Question First. On Veracity and Fidelity

634. On veracity. 1. Veracity is a virtue which inclines the will to inducing conformity between our mind and the signs by which we manifest something to our neighbor; therefore it inclines to taking care for truth in signs.

a. Veracity is a special virtue, because it regards a special honesty distinct from the honesty of other virtues, namely truth in sayings and deeds.

b. Veracity is a virtue annexed to justice: alpha. because it is toward another: for signs have been given to us so that we may manifest to others the judgments of our mind; beta. because of itself it induces a moral debt; but per accidens it can happen that a strict right belongs to others of requiring truth, for example, in contracts.

2. The material object of this virtue is signs by which we manifest our mind to our neighbor; the formal object is the honesty which is found in the conformity of the mind with external signs: for that signs which have been given to us for making the mind open to others be discordant from the mind is opposed to the natural order; then, without truth social life cannot stand.

3. The duties of veracity are: a. to love truth in sayings and deeds; b. to take care lest anything be said against the judgment of the mind; c. to express the mind where reason and occasion demand this: for veracity does not require that always and everywhere the judgment of the mind be opened, which rather sometimes must be hidden; d. to inquire into the truth of the thing when something must be absolutely affirmed or denied; e. to execute promises.

¹ Lessius, De iustitia et iure, l. 2, c. 47, n. 29 ss.; Kossing, Uber die Wahrheitsliebe (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1893).

635. On fidelity. 1. Fidelity is a moral virtue inclining the will to conforming deeds to promises, that is, to past words promising.

a. Fidelity is akin to veracity: for just as veracity requires that we conform words to the mind, so fidelity requires that we conform deeds to words.

b. Like veracity, so also fidelity has very great social moment: for faith and trust in one's neighbor (das Vertrauen) are founded on fidelity; but human commerce requires no less that we be able to trust those promising than that we be able to believe those speaking.

2. The obligation of fidelity arises from promise, by which someone freely obligates himself to doing something afterward: for it belongs to the nature of promise that the one promising intends in some way, either from justice or from fidelity, to obligate himself to doing the thing promised.

a. A saying by which someone predicts that a future action will be done or omitted signifies two things: the present will, or purpose, of the future action, and the future execution of the purpose. Therefore the same saying must have a twofold conformity: conformity with the present purpose, which veracity requires, and conformity with future execution, which fidelity requires.

b. Not any purpose whatsoever of a future action or omission expressed before others obliges to execution; only a promise made to others induces the obligation of execution. He who does not execute a purpose, even a serious one, is accused of inconstancy; he who does not execute a promise is accused of infidelity: for a saying in an externally expressed purpose is nothing except a sign of the internal will of doing something; but in a promise a saying is a surety of future execution, or is faith made to another concerning future execution (sein Wort geben).

c. He who seriously promises something must have the will of obligating himself to doing that which he promises, and the will of fulfilling the promise. He who promises without the former will sins by lying; he who promises without the latter will sins by mental infidelity.

3. Fidelity from itself obliges only under light obligation; wherefore infidelity does not exceed venial sin, unless damage follows to one's neighbor because the thing promised is not furnished.

There are those, such as Lessius, Suarez, and Vasquez, who say that fidelity in grave matter obliges under grave obligation; but Lugo rightly notes¹ that the dishonesty which is contained in infidelity is not grave. For he who does not observe faith given to another deceives the other, who had hope, not right, concerning the thing promised; but to frustrate hope of this kind is not grave. Moreover he who does not observe faith given is not worthy that trust be given to his promises; but neither is this deformity and baseness of the one promising grave. The reason is the same on account of which a lie from itself is only a light sin.

¹ De iustitia et iure, disp. 23, sect. 6, n. 90 ss.