Vow of Chastity

THE Catholic Church, following the teaching and example of our Lord and of St Paul, esteems very highly the beautiful virtue of chastity. According to her teaching, the state of marriage is indeed good, and Jesus Christ raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, but the state of virginity is better. For such as wish to follow Jesus Christ more closely and to dedicate themselves wholly to God, celibacy and absolute chastity are proposed as a counsel of perfection. There is no fear that the number who embrace this counsel will ever be so great as seriously to interfere with the proper increase of “ the population. There will always be a sufficient number left in the world to enter upon the married state. Nor is the heroic renunciation of the pleasures of married life made by religious lost upon the world. As long as there are numbers of men and women to be seen who for love of God and chastity lead solitary lives, it should be more easy for people in the world to curb their fleshly appetites so as to keep within the bounds of reason and virtue.

By the vow of chastity the religious promises Almighty God. that he will altogether abstain from all venereal pleasure, whether of thought or deed. In consequence he is bound to observe perfect chastity of body and mind, so that any act which he commits contrary thereto will be a double sin, against the virtue and against his vow. We saw, when treating of the Sixth Commandment, that sins by which venereal pleasure is directly sought or consented to are always grave, and so, when such sins are committed by religious, their grievous malice will be twofold.

One who has taken a solemn vow of chastity is incapable of contracting a valid marriage by the law of the Church, and a fortiori he cannot enter on valid espousals. A marriage contracted and consummated before the taking of a solemn vow of chastity remains valid, but by ecclesiastical law a marriage which has not been consummated is dissolved by solemn vows taken in a religious order (Can. 1119). A simple vow of chastity never annuls a previous marriage, but it makes the use of marital rights unlawful. It is a disputed point as to whether a simple vow annuls previous espousals. A simple vow of chastity certainly makes subsequent espousals invalid, as being an unlawful promise, and it renders subsequent marriage unlawful though not invalid, except the simple vow made in the Society of Jesus, which is a diriment impediment to marriage by a special privilege of the Holy See.

In order to safeguard the chastity of religious, and to enable them to lead more quiet and tranquil lives, the law of enclosure has been introduced. The enclosure in a religious house is all the space within which the religious may move freely, but which they may not leave without the required permission, and to which others are denied access.

The law of enclosure is laid down in detail in the new Code of Canon Law, Can. 597 ff.

Papal enclosure should be kept in the houses of regulars, whether of men or women, if they are canonically erected, even though less than six professed religious live there.

Enclosure should also be kept in the houses of religious congregations whether of pontifical or diocesan law. The bishop has authority in this matter, and can enforce his regulations by censure.

Even societies of men or women who live together under a superior like religious, but without vows, are subject to the law of enclosure according to Canon 679, sec. 2.

I. Notion. The vow of chastity is a promise made to God of excluding the appetite and use of venereal things.

The remote material object is the appetite and use of venereal things; the proximate object is acts of excluding the aforesaid.

The formal object is the honesty which shines forth both in the said exclusion and in the vowing of it.

II. Effects. 1. A simple vow prohibits contracting marriage (can. 1058, § 1); a solemn vow, and likewise a simple vow to which this force has been added by a special prescription of the Apostolic See, dissolves a marriage contracted and not consummated between baptized persons or between a baptized party and a non-baptized party (can. 1119).

2. Concerning the manner in which both a simple and a solemn vow extinguish betrothals, see in the treatise on Matrimony.

III. Obligation. One who violates the vow of chastity sins: 1st, against religion, as is clear; moreover he commits the sin of personal sacrilege (n. 614); 2nd, against the virtue of chastity, at least if he perpetrates an act illicit in itself. It is disputed if he exercises an act licit in itself, as if a husband who has become a religious were again to use his wife.

IV. Penalties against violators of the vow; cf. our little work De virtute castitatis, 3rd ed., n. 60.

What is the object of the vow of chastity? - The object of the vow of chastity comprehends two things, namely those things which by natural and divine law are already prohibited by the virtue of chastity, and also those things which can licitly be done in legitimate marriage.

What is the gravity of sins committed against the vow of chastity? - R. There is exactly the same gravity or lightness of sin against the virtue of chastity as against the vow in those things which are prohibited by the virtue; and in these two sins are given, if the vow is violated. One sin is committed in that which is forbidden by the vow alone. But the gravity or lightness is to be taken from the virtue itself of chastity, namely if it would also be opposed to that virtue.

What is the difference between the solemn and simple vow of chastity? - The solemn vow of chastity invalidates subsequent betrothal and marriage, and likewise antecedent betrothal, and also antecedent ratified but non-consummated marriage. And note the difference with the vow of chastity in the reception of sacred orders, for this latter indeed invalidates betrothal and marriage contracted afterwards, but it does not invalidate marriage contracted before, although not consummated. A simple vow of chastity by common law does not invalidate marriage, whether subsequent or antecedent. By common law, because the Supreme Pontiff can decree that the simple vow of chastity dirimently impede marriage, just as if it were solemn. And thus it was really established as regards subsequent marriage for the simple vows of scholastics of the Society of Jesus. Furthermore, through the simple vow of perpetual chastity, subsequent betrothals are void, for the promise of marriage then concerns an illicit thing. More probably, antecedent betrothals are also dissolved. The reason is that the promise of betrothal is always judged to have been made under the tacit condition: unless a better state be chosen. - C. Rursus 6 Qui cler.; Trent s. 24, c. 6, 9; L. l. 6, n. 812, 958, 1059; Lucidi ed. 3, p. 93, 148.

What about enclosure? - For the greater custody of chastity enclosure was introduced, by force of which nuns cannot go out from the monastery except by license of the Pontiff or Bishop, which can also be given only in extraordinary cases. But religious men cannot be absent from the house without the license of the prelate. Nor indeed can women enter the enclosure of regular men, nor persons of whatever sex or age enter the enclosure of nuns. Likewise frequent access to nuns is prohibited, and to regulars, as is fitting, more severely than to others, both secular clerics and laymen. - C. 20, caus. 18, q. 2; Trent s. 25, c. 4, 5 de Reg.; Benedict XIV, Decretal Letter Gravissimo, October 31, 1749; C. Quamvis iusto, April 20, 1749; Clement VIII, C. Nullus; Ferraris v. Moniales a. 3; E. M.

Enclosure is also to be observed in hospices, stations, and houses of regulars in places of missions; and its norm and limits are constituted by the Decree of the S. C. de Propaganda Fide, August 26, 1780, Collect. n. 410.

As regards modern Religious Institutes of simple vows, they have enclosure, indeed not strict, but partial, determined in the Constitutions themselves, which requires at least that in all houses some part be reserved for the Sisters themselves, into which no other is admitted. Norms of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars for more recent Institutes, n. 170. It will belong to the Bishop to take care that this partial enclosure be rightly observed, and to restrain whatever defect creeps into it. Norms n. 172.

Sisters seeking alms must have the license of the Ordinary, and are held to observe the prescriptions established by the Decree Singulari quidem of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars, March 27, 1896, and also the norms which were promulgated by the S. C. of Religious, Decree De eleemosynis, November 21, 1908, both for mendicant Orders and for non-mendicant religious Orders or Institutes. A. A. S. v. 1, p. 153. From this Decree the Friars Minor are exempted as regards collections customarily made in favor of the Holy Land. S. C. of Religious, October 1, 1909.

As regards Sisters who provide assistance to the sick either in public Hospitals or in private houses, works of charity are by no means approved which seem unbecoming to virgins dedicated to God and clothed in ecclesiastical habit. Norms art. 15, 291.

Confraternities are prohibited in Convents of Religious women, whether of solemn or simple vows; but by no means pious Associations of women only, the things to be observed having been observed. But if it is a question of erecting pious Associations of either sex, the matter is remitted to the Ordinaries. S. C. Bishops and Regulars in Tirasonensi, November 9, 1595; January 18, 1907. - Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 4, d. 40.

Without a special faculty, male and female Religious cannot receive outside persons as guests in their own house, except by reason of charity when some case occurs. - Outside youths cannot live in Convents of men by any title or pretext unless they have completed the twenty-first year of age. - S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 16, 1675.

The use of the telephone is now permitted by common custom to all religious, men and women. Yet due cautions, as is clear, must be used.

What sort of sin is it to go out from the monastery without license? - For nuns living within enclosure it will always be grave, since the Church prohibits it under a most grave penalty, namely excommunication. - For religious men it will be grave if it is done rather often with scandal, or furtively at night; but only venial if someone goes out once or twice, or only sometimes during the day. - Clement VIII, on the Reform of Regulars, art. 19, prohibited a general license from being given, or one without a companion; but it is not certain whether the ordinances of Clement VIII are all preceptive, or at least some directive. Cf. Salm. tr. 15, c. 5, n. 163. Yet one can stand by legitimate custom, and by the Constitutions of each order approved by the Holy See. - The prescription of a companion is still in force from the practice of the S. C. Bishops and Regulars and now of the S. C. of Religious in the approval of more recent Institutes, especially as regards nuns. Norms a. 174. - L. 37; Suarez, de Relig. tr. 8, l. 1, c. 6, n. 8.

What about the obligation of wearing the habit? - In those Institutes in which a certain habit is ordered to be worn as a sign of religious profession, speaking of itself, the formal putting off of the habit, i.e., by changing the habit so that one is not recognized as a religious, if done rashly, is a mortal sin. C. Ut periculosa 2 Ne clerici vel monachi in 6. - Bouix v. 2, p. 585 ff.

1. Theodore, a religious, with a general permission of his superiors for spending money, applies to his own use money given to him for this purpose by friends; he spends some things upon objects not indeed necessary, yet useful or proper; other things, on the contrary, upon matters wholly superfluous and useless, and even sometimes unlawful. Hence it is asked:

Whether Theodore sins against the vow of poverty in these expenses?

Response. 1. An abundant use of things, provided it is had by permission of the superiors, is not of itself opposed to poverty. The reason is, first, because a poor man does not cease to be poor because at times he is somewhat more abundantly supplied by the charity and liberality of others; for he does not use those more abundant things by his own right, nor does he cease habitually to suffer want of all things. The reason is, secondly, because religious poverty is not to be understood so strictly, according to the manner of certain very timid persons, that it contains only the use of things strictly necessary, with permission of the superior; otherwise there would be no end of scruples and anxieties. See Suarez, De Religione, tome 3, book 8, chapter 5, nos. 32, 33, and chapter 15, nos. 3, 4. Therefore Theodore is not to be disturbed with regard to things simply abundant beyond strict necessities, as far as concerns the vow of poverty. Nevertheless a fault can perhaps be present by reason of scandal, or danger of relaxing regular discipline; indeed, there can also be so notable and excessive an abundance as to bring an indecency upon the state of poverty contrary to the vow itself. St. Alphonsus, book 4, no. 30.

2. Expenses in things wholly useless and unlawful are plainly illicit. But whether the permission of the prelate for such uses is invalid in itself is a question of no small moment. The first and more common opinion affirms that it is; because the prelate is not the owner, but only the administrator, of the goods of the monastery, and therefore he cannot validly permit useless or unlawful expenses, since he has not this power either from religion or from the canons. The second opinion denies this; for otherwise these purchases would be invalid, and no law declares that they are invalid. St. Alphonsus adheres to the first opinion, but says that he does not dare to reject the second. And certainly the reason for the first opinion is not entirely demonstrative, at least when the question is not about goods of the monastery, but about things received from outsiders in order to be spent. See Suarez, De Religione, tome 3, book 8, chapter 5, no. 33; Lugo, Responsa Moralia, book 4, doubt 6, no. 8; Liguori, book 4, no. 28.

3. As concerns Theodore, he did not receive a faculty to spend money on useless and unlawful things, but only a general permission to spend money. St. Alphonsus asks: if a prelate grants to a religious a general permission to spend some sum at his pleasure, and the religious spends it on base and vain uses, whether the religious sins against poverty, and whether both he and the receiver are bound to restitution? The holy Doctor reports two opinions. The first affirms it, on account of the reason given above. The second denies it, because the fact that the superior is not the owner does not stand in the way. For, at least, the monastery is the owner in such a way that it can dispose of its goods for all uses; and in the case it is presumed to consent, lest the reputation of the subject, of the superior, and of the monastery itself be endangered. Lugo, after reporting this opinion, says:

In truth, although the superior is a simple administrator, still no law is known by which his power is restricted to licit uses alone. For it must not be judged that the superior, when he gives a license, limits it only to licit uses; but, giving a general license, he removes the impediment which arose from the defect of license. In the same way, if the Pope dispenses with relatives so that they may marry, he does not merely grant that they may lawfully have the conjugal act, but he also removes the malice of incest; so that even if afterward they were to sin with one another outside the use of marriage, there would not be the malice of incest. Likewise, if the Pope dispenses with someone for eating meats, even if that man eats meats harmful to his health, he will sin against temperance, but not against the precept of fasting, which has been taken away by the dispensation.

Nevertheless St. Alphonsus says again that he embraces the first opinion, but does not dare to reject the second. Therefore we abstain from charging Theodore, in the proposed case, with a grave sin against the vow of poverty. See Lugo, Responses, as above; La Croix, book 4, no. 115.

2. Francis, a religious, hesitates whether he can ask the superior for permission to spend, in favor of a Marian Congregation of workers, whose Director he has been appointed by the superiors, various alms received for this purpose from devout persons, and the proceeds of various pious books which he has published. These expenditures would be necessary for promoting the Congregation. But it seems to him that he would thereby possess a peculium contrary to poverty.

Response. There is no reason why he should hesitate. This is, in fact, done even by holy religious, as we read concerning St. Francis de Hieronymo. Nor should Francis fear that he possesses a peculium, if he asks and obtains permission from the superior, and if he acts always dependently on him; much more, if he deposits the money with the superior for the destined pious use, and, as often as there is need, asks money from him.

For a peculium is properly that which individual religious have in order to provide for their necessities and useful needs. If they use this according to the need of the state of poverty, with the permission of the superior, and therefore by precarious use, that is, by a use revocable at the superior’s will, it is not against the vow of poverty. See I.M. 288. But in the proposed case the money is not destined for the proper uses of Francis, but for a pious work plainly conformable to his Institute, as is evident from the fact that the superiors have appointed Francis director of that same Congregation. Therefore, since it is used in a pious work exercised by the Institute according to Constitutions approved by the Apostolic See, it is wholly outside the notion of a peculium.

3. Ferdinand, a religious, obtained from the superior permission to dispose of a sum of money. The following day that superior was removed from office, and another was appointed in his place. It is asked:

Whether Ferdinand is obliged to ask permission again?

Response. No. The permission given by the superior also regards the future time, when he will have been removed from the office of superior. For the power or grace once granted is complete and perfect. La Croix adds:

Although a superior can licitly accept something for himself while he is superior, and can retain it after he has ceased to be superior, nevertheless he cannot spend it without the permission of the present superior; because he could delegate or entrust to others, not to himself, the power of spending for the following time, since there must be a distinction between the one delegating and the one delegated.

La Croix, book 4, no. 115.

4. Theodosius, a religious, while his parents were still living, before solemn profession renounced every present and future hereditary right in favor of his nephew Antonius. After the profession, his parents died intestate. The brothers of Theodosius, succeeding their parents, ask whether in conscience they are bound to give a part of the inheritance to Theodosius, or whether they can retain it for themselves. For Theodosius claims the inheritance, invoking the modern laws which favor him, and he thinks of disposing of it in favor of another nephew, Augustinus. Antonius also claims the inheritance by virtue of the renunciation made in his favor. But the steward of the convent says that it is owed to the convent, which succeeds in place of the religious by the principle: “Whatever a monk acquires, he acquires not for himself, but for the monastery.”

Response. 1. Theodosius invokes the modern laws in vain. For by solemn profession he was made canonically incapable of possessing anything. Nor can he recover this habilitas in a particular case by dispensation of a regular prelate, or even of a bishop. Therefore he cannot dispose of the paternal inheritance in favor of Augustinus, even with the permission of the superior or of the Ordinary; nor in any other way, even in favor of pious causes.

2. Antonius cannot claim the inheritance by reason of the renunciation made in his favor. For that renunciation has no force, since no one can give what is not, and will not be, his own. At the time when the renunciation was made, the inheritance did not belong to Theodosius, since his parents were still living; nor did it belong to him afterward, since a professed religious is incapable of being an heir. Therefore this inheritance was not included in the general renunciation of present and future goods and rights. It was not a present right, and neither was it a future one, since by reason of his incapacity it could not pertain to the professed man. Besides, either civil or canon law prohibits any disposition of an unopened inheritance in favor of a determinate third person, and makes it invalid.

3. The steward has no right, if by the Constitutions of the Order the convent is not capable of hereditary succession in place of the professed religious, as happens in the Society of Jesus, which does not succeed its professed members, nor are the professed capable of hereditary succession. In that case, the brothers of Theodosius claim the inheritance by right. But if the convent is capable of hereditary succession in place of the professed religious, the inheritance belongs to the convent, and the brothers of Theodosius have no right to it.

4. Cardinal Lugo, Responsa Moralia, doubt 5, no. 9, thinks otherwise. He concedes that it is impossible to renounce, by transferring to another and to the prejudice of another, namely the convent, a right which one does not yet have, nor ever will have, if the inheritance is not owed, for example, from a collateral relative. But he says that it is otherwise concerning the renunciation of the legitime; because, although the son does not actually possess it while the father is living, nevertheless he has a right to it, and it is owed to him. Therefore he says that he would not deny that the son could, before profession, renounce it in favor of another, to whom he now gives it. But this does not persuade us. For the son has no strict right to the legitime until the father dies, from the goods then left. Therefore, if the father dissipates the goods during life, although he sins, nevertheless he does not sin against commutative justice, nor is he bound to restitution. Furthermore, such a disposition of an unopened inheritance is prohibited and made invalid by positive law, even in the legitime. See I.M. 1034. Indeed Lugo himself, in the immediately preceding doubt 4, no. 7, says that if a novice or scholastic of the Society after the vows of the biennium renounces the inheritance of a living father in favor of a relative, then if the parent dies and the one renouncing has already been professed, the inheritance does not pertain to the one in whose favor he renounced, unless it is otherwise left to him by intestacy or testament; rather, it is deferred to those who would have to succeed according to the testament or intestacy, because from the renunciation they could acquire no right to the inheritance deferred at that time.

5. John, a professed religious of the Society, before profession renounced, in favor of a certain college of the Society, all his present and future goods and rights. Afterward, when he was already professed, his brother left him a legacy; and a doubt arises whether this legacy is valid notwithstanding the profession, and whether it is acquired by the college in whose favor John had renounced, or by another college in which, at the time of his brother’s death, John was permanently living.

Response. The universal clause of renunciation of all present and future goods and rights is usually added by notarial style, in order to signify the universality of the renunciation; nor is it without every effect. For if, between the renunciation and solemn profession, some goods and rights come to the religious, they are included under that clause. It is otherwise harmless, because it is conditional: if I shall have goods and rights in the future. But that condition cannot be verified after profession, since the professed man is incapable of having any good or right.

There is no doubt about the validity of the legacy. For the professed of the Society cannot be heirs, whether by testament or by intestacy; but they can be legatees. See Sanchez and Lugo. Thus, whether John had renounced or had not renounced, he remained capable of the legacy, although he could not be instituted heir.

But the legacy does not belong to the college in whose favor he had renounced before profession, but to that in which he was living when the legacy devolved. For, if there had been no renunciation, it is certain that the legacy would belong to the house or college in which he was living, according to the principle: whatever a monk acquires, he acquires for the monastery. And when it is said that the Society is not capable of succeeding its professed members, this is to be understood in this sense: that the goods of the professed do not pass by profession itself, by force of law, to the Society, but to the testamentary or intestate heirs. It is not to be understood as meaning that after profession the Society can acquire nothing through the professed. Therefore, if a devout person gives an alms to a professed religious, that alms is acquired wholly by the Society, or by the house and college in which he lives. Although the professed man cannot be heir, and if an inheritance devolved upon him the Society could not acquire it, nevertheless the same professed man is capable of a legacy, which he acquires not for himself, but for the Society, that is, for the house and college in which he is. Therefore, just as an alms given to a professed religious would not be acquired by the college in whose favor he made the renunciation before profession, so neither is the legacy acquired by it. For he cannot transfer to another what he does not have and to which he has no right. But he does not have, at the time when he renounces, things given to him afterward by donation or by legacy after profession, nor does he then have a right to them; nor does he have such a right after profession, since he is incapable of dominion and of right. The whole right, therefore, then belongs to the house and college in which he is. Therefore only this house and college acquires the thing given or left to him. Lugo, Responsa Moralia, book 4, doubt 5.

6. Pius, a testator, ordered that from his goods there be erected, in a parish church and at a fixed altar, a perpetual chaplaincy with the burden of daily Mass, the revenue assigned being 6,000 lire. Sempronius, a regular dispersed after the violent suppression of religious orders, in order to provide for his own support and that of another religious living with him in the same private house, asked for and obtained this chaplaincy from the bishop, although the parish priest was displeased.

Response. Sempronius acted by right. For first, a chaplaincy with a simple burden of Mass has the nature of a simple pious legacy, and, according to the Doctors, religious are not incapable of such chaplaincies. Indeed the Sacred Congregation of the Council, in Meliten., decreed that with the authority of the superiors religious can obtain such chaplaincies not only in their own churches, but also in secular churches, 23 November 1694, 11 June 1695, and 1 December 1691. Moreover, in the Letters of the Sacred Penitentiary by which the faculties already granted to dispersed regulars are enlarged, paragraph 16 grants to solemnly professed regulars that they can legitimately obtain and retain in administration chaplaincies, or even one ecclesiastical benefice, whether residential or with cure of souls, with the consent and at the will of the Ordinary, with the superiors also agreeing; yet they are obliged to leave it immediately when they are recalled by their superiors to the cloisters. Finally, the resolution is made certain from the affirmative response of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, 21 August 1869, in Acta Sanctae Sedis, volume 5, page 82 and following.

7. Brother Francis of the Passion, a lay brother of the Congregation of Discalced Clerics of the Most Holy Cross and Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ, before he emitted profession, renounced the usufruct of his goods conjointly to his parents, retaining for himself the right of ownership, as the Constitutions of the Society permit, chapter 13. His father having died, his mother survived with twin unmarried daughters, who were in want of all things. There were also two brothers who had withdrawn from the maternal home, and were placed in such a condition that they could support and nourish themselves and their family. Now these brothers were asking that the part of the usufruct which previously the father enjoyed should be granted to them; the mother, on the contrary, claimed it for herself.

Question 1. To whom does the aforesaid usufruct devolve: to the mother, to the sons, to the daughters, to all, or finally to Francis himself?

Question 2. To whom does the whole usufruct devolve when the mother also has died?

R. To the first question: the usufruct devolves to the mother by right of accretion. To the second question: the usufruct devolves to the owner himself, for the purpose of disposing of it according to the Constitutions. Thus S. C. EE. et RR., 15 September 1837, in Bizzarri, Collect., p. 75, ed. 1885.

8. “Titius by testament established a certain and perpetual revenue for a chaplaincy in the Church of a professed house of the Society of Jesus; and he enjoins the chaplain, to be appointed for the time by the superiors of the Society, that, retaining for himself a determined sum, namely one suitable as an alms for the daily Mass to be celebrated, he should give what remains each year as an alms to the Church of the same professed house.

Question. Whether this is an obstacle to the poverty of the professed house, or of its Church?

R. It is not an obstacle, provided that there is in the hands of the Society no disposal of those revenues, and no civil right is acquired by the same Society for petitioning in court for annual alms of this kind.

All these things are had expressly in the Constitutions of the Society, part 6, chapter 2 and 1, § 6, where it is said thus: ‘No one of the Society ought, nor can he, induce anyone to leave perpetual alms to houses or churches of the same Society; and if any should leave them of their own accord, let no civil right be acquired for petitioning for them in court. But when charity on account of God has moved them to this, then let them bestow them.’ Again, that there can be no disposal of those revenues in the hands of the Society is had in the same chapter, § 2: ‘No revenues can be held as applied to anyone, not even to the sacristy or the Fabric; nor in any other manner, so that there is in the hands of the Society any disposal of them.’ And in the Declarations of the same chapter, letter B, these things are had: ‘If one of the founders of houses or churches should wish to leave certain revenues for the use of the Fabric, provided that neither the disposition of them pertains to the Society, nor there is anything from which an action concerning them belongs to it, although it would be its care that the one to whom such a duty has been committed should do his office, and so in similar matters, this would not be alien to the poverty of the Society.’ From these things the truth of this proposition is manifestly gathered: it is not against the poverty which the Constitutions of the Society require in professed houses and Churches, if these use revenues spontaneously established by benefactors, provided that the disposition of them is not in the hands of the Society, nor a right to petition for them in court.

“It is said, that the disposition ought not to be in the hands of the Society, so that care may be taken lest even colleges have revenues which they perpetually expend, whether from an obligation imposed by benefactors, or from a disposition left free to themselves, for the support of professed houses and their churches. For this is held to be against the poverty of the Society in canon 12 from decree 61 of the Seventh General Congregation. With this caution having been applied, the Society is now understood to have done whatever it can on its part for guarding the purity of its poverty against revenues spontaneously left for its benefit. It has rendered itself incapable of any right whatever in the revenues themselves; it has furthermore willed no right whatever for petitioning and exacting them. What remained for it to perform? Was it that it should not petition in any way whatever? or that it should not accept, when they were given each year? But these two things do not stand in the way of poverty. But you will say: they would be owed each year; therefore they would be like a true revenue. But the response is manifest: for they would not be owed from any right residing in the Society, but from the right of him who disposed of his goods. Thus, one who receives money from another, in order to distribute it to the poor, owes it to the poor, not from a right existing in the poor, but in the owner, especially since the poor either are incapable of right, or are unwilling to have that right. Rome, 26 June 1723. Christopher Rassler, Edward De Vitry, Antonius De Gaizenrode, John De Ulloa, John James Ghezrius.” A copy of this Resolution is preserved in the Archive of the Father Procurator General of the Society of Jesus.

9. Boniface, a regular superior, whenever his subjects ask from him permission to give some alms to the poor, or to spend something on pious causes and on pious works proper to the Order, never exceeds the quantity of a few solidi. For he says that since religious are poor, they cannot, whether in giving alms or in doing pious works, exceed the quantity proper to the poor.

Question. What is to be said to the Case?

R. Boniface’s reason, considered in itself, is true if there is question of money and other things, in great quantity, to be expended for uses wholly superfluous, vain, and unlawful. Expenses of this kind in superfluous matters, in notable quantity, are opposed to the state of religious poverty. Hence it is that, although they are made with the superior’s permission, this indeed not improbably prevents the religious from being a proprietor, since he usurps nothing without the consent of the superior; but it does not prevent there being an illicit use opposed to the vow of poverty. I say in notable quantity; otherwise the aforesaid expenditures, although unlawful from another source, are not specially opposed to poverty. Cf. Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, d. 3, 127 ff., n. 134 ff.

But what things are called notably superfluous in this matter cannot be handed down by one general rule. For it depends on prudent judgment, with attention to the circumstances of persons, place, custom, and similar things. Hence, in an observant religion, it would be a grave sin against poverty to have, for example, gold or silver furnishings, silk garments, silk coverlets or ornaments of the bed, forty or thirty linen shirts for one’s private use, etc. For these and similar things are not fitting, but gravely unbecoming to the state of poverty which an observant religion professes. Therefore a subject having these things, even with the superior’s license, sins against the vow of poverty, not indeed because of defect of license, but because that vow is not only about not using any thing without the prelate’s license, but also about preserving the state of a poor man, and not making expenditures which do not befit the poor. Lugo, loc. cit., n. 131, 183.

With these things premised, it is clear first that, although Boniface’s reason is true considered generally, nevertheless it is applied erroneously by restricting the legitimate faculty of the superior and the legitimate use of the subject to a few solidi. Besides, it is also applied erroneously to the giving of alms and to the performing of other pious works. For these are not expenses and expenditures which are unbecoming to religious poverty. And as regards alms for the poor and needy, there is indeed no precept for religious, as there is for beneficiaries, that the superfluous be expended upon the poor and pious causes; but this is so because it is exceedingly clear that religious, who profess poverty, expend the superfluous in alms and other pious causes, which in fact is done by religious even very poor and most observant of poverty. Hence it is that they often feed even many poor daily, and build churches and Altars of great price, and establish public works of piety and mercy.

164. • The vow of chastity must be judged much more excellent than the vow of poverty, since through it the Religious renounces not goods extrinsic to himself, but intrinsic ones, namely pleasures of the body and senses.

Its object comprehends two things, namely those which are already prohibited by natural and divine law, and also those which could licitly be done in legitimate matrimony. Therefore this is the efficacy of the vow of chastity, that what otherwise could be licit becomes illicit for a Religious; but those things which are prohibited to all, he himself ought to avoid from a double obligation, namely of chastity and Religion.

The simple vow of chastity constitutes only an impeding impediment of matrimony, and therefore makes matrimony illicit, but not invalid. But the solemn vow also diriments a subsequent marriage.

165. Questions. - QUESTION 1º. Are sins of luxury, even merely internal ones, opposed to the vow of chastity?

Resp. Affirmative. The reason is that a Religious by force of the vow of chastity is held to abstain from every voluntary venereal delectation, whether internal or external, so that if he injures chastity, he incurs a double guilt, namely of luxury and sacrilege. - St. Ligorius, n. 33.

According to some, the vow of chastity is violated only by external sins of luxury; because, they say, the Religious devotes to God only 1º external goods, of which he despoils himself by the vow of poverty; 2º the body, whose pleasures he renounces by the vow of chastity; 3º the soul, or mind and will, which he hands over to the Superior to be moderated by the vow of obedience. But the most common and true doctrine is that the vow of chastity is violated, and indeed gravely, even by merely internal sins; because the one vowing simply promises to God that he will abstain from every delectation without any distinction.

166. • QUESTION 2º. What is the gravity of sins committed against the vow of chastity?

Resp. This general rule must be established: the gravity of sin against the vow is exactly the same as against the sixth and ninth precepts of the Decalogue, namely the sin is mortal or venial against Religion according as it is mortal or venial against chastity. But smallness of matter is not to be admitted in sins of luxury sought or admitted, nor can the fault be light except from imperfect consent, according to the things said in tom. 1, n. 412.

167. • QUESTION 3º. Whether or what difference is there between the virtue and the vow of chastity?

Resp. 1º No difference is given by reason of the object, since the vow extends as broadly as the virtue itself. Nevertheless they differ in this, that in those things which are prohibited by the virtue, two sins are given if the vow is violated, while one sin is committed in that which is interdicted by the vow alone. For if someone bound by a simple vow of Religion were to contract matrimony, he would perpetrate one sin, namely against Religion, in the use of marriage ¹. Therefore sometimes the vow can be violated without the virtue itself being injured.

¹ ** Say the same if, with the consent of the wife, the husband has received sacred Orders or has emitted solemn vows in a Religious Order. For if afterwards they were to use matrimony, they would bind themselves by the crime of sacrilege, yet they would not sin against the virtue of chastity.

Resp. 2º The virtue of chastity, besides the obligations which it imposes, also counsels mere counsels leading to greater perfection; while the vow affects only the matter of obligation.

But for the greater custody of chastity enclosure was introduced, by force of which Nuns cannot go out from the Monastery except with permission of the Pontiff or Bishop, which can be given only in extraordinary cases; but Religious cannot be absent from the house without the permission of the Prelate. Thus from the Constitution of Clement VIII, Nullus, etc. - Hence:

QUESTION 4º. What kind of sin is it to go out from the Monastery without permission?

Resp. 1º For Nuns dwelling within enclosure it will always be grave, since the Church prohibits it under a most grave penalty, namely of excommunication.

Resp. 2º For Religious it will be grave if it is done more often with scandal, or secretly at night; but only venial if someone goes out once or twice, or only sometimes during the day. - More things concerning enclosure and the penalties inflicted upon violators of it in the Treatise on Censures.

"1. Whether, if there are not solemn vows, nuns nevertheless are bound to observe the enclosure which they vow by a simple vow, under the censures enacted by Trent, where the Bishop has restored the enclosure. 2. Whether he also incurs the penalty of excommunication who without license enters the precincts of the monastery, where the enclosure has been restored by the Bishop? Resp. To the 1st, negatively as regards the penalties prescribed by the sacred canons and apostolic constitutions. To the 2nd, affirmatively with relation to censures perhaps imposed by the Bishop." S. C. EE. and RR. 1 Aug. 1839.

The explanation of the vow of poverty is the most difficult of the three vows. Wherefore, for the sake of clarity, a general idea of that vow seems to have to be placed before the other explanations.

— I. General Idea of the Vow of Poverty. By the vow of poverty, the religious promises to God that renunciation of exterior goods or riches which is prescribed by the constitutions of the religion as the matter of the vow.

In the present discipline of the Church, by force of the vow of poverty, from common law:

1. Every professed is prohibited from the independent use, for his own advantage, of any thing estimable by price; that is, he can use no thing estimable by price as his own, whether that thing is his own property, or belongs to the community, or to another person.

2. Every professed acquires for his religion the temporal fruits of his own industry, so that if he alienates the same without permission, he is also held to restitution on account of violated commutative justice. And this industry, if we take the norm of the responses of the Sacred Congregation of Religious, March 16, 1922, concerning moneys which come to religious on the occasion of military service, is to be taken very broadly, concerning every emolument of one's own action, even one foreign to the religious state, and concerning every donation which seems in some way remuneratory of such action, as is a donation made in reward of military virtue.

3. Those solemnly professed are incapable of ownership and, after such profession, acquire all things for the religion, if this is capable; otherwise, for the Holy See (c. 582).

It is also common that those simply professed of themselves preserve their patrimony and are capable of new acquisition.

All remaining things vary, whether you consider ownership of goods or dispositions concerning goods.

For what goods can those simply professed acquire? Quite often, besides goods which connaturally accede to the patrimony, also any legacies and gifts made in view of their own person. Yet this rule is not universal: the faculty of scholastics of the Society of Jesus is less broad.

As to dispositions concerning revenues, the professed sometimes disposes by his own free judgment; sometimes the disposition must be approved by Superiors; sometimes it is defined by the Constitutions themselves.

But concerning goods, c. 583 establishes this: To those professed of simple vows in religious Congregations it is not lawful: "1. By an act between the living to abdicate the ownership of their goods by gratuitous title." The making of a testament is prescribed to novices of religious Congregations, c. 569, §3. As to the mode of disposing of goods, sometimes, but not always, permission of the Superior is to be sought.

As to sanctions, a disposition illicitly made can be opposed either to the vow or to ecclesiastical law alone or to the Constitutions. More easily are acts contrary to the vow by which something is illicitly acquired or kept than acts by which someone illicitly renounces goods. And because in religious Orders simple profession succeeded solemn profession, which by the vow of poverty excluded all independent acts concerning any goods whatsoever, those simply professed in religious Orders seem, as often as they act illicitly, at the same time to violate the vow, while so absolute a rule cannot commonly be applied to religious Congregations.

The Constitutions must be consulted; the way in which the vow of poverty is commonly understood in the Institute must be considered.

4. But all, with due permission, can perform acts civilly necessary, for example for possessing or acquiring common goods.

— II. The remote matter of the vow of poverty is an external temporal thing estimable by price; therefore not honor, reputation, the very industry of the religious, or the application of Mass, but indeed the fruits of industry, stipends received for the application of Mass. Manuscripts, insofar as they are retained with the person, fall outside this matter, as too much joined with the person; but if the writer wishes to separate them from his person, now donation or alienation without permission is prohibited by the vow itself. Cf. Sacred Congregation of Religious, July 13, 1913.

A work made by art, a painted picture, are matter of the vow. But a religious artist does not violate the vow who from the beginning promises or cedes to someone the work by which he will make a statue or picture, especially if the other has furnished the material.

— III. With the goods which continue to belong to the professed now set aside, the following acts violate the vow, unless they are made honest by due permission: acquisition, in such a way nevertheless that permission can easily be presumed for accepting what yields to the utility of the religion; donation and renunciation of a right already acquired, in such a way that by refusing an alms or donation not yet accepted, though it must be said otherwise of a legacy, charity alone can be injured; exchange, in such a way nevertheless that if it concerns fungible things of the same kind, such as various coins of themselves are, this scarcely seems repugnant to the vow, and, from presumed permission, is done altogether honestly; so that exchange of things wholly similar lacks grave fault, and lesser fault is present in exchanges of similar things among brothers of the same house; consumption, in such a way that if you receive and consume food or drink among outsiders themselves, probably, according to Cardinal De Lugo (De iust. et iure, d. 3, n. 53), you do nothing except a use of fact by which the vow is not injured; otherwise if you carry things home and consume them there; loan and commodatum, in such a way that, if restitution is certain and the concession has been made for a brief time, there will not have been grave violation, and less grave if you give to a brother than to an outsider; use for other ends than those which have been taxatively indicated by the prelate expressly or tacitly, as if you do not expend the whole travel allowance given for a journey and, returned home, keep it for various uses; great negligence or quasi-dissipation in using clothing, etc., or consuming things of which, as for example paper and oil, disposition is permitted to the reasonable judgment of the religious; retention of a thing beyond the time for which it is conceded, as if you retain books of common use longer, but it will not be grave if another who needs them can easily recognize the holder; concealment of a thing, even one obtained with permission, done for this reason, lest the Superior be able to take the thing away. If the thing is concealed or locked up for another end, for example lest others see it importunately, or lest a Superior of lesser grade petition revocation of the faculty, the vow will not be violated, unless the permission is judged to have been given on this condition, that nothing be closed to the immediate Superior.

— They do not violate the vow, although they can be illicit from elsewhere: administration of another's thing, made in his name; destruction of a thing, probably, if you do it merely with the mind of doing harm, taking no utility from it; acceptance of money for a pious use, whether determined, which all concede, or even, as is probable, to be defined by the religious himself, provided that he cannot use the thing also for profane uses by his own judgment; administration of a benefice, since it accedes to a spiritual thing; possession of goods in common.

What concerning a deposit properly so called, not concerning a certain simple custody of a thing furnished? A deposit seems to others repugnant to the vow, since the depositary takes on an obligation to which he cannot fully satisfy except as owner; which others deny, since it contains no act of ownership over the thing deposited.

— The permission by which the vice of proprietorship is warded off must proceed from the proper competent Superior of the religious. Wherefore, unless the constitutions subject guests to the Superior of the house in which they are staying, he will not be able to give permission except to those religious who have domicile or quasi-domicile in the house over which he presides.

Permission would be invalid if it were extorted by force or fraud. But of itself it can be general, special, express, tacit, reasonably presumed. Presumption is plainly legitimate in circumstances where the prelate is prudently judged to oppose neither the thing or substance of the fact, nor the mode by which you act, that is, permission not having first been petitioned. For then the act is made dependently upon the will of the prelate. On the contrary, permission which would be denied cannot be presumed. If the prelate, having been asked, would have conceded permission, but is opposed to the fact that you did it with himself not consulted, then either he is judged so disposed that absolutely he would not will the thing to be used by you without permission, or, the negligence being known, he would be opposed merely to the omission of permission. In the latter case, he is unwilling only as to the mode, nor is the vow injured; in the former case, he is said to be unwilling by reason of the mode as to the substance, and the vow has been violated. Displeasure which seems likely to be grave or light can be held as a sign of one or the other repugnance.

After the fact, it is of itself fitting to admonish the Superior concerning presumed permission, and not rarely the rule enjoins it. Yet to omit this is not opposed to poverty, unless the matter, not plainly past, has some successive course, as if you keep with yourself a thing accepted from a presumed faculty.

Of itself, unless otherwise established, the permission which a prelate now performing an office previously gave continues to be valid; but he cannot give permissions to himself, as to an inferior, for the later time: for he was never subject to himself.

The dissent of a greater prelate, or a simple prohibition made by the same, of itself takes nothing away from the power of a lesser prelate, who therefore can validly concede what the greater Superior has denied. Yet the latter can weaken the former's faculty in advance or after the act.

From a reasonable interpretation, express permission of receiving several medals, rosaries, and little images in number is tacit permission of distributing them; but permission made to someone of giving or receiving, when from the declaration of the Superior or from usage it is judged to regard all, consequently gives to others the faculty of receiving or giving. Yet one must act in good faith, lest one person seem to have been constituted through whom all mutual gifts, with the Superior unaware, pass. And unless the prelate has contradicted it, from tacit or presumed permission, religious can, when the prelate cannot be approached, give modest alms in grave necessity of the poor or when this seems to pertain to edification. The same must be said concerning slight donations which are, as it were, owed from gratitude, if the religious has certain goods conceded to himself for use. St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 21. And when, as in certain religions it has been accustomed to be done for clothing, a certain amount of moneys or things is so given for the support of the religious that neither the monastery must supply anything nor he himself render an account, or if he is staying outside the cloister, the faculty is judged conceded of giving to whomever he pleases that which by living more sparingly he has obtained as remaining over.

— IV. Grave Matter. 1. The question concerning grave injury of poverty is reputed difficult and is accustomed to be treated incompletely. For although today most religious are no longer solemnly professed, nevertheless present moral treatises are accustomed to examine only those cases which formerly were almost universal, namely of religious who can have nothing proper. Yet it is manifest that donation of a thing which a religious truly possesses cannot be assimilated to donation of a thing not possessed. Donation of the former, unless there were a positive prohibition, would not even be contrary to the vow of poverty. For by donating or abdicating, someone becomes poorer.

2. When there is question of the vice of proprietorship properly so called, or of acts which are prohibited by the vow to be done concerning things not proper to oneself, the more common opinion proposes this rule: the same quantity which would constitute grave theft is to be indicated as a grave injury of religion in one professing poverty. That rule rests upon a certain likeness between theft and sin against the vow of poverty: in each an undue appropriation is committed.

But this rule must be explained more; for there is absolutely and relatively grave matter of theft. Most take matter relatively grave, with account had of the riches or poverty of the monastery itself. Yet there is not question of estimating damage, which pertains to injustice, but of weighing neglect of due dependence upon Superiors, which seems to be the same whether the thing wrongly usurped belongs to a poor or to a rich one. Wherefore Palmieri, t. IV, whom Genicot follows, II, 98, thinks that an absolutely grave quantity must be taken. That opinion will be safe in a religion whose approved authors have defended it: the intention of those vowing can be judged accommodated to this, who can, not indeed turn light matter into grave, but attenuate the obligation which of itself would correspond to the matter.

But elsewhere we would not put it forward; for it seems to us alien from the true. For does not another relative consideration succeed in place of the relative consideration of damage or detriment brought? Both, justice and poverty, regard property, but in a different way: the former, that you may preserve another's property inviolate; the latter, that you may repel it from yourself. Therefore, just as under the former respect the question concerning grave matter is posed thus: what is notable spoliation of another, so under the other respect, which is our present one, this question must be solved: what is notable acquisition of a religious as such? But that this varies according to the manner of living of the one acquiring is manifest. And who will deny that a religious who, as a Capuchin Friar Minor, professes strict poverty sins gravely by a lesser quantity than a regular canon of a wealthy monastery? Wherefore we judge that the condition in which the religious who has sinned stands from his profession is to be attended to. Is it, as in most present religions, the condition of an honest priest? Matter grave in comparison with an honest priest will of itself have to be taken.

3. But a much greater quantity is required when a religious, without due permission, disposes of goods whose ownership he lawfully keeps. For then not so much the thing as the very distribution or administration is usurped. Wherefore: a. if he disposes for himself, we judge that he sins gravely when from this he draws a tenor of life which gravely derogates from the profession of poverty; b. but if he attributes to another, the quantity absolutely grave in the account of theft could perhaps be taken four or five times. And if the use was a work of piety, or something similar, the Superior will scarcely of himself be gravely unwilling.

4. Several things which are accustomed to make the prelate, whose permission removes the vice of poverty, less unwilling attenuate the gravity of the sacrilege, so that there is need of a greater quantity for lethal sin. Hence, if there is question of edibles and drink, especially for the present use of the religious, unless the thing was extraordinary and precious, grave fault will be absent; the fault is also of itself lighter if from common things you illicitly take for yourself or give to brothers of the same house than if you give to outsiders; if you intend a useful use than if a vain one.

And it is clear that when use alone is usurped, the value of the use is to be considered.

On the contrary, because the prelate is judged more unwilling, several wish that one sins more gravely against the vow if at the same time he has injured justice than if he has injured religion alone.

5. Small sacrileges, although often repeated, do not seem to coalesce. Yet he sins gravely from the beginning who deliberately accepts small things with the mind of progressing to grave matter; and he who, from several things preserved, has with himself a grave value which he cannot retain without grave guilt.

— A religious injures justice, whether toward the religion or toward outsiders, who damages, steals, retains for himself, or gives to others what by right belongs to the community or to others, all these things being understood as is explained in the treatise On Justice. But when the detriment belongs to his own religion, although the very severity of discipline and the lesser faculty of disposing in a prelate, who is not owner but administrator, does not allow that the religious be judged a son under family power, nevertheless, because the goods of the religion yield to the utility of the religious, their case seems able to be estimated more benignly than that of outsiders, so that you can increase somewhat, for example by half, the quantity required for grave sin.

The cases are:

a. of injury without sacrilege: as if a religious, merely from the mind of doing harm, brings damage upon another's thing, or as confessor unjustly dispenses someone from restitution;

b. of sacrilege without injury: as if the religious otherwise applies or hands over to another what he could consume unproductively for a certain end; if he takes for himself what the prelate would not have denied him; if what he has spared of money, for example on a journey, he expends otherwise in the same moral time; if from outsiders he accepts something consumable by use and offered exclusively to himself;

c. of sacrilege concurring with injury: as if he does not hand over to the religion the fruits of his own industry, for example Mass stipends received.

And grave injury can be light sacrilege, and conversely: as if a religious snatches a modest quantity from a poor person, or, conversely, takes for himself a great amount of money from a person lightly unwilling.

— Because permissions and obligations of religious are judged to have been made or undertaken for no temporal profit of the Institute but for the sake of religion, sloth or laziness of a religious does not seem to be condemned as injustice. A religious will make restitution to the community by avoiding expenses which he could lawfully make from common goods, by handing over to the community what he could have applied to other uses. Yet for that reason he must not deprive himself of things which are referred to his own honest support.

— On Common Life and on Peculium. A threefold account of common life can be distinguished. The first is had when, other things being equal, religious are clothed, fed, and treated in a morally equal way. Other things being equal, insofar as Superiors at the same time with paternal charity provide for the peculiar necessities of a weaker body, and, with attention to the end of the Institute, procure what special studies or ministries can require.

Another account is observed if religious obtain necessary things for themselves from the community, formally or equivalently. Formally, as when things are bought with common money; equivalently, as when things bought with another's money are handed over to the free disposition of the Superior, and are conceded for use to the religious for whom they were destined by the buyer only dependently upon the will of the Superior and precariously.

Finally the third account demands that things be administered commonly, and that there be no portion of common things which the religious, beyond what present necessity morally requires, is permitted to possess, administer, or hold for his own uses.

The first account of common life procures uniformity; the other, common possession; the third, common administration.

To the second and third account of common life peculium is opposed. But peculium is distinguished into that of perfect right, which the Superior now cannot take away, and that of imperfect right, which can be circumscribed or taken away by the Superior. Peculium of perfect right is opposed to the vow of poverty, just as it is commonly understood in present law; peculium of imperfect right is not of itself repugnant to the vow, but if there is question of lasting peculium and one received, as it were, by customs, it is alien from the mind of the Church. She urges everywhere the prudent restoration of common life. But a custom which is opposed to the Code cannot be tolerated unless centenary or immemorial, insofar as Ordinaries have judged this opportune.

2. Now the Code, c. 594, §1, prescribes that "in any religion common life be observed by all, even in those things which pertain to food, clothing, and furniture." Besides, in §2 it is enjoined that whatever religious, even Superiors, acquire by their own industry or by reason of religion, and whatever goods come to an Order by reason of the solemn profession of members, be mixed with common goods, and that any money and all securities be deposited in the common chest.

With this prescription of the second paragraph saved, the common life of which in §1 seems able to be understood as it is imposed by the constitutions. This is confirmed by c. 2389. For canon 2389 commands Superiors gravely to admonish, and, if amendment has not followed, to punish religious who in a notable matter violate the law of common life as prescribed by the constitutions.

— There does not exist a special virtue of poverty, since riches and the possession of them are of themselves indifferent. But excessive affection toward temporal goods, just as in another person, so also in a religious, is to be charged as a sin which, according to the varying case, will be opposed to varying virtue.

— Matter of the Vow. By the vow of chastity, which coheres intimately with the profession of sanctity, a religious is prohibited, from the motive of religion: a. from all lust, internal and external; b. from marriage during profession.

For the common understanding of the matter has it thus: that the material object of the vow is the same as that of the virtue. Yet it can happen that, with the virtue intact, only the vow of chastity is violated, and conversely. One who is bound by a simple vow contracts marriage illicitly but, with peculiar exception saved, validly. If he uses the same, he will indeed injure the vow but not the virtue of chastity. And he who, himself free of lust, induces someone to sin with another person, will have sinned against the virtue, but not against the vow.

Some charge the violation of a solemn vow as a stricter sacrilege; but that the species varies on account of solemnity is not demonstrated.

Marriages honorable of themselves, with a pact of continence and therefore with a vow of chastity, can be composed together. But in the vow of chastity of religious, a vow of celibacy is judged to be contained, as is proved by the canonical penalties themselves to be alleged immediately below.

— Juridical Effects. "Religious who have professed solemn vows attempt marriage invalidly" (c. 1073).

Besides, "a marriage not consummated between baptized persons, or between a baptized party and a non-baptized party, is dissolved... by the law itself through solemn religious profession" (c. 1119).

With a special disposition set aside, as in the Society of Jesus, a simple vow of chastity does not dirime marriage. And by no simple profession is a marriage merely ratified dissolved. But by simple profession nuptials are prohibited; and every vow of chastity of religious, since it is public, is reserved to the Holy See. Concerning the effect of dismissal or departure with indult, cf. below, nn. 154, 157.

— Penal Sanction. Those solemnly professed who presume to contract marriage even civilly only, just like persons who presume to contract nuptials with them in the same way, are punished with an excommunication latae sententiae simply reserved to the Holy See. If there is question of those professed of perpetual simple vows, the excommunication latae sententiae is reserved to the Ordinary (c. 2388).

On account of the word "presume," every ignorance, with affected ignorance alone excluded, excuses from the censure. But the Ordinary to whom the excommunication is reserved, since the Code defines nothing further, seems to be the one to whom the penitent is actually subject.

— Account of the Vow. The vow of obedience of religious is a promise made to God of the obedience which is owed in religious life.

1. Whom one must obey. By force of the vow of obedience, the religious must obey: a. that hierarchical prelate who commands him as a religious by power of jurisdiction. This is, as to Orders and Congregations of pontifical law, the Supreme Pontiff (c. 499, §1) and the regular Prelate, at least exempt; as to diocesan religions, also the bishop or quasi-bishop; b. those who are placed over the internal governance of the religion or house: therefore the religious Superior properly so called, and also, if usage bears this, others to whom the Superior has communicated his power, as to a Prior, sub-Prelate, or Minister, sub-Rector. But usage rather has it that, at least when the Superior of the house is present, he alone is to be obeyed from the vow. Yet in other matters the authority of the Superior himself, and thus the vow, could be violated.

2. The remote matter of the vow is contained in all those things which either are explicitly presented by the rule or constitutions, or belong to it reductively, insofar as they are at least very suitable for the observance of the rule: thus mutual services, suitable punishment of delicts. For religious vow obedience according to their religious manner of life. St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 104, art. 5 ad 3.

Although the matter is disputed, internal acts do not seem able to be directly prescribed, since obedience owed to man cannot exceed the mutual conversation of men, which is circumscribed by external things.

In doubts concerning power, the presumption stands for the Superior, at least when the matter belongs to the genus in which it is established that the Superior can command; in doubts concerning the honesty of the matter, if the Superior prescribes what is probably honorable, he seems to have to be obeyed, though Lessius is contrary, c. 41, n. 76. In negative doubts, let the subject simply commit himself to the governance of Superiors.

— The proximate matter of the vow of obedience comprehends precepts strictly such, which are imposed on religious as such by force of dominative power or even of jurisdiction.⁽¹⁾ Precepts strictly such, that is, by which the Superior intends to oblige conscience; on religious as such, that is, precepts which are referred to their proper state, not to the common condition of citizens or the faithful, such as precepts concerning the observing of sacred times; by force of dominative power or even of jurisdiction, so that he also will have violated the vow who has transgressed a rule obliging under sin. Yet one must see how the vow is commonly understood in the religion of the one vowing. But violation of the special law of religious or of laws which have been made for religious does not seem contrary to the vow unless it brings forth properly so-called precepts.

In many religions today, the Superior is not judged properly to command, not even under light sin, through the very words: "I strictly prescribe"; "I enjoin under precept"; but it is necessary that he command in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of holy obedience, or by at least some other manner clearly express his will of obliging conscience.

Therefore he sins against the vow:

1. Who impedes the precepts themselves while he tries to withdraw himself from the dominion of Superiors in perpetuity or for a time: through apostasy, flight, or by illicitly procuring his own expulsion.

2. Who virtually violates the precepts when, even on the occasion of a simple command, he absolutely declares: "I do not wish to obey, I will not do it," understanding that of every matter or of some grave matter. If he limits it to a small matter, which seems to him useless or ridiculous, the violation will not have been grave.

3. Who violates a precept obliging under sin.

Violation of the vow of obedience is sacrilege; and besides, a sin, generally light, against observance toward the Superior to whose dominative power the religious is subject. If the Superior, which he is not presumed to do, has used his power of jurisdiction in commanding, the sin will also be opposed to that virtue to which the matter prescribed pertains.

⁽¹⁾ There are those (Suarez, Rel., tr. 7, l. 10, c. 2, n. 5; Sanchez, Dec., 4. 11, 25) who think that it remains entire for the Superior, when he prescribes by force of jurisdiction, either to urge or to omit the obligation of the vow. Rather, from our very definition of religious obedience, we would take away the opposite opinion from Lugo. Cf. Lugo, Paenit., 10, 172.

— An Opportune Manner of Prescribing. It pertains to the gentle governance of Superiors that they rarely induce the guilt of sin by their precepts. But a religious who does not obey the more broadly preceptive will of the prelate, although he is not a transgressor of his vow, nevertheless will offend observance toward the Superior, charity toward the community, and humility; and habitual disobedience of this kind does not seem to be excused from grave guilt, whether on account of the sadness by which it affects the Superior and Brothers, or on account of the common detriment which it effects, or on account of the danger of expulsion which it thus prepares. It is not rarely said to transgress the virtue of obedience, or obedience commonly so called. Yet the special virtue of obedience does not intervene here.

I say. The object of the vow of chastity, which is certainly more excellent than the vow of poverty, embraces two things, namely those things which are already prohibited by natural and divine law, and also those things which could be done licitly in legitimate matrimony. Therefore this is the efficacy of the vow of chastity: that what otherwise could be licit becomes illicit for a Religious; but those things which are prohibited to all, he must avoid from a double obligation, namely of chastity and of religion.

Question 1. Are sins of luxury, even merely internal ones, opposed to the vow of chastity?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the true and most common doctrine; because a Religious, by force of this vow, as this is commonly understood by Religious themselves, is held to abstain from every voluntary venereal delectation, which can be both internal and external. Therefore in whatever way he wounds chastity, he incurs a double guilt, namely of luxury and sacrilege. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 33.

Question 2. What is the gravity of sins committed against the vow of chastity?

Resp. This general rule must be established: the gravity of sin against the vow is exactly the same as against the sixth and ninth precept of the Decalogue; namely, a sin against religion is mortal or venial according as it is mortal or venial against chastity. But smallness of matter is not to be admitted in sins of sought or admitted luxury, nor can the fault be light except from imperfect consent, according to those things which have been said elsewhere.

Question 3. Whether, or what, is the difference between the virtue and the vow of chastity?

Resp. There is no distinction by reason of object, since the vow extends as widely as the virtue itself. Nevertheless they differ in this, that in those things which are prohibited by virtue there are two sins if the vow is violated, while one sin is committed in that which is interdicted by the vow alone. For if someone bound by a simple vow of chastity contracted marriage, he would commit one sin, namely against religion, in the use of marriage. Therefore sometimes the vow can be violated without the virtue itself being wounded.

I. QUESTION I. What is the vow of religious chastity? ANSWER. It is a perpetual abstinence from every venereal act, both internal and external. Priests sinning against this vow increase the malice on account of the twofold title or bond by which priests are bound to preserving chastity. The observance of this vow depends very much upon modesty of the eyes, upon solitude, upon mortification of the flesh, and upon the declining of idleness. Wherefore every Religion prescribes fasts, temperance of food, and other virtues more or less as a safeguard of chastity. They renounce riches, that they may preserve their soul immune from affection for money. They are separated from the world, that, every occasion being taken away, they may more easily guard that chastity which Christians themselves are bound to observe, whether virginal or matrimonial, in the midst of the snares of the world and amid the very prestiges of women. A look at venery and a deliberate lustful delight thrust down into Hell a Christian and a religious man equally, with a difference only in the circumstance of sacrilege.

II. This virtue is carried like the most limpid crystal in a putrid and muddy body. Most easily is the bitumen kindled and the fire of luxury burns, and sulphurous exhalations obscure the candour of chastity, unless it be guarded by assiduous vigilance. Concupiscence is a dire wild beast, which always roars and machinates revolutions. If at the outset it be restrained by a heroic spirit, and bridled by continual custody, a victory of this kind is easy. Never nevertheless is it to be trusted, since it weaves its rebellion out of craft and from ambush. Preachers and confessors above all must needs be vigilant. For these by reason of their ministry frequently address women. From spiritual conversations the beginning is taken; but unless the highest caution be employed, all things fall away into the flesh. Confessors have their own spiritual daughters, with whom they weave familiar discourses. That virginal and at the same time womanly breath, those warm sighs, and the familiarity of a spiritual paternity with a spiritual daughter are to be fled as the hiss of a basilisk. Women are to be handled no otherwise than persons infected with plague. Let spiritual nourishment be held out, and let separation forthwith succeed; otherwise the pest of luxury sends in its enchantments. But since there are innumerable books which treat this argument more fully, therefore I abstain from further discourse.

III. QUESTION II. To what is a Regular bound by reason of the vow of obedience? ANSWER. The vow of obedience is an oblation of one's own will made to God, while a Regular promises to obey his superiors in all those things which they shall command according to his own rule. Wherefore a Regular is bound under grave fault to the precepts of superiors. When a superior does not command, but only wishes and exhorts, even if a subject do not obey, he does not on that account violate the vow of obedience, because he transgresses no precept. But the precepts of superiors must be of a grave matter.

IV. Four conditions the holy Doctors commonly require for exact obedience: 1. That there be a prompt execution of that which is commanded; 2. That the interior will accede to the external execution; 3. That a subject submit his own judgment in a doubtful or controverted matter to the judgment of his superior; 4. That, the superior's will being known, a precept is not to be awaited, but that which the superior desires is to be fulfilled. These conditions nevertheless are required for the greater perfection of obedience, but not for the nature of the same virtue. For this, and that a sin at least a grave one be avoided, it is enough that in fact the subject obey and execute the imposed precept. It is nevertheless to be adverted that superiors sometimes suspend precepts that they may avoid scandal, because they foresee subjects by no means prepared for fulfilling the precept. And then subjects who afford these arguments for resisting the mandates of superiors are in a bad state, and can sin mortally, the gravity of the thing to be commanded being regarded. For in these things the circumstances are to be regarded.

V. Superiors can by right command all those things which are contained within the confines of the Rule and Constitutions, or which even indirectly conduce to the preservation and decorum of the Rule and of the Religion. Prelates can also forbid those things which tend to the violating of their own laws, and command other things which gravely expedite the observation of the Rule and Constitutions. Wherefore a superior can command, necessity urging, that subjects serve Religious and minister the sacraments to Christians infected with plague, chiefly if the Religious profess an Order instituted for procuring the salvation of neighbours.

VI. In a doubtful matter a subject is bound to obey a superior commanding, because possession stands for the superior, as theologians commonly teach. Certain Probabilists contend that subjects having on their side an opinion even less probable are free from the obedience to be furnished, although the opposite opinion be more probable and stand for the superior. And so they are compelled to teach, the probabilistic system being admitted. Hence indeed it appears more luculently how seditious and pernicious Probabilism is to the authority of superiors and to good government.

VII. Superiors on the contrary can command nothing above or contrary to the Rule. A subject nevertheless is not the lawful judge whether that which the Prelate enjoins be against or above the Rule, unless the thing be evident. General Chapters can prescribe and establish new statutes also, which may increase the decorum of the Order and more strongly confirm regular observance. To prefectures also to be accepted and undertaken Prelates can by right urge their subjects with their precepts; otherwise as to accepting dignities or a bishopric outside the Order.

VIII. Regulars sin gravely either while they refuse to fulfil the precept of a superior, or while they contemn his voice, or while they resist him reforming abuses and corruptions brought in against the Rule and Constitutions. They sin venially if they neglect to commit to execution those things which they know to be prescribed by a superior, although not under precept — as when they inculcate the observance of the Rule and Constitutions. And although Constitutions by their own nature do not oblige to fault, yet in fact they are never deliberately violated without some venial fault. But those who from habit and custom transgress them indiscriminately dispose themselves to a tacit contempt, and sin against the precept of aspiring to perfection.

IX. Superiors who dissemble transgressions of the Rule and Constitutions, who neglect to correct and hinder the same with all their strength, either from torpor and negligence or from a certain connivance, sin mortally, as Diana, the Salmanticenses, La Croix, and others commonly teach. For Superiors are destined by their office to the custody of the laws and to the promoting of the observance of the whole discipline. Their negligence in hindering transgressions inflicts a most grave detriment upon Religion. For hence proceed most grave absurdities, and hence have flowed all the relaxations of the sacred Orders. For upon these transgressions there succeed violations of the vows, scandals, the loss of chastity, and the pest of property.

You have the INCORRUPTIBLE Lily of Chastity, at once fragrant with the odor of purity and aflame with the ardor of heavenly things, in the Seraphic Doctor in the Dieta, tit. 4. cap. 4., where he pours forth the snowy leaves of this most beautiful flower, and the kindled crocus glinting among golden grains, into the chastity of the body and the cleanness of the mind; for unless the mind, kindled within by divine ardor, be made clean, in vain is chastity boasted of outwardly in the body: on account of this twofold purity of heart, and of flesh, Chastity is compared in the Songs to a garden enclosed, and a fountain sealed, as the Saintly Doctor notes at the place cited; for as nothing enters a well-closed garden except from on high, so into a chaste soul entrance plainly opens only from above, from Heaven: this closing of the soul is obtained especially by cloistered Chastity. I shall treat, therefore, here of this most preeminent dowry of the heavenly spouse, insofar as it is consecrated by Vow; but below, where I treat of temperance, I shall weigh it as a virtue moderating pleasure about touch. Here also I shall add certain things on the observance of the Cloister, which is the guardianship of Chastity.

The FIRST opinion is of certain Theologians, and of almost all the Canonists, whom Suarez lib. 9. on the vow of chastity reports, with Sancio lib. 7. disp. 27.: that the difference between the chastity professed by Clerics and by Religious is this: that the obligation of the latter is by force of the vow, but of the former by the virtue of an Ecclesiastical statute alone.

The SECOND opinion is that of D. Bonaventure, and of as many Ecclesiastical writers as wrote on the 37th distinction of the Sentences: that Ecclesiastical Chastity differs from that which is vowed solemnly in Cloisters in that the former is at once by reason of the statute and of an implicit vow; the latter, however, arises from an explicit vow alone. To this opinion Suarez subscribes at the place cited, Azor. tom 1. lib. 7. cap. 12. question 6. Vasquez tom. 3. on the 3. part, disp. 246. cap. 3. Sancius loc. cit., to whom add others reported everywhere by these authors.

I ASSERT with this opinion that Religious chastity differs from Ecclesiastical in this: that the latter had its origin from the statute of the Church, but now draws its obligation both from a vow and from the precept of the Church: but Religious Chastity has its origin and progress from solemn and express profession.

It is PROVED by the Saintly Doctor here in the body, and in the doubts litt. by an efficacious reason, which the others who hold this opinion bring forward: He who receives the habit of Religion without any further express promise vows implicitly the chastity annexed to such a habit; therefore he who receives the Clerical order, to which perpetual continence is annexed by precept, vows it implicitly.

It is PROVED secondly from S. Bonaventure: where there intervenes a spontaneous promise, and the precept of a superior, there is found a twofold obligation, of vow and of statute; But in the continence of clerics there is a spontaneous promise, and a precept. The minor is proved by D. Bonavent. foundation 3., where he reports from Gregory, as is had in the letter: Let Bishops presume to make no Subdeacon except one who has promised that he will live chastely: Therefore the Saintly Doctor infers, he who promises himself into the hand of the Bishop vows continence: Hence of old they were not promoted to sacred Orders except those who, asked about keeping chastity, would promise it, as is clear from the Second Council of Arles cap. 2. Toledo II, cap. 1. Orange I. can. 22.

MOREOVER, in a Cleric the violation of Chastity has the malice of sacrilege, not precisely by reason of the Order — otherwise the Presbyters of the Eastern Church would be guilty of sacrilege as often as they approached their wives, which S. Bonaventure here in the body disapproves, since they use them licitly; nor yet precisely by reason of the precept, because thus only disobedience is committed: Therefore this malice is by reason of the Vow.

ADD that many Canons speak of the solemnization of the vow through the reception of Order, as Suarez notes after the Saintly Doctor in the body at the place cited, cap. 17. num. 4., as is clear from cap. unico on the vow, in 6., where a twofold solemn vow is enumerated, namely one of Order; another of Profession.

HENCE you have that in reality there is no difference between the Chastity of Clerics and of Religious, except that the former vow it implicitly, and by annexation; but these expressly, and with a certain principal intention.

There is however one notable difference: that from the beginning of the Church, the vow of religious chastity not only impeded a marriage to be contracted, but severed one already contracted; not so the Chastity annexed to the order made, as Bellarmine proves at the place cited, citing Suarez.

Likewise, that Religious Chastity is of such virtue that, while it is vowed, it dissolves a ratified marriage; not so the Chastity of sacred Order, nor even of the Episcopate itself; as is clear in the sole Extravag. on the vow under Ioan. XXII., as also all Theologians hold with D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 27. The reason of this difference shines forth principally from the will of the Church, which, as it could determine one, so also the other, and with the stronger right, because the Clerical state, at least in the Episcopate, is more perfect than the Monastic profession.

There are nevertheless several congruences why Chastity, which one vows in sacred Orders, is not of such efficacy as it is in Religion, for dissolving a ratified and unconsummated marriage. The first is taken from the repugnance of the Religious state with the use of marriage; since it makes its professor dead to the world: not so the Ecclesiastical state.

The second is taken from the perpetual tending of the Religious toward perfection, which would be too much retarded by the use of a wife. But Order, although out of the reverence due to it it requires separation from carnal acts, nevertheless does not of itself place man on the way, and in the tending, toward the state of perfection; and so it was not fitting that it should dissolve the bond of a ratified marriage; and although the Episcopate be at the very summit of perfection both exercised and acquired, since nevertheless it does not prescribe of itself the means for acquiring perfection, but only for exercising it; hence it is that it has not the virtue of vowing chastity to the prejudice of a ratified marriage; add that in Episcopal, or Priestly ordination no civil death intervenes through the abdication of one's own will.

There are also several other accidental differences in the modes, and means, by which the Chastity of either state is preserved unsullied, which are evident in practice.

The first part of this question is easily resolved from what we said in the preceding disputation, question 30, where we abundantly elucidated the mind of the Seraphic Doctor on this matter; who, although he was most devoted to religious Chastity, does not nevertheless defend its indispensability with such tenacity as to deny that it can be released by the supreme power of the Pontiff, when a cause of greater benefit intervenes; see also what we said in the same disputation about the nature of a dispensation; whether it is a relaxation of the law, or rather a declaration; for from these one may easily conjecture whether some grave cause ought to precede a dispensation, so that it may be done licitly and validly.

This difficulty Suarez also solves in the same way, by referring to what he had said about the solemnity of vows, so that a valid consequence might allow arguing from genus to species; for if the Pontiff can dispense in solemn profession, which contains the three vows under itself, no one will doubt that he can also dispense in those vows.

But there turns upon the pivot of greater difficulty the question there treated by Suarez, cap. 26., namely whether, the other vows remaining, religious chastity can be dispensed in one or another act; a knot indeed hard to untie, and which therefore perhaps almost no Doctor has touched, as num. 7. intimates Suarez. But he, having premised the foundations of the negative opinion, which we lightly touched upon for the dispensation of solemn vows in the places already cited, concludes for the affirmative, persuaded by the example of the military religion, whose solemn virginal chastity was changed into conjugal.

But that example, as Suarez himself admits in the same place, militates for those who made profession after that institution, not however for the dispensation of those who had previously vowed religious and integral chastity solemnly, as is clear from the Bulls of Paul III and Gregory XIII.

Whatever indeed may be said of this opinion, which I remit to be discussed by a better judgment, those reasons can hardly be persuaded which Suarez heaps up at length, who admits two things which strongly impugn him, namely that the three solemn vows are of the essence of the religious state, among which Chastity will yield the last place to none, and no one will count conjugal chastity among those vows; then he confesses that this partial solution of a solemn vow suffers no small diminution of the religious state; whence someone may thus argue: By any addition, or subtraction of those things which pertain to the essence of any thing, the whole essence itself is lost, as is Aristotle's constant rule, who therefore says that essence is after the manner of a number, which with any unit added or subtracted passes wholly into another species, as is evident of itself; but not slightly is something subtracted from the essence of the Religious state, while its chiefest and purest vow, in one or another act, is not only mutilated, but changed wholly into another species: for as he who licitly consummates matrimony, although he excel in every chastity, no longer possesses virginal chastity; because they are two species, of which one is lost by the approach of the other. So, etc.

QUOD if the Pontiff should decree something similar, which we do not yet note as decreed, it would rather be a dispensation of the whole state for a brief time, and its subsequent reintegration; whence no inconvenience would follow.

QUOAD the other part of the question, it is resolved from those words of Boniface VIII, indicating that enclosure be kept, unless a grave cause intervene, and the special license of him to whom it pertains. For there are certain monasteries of nuns immediately subject to the Pontiff himself, who alone can dispense both in these and in the others absolutely and in perpetuity; Bishops, however, for the time being and for a reasonable cause, can dispense in enclosures subject to them, as the Council of Trent enjoins, sess. 25. de regularibus, cap. 5. in those words, without the license of the Bishop or superior, obtained in writing: and a little after: but the Bishop or superior alone ought to grant license in necessary cases, nor can anyone else in any way, etc. He says, however, the Bishop or superior, because certain monasteries are subject to Bishops as well as to regular prelates; and under the name of Bishop is comprehended his Vicar general, provided however that he have a special mandate for this, as the Congregation of Cardinals declares and modifies, cited by Suarez cap. 10. num. 11. tom. 4. de relig. lib. 1. de obligationibus religios. whence it is clear that this power is delegable, and therefore ordinary in the Bishop, under whose name comes also the Chapter during a vacant see, just as secular Abbots, holding a quasi-episcopal power in the monasteries subject to them.

DE Regular prelates, to whose direction certain exempt nuns are committed, this same thing is certain, since they are truly their superiors, and since the Council says the Bishop, as superior; for the verification of either part suffices for the truth of a disjunctive proposition; whence if license be necessary for entering, the approval alone of the regular prelate suffices; but if it be required for going out, the cause must be approved by the Bishop; since going out demands a graver cause, and sometimes redounds to public scandal, which the Bishop is bound to avert; see Suarez num. 11.

FURTHERMORE, although the Council uses the disjunctive particle vel, it does not however follow from this that the Bishop can dispense, or grant license for entering or leaving, monasteries whose care the Regulars have; otherwise these also could in turn render the like to them; whence not a few, nor small, inconveniences would follow; as Suarez well observed num. 15. Therefore the particle vel is to be understood according to an accommodation of division, that each may share and divide his own power; yet if it be otherwise established by custom, that be observed; since in a certain declaration of the Cardinals, cited by Suarez, it was so provided.

BY the name of regular prelate, more properly comes the Provincial, since he has power as it were episcopal; yet if others by force of rule, constitution, or custom have the care and jurisdiction over the Nuns, they will be superiors accordingly, and according to the mind of the Council will be able to dispense.

OTHER several things remain to be said about enclosure, concerning which Bonacina wrote an entire treatise, and Suarez also treats diffusely of the same matter: But since these are of no such weight, and are easily deduced from what has already been said, I remit the reader to the aforesaid Authors, and to others cited by them: What remains to be discussed concerning Chastity, below; where I shall examine it more fitly under Temperance.

Catherine, a professed nun in a certain religious Congregation, confesses with great difficulty and after many evasions that she sinned against the second vow by indulging in evil thoughts and also by touching herself immodestly. From her other statements Titius, the confessor, gathers that she sometimes procured an emission of semen, as she asserts, in no way for the purpose of taking pleasure but only to allay itching. Having heard this, Titius tells her that in such matters it is sufficient to confess the immodest touching. Hence it is asked:

1. What is the object of the religious vow of chastity, and does it comprehend internal acts?

2. Is there a specifically distinct sin of self-pollution both among men and among women?

3. Is it ever lawful to procure an emission of semen outside the use of marriage?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is the object of the vow of religious chastity, and does it include internal acts?

“ It is so well established among all that by the vow of chastity, by reason of religion, not only external acts of lust but also every internal act is forbidden, that it is unnecessary to dwell upon it.,” says Lehmkuhl (I, n. 687).

2. Is there a specifically distinct sin of masturbation both among men and among women?

“ Even in women there is an emission which differs specifically from incomplete venereal pleasure, and therefore must be distinctly accused in confession. Thus we opine with the common doctrine, even of the more recent authors,” says Génicot (I. n. 396).

3. Is it ever lawful to procure an emission of semen outside the use of marriage?

Insofar as a voluntary emission of semen outside marital intercourse is gravely and intrinsically evil, it is never lawful directly to procure it.

4. In the case. In order to fully confess, Catharina should declare how often she has indulged in evil thoughts, and how often she has touched herself impudently. She sought the emission of semen or full sexual pleasure to relieve itching, not to obtain pleasure. However, as far as the emission of semen was directly sought as a means to the end, and that means is intrinsically and gravely evil, Catharina committed a mortal sin. Lehmkuhl says (I, p. 586), nota: “ According to St. Alphonsus (III, 476), all condemn as mortal sin not only permitting pollution but procuring or intending it, even if it were done for the sake of health or of preserving life. Therefore the distinction between physiological and moral pollution, as though only the latter, which is done for the sake of pleasure, were unlawful, while the former were lawful if the intention and approval of pleasure were absent, is plainly excluded.”

From what has been said it follows by itself it is insufficient even for women to confess only an impure touch when complete venereal pleasure has been admitted. Nevertheless, a woman a confessor is not required to interrogate a woman who confesses an impure touch whether she committed pollution for, as Génicot says, citing Berardi: “Berardi rightly writes (Practice of Confessors, no. 851): ‘When a penitent says, “I touched myself,” if it is established that the person truly touched himself or herself lustfully, it must be presumed that the act was carried through to its natural end; hence (whether men or women are in question) I would say that questions about this matter can be omitted.’ It is true that some interrupt the act, even though they began it lustfully; but it cannot thence be concluded that confessors are obliged, for each and every person who confesses having touched himself or herself, to add questions in ordinary confessions about this interruption itself.”

1 Génicot, vol. i, n. 396.