Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question I: On truth
TRUTH is a special moral virtue seated in the will, whereby one loves to speak the truth in words and deeds. So D. Thom. art. 1. et 2. and S. Bonav. wills the same in explanatione terminorum Theologiae, near the end, thus defining: Truth is the virtue whereby the heart and words are commanded to accord with things. and 3. part. Centil. sect 44. thus defining: Truth is the virtue by which things that are, or were before, or are to be, are said unaltered. The same is had lib. 3. Compend. Theol. cap. 37.
De VERITATE.
VERITAS est specialis virtus moralis in voluntate sita, qua quis in verbis, et factis amat verum dicere. Ita D. Thom. art. 1. et 2. et idem vult S. Bonav. in explanatione terminorum Theologiae, circa finem, sic definiens: Veritas est virtus, qua rebus cor, et verba concordare iubentur. et 3. part. Centil. sect 44. sic definiens: Veritas est virtus, per quam immutata ea, quae sunt, aut, quae ante fuerunt, aut futura sunt, dicuntur. Quod idem habet lib. 3. Compend. Theol. cap. 37.
BUT this virtue does not consist in that consonance of the voice with the intellect, but in the expression consonant with it as commanded by the will. And although faith also, and the other intellectual virtues, are concerned with truth, yet those are concerned with truth to be sought and known; and this one with truth to be expressed. But this virtue has a mean, because it neither enlarges nor diminishes the thing to be signified. To it is opposed duplicity, which tends to one thing not in diverse, so as to intend one thing within and pretend another without.
NON stat autem haec virtus in illa consonantia vocis cum intellectu, sed pro ut est a voluntate imperata illa expressio consonans. Et quamvis etiam fides, aliaeque virtutes intellectuales circa veritatem versentur, tamen illae versantur in veritate indaganda, et agnoscenda; et ista in veritate exprimenda. Habet autem haec virtus medium, quia neque ampliat, neque diminuit rem significandam. Ei autem unificatus simplicitas, quae tendit in unum, non in diversa, ut aliud intendat interius, aliud praetendat exterius.
IT IS, moreover, a potential part of Justice, as S. Bonavent. teaches in the places cited. D. Thom. art. 3. from Marcus Tullius l. 2. de invent. It agrees with Justice, because it is directed to another, expressing one's meaning, and because it preserves a certain equality, adapting signs to the things which the speaker manifests. But it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, because it does not contain a legal debt pertaining to justice, but rather arises from honesty, insofar as man owes it to another sincerely to express the truth; for since man is a sociable animal, he must preserve those things that are necessary for preserving society; such indeed is the sincere expression, especially in contracts; for men could not converse with one another unless they believed one another. Truth indeed also concerns those things that pertain to doctrine, but specially those that pertain to man, that man express himself such as he is. So D. Thom. art. 3. ad 3.
EST autem pars potentialis Iustitiae, ut docent S. Bonavent. locis adductis. D. Thom. art. 3. ex Marco Tullio l. 2. de invent. Convenit cum Iustitia, quia est ad alterum explicans suum sensum, et quia servat aequalitatem quandam, adaequans signa rebus, quas loquens manifestat. Deficit vero a ratione propria iustitiae, quia non continet debitum legale, ad iustitiam pertinens, sed potius ex honestate, quatenus debet homo alteri sincere exprimere veritatem; cum enim homo sit animal sociabile, debet ea, quae ad societatem servandam necessaria sunt, servare, talis autem est sincera expressio, maxime in contractibus; non enim possent homines invicem conversari, nisi sibi invicem crederent. Spectat quidem veritas etiam ea, quae doctrinae sunt, specialiter tamen ea, quae sunt hominis, ut talem se homo exprimat, qualis ipse est. Ita D. Thom. art. 3. ad 3.