Violence

Violence or coercion is the using of greater force than can be resisted to compel another to perform some action against his will. In certain connections the person who suffers violence is said in English law to be under duress.

It follows from the definition that violence is from something external to the agent; no one can offer violence to himself; and that the subject resists to the utmost of his power.

If the resistance is only partial, there is violence only under a certain respect (secundum quid).

The elicited acts of the will cannot be forced by violence, for in that case the agent would will and not will at the same time.

The other internal faculties, and much more the external faculties of man, may be subject to violence. If the violence is absolute, the resulting action is involuntary and not imputable to him who suffers violence; if the resistance is only partial, the action will be voluntary to a certain extent, and in the same degree it will be imputable to the agent (Can. 2205, 52215, Sec, 2).

Violence is the onset of force too great to be resisted, and fear is a perturbation of mind arising from present or future danger. Here we treat of fear caused by extrinsic violence, inasmuch as it is a diriment impediment of marriage.

When marriage is contracted through grave fear, caused unjustly by a free agent with a view to extorting marriage, ecclesiastical law makes it null and void. Whether such a marriage is invalid by natural law is a moot point among Doctors. Fear may, indeed, sometimes be so excessive that it takes away the use of reason, so that a man under its influence does not know what he is doing. If a man married under the influence of such terror, the marriage would of course be invalid for want of consent. But commonly even grave fear does not produce such effects; a man in danger of shipwreck or death knows as a rule what he is doing, and if he marries in such circumstances, though induced by fear to do so, the marriage will be valid. But when he is unjustly forced by someone to marry against his will, the injury done to him is a sufficient reason for the Church to make the marriage null and void, even though he knew what he was doing and consented to the marriage. The only difference between this case and the former lies in the injury inflicted by the fear caused by a free agent. This however, does not seem sufficient ground for asserting the nullity of the contract by natural law, though it affords a just reason why positive law should make it invalid. The better opinion, then, seems to be that grave fear is a diriment impediment of marriage by ecclesiastical law when the fear is caused unjustly by someone with a view to compelling the party to marry against his will. Hence, if one who had violated a woman was threatened with a beating and married her in order to escape it, the marriage would be valid. Fear arising from reverence for parents and superiors is in general not sufficiently serious to make marriage contracted under its influence null and void. In certain circumstances, however, such a fear may become grave and sufficient to annul marriage. Much depends on the character of the party who was influenced by fear and on the means employed to compel acquiescence to the wishes of harsh and severe parents or guardians. The question as to whether in any particular case there was grave fear is a question of fact to be determined by the ecclesiastical judge after weighing all the circumstances of the case (Can. 1087).

I. Notion. Physical violence is a physical motion proceeding from an extrinsic principle, while the one who suffers it resists or at least contributes nothing. What proceeds from violence is called violent or coerced. Now:

1. The will cannot suffer violence in its elicited acts; in other words, elicited acts of the will cannot be coerced. For elicited acts are nothing other than inclinations of the will toward something, while violence supposes that the one who suffers it resists or at least is not inclined. And it is repugnant that the will be inclined toward something and at the same time not be inclined toward it, or even resist it. Hence not even God can coerce the will; nevertheless he can "change the will, and from one unwilling make one willing through efficacious grace. But then this is not to coerce, but to supply, in place of the old inclination by which it was unwilling, a new inclination by which it wills what before it did not will" (St. Alphonsus, V, XIX).

2. The will can suffer violence in commanded acts to be elicited by another power; or rather, acts commanded by the will but to be elicited by another power are subject to violence. For that other power can be impeded from an act against the command of the will, or moved to it. Thus, for example, the will can command speech, and the tongue can be impeded by external force from uttering words (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, V, XIX).

II. Division. Violence is usually distinguished as absolute and qualified, according as the one who suffers force resists, or does not resist, as much as he can and ought (St. Alphonsus, V, XVI).¹

¹ This division, however, is not a division of violence as such, because resistance is not required for the essence of violence.

III. Influence on the voluntary-free.

1. Absolute violence removes the voluntary; indeed, it causes the involuntary. For the involuntary is that which not only does not depend on the will, but besides is rejected by it; this has place in absolute violence.

2. Qualified violence does not remove the voluntary, but nevertheless lessens it. It does not remove the voluntary, because where the will does not resist as much as it can and ought to resist, there remains some aspect of the voluntary. Yet it lessens the voluntary, because, when the will resists to some extent, less of the voluntary is had (St. Alphonsus, V, XVIII).

Defects that Invalidate Consent.—The defects that vitiate consent by taking away knowledge or choice render contracts either void or voidable (see 40-55). These impediments are the following:

(a) error, which is a judgment of fact or of law in reference to the contract, not in harmony with the truth, but not maliciously caused by other persons. If error is substantial (that is, about the nature of the contract or the nature of the subject-matter of the contract), the agreement is naturally void; if error is only accidental (that is, about features of the contract, subject-matter or co-contractant, that are only incidentally intended), an onerous agreement is naturally valid, but positive law in the interest of freedom will often grant the privilege of rescindment (see Canon 1684, n. 2). But if error cannot be proved, courts will stand for the validity of a contract;

(b) fraud, which is error or mistake about a contract caused in one of the parties by the dishonest representations of the other party or of a third person (e.g., when an insurance agent deceives about the benefits, or a policy-taker deceives about his age or health). Fraud exists, then, when there is intention, at least indirect, to mislead, and statements, acts or omissions calculated to mislead; but the usual boasts of vendors and advertisers about the wonderful excellence of their wares are not fraudulent, since the public understands that such talk must be taken cum grano salis. The effects of fraud on the value of contracts are the same as those produced by error; but it should be noted that the person guilty of the fraud is bound to make good the losses of the injured party, even though the contract be valid and not rescindable, or though the guilty person be not a party to the contract;

(c) fear, which is a disturbance of mind caused by the belief that some danger is impending on oneself or others (see 41 sqq.). It makes a contract invalid in natural law, when it takes away all consent (e.g., when it overpowers the reason, or makes one dissent internally from what is agreed to externally), and probably also when it takes away perfect freedom in a gratuitous contract, or makes one enter into a contract for immunity from an unjust vexation; it renders an act or engagement invalid according to positive law in many special cases (e.g., the Canons declare null elections, resignations, marriages, vows, etc., which are made under the influence of fear). Contracts are considered naturally voidable if one of the parties unjustly extorts the consent of the other by grave fear, or if a third party intimidates a person into bestowing something through gratuitous contract; and the positive law generally treats agreements entered into under grave fear as rescindible (see Canon 103, n. 2). Fear unjustly caused, even though it does not make a contract void or voidable, is at times a reason for the duty of restitution, as when a third party by his unjust threats forces an innocent person to make expensive contracts as a measure of protection, and probably also when a third party directly constrains one to make an onerous contract with a person who knows nothing about the coercion. Fear, no matter how great, does not in any way weaken a contract, if there is consent and the fear is induced by a natural cause (e.g., a storm), or by a human cause acting justly (e.g., an injured man threatening a lawsuit);

(d) violence or coercion, which is like to fear, the latter being moral force and the former physical force (see 52). According to natural law, violence invalidates a contract, unless we suppose that it is only concomitant, as when Sempronius uses coercion to make Balbus sign a contract which Balbus is really willing to sign. Positive law does not recognize, or will set aside, agreements made under overpowering constraint (see Canon 103, n. 1).

Can the will suffer violence besides fear? - Force or violence is the impulse of a greater thing which cannot be repelled. Here it is commonly defined as that which is from an extrinsic principle, while the one who suffers force resists. While resisting, and accordingly it is against the inclination of the will, so that the one who suffers force cannot do the contrary, and entirely resists. Therefore two things are required for violence. The first, that it be from an extrinsic principle, because no one can properly be said to inflict violence on himself. Hence the distinction between violence and fear is clear, which can come both from an intrinsic principle, such as, for example, fear of death coming from illness, and from an extrinsic principle, such as, for example, fear of shipwreck, of hell, and of punishments. The second thing required is that the one suffering entirely resist, that is, according to his powers and positively; for if someone were only passive, then indeed he would not contribute to violence by acting, but he would contribute by willing to suffer. Nevertheless resistance altogether absolute and continual against the coercion inflicted is not always required for avoiding fault, namely when on the one hand it would be useless, and on the other on the other hand the matter concerns something less dangerous. Thus the martyrs, when led to pagan temples, did not sin, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required for averting the danger of scandal or injury to religion. L. 1. 5. n. 15 seq. "As regards the proper act itself of the will (namely, the elicited act), violence cannot be inflicted upon it. And the reason for this is that the act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior principle which knows.... But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. Therefore no one can will unwillingly, because he cannot will while not willing to will. By the hypothesis he would will, and at the same time he would not will, because he would be opposing himself as willing. S. Anselm, De libero arbitrio, l. 1, c. 6; L. 1. 5. n. 19. "As regards acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence, insofar as the exterior members can be hindered by violence from carrying out the command of the will." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. The will can likewise suffer violence in the exterior members, even though the command of the will is not properly present, as, for example, if someone is seized against his will, bound hands and feet, cast into prison, etc. And this holds not only as regards the exterior members, but also as regards the interior faculties. For it is clear that the will can command not only the hand, for example, not to sign one's name on the promissory note of a fictitious creditor, and yet that hand, seized by force by him, must sign; but it can also command the intellect to think about and consider some matter, and yet the intellect, distracted, is carried off to thinking about other things; it can command the sensitive appetite to obey reason, and yet that appetite is moved contrary to reason. Likewise an extrinsic cause, for example the devil, can excite phantasms in the imagination against the will, etc. Suarez tr. 2. d. 2; Lessius on q. 6. a. 4; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 80, S. q. 47. a. 2; L. 1. 3. n. 430. 433; E. M.

64 bis. Note: The command of the will is not exercised in the same way over the senses as over the exterior members. When these are found in their normal state, the will exercises perfect command over them, according to their natural power. But as regards the senses and the sensitive appetite, it is not the same. "It must be said," says S. Th. 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3 ad 3, "that, as the Philosopher says, reason, in which the will is, moves by its command the irascible and concupiscible powers; not indeed by despotic rule, as a servant is moved by his master; but by royal or political rule, as free men are governed by one ruling, who nevertheless can move in a contrary direction. Hence both the irascible and the concupiscible can move the will in a contrary direction. And thus nothing prevents the will from sometimes being moved by them."

Does violence cause the involuntary? - Violence causes the involuntary as such contrarily. For "violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as also to the natural. For it is common to the voluntary and the natural that both are from an intrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something be against nature, so in things that know it makes something be against the will. But what is against nature is said to be unnatural; and similarly what is against the will is said to be involuntary. Hence violence causes the involuntary," S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6; violence simply causes the involuntary simply, violence in a qualified sense causes the involuntary in a qualified sense; not indeed as regards elicited acts, but as regards commanded acts. For only as regards commanded acts, and not also as regards elicited acts, can the will suffer violence. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5 ad 1, S. q. 47. a. 1. - E. M.

You will resolve: Therefore when some passion is simply violent, namely because someone resists and opposes it by the will in every way he can, it is simply and contrarily involuntary, and therefore not human, nor imputable. But when it is only violent in a qualified sense, namely because it is not sufficiently resisted when it can be repelled or weakened, or because it is not wholly opposed when in no way can it be repelled or diminished, then the notion of the voluntary is not taken away, and therefore neither is the notion of a human and imputable act; but it is only diminished, according to the greater or lesser force inflicted, and according to the greater or lesser resistance and opposition. Rom. 7:20; S. Aug. De Civitate Dei c. 16; L. 1. 3. n. 430. 433, 1. 5. n. 16.

66 bis. Note: "The involuntary is said in two ways, namely through ignorance and through violence. And therefore robbery has one notion of sin, and theft another. Therefore on this account they differ in species.... In other genera of sins the notion of sin is not taken from something involuntary, as it is taken in sins opposed to justice; and therefore where a diverse notion of the involuntary occurs, there is a diverse species of sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 4. 9.

What are the daughters of avarice? - They are the following: 1. Hardening of heart, against mercy, by not compassionating the needy and poor, by reproaching them, by demanding debts too harshly when the debtor is not able to pay, etc. By this one can sometimes sin mortally, when the precept of almsgiving or charity urges, and nevertheless from such hardness he is not helped. L. 69. 2. Disquiet of heart, i.e., a vehement and inordinate application of the mind to acquiring or conserving riches, with empty and vain fear lest they not be acquired or lest they be lost. It is mortal when it withdraws from spiritual things or other things to which we are obliged by grave precept, or induces superfluous fear, and from this distrust toward God. It is venial if it is concerning a good matter, but at an undue time or place, e.g., concerning family, harvest, vintage, when someone is in church, or should be free for God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 55, a. 6; L. 69.

3. Violence, namely the usurpation of another's thing by force. It is mortal if it concerns a grave thing, or inflicts grave force. L. 69. 4. Fallacy, or deceit in words; it can be mortal by reason of the end or of the means. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 55, a. 4; L. 69. 5. Perjury, if confirmation by oath is added. 6. Fraud, or deceit in deed. It is mortal from its genus; and it occurs in many ways in contracts. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 55, a. 5; L. 69. - 7. Betrayal, which is deception against faith given or owed, to the harm of another. It is mortal from its genus. It occurs in almost three ways: 1. concerning persons, in which way Judas betrayed Christ; 2. concerning things, as if you show to the enemy the manner of taking a fortress, or show to a robber money, clothing, etc., that has been hidden; 3. concerning a secret, either by revealing one committed to oneself, or by reading others' letters. But if this is in a grave matter, it is per se mortal. L. 69; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 118, a. 8; q. 55, a. 8.

How must right process be instituted? - In a civil case the process must be instituted at the petition of the plaintiff. Plaintiff is so called from action. Action is the right of pursuing in judgment what is owed to oneself. Hence he who proceeds in judgment by actions is called plaintiff.

But it is necessary that he be able to stand in judgment; that he have an action in judgment according to the laws; that he manifestly prove what he seeks. Proofs are made by examination of laws and facts, by sentences given in other similar cases, by presumptions, by sworn witnesses, by writings, by the sworn confession of the party. C. I. 1312 ff., 2142; C. G. 1315 ff., 2275; C. L. 2404 ff. But actions are repelled on the part of the defendant by exceptions, which he himself likewise is bound to prove. "Exception is so called as a certain exclusion, which is customarily interposed against the action of any matter in order to exclude that which has been brought into the intention or condemnation." L. 2 de Except. Wherefore one exception is of fact, another of law. By the former the fact is excluded, for example, the loan received. By the latter the law is excluded, for example, if a homicide, not criminal, was committed in order to defend oneself.

Other proofs having been omitted, either an interrogatory or an oath can be tendered to the defendant. If an interrogatory is tendered, the defendant must answer, and if he has not answered, it will be taken as confessed. C. I. civil procedure 216 ff. But an oath is twofold, decisory and supplementary. A decisory oath is a certain species of settlement for ending a lawsuit, and therefore it is tendered by one party to the other. Hence, if the defendant does not furnish the oath, he is condemned; likewise, if the plaintiff does not furnish the oath tendered to him, he is condemned. But if the defendant furnishes it, even if he is perjured, he is absolved. C. I. 1364 ff.; C. G. 1358 ff. Namely, he is absolved, even if perjured, in the external forum, but he is not freed from obligation in the forum of conscience; for the settlement was made by oath, not by perjury. The oath is tendered concerning one's own fact, and also concerning the fact of another, if there is a presumption that it is known by the one swearing, and if it is necessary for expediting the case to know that fact. A supplementary oath is one which is tendered by the judge to complete proofs, but not to the defendant himself in a criminal case. C. I. penal procedure 232. Cf. L. 11 de Act. rer. amot. ff. As regards the forum of conscience, the judge cannot tender it to one who probably will perjure himself, without injuring charity and justice. For it is in his power to tender it or not. C. I. 1314 ff.; C. G. 1366 ff. Cf. Rules of the S. R. Rota, title 4; L. fin. de Iureiur. ff.; C. L. 2520 ff.

In a criminal case from Roman Law, and also from more recent law as regards the very substance of the matter, the process can be instituted in three ways: 1. By way of accusation, when there is some accuser who promises that he will prove the crimes objected. 2. By way of denunciation, when the one reporting the crime does not wish to assume the burden of proving. 3. By way of inquisition, which the magistrate institutes.

In the accusatory process the whole case is conducted between the accuser and the accused. The accuser objects the crime; the accused responds, denies or confesses the fact, and if he confesses he is as condemned. Witnesses are all examined before both, and orally. For no one is to be condemned unheard and without witnesses. Formerly the defendant was tortured on the rack, so that full proof might be made from his confession. But by present laws no one can be compelled to bear testimony against himself. Then the sentence of innocence or guilt is pronounced, and punishment is imposed by law on the guilty person. If the accuser has failed in proof of the crime and from malice has brought someone into danger of grave penalty, formerly he suffered a similar or talion penalty. Today an action of calumny and defamation is granted against the accuser. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 68. a. 4; Deut. 24, 19 ff.; Decretal de Calumniator.

The way of denunciation falls back into inquisition. For when the matter has come to the knowledge of the magistrate through denunciation, either from one lodging complaint, or from an informer, or from ministers of public order, then he begins to inquire into the delict and the delinquent. He can inquire into the delict from the slightest indications, but into the delinquent only from grave ones. Once the inquisition has been completed, the delinquent is subjected first to summary examination, then to ordinary examination. Then the criminal process is instructed before him, and witnesses are examined in it. If from it the defendant is proved guilty, he is condemned; if he is proved innocent, he is absolved; if neither is established from the acts and proofs, he is dismissed.

Moreover, inquisition is threefold. The first is general, namely when it is asked in general whether the laws are observed, whether there are transgressors. The second is special, when inquisition is instituted concerning a certain crime and concerning a certain person as its author. The third is mixed, when either the person alone or the crime alone is special, for example, whether Titius is guilty, or who killed Caius. L. 197; S. Th. Quodl. 11, a. 13.

Therefore by whatever way the process is instituted, there is always some accuser, whether a private or public person, whether physical or moral. Accusation can be both formal and virtual. Hence the evidence of the fact, public infamy, or notoriety of the crime supplies the place of the plaintiff or accuser. In judgments three persons are required: judge, plaintiff, defendant. For judgment is an act of justice, which is not toward oneself, as are the other virtues by which man is ordered in himself, but is toward another, ordering man to another. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 67. a. 3.

By canon law a previous admonition of the defendant is often required, for example, in causes of clerics who are concubinarians, and where excommunication is to be inflicted. Trent, sess. 25, c. 3, 14 de R.

Decretals l. 2; L. Qui crimen C. de iis, qui accusare non possunt; L. ult. C. de Accusat. et inscript.; Sanchez, Cons., l. 6, c. 2, proem.; Lessius, l. 2, c. 29, n. 106; Lugo d. 27, n. 75; E. M.

The rack: It is a kind of torment, namely a wooden machine put together in the manner of a horse, cavalletto, upon which those concerning whom there was inquiry about some crime were stretched out and tortured, so that full proof might be made from their confession.

1. Force or violence is called that which is from an extrinsic principle, against the inclination of the will, so that he who suffers force cannot do the contrary, and wholly resists.

2. That which is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the will; for the coerced and the violent are opposed to the natural and voluntary, which are said of that which is from an intrinsic principle according to proper inclination. Wherefore St. Thomas says: “what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. “Violence makes something to be against the will,” ibid. a. 5. Hence the will cannot inflict force or violence upon itself. Moreover, the difference appears between force or violence and fear: for, since force or violence is that which is from an extrinsic principle, it is not from the will, while, on the contrary, since fear is in the will itself, it is from the will, as conceiving fear.

3. So that he who suffers force cannot do the contrary: for if he can act against it, force or violence is now not had; for force or violence ought to be against the inclination of the will. But that which someone admits in himself, although he can remove it, certainly is not against the inclination of the will. “When someone is coerced by some agent, so that he cannot do the contrary, this is called necessity of coercion.” Thus St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 82. a. 1. Under this head force or violence can be distinguished as twofold, absolute and total, in a certain respect and partial, according as namely someone can in no way do the contrary, or can at least attempt and do something against it, for lessening the force and violence. Yet resistance altogether absolute and continuous to the coercion inflicted is not always required for avoiding fault, when namely on one side it would be useless, but on the other the matter is less dangerous. Thus martyrs led to the temples of pagans did not sin, although they walked on their own feet. But in every case one must resist as much as is required for averting proximate danger of sin and scandal, and injury to religion. Likewise someone can be excused from resistance to be opposed on account of fear of graver harm; nevertheless it is always necessary that internally, as much as he can, he resist sin by will. Wherefore, for bearing judgment concerning fault from omission of resistance, it must be considered not only whether someone could have resisted, but also whether he ought to have resisted. Therefore he who, resisting or acting contrariwise as much as he can, suffers force; or even resisting nothing and doing nothing contrary, because he can do nothing, because he is bound to nothing, cannot be called a cooperator and accomplice.

4. And wholly resists: for although force and violence inflicted from outside are such that someone can do nothing contrary, if nevertheless that repugnance of the will is lacking, he now does not suffer force and violence unwillingly. Hence again the difference between violence and fear is clear, because he who suffers force contributes nothing to that which is done through force and violence; but “to that which is done through fear the will of the one fearing contributes something.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 1. And since interior repugnance of the will of this kind can be total, and can also be not altogether full, hence again under this head also force and violence can be distinguished as absolute and in a certain respect. “Something,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5., “can be called voluntary in two ways: in one way according to action, as when someone wills to do something; in another way according to passion, namely when someone wills to suffer from another. Whence when an action is inflicted by someone exterior, the will of suffering remaining in him who suffers, it is not simply violent, because although he who suffers does not contribute by acting, nevertheless he contributes by willing to suffer. Whence it cannot be called involuntary.”

5. From what has been said it follows that violation is voluntary for a woman if, when she can repel the invader of her chastity, she does not repel him; or if, when she cannot repel him, she does not resist the force by her will, and voluntarily admits him, or at least does not resist him in every way in which she can. On the contrary, violation would be altogether involuntary for a woman if she could in no way resist the invader of her chastity and by her will wholly resisted him. Wherefore coercion can be in a certain respect in two ways, objectively and subjectively. Objectively, if the force of the one coercing truly is not so great that it cannot be repelled or at least weakened by the resistance of the one suffering. Subjectively, if, although the coercion can neither be repelled nor weakened, nevertheless someone according to his powers does not resist it, nor wholly resists it by his will. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 16.

6. Now force or violence cannot be inflicted upon the will as regards its own acts. “As regards the proper act itself (namely elicited) of the will, violence cannot be inflicted upon it. And the reason of this is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle.... But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. Indeed, if acts of the will are elicited by the will itself, as by an active intrinsic principle, since the will is their active intrinsic principle, the same acts cannot be from an extrinsic, violent principle; for violent is that which is from an extrinsic principle, with the thing suffering not contributing force. “No one can will something unwillingly, because one unwilling to will cannot will.” St. Anselm, On Free Choice, cap. 6. Nevertheless, in the common mode of speaking, force is said to be inflicted upon the will when force is applied so that the purpose of the will is changed, which indeed cannot happen without a proper act of the will.

7. Hence it is clear that in a twofold sense acts elicited by the will can be understood to be coerced: namely first, so that they are called violent or coerced by violence or coercion as by an active principle, which cannot be; secondly, so that they are called violent or coerced by violence or coercion as by a motive. For just as fear can move or impel someone to doing something which otherwise he would not do, so also external force and coercion. Becanus, Tr. 1. C. 2. q. 10. n. 40.

8. “As regards acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence, insofar as through violence exterior members can be impeded from executing the command of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. But the will can suffer violence in the exterior members, although an explicit command of the will is not properly had, as, for example, if someone is seized against his own will, bound hand and foot, thrust into prison, etc. — And this is valid not only as regards exterior members, but also as regards interior faculties. For it is clear that the will not only can command the hand, for example, not to subscribe one’s own name in the promissory note of a fictitious creditor, and that hand, seized by that man by force, must subscribe; but it can also command the intellect to think and consider some thing, and the distracted intellect is carried away to think about other things; it can command the sensible appetite to obey reason, and that appetite may be moved against reason. Likewise an extrinsic cause, for example a demon, can stir up phantasms in the imagination against the will, stir up sensible motions in the sensible appetite, with the will likewise resisting, etc. Cf. Suarez D. 2.; Lessius on q. 6. a. 4.; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 80.

9. Commanded acts, as is drawn from the very definition of coercion and the notion of a commanded act, indeed cannot be called coerced in relation to the faculty physically eliciting them, but only morally in relation to the will commanding them. For the rest, no act which happens without the command of the will can properly be called commanded. But the will cannot be coerced to the commanded acts of other powers. For the will cannot command acts of other powers except through an act elicited by itself. But it cannot be coerced to an act elicited by itself. Therefore it cannot be coerced so that it commands acts of other powers.

10. Indeed the will itself can command an act against the natural inclination of the faculty, as when someone bends the members against their natural flexibility. That commanded act, although it is violent in a certain respect, nevertheless is not simply violent. For since the part exists on account of the whole, the part must not be viewed only according to itself, but chiefly according to its order to the whole. Hence what is violent to the part according to itself is not violent to it according to its order to the whole. “It must be said that, as the Philosopher says, Physics, book 8, text 27, the motion of an animal, by which sometimes an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, nevertheless is in some way natural to the animal, to which it is natural that it be moved according to appetite; and therefore this is not violent simply, but in a certain respect. And similarly it must be said when someone bends the members against natural disposition; for this is violent in a certain respect, namely as regards the particular member, but nevertheless not simply as regards the man himself.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5. ad 3.

11. Violence, as regards the act to which it coerces, causes the involuntary as such in a contrary way. For “Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as also to the natural. For it is common to the voluntary and the natural that each be from an intrinsic principle. And on account of this, just as in things which lack cognition, violence makes something against nature, so in cognizing things it makes something to be against the will. But what is against nature is said to be unnatural; and similarly what is against the will is said to be involuntary. Whence violence causes the involuntary,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5.; violence simply causes the involuntary simply; violence in a certain respect causes the involuntary in a certain respect; not indeed as regards elicited acts, but as regards commanded acts. For only as regards commanded acts, and not also as regards elicited acts, can the will suffer violence. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5. ad 1.

12. Wherefore, when some passion is simply violent, because namely the force inflicted upon it is irresistible, and someone resists and repels by will in every way in which he can, it is simply and contrarily involuntary, and therefore not human, nor imputable. But when it is only violent in a certain respect, because namely it was not altogether unconquerable, and according to his powers someone does not resist and repel it by his will, then the account of the voluntary is not taken away, and therefore neither the account of a human and imputable act, but it is only diminished according to the greater or lesser force inflicted, according to the greater or lesser resistance and repugnance. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 18.

108. 1. Notion. Besides the causes which act upon the intellect and will, there are those which directly impede the execution of volition and indirectly influence the will itself: such is violence, which is defined as a certain motion impressed from without against the inclination of the will.⁴ This is physical violence, and is distinguished from moral violence, which consists in threats, reproaches, and other things of this kind, and falls back into fear: for from these threats arises trepidation of mind. From this it is clear that violence does not properly coerce the will, but falls only upon those acts which can be commanded by the will. Nevertheless it can indirectly influence consent, insofar as the external act which the agent is forced to effect solicits the consent of the will. Thus, if someone is forced to drink sweet and generous wine, he experiences sensible delight, to which the will is in some way inclined to consent; thus a woman, oppressed by force, falls into the danger of consenting interiorly to pleasure.

³ St. Thomas, Ia IIae, q. 6, a. 4-5; Suarez, De voluntario, disp. II; Salmanticenses, De volunt. et involunt., disp. V; Billuart, diss. 1, art. 5-6; Frins, De actibus hum., n. 247-280; Bouquillon, n. 344-346; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 67-72.

⁴ A few indeed say that violence is present whenever imagination experiences base phantasms, or the appetite suffers movements of inordinate concupiscence, against the inclination of the will; but all these things are better called first-first acts, concerning which above, n. 79.

109. 2. Concerning the influence of violence on free acts. When violence is done to someone, his will can have itself in a diverse way.

(A) If he resists internally and externally, as much as he morally can, the violence is called absolute, and the act so perpetrated is in no way free, nor consequently imputable: such is he whose knees by external force are bent before an idol, and whose hands are moved to offering incense to false gods, against his inclination; or he who is violently forced to sign a contract or testament, against his assent.

110. (B) But if the agent indeed resists externally the force brought upon him, but inwardly consents, the free indeed is diminished, but of itself is not removed.

(a) The free is diminished, for in such a case the mind cannot deliberate quietly, nor is the will left to its own indifference, but is allured to giving consent, and indeed the more vehemently the more vividly the delight is felt which, as it were necessarily, accompanies the external act; whence liberty and imputability are much diminished; such is the case of a woman to whom force is brought.

(b) Yet it is not removed of itself; for, even if the will is powerfully allured, and the mind cannot deliberate so easily, nevertheless, provided the exercise of reason is not wholly impeded, the will can dissent, as St. Anselm¹ excellently notes: "A man can be bound unwillingly, because he can be bound when he is unwilling; he can be tortured... but he cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will when he is unwilling to will; for everyone willing wills his own willing."

¹ St. Anselm, De lib. arb., c. 5.

111. (C) If the agent outwardly behaves altogether passively, neither consenting nor resisting, although inwardly dissenting, he freely permits the external act, which consequently is imputed to him whenever there is an obligation of resisting.

It can indeed happen that there is an obligation also of resisting externally, whether on account of scandal to be prevented, for example in the cause of faith, or in order to remove an interior danger of consenting, as in the matter of chastity; in which case it is not lawful to behave permissively, as is clear. But if no obligation of this kind is present, external resistance can be judged useless, and therefore not imputable. Wherefore from all the circumstances it must be judged whether the agent has sinned or not.

In practice, when the delight which accompanies the external act is vehement, the obligation falls upon one of resisting externally, insofar as it can be done, lest the will, allured by pleasure, consent interiorly.

To be free, an action must proceed (1) from internal inclination, without constraint; (2) from a full knowledge of the end intended, and (3) from indifference of the will.¹

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 5 sqq., qu. 76 sq.

An action that is performed without constraint is called spontaneous. Obstacles to spontaneity are: 1. VIOLENCE. —By violence (vis, violentia, coactio) is meant the state of being driven by some external force which the agent is unable to resist. Since the will itself cannot be subjected to violence, its interior acts (actus eliciti s. interiores) are never forced. The only acts that can be affected by force are those mediate acts known as imperati.² Acts performed under absolute compulsion, the subject resisting internally, are involuntary (actus simpliciter involuntarii). When the compulsion is not absolute, the acts performed under it are more or less voluntary, according to the degree of resistance offered.³

² Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 4: "An act of the will is twofold: one is immediately its own, as elicited by it, namely to will; the other is an act commanded by the will and exercised through another power, such as walking and speaking. These are commanded by the will but exercised through a motive power. Therefore, with respect to acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence insofar as the exterior members can be prevented by violence from executing its command. But with respect to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be inflicted upon it. The reason is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior knowing principle, just as natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle but without knowledge. What is coerced or violent, however, is from an exterior principle. Hence it is contrary to the nature of an act of the will itself that it be coerced or violent, just as it is contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or of the motion of a stone that it be borne upward. For a stone can be carried upward by violence, but it cannot be that this violent motion comes from its natural inclination. Similarly, a man can be dragged by violence, but that this should be from his will is contrary to the nature of violence." —Cfr. St. Anselm, De Lib. Arbitr., c. 5: "A man cannot will unwillingly, because he cannot will while unwilling to will." (Migne, P. L., CLVIII, 496). God can ex nolente facere volentem per gratiam efficacem (St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 19), and, by His omnipotence, cause the human will to act or abstain from acting; but He cannot properly speaking compel it, because He cannot cause it to will and not to will the same thing at one and the same time. —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 10, art. 4: "It does not belong to divine providence to corrupt the nature of things, but to preserve it." —IDEM, De Veritate qu. 22, art. 8: "God can change the will by necessity, yet He cannot coerce it."

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 5. —That internal compulsion (necessitas) destroys the freedom of the will has been indirectly defined by the Church. Cfr. Prop. Damnat. Baii, prop. 46: "Voluntariness does not belong to the nature and definition of sin." Prop. 67: "Man sins, even damnably, in that which he does necessarily." —Prop. Damnat. Jansenii, prop. 3: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity is not required in man; freedom from coercion suffices." —Prop. Damnat. ab Alexandro VIII. (7 Dec., 1690), prop. 1: "In the state of fallen nature, for formal sin and demerit that freedom suffices by which the act was voluntary and free in its cause—original sin and the will of Adam sinning." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1046, 1067, 1094, 1291). —Cfr. Th. Müncker, Der psychische Zwang in seinen Beziehungen zu Moral und Pastoral, Düsseldorf 1922.

2. IGNORANCE. —When a man has no knowledge of the end intended, he is said to be ignorant. Moral ignorance may therefore be defined as a lack of that knowledge which a person ought to have in order to perform the duties of his office or vocation. It is impossible to will a thing that lies outside the scope of one's knowledge.⁴ If a man unknowingly directs his action towards such an object, that action is in so far forth involuntary (involuntarium).⁵

⁴ "Quod latet, ignotum est," "Ignoti nulla cupido," are Scholastic axioms.

⁵ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arbitr., III, c. 19, n. 53: "It is not charged to you as a fault that you are unwillingly ignorant, but that you neglect to seek what you do not know." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 1297).—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 76, art. 2-3.

Ignorance may be culpable or inculpable (culpabilis s. inculpabilis), vincible or invincible (vincibilis s. invincibilis).

Invincible ignorance is that which cannot be overcome by the use of ordinary intelligence. It involves no moral responsibility.

Vincible ignorance, on the other hand, —the kind that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary intelligence, —may, in certain circumstances, diminish moral responsibility, but never entirely abolishes it; for whatever is done in a state of vincible ignorance, is willed at least indirectly, and to that extent is voluntary.

Ignorance due to gross negligence is called crass or supine (ignorantia crassa); when means are used to foster it, it is called affected (ignorantia affectata). Both crass and affected ignorance are sinful.⁶

⁶ Cfr. Job XXI, 14; John IX, 41; XV, 22.

3. FEAR. —Fear (metus) is a disturbed condition of the mind caused by real or imaginary danger. Fear does not always destroy free-will, but generally diminishes accountability.⁷

⁷ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 6; qu. 41-44; St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 20—22.

Fear is grave or slight (metus gravis s. levis) according to the nature of the danger by which it is caused. As fear, generally speaking, does not exercise compulsion, the actions which it inspires are voluntary, though the degree of their imputability varies in proportion to the disturbance excited in the mind. Both canon and civil law regard acts inspired by grave and unjust fear as void.⁸ If serious evil or danger suddenly overwhelms a man, so as to deprive him momentarily of the use of reason, the acts he performs in that state are involuntary; in other words, a man may sometimes be so disturbed by fear that free-will is suspended.

⁸ Cfr. J. Laurentius, S.J., Instit. Iuris Eccl., Freiburg 1903, pp. 458 sqq.; E. Taunton, The Law of the Church, London 1906, p. 345.

4. CONCUPISCENCE. —Concupiscence (concupiscentia), in the general sense of the term, is any movement of the sensitive appetite towards its proper object.⁹ More particularly, it is that inordinate inclination to evil which is in human nature since the fall of Adam and Eve.¹⁰

⁹ Cfr. Catechismus Romanus, P. III, c. 10, qu. 5: "It must be known that concupiscence is a certain agitation and force of the mind by which men, impelled, seek pleasant things that they do not have."

¹⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 30, art. 1-3: "Concupiscence is the appetite for a delightful good ... according to sense, ... the sensitive appetite, a passion of the sensitive appetite." Cfr. qu. 77, art. 1 and 7. —St. Alphonsus, De Act. Human., n. 23-25; Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, pp. 203, 217, 245, 261 sqq., 283 sqq.

Concupiscence may precede or follow the action of the will. In the former case it is called antecedent; in the latter, consequent.

Antecedent concupiscence (concupiscentia antecedens) is involuntary when it completely impedes the use of reason, and in that case there is no accountability. Men are often "blinded by passion." When the use of reason is not entirely suspended, the guilt of an evil act may be greatly diminished by passion.¹¹ Thus, to kill a man in a rage is less criminal than to murder him in cold blood.

¹¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 7: "Sometimes passion is so great that it entirely takes away the use of reason, as is evident in those who become insane through love or anger; and then, if such passion was voluntary from the beginning, the act is imputed as sin because it is voluntary in its cause. ... But if the cause was not voluntary but natural, as when someone through illness or some similar cause falls into such a passion as entirely takes away the use of reason, the act is rendered wholly involuntary and consequently is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, passion is not so great that it entirely interrupts the use of reason; and then reason can exclude the passion by turning to other thoughts, or prevent it from obtaining its effect, because the members are not applied to action except by consent of reason. Hence such passion does not entirely excuse from sin." (Cfr. qu. 10, art. 3; qu. 73, art. 6).

Consequent concupiscence (concupiscentia consequens) may to some extent obscure the light of reason, but as a rule increases the malice of evil acts ¹² because it is either deliberately excited by the will or, at any rate, willed in its cause.¹³

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, art. 7: "Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but rather makes something voluntary. For something is called voluntary because the will is borne toward it; through concupiscence the will is inclined to will what it desires, and therefore concupiscence tends more to make something voluntary than involuntary." —Qu. 77, art. 1: "A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot directly draw or move the will, but it can do so indirectly, and in two ways: first, by a certain distraction ... and secondly, on the part of the will's object, which is the good apprehended by reason."

¹³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 77, art. 6: "Consequent passion does not diminish sin, but rather increases it, or more properly is a sign of its magnitude insofar as it shows the intensity of the will toward the sinful act. And so it is true that the greater the lust or concupiscence with which someone sins, the more he sins." —IDEM, De Veritate, qu. 26, art. 7: "Consequent passion itself in the lower appetite is a sign that the movement of the will is intense. For in a passible nature the will cannot be strongly moved toward something without some passion following in the lower part. Hence Augustine says that while we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions, we do not live rightly." —The passage of St. Augustine here referred to by the Angelic Doctor is De Civitate Dei, XIV, c. 9, n. 4 (Migne, P. L., XLI, 451).

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 6, qu. 76 sq. —V. Cathrein, S.J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. I, 4th ed., Freiburg 1904, pp. 73 sqq. —A. Huber, Die Hemmnisse der Willensfreiheit, pp. 48 sqq. —Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus Theol. Mor., Vol. I, tr. 1, c. 3-6. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 41 sqq. —A. Sweens, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, 2nd ed., Haaren 1910, pp. 59 sqq. —F. P. Kenrick, Theologia Moralis, Vol. I, pp. 7 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 177 sqq., 184 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, Bruges 1922, pp. 69 sqq., 77 sqq., 81 sqq.

I. Notion. While spontaneous is said of whatever is done according to a natural tendency, force or coercion is a motion whose principle is outside, while he who suffers resists to the contrary.

II. Division. The coerced absolutely or simply is that to which one resists fully but fruitlessly. Cf. Wernz, Matr., n. 260, 261. But the coerced according to something is that which by greater resistance could at least partly have been impeded; or that which the sufferer, although he cannot resist, suffers not wholly unwillingly.

The will cannot be coerced: he who wills does not resist. Exterior powers can be coerced, as is manifest; and also interior faculties: phantasy, the sensible appetite, for example by a good or evil angel. For although the coerced act of appetition is done according to the tendency of the lower appetite, nevertheless it is produced while the will is unwilling or resisting, so that the man suffers coercion.

Absolute force effects the involuntary (Cf. can. 2205, § 1). Coercion according to something diminishes the voluntary more or less, according as the coercion itself was greater or lesser, or according as the will acquiesced more or less (Cf. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 6, art. 5, ad 2).

The omission of resistance, according to the varied cause, can be blameworthy, inculpable, or praiseworthy. And say the same concerning the assent which the will confers, not indeed by acting, but by willing to suffer. Thus Christ and several Martyrs, by the most willing will by which they underwent death, merited exceedingly. On the contrary, a virgin oppressed by force sins if she consents internally, although she does not sin by the sin of complicity.

You will ask how much one ought to resist him who inflicts force and proposes indecent things? For he who inflicts force sometimes himself alone intends to complete the evil action. Thus a thief, a murderer, is accustomed to act; thus acted the slayers of Christ the Lord: then the obligation of resisting or fleeing is one thing in one case, another in another, and can also be none ¹. But sometimes participation ² in the evil action is demanded: for instance, that the sufferer offer incense to idols, or admit fornication or adultery. Then it is not enough that the one suffering force dissent internally, but besides this he must abstain from every action by which he seems to favor the depraved counsel ³, and oppose every positive resistance which is useful or which averts scandal of consent or danger of consent. Therefore they judge that a woman oppressed is per se obliged to defend herself by cry and by the powers of the body. "But if this positive resistance is useless or too difficult, indeed dangerous, she is excused from applying it, provided she can avoid consent." Noldin, De act. hum., n. 58.

¹ Thus, in Plato's dialogue Crito, Socrates is said to have been unwilling to flee, lest he should seem to despise the law.

² It must be judged morally what one can positively perform without the scandal of an omission which seems voluntary: for example, to climb a ladder, etc.

³ Unless the question concerns the violation of exterior goods, and someone can, on account of threatened menaces, cooperate with a robber without formal injustice.

63. Notion. Violence (coercion, force), or the violent, is that which proceeds from an extrinsic principle, while he who suffers force is altogether resisting.^48a From this definition it follows that two things are required for a violent act, namely: 1. that it proceed from an extrinsic principle; 2. that it occur with complete repugnance, that is, external and internal, on the part of him who suffers force. Hence no one is able to inflict violence upon himself; for he is not an extrinsic principle to himself. Sometimes even vehement fear is called violence in a certain respect, but here we speak of physical and absolute violence, or of violence in the strict sense, concerning which the following principles are valid:

^48a Concerning the difference between the violent, the coerced, the necessary, and the involuntary, see Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 5.

64. Principle 1. No internal act of the will can be extorted by any external violence.

The reason is that the will is a spiritual faculty whose essential mode of operating is liberty. But it is repugnant that the same act should be at the same time free, as elicited by the will, and at the same time coerced, as caused by a violent external principle. Wherefore violence can indeed attack, but not conquer, an unwilling will.

Hence the old Roman law briefly established: "a coerced will is a will"; and St. Anselm says elegantly:⁴⁹ "One cannot will unwillingly, because one cannot will while not willing to will, for everyone willing wills his very willing." St. Thomas⁵⁰ teaches: "Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as also to the natural ... just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something contrary to nature, so in knowing things it makes something be contrary to the will. But that which is contrary to nature is said to be unnatural, and similarly that which is contrary to the will is said to be involuntary; whence violence causes the involuntary." Indeed St. Bonaventure⁵¹ teaches that not even by God Himself can violence be inflicted upon the will. "Therefore the will can be induced by a created agent; but it cannot be changed by another except by an uncreated agent; but it cannot be coerced by anyone." St. Thomas says the same:⁵² "God can change the will by necessity, yet He cannot coerce it." Nor does this detract from the full dominion of God; for although God cannot inflict violence upon the human will, since this is repugnant (just as generally God can do nothing which is intrinsically repugnant), nevertheless by various modes He is able infallibly to move even our rebellious wills and to change them at His nod.

⁴⁹ De lib. arbitr. c. 5 (Migne, Patr. lat. 158, 496).

⁵⁰ S. theol. I-II, q. 6, a. 5.

⁵¹ In II, dist. 25, pars 2, a. un., q. 5.

⁵² Quaest. disp. de verit. q. 22, a. 8.

65. Principle 2. External acts of the will, that is, all acts which can be commanded by the will, can be caused by extrinsic violence.

The reason is that these acts (at least if you except the proper act of the intellect) are exercised by means of a sensible organ. But an extrinsic principle can act violently upon a sensible organ, however much the will inwardly resists. Thus, for example, the eyes can be compelled to seeing, the ears to hearing, notwithstanding the resistance of the will. In a psychopathic state a man pronounces certain words and performs certain movements, although the will resists (Zwangsreden, Zwangshandlungen). Thus likewise a luxurious delectation can be violently produced by an external agent, however much the will resists. Hence also the devil can violently produce obscene images in the phantasy, and by means of those phantasms indirectly move (but not coerce) both the will and especially the intellect. But the devil cannot directly move the human intellect nor know its thoughts without the consent of man. God alone can directly coerce the intellect of man.⁵³

⁵³ Cf. S. theol. I, q. 57, a. 4 and I-II, q. 80, a. 2.

66. Corollaries. From what has been said it follows:

1. Internal acts are morally imputed, however much a man has suffered violence; for they remain voluntary. For example, a man sins who under a most vehement diabolical temptation consents to morose delectation.

2. External acts caused by violence are not imputed,⁵⁴ provided the man has restrained internal consent and has manifested his displeasure also externally. The reason is that such acts are altogether involuntary. Hence, for example, a woman who is violently oppressed immodestly does not sin, provided that inwardly she does not consent and also seriously manifests her displeasure outwardly. - Authors are accustomed here to ask whether a woman in this case is bound rather to suffer death than her own violation. That a woman in these circumstances can rather choose death than her own violation, all teach, both because, on account of the great delectation following from a libidinous act, some danger of interior consent is present, and because bodily integrity is a great good, which by some is equated with life. - Some deny, others affirm, that a woman then is bound to prefer death. St. Alphonsus⁵⁵ says concerning this matter: "The first opinion (namely, the negative), speaking speculatively, does not seem to lack its probability. Yet it must not be denied that the second, affirmative opinion is altogether to be urged in practice; at least because of the danger of consent, which can easily be present in that permission." It seems to me that this case pertains rather to fear than to violence. For a woman under fear of death is accustomed to be induced to permitting rape. Besides, the denying opinion is safe in practice; for there does not seem to be such a proximate danger of sinful consent, since the woman (inwardly abhorring that act with all her strength) will be so sorrowful because of the unspeakable disgrace that she will perceive no carnal delectation, as the example of the woman, even pagan Lucretia, oppressed by Tarquin, shows. Moreover, fear and disturbance of spirit will be so enormous in those circumstances that the use of reason is considered very much diminished. Whence no strict obligation exists of preferring death to violent oppression.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Code of Canon Law, c. 103, § 1, and c. 2205, § 1.

⁵⁵ Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 368.

⁵⁶ Thus also Billuart, De act. hum. diss. 1, a. 6.

S. Th. I-II, q. 6, a. 4 and 5.

68. Violence, which is called coercion when it is exercised toward a being that has knowledge, is properly a motion which proceeds from an extrinsic principle, with the patient resisting, that is, with that which suffers force resisting. It is said:

1. From an extrinsic principle, and thus the violent differs from the natural and the voluntary, which are from within: for nothing properly inflicts violence on itself, for otherwise it would at the same time tend and not tend toward the same thing;

2. With the patient resisting, that is, while the one suffering resists with every effort. For if something is naturally or voluntarily disposed, or not indisposed but indifferent, to suffering that which is from without, the passion will be natural or voluntary or permitted, not violent.

Hence violence is distinguished as a) violence strictly so called, or absolute and perfect, when the patient resists as much as he can, for example death inflicted on one who defends his life; and b) violence broadly so called, imperfect and in a certain respect, when he resists but not as much as he can, for example death inflicted on a martyr.

It differs a) from the necessary, to which it adds that it is from an extrinsic principle, while the necessary can also be from within;

b) from the involuntary, because this can be from within, from the knowledge of evil or defect of knowledge of the end. Indeed, every violent thing is necessary, and, if there is question of a knowing being, involuntary; but not conversely;

c) from that which is called moral violence: with properly so called physical violence (which by St. Thomas, II Sent. d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, is called sufficient and compelling) there is not to be confused the improperly so called or moral (it is called insufficient and impelling), which is inflicted by threatening and rebuking and which coincides with grave fear instilled, especially when something would not be impeded by resisting but would then be effected by external force, e.g., departure from a house made by someone who otherwise is expelled by military hand.

69. Can Violence Be Inflicted on the Will? - There is a twofold act of the will: one immediately elicited by it, namely, to will; the other commanded by it, exercised through another power, for example voluntarily to think, to walk, to speak. As to the former, violence cannot be inflicted on the will: for an elicited act is the very inclination of the will to something, proceeding from an intrinsic knowing principle; but a violent act proceeds from an extrinsic principle. Therefore it is impossible for an act of the will to be violent. And indeed, the violent is against the inclination of the patient; but the elicited act of the will, since it is the inclination of the will itself, cannot be against its own inclination. Hence Anselm says, De libero arbitrio, chapter 6: "No one can unwillingly will something, because he cannot will while unwilling to will." - But as to commanded acts, it can suffer violence, insofar as by violence our external or internal powers are moved against the command of the will, or are impeded lest they execute it, for example the foot lest it make a step, the eye, by closing it, lest it see, etc. Hence:

a) No one can coerce the will itself, not even God Himself.

b) God alone, as cause both of the will and of the act itself, can change it, that is, transfer it from one thing into another and make the unwilling willing, and the one willing this to be willing that; nevertheless He then does not inflict violence, or coerce the will against its inclination, but makes one inclination of the will succeed another.

c) God, angels, and the devil can, against the will, move the intellect, imagination, and sensitive appetite toward some object; in this case that movement with respect to these faculties is not violent, but it is violent with respect to the will.

d) All these, and men, can move the exterior members and external senses against the will.

70. Principles. The violent is directly opposed to the voluntary, and therefore makes the involuntary: for the violent (when it is inflicted on a knowing being) is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the willing subject; but the voluntary is from within, that is, from the proper inclination of the will (cf. can. 2205, § 1).

"Common to the voluntary and the natural," says St. Thomas, a. 5, "is that each is from an intrinsic principle" (i.e., from the proper inclination of the agent); "but the violent is from an extrinsic principle" (against the inclination of the subject). "And because of this, just as in things which lack cognition violence makes something be against nature" (unnatural), "so in knowing things it makes something be against the will... which is called involuntary."

Hence that which happens from an extrinsic principle:

1. If the subject resists externally and internally as much as he can, is absolutely violent and altogether involuntary;

2. If he resists externally, but consents internally, it is not voluntary nor involuntary, but willed;

3. If he does not consent nor resist, or does not resist as much as he can, but bears himself passively, while he ought not to resist or to resist more, it is not voluntary but permitted;

4. If he does not consent, but neither does he resist as much as he ought, it is indirectly voluntary (no. 60, II);

5. If he does not resist as much as he can but consents, it is violent in a certain respect but simply voluntary, yet less so the greater the violence was or the more he resisted. For the voluntary is "in one way according to action, when someone wills to do something; in another way according to passion, when someone wills to suffer something from another. Hence when an action is inflicted by someone exterior, while there remains in him who suffers the will of suffering, it is not simply violent, because although he who suffers does not contribute by acting, nevertheless he contributes by willing to suffer; hence it cannot be called involuntary" (a. 5, ad 2).

A girl oppressed by force, if she resists as much as she can, is oppressed involuntarily; if she does not resist as much as she ought or if she consents, voluntarily and culpably; if she does not resist as much as she can but as much as she ought, not involuntarily but permissively. Danger of consent being excluded, she is not bound to resist by useless means, or extraordinary means (the killing of the aggressor), or even by shouting if there is danger of notable harm, e.g., death, excessive shame: in these cases the oppression is not voluntary. But if internally she consents, externally she resists as much as she ought, the external oppression is not therefore truly voluntary, but only willed.

Force or violence is coercion which is brought upon someone by an extrinsic and free cause, his will resisting. But the will is said to resist when, both exteriorly, that is, by the aid of means extrinsic to itself, for example, by prayers dissuading, by threats deterring, by repelling force with force, etc., and interiorly, that is, in itself and by an interior affection, it resists as much as it can.

Acts elicited by the will can in no way be forced, because, as St. Thomas says: "it is against the account of the act of the will itself that it be forced or violent." But the other acts extrinsic to the will, whether they are completed by the external powers, or by the internal powers as by phantasy and the sensitive appetite, if they are posited from absolute violence, are not voluntary, and therefore not sinful; but if from violence in a certain respect, they are more or less voluntary according to the greater or lesser difficulty of resisting, or according to the greater or lesser affection with which one suffers force. Cf. St. Thomas, 1-2, q. 6, art. 4. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 17 and 18.

In canon law.

§ 1. Acts which a person, whether physical or moral, posits from extrinsic force, which cannot be resisted, are held as not done (Can. 103).

You Will Resolve. 1st. A woman who resists in every way the violence which is brought upon her sins in no way, even if intercourse occurs; because no one sins wholly unwillingly.

2nd. Women suffering force sin gravely if, through faintheartedness or vain fear, for example, of offending the aggressor, etc., they do not resist as much as they can, even with the danger of consent excluded, because while they resist less than is fitting, they equivalently consent to the violation of themselves, and cooperate in the crime of another.

But if you ask whether this resistance ought to be so great that it reaches even to crying out, a distinction is needed: if there is present proximate danger of consent, the woman is bound to cry out, despising whatever damage the aggressor threatens to her, because formal sin must absolutely be avoided. But with this danger excluded, again a distinction must be made: if the aggressor does not seek intercourse, being content only with touches and other things of this sort, then, according to St. Alphonsus, it is very probable that there is not such an obligation, even if fear of a damage less than death is cast upon her. The reason is that such an obligation cannot arise either by reason of preserving virginity, which by hypothesis remains intact, or by reason of charity, which does not oblige with so great an inconvenience. But if intercourse is sought, then, according to the same holy Doctor, the opinion which holds that a violated woman is not bound to cry out, while fear of death stands, is not lacking in probability, but only speaking speculatively; for practically it scarcely seems possible that this woman would not consent to venereal delight. Cf. St. Alphonsus, on the fifth precept of the Decalogue, n. 368; on the sixth precept of the Decalogue, n. 430.

3rd. Sometimes resistance wholly absolute and continuous against inflicted coercion is not required, namely when on the one hand it would be useless, and on the other hand there is question of a less dangerous matter. Thus martyrs led to pagan temples did not sin, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required for averting the danger of scandal, or injury to religion.

The things established in these two chapters concerning the human act receive splendid confirmation from those things which the new Code decrees concerning delicts, or external violations of law to which a canonical sanction has been added.

Question 1. On what things does the imputability of a delict depend?

Response. The imputability of a delict depends on the malice of the delinquent, or on his fault in ignorance of the violated law or in omission of due diligence; wherefore all causes which increase, diminish, or remove malice or fault, by that very fact increase, diminish, or remove the imputability of the delict (Can. 2199).

§ 1. Malice here is the deliberate will of violating the law, and to it there is opposed, on the part of the intellect, defect of knowledge, and on the part of the will, defect of liberty.

§ 2. Once an external violation of law has been posited, malice in the external forum is presumed until the contrary is proved (Can. 2200).

Namely, such is the fault to be imputed as is the deliberate will of violating the law; defect of knowledge diminishes the account of the voluntary according to the measure of ignorance, just as defect of liberty also diminishes actual imputation; in equal manner omission of diligence flows into fault. These things notwithstanding, once an external violation of law has been posited, the deliberate will of violating the law, or malice, is supposed, unless the contrary is proved. Therefore the subjective elements of a delict are discretion of mind and liberty of will; when these are lacking, there cannot be given an intention of committing a delict, or the foundation of imputability.

Question 2. Who are, and who are presumed to be, incapable of delict? In what manner does voluntary and involuntary drunkenness stand toward the imputability of a delict? In what manner weakness of mind?

Response. § 1. Those are incapable of delict who actually lack the use of reason.

§ 2. Those habitually insane, although sometimes they may have lucid intervals, or in certain reasonings or acts may seem sane, are nevertheless presumed incapable of delict.

§ 3. A delict committed in voluntary drunkenness is not devoid of some imputability, but this is less than when the same delict is committed by one who is fully master of himself, unless, however, drunkenness was sought expressly for perpetrating or excusing the delict. But when the law is violated in involuntary drunkenness, imputability is wholly absent if the drunkenness takes away the use of reason entirely; it is diminished if only in part. The same is to be said of other similar disturbances of mind.

§ 4. Weakness of mind diminishes the imputability of a delict, but does not wholly remove it (Can. 2201).

This canon is an application of the preceding one to various cases, and first indeed to those lacking the use of reason, who cannot intend a delict and therefore are simply incapable of it. For how shall he be constituted guilty who does not know what he is doing? By equal reason the habitually insane are presumed incapable of delict; they should rather be cared for and pitied than punished, c. 14, C III. 9. Drunkenness stands in diverse ways toward the imputability of a delict, which certainly will not be lacking when the drunkenness was voluntary, although it is less than when a man is fully master of himself, unless the drunkenness was directly sought for perpetrating the delict. Involuntary drunkenness indeed removes fault; weakness of mind does not remove the use of reason, but plainly diminishes it and liberty, and thus imputability.

Question 3. Does ignorance affect the imputability of a delict?

Response. § 1. The violation of an unknown law is in no way imputed if the ignorance was inculpable; otherwise imputability is diminished more or less according to the culpability of the ignorance itself.

§ 2. Ignorance only of the penalty does not remove the imputability of the delict, but diminishes it somewhat.

§ 3. Those things which are established concerning ignorance are also valid concerning inadvertence and error (Can. 2202).

This canon is an application of canon 2199 to defect of knowledge, which is opposed to imputability. For if ignorance of the violated law is inculpable, the very fact of violation is inculpable. But if, however, ignorance of the law is culpable, the violation will be culpable; and indeed the culpability of the latter follows the culpability of the former. Ignorance only of the penalty leaves the violation of the law intact; and therefore in no way removes imputability. But since such a violation does not carry with it contumacy against the punishing authority, imputability is diminished. Nevertheless a sinner of this sort has posited the cause of some punishment.

Question 4. Is imputability diminished from the omission of due diligence?

Response. § 1. If someone violates a law from omission of due diligence, imputability is diminished according to a mode to be determined by a prudent judge from the circumstances; but if he foresaw the matter and nevertheless omitted the cautions for avoiding it which any diligent man would have employed, the fault is proximate to malice.

§ 2. A fortuitous case which cannot be foreseen, or which when foreseen cannot be met, exempts from any imputability (Can. 2203).

If, therefore, some unjust damage occurs which could and ought to have been foreseen by the one omitting diligence, the infliction of damage is imputable according to the measure of the diligence omitted. The law directly obliges me to avoid voluntary violation; indirectly it also obliges lest from my action there follow the same damage which would follow from voluntary violation. And hence omission of diligence is imputable, as, for example, in homicide arising from omitted diligence of taking care lest it be done by the action. It belongs to the judge to determine the mode by which imputability is diminished.

But if the agent foresaw the matter and neglected it, his fault is proximate to malice. Thus the Most Holy Eucharist is to be guarded under faithful custody with keys employed, lest a sacrilegious hand extend itself to it for carrying out wicked things; the fault of a priest foreseeing such a sacrilege, yet omitting diligence by employing cautions lest the crime occur, is proximate to the fault of deliberate violation of the law, or malice.

Of the unknown there is no desire, nor imputability; wherefore it is not imputable to anyone that which followed by chance from his action, and which was neither foreseen nor could have been foreseen.

Question 5. What is the influence of passion upon the imputability of a delict?

Response. Passion, if it has been voluntarily and deliberately excited or nourished, rather increases imputability; otherwise it diminishes it more or less according to the diverse heat of passion; and it wholly removes it if it precedes and impedes every deliberation of mind and consent of the will (Can. 2206).

In these circumstances the influence of passion upon imputability is varied. If passion has been deliberately excited and nourished, it increases affection and hence the voluntary; if it has not been such, it is not in the full power of man; wherefore according to the greater or lesser heat it is less or more voluntary; indeed it can be that it not only precedes every consent of the will and deliberation of the mind, but also simply impedes it, in which case it removes imputability.

You will resolve. - 1st. Lesser age, unless something else is established, diminishes the imputability of a delict, and by so much the more the nearer it approaches to infancy (Can. 2204).

The reason is that in minors there is not that perfect reason, by defect of which full malice seems to be absent from their crimes. Cf. Clement XIII, Quemadmodum, n. 5. And the nearer age approaches to infancy, by so much the less must the delict be held imputable. Hence, in children, much is usually left which in others of more advanced age human laws say must be more severely corrected, as c. 2, X, V. 23. On account of the defect of the age in which the excess was committed, rigor is to be tempered by mildness.

2nd. § 1. Physical force which takes away every faculty of acting wholly excludes a delict.

§ 2. Grave fear also, even only relatively grave, necessity, indeed even grave inconvenience, for the most part wholly remove a delict, if there is question of merely ecclesiastical laws.

§ 3. But if the act is intrinsically bad, or tends toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward damage of souls, the causes spoken of in § 2 indeed diminish the imputability of the delict, but do not take it away.

§ 4. The cause of legitimate defense against an unjust aggressor, if due moderation is preserved, wholly removes a delict; otherwise it only diminishes imputability, just as also the cause of provocation does (Can. 2205).

Concerning force the matter is clear: it removes the foundation of imputability.

The reason for the second paragraph lies in this, that ecclesiastical laws and other human laws do not oblige with great inconvenience, unless the act is intrinsically bad, or tends toward contempt of the faith, etc. Certainly the excuse of necessity does not extend itself to freeing someone from the obligation of not blaspheming, of not perjuring; wherefore also the reason for the third paragraph is clear. But the fourth paragraph is evident from this, that he who so defends himself in no way sins, provided that he does not exceed the limits of just defense.

Four causes of the involuntary are commonly assigned: violence, fear, concupiscence and ignorance. But note, once for all, that when it is said that violence, or fear, or concupiscence, or ignorance cause the involuntary, the sense is not that violence, fear, concupiscence, or ignorance physically influence the act of will, upon its very involuntariness so to speak, but that they move physically or morally toward an act which simply or relatively is contrary to the inclination of the will; whence that involuntariness is caused by love of some opposite good. Thus, e.g., while one is moved by fear of shipwreck to cast goods overboard, that casting is involuntary in a certain respect [secundum quid], because it repugns to the affection which the one casting has for preserving his goods; whence the involuntary found in that casting is not caused by fear, but by love of his goods.

The proper sense, therefore, of these questions is, that acts from violence, fear, concupiscence and ignorance are involuntary simply or in a certain respect, inasmuch as they suppose in the agent an inclination simply or in a certain respect contrary to the present act toward which they move. I suppose that violence cannot be inflicted upon the will as to elicited acts, well indeed as to commanded acts.

The first part stands, because the violent, which is from an extrinsic principle with the patient resisting, is against the inclination of the patient. But an act elicited by the will is not from an extrinsic principle but intrinsic, namely from the will, nor against the inclination of the patient, since it is nothing else than the very inclination of the will toward its object. Whence St. Anselm rightly said, de Lib. arbit., cap. 6: « No one unwilling can will anything, because he cannot will, unwilling to will. »

Plain also is the second part, because the members, or exterior powers, can be moved by force from without or impeded against the command of the will ¹, as if, e.g., the will wished to see, one could forcibly close the eyes, and if it wished not to see, one could force open the eyes: and so of the rest. Therefore. ¹ Here q. 6, a. 4, c.

Of these commanded acts the question is whether violence causes the involuntary in them. Wherefore

I say: Violence causes the involuntary simply, or the act done under violence is involuntary simply.

Understand the conclusion of absolute violence, which one cannot overcome with all legitimate effort employed, not of violence in a certain respect, which one could conquer if he resisted as much as he morally can.

It is proved of the conclusion. The voluntary is from an intrinsic principle and consequently according to inclination; the violent is from an extrinsic principle and against the inclination of the patient; for we defined it « that which is from an extrinsic principle with the patient resisting ». Therefore what is violent is not voluntary.

From these authors commonly gather that a woman oppressed by violence from a man, resisting him both within and without as much as she morally can, sins nowise; because this violence destroys altogether the voluntary, without which there is no sin.

But if you ask what and how much the woman ought to do, that she be held to resist as much as she morally can, and thus suffer absolute violence simply so called,

I answer. First that she cannot kill the oppressor; because, as we say de Jure et Just., dissert. X, a. 6, § 2, chastity is a good of lower order than the life of man. She can however resist with cries, blows, slaps, wounding of the oppressor, yet not lethally, and the like; and to these she is bound, short nevertheless of danger to her own life and reputation; because, if such danger be present, and elsewhere there be absent danger of interior consent to lust, she is not bound to resist externally at so great loss of higher goods; because external resistance is an affirmative precept which does not bind always, and at so great cost. I said, « provided danger of consent to interior lust be absent »; which since it rarely is absent, rarely also is she bound to employ these at peril of life or reputation.

[Too absolutely does our Author deny that, in the case proposed, it is licit for the woman even to kill the oppressor.

Theologians commonly hold it licit to kill an unjust invader of goods of fortune, « if they be of great moment, and cannot otherwise be defended or recovered than by the death of the despoiler, » as Sylvius says, in IIam IIae, q. 64, a. 7.

And the same many cited by St. Alphonsus hold, lib. IV, n. 383; and this card. Gousset holds at least as more probable, n. 617, and Gury, n. 397. But chastity, and especially virginity, considered in itself, far surpasses goods of fortune. Therefore much more is it licit to kill the aggressor, if no other way be at hand for preserving chastity. So say the authors just named.

Moreover everyone is bound to turn away proximate danger of mortal sin. But in the case the woman is placed in proximate danger of consenting to another's lust, which consent would be mortal sin. Therefore she not only can but is bound to turn away that danger, even by killing of the aggressor.

If you say that everyone is bound to prefer the eternal salvation of his neighbor to his own temporal good, I answer:

1° The aggressor freely and knowingly casts himself into danger of salvation, and cannot require that the woman renounce a good, even temporal, which far surpasses other goods of the same order, to turn away from a criminal such danger as is willed at least in its cause.

2° The woman, if she repel not the force by every possible means, is herself constituted in danger of the same kind, namely of consenting to lust and losing through mortal sin the supernatural life of the soul. But not only is she not bound, she cannot even licitly prefer the salvation of another to her own salvation. Therefore. Whence St. Antoninus says in Summa, part. III, tit. 4, c. 3, § 2: « The woman uses her natural right, whereby she may repel force with force, and she is bound rather to provide for her own salvation than for another's; for she exposes herself to danger of consenting to an act of sin by suffering herself to be oppressed, on account of the difficulty of the pleasure. »

It must therefore be concluded, against our Author, that this violence does not destroy the voluntary altogether; for that cannot be judged altogether involuntary which is not removed by all possible and licit means.]