Question One: On Truth in Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 109.

849. Truth or veracity (waarachtigheid) is a moral virtue inclining one to say what is true conformably to the mind of the speaker; or, the virtue by which someone, in life and speech, shows himself to be such as he is (a. 1 and a. 3, ad 3). According to its essence it conforms words and signs to the mind; yet there pertain to it as integral parts, both:

1. simplicity, which makes the intention upright, by excluding duplicity by which someone shows one thing outwardly and has another in his mind (a. 2, ad 4; q. 111, a. 3, ad 2);

2. fidelity, which inclines the will to carrying out promises sincerely, and so conforms deeds to promises (q. 110, a. 3, ad 5; q. 89, a. 7; q. 98, a. 3, ad 1 and 3).

It is a virtue because its act, to say what is true, is good. It is a moral virtue: for although to know the true is an act of the intellect, the external manifestation of truth pertains to the will, which moves to the use of the external organs and members (a. 1, ad 3; a. 3, ad 2).

It is a special virtue because it has a special goodness, which consists in the order by which external words or deeds are duly ordered to signifying something (a. 2).

850. Object of truth. - The material object which truth exhibits is external signs (words or deeds) by which we manifest our mind to our neighbor; the primary material object which it principally intends to exhibit is equality, or conformity, due from honesty, by which external signs agree with the mind; the formal object or motive on account of which is the honesty of this equality.

851. Corollaries. - 1. The debt which truth considers of itself is not a legal or strict debt, but rather a moral debt, insofar as, namely, from honesty one man owes to another the manifestation of truth; and therefore of itself it does not oblige under grave obligation. Yet it is a debt necessary for honesty: for men could not live together with one another unless they believed one another, as manifesting truth to one another. "Because man," says St. Thomas, q. 114, a. 2, ad 1, "is naturally a social animal, from a certain honesty he owes the manifestation of truth to other men, without which the society of men could not endure." Cf. q. 109, a. 3, ad 1.

2. Hence truth is not justice strictly so called, but its potential part: for it is a) annexed to justice, because it is toward another and establishes equality; b) yet it falls short of justice, because of itself it is concerned with a moral debt, although one necessary to the social order, and only accidentally with a strict debt when there is added the obligation of fidelity, charity, religion, piety, or justice, as in contracts (a. 3).

3. Since truth is a moral virtue, it is in the mean, and indeed in a twofold way: a) on the part of the object, because the true imports equality of the intellect or of the sign to the thing understood or signified; moreover equality is a mean between more and less; b) on the part of the act, because it says what is true when it ought, and how and where it ought: it is superfluous to say what is true when one ought not, a defect not to say it when one ought (a. 1, ad 3).

4. Hence two vices are opposed to truth on the part of the act: by excess there is opposed every indiscreet manifestation of the true, but especially violation of a secret, which can also be injustice; by defect, lying with its various species. Of these we must now speak.