Morals of the Church
Library › Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology › Volume I › Book I. On the General Principles of the Christian Life › Treatise II. On Motion in Order to the Final End, or on the Human Act, Considered according to Moral Being › Dissertation I (Preliminary). On the Human Act, Considered according to Physical Being › Part II. The Elements of the Human Act Considered Separately › Section II. On the Free › Chapter II. On Those Things which Influence Liberty

Article — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Article I. On Physical Violence

27.

I. Notion. Physical violence is a physical motion proceeding from an extrinsic principle, while the one who suffers it resists or at least contributes nothing. What proceeds from violence is called violent or coerced. Now:

  1. The will cannot suffer violence in its elicited acts; in other words, elicited acts of the will cannot be coerced. For elicited acts are nothing other than inclinations of the will toward something, while violence supposes that the one who suffers it resists or at least is not inclined. And it is repugnant that the will be inclined toward something and at the same time not be inclined toward it, or even resist it. Hence not even God can coerce the will; nevertheless he can "change the will, and from one unwilling make one willing through efficacious grace. But then this is not to coerce, but to supply, in place of the old inclination by which it was unwilling, a new inclination by which it wills what before it did not will" (St. Alphonsus, V, XIX).

  2. The will can suffer violence in commanded acts to be elicited by another power; or rather, acts commanded by the will but to be elicited by another power are subject to violence. For that other power can be impeded from an act against the command of the will, or moved to it. Thus, for example, the will can command speech, and the tongue can be impeded by external force from uttering words (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, V, XIX).

Violence

28.

II. Division. Violence is usually distinguished as absolute and qualified, according as the one who suffers force resists, or does not resist, as much as he can and ought (St. Alphonsus, V, XVI).1

1 This division, however, is not a division of violence as such, because resistance is not required for the essence of violence.

Violence

29.

III. Influence on the voluntary-free.

  1. Absolute violence removes the voluntary; indeed, it causes the involuntary. For the involuntary is that which not only does not depend on the will, but besides is rejected by it; this has place in absolute violence.

  2. Qualified violence does not remove the voluntary, but nevertheless lessens it. It does not remove the voluntary, because where the will does not resist as much as it can and ought to resist, there remains some aspect of the voluntary. Yet it lessens the voluntary, because, when the will resists to some extent, less of the voluntary is had (St. Alphonsus, V, XVIII).

Violence