Whispering (Tale-bearing)

(St. Thomas, II-II, q. 74; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book V, n. 72.)

I. Notion. Whispering is evil backbiting directed to dissolving true or ordered friendship. The whisperer and the detractor intend to take away reputation.

"They differ," says the Angelic Doctor, "in the end, because the detractor intends to blacken the reputation of the neighbor; whence he chiefly brings forward those evils about the neighbor from which the neighbor can be defamed, or at least his reputation diminished; but the whisperer intends to separate friendship ... and therefore the whisperer brings forward such evils about the neighbor as can move the mind of the hearer against him, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus 28: 'A sinful man will trouble friends, and in the midst of those having peace he will cast enmity'" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 74, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, V, 72).

II. Morality. 1. Whispering is opposed to charity and is a grave sin; indeed it is graver than detraction and insult. It is opposed to charity because it deprives the neighbor of a good. It is a grave sin, which is clear both from Sacred Scripture,¹ and from the fact that it deprives the neighbor of a grave good. It is graver than detraction and insult, because it takes away from the neighbor a good which is greater than reputation and honor (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 74, a. 2; St. Alphonsus, V, 72). Yet it can be venial on account of slightness of matter, for example if it is apt only to lessen friendship a little.

2. To whispering there is added a sin of injustice if it is done by an unjust means, as by detraction or unjust revelation of a secret; but in that case it obliges to restitution properly so called, as is clear (St. Alphonsus, V, loc. cit.).

What if someone deprives another of acquired friendship, using a means not unjust in itself, for example by manifesting natural defects publicly known?

Response. Many judge that in the case there is sin only against charity, not against justice; neither by reason of the good, i.e. friendship, since it is not owed from justice; nor by reason of the means, for in this case this is not unjust. But with St. Alphonsus and others it seems it must be said that there is sin also against justice, because if there is question of a good already acquired, no one, as it seems, can without injustice cooperate in any way toward deprivation of the good; to deprive him of such a good belongs only to him who continuously and gratuitously grants that good (St. Alphonsus, V, loc. cit.).

¹ Ecclus. VI, 15; XXVIII, 15; Rom. I, 29, 30.

Whispering or Tale-Bearing.—Whispering (susurratio), also called mischief-making and tale-bearing, is a speech unfavorable to another person secretly made with the purpose of breaking up a virtuous friendship.

(a) It is unfavorable speech, that is, the whisperer says something to his listener that will turn the latter against the person spoken about. The thing attributed to the absent person may be either something evil or something that is only seemingly evil, but in either case it will be something displeasing to the listener. Whispering, therefore, does not necessarily include defamation.

(b) It is secret, that is, the whisperer speaks privately, and usually in the way of confidence to the person whose mind he wishes to impress. Often, however, he goes now to one of the friends, now to another, speaking in different senses to each, to make his work doubly effective. This kind of whisperer is known as double-tongued: “The whisperer and the double-tongued is accursed” (Ecclus., xxviii. 15).

(c) It is aimed at the breaking up of a friendship, that is, the whisperer intends to destroy the feeling of respect and affection which his listener has for the absent person, or even to instill into the listener’s mind a feeling of disrespect and dislike for the absent person. Whispering, therefore, is incomplete when it ends a friendship, and complete when it makes enemies of those who had been friends and sows discords and quarrels: “A passionate man kindleth strife, and a sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace” (Ecclus., xxviii. 11); “When the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease” (Prov., xxvi. 20). Whispering, then, differs from simple defamation, whose purpose is to steal away fame, for the mischief-maker intends to steal away friendship.

(d) It is directed against a virtuous friendship, for there is no sin but rather an act of charity in the effort to end a sinful or harmful friendship, as when a parent tries to keep his daughter away from a wicked man with whom she is infatuated, or his son away from a disorderly set whose companionship appeals to the youth (see 1353).

The Sinfulness of Whispering.—(a) Theological Species.—Whispering is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is hateful to God (the soul of the Lord detesteth “him that soweth discord among brethren,” Prov., vi. 19), and deprives man of the boon of a virtuous friendship, the greatest of external goods. “A faithful friend is a strong defence, and he that hath found him hath found a treasure. Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and silver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity. A faithful friend is the medicine of life and immortality” (Ecclus., vi. 14-16). Whispering is a greater sin than contumely or defamation, since honor is less esteemed than friendship, and reputation is only a means to friendship.

(b) Moral Species.—Generally, whispering is a sin against justice on account of the unjust means (e.g., force, fraud, lies, detractions) to which it resorts; but from its nature it is only a sin against charity, for the injured party has no strict right to friendship, which is a free relationship that may be terminated at will by either of the parties.

Circumstances Which Affect the Species of Whispering.—Is the species of whispering changed by circumstances?

(a) The theological species is changed when the sinful act is imperfect in malice (e.g., when the whisperer had not reflected well on the evil that would be caused by him), or when the harm done is slight (e.g., when no enmity was caused and the friendship broken up was not strong or important to the friends). It is not a small matter, however, to destroy friendships that are very necessary, such as the friendship between husband and wife, between parent and child.

(b) The moral species is not subdivided, for, though there are different kinds of friendships (see 1111), whispering is not directed against the special features, but against the general character common to all of them, namely, unity of soul and mutual affection. Hence, the whisperer is not obliged to mention in confession whether the friendship he broke up was based on utility, or pleasure, or virtue. It is clear, however, that a new species may be added to whispering. Thus, he who separates husband and wife, intending to secure the wife for himself, is guilty also of adultery; he who separates a business man and his patrons, intending to attract the trade to himself, is guilty also of theft; he who separates ruler and subjects by his whispering, is also guilty of sedition, etc.

1. Anastasius, greatly desiring to think and judge well of all, experiences on the contrary in himself a continual inclination to judging badly of others. And this is altogether vehement when evil indications appear, which, although absolutely they could be taken in a good sense, nevertheless he is inclined to take them in a bad sense from a certain judgment which spontaneously arises in his mind, namely that matters are not to be considered speculatively and in the abstract, but practically and in the concrete, not according to the possibility of the same matters, but according to the depraved nature of men.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Anastasius does not seem to be accused of grave sin; since he does not form a rash judgment concerning persons, but only has some suspicion, which, with attention to the subjective disposition of Anastasius deliberately to think and judge well of all, is rather indeliberate than at least fully voluntary. Besides, the aforesaid suspicion of Anastasius in particular cases does not seem altogether rash, since it arises from those evil indications. Nor truly, speaking per se, is suspicion a mortal sin.

For “in those things which are mortal sins from their genus, imperfect movements are not mortal sins, but venial. For adultery is mortal, namely when the will is complete, but not when it is incomplete; for not every movement of concupiscence is a mortal sin. But judgment is twofold, concerning things and concerning persons. Judgment concerning things is always a mortal sin, say to say that giving alms is evil. But judgment concerning persons, although sometimes it is false, nevertheless is not always a sin, except when it is altogether rash.... But when from a slight matter a firm judgment proceeds in the heart, sometimes it is a mortal sin, because it is with contempt of neighbor; but suspicion is something imperfect in the genus of judgment, and therefore is an imperfect movement, and therefore it is not mortal from its genus; although if it is done from hatred, it will sometimes be mortal.” S. Th. Quodl. 12. a. 34. But Anastasius is far from hatred. Therefore he is by no means to be disturbed as guilty of grave sin. — S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3; I. M. 1483.

Nevertheless that judgment of Anastasius, which spontaneously arises in his mind, is certainly not the right rule of judging, in doubt, concerning the malice of others. For from this very thing, that someone has an evil opinion concerning another without sufficient cause, he unduly contemns him, and consequently affects him with injury. But no one ought to contemn another, or inflict any harm whatever, without a sufficient compelling cause. And therefore where manifest indications do not appear concerning the malice of someone, we ought to hold him as good, by interpreting what is doubtful in the better part. But it would be otherwise if there were question of applying a remedy to some evil: for then, in order that the remedy be applied more safely, it is expedient that that which is worse be supposed, because a remedy which is efficacious against a greater evil is much more efficacious against a lesser evil. But to suppose is not determinately and definitively to judge evil concerning others. S. Th. 2.2. q. 60. a. 3, 4; I. M. 1485.

2. Aquilinus, in order often to excite the languishing conversation of friends, narrates the sayings and deeds of some persons, whence grave detraction against the reputation of others follows; but since he himself does not intend that, nor, as he himself says, does he narrate these things from an evil mind, he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin. But he has contracted so strong a habit of detracting from the reputation of others that sometimes he scarcely even adverts that the things which he reports can bring grave harm to others.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Aquilinus is guilty of detraction at least in cause. For it is evident that he himself sufficiently knows the depraved habit contracted, which he ought to strive efficaciously to uproot. By reason of actual inadvertence he can sometimes be excused from actual grave fault. For detraction can easily be venial not only on account of lightness of matter, or slight damage inflicted on the neighbor, but also on account of defect of sufficient advertence, on account of the sudden impulse of passion.

“Sins of speech,” says S. Th. 2.2. q. 73. a. 3, “have some lightness, insofar as they easily proceed from a slip of the tongue without great premeditation.” But Aquilinus is not to be excused from grave sin from the fact that without the intention of harming others, but from mere lightness of mind, he gravely detracts from others. For it makes no difference that detraction is not directly intended; it suffices that it is implicitly willed, namely if those things are advertently said from which detraction arises.

3. Guido constantly speaks about Iulius, and constantly reports his slight defects, which he sometimes exaggerates, at one time adverting that what he says is not true, at another almost inadvertently from his very slippery loquacity. Nevertheless Guido thinks himself immune at least from mortal sin, because in truth he says and manifests only slight things, and this seems to him to be done by himself without a malicious mind. — Does Guido sin gravely?

R. It can easily happen that Guido sins gravely. For by this very fact, that Guido reflexively considers his manner of speaking, whence he thinks himself at least immune from grave sin, that Iulius, concerning whom he speaks so easily and freely, does not seem to be any common person whatever, but a person of some note, and to whom perhaps grave damage can thereby be brought. Wherefore, for rendering a definitive judgment, it is necessary that Guido expose the personal conditions of Iulius. For if grave harm is brought to Iulius as to reputation, or even as to temporal goods from that manner of speaking, there is no doubt that Guido sins gravely both against charity and against justice. That he himself does not speak thus from a malicious mind does not of itself excuse from grave sin, objectively speaking, just as it does not impede real grave damage. Therefore Guido perhaps could then be excused from grave sin, but only on account of his subjective ignorance and some good faith. Nevertheless, without doubt, if in truth he gravely injures the reputation of Iulius and brings him some other grave damage, he himself is placed in a grave illusion. G. 427, 428; I. M. 1487, 1488.

4. Menander, a servant, was dismissed by his master Balduinus because of a hidden theft. When Lord Martinus wished to take Menander as a servant in his house, he asks Balduinus whether Menander is honest and faithful. Balduinus then opens to him the reason on account of which he dismissed him.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Balduinus could, without detraction, manifest the theft of Menander to Martinus. There was present a grave and sufficient reason for such manifestation, namely the grave damage of Martinus to be averted. In truth, the grave defects of others and grave sins can generally be manifested to some person, if this is done from a grave reason of averting grave damage, whether temporal or spiritual, from some community, or family, or private person. For then those whose defects and sins are revealed no longer have a right that they not be uncovered with the damage of others. Others also have a right, and a prevailing one, to avert damage of this sort from themselves; to whose right in the Case the right to one’s own reputation yields, for this right cannot exist with the injury of others.

Hence also a maidservant, e.g., who has left a master depraved in morals and dangerous to maids, can warn another maid who, ignorant of the matter and in good faith, is arranging to devote her services to the same master. Hence also generally someone can reveal the defects and sins of another by reason of grave damage of his own or of another to be impeded, although in this way a marriage is impeded, or the obtaining of an inheritance, or the obtaining of another benefice. — I. M. 1494; G. 426, 427.

5. Alexius, whatever evil he hears concerning others, in familiar conversation with his friends and companions, is accustomed at once to report to others. Hence it happens that discords and dissensions arise among friends and companions, and since no one dares to manifest to others the cause of his own displeasure, Alexius easily enjoys the friendship and confidence of all, and dominates all despotically. Alexius, adverting his own malice, often confesses that he has detracted from the reputation of his neighbor, nevertheless adding that the matter was of little importance, and was done rather for the sake of laughter and jest than with a malicious mind. Whence, easily receiving absolution, he frequently receives the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Alexius is to be numbered among whisperers, an abominable race of men, since secretly they sow discords among brothers and friends. How many evils whisperers cause in families, in colleges, in seminaries, in religious communities, cannot easily be said. A whisperer and a double-tongued man is accursed; for he will disturb many who have peace. Eccli. 28:15. But Alexius, speaking per se, does not sufficiently confess his sin, or rather his continual sins. For the sin is not light, but grave, although perhaps the matter of detraction is light, by reason, namely, of the depraved effect gravely evil and harmful, i.e., of the grave displeasure engendered in the souls of his friends and brothers against friends and brothers, and of grave dissension and discord arisen among them. Alexius perhaps deceives himself in this so grave and delicate matter; but a prudent confessor ought not be content with so superficial a confession. Nor truly does Alexius sufficiently explain his sin by saying that he detracted from the reputation of his neighbor. For whispering is of a diverse species and graver than detraction. S. Th. 2.2. q. 74. a. 2; I. M. 1486.

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What intention is required in adults for receiving the individual sacraments? - In baptism and order there is required at least a habitual explicit will. The reason is that sacraments of this kind impose grave obligations to be fulfilled. But no one is judged to receive a grave obligation; rather, his positive will must be altogether clear. Lugo d. 9, n. 119, 127; L. 81, 82. The sacrament of baptism and of order is indeed invalidly conferred on those having only interpretative intention. Nevertheless Coninck, Sporer, Dicastillo, etc., apud Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 168, and others judge that for receiving baptism an implicit intention contained in contrition or attrition had by the recipient suffices, or, as Lugo d. 9, n. 130 says, in the will of giving one's name to the Christian Religion, or, if he is ignorant of this, of doing whatever things are necessary for salvation, as La Croix has it, l.c. Cf. L. 82. This indeed can have place in urgent necessity, but baptism must then be conferred conditionally, and therefore repeated conditionally if time allows, unless there is certainty concerning a true and explicit intention not retracted. Cf. S. C. de P. F., March 30, 1898.

In confirmation, extreme unction, and the Eucharist, a habitual implicit will suffices, which is less rightly called interpretative, and which consists in this, that someone has had a general intention, and has not retracted it, of applying those things which are necessary and useful for his salvation; or of living and dying in the Catholic religion, with the helps of the same religion; or, a fortiori, of receiving all the sacraments in life and at death. The reason is that these sacraments bring many advantages and no disadvantage. But all are judged to wish to receive advantages. Hence both confirmation and extreme unction can be conferred conditionally on a dying person deprived of his senses. Ritual, de Extr. unct. § 6; L. 82. But if he in reality had never thought of receiving them, they would have to be altogether repeated.

For penance there is required either actual or at least virtual intention; nor therefore does habitual intention suffice. The reason is that in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are required for the matter, and these indeed cannot be had without at least virtual will of receiving the sacrament.

L. 82. - Likewise for matrimony at least virtual intention is required. For "since each spouse is not only receiving, but also minister of the sacrament, in each of them there is certainly required that intention which is demanded in the ministers of the other sacraments." L. 82.

Fr. Lehmkuhl, ed. 11, n. 66, requires for the Eucharist, besides the case of viaticum, an expressed habitual intention. Yet ordinarily it is not only virtual, but even actual. The reason, he says, is that "in the general will of living a Christian life there is in no way contained the will of receiving the sacred Eucharist so many times and at such a time." - But if, besides the case of viaticum, it is a question of the Eucharist to be received from obligation, certainly that general will also implicitly contains this. And if that general will is conceived more determinately, namely of applying all the means constituted by God as necessary and useful for salvation, certainly this will would also implicitly include the Eucharist to be received from mere devotion. Finally, if the general will of dying in a Christian manner includes the will of receiving the sacraments of the Church at the point of death, why does the general will of living a Christian life not include the will of receiving Christ's sacraments during life? "Wherefore," the same Fr. Lehmkuhl concludes, "an adult to whom, besides the case of viaticum, the Holy Eucharist were given without his knowledge, would indeed receive it materially, but not with fruit." - But consequently to the things which have just been noted: if in the case of Viaticum the aforesaid adult would receive the sacred Eucharist sacramentally and with fruit, also outside that case he would receive it sacramentally and with fruit, if namely, as was said, he has its will at least implicitly.

395. Whispering (in French rapport, delation) is the manifestation of some saying or deed of another for disturbing peace and friendship among families or friends. Therefore it differs from detraction by reason of the end, because properly it intends not the blackening of the neighbor, but the sowing of discord; nevertheless it generally involves detraction or calumny, and therefore contains a twofold malice. - Whisperers in Scripture are called double-tongued, because they often use a double mode of speaking, conversing in one way before one person, in another way before another, so that they may more efficaciously sow the causes of quarrels.

396. Whispering is a grave sin from its kind, directly indeed against charity, but indirectly also, at least for the most part, against justice, insofar as it involves detraction or calumny. It is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it tends to destroy friendship, which is the greatest good, according to Scripture as witness: "A faithful friend is a strong protection: and he who has found him has found a treasure; there is no comparison to a faithful friend... a faithful friend is a medicine of life and immortality."¹ - Hence in the same place whispering is often reproved as a sin hateful to men and God, and worthy of death: "A whisperer shall defile his own soul, and in all things he shall be hated... The whisperer and the double-tongued are accursed: for he will disturb many having peace."² And elsewhere:¹ "Six things there are which the Lord hates, and the seventh His soul detests... him who sows discord among brothers"; wherefore, according to St. Paul,² whisperers are worthy of death. Therefore whispering is of itself a grave sin: "And therefore whispering is a greater sin than detraction, and also than contumely; because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved than to be honored."³

¹ Eccli., VI, 14-16.

² Eccli., XXI, 31; XXVIII, 15.

¹ Prov., VI, 16, 19.

² Rom., I, 29, 32.

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 74, a. 2.

But the sin is the graver the more intimate and more necessary the friendship is which is dissolved, and the worse the effects are which can be foreseen from this; therefore if friendship is dissolved between parents and children, or between spouses, or between defenders of the Catholic faith, and from this dissensions, quarrels, and other things of this kind can be foreseen, the sin is greater.

But he does not commit whispering who dissolves by counsels or fraternal correction a harmful or dangerous friendship.

434. [Original misprint: 432.] Whispering (oorblazerij) is evil and secret speech against one's neighbor for dissolving true friendship, or the manifestation of some saying or deed of another for disturbing peace and friendship among families or friends. It differs in species from detraction by reason of the end, because it properly does not intend the denigration of one's neighbor but the sowing of discord, although for the most part it contains detraction.

It is a sin against charity and against justice, not only when it uses unjust means as often happens, but always, because it takes away from another the good of friendship, for preserving which, once friendship has been entered, he has a strict right by reason of possession.

But it is a grave sin from its genus, because of itself it tends to destroying friendship and peace, which is the greatest good, with Scripture as witness (Eccli. VI, 14-16): "A faithful friend is a strong protection: but he who has found him has found a treasure; to a faithful friend there is no comparison... a faithful friend, a medicine of life and immortality."

"And therefore," says St. Thomas, q. 74, a. 2, "whispering is a greater sin than detraction, and also than contumely; because a friend is better than honor and to be loved than to be honored." For whispering deprives one of a greater good and brings greater harm. Hence in the Scriptures that sin is said to be hateful to God and men (Eccli. XXI, 31; XXVIII, 15; Prov. VI, 16-19), and worthy of death (Rom. I, 29, 32).

Hence a) it is graver according as the friendship which is dissolved is more intimate or more necessary, and according as worse effects are to be feared from it: thus it is very grave if discord is sown between spouses, between parents and children, among defenders of the Catholic faith, or if very great dissensions are foreseen;

b) on the contrary, it is not a sin to remove a friendship which is not true but harmful or dangerous, such as is had among thieves or with a concubine.

The Whisperer is also called two-tongued (bilinguis), since he subverts his neighbors on both sides by whisperings, as it were with two tongues: Of this Ecclesiasticus 28.: The whisperer and the two-tongued is cursed; for he will trouble many who were at peace.

Whispering (susurratio) is occult detraction against one's neighbor, by which discord could arise among friends. Thus it is taken from St. Thomas, art. 1.; Valencia, disput. 5. quaest. 18.; Soto, l. 5. de Iust. quaest. 11. art. 3.; Sayrus, l. 12. cap. 5.; Filliucius, Tomo 2. tract. 40. cap. 5. num. 135.; Fagundez, l. 8. cap. 12.. Most excellently the holy Doctor in the Opusc. explicatio sermonum Theology penetrates the formal element of whispering-detraction, defining it thus: Whispering is the will of speaking, sowing discords among brothers.

That formal whispering is a mortal sin the holy Doctor proves in the Speculum animae, cap. 1. §. Machinatio, at the end, from that Proverb 6.: Six are the things which the Lord hates, and the seventh his soul detests. He who sows discords among brothers.

That it is worse than theft, detraction, and contumely is proved by Tanner, disp. 4. quaest. 8. num. 152., from St. Bonaventure, serm. 10. de Apostolis, and St. Thomas, quaest. 74. art. 1., from that Ecclesiasticus 6.: There is no comparison with a faithful friend, nor a weighing of gold worthy [of him], nor of silver, that could resist the goodness of his fidelity. Hence this argument is drawn. A sin is the worse, the greater a good it takes away: but whispering takes away a greater good than theft, detraction, or contumely: Therefore. The minor is proved, for it takes away friendship, a most precious good above riches, reputation, and honor: Therefore also the vice destructive of friendship is the worst. The minor is proved secondly from St. Bonaventure, serm. 9. de Sanctis Apostolis: That is always better which is more like the better, from Aristotle 3. Top. cap. 2. loco 32., and l. 2. de caelo text. 66. But Christian friendship makes one like God in an exquisite manner; whence John 15.: In this shall they know that you are my disciples, if you have love one for another.

The minor is PROVED thirdly from St. Bonaventure, ibid.: The end is nobler than the things that are toward the end; but CHARITY is the end of human life: Therefore it is nobler than fame, honor, and riches, which are only means. St. Thomas confirms it with the Scriptures gathered together, Rom. 13.: Owe nothing to anyone, except that you love one another; Therefore the fullness of the law is love. Psalm 81.: I have said: You are gods, and sons of the Most High. St. John always insisted: Little children, love one another, and if this be done, it suffices.; many excellent things he adds also in the sermon on Saints Philip and James. The same he repeats on Luke 11.: Which of you has a friend.

In the first sermon on St. Bartholomew he adduces the saying of Tully in the Laelius de amicitia, and of Valerius Maximus, l. 4. cap. 7., who say that friendship is to be preferred to kinship, and Tully concludes: Friendship is to be preferred to all human things.

See the holy Doctor also in collation 18. on cap. 3. of John.

He shows THE SAME on Luke 16. in these words: I know what I shall do, where the steward preferred friends to riches, because a friend is the light of life, he is a treasure. Eccl. 6, on the contrary enmity is like darkness and death. 1 John 2.: He who hates his brother is in darkness. Therefore he who breaks friendship and introduces enmity is the worst. Therefore Ecclesiasticus 29.: Lose your money for a friend.

This sin is against justice, at least if it is contracted by deceit, fraud, lies, or the revelation of secrets: The reason is, because everyone has a right to this good, which is to be preferred to others. Thus Fagundez, cap. 12.; Filliucius, tract. 40. cap. 5. num. 137.

You will ASK: Whether it is lawful to whisper to a Prince or Prelate, so that I may succeed him in friendship in place of another, of whom he speaks ill.

It is ANSWERED that it cannot be done. Thus Soto, l. 5. quaest. 11. art. 1.; Salon., 2. 2. quaest. 74. art. 1.; Sayrus, l. 11. cap. 5. from num. 5.; Fagundez, l. 8. cap. 12. num. 6.

The REASON is, because one's own good is not a sufficient reason to deprive another of his right; otherwise it would be lawful to steal. Next it is against the natural precept, that we do not do to another what we would not want done to ourselves.

You will ASK: whether he who dissuades one who wishes to resign a benefice, or to bequeath goods to someone, so that he assign those goods to himself, is a Whisperer.

It is ANSWERED that if he does not proclaim him unworthy, and only exhorts, he does not sin according to Fagundez, because the other does not yet have a right to those goods.

I. Hatred of God is twofold: one which is included in every sin; the other peculiar, which is described as an aversion from God, by which the will detests God insofar as he prohibits sins and inflicts punishments. This hatred of God is the gravest of all crimes, since it is opposed to the most excellent virtue of charity according to its primary act, namely the divine love. It is by its kind mortal, nor does it admit the excuse of parvity of matter; but it can turn out venial only from imperfect deliberation.

II. Hatred of the neighbor is an expressed malevolence, by which we wish him evil. It is by its kind deadly; yet it can become venial, both by parvity of matter and by imperfect deliberation — as if you wish a light evil to your neighbor, or if with imperfect deliberation you desire it for him.

III. It is licit to abominate the sinner, as sinner, according to Proverbs 29: The just abominate a wicked man. For then the sin is hated, not the man. For it is never licit to wish evil to a man, insofar as it is his evil, even with an inefficacious affection; nor is it licit to be saddened over his good, or to rejoice over his evil, as is plain from the proscribed thesis of Innocent XI recounted in the preceding chapter.

IV. Although it is never licit either to desire or to rejoice over the neighbor's evil, it is nevertheless licit, with an inefficacious affection, to wish some temporal evil to another, and to rejoice over it, insofar as this temporal evil conduces to his spiritual good — for instance, that he desist from sin, that he be called back to a better way — as St. Thomas teaches, on the third book, distinction 30, article 1, ad 4. For charity has an order, and each one ought to love himself more than another, and his kin more than strangers, and friends more than enemies, and the common good of many more than the good of one.

One can, without violating charity, wish some temporal evil to another, or rejoice if it should happen — not insofar as it is his evil, but insofar as it is an impediment of evils to another whom one is more bound to love, or to the Community, or to the Church. Similarly of his temporal evil, according as by the evil of punishment the evil of fault is frequently prevented. Hence it is licit to wish for victory in a just war, for the destruction of the Turks, for the common good of the Church or of the Principality; it is licit to wish that a punishment be inflicted by the judge on a malefactor, that he desist from inflicting harm on the Community or on a neighbor. Yet the utmost vigilance is needed in desires of this kind, however inefficacious, lest under the appearance of the common good the cupidity of private vengeance lie hidden. Similarly it is never licit to wish a lesser evil to oneself or to others in order to avoid a greater. Wherefore they gravely sin who deliberately desire death for themselves in order to avoid other troubles.

V. Question I. Is it a sin to speak ill of one's neighbor? Answer. He who with deliberate mind imprecates a grave evil upon his neighbor sins mortally. Weak women, and base men, frequently burst forth into these imprecations, and, to excuse themselves, allege the impulse of anger, as though anger were not a sin. That anger can at times forestall reason is true; but frequently, from a depraved habit and from grave negligence in restraining anger, women and men break forth into such curses. They often say, when their anger has cooled, that they are displeased at having hurled such curses; but this is not a sign that they did not sin: for when the anger has been poured out, the mind perceives the evil it has committed, and therefore is then displeased. Parish priests and Confessors, then, should instruct such persons, and show them the necessity of curbing the savage beast of anger: since their frequent curses flow from a depraved habit of becoming angry. But this wicked habituation does not excuse them, but accuses them. That Confessors may be able to discern whether they have offended gravely or lightly, let them weigh all the circumstances, the deliberation of mind, the scandal, the gravity of the evil wished, and the rest of that kind.

VI. Question II. What is discord? Answer. It is a dissension of wills from the divine good and the good of the neighbor, in which they ought to agree. It is opposed to concord, which unites hearts and wills. By its kind it is a mortal sin. For God, Proverbs 6, detests him who sows discord among brethren. It is required, however, that someone knowingly dissent from the good of God or of the Neighbor, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 37, art. 1. Wherefore there is no discord when one, in good faith, judges that this pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Neighbor, and another judges otherwise. For this frequently happens even among the holier men themselves.

VII. Question III. What is contention? Answer. It is an altercation of words for impugning the truth; or it is an impugning of the truth with a confidence of clamor, as the Angelic Doctor says, II-II, q. 38, art. 1, where he opportunely adds: But if contention is called an impugning of falsity with a due measure of acrimony, then contention is praiseworthy. Acrimony must never be poured out upon persons, but only, with due sparingness, upon errors. This acrimony is like a seasoning, which must be used with great prudence and moderation, especially in vocal disputations. For when men dispute with mutual words, if they clamor with an immoderate outcry of voices, if they rub each other with mutual wit, the disputation easily ends in criminal contention, because the persons are present. But when errors are refuted in writing, often the authors of the errors are either dead or absent; therefore there is no danger of culpable contention. Hence it is that the mildest Fathers — Augustine, Bernard, and others — often used a style sprinkled with wit. For the reader is wearied by a cold reading; but, on the contrary, writing seasoned with a moderate pepper of acrimony sharpens his palate.

VIII. Question IV. What is Schism? Answer. It is a deliberate separation from the unity of the Church. Now he is separated from the Church who refuses either to communicate with her members, or to render due obedience to the Roman Pontiff, her visible head. Not every disobedient man is a schismatic, because pertinacity can be lacking. But every schismatic is disobedient; just as every heretic is a schismatic, but not conversely. Yet in practice these two crimes, schism and heresy, are scarcely separated, as St. Thomas teaches, II-II, q. 39, art. 1, ad 3.

IX. Question V. What is sedition? Answer. It is an aggressive war of one part of the Commonwealth against another part, or against its own Prince. It is by its kind a mortal sin, because it is gravely adverse to peace, to unity, and to the common good. Of war and duel I shall treat in explaining the fifth precept.