§ 1. On Truthfulness

165. Notions. Truth is taken in a diverse sense: either 1. for conformity of the intellect with the thing, or of the thing with the intellect (and in this sense truth is treated in philosophy, which distinguishes between formal or logical truth and ontological truth), or 2. for a moral virtue. In this last sense truth is sometimes called truthfulness and can be defined: the virtue inclining one to say what is true, when, where, and in what manner one ought; or according to St. Thomas: "the habit by which someone shows himself, both by life and by speech, to be such as he is."²⁸⁸ The same Angelic Doctor²⁸⁹ excellently teaches that the act of him who manifests the truth from justice, for example, when someone confesses the truth in judgment or says true testimony, directly pertains to the virtue of justice. We spoke above concerning acts of this kind, where there was discussion of the obligations of the judge, advocate, witness, etc.... But if someone from a certain uprightness manifests the truth to another, as is accustomed to happen among private men outside judgment, then an act of this kind pertains to the special virtue of truthfulness, which is only a potential part of the virtue of justice. Truthfulness taken in this sense is a special and moral virtue. Special indeed, because it exercises acts having a special notion of goodness. For the special goodness of our acts is that our exterior things (whether words or deeds) are duly ordered to our internal intention, as sign to thing signified.²⁹⁰ But the Angelic Doctor²⁹¹ notes that simplicity²⁹² is reduced to this virtue of truthfulness; simplicity is opposed to duplicity, by which, namely, someone has one thing in the heart and shows another externally. In some way also reduced to this virtue of truthfulness is the virtue of fidelity, which inclines the will to execute promises sincerely.²⁹³ For just as truthfulness is conformity between external words and the internal mind, so fidelity is conformity between deeds to be performed and the words of the promise.

The virtue of truthfulness, because it is a virtue annexed to justice, partly agrees with it and partly falls short of it. The virtue of truthfulness agrees with justice in two things, namely, being toward another and constituting a certain equality. For by truthfulness one man manifests to another, and indeed according to equality, his internal thoughts, insofar as words and other external signs are equal to the internal conception. But truthfulness falls short of the proper notion of justice, because in justice there is a strict debt, while in truthfulness there is only the moral debt of uprightness, insofar as wounding truthfulness is indeed against uprightness and against debt broadly so called, but of itself alone it neither induces an obligation of restitution nor offends the debt of the neighbor strictly so called.²⁹⁴

Excellence. Truthfulness is a most beautiful virtue; it is praised by all and is very necessary. "Because man is naturally a social animal, he owes to other men from a certain uprightness the manifestation of truth, without which the society of men could not endure."²⁹⁵ For the peaceful living-together of men is wholly impossible if lies and deceits prevail in place of truthfulness. Wherefore St. Paul warns: "Speak truth, each one with his neighbor, because we are members one of another."²⁹⁶

The offices of truthfulness are: 1. To love truth in words and deeds. 2. To conform external words and deeds with the interior thought, insofar as this is possible, with all the circumstances considered. For truthfulness by no means requires that the judgment of the mind always and everywhere be manifested externally; indeed, it sometimes must rather be concealed, since otherwise there would be a sinful violation of a secret. 3. Faithfully to execute lawful promises.

The vices opposed to truthfulness are, by defect: lying and infidelity in promises. But by excess violation of a secret is opposed to truthfulness. Lying and violation of a secret will be treated at once, but infidelity in promises below, n. 268.

²⁸⁸ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 109, a. 3 ad 3.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 109, a. 2.

²⁹¹ Ibid. ad 4.

²⁹² Offenheit, Geradheit.

²⁹³ Concerning the obligation of this virtue of fidelity arisen from a promise, there will be broader treatment below, n. 267 sqq.

²⁹⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 109, a. 3.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. q. 114, a. 2 ad 1; cf. also q. 109, a. 3 ad 1.

²⁹⁶ Eph. 4, 25.