements contrary to fact, or untruthful while making statements agreeable to facts, for truthfulness is sincerity, not correctness.

(e) It is a due expression of one’s mind or belief; that is, it is given when and where and as it should be given. A person who speaks out his mind on all occasions, with no regard for results, is not a liar, but he is at least imprudent, and he cannot be said to possess the virtue of truthfulness, for every virtue is prudent. Examples of this are persons who unnecessarily indulge self-praise by telling their true virtues or perfections (Prov., xxvii. 2), or who vaingloriously or otherwise foolishly publish their true sins or imperfections (Is. iii. 9).

The Excellence of Truthfulness.—(a) Truthfulness is a virtue, since it makes right use of language and other signs by employing them for the truth, and also serves society, which rests on the trust that men have in the words and promises of their fellow-men. St. Paul admonishes the Ephesians (iv. 25) that each one speak the truth to his neighbor, since all are members of the other.

(b) It is a moral virtue, preserving moderation in conversations and other interchanges of thought. This virtue sees that facts are neither exaggerated nor understated, that truth is not manifested when it should be concealed, nor concealed when it should be spoken.

(c) It is a special virtue, for, while the other moral virtues regulate actions and external things, none of them except truthfulness regulates those objects precisely in their character of media or instruments for signifying and conveying thoughts, opinions, and decisions. And since a great part of human life is occupied in conference or correspondence with others, truthfulness is one of the most useful of the virtues and one whose exercise is most frequently called for.

(d) It is a virtue annexed to justice. On the one hand, it is like justice, since it pays a debt which one social being owes another of speaking the truth; on the other hand, it falls short of justice, since the debt is moral, not legal. This is said of truthfulness in ordinary intercourse, for in judicial process and in contracts there is also a legal obligation of justice to tell the truth.

Sincerity and Fidelity.—Two virtues that pertain to truthfulness are sincerity and fidelity.

(a) Sincerity (simplicity) is the virtue of one who is consistent with himself, avoiding duplicity and double dealing of every kind, such as lies, equivocations, sophistries, specious excuses, quibbles, dishonest shifts, distractions, concealments, and the like.

(b) Fidelity (loyalty) is the virtue of one who fulfills promises that are obligatory only in virtue of his word freely given. It differs from constancy, which is concerned not with promises but resolutions, and from virtues concerned with promises that are obligatory in virtue of legal debt, such as contracts, promissory oaths (see 1692, 1749, 1753, 1888). Fidelity makes an honest man’s word as good as his bond, and it is therefore one of the most appreciated of virtues (Matt., xxv. 21; Psalm xiv). Horace calls it the sister of justice.

Vices Opposed to Truthfulness.—(a) By defect one sins against truth through lying and breach of promise; (b) by excess one sins against truthfulness in violation of secret or other unjustifiable disclosures.

1. DEFINITION.—Veracity or truthfulness (veritas sive veracitas) means habitual regard for the truth, and may be defined for our present purpose as the duty of adhering to the truth in our intercourse with others.

St. James teaches: "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man; he is able also with a bridle to lead about the whole body."¹

¹ Jas. III, 2: “If anyone does not offend in word, he is a perfect man. For he can lead the whole body about with a bridle.”

Commenting on this passage, Dr. Belser says:

"What does it mean not to offend in word, and to be perfect in speech? It means to tell the truth always, to speak exactly as one thinks, to say neither too much nor too little, to speak in the right place and at the proper time, without anger, bitterness, or exaggeration. It is not enough to be cautious in speech for prudence sake or to observe a diplomatic reticence, but we should habitually control our tongue and employ it exclusively for the honor of God and the edification and salvation of our fellowmen."²

² J. E. Belser, Die Epistel des hl. Jakobus, Freiburg i. B. 1909, pp. 140 sq.

2. VERACITY A SOCIAL NECESSITY.—Man is an ethical and a social being. He is made for intercourse with his fellowmen and cannot live without their assistance. Now, community life depends upon mutual fidelity and veracity.³

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 2: “Truth is a certain special virtue by which a man arranges his outward things—whether words, deeds, or signs—in due order.”—Ibid., qu. 129, art. 3, ad 1: “Every man needs first divine assistance, and secondly also human assistance, because man is naturally a social animal, since he is not sufficient unto himself for life.”

"Men could not associate with one another," says St. Thomas, "if they did not believe each other."⁴ This is but another way of saying that the virtue of veracity is one of the fundamental conditions of a well-ordered community life and, therefore, a duty resting upon each individual member of society. "Putting away lying," says St. Paul, "speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor; for we are all members one of another."⁵

⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3, ad 1: “Because man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another that without which human society could not be preserved. Men, however, could not live together unless they believed one another as persons manifesting truth to one another. And therefore the virtue of truth in some way bears the character of a debt.”—Cfr. Hirscher, Die christliche Moral, Vol. III, pp. 274 sqq.

⁵ Eph. IV, 25: “Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor; for we are all members one of another.”—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 2, ad 1: “Because man is naturally a social animal, he owes to other men, from a certain honorableness, the manifestation of truth, without which human society could not endure.... Man could not live in society without truth.”

3. VERACITY A DUTY.—Faith and mutual confidence, without which human society could not exist, are essentially conditioned upon vera- city, which consequently is a postulate of the moral order or, in other words, a natural duty. But it is more than that: it is also a supernatural duty, enforced by Revelation.⁶

⁶ Ex. XX, 16; Lev. XIX, 11; Ps. XIV, 3; XXX, 24; Zach. VIII, 16, 19; Prov. VI, 16 sq.; XII, 22; Ecclus. IV, 30; Matth. V, 37; 2 Cor. VI, 7; Eph. IV, 25; VI, 14.

Veracity as a duty has a positive as well as a negative side. Positively, it obliges a man to tell the truth; negatively, it obliges him not to lie. a) As a positive duty veracity obliges not absolutely, but merely in a conditional way; that is to say, we are not bound to tell our fellowmen all we know, but to reveal our thoughts to them only when obliged to do so by strict justice (as when questioned by legitimate authority) or by charity (as when it becomes necessary to uncover a harmful error or to aid an innocent man in obtaining his release from prison).

We are allowed to withhold the truth when we are not under positive obligation to reveal it and when to speak out would cause harm and inconvenience to ourselves. It is permitted to feign sleep or death in order to escape being murdered, to disguise oneself to avoid danger, and to dress poorly in order to conceal one's wealth or to avoid inconvenience or annoyance. By such acts one merely withholds facts or conditions which one is not obliged to reveal and allows others rather to deceive themselves. Even when asked by legitimate authority, one who is accused of a crime may refuse to confess if he can do so without being guilty of positive or negative untruth and without violating commutative justice, i. e., without seriously injuring his fellowmen, for instance, by causing an innocent person to be condemned.

Finally, there is the duty of not revealing to others what has been entrusted to us as a secret, or which we have bound ourselves by a promise or by the assumption of an office to keep to ourselves. Thus priests, physicians, counsellors-at-law, and editors are not allowed to divulge secrets they have learned in the exercise of their profession.

Besides this there is the general duty binding every Christian to guard his tongue at all times and to avoid useless or frivolous gossip, mindful of the fact that on the day of judgment he shall have to give an account of every word he has uttered.⁷

⁷ Matth. XII, 36; Jas. I, 19; III, 5 sqq.

A higher degree of veracity is frankness or simplicity of heart (simplicitas), which consists in habitually saying what one thinks, without reserve, exaggeration, or ulterior motive.⁸ Sim- plicity differs from veracity only in concept (in ratione), as the former has reference to the agreement between a sign and that which it signifies, while the latter aims at harmonizing the internal intention with its external expression.⁹ It is simplicity that constitutes the childlike disposition so highly extolled by our Divine Lord in conjunction with prudence. Simplicity renders the soul receptive to the influence of grace, fills the heart with joy, and is a mark of supernatural perfection.¹⁰

⁸ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 2, ad 4: “Simplicity is named by opposition to duplicity, namely, whereby someone has one thing in his heart and shows another outwardly; and thus simplicity pertains to this virtue [truth]. It makes the intention right, not indeed directly (because this pertains to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another.”

⁹ Ibid., qu. 111, art. 3, ad 2: “The virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth, but differs only in concept, because truth is said according as signs agree with the things signified, whereas simplicity is said according as it does not tend to diverse things, namely, that one should intend one thing inwardly and pretend another outwardly.”

¹⁰ Prov. XI, 20; XXVIII, 18; Matth. X, 16; XVIII, 3.

The vice opposed to simplicity is duplicity, i. e., deceitfulness in character, speech, or conduct, more commonly called double-dealing. b) On the negative side the duty of veracity or truthfulness binds absolutely,—that is to say, we are not permitted, under any circumstances and for any reason, to lie, i. e., knowingly to tell an untruth in order to deceive others. Ecclus. VII, 14: "Be not willing to make any manner of lie: for the custom thereof is not good."¹¹

¹¹ Ecclus. VII, 14. Cfr. Ex. XXIII, 7; Eph. IV, 25; Col. III, 9.

READINGS.—Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sent., tr. 4, c. 5 (Migne, P. L., CLXXVI, 122 sqq.).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 109 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, II, 212 sqq.).—St.

Bonaventure, Comment. in Sent., III, dist. 38 (Opera Omnia, III, 836 sqq.).—Kössing, Über die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 1 sqq., 55 sqq.—J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 124 sqq.—H. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, p. 647.—Jos. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and Its Antagonists (tr. by A. M. Buchanan; N. Y. 1914, pp. 113 sqq.).—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., “The Catholic Doctrine of Lying and Equivocation,” in Political and Moral Essays, N. Y. 1902, pp. 215–233.—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 60 sqq.

1. DEFINITION.—Closely related to veracity is fidelity. Veracity consists in speaking the truth or expressing one’s mind without deceit; fidelity (πίστις, fides, fidelitas), in keeping a promise or in performing that to which one is obliged.¹

¹ Cfr. Matth. XXIII, 23.

Fidelity is a most important virtue both morally and socially. Without mutual confidence there could be no social intercourse and society would fall to pieces. He who can be always trusted and relied upon to do his duty, is not only highly respected among men, but, as Holy Scripture says, worthy of entering into the joys of Heaven.²

² Prov. XXVIII, 20; Matth. XXV, 21.—Cfr. J. de Lugo, De Iust. et Iure, II, disp. 23, s. 1, n. 13: “Just as truthfulness inclines one to conform outward words to the mind, so fidelity inclines one to conform deeds to previous statements; fidelity obliges one to conform deeds to words signifying a promise.”—Horace, Carm., I, 24, 6: “Iustitiae soror, incorrupta fides nudaque veritas.”—Ibid., III, 3, 1: “Iustum et tenacem propositi virum non civium ardor prava iubentium,” etc.

2. The duty of fidelity, which is based upon the same grounds as veracity, may originate:

a) In a promise, i. e., a declaration of willingness to undertake a certain task or to live up to a certain obligation.³ A lawful and valid promise must be kept in the sense in which it was made by one and received by the other, that is, without equivocation or restriction, and it makes no difference whether he to whom it was given is an orthodox believer or a heretic (fides haereticis habenda).⁴

³ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 758: “A promise is a contract by which someone freely and spontaneously binds himself gratuitously to perform or omit something in another’s favor. The conditions required for the obligation of a promise are: (1) That there be a will to bind oneself, at least virtual and implicit, which he is judged to have who seriously wishes to promise, even if he does not advert to the obligation. (2) That the promisor’s consent be fully free and spontaneous, and therefore that all error and deceit concerning the substance and final cause, and all compulsion or unjust fear, be absent. (3) That the promise itself be manifested outwardly and accepted; for every agreement must consist in the mutual consent of two or more persons upon the same object, and, moreover, no one is judged to wish to bind himself toward another unless the latter accepts.”

⁴ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 88, art. 3, ad 1: “According to moral rectitude [i. e., in conscience and before God], a man is bound to another man by any promise whatsoever, and this is an obligation of natural law.”—St. Augustine, De Doctr. Christ., l. IV, c. 18, n. 35: “What is least is least, but to be faithful in the least is great.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 105).—IDEM, Epist., 189 (al. 205), n. 6: “When faith is pledged, it must be kept even with an enemy against whom war is waged; how much more with a friend for whom one fights.” (P. L., XXXIII, 856).

If a promise forms the foundation of a legal relation (e. g., a contract, as in a betrothal) it constitutes a serious obligation, the non-fulfilment of which entails the duty of restitution.⁵ The obli- gation ceases when its fulfilment becomes morally impossible or injurious to the person to whom the promise was given (not so, however, if it would merely injure him who made it), or if the one to whom it was made lifts the obligation or fails to keep his part of the agreement, or, finally, if the promise has become useless or futile, or the circumstances of the case have so completely changed that if they had been foreseen, the promise would never have been made.⁶

⁵ Cfr. Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Casus Conscientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 835: “A wholly gratuitous promise of itself binds from fidelity alone, and not under grave sin but only under venial sin, unless special circumstances are added.”—Ibid., n. 837: “A promise can bind in justice, and this actually occurs: 1. If an obligation of justice is expressly undertaken; 2. if it is tacitly undertaken, namely by knowingly allowing the risk that the promisee may suffer harm from the promise’s nonfulfilment. In that case the obligation of justice is either to fulfil the promise or to repair the loss caused. Otherwise there would be a harmful deception.”

⁶ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 760: “It is asked, when does the force of an accepted promise cease? The answer is: 1. If the promisee voluntarily remits it or yields his right; 2. if the thing promised becomes unlawful or useless; 3. if the promisee does not stand by his own promises; 4. if the state of affairs or persons changes in such a way that the promise does not appear to have been intended to include that event; 5. if something was promised for a reason that does not exist.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3, ad 5: “If [someone] does not do what he promised, he then seems to act faithlessly by changing his mind. Yet he may be excused in two ways: first, if he promised something that is manifestly unlawful, because he sinned in promising it, but does well in changing his purpose; secondly, if the conditions of persons and affairs have changed.”—Seneca, De Benefic., l. IV, c. 35: “All things must remain the same as they were when you promised, in order that you be held to the promisor’s pledge.”

The oft-quoted axiom, “Haereticis fides non est servanda,” says Dr. Linsenmann, could be justified only on the supposition of the medieval law that a heretic was an enemy of the public order and incapable of entering into legal relations with the faithful, in other words, that whoever espoused heresy knew that, as one denying an important truth of Christian Revelation, he would have no legal standing in the community and no right to expect fidelity from others. To-day, in civil society, we place the heretic on the same plane with the loyal Catholic, and therefore any promise made to him must be faithfully kept. It would not be permissible to break one’s word even to a robber or a murderer who had surrendered himself on the promise of immunity, provided, of course, no positive violation of the moral law were involved. A mere advantage to be gained for the commonwealth never justifies the breaking of a promise.⁷

⁷ Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, pp. 443 sq.

b) The duty of fidelity may originate, secondly, in the confidential relation existing between members of the same social group. Every social relation freely entered into, whether of superiority or inferiority, as between husband and wife, master and servant, etc., entails the obligation of mutual fidelity, which in some instances is solemnly vowed, in others silently assumed. Fidelity is a mutually binding duty, which must be observed in the spirit and meaning of each relation. It is opposed, on the one hand, to compulsion and slavish servility and, on the other, to a mere desire for remuneration, and forms the one and only ethically effective bond of all relations resting on mutual confidence and of all contracts. Only he who is faithful to his vocation will live up to its duties and make the sacrifices demanded by it, even though they be unforeseen. The duty of fidelity has no limit except when it conflicts with the irreducible demands of the moral law.

Fidelity, says Linsenmann, does not demand slavish obedience, but presupposes a spiritual distinction. A servant will often be able to serve his master more faithfully by using his own judgment than by obeying orders literally. . . . Fidelity’s closest ally is honor. Where fidelity is not esteemed, where conscientious compliance with duty is not gratefully acknowledged, where honest servants are not protected, where services rendered in confidential positions are rewarded with money only, there the spiritual bond which should connect master and servant is missing, and society is in danger of disruption.⁸

⁸ IDEM, ibid., pp. 444 sq.

3. Opposed to fidelity is infidelity or perfidy. If the promise was confirmed by an oath, infidelity becomes perjury. The guilt of perfidy is gauged by the subjective malice and the importance of the matter involved, and it may, therefore, be either a venial or a mortal sin according to circumstances. Perfidy dishonors a man, places him in opposition to God, who, as St. Paul says, is faithful,⁹ and destroys mutual confidence among men. The Apostle enumerates this sin among the vices on account of which God delivered the gentiles up to shameful affections.¹⁰

⁹ 2 Tim. II, 13; 1 Cor. X, 13.

¹⁰ Rom. I, 31; I, 26. On perjury, see this Handbook, Vol. IV, pp. 256, 264 sqq.

A particularly grievous sin of infidelity is that committed by a soldier who deserts his flag, especially when his conduct involves injury to the bonum commune, as it usually does in time of war. A deserter is bound to return to his allegiance, not only ex titulo oboedientiae et iustitiae legalis, but also, if he took an oath to uphold the flag, ex titulo fidelitatis et religionis, unless the punishment he would have to undergo were entirely too severe.¹¹

¹¹ Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, p. 148.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 1, ad 3; qu. 88, art. 3.—Lessius, De Iust. et Iure, l. II, c. 47, n. 29 sqq.—Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 29 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 443 sqq.—Aug. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Casus Conscientiae, Vol. I, 3rd ed., n. 835 sqq.—A. Vermeersch, S.J., Quaestiones de Iustitia, pp. 361 sq.

165. Notions. Truth is taken in a diverse sense: either 1. for conformity of the intellect with the thing, or of the thing with the intellect (and in this sense truth is treated in philosophy, which distinguishes between formal or logical truth and ontological truth), or 2. for a moral virtue. In this last sense truth is sometimes called truthfulness and can be defined: the virtue inclining one to say what is true, when, where, and in what manner one ought; or according to St. Thomas: "the habit by which someone shows himself, both by life and by speech, to be such as he is."²⁸⁸ The same Angelic Doctor²⁸⁹ excellently teaches that the act of him who manifests the truth from justice, for example, when someone confesses the truth in judgment or says true testimony, directly pertains to the virtue of justice. We spoke above concerning acts of this kind, where there was discussion of the obligations of the judge, advocate, witness, etc.... But if someone from a certain uprightness manifests the truth to another, as is accustomed to happen among private men outside judgment, then an act of this kind pertains to the special virtue of truthfulness, which is only a potential part of the virtue of justice. Truthfulness taken in this sense is a special and moral virtue. Special indeed, because it exercises acts having a special notion of goodness. For the special goodness of our acts is that our exterior things (whether words or deeds) are duly ordered to our internal intention, as sign to thing signified.²⁹⁰ But the Angelic Doctor²⁹¹ notes that simplicity²⁹² is reduced to this virtue of truthfulness; simplicity is opposed to duplicity, by which, namely, someone has one thing in the heart and shows another externally. In some way also reduced to this virtue of truthfulness is the virtue of fidelity, which inclines the will to execute promises sincerely.²⁹³ For just as truthfulness is conformity between external words and the internal mind, so fidelity is conformity between deeds to be performed and the words of the promise.

The virtue of truthfulness, because it is a virtue annexed to justice, partly agrees with it and partly falls short of it. The virtue of truthfulness agrees with justice in two things, namely, being toward another and constituting a certain equality. For by truthfulness one man manifests to another, and indeed according to equality, his internal thoughts, insofar as words and other external signs are equal to the internal conception. But truthfulness falls short of the proper notion of justice, because in justice there is a strict debt, while in truthfulness there is only the moral debt of uprightness, insofar as wounding truthfulness is indeed against uprightness and against debt broadly so called, but of itself alone it neither induces an obligation of restitution nor offends the debt of the neighbor strictly so called.²⁹⁴

Excellence. Truthfulness is a most beautiful virtue; it is praised by all and is very necessary. "Because man is naturally a social animal, he owes to other men from a certain uprightness the manifestation of truth, without which the society of men could not endure."²⁹⁵ For the peaceful living-together of men is wholly impossible if lies and deceits prevail in place of truthfulness. Wherefore St. Paul warns: "Speak truth, each one with his neighbor, because we are members one of another."²⁹⁶

The offices of truthfulness are: 1. To love truth in words and deeds. 2. To conform external words and deeds with the interior thought, insofar as this is possible, with all the circumstances considered. For truthfulness by no means requires that the judgment of the mind always and everywhere be manifested externally; indeed, it sometimes must rather be concealed, since otherwise there would be a sinful violation of a secret. 3. Faithfully to execute lawful promises.

The vices opposed to truthfulness are, by defect: lying and infidelity in promises. But by excess violation of a secret is opposed to truthfulness. Lying and violation of a secret will be treated at once, but infidelity in promises below, n. 268.

²⁸⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 109, a. 3 ad 3.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 109, a. 2.

²⁹¹ Ibid. ad 4.

²⁹² Offenheit, Geradheit.

²⁹³ Concerning the obligation of this virtue of fidelity arisen from a promise, there will be broader treatment below, n. 267 sqq.

²⁹⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 109, a. 3.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. q. 114, a. 2 ad 1; cf. also q. 109, a. 3 ad 1.

²⁹⁶ Eph. 4, 25.

S. Th. II-II, q. 109.

849. Truth or veracity (waarachtigheid) is a moral virtue inclining one to say what is true conformably to the mind of the speaker; or, the virtue by which someone, in life and speech, shows himself to be such as he is (a. 1 and a. 3, ad 3). According to its essence it conforms words and signs to the mind; yet there pertain to it as integral parts, both:

1. simplicity, which makes the intention upright, by excluding duplicity by which someone shows one thing outwardly and has another in his mind (a. 2, ad 4; q. 111, a. 3, ad 2);

2. fidelity, which inclines the will to carrying out promises sincerely, and so conforms deeds to promises (q. 110, a. 3, ad 5; q. 89, a. 7; q. 98, a. 3, ad 1 and 3).

It is a virtue because its act, to say what is true, is good. It is a moral virtue: for although to know the true is an act of the intellect, the external manifestation of truth pertains to the will, which moves to the use of the external organs and members (a. 1, ad 3; a. 3, ad 2).

It is a special virtue because it has a special goodness, which consists in the order by which external words or deeds are duly ordered to signifying something (a. 2).

850. Object of truth. - The material object which truth exhibits is external signs (words or deeds) by which we manifest our mind to our neighbor; the primary material object which it principally intends to exhibit is equality, or conformity, due from honesty, by which external signs agree with the mind; the formal object or motive on account of which is the honesty of this equality.

851. Corollaries. - 1. The debt which truth considers of itself is not a legal or strict debt, but rather a moral debt, insofar as, namely, from honesty one man owes to another the manifestation of truth; and therefore of itself it does not oblige under grave obligation. Yet it is a debt necessary for honesty: for men could not live together with one another unless they believed one another, as manifesting truth to one another. "Because man," says St. Thomas, q. 114, a. 2, ad 1, "is naturally a social animal, from a certain honesty he owes the manifestation of truth to other men, without which the society of men could not endure." Cf. q. 109, a. 3, ad 1.

2. Hence truth is not justice strictly so called, but its potential part: for it is a) annexed to justice, because it is toward another and establishes equality; b) yet it falls short of justice, because of itself it is concerned with a moral debt, although one necessary to the social order, and only accidentally with a strict debt when there is added the obligation of fidelity, charity, religion, piety, or justice, as in contracts (a. 3).

3. Since truth is a moral virtue, it is in the mean, and indeed in a twofold way: a) on the part of the object, because the true imports equality of the intellect or of the sign to the thing understood or signified; moreover equality is a mean between more and less; b) on the part of the act, because it says what is true when it ought, and how and where it ought: it is superfluous to say what is true when one ought not, a defect not to say it when one ought (a. 1, ad 3).

4. Hence two vices are opposed to truth on the part of the act: by excess there is opposed every indiscreet manifestation of the true, but especially violation of a secret, which can also be injustice; by defect, lying with its various species. Of these we must now speak.

I SHALL EMBRACE much here, yet in few words, that I may finish the other virtues which accompany justice; and in the first place I shall treat of Veritate, which is a virtue especially necessary to justice; for no one can be just in acting unless he be truthful in speaking. Second, I shall explain what that sweet bond of souls is which we call Amicitia. Third, I shall weigh what Liberalitas is, what Epikeia, or what vices are opposed to these. I shall also resume Pietas insofar as it is a Gift of the Holy Spirit; since, insofar as it has a place among the moral virtues, I discussed it above. Finally, whatever precepts of the Decalogue pertain to the observance of Justice, I shall briefly indicate.

TRUTH is a special moral virtue seated in the will, whereby one loves to speak the truth in words and deeds. So D. Thom. art. 1. et 2. and S. Bonav. wills the same in explanatione terminorum Theologiae, near the end, thus defining: Truth is the virtue whereby the heart and words are commanded to accord with things. and 3. part. Centil. sect 44. thus defining: Truth is the virtue by which things that are, or were before, or are to be, are said unaltered. The same is had lib. 3. Compend. Theol. cap. 37.

BUT this virtue does not consist in that consonance of the voice with the intellect, but in the expression consonant with it as commanded by the will. And although faith also, and the other intellectual virtues, are concerned with truth, yet those are concerned with truth to be sought and known; and this one with truth to be expressed. But this virtue has a mean, because it neither enlarges nor diminishes the thing to be signified. To it is opposed duplicity, which tends to one thing not in diverse, so as to intend one thing within and pretend another without.

IT IS, moreover, a potential part of Justice, as S. Bonavent. teaches in the places cited. D. Thom. art. 3. from Marcus Tullius l. 2. de invent. It agrees with Justice, because it is directed to another, expressing one's meaning, and because it preserves a certain equality, adapting signs to the things which the speaker manifests. But it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, because it does not contain a legal debt pertaining to justice, but rather arises from honesty, insofar as man owes it to another sincerely to express the truth; for since man is a sociable animal, he must preserve those things that are necessary for preserving society; such indeed is the sincere expression, especially in contracts; for men could not converse with one another unless they believed one another. Truth indeed also concerns those things that pertain to doctrine, but specially those that pertain to man, that man express himself such as he is. So D. Thom. art. 3. ad 3.